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Filed 2/23/23 P. v. Woods CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO WOODS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A166278

(San Francisco Super. Ct.

Nos. SCN197148, CRI02240071)

Antonio Woods appeals from the trial court’s imposition of two years of 

parole supervision under Penal Code1 section 1172.6, subdivision (h) upon 

Woods’s resentencing under section 1172.6. Woods’s appointed appellate 

counsel has submitted a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

436 requesting that we independently review the record. Counsel also has 

advised Woods of his right to submit a supplemental brief within 30 days, and

Woods has not done so. Our independent review of the record has disclosed no 

issues that warrant further briefing.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2006, Woods was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, 

subd. (a)) and felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)). 

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
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He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for the first degree murder 

conviction and three years for the felon in possession conviction, the latter to 

be served concurrently. Woods appealed, and this court affirmed the 

judgment in an unpublished opinion, People v. Woods (Sept. 13, 2007, 

A114359), a copy of which is contained in the record. To provide background, 

we quote from our statement of facts in that opinion:

“On February 8, 2003, Eugene Befford was sitting in his car in front of 

his house on Page and Webster Streets. [Woods] and codefendant Anthony 

Johnson drove up and parked behind Befford’s vehicle. They walked toward 

Haight Street and approximately a half hour later they returned to the 

corner of Webster and Page. According to Befford, the two men were ‘yelling 

and using vulgarities about someone [who] had pissed them off.’ Something 

was said about ‘doing something to somebody.’ [Woods] told Johnson that the 

gun was in the car. Johnson went to the car while [Woods] went to the 

corner.

“Ron Coleman arrived on the other side of the street. [Woods] and 

Coleman began arguing and yelling. [Woods]’s shirt was open. He put his 

hands in the air and turned around in a circle. They continued yelling. 

Eventually Coleman crossed the street toward [Woods]. As Coleman 

approached [Woods], [Woods] backed up. While they continued arguing 

Johnson proceeded along the wall of a building, crouching down with a gun 

between himself and the building. Johnson walked to a point behind 

Coleman and moved his arm in front of him with the gun. Coleman turned 

around and Johnson shot him in the chest.”

In 2022, Woods petitioned the San Francisco County Superior Court for 

resentencing under former section 1170.95, the predecessor statute to section 

1172.6. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3 [“with the 
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passage of Assembly Bill No. 200 [(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)], the Legislature 

then renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without any 

further substantive change”].) Following an evidentiary hearing, the court 

granted Woods’s petition. It vacated Woods’s first degree murder conviction 

and set aside his guilty plea to that charge, Woods pleaded not guilty to the 

charge, and the court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the charge in 

the interest of justice under section 1385. Woods pleaded guilty to the new 

charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)) and 

admitted to being the principal armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).

The court adjudged Woods to have committed those crimes and 

sentenced Woods to seven years in prison. This sentence consisted of a 

principal term of six years for the assault with a semiautomatic firearm 

conviction and one year for the firearm enhancement, the latter to run 

consecutively, along with three years for Woods’s felon in possession of a 

firearm conviction, to run concurrently. The court ordered that Woods had

6,568 days of custody credits, which exceeded his sentence. Accordingly, it 

further ordered that he be released from prison. It also ordered under section

1172.6, subdivision (h) that he be placed under parole supervision for two 

years. The court imposed this parole period over the defense objection that 

Woods’s custody credits exceeded this parole period as well.

Woods filed a timely notice of appeal from the “imposition of a parole 

period under Pen. Code §1172.6(h) given excess credits beyond 2 years.”

II. DISCUSSION

We have independently reviewed the record under Wende and conclude 

there are no issues that warrant further briefing.

Section 1172.6, subdivision (h) provides, “A person who is resentenced 

pursuant to this section shall be given credit for time served. The judge may 
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order the petitioner to be subject to parole supervision for up to two years 

following the completion of the sentence.”

The court acted within its discretion to impose a two-year parole 

supervision period under section 1172.6, subdivision (h), even if Woods’s 

custody credits exceeded the time imposed for his new sentence and parole 

period. (People v. Arellano (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 418, 437–438 [trial court 

did not err in imposing a parole term upon the defendant’s custodial release 

under section 1172.6, subdivision (h), rather than applying excess credits to 

satisfy the entirety of the parole term]; People v. Wilson (2020) 

53 Cal.App.5th 42, 46 [Division Three of this district holding under former 

section 1170.95 that a “court is not required to mechanically apply excess 

custody credits to reduce or eliminate the parole period imposed at a 

resentencing,” but “[i]instead, and notwithstanding excess custody credits, 

. . . may exercise its discretion when deciding whether to order a period of 

parole”]; People v. Lamoureux (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 136, 144–145 [holding 

the same under former section 1170.95].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, Acting P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.