[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________ No. 13-14863

_________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-01254-TCB

DIANA ARIAS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSEPH T. CAMERON, et al ., Defendants-Appellants.

__________________________ Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

__________________________ (January 20, 2015) Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 1 of 282 ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge: On the football field, a team with a weak defense may choose to emphasize its offense. The trouble is, in the end, it can be hard to win without a reliable defense. That is much like the problem th at Defendants-Appellants Joseph T. Cameron and The Dow Chemical Company (“ Dow”) have in this case. PlaintiffAppellee Diana Arias sued Cameron and Do w for injuries that Cameron allegedly inflicted on Arias while Cameron was acti ng within the course of his employment for Dow. When Defendants sought judgment in the case on the basis that Arias had allegedly failed to timel y perfect service upon them before the statute of limitations ran, Arias moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. By doing so, Arias hoped to take advantage of Georgia law, which allows a plaintiff who originally files a case within the statute-of-limitations period to voluntarily dismiss her case and refile it within six months, thereby triggering a new period in which to timely effect serv ice. Defendants went on th e offensive, opposing Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal on the basis that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice would prejudice them by depriving them of their statute-of-limitations defense. The district court granted Arias’s mo tion and voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. De fendants now appeal.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 2 of 283 But Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense is, by no means, a certain winner. So their offense—that they will suffer prejudice as the result of avoluntary dismissal without prejudice because they will lose their statute-oflimitations defense—necessar ily falters since it de pends on their unreliable defense. And even if Defendants had a viable statute-of-limitations defense that would be destroyed by a voluntary dismissa l without prejudice, all of the other equities in this case—which a district cour t should consider unde r Rule 41(a)(2) in determining whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal—favor Arias. For these reasons, we find that the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion when it granted Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. I. A. The Nature of the Case In her complaint, Arias alleged that , on March 19, 2011, she was riding her bicycle in Georgia when Defendant-Appella nt Cameron, driving a rental car, failed to yield and collided with her. Accordin g to the complaint, the car that Cameron was driving was insured by Cameron’s employer, Dow, and Cameron was operating the car within the course and scope of his employment. As a result of the incident, the complaint asserts, Arias suffered “great bodily injuries.”

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 3 of 284 When the incident occurred, Cameron pr oduced a California driver’s license to the Cobb County Police Department, whic h cited Cameron for failure to yield under Georgia statute O.C.G.A. § 40-6- 71 and issued Cameron a ticket. On February 25, 2013, just over thr ee weeks before the end of Georgia’s two-year statutory period for filing such claims, 1 Arias filed suit in Cobb County State Court against Cameron and Dow. She claimed that she was entitled to damages under two theories of recovery: ne gligence and stubborn litigiousness. B. Arias’s Initial Attempts at Service Upon the filing of her complaint, Aria s attempted to serve both Cameron and Dow. With regard to Cameron, Arias st ated in the proceedi ngs below that she believed him to be a Calif ornia resident, based on his production of a California driver’s license at the time of the incident and based on Georgi a law that generally requires all residents of the state for more than thirty days to obtain a Georgia driver’s license before operating a motor vehicle in the state, see O.C.G.A. § 40-5- 20(a). For this reason, Arias attempted to serve Cameron with the summons and complaint pursuant to Georgia’s Non-Resid ent Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1, et seq . (“NRMA”), which sets forth requirem ents for service on those who are not residents of Georgia, as the service requi rements relate to complaints involving the operation of a motor vehicle.

1 In Georgia, the statute of limitations fo r bringing a tort acti on involving claims of personal injuries is two years from da te that the cause of action accrued. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 4 of 285 In an effort to comply with the NMRA, on March 13, 2013, Arias mailed the summons and complaint to the Georgia S ecretary of State to obtain service on Cameron. Arias also sent Cameron a copy of the summons and complaint by certified mail on the same date, which Cam eron later received on March 23, 2013. With respect to Dow, counsel for Ar ias attested in the district-court proceedings that, on February 6, 2013, he visited the Georgia Secretary of State’s website to find the registered agent for Do w, but his query resulte d in a showing of no agent for service of process in Georgia. According to counsel for Arias, he did not learn until “[m]uch later” that th e website was “in transition and not functioning properly.” Based on the erroneous belief that Do w lacked a corporate presence in Georgia, Arias mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to Georgia’s Secretary of State on February 28, 2013, to obtain service on Dow in Delaware, its place of incorporation. Arias also se nt the summons and complaint to Dow’s registered agent in Delaware via certif ied mail on March 13, 2013. On that same date, Arias sent the summons and compla int to the New Castle County Sheriff’s Department as well, to make service on Dow in Delaware. On March 19, 2013, the day upon which Dow contends that the two-year statute of limitations expired under O.C .G.A. § 9-3-33, Dow received the summons and complaint that Arias sent by certif ied mail on March 13, 2013. One week Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 5 of 286 later, on March 27, 2013, th e New Castle County Sheri ff’s Department personally served Dow’s registered agent in Delawa re with the summons and complaint. Although Arias believed th at she had adequately served Dow, on April 1, 2013, Georgia’s Secretary of State sent couns el for Arias a letter stating that Dow was actually registered with the Office of Georgia Secretary of State, so the Office returned the documents that Arias’s c ounsel had sent it for service upon Dow. Alerted to the fact that Dow had a regist ered agent in Georgia, Arias immediately attempted to obtain persona l service on Dow’s agent. Towards this end, on April 4, 2013, Arias sent the summons and co mplaint to the Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Department for service on Dow’s Georgia ag ent. The Sheriff’s Department served Dow’s registered agent on April 9, 2013. C. Removal of the State Court Action and th e Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss As a result of Arias’s service efforts, both Dow and Cameron received notice of Arias’s action, and, on April 17, 2013, Dow and Cameron removed the matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that the district court enjoyed diversity jurisdiction over the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. One week later, on April 25, 2013, De fendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b )(5), and 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. In the motion to dismiss, Defendants asserted that Arias had failed to timel y and properly serve them, so the matter should be dismissed for improper service of process. They

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 6 of 287 further argued that dismissal should be w ith prejudice, since, at the time that Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, in Defendants’ view, Arias’s claims were time-barred under Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations. More specifically, Dow contended that Arias did not make proper service upon it until April 9, 2013, after the statute of limitations expired. As to Cameron, Defendants asserted that service on him under Georgia’s NRMA was improper because Cameron claimed to have actually b een a resident of Georgia at the time of the accident. 2 So Defendants argued that Aria s should have served Cameron in accordance with Georgia’s long-arm stat ute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, which required Arias to personally serve Cameron in Ca lifornia—something that Arias had not done at that point. 3
Cameron also contended that even if he were not considered to be a resident of Georgia at the time of the incident, the NMRA service wa s deficient because Arias had failed to comply with its strict requirements in that Arias allegedly had omitted required pieces of info rmation and did not file th e proper papers with the

2 Despite the fact that he still apparently ha d no Georgia driver’s license at the time of the incident, according to Cameron, he had lived in Georgia for approximately seven months and was considering staying in Georgia permanently. Cameron stated that he engaged in daily life activities such as entertaining fr iends at his home, had a gym membership, and received personal mail in Georgia. Id. 3 Under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94, a person of sound mi nd, who is of the age of majority and is a nonresident of Georgia subject to personal jurisdiction unde r Georgia’s long-arm statute must be served either personally or by leaving copies of the summons and complaint “at [his] dwelling house or usual place of abode with some pers on of suitable age and di scretion then residing therein,” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7).

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 7 of 288 state court after service. 4 Cameron also alleged that the NMRA service was untimely since he did not receive the complaint and summons by certified mail until March 23, 2013, after the statute of limitations had expired. D. Arias’s Further Atte mpts to Serve Cameron The April 24, 2013, filing of the motion to dismiss put Arias on notice that Cameron contended that he wa s a resident of Georgia at the time of the accident. So Arias pursued personal service on Camer on in California, pursuant to Georgia’s long-arm statute—the provision that would govern service on Cameron in California if Cameron were a resident of Georgia at the time of the incident. On April 29, 2013, Arias sent the summons and complaint to the San Bernardino’s Sheriff’s Office in Califor nia to accomplish service on Cameron. According to the San Bernardino Sheri ff’s Department, it attempted to serve Cameron on four occasions between May 4, 2013, and May 29, 2013, but it had no success. On the second attempt, the Sheri ff’s Department left a business card with a name and contact telephone number, requesting that Cameron call the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department, after no one answered Cameron’s door. Still, it was unable to serve Cameron.

4 For instance, although Arias mailed Cameron a copy of the complaint and summons, the defendants claimed that she did not include the notice of service upon the Secretary of State, as required by O.C.G.A. § 41-12-2. The defendants also contended that Arias did not “append” Cameron’s return receipt, her affidavit of comp liance, and the summons, process, and complaint to the other papers and file them collectively with the state court to establish that she had complied with the NMRA.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 8 of 289 So on May 16, 2013, counsel for Aria s sent Cameron’s attorney a letter stating that the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department had been trying to serve Cameron but was having no success. Couns el for Arias therefore asked Cameron’s counsel whether Cameron would be willing to waive service, but Cameron refused. As a result and after the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department had made four unsuccessful service attempts on Cameron, on May 29, 2013, Arias hired a process server in California and requested that th e server “stake out” Cameron’s residence until accomplishing service on Cameron. Two days later, on May 31, 2013, the process server personally served Camer on with the summons and complaint under Georgia’s long-arm statute. E. Cameron and Dow’s Mo tion for Summary Judgment While Arias was still attempting to serve Cameron under Georgia’s longarm statute, on May 8, 2013, Defendants filed their Answer to the complaint and re-filed their motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c). Defendants c ontinued to make essentially the same arguments concerning alleged failure to effect proper service. Arias timely opposed the motion, arguing that service of process had been timely and proper on both Defendants. She also asserted that it would be inequitable to penalize her under the ci rcumstances, since she had diligently pursued service of Defendants. Along with her opposition to Defendants’ motion

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 9 of 2810 for summary judgment, Arias moved for voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., as an alternative to the granting of summary judgment to Defendants. She did so for the express purpose of taking advantage of Georgia law, which a llows a litigant to refile a case within six months of the voluntary dismissal of the action after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, when th e original action was filed within the applicable statute of limita tions. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61. Defendants opposed Arias’s request for voluntary di smissal. Among other reasons, Defendants contended that vol untarily dismissing the case would eliminate Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense, which was based on the claim of ineffective timely service of process, since Georgia law allows a plaintiff to revive her claims after the statute of li mitations has already run and restart the service clock. The district court granted Arias’s moti on to voluntarily dismiss her case and denied as moot Defendants’ motion fo r summary judgment. But the court nonetheless directed that if Arias chose to refile her claims, she must first pay Defendants’ attorneys’ fees and costs incurre d in this action, as the district court determined those costs and fees. Defe ndants now appeal the district court’s voluntary dismissal of Arias’s claims.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 10 of 2811 II. The decision of whether to grant a vo luntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., falls within the sound discretion of the district court. Therefore, we review the district court’ s decision to voluntarily dismiss the case for an abuse of discretion. See Fisher v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., Inc. , 940 F.2d 1502, 1502-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (citing LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc. , 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976) 5 ). III. Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs a plaintiff’s ability to dismiss an action vol untarily and without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). The rule allows a plaintiff to do so without seeking leav e of court, as long as the defendant has not yet filed an an swer or a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). If a defenda nt has made such a filing, the plaintiff must obtain permission from the court to vol untarily dismiss her case: “Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court consid ers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Such a dismissal is considered to be w ithout prejudice unless otherwise specified by the court.

5 Opinions of the Fifth Circuit issued prio r to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 11 of 2812 A district court enjoys broad discreti on in determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41( a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P. Pontenberg v. Boston Scientific Corp ., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Generally speaking, a motion for voluntary dismissal should be granted unl ess the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice other than th e mere prospect of a second lawsuit. Id.; Fisher, 940 F.2d at 1502–03 (citing Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967)). The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) “is primar ily to prevent voluntary dismissals which unfairly affect the other side, a nd to permit the imposition of curative conditions.” McCants v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation and internal quotatio n marks omitted). We mu st consider the crucial question of whether “the defendant [woul d] lose any substantial right by the dismissal.” Pontenberg , 252 F.3d at 1255 (citation omitted). But, ultimately, the determination of whether to grant such a dismissal falls within the sound discretion of the district court. Fisher, 940 F.2d at 1503 (citing LeCompte, 528 F.2d at 604). While the district court “should keep in mind the interests of the defendant, for Rule 41(a)(2) exists chiefly fo r protection of defendants,” id. , the court should also weigh the relevant equitie s and do justice between th e parties in each case, imposing such costs and attaching such c onditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate. McCants, 781 F.2d at 857.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 12 of 2813 Here, Cameron and Dow cont end that the district court erred in granting Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal beca use the dismissal resulted in clear legal prejudice to them: the loss of their statut e-of-limitations defense if Arias re-files her action in Georgia state court. We di sagree that the district court abused its discretion under the circumst ances of this case. A. Defendants’ Statute-of-Limitations Defense To explain why, we first consider th e strength of Defendants’ statute-oflimitations defense. If the defense lacked merit, Defendants did not even arguably suffer any cognizable prejudice as a result of the voluntary dismissal. We begin with a review of applicable Georgia law. Although Georgia law requires a process se rver to effect service within five days of receipt of the complaint and su mmons, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c)(5), it states no time limit within which a plai ntiff must seek service. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore , 462 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Ga. 1995). So, as long as service is perfected before the statute of limitations expires, “the mere ti me lapse between the date of filing and the date of service is not a valid basis for dismissal.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a complaint is filed within th e limitations period but service is perfected after the limitations period ends, service relates back to the time of filing “so as to avoid the limitation,” as long as service is timely perfected. Giles v. State

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 13 of 2814 Farm Mut. Ins. Co. , 765 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Although § 9-11-4(c)(5)’s five-day sa fe-harbor provision applies by its language to process servers only and not to parties, service is, nevertheless, always timely perfected if a party completes it within that period. See id. If perfected service is attempte d before the expiration of the statute of limitations but is not made within the five-day period a nd the defendant assert s insufficiency of service after the statute of limitations expi res, service can still be timely perfected and relate back to the time of filing, pr ovided that the plaintiff acts with “the greatest possible diligence to serve the defendant from that point forward.” 6 Moody v. Gilliam , 637 S.E.2d 759, 761 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, Arias attempted to complete service on Dow three different ways before the statutory period ended on Marc h 19, 2013: on February 28, 2013, she sent a copy of the process to Georgia’s S ecretary of State to make service on Dow in Delaware; on March 13, 2013, by certified mail, she sent the process to Dow’s registered agent in Delaware; and also on March 13, 2013, she arranged for the New Castle County Sheriff’s Department to make service on Dow in Delaware.

6 Service is also timely perfected if the proce ss server makes service within five days of receipt of the summons and complaint from the clerk of court, regard less of how much time lapses between the plaintiff’s filing of the action and the process server’s receipt of the complaint and summons from the clerk, provi ded that service is accomplishe d within the statutory period. See Giles , 765 S.E.2d 413. In this case, however, Plai ntiff—not the clerk of court—provided the various process servers with pro cess, apparently after Plaintiff had obtained it from the clerk.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 14 of 2815 So it is clear that Arias attempted to pe rfect service on Dow within the statutory period. Arias only learned that she did not perfect service on Dow through her February and March 2013 efforts when she received the letter da ted April 1, 2013, that Georgia’s Secretary of State sent ad vising that Dow was registered with the Office of the Georgia Secretary of St ate. Allowing for three mailing days, cf. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(e), Arias could have been expected to receive the Secretary of State’s letter—and thus notice of insufficie nt service—on April 4, 2013. And, the record reflects that that very day, Aria s sent the summons and complaint to the Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Department for service on Dow’s Georgia agent. The Sheriff’s Department then served Dow’s registered agent on April 9, 2013—within the five-day period from its receipt of th e summons and complaint for service. Because Arias immediately delivered th e summons and complaint for service upon learning that her original service on Dow was insufficient, and then the process server accomplished proper service within the five-day safe-harbor period, Arias appears to have timely perfected service on Dow that relates back to the time of her filing her complaint within the limitations period. 7

7 Dow asserts, “Defendants do not concede that any of Plaintiff’s service attempts were made by authorized individuals, particularly given the numerous other flaws in her service attempts.” This conclusory and entirely unsuppo rted argument cannot carry the day for Dow, in light of the fact that the record contains a not arized return of service on Dow, signed by a deputy

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 15 of 2816 With regard to Cameron, Arias learne d that her service on him was arguably insufficient when she received Defendants’ motion to dismiss, which they filed on April 24, 2013—a Wednesday. Allowing tim e for service under O.C.G.A. § 9-11- 6(e), Arias should have taken action to e ffect proper service by Monday, April 29, 2013. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-6(a); 1-3-1(d)(3) (w hen the last day of the period falls on a Saturday or Sunday, the next busine ss day following become s the last day of the period). The record reveals that is exactly wh at she did. On April 29, 2013, Arias sent the summons and complaint to the San Bernardino’s Sheriff’s Office for service on Cameron in California. Despite four attempts by the Sheriff’s Office to serve Cameron between May 4, 2013, a nd May 29, 2013—including the Sheriff’s Office’s leaving of a note on Cameron’ s door instructing him to call, and Plaintiff’s communications in May with Cameron’s c ounsel about the service attempts—the Sheriff’s Office was unabl e to make service on Cameron. Arias then sought to effect service on Came ron in a third way since learning that Cameron contested Arias’s original servi ce efforts: she hired a private process server and directed him to “stake out ” Cameron’s residence until Cameron was personally served. It still took two days to accomplish service. Under these circumstances, it appears that Cameron may have been trying to evade service.
sheriff with Gwinnett County. Georgia law author izes deputy sheriffs in the county where the action is brought or where the defe ndant is found to serve process. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c)(1).

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 16 of 2817 A defendant’s evasion of service bear s on the determination of whether a plaintiff exercised diligence in atte mpting to accomplish service. In Feinour v. Ricker Co. , 604 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), overruled on diffe rent grounds by Giles , 765 S.E.2d 413 at n.2, for example, th e plaintiff filed her case on September 28, 2000, and began service attempts on the defe ndant on October 2, 2000. Id. at 590. Between October 2, 2000, and March 7, 2001, the defendant engaged in acts to evade service. Id. at 590-91. The plaintiff made several efforts to serve the defendant, first through one sheriff’s o ffice, then another, then through a professional process server, and last, th rough a court-appointed process server, finally serving him on March 7, 2001, after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 591. Although the trial court gr anted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on untimely service, the appe llate court reversed, concluding that where there was “evidence that [the plain tiff’s] efforts to serve [the defendant] were continuous and that she exercised th e greatest possible d iligence in light of [the defendant’s] obvious and continued attempts to evade service,” summary judgment for untimely service was improper. Id. at 591-92. This case is substantially similar to Feinour . While the Feinour plaintiff attempted service in four different ways over a five-month period, Arias tried three different ways to obtain service on Cam eron over a 27-day period. The first method—through the San Bernardino Sher iff’s Office—involved four separate

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 17 of 2818 attempts, and, with respect to the third me thod, Arias instructed the process server to effectively remain at Cameron’s hous e until service was accomplished. These efforts were comparably continuou s and diligent to those of the Feinour plaintiff. As a result, when service was finally ma de on Cameron on May 31, 2013, it should have related back to the f iling of the complaint before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus, Defendants’ statute- of-limitations defense appears to lack merit. B. Precedent But even if we very charitably descri bed Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense as potentially viable—a descripti on that we do not endorse, the district court still did not abuse its discretion in voluntarily dismissing the case without prejudice because our precedent allowed it to do so. McCants v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 781 F.2d 855 (11th Cir. 1986), decided n early thirty years ago, drives the outcome of this issue.
In McCants , we held that, under the facts of th e case, the loss of a statute-oflimitations defense alone did not necessarily constitute per se legal prejudice sufficient to bar a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41. Id. at 859. The plaintiff in McCants filed a wrongful-death action under Mississippi productsliability law in an Alabama federal court, based on a jeep accident that occurred in Mississippi. Id . at 856. When the plaintiff originally filed suit, she did so within

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 18 of 2819 the limitations period, but she sued the wrong party, A.M. Genera l, believing it to be the manufacturer of the jeep. Id. When she discovered the error, the plaintiff sought leave to amend her complaint to a dd Ford as a defendant, since it was the actual manufacturer of the jeep. Id. Rather than granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint, and after the one-y ear statute of limitations had run under Alabama law, the district court dism issed the action without prejudice. Id . Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a second suit , this time naming Ford as a defendant. Id. Ford did not plead the statute of limitati ons in its answer but raised it in an amended answer about eight months after the initiation of th e suit and a month before it filed its summary-judgment motion. Id. at 857. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment and, the following day, granted the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal without prejudice. Id . The dismissal without prejudice provided the plaintiff with the opportunity to refile the action in Mississippi, which had a longer limitations period. On appeal, Ford argued, among other things, that it had suffered legal prejudice when the case was dismissed w ithout prejudice because it had lost its statute-of-limitations defense. Id. Ford further contended that the district court had abused its discretion in allowing the dismissal because it had failed to

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 19 of 2820 acknowledge the importance of the loss of Ford’s limitation defense when the court balanced the equities of the case. Id. We upheld the district court’s granting of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, stating, “[T]he likelihood that a di smissal without prejudice will deny the defendant a statute of limitations defens e does not constitute plain legal prejudice and hence should not alone preclude such a dismissal.” Id. at 858. We found support for this view in our precedent—namely, Durham v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 385 F.2d 366. Id. We also noted that “n o evidence in the record [suggested] that [McCants] or her counsel acted in bad faith in filing this action in Alabama or in filing it more than one year after the accident occurred.” Id . at 859. Under the circumstances, we concluded th at Ford could not be said to have suffered “any plain legal prejudice other th an the prospect of a second lawsuit on the same set of facts.” Id . Consequently, we determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the di smissal without prejudice because the loss of a valid statute-of-limitations defense di d not alone necessarily constitute a bar to dismissal without prejudice. Id. McCants does not require a district court to find a lack of legal prejudice every time a defendant is potentially stri pped of a statute-of-limitations defense. Rather, McCants and its progeny hold only that the loss of a statute-of-limitations defense alone does not amount to per se prejudice requiring denial of a voluntary

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 20 of 2821 dismissal without prejudice. A district cour t must look to the particular facts of the case, including, among others, whether the plaintiff’s counsel has acted in bad faith, and “weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the parties” when evaluating a motion for a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). McCants , 781 F.2d at 857; Goodwin v. Reynolds , 757 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014). Nor is it a “bar to a voluntary dismissal that the pl aintiff may obtain some tactical advantage over the defendant in future litigation.” Goodwin , 757 F.3d at 1219 (citing McCants , 781 F.2d at 856-57). Here, based on our review of the underl ying facts, we conclude that the district court acted well within its disc retion when it granted Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal. First, the parties here do not dispute that Arias filed her lawsuit in Georgia state court before the two-year statute of limitations ran. Second, as explained above, Arias acted d iligently in attempting to serve Cameron and Dow with the summons and complaint. Third, none of the facts of this case demonstrate bad faith on the part of Ar ias’s counsel, a factor that should be examined when considering a motion for vo luntary dismissal without prejudice. Fourth, Defendants’ claimed statute-of-limit ations defense is weak, at best. And, finally, the only reason that Defendants even arguably have a statute-of-limitations defense is because they rem oved the case to federal court. Had the case stayed in Georgia court, where Arias chose to file it, there would have been no question that

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 21 of 2822 she would have been able to voluntarily dismiss the case and take advantage of Georgia’s six-month refiling provision. So Defendants effectively “created” the very statute-of-limitations defense that th ey now complain that they have been “stripped” of—a defense that did not ev en arguably exist until they removed the case to federal court. Moreover, although Defendant s suggest that Arias sh ould not be able to avoid the entry of summary judgment by voluntarily dismissing her action, for the reasons that we have previously discusse d, it is surely not certain that summary judgment was appropriate. And, even if summary judgment were likely, this circuit has declined to adopt a bright-l ine rule precluding a district court from granting a Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismis sal without prejudice when a motion for summary judgment is pending. See Pontenberg , 252 F.3d at 1258. As we have explained, “the mere atte mpt to avoid an adverse summary judgment ruling in and of itself, particularly where there is no evidence of bad faith, does not constitute plain legal prejudice.” Id. The district court’s attachment of conditions to the dismissal—requiring Arias to pay attorney s’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation if she refiles—further weighs in favor of affirming the district court’s voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice.

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 22 of 2823 Nor, as Defendants urge, is McCants inconsistent with controlling precedent in this Circuit. 8 Defendants suggest that McCants conflicts with LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc. , 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976), and Exxon Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co. , 599 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1979). We disagree. Neither Exxon nor LeCompte considers or addresses the specific question of whether the potential loss of a defense upon voluntary dismissal without prejudice alone constitutes per se “prejudice” to a defendant, requiring denial of a motion for voluntary dismissal. Rather, these cases use the term “p rejudice” in a more general sense and do not involve the potential loss of a defense upon voluntary dismissal. In fact, in Exxon , our predecessor court did not even consider a motion for permissive voluntary dismi ssal under Rule 41(a)(2). In stead, that case dealt with dismissal as of right under Rule 41(a)(1). And, to the extent that the Court discussed prejudice in LeCompte , it relied on Durham v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. , 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1967). See LeCompte , 528 F.2d at 604. Durham —a case that predates both Exxon and LeCompte —is entirely consistent with McCants . In Durham , the plaintiff sued his employer for failure to

8 When circuit authority is in conflict, a panel should look to the line of authority containing the earliest case because a decision of a prior panel cannot be overturned by a later panel. Walker v. Mortham , 158 F.3d 1177, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d 1372, 1380 n.10 (11th Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Bonner , 661 F.2d at 1209 (holding that decisions of prior panels are binding on subsequent panels an d can be overturned by the court sitting en banc only)).

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 23 of 2824 provide a safe workplace. Id . at 367. The defendant pl ed contributory negligence as an affirmative defense. Id . When the matter was calle d for trial, the plaintiff contended that he had discovered new ev idence and moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a new clai m under the Federal Safety A ppliance Act, an act under which the plaintiff may recover without re gard to any contributory negligence. Id

. The district court denied the motion for l eave to amend, prompting the plaintiff to move to voluntarily dismiss the suit without prejudice. Id. The trial court denied the motion and called the case for trial. Id. When counsel announced that he could not proceed with the trial of the case, th e district court dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. The plaintiff then appealed. On appeal, the former Fifth Circuit emphasized that dismissing actions with prejudice was the most severe sanction a nd should be imposed only when a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff exists. Id. at 368 (citation omitted). Because those circ umstances did not exist in Durham , the Court opined that the “crucial question” in determin ing whether voluntary dismissal should have been granted was whether the defendant would lose any subs tantial right by the dismissal without prejudice requested by the plaintiff. Id . As the Court explained, “[D]ismissal should be allo wed unless the defendant w ill suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second law suit. It is no bar to dismissal that plaintiff may obtain so me tactical advantage thereby.” Id. (citation

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 24 of 2825 and quotation marks omitted). Although a voluntary dismi ssal would have resulted in the defendant’s loss of its contributory -negligence defense, the Court concluded that the record did not disclose any prej udice to the defendant upon the granting of a voluntary dismissal, other than the a nnoyance of a second litigation on the same subject. Id. at 369. So the Court reversed th e district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded the case for dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Id. Durham supports our subsequent decision in McCants , where we concluded that the loss of a statute-of-limita tions defense alone does not constitute per se prejudice requiring denial of a motion fo r voluntary dismissal. Indeed, our decision in McCants cited to and relied upon Durham . In short, McCants does not violate our prior-precedent rule, and we are bound to follow it. We also respectfully reject Defendants’ contention that McCants should be limited to its facts. Defendants suggest that McCants should apply to only those situations where a defendant delays in ra ising the affirmative defense that it hopes to preserve against a voluntary dismissal. Because Defendants here raised their statute-of-limitations defense in a moti on to dismiss one week following their removal of the case to federal court, they assert that McCants should not apply. But the way in which we framed the issue in McCants reveals that the timing of the defendant’s assertion of the defense did not drive the resu lt in the case. As

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 25 of 2826 we described it, the issue in McCants was simply “whether it constitutes an abuse of discretion for a district court to dism iss without prejudice an action that is timebarred as brought, where the purpose or eff ect of such dismissal is to allow the plaintiff to refile the action in a pla ce or manner in which it is not similarly barred.” 781 F.2d at 858. Nor did we limit our holdi ng that “the loss of a valid statute of limitations defense [does not] constitute a bar to a dismissal without prejudice,” id. at 859, to circumstances where defendants delay in raising their statute-of-limitations defense. And we decline to so restrict McCants today. We recognize, as Defendants point out, that other circuits have found clear legal prejudice to exist when a Rule 41(a)(2 ) dismissal is granted in the face of a valid statute-of-limitations defense. See Wojtas v. Capital Guardian Trust Co. , 477 F.3d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2007); Grover ex rel. Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1994); Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa F.S.B. v. W. R. Grace & Co. , 999 F.2d 1257, 1262 (8th Cir. 1993); Phillips v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 874 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir.1989). And we acknowledge that both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have expressly announced their disagreement with our decision in McCants

. See Phillips , 874 F.2d at 987; Metro. Fed. Bank of Iowa , 999 F.2d at 1263. But we are bound by the prior- precedent rule to follow McCants

. See Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 26 of 2827 omitted) (“Under our prior precedent rule , a panel cannot overru le a prior one’s holding even though convinced it is wrong.”). So even if we disagreed with it, we would nonetheless be required to be faithful to it. See id

. We do not disagree with McCants , though. Rule 41(a)(2) contemplates that the district court will weigh the equities in determining how to rule on a motion for voluntary dismissal. The equities of this case—including the dubious merit of Defendants’ statute-of-limitations defense, the consistent diligence of Arias, the apparent attempts by Cameron to evade serv ice, and the fact that Defendants could not even arguably invoke their statute-of- limitations defense had they not removed the case from Arias’s chosen forum c ourt in the first place—provide a good example of why a per se rule prohibiting district courts from allowing dismissals without prejudice any time that a statute- of-limitations defense might possibly be lost could significantly undermine the distri ct court’s ability to balance the equities in ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2). The fact that McCants does not render loss of a statute-of-limitations defense

per se prejudice does not mean that a party that could suffer the loss of such a defense upon a voluntary dismissal without prejudice will necessarily be at the losing end of a motion for voluntary di smissal without prejudice. Rather, McCants allows for a motion for voluntary dismissa l without prejudice to be denied if a statute-of-limitations defense could be lost, provided that consideration of all of the

Case: 13-14863 Date Filed: 01/20/2015 Page: 27 of 2828 equities in the case warrant such a conclusi on. We think that this is the correct formulation of what Rule 41(a)(2) requires. Finally, based on all of these considera tions, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). V. In sum, we conclude that it is unlik ely that Defendants had a meritorious statute-of-limitations defense in the first place. But even if they did, in view of the equities, the district court did not abuse its discretion in gran ting Arias’s motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursu ant to Rule 41(a)(2). We therefore affirm the order of the district court. AFFIRMED

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