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i 

87–862 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–99] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS 

FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA AND 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 2, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KIMBERLY SHAW, Professional Staff Member 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

SPENCER JOHNSON, Counsel 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 2, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Strategic Command ........ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 2, 2014 ....................................................................................... 35 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command ................. 5 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea ................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Haney, ADM Cecil D. ....................................................................................... 64 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 39 

Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M. ............................................................................. 43 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 94 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 93 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 93 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. FORCES KOREA 

AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization budget request from U.S. Forces 

Korea and U.S. Strategic Command. 

Joining us today are General Curtis Scaparrotti and Admiral 

Cecil Haney. 

The commander of U.S. European Command, General Breedlove, 

was also scheduled to testify today. However, late last week Secretary Hagel called him back to Brussels to directly deal with the 

crisis with Russia. We will look to another date later this year and 

try to get the general to appear before the committee then. 

The general’s callback is a sobering reminder about how our military presence in Europe still matters and is still needed. Yet as we 

have shifted focus on other threats across the globe, our readiness 

and force posture in Europe has declined, and we have come to find 

that deterring regional aggression has become more difficult. 

The crisis with Russia is also a reminder that we have to be prepared for a range of scenarios, whether we think them likely or 

not. 

Some may think a major conflict on the Korean peninsula is unlikely and therefore we don’t need to size our forces, especially our 

land forces, for such a scenario. However, we can look to every 

major land conflict we have been involved in to know that we are 

usually wrong. 

North Korea maintains the world’s fourth largest army. It poses 

a grave threat to our South Korean allies and to stability in the 

region, and increasingly direct threat to the United States. 

Yet I remain concerned that the end strength and force structure 

cuts contained in the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and the 

budget request create significant risk for a Korean scenario, and 

also creates greater vulnerabilities in other parts of the world. 
2 

In a Korean scenario, General Amos has testified that the Marine Corps would be all in, with 20 of its 21 infantry battalions 

committed to the fight. General Odierno testified that the Army 

force structure in the QDR will put in doubt our ability to execute 

even one prolonged, multi-phased major contingency operation. 

General Scaparrotti, I hope you can discuss the changing threat 

on the peninsula, the implications it has both for U.S. and South 

Korean forces and capabilities, and the implications of the QDR 

and budget request. 

Admiral Haney, U.S. Strategic Command has a vast portfolio to 

include nuclear forces, missile defense, cyber operations, and space. 

As you know, General Dempsey believes our Nation’s top national security interest is to continue to assure the survival of the 

Nation. I agree with that prioritization and I support the funding 

in this year’s base budget request that protects the nuclear triad 

and other nuclear deterrent capabilities. 

It is imperative, Admiral, that you continue to take on those who 

would pretend that the United States alone among nuclear powers 

can continue to disarm itself. 

I am increasingly troubled by the aggressive counter-space programs of China and Russia, in particular. I trust you will not hesitate to tell this committee what you need to accomplish that mission. 

At the conclusion of our open session today, we will move into 

2216 for a closed briefing. I would encourage all Members that can, 

to attend that session. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership, for your service during this challenging period. And I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to General 

Scaparrotti and Admiral Haney. 

I particularly note, General Scaparrotti, welcome. We enjoyed 

your time out at Fort Lewis, really appreciated your leadership 

there. And I am glad that you are on the job in Korea. So it is good 

to see both of you and I thank you very much for your leadership. 

I also want to join the chairman in noting General Breedlove’s 

absence, given the crisis in the Ukraine and Europe that his presence is required back there. But the issues that he is involved in 

are critical to this committee and ones that we will continue to exercise oversight on as we deal with the situation between Russia 

and the Ukraine. 

And in Korea, I also agree with the chairman, that continues to 

be one of the more, you know, dangerous parts of the world for us. 

North Korea is unpredictable. Another sign of that yesterday, as 

they attempted to I guess establish a larger border by lobbing missiles across the line in the ocean, or artillery. 

And North Korea’s unpredictability requires our presence. We 

are and have been for some time the guarantor of South Korea’s 
3 

security. And that is going to continue to be the case for as far as 

I can see, given the way North Korea is acting. 

And I share the chairman’s concerns as we once again look at sequestration here in the near future and go through budget cuts, 

will we have sufficient forces and sufficient presence to provide 

that deterrent capability? 

Because as bad as what North Korea has been doing for the last 

couple of decades, I think we don’t want to imagine how much 

worse that would be if they thought we were not there to stop them 

from further aggression against South Korea. 

So I would be curious about your thoughts about how you manage that declining budget and continue to maintain a credible deterrent to North Korea. 

Also, to learn more about South Korea’s growing capabilities. Obviously, they are a key partner in that deterrence. They have become more capable in recent years. That is obviously helpful. 

And I am curious to hear how you feel our partnership with 

South Korea is going and how that matches up to provide that deterrent to North Korean aggression. 

So thank you. I look forward to that testimony. 

Admiral Haney, you have an incredibly important portfolio, as 

the chairman mentioned. Space is critical to literally everything we 

do. So curious to hear how we can maintain our leadership in that 

area, make sure that our assets in space continue to provide for us 

what we need throughout our military operations. 

And also I am curious about how the triad is maintained going 

forward, or what is your vision for nuclear deterrence as we face 

some very difficult budget challenges in all pieces, all assets of the 

triad? 

Trying to figure out what we are going to do with the future 

long-range strategic bomber, how we maintain our submarine fleet 

given a shrinking budget, and how we maintain our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] domestically, as well. What does the 

triad look like? 

And then, lastly, I would be interested in hearing an update from 

you on missile defense, on what you think our future is, where we 

would be most wise to spend our money. 

Because I believe missile defense continues to be critically important as adversaries like Iran and North Korea develop better and 

better missile technology, and our ability to defend against that is 

going to be critical to our national security. 

But I want to make sure that we are spending our money wisely 

as we do that to give us the best chance to have the best possible 

missile defense system to deter those threats. 

I thank you both for being here. I look forward to your testimony 

and the questions and answers from the committee. And I yield 

back. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Scaparrotti. 
4 

STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA 

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member 

Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored 

to testify today as the commander of the United Nations Command, 

Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. 

On behalf of the service members, civilians, contractors, and 

their families who serve our great Nation in Korea, thank you for 

your support. 

After 6 months in command, I am confident that combined and 

joint forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea are capable and ready to deter, and if necessary, respond to the North 

Korean threats and actions. 

We know how real the North Korean threat is, as over 4 years 

ago last week, North Korea fired a torpedo sinking the South Korean ship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. 

That terrible day is a constant reminder that standing at freedom’s frontier with our Korean ally, we cannot allow ourselves to 

become complacent against an unpredictable totalitarian regime. 

The Kim Jong-un regime is dangerous and has capability, especially with an increasing asymmetric threat to attack South Korea 

with little or no warning. 

North Korea has the fourth largest military in the world with 

over 70 percent of its ground forces deployed near the DMZ [demilitarized zone]. 

Its long-range artillery can strike targets in the Seoul metropolitan area where over 23 million South Koreans and almost 50,000 

Americans live. 

In violation of multiple U.N. [United Nations] Security Council 

resolutions, North Korea continues to develop nuclear arms and 

long-range missiles. Additionally, the regime is aggressively investing in cyber warfare capabilities. 

North Korea brings risk to the world’s fastest growing economic 

region, which is responsible for 25 percent of the world’s GDP 

[gross domestic product] and home to our largest trading partners. 

Against this real threat, our Nation is committed to the security 

of South Korea and to our national interests. 

Our presence and your support of our troops give meaning to 

that commitment. We are a key component of the Nation’s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 

Together, the alliance’s commitment to each other enables stability and prosperity now and into the future. 

In the spirit of this commitment, we are working closely with the 

South Korean military to develop its capabilities and combine C4I 

[command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence] 

systems and alliance counter-missile defense strategy and the procurement of precision-guided munitions, ballistic missile defense 

systems, and ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 

platforms. 

Readiness is my top overarching priority. To ensure we are focused on the right things at the right time, I have developed five 

priorities: first, sustain and strengthen the alliance; second, maintain the armistice to deter and defeat aggression and to be ready 

to fight tonight; third, transform the alliance; fourth, sustain force 
5 

and family readiness; and my fifth priority, enhance the UNC 

[United Nations Command], CFC [Combined Forces Command], 

and USFK [U.S. Forces Korea] team. 

An essential part of this is a positive command climate that focuses on the covenant between the leader and the led and our mission together. 

At the core of mission success is the close relationship we share 

with our South Korean partners. We benefit from an important history forged on many battlefields, shared sacrifices and democratic 

principles. 

Over the past 60 years, we have built one of the longest standing 

alliances in modern history. We will continue to ensure a strong 

and effective deterrence posture so that Pyongyang never misjudges our role, our commitment, or our capability to respond as an 

alliance. 

I am extremely proud of our joint force and their families serving 

in the Republic of Korea. I sincerely appreciate your continued support for them and for our crucial alliance. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found in 

the Appendix on page 43.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

STRATEGIC COMMAND 

Admiral HANEY. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee, with 

your permission, I would like to have my full statement made as 

part of the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. No objection, so ordered. 

Admiral HANEY. And I am honored to join you here today as my 

first appearance as the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. 

I am also pleased to be here with General Mike Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea. I would like to express my appreciation for his vision and leadership. 

As you know, U.S. Strategic Command executes a diverse set of 

global responsibilities that directly contribute to national security. 

And I can say with full confidence that today, U.S. Strategic Command remains capable and ready to meet all assigned missions. 

We are blessed to have a talented, dedicated, and professional 

military and civilian workforce to address the significant national 

security challenges facing the United States of America. 

I thank the Congress and this committee for your support and 

I look forward to working with you throughout my tour of duty. 

We appreciate the passage of the 2-year Bipartisan Budget Act 

of 2013 and the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 

This legislation decreases near-term budgetary uncertainty, but 

I remain concerned that sequestration will continue to stress the 

human element of our capabilities as well as impacting our capability to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st century. 

The current global security environment is getting more complex, 

dynamic, and uncertain than any time in recent history as ongoing 

events in Ukraine and North Korea, as mentioned, are making 
6 

abundantly clear—advances in state and non-state military capabilities across the air, sea, land, and space domains, as well as in 

cyberspace. 

The space domain is becoming ever more congested, contested, 

and competitive. Worldwide cyber threats are growing in scale and 

sophistication. 

Nuclear powers are invested in long-term and wide-ranging military modernization programs. Proliferation of weapons and nuclear 

technologies continues. 

Weapons of mass destruction capabilities deliver—technologies 

are maturing and becoming more readily available. No region of 

the world is immune from potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear risks. 

Terrorist threats remain a source of significant ambiguity and 

the threat of homegrown violent extremists remains a concern. 

Against this dynamic and uncertain backdrop, U.S. Strategic 

Command’s mission is to partner with other combatant commands 

and to deter and detect strategic attack against the United States 

of America and our allies, and to defeat those attacks if deterrence 

fails. 

Our Unified Command Plan assigned missions are strategic in 

nature, global in scope, and intertwined with the capabilities of the 

joint force, the interagency, and the whole of government. 

These attributes require linkages and synergies at all levels to 

bring integrated capabilities to bear through synchronized planning, simultaneous execution of missions and coherent strategic 

communications. And we must secure these activities by implementing a defensible joint information environment. 

U.S. Strategic Command manages this diverse and challenging 

activity by actively executing a tailored deterrence and assurance 

campaign plan and by executing my five command priorities: number one, provide a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent 

force; two, partner with other combatant commands to win today; 

three, address our challenges in space; four, build cyberspace capability and capacity; and five, prepare for uncertainty. 

In keeping with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, my first number one priority is to ensure a safe, secure, effective nuclear deterrent force consisting of a synthesis of dedicated sensors, assured 

command and control, the triad of delivery systems, nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure, and trained ready people. 

In light of recent personnel integrity concerns associated with the 

intercontinental ballistic missile force, I fully support Secretary 

Hagel’s initiatives to assemble key Department of Defense stakeholders to fully assess and understand the implications of recent 

events and seek long-term systematic solutions that will maintain 

the trust and confidence in our nuclear enterprise. 

This has my utmost attention—but let me repeat: America’s nuclear deterrent force remains safe, secure, and effective. 

In addition to our critical deterrence and assurance work, we are 

engaged on a daily basis in a broader range of activities across our 

mission areas of space, cyberspace, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, combating weapons of mass destruction, missile defense, joint electronic warfare, global strike, and analysis and targeting. 
7 

While these diverse activities are being synchronized and integrated by an outstanding team, none of this work I have described 

can be accomplished without trained and ready and motivated people. They remain our most precious resource and deserve our unwavering support. 

My travels to a number of U.S. Strategic Command and partner 

locations since I took command last November confirm my belief 

that we have an outstanding team in place across all of our mission 

areas. 

I have the utmost respect for their professionalism, their dedication to duty, and sustained operational excellence. 

In today’s uncertain times, I am proud to lead such a focused and 

innovative team. We are building our force—our future on a strong 

and successful path. 

Your continued support, together with the hard work of outstanding men and women of U.S. Strategic Command, will ensure 

we remain ready, agile, and effective in deterring strategic attack, 

assuring our allies, and defeating current and future threats. 

Today, I am joined by my sister behind me, Dr. Yvonne Coates, 

who has worked as a DC [District of Columbia] public school teacher for many years. 

While I often acknowledge the support of military families, today 

I salute the efforts of my sister, who represents our siblings, who 

many times are often left to handle family matters while we in the 

military service serve our Nation far away from home. We couldn’t 

do it without their support, too. 

I thank you all for your time, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Scaparrotti, while North Korea remains one of the 

world’s largest conventional forces, your testimony also discusses 

its increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities. Can you discuss 

these capabilities in more detail and the implications they have for 

U.S. forces and capabilities? And as you look at the Korean Peninsula scenarios, what are your concerns with the defense strategy in 

the fiscal year 2015 budget request to include Army force structure 

cuts to the 420,000 active and changes in the ISR programs? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Chairman, thank you very much. 

First of all, as stated, North Korea presents a very large force— 

a million—across all of its services. A good portion of that is conventional, as you know, but in recent years the North Koreans 

have invested in their asymmetric capabilities, as well. And those 

are predominantly in their missile capabilities, which have been 

demonstrated here since the 21st of February, most recently, a medium-range ballistic missile—two—that were fired across the peninsula into the East Sea, as well as development—at least they 

have displayed intermediate-range ballistic missile and an intercontinental ballistic missile, as well. Although not tested, they have 

displayed them, and they claim to have this capability. 

They are developing, as you know, a nuclear capability, as well. 

And then within their navy, they have a—although not a modern 

submarine force, a very capable one that presents challenges in 
8 

terms of their ability to use torpedoes, mining, and also for the insertion of soft forces into South Korea. 

And then finally, coupled with that is a very large soft special 

operations force who train for infiltration techniques by air, land, 

and sea, specifically, against targets that we have seen mockups in 

South Korea over the last winter training period. 

And then finally, they have continued to develop a long-range artillery capability. Significant number of tubes of long-range artillery that can reach Seoul from their positions on the other side of 

the DMZ. And they are in hardened positions, so it makes it very 

difficult for us to detect, and then to counter. 

The impact of that is, is that they present a large conventional 

force with some credible asymmetric capabilities, both of which 

they may choose to use for limited objectives, for instance, in the 

asymmetric capabilities. And they present us with a problem where 

it is very difficult for us to have indicators and warnings of their 

use. So, it reduces our time to detect—our ability to detect and 

then our time to respond. And that has created—that has caused 

us to change our strategy in terms of defense and our posture on 

the peninsula across the alliance, both South Koreans and the 

United States. 

Finally, to your question about the present budget under consideration—Korea has—the Korean theater has enjoyed being the 

highest of priorities, right behind Afghanistan. So, as a result, Mr. 

Chairman, I have been resourced to defend the peninsula and our 

interests. And my forces are ready to do that. My concern, however, 

is in the follow-on forces, which, if there is a conflict or an escalation of crisis on the peninsula, I rely on to be there quickly and 

to be ready. 

I am concerned that the follow-on forces, given the fiscal constraints and their impact on our forces writ large—that they are 

at a reduced readiness capability today. And also, the capability of 

moving them on the timeline that I might need them is in jeopardy. 

And so, those are my concerns with the present fiscal constraints. If sequestration were to continue, I think that would become a greater concern. 

With respect to the forces, my concern would be that we maintain enough depth in all of our services. That we can respond to 

the many global challenges that we have and commitments that we 

have made, as well as be able to respond to a crisis, for instance, 

on the Korean theater, and have enough depth to deal with that, 

particularly if it is one that is not of short duration. 

In the Army’s case, I think that if we were to reduce our force 

size based on the sequestration, we would probably be challenged 

in terms of maintaining a long duration conflict, or one that included stability operations for some time thereafter. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Haney, can you confirm that it is your position, as it is 

the position of the chairman and the vice chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs that further reductions in U.S. nuclear forces be negotiated, 

bilateral, and verifiable? And that you would oppose unilateral U.S. 

nuclear force reductions? 
9 

Admiral HANEY. Chairman, I agree with the statement you have 

made there. Any additional reductions in nuclear weapons require 

it to be non-unilateral. And it has to be in a verifiable manner so 

that we can get the benefits, such as those we have gotten from 

the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, where we have 

had access and the ability to be able to verify what Russia has in 

a very methodical way and a very open and transparent way. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Haney, when you look at the—I guess it is sort of like 

three challenges here. New START—obviously, having to implement that. And then, you know, updating and maintaining the existing triad. You know, getting ready to build the new, you know, 

Ohio class, you know, submarines. Dealing with, you know, the 

aging ICBM fleet, and also the long-range strategic bomber. 

So, as you balance New START, the cost of modernization—so it 

is also modernization costs for specific nuclear weapons. And then 

the challenge of the budget. What is sort of your vision for how we 

maintain, you know, our nuclear deterrent? Maintaining the full 

triad, meeting New START, meeting those modernization requirements in a tight budget environment? I realize that is not exactly 

a short answer, but just quickly, what is your vision for how to 

meet all those challenges and make sure we still have the nuclear 

deterrent that our national security plan requires? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Smith, I thank you for that question. First and foremost, I think it is important that we as a country realize just how important and foundational our strategic deterrent is today for us and well into the future. 

As you have mentioned, there is a need for modernization in a 

variety of areas. When you look at the credible strategic deterrent 

we have today, that includes everything from the indications in 

warning to the command and control and communication structure 

that goes all the way from the President down to the units, and 

to what frequently we talk about as the triad involving the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the submarines, and the bombers, 

each providing its unique aspect of deterrent. 

And as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review 2010, which is still 

enduring, these are capabilities that our country must have for the 

foreseeable future, even as we work to meet those New START 

Treaty limits that are provided. And we are on a good course regarding those. As you look at what numbers of our stockpile was 

back in the 1970s to where we are today and we are going, that 

is a good thing—— 

Mr. SMITH. Yes—— 

Admiral HANEY [continuing]. For the United States of America. 

Mr. SMITH. Admiral, if I may, I think the greater challenge is the 

budget piece. I mean, what if sequestration kicks in and we don’t 

have enough money to replace the Ohio class? You know, or those 

budget constraints kick in and we can’t modernize the missiles we 

need to keep our ICBM fleet up to snuff, or can’t build a new longrange bomber? 
10 

How deep are you into contemplating what the choices are in 

terms of what the smartest cuts to make and still maintain a credible deterrent would be? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, Congressman Smith, I would say, number 

one, if we continue on a journey of sequestration and have to make 

those kind of choices, that will be detrimental to our national defense structure. And I would make that my point, first and foremost. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. That is subtly and artfully put. I think it 

would be devastating. I mean, it would—I think it would require 

us to fundamentally reexamine our nuclear deterrent strategy. 

And I know many Members are very adamant that we need that 

nuclear deterrent strategy, we need that triad. Sequestration 

makes that impossible. It would require choices—it would require 

us to go in a different direction, and there may be a way out of it, 

a logical way. 

But I just want to make sure that everyone understands that sequestration basically blows up that strategy, that nuclear deterrence strategy based on the triad, given all of the things that have 

to happen over the course of the next couple of decades to fund it. 

Am I wrong about that or is that a fair assessment? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Smith, we will have to look at all 

things across our national security apparatus in that view. And 

there will be, as we have already made and will continue to have 

to make, very hard choices going forward in that regard. 

When you look, though, historically here, the force we have today 

has been really on what I call the decay heap from the investments 

made in particular around the 1980 timeframe. And consequently, 

that capability has been enduring and has lasted quite some time, 

even to this day, where its portion of defense funding is somewhere 

in order of 2.5 percent or more. 

And even the business of modernizing and improving that, which 

again will build things that will last a long time, requiring some 

modernization, will still perhaps be in the doubling of that amount 

or more over time. 

It is an investment, from my opinion, that we as a country can 

ill afford not to make, given the modernization that we see going 

on in other countries in the strategic environment today. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sure. Thank you. I do have questions for General Scaparrotti, but I will save those for the classified session and 

let other Members get in. I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the ranking member 

for holding this hearing. 

General, Admiral, thank you for your service to our country. And 

Admiral, we are certainly appreciative of the support your sister 

and your entire family has given to you as you have served with 

the general so ably for this country. 

General, we have heard words on North Korea like unpredictable, dangerous, unstable, one of the world’s largest conventional 

forces, willingness to use their military force. 
11 

Last month, General Dempsey testified to this committee that he 

considers anti-personnel landmines to be an important tool in the 

arsenal of the Armed Forces of the United States. The chairman 

also made this committee aware that an assessment has been conducted by the Pentagon on the issue of landmines and the impact 

of signing the Ottawa Treaty. 

Have you been able to review that assessment yet? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. FORBES. And can you tell us what that assessment is? Or is 

that something you would prefer to do when we go into the classified session? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I would prefer to do it in the classified session. 

Mr. FORBES. Then in this session, can you tell us not based on 

that assessment but in your best professional military judgment, 

what would your advice be to the chairman and this committee on 

the utility of anti-personnel landmines to your mission on the Korean Peninsula? 

And particularly, let me ask you this—what will be the impact 

to your mission on the Korean Peninsula if such a treaty were 

signed? And how would the United States and the Republic of 

Korea provide an effective deterrent to North Korea without the 

use of landmines? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I have provided my best military advice on this issue, as well. And it is my assessment that landmines 

are a critical element in the defense of the Republic of Korea and 

our interest there. And they are a critical element of our contingency plans, as well. 

For any further response, I would ask that we refer that to the 

closed session. 

Mr. FORBES. And with that, I will look forward to that response 

in that closed session. 

And Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to both of you gentlemen. Having personally had opportunities to meet with you in former commands that each of you 

had, I greatly appreciate the work and have witnessed it personally. And I thank you for that dedication and commitment. 

General Scaparrotti, particularly your time at Fort Bragg; and 

Admiral Haney, your time at the USS North Carolina commissioning that we had down at our congressional district, and also 

the work you did in PACOM [Pacific Command] and over in Pearl 

Harbor. 

With regard to your testimony, Admiral Haney, on page 10 you 

say that ‘‘recapitalizing our sea-based strategic deterrent force is 

my top modernization priority and I am committed to working 

closely with the Navy on this program.’’ 

And then you speak about the Trident ballistic missiles and the 

concerns that you have. 

And you talk about, with respect to the submarine that delivers 

these missiles, and I quote: ‘‘the Ohio-class submarine has already 

been extended from 30 to 42 years of service—no further extension 
12 

is possible and these submarines will start leaving service in 2027. 

As such, the Ohio Replacement Program must stay on schedule. No 

further delay is possible,’’ closed quote. 

And then you refer to our commitment to working with the 

United Kingdom on this. Would you discuss the risk and the cost 

savings associated with any further slippage in the schedule for the 

Ohio-class replacement submarine? 

In other words, will the Navy be able to fulfill STRATCOM’s 

[Strategic Command’s] continuous at-sea deterrence requirements 

in future years on the current schedule? And if these replacement 

submarines are further delayed? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman McIntyre, thank you for your 

question. 

As you have described here, I am fully committed to the Ohio replacement program due to what it provides our Nation as part of 

the triad. The survivable nature of our sea leg of this strategic deterrent continues to provide and will in the future provide credible 

both deterrence and assurance for our Nation and our allies. 

We have extended the Ohio class, the current class, out to this 

42 years, which is further than we have had any other submarine 

class operated before. Only one submarine, USS Kamehameha, was 

out to 36 years. 

So through proper engineering assessments and what have you, 

by refueling that class, we were able to get it out to 42 years. But 

in doing so, that really puts it at significant risk of going beyond 

that and maintaining the presence of strategic deterrence, its survivable leg at sea, for the future. 

As we look at the current plan which has been moved to the 

right, we won’t have that new Ohio replacement submarine on patrol until 2031, even with the current program we have right now. 

And as such, that puts our strategic deterrent at risk if we don’t 

continue to move forward and as we work through our sequestration journey, that that has to remain a high priority. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Scaparrotti, in the time I have left, I know the Army announced a rotational deployment of a combined arms battalion to 

Korea. We here get advice and hear consultations and testimony 

from other groups. And I want your reaction to this. 

The Center for Strategic International Studies has recommended 

that the Department consider replacing U.S. ground combat units 

with rotations of trained and ready Army brigades as one approach 

to enhancing readiness. 

Can you tell us what the benefits and risks of such a rotational 

model would be? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

As you know, we are rotating today on the ground force side of 

this, an aviation, reconnaissance aviation battalion, and as you 

mentioned, a combined arms battalion. 

The advantages of that are that those are both additional forces 

in Korea. So we were able to add forces with that rotation to meet 

needs for posture on the peninsula. So it allowed us to add a force. 

And when we do that, we can provide a force that is completely 

trained. It is ready. And it will be ready and in place for the dura-
13 

tion, a 9-month rotation in this case, to provide the deterrence and, 

if necessary, the combat forces that we need in a crisis. 

These forces are trained for that. They come into the theater 

ready to go. And we don’t have the turbulence that we see in the 

remainder of our forces that are assigned on the peninsula. 

As you know, we have most of our forces, particularly the soldiers, there on 1-year tours unaccompanied. And then, if they have 

families, which is about 20 percent, it would be a 2-year or 3-year 

tour. 

So we have an increased rotation of personnel, which challenges 

us in terms of readiness. 

So overall, I would say that I favor rotational forces, but we have 

to have a balance of those between the number that we rotate and 

then another grouping that is stable and on the peninsula to provide that persistence in a long-term relationship that we need within the alliance, as well. So a combination works best. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Admiral, 

thank you very much for your service. And I am particularly grateful to be with you in that I had the opportunity to be on a very 

rare delegation to North Korea. And so I have seen North Korea. 

I have just completed my third visit to South Korea. 

There is no greater contrast on Earth as to the difference between the failure of socialism in North Korea and the dynamic success of South Korea. And I give so much of that credit to American 

military to make this possible. The security there, the opportunity 

for the people of South Korea. And I just saw it firsthand. 

Additionally, I had the opportunity—it was my third visit to the 

DMZ. And I thought, General, Admiral, when I was going there 

that, gosh, third time. This is going to be boring. No. Any time you 

go it is, again, a chilling reminder with victory in the Cold War, 

there still is a remnant of the Cold War. And our military personnel are making such a difference in preserving by peace through 

strength in that region. So thank you for your service. 

I am particularly concerned that North Korea is changing its 

asymmetric capabilities with deployments and development of new 

ballistic missile systems, nuclear tests, cyber threats, and increased 

emphasis on specialized light infantry special operation forces. 

With that in mind, are the U.S. forces postured and capable of 

defending our allies given North Korea’s ability to conduct limited 

attacks, as indicated, Admiral, with limited or even no warning? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Would you like me to take it? 

Mr. WILSON. Both. Yes. Thank you. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sure. As I stated, they are investing in 

asymmetric means. We have made adjustments to our posture as 

an alliance, both ROK [Republic of Korea] and U.S. as a result of 

their changes. We have made changes in our armistice plans day 

to day, as well as our contingency plans for either provocation or 

crisis. 

So we have continued to adapt both the forces we have and the 

plans that we rely upon as an alliance to address that. And we are 

able to deter today and we can respond, as you saw this past week. 
14 

The ROK forces responded to the artillery fires in the northwest region. Thank you. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Wilson, likewise, our forces remain postured and ready. And the planning that we do with 

USPACOM [United States Pacific Command] is integrated in order 

to look at the threats from North Korea. 

But as you have stated, their provocation cycle and in particular 

their ability here to launch things in space, as well as parading 

around their various ballistic missile type capability and their nuclear test is something that we must continue to deter and provide 

assurance to as we go forward. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am going to thank both of you because I believe you are both very convincing. And this has to be reassuring, 

as the general indicated, to 23 million people who live virtually 

within artillery range in Seoul. And again, thank you. 

Additionally, with the rebalancing of the Asian Pacific, how is 

that affecting your ability to provide support in the region? Can 

you explain the adjustments that our forces are making that is different than currently postured? General. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sure. I can address that. First, it has been 

very positive on the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific at large, as 

you might imagine. But for me, the additional rotational forces that 

we just discussed are a part of the rebalance. 

In terms of the equipment that we have, the equipment within 

Korea, the services are—the Army has already completed the move 

to give us the most modern equipment in terms of Apaches, Bradleys, tanks that are available. And that is true with the other services. They are working along the same lines. 

In terms of the rebalance, I have been resourced so that I can 

maintain my readiness. My pilots, for instance in the Air Force, 

where our funds were increased this year to ensure that they could 

keep their skills honed to be able to respond and fight tonight. So 

I am pleased with that aspect of it. 

If I could, one thing from your last question is that is my first 

need given the threat that we face is increased ISR. And I wanted 

to make that point because you noted the limited warning time 

that we have. And it is an increase in ISR that will allow me to 

get indicators and warnings and posture the force properly and be 

proactive as opposed to reactive. 

Mr. WILSON. Well that is incredible, and I thank you again for 

your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And want to thank 

both the witnesses for being here today. General, your opening reference to the sinking of the Cheonan, you know, again, I think is 

an important reminder about the fact that, you know, the conflict 

over there, which again a lot of the press is focused on sort of, you 

know, rockets being fired and missiles being fired, but it also extends under the sea. 

And that actually was, again, the most—had the biggest casualty 

impact and was really the most outrageous breach of the rules over 

there. So thank you for, you know, sort of highlighting what happened in that incident. 
15 

And Admiral, it is good to see you again. Your service at Squadron Two up in Connecticut, again, was, again, an outstanding addition to your amazing resume ́. And it is good to see you in your new 

position. 

At every hearing since the budget came out, whether it was Secretary Hagel, Secretary Mabus, Mr. Stackley, recapitalizing the 

ballistic submarine force has been sort of a top issue, number one 

in terms of the priorities of the country but also obviously the challenge it presents to shipbuilding. 

I wanted to focus for a minute, in terms of CBO [Congressional 

Budget Office] sort of laid out some different scenarios in a recent 

report that talked about a fleet size of ballistic subs of 8 versus the 

planned 12. And again, in a very sort of strategic neutral fashion. 

It just sort of did it based on, you know, the impact in terms of 

budget numbers. 

But I was wondering if you would comment in terms of what the 

impact of having a smaller fleet would be if 8 were the size of the 

fleet as opposed to the—again, the reduced size of 12 that is now 

presently being planned. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Courtney, a very important question, in that through a variety of different jobs, including this one, 

as we have rigorously looked at the requirement, eight will not 

meet the requirement for the foreseeable future. 

When I first entered this business, we had ‘‘41 for Freedom’’ in 

terms of the number of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] that 

were available. Today we have worked hard to get to what—just 

what the country needs. And as we look at this future, the 12 Ohio 

replacement platforms is the requirement now and into the future. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And in terms of what eight would mean is that— 

you know, sometimes people might think eight would always be out 

there deployed at all times, but the fact is is the reality doesn’t 

allow for that. You need to have boats in for repair availabilities 

that take them out of the circulation. And I mean, isn’t that sort 

of really the rub of a smaller fleet size? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Courtney, we have worked over 

the years to refine our operational concept such that we could even 

get down to the 14 ballistic missile submarines we have today. 

Those submarines have an operational tempo of 70 percent and we 

keep them with the two-crew concept out at sea more so than our 

other platforms. 

As a result, you couldn’t do the same thing with eight today. 

That would be a significant reduction from the requirement that is 

necessary in order to have that survivable sea leg capability providing our deterrence day in and day out. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And last year during, again, some of the budget 

deliberations, again, there was an attempt again to sort of reduce 

the design budget and, again, push the schedule off to the right, 

which there was a fairly strong bipartisan vote rejecting that proposal. 

Again, I just wondered if you could sort of talk a little bit about 

the impact of another delay if that were ever to be approved by 

Congress. 

Admiral HANEY. Well, first I would like to thank the Congress 

for keeping us on course here. Because as I mentioned both in writ-
16 

ten testimony and verbally here, it is just so important that we not 

delay any further because we will take a detriment in having that 

strategic deterrent, that survivable leg capability that has been 

providing our deterrence for years and will continue to be a foundation of our national security for years to come. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Haney, I want to thank you for your very clear description of the need for us to take very seriously the investment in our 

strategic forces. Your statement of the investments that were largely being carried on occurred in the 1980s—the need to make certain that we have a credible and quality valid nuclear deterrent is 

incredibly important. 

Putin has allowed us in his most recent actions to understand 

that we have been pursuing a false narrative with respect to Russia, both with respect to our conventional forces in Europe and our 

strategic forces. We now see that there have been some actions that 

Russia has been taking, specifically under the leadership of Putin, 

that perhaps we have ignored or that we have diminished in importance. 

As we review those issues again, certainly our nuclear deterrent 

comes to mind as an issue that needs to be reviewed in light of 

Russia’s actions and Russia’s doctrine. So, my question to you is 

twofold with respect to Russia’s actions and doctrine with respect 

to its nuclear deterrent. 

Recently in the Global Security News wire, there was a statement that this weekend there was a massive nuclear force exercise 

in Russia that was under way, that, obviously having a great concern, if that is accurate, that that occur in context of the significant 

conventional mobilization that is happening of Russia on the border 

of Ukraine. 

So, I wonder if you might speak for a moment about Russia’s nuclear doctrine as we try to look to what narrative we should see 

Russia in. Could you tell us about this exercise and about Russia’s 

nuclear doctrine in general? And also, how does Russia integrate 

the use of its nuclear weapons into its conventional war plans, as 

we look to, obviously, a Russia that is mobilizing for war, specifically as we looked at Crimea and the prospects of Ukraine? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Turner, first and foremost, I 

would like to make sure I under—we are clear that I know of no 

massive nuclear exercise that is ongoing right now. I will say in 

2013—— 

Mr. TURNER. But let me just read what this says. It says, ‘‘According to the Russian Daily, on Thursday, Russia’s strategic missile forces began a massive 3-day exercise involving 10,000 soldiers 

and 1,000 pieces of equipment for more than 30 units. The major 

purpose of this drill, according to the report, which cites multiple 

senior Russian military officers, is to ensure Russia’s strategic missile forces have sufficient readiness to conduct offensive operations 

involving the massive and simultaneous use of nuclear missiles.’’ 
17 

Now, even if that—if you are not familiar with it, and even if it 

is not occurring, it certainly gives us the light of their concept— 

which is where my question goes—of the use of strategic weapons 

in context of their offensive or conventional movements. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Turner, Russia has maintained 

and continues to modernize their strategic deterrent capability, and 

also, periodically, exercises both their command and control capability through their communications, as well as as we saw in 2013, 

quite frankly, Russia put a YouTube video out on one of their strategic operational nuclear force exercises, where they demonstrated 

back in September, October timeframe every aspect of their capability. It did not make as much news as you described here today. 

But on a day-to-day basis, they exercise and have a readiness posture of their capability, which we monitor very closely. 

Mr. TURNER. Could you talk a moment about the issue in their 

doctrine about de-escalation? Because we have heard in front of 

this committee testimony about their use of nuclear weapons to deescalate a conflict, which we would consider to be an escalation of 

it. 

Admiral HANEY. Well, Congressman Turner, I think it would be 

much more appropriate to have that kind of conversation in a 

closed hearing. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, my point being, if—whatever you can say on 

the record, this certainly requires a public discussion of what our 

deterrent may be looking to. What can you tell us about Russia’s 

view versus our view? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, Russia has, as I mentioned, been on a continuous modernization program of their capability. Not just fixed 

ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile sites. For example, they 

have mobile ICBM missiles. They have been developing a new class 

of SSBN, as well. And they have exercised their strategic bomber 

capability frequently over the years, and continue to do so. 

I would be remiss if I was to go deeper into their strategy and 

what we think in that regards. But, as noted, through our various 

arms control deliberations, and even in his public statements that 

have been made by President Putin, he has always stated the importance of his strategic capabilities for the country of Russia. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This—all the way stage 

right. This question is in follow-up really to Mr. Wilson’s questioning and Mr. Turner’s questioning. 

We have seen several incidents of the North Koreans launching 

short-range and medium-range ballistic missile testing. We have 

seen several provocations of artillery firing on the part of the North 

Koreans, with some response with South Koreans. 

In light of what we have seen in Ukraine, and especially Crimea, 

do you detect any further provocations on the part of North Korea? 

I realize that North Korea has had a history of provocation—deescalation, provocation, de-escalation. But do you see any linkages 

here between the North Koreans’ recent activities and with the 

Russian actions in Crimea? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, no, I don’t. I have got to believe that Kim Jong-un and his regime obviously watches what 
18 

goes on in—globally and our responses to it. But in terms of this— 

the recent missile launches, the live fire event the other night, this 

is a common strategy with North Korea, to come out of a period 

of calm and to use these types of actions to message to both the 

United States, the international community, and South Korea. 

And also to demonstrate capability. And I personally believe that 

he is in a period now, particularly coming out of winter training 

cycle, and having had the alliance demonstrate our capabilities and 

our training period here over the last 2 months, that that is what 

this is about. It is the normal pattern of messaging his displeasure 

with our training. Messaging their capabilities. And just recently, 

their rhetoric has begun to pick up, as well, particularly in the last 

2 or 3 days. 

So, I think it is something that I expected, particularly at about 

the March-April timeframe. 

Mr. ENYART. Do you anticipate that this is sending the message 

also to China? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I think it could be. You know, China is— 

we would hope, have some influence. They certainly have every opportunity to influence Kim Jong-un and his regime. We would hope 

they would continue to put some pressure on him to abide by international norms and the United Nation’s Security Council Resolutions. 

Mr. ENYART. And one final question. What impact has the execution of his uncle had on the military command and control structure in North Korea? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, sir. 

That is a difficult question to answer in the sense that, you 

know, the regime is closed. They are very good at control of information, et cetera. And it is difficult for us to have a real clear picture of impact and intent. 

However, I think from what we do know, the fact that Kim Jongun executed his uncle—that it was his uncle, that it was an elder, 

and in the fashion that he did it—the public nature of it—and that 

he announced the reasons for it in the way he did, obviously, had 

an impact on the regime, as well. Because it really changed the 

rules, if I can put it that way. And I believe they probably are unsure of what the rules are today. 

So we believe it probably did have an impact on the regime. It 

probably was unsettling. 

From Kim Jong-un’s point of view, though, I would say that he 

has successfully controlled that situation, has gained power as a result of that. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank both of you for being here and for your service to 

our country. 

Admiral Haney, I was listening to your interaction with Ranking 

Member Smith and talking about sequestration and its effects on 

us. And I know from our conversations and your reference in his 

questioning that modernization is a top priority for you. 
19 

And your belief that sequestration is going to have a seriously 

detrimental effect on our ability to modernize. But when you were 

answering Congressman Turner, you made this quote, this statement: ‘‘Russia has been under continuous modernization process.’’ 

Can you tell us more about that continuous modernization process? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Rogers, as Russia has articulated 

their value in having strategic capability, and as such, each area 

they have invested in both in terms of nuclear strategic capability, 

as well as space capability and cyberspace capability, in terms of 

things. 

And as a result, we have seen them demonstrate their capability 

through a variety of exercises and operations. They maintain their 

readiness of that capability on a continuous fashion. And it is a capability I don’t see them backing away from. 

Mr. ROGERS. Over how long a period of time would you say they 

have been under this continuous process? 

Admiral HANEY. I would say, as a minimum, as the Russian capability drew down, the one area that they maintained was their 

strategic capability. 

Then their modernization has been occurring over the last decade 

or so. 

Mr. ROGERS. And how does it compare to our modernization effort over that same 10-year period of time? And what you see going 

forward? 

Are they as vigorous or more vigorous or less vigorous than we 

are at modernization? 

Admiral HANEY. I would say, at this point, over the last decade, 

they have put in place new programs, where in our case we have 

sustained existing programs. So I want to be careful in terms of 

comparing apples to oranges. 

It is just as we look to our future, you can only sustain what we 

have for so long. For example—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I guess what I am getting at is, would you say our 

modernization effort is inadequate? 

Admiral HANEY. I would say we have plans for our modernization that we must continue to work through. And if—as long as we 

stay on course on those plans, we will be fine. 

Mr. ROGERS. And will sequestration allow you to stay on course 

on those plans? 

Admiral HANEY. Sequestration, as written today, puts uncertainty in those plans, in terms of what will be funded into the 

future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Now I want to turn to the B–61 LEP [Life Extension Program]. 

Do you think our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies 

should help share the cost of our B–61 Life Extension Program? 

Admiral HANEY. I believe the B–61 Life Extension Program is a 

United States of America program and that is where it should be 

in terms of things. 

Mr. ROGERS. But do they currently shoulder part of those expenses by sharing the basing of them? 

Admiral HANEY. The expenses that our NATO partners expend 

on is associated with the storage and security of our storage areas. 
20 

Mr. ROGERS. So in fact they are sharing a part of the cost at 

present. 

Admiral HANEY. They are sharing that part of the cost. 

Mr. ROGERS. Which is a part of the cost. If they didn’t do it, we 

would have to do it, wouldn’t we? 

Admiral HANEY. That is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think that having them share part of these 

costs is in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? 

Admiral HANEY. The way they are paying for the security and 

storage is not in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

And I want to make sure we are clear—you restate your position 

on the importance of the B–61 LEP. 

Admiral HANEY. It is very important as we go forward here with 

what we have been calling our ‘‘3+2’’ strategy for weapons modernization that we life-extend the B–61 program. And that program 

has started and it provides the capability for our air leg to continue 

to be a viable part of our credible strategic—— 

Mr. ROGERS. There are those in the Congress who want to—who 

are calling for termination. Do you think that would be a responsible position to take? 

Admiral HANEY. No. I would urge the Congress to support the B– 

61 Life Extension Program. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, sir. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you very much for 

your testimony and for your service to our Nation. I congratulate 

you and wish you well in your respective positions. Thank you for 

all you are doing. 

General—actually Admiral, if I could start with you, since we 

have discussed New START this morning already a bit. I want to 

dive into that just a little more and talk about what STRATCOM’s 

view is as the best path for meeting New START levels while maintaining a nuclear deterrent and why. 

Admiral HANEY. We are, Congressman Langevin, on our journey 

in terms of meeting the requirements of the New START Treaty 

that goes fully in effect on the 5th of February in 2018. 

This involves where we will end up with 1,550 operational warheads that are also associated with 700 deployed launchers that 

are spread around the intercontinental ballistic force, the sea base, 

submarines, and the bombers. 

We are working our way through that journey and then there is 

another number, the 800 total launchers, meaning that you have 

about 100 that are non-deployed, meaning that they are not operationally with a—in the case of an ICBM or a submarine physically 

with a missile in the tube in that type of a configuration. More of 

a warm status. 

We are working our way through that cycle so that we will be 

there in 2018. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And the thoughts on the balance in terms of the 

missiles that are warm in the silos? Is that going to come at the 
21 

expense of what is our most survivable nuclear deterrent, that is 

our SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] in the tubes? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, the work is ongoing with U.S. 

Strategic Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense. And in 

terms of looking very—in detail with the attributes that each of 

those legs provide as we look at which will be kept in the warm 

status and I think the results of that will be coming out soon. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. 

General, if I could turn to you, and I thank you both for identifying the cyber threat as one of our top concerns. And I have been 

working on this issue for years. When I first did a deep dive on this 

in 2007, I can tell you pretty much nobody was talking about it. 

Now it seems that everyone gets how important and challenged we 

are in securing our Nation’s cyberspace. 

So General, if I could just start with you, what does the cyber 

threat landscape look like in your AOR [area of responsibility]? 

What trends concern you most? And I will see if I have time for 

a follow-up after that. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, thank you. I was remiss in 

not noting cyber as one of the asymmetric threats that North Korea 

is developing. And they are developing a cyber threat, as well. 

Theirs is not as advanced as some others, globally challenges. 

But they have demonstrated the ability to do denial of service, as 

well as disruption of web faces, et cetera. They had an impact on 

the South Korean banking and media industry here in the spring 

and summer of 2013, for example. 

And we know that they are working hard to develop a greater 

capability in cyber. 

And then also within our area, as you know, China presents a 

cyber challenge, as well, in the Pacific region. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And on that point, General, do you assess any security risk to U.S. forces from Seoul’s interest in China’s Huawei 

communications and networking equipment? 

General SCAPARROTTI. I am sorry, sir, on the last part, China’s—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. China’s Huawei communications and networking 

equipment? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I can’t comment on that. I don’t have 

the knowledge on that particular issue. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I would like to circle back with you. As you 

know, the Intelligence Committee on which I sit, as well, has done 

a deep dive on the Huawei issue and it is of great concern to us 

to the point that we have blocked Huawei from doing business here 

in the United States. 

But that is an ongoing and evolving concern that we have. So, 

we should talk more about that. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, I will have more questions in the classified session. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for your service to our country. 
22 

Admiral Haney, is it true that according to the latest New 

START Treaty declaration, we have actually cut our nuclear warheads by 103 while Russia has increased its deployed warheads? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I would put it a different way in 

that we are all working toward our strategic deterrent limit numbers as I described here relative to the 1,550 warheads for the 

United States of America, as well as for Russia in this arms control 

agreement. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I can’t dispute what you are saying. But to 

me, it is a remarkable situation that we are decreasing and they 

are increasing. 

You don’t have to comment on that, but let me ask you this— 

what is the ratio of imbalance of nuclear forces not covered by the 

treaty, like tactical weapons? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Lamborn, as you know, Russia 

has a sizable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons. 

The agreements we have had thus far have been focused on the 

strategic nuclear weapons. And when you look at those stockpile 

reductions, we have come down quite significantly as appropriately, 

in my opinion. 

And at the same time, through agreements ensuring that we 

have strategic stability as part of that process—and the verification 

piece that provides us that transparency; for example, 18 inspections on each side is a critical part of that agreement. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But is the imbalance roughly 10 to 1 when it 

comes to tactical warheads and weapons? 

Admiral HANEY. I would rather not put a number to it in this 

open forum, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral Haney, your predecessor testified that B–61 nuclear 

weapons stationed in Europe provide the President with important 

options and therefore have military value. 

Would you agree with that assessment? 

Admiral HANEY. I would agree with that assessment. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you very much. 

And now, for either one of you, how dangerous are North Korea’s 

KN–08 missiles? Are they different from what we have seen in the 

past? 

General SCAPARROTTI. The KN–08 is their developmental intercontinental ballistic missile. They have not tested it. They have displayed it. 

We believe that they have the technical capabilities and the skill 

to produce an ICBM. They claim that they have done so. 

And so, because of that, I think it is dangerous and we have to 

assume that they can employ one. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, with that in mind, are we adequately prepared to defend against North Korean missiles—either the KN–08 

we just discussed or the shorter range weapons that could hit our 

forces in the region? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, I will take the Korean theater portion of that. We and the Republic of Korea forces have a 

missile defense system that is in place which does provide the fence 

for the Korean theater and the forces therein and the populace 

there. 
23 

As noted in my testimony, it is one area, though, that we do need 

to continue to focus on. And it is one of the areas for improvement 

on both the ROK and U.S. side, in terms of the alliance. We can 

be better, is what I am saying. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Lamborn, our missile defense system which we have developed and continue to work on improving 

is designed specifically for a threat such as from North Korea. 

This is an area that we continue to work on investments, particularly in our sensing capability, discrimination, and working to 

improve the kill vehicle aspect of that capability are our top priorities. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And lastly, does the North Korean regime continue to put an emphasis on developing weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, yes they do. They are working on it steadily. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you both. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I would like to address a little bit more about the Republic of Korea’s military’s capabilities. 

You know, I know that historically, DOD [Department of Defense] was really looking at varied options to improve their readiness and also to look at the transfer of wartime operational controls back to the South Koreans—and that has been delayed until 

2015 for a number of reasons. 

So, I would be really interested in hearing about the current status of those efforts and what some of the biggest impediments to 

the transfer might be right now. 

There have also been some reports that have expressed concerns 

about the South Koreans’ abilities to assume control—whether they 

have demonstrated capabilities in place, or especially when they 

don’t have certain capabilities such as landing crafts. 

I am just very concerned about the range of security issues in the 

region and would like for you to perhaps comment on the current 

combat deficiencies with the ROK—beyond F–35, which you have 

already mentioned—that may further delay transferring operational control. 

And could you also identify capabilities that they should be pursuing that they currently don’t have or aren’t and if that is anything that can be addressed with the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] 

program? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. 

We are presently—and I say we—it is the Minister of Defense 

and the Secretary of Defense; the Department of Defense here last 

October agreed that they would form a working group to review the 

OPCON [operational control] transition of control in wartime of the 

alliance forces; they would review that throughout this year with 

an end date of reporting back at the next military committee this 

coming October. 
24 

That review is underway. And really, what they are looking at 

is, is it appropriate? What is the right timing of the transition? It 

is scheduled for December of 2015 at this point. 

And then also looking at what are the conditions that have to be 

met—because the transfer—Strategic Alliance 2015, as it is 

called—is a conditions-based process. It is not set on a date alone; 

it is on the condition. 

So, those are being reviewed today. What I would say to you is 

that the Republic of Korea leadership that I work with daily has 

stated that they are not prepared to take control of alliance forces 

in crisis at this point, and don’t believe they will be by 2015. 

Having said that, and to respond to the areas where I believe 

that we need to work—and these are areas that within the alliance, we need to work, but also ones that the Republic of Korean 

forces are focused on—is, first, ISR, the intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance systems that enable us as an alliance to provide indicators and warnings and to know what happened if there 

is an instant to determine what needs to be done next. 

Secondly, C4I, which is our computers, communications systems 

that allow command and control. An area there that is sufficient 

today; but given technology, can be much better—internally for 

each of our forces, but specifically for the alliance and something 

that I think for transition needs to be improved. 

The third is the ballistic missile defense system. As an alliance, 

we prefer an interoperable, layered, integrated system that works 

together—it is a much stronger system that way. There are things 

that need to be done in order to attain that objective. 

On the part of the Republic of Korea, that is one of their central 

priorities within the Ministry of Defense. And they are working 

what is known as the Korean Air Missile Defense System, and they 

have established a cell on a procedure to get to that point. 

And then finally, munitions. Within the alliance, we don’t have 

the right stockage of munitions and the numbers that we need to 

sustain us for a crisis of 30 days or more, for example. And we are 

working closely with the Republic of Korea to resolve that. 

I would finally close by saying that the ROK Government this 

year has budgeted within their budget against each of these areas 

and they are also focused on the areas that we believe as an alliance need to improve as we work toward OPCON transition. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Are their priorities the same as 

yours—you know, the ones that you have addressed? 

You talked about the ISR, C4I, the ballistic missile defense, munitions—would you say that there would be concurrence on the 

South Korean defense minister’s part, as well, or do you think he 

has slightly different priorities? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, he may have other priorities as well, 

but they agree with these priorities with the alliance. They have 

been agreed upon bilaterally. And as I said in the budget for instance, ISR, they recently budgeted to purchase Global Hawk, 

which is very important. 

They also put funds against munitions, et cetera. So we are 

working now on exactly—for instance munitions, which ones are— 

do we agree upon that we need, et cetera. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. All right. Thank you. 
25 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank both of you and those with you. Always very 

grateful to those who wear the uniform. I have 5-year-old twins, 

and I know that they have a much better chance of walking in the 

light of freedom because of the commitment that you have shown 

your entire lives, and I am very grateful to you. 

With that, if it is all right General Scaparrotti, I will start with 

you. President Obama recently told leaders of Japan and South 

Korea that he has succeeded in ‘‘changing the game’’ over North 

Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 

And yet last month, North Korea launched two mid-range ballistic missiles, and earlier this week they released a statement saying they would not rule out a new form of nuclear test for bolstering nuclear deterrence. 

And from your perspective, what is our Defense Department 

doing or able to do to change the game in our favor, and how are 

our missile defenses postured to support and protect our allies in 

the region from potential North Korean missile threats? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, in terms of the Defense Department 

strategy, it is really a whole-of-government approach that includes 

diplomatic, economic information, as well as military responses. 

In terms of the military, it is our posture. The exercises that we 

do for instance are a part of this deterrent strategy we have in 

terms of Kim Jong-un’s view of his missile and nuclear capabilities 

and what capability he may have and what it may cost him. So we 

look across the whole of government to respond to this. 

And actually just as with the occurrences that we have had here 

since the 21st of February and over the last few days, we are continually working that and changing our posture in order to have 

influence. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. Admiral Haney, STRATCOM mission is 

to ‘‘deter and detect strategic attacks and defeat attacks if deterrence fails.’’ 

And I have to say to you, having the privilege of serving on the 

Strategic Forces Committee here, I believe that the dollars spent 

under your command are the most important dollars in our entire 

military because our diplomacy is always seen in the shadow of our 

military capability. And I just can’t express to you how deeply convinced I am that your leadership and the work that you do is vital 

to this country. 

You have stated that our spending on nuclear forces was only 2.5 

percent of DOD spending in 2013. And I am not sure that upper 

echelons of leadership are really giving you the resources that you 

need. And I hear now of further reductions even beyond the New 

START Treaty levels. And I have to express to you, the low spending and even the further reductions in our New START concerns 

me greatly. 

Does it affect your mission to deter, detect, or defeat while potential adversaries around the world are pursuing greater capability 

in light of some of these moves in the direction of where it would 

reduce your overall response or throw-weight capability? Tell me, 

how is that affecting your mission? 
26 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, first and foremost, you know, the 

forces that I lead and have at our country’s disposal today is in fact 

ensuring we have a credible, secure, and effective deterrent capability. And it is run and operated by very capable people day in and 

day out. 

But to your point here, we cannot just assume that that will continue without proper investments, modernizations, support for our 

laboratory infrastructure and what have you that supports that capability now and into the future. It will continue to require investment. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I know—you know, there is no one that can 

tell you about anything about deterrent. You are the—I think one 

of the most well-qualified leaders of this particular part of our military that we have ever had. 

But having said that, you know, the deterrent is always in the 

mind of the enemy or the potential enemy. And my concern is that 

when they see us moving toward reduction and lower spending, 

that they may begin to be a little bit more—maybe question that 

deterrent more than they should, especially as we get that umbrella broadened out. 

And do you have any thoughts for this committee about what our 

future mindset should be toward the deterrence spending? 

Admiral HANEY. Well, I would hope this committee would support the modernization programs that support our credible, secure, 

and effective deterrent. And that extends all the way from the indications and warning sensors, the command and control piece, as 

well as the modernization of the platforms that are required, all 

the way to the weapon, the warhead itself. And we have to stay 

on course in that regard. 

As mentioned earlier, these modernization programs such as— 

from the weapons side, the warhead such as the B–61 program, 

very important to our Nation going forward. And in its future, the 

replacement for the air-launched cruise missile will be just as critical. 

Similarly, as we look at platforms, the Ohio replacement platform, the long-range strike bomber, support for those programs are 

critical to the future of our deterrent. As we do reduce in numbers 

to the New START Treaty, you should know that those numbers 

support the warfighting capability we need to have, the deterrence 

and assurance capability we need to have. 

And that has been looked at very, very hard. And having seen 

that process before when I was deputy commander and in other 

jobs in the Pentagon to seeing where we are now, we are on the 

right course. But that really makes every leg of the triad very important for the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Admiral. Thank you both for your 

service. 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. Gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both, 

gentlemen, for being with us this morning. And as my colleagues 

have said, thank you for your service and your leadership to our 

men and women in uniform. 
27 

I want to talk first of all with you, Admiral Haney, about cyber 

threats in the United States. I think Secretary Hagel said it well, 

that this is in the future in many ways of our defense posture and 

we must make sure it is robust. 

I believe we have to expand our cyber warfare capabilities to confront what we know are the evolving and ever-growing cyber 

threats against the United States. And as you know, Admiral, innovations in technology are moving very rapidly. And there is convergence between various disciplines with network systems and tactics. 

And this convergence of technology I believe calls for a diverse 

cyber workforce with capabilities from various disciplines. As you 

may know, Admiral, I have an outstanding garrison, Fort 

Huachuca, in my district with its electronic proving grounds, which 

is I believe an important partner in this evolving mission of 

cybersecurity. 

Not only does the installation have one of the most pristine environments in the world for C5ISR [command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance] testing in the United States, but also has a training facility right at its back door. Admiral, could you comment on 

this? 

As cyber warfare increasingly becomes a high priority in our national defense strategy, how do you see STRATCOM or more specifically USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] diversifying its 

cyber capabilities with existing infrastructures like Fort Huachuca 

and the electronic proving grounds? 

And do you see the Nation’s ranges playing an increasingly important role in the testing of future cyber and electronic magnet— 

electromagnetic technology? Please respond, Admiral. 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Barber, I thank you for that question. Your concerns for cybersecurity and our cyber capabilities are 

spot on. 

This is an area that is very important to me, and as I get to have 

this focus in my command as a priority of building cyberspace capability and capacity in working with our services and the joint 

staff and of course with U.S. Cyber Command in order to look at 

the threats of the day and the threats of the future and ensuring 

that we man, train, and equip to be able to address those threats, 

and also to integrate that capability into our tool bag for the future. 

So there is a lot of work going on. Your discussion of ranges is 

also important. And that interface between the electronic warfare 

environment and the cyber environment is one that we are continually working on now and into the future. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, I definitely commend the installation at—in 

Cochise County in my district, Fort Huachuca, and the range that 

as I mentioned is right there, the Goldwater Range, and great capabilities. 

Let me have a follow-up question with you on this, Admiral, too. 

And that has to do with how the fiscal restraints and the budget 

cuts are impacting on this important asset that we must have 

going forward. 
28 

How does the Department of Defense diversify and build a cyber 

workforce during a time of pretty significant personnel reductions 

and budget constraints? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman Barber, that work is under way 

and ongoing, and I am very pleased that the commitment from the 

services and through the joint force apparatus—Office of Secretary 

of Defense support. In terms of working to build up that capability, 

even in this environment of sequestration, we have been supported 

to build up a number of teams associated with our cyber workforce. 

From a protection standpoint, national mission teams. And they 

are working hand in hand at U.S. Cyber Command—they are—day 

in and day out, and improving that capability. 

I think as we go forward, we will still need some work outside 

of what was already discussed in terms of policies, authorities, and 

those to support this workforce that we continue to train and develop and grow. 

Mr. BARBER. Let me turn—thank you, Admiral. I will turn to 

General. This has to do with South Korea and the protection of our 

ally there, the treaty that we have. 

The A–10s, as you know, have played an important role in providing close air support, should we have a conflict with North 

Korea. And you never know—tomorrow it could happen. I mean, I 

can ask your comment—for you to comment on the A–10’s presence, its importance, and about what might happen if we no longer 

have it in the air and flying in protection of our troops. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Thank you, sir. 

As you know, the A–10 is a unique platform that provides exceptional close air support to our troops. I’m an infantryman; it has 

been employed on my behalf in combat. And the pilots that fly 

them—it is an exceptional platform. 

On the peninsula, I think it is an important part of our defense 

there in the sense that you have the kind of terrain that an airplane like that can be helpful. However, I also know in this case, 

the Air Force’s difficulties with the physical constraints that they 

have, and an aging platform, that they have got to make some 

tough decisions. And I believe that if the A–10 does not remain in 

the inventory, that we can be provided support from F–15, F–16, 

and the other platforms, as we have done in Afghanistan successfully. 

So, within the peninsula, my concern is, is that I have an aircraft 

that will replace that A–10 if, in fact, it leaves the inventory. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, General. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Scaparrotti, Admiral Haney, thank you so much for joining us today. We 

appreciate your service to our Nation. 

General Scaparrotti, in August of 2013, the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense denied the Army’s request to increase the overseas housing 

allowance in support of the Humphreys Housing Opportunity program, stating that there were some issues there. And what they 

did was to direct the Army to look at alternatives to that housing 

opportunity program there that would meet the readiness requirement set forth by U.S. Forces Korea’s commander. 
29 

Let me ask this. Do you believe that the readiness requirements 

for Camp Humphreys housing is still valid? Are you reevaluating 

those requirements? And what are you doing currently in working 

with the Army to address the projected housing deficits there at 

Camp Humphreys? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, thank you. 

As I came into command, one of my first priorities was to really 

review very closely our reposture of our forces, and in particular, 

our ability to take care of our forces in barracks and families in 

quarters. And I have done that in the time that I have been in 

command. And, actually, I have established my requirement at 40 

percent of our command sponsorship program families, which is 

also General Thurman’s prior requirement. I believe that is accurate. 

And I have—the Army is aware of that requirement, as well. 

Now, I have worked with the Army since I have been in command 

on this issue. In fact, spoke to Ms. Hammack this week. And then 

about 10 days ago, the Army held a conference in Korea, targeted 

at determining the market off post, and the availability off post— 

the availability of building. 

So, having said that, it is an Army issue. As a commander, I do 

need a solution. As you know, the majority of our forces are moving 

in 2016. I am really inside of the window for being able to provide 

for the families that will be moving. And so I look to the Army to 

find a solution, and it will probably be a combination of both onand off-post capability in order to meet our requirements. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

If you would give me your assessment of U.S. Forces Korea readiness, and how you look at the other challenges that are out there 

that may have an impact on your state of readiness, and that is, 

the effect of other COCOMs [combatant commands] and the other 

service branches as far as the current readiness states. 

And what are your thoughts and concerns about PACOM’s prepositioned stocks, including operational stocks? And is there a challenge there with those stocks being deficient? And if so, what would 

you propose be done in relation to your efforts with PACOM to address that? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Congressman, we are in close working relationship with PACOM. We have an excellent relationship in 

terms of our staffs. I do have concerns about pre-positioned stocks, 

primarily with the fiscal constraints, and perhaps some decisions 

that Army may make with respect to the available stocks for us, 

which we rely upon if we go into crisis. 

I also have concerns about munitions. Having the stockage that 

I need. I am short right now in some specific categories—precision 

munitions and ballistic missile defense, in particular. And also, the 

location of those so that they match my deployment schedule in the 

places that I need them as I flow forces. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Give me your perspective on the current state of 

readiness there. If you would put that in perspective. Obviously, we 

talked about the operational and pre-positioned stocks, but give me 

your perspective on where you are from a readiness standpoint. 

General SCAPARROTTI. I think today, Congressman, I am in good 

shape in terms of readiness for deterrence, and for actions in armi-
30 

stice or provocation. My concern with readiness has to do with development where provocation escalates to a crisis. And at that 

point in time, I will immediately need follow-on forces. 

The initial forces from PACOM, I am confident, given my discussions with the PACOM commander and his subordinate commanders that they are focused on my immediate needs, and they 

track that daily. But as we get into a greater conflict, and we begin 

to flow forces from all the services, you know today that they are 

at a reduced readiness rate. And so, I am concerned that they 

would be—they would come in a ready state that I need them for 

what will be a high-intensity conflict. Not like Afghanistan or Iraq, 

but a high-intensity conflict. And also, that they can be delivered 

by TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] in the timeline that I 

need them. And I believe today that TRANSCOM could not meet 

that schedule, given the fiscal constraints that they have. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

General, you spoke earlier to the ISR on the battle management 

platforms and the importance of them. The JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] fly out of Robins Air Force Base 

that I represent. And there is a proposal currently to recapitalize 

that fleet. I have a tremendous amount of respect for General 

Welsh. Agree with him that we need to move to that next generation platform. 

In moving to that platform, we are going to be pulling down some 

of the current aircraft that are flying and providing that intel and 

that battle management platform. 

My question for both of you is, as we draw down those units 

when they go in for depot maintenance, to recapitalize the fleet, my 

concern is that it leaves us with a gap in that ISR and battle management platform. Could you discuss the importance of the 

JSTARS, the recapitalization, and any potential gap that may be 

there as we recapitalize that fleet? 

General SCAPARROTTI. In my case, sir, I—the environment in 

Korea—the JSTARS provides me some critical intelligence in terms 

of change management, et cetera. And I would prefer not to go into 

too much more detail here, but it is very important to us. And 

when that transition takes place, for me, it is important that it is 

done so that I don’t have a loss in capability as we transition to, 

and make available, a new airframe that will provide the same intelligence capabilities. 

Mr. SCOTT. I think that—obviously, our goal is to get you more 

intelligence from the JSTAR unit. But we will speak further about 

it when we go into the classified meeting. But thank you for your 

comments. 

And, Admiral, do you have anything to add to the JSTARS? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I would say at large, in terms of 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and our assets, they 

are at high demand and in total. 

And the business of being able to have that unblinking eye is a 

critical mission area that we are all—work together at. 

So, when we get to this point here of JSTARS management, that 

is going to require careful management to ensure that we don’t lose 

capability where we need to have it. 
31 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank both of our—General and Admiral, for your 

time here today and briefing us. 

I had an opportunity to go to South Korea back in 2006 before 

I got involved in this crazy place. I went there to visit my son, who 

was up at Camp Casey, Camp Humphrey—two garden spots, I 

would say. 

But I was always concerned about our ability to defend ourselves 

and the South Korean Peninsula. 

And there have been a number of changes in force—he was 

heavy armor, then went to Bradleys. 

So, I hear some reluctance in your statements, General, in regards to pre-positioning of our assets. You know, everything that 

I have heard and read about North Korea—it doesn’t bode real well 

for us in the short-term for those forces that we have there. 

Can you give me assurances as a father of three soldiers that 

currently serve—two Active Duty, one National Guard—that we 

are capable of defending not only South Korea, but our own men 

and women that are stationed there? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Yes, Congressman, I can. The Republic of 

Korean forces, which have the—provide the predominance of the 

ground force today and the defense along the DMZ—which has 

changed, you know, since 2006. There has been a transition there 

within the alliance. 

They are a capable, modern force. Their officerships are welltrained and they are getting stronger every day. 

Our posture there, I think, is sufficient now. To your point, in 

terms daily, I believe, yes—we can defend the peninsula. 

But what I would say is, is that this is a different environment 

than we have—you know, it is a different—the nature of this conflict will be different. 

And it will be high intensity; there will be higher casualties than 

we have seen in the recent conflicts that we have been in because 

of the, one, the capability of both sides; but also, the number of 

forces that are involved here and the limited warning. 

So, there is no doubt that we can defend the peninsula. But this 

will be a high-intensity, tough conflict, and it will have potentially 

some high casualties, as well—that is, if we go to a full crisis. 

In short, in terms of provocation, I assure you that we can deal 

with provocation. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I know from the intel side of it, very difficult 

to judge where Kim Jong-un—his regime is at any given time, particularly he obviously has no problem in taking out those that he 

feels are a threat to him in any way at all. 

But changing just a little bit—as it relates to the National Guard 

and the Reserve forces, there is a lot of discussion about, A, keeping them operational. What, if any, mission do you see with the 

National Guard or Reserve forces to supplement the forces—Active 

Duty forces that are currently in Republic of South Korea? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Well, sir, in terms of our forces, the Guard 

is—you know, over the years, particularly through the conflict in 
32 

the last decade, they have served side by side with us. We have 

been a total force. 

As a commander in Afghanistan, I averaged between 11 and 14 

percent Guard and Reserve with every unit that I commanded in 

Afghanistan or Iraq. 

And in terms of the peninsula, I think they are an integral part 

of what we do day to day in armistice and as well as if we go to 

conflict. 

Mr. NUGENT. Are you planning National Guard rotations or Reserve rotations through the peninsula? 

General SCAPARROTTI. Sir, I don’t necessarily specify the type of 

element. I have a requirement as a commander—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

General SCAPARROTTI. And then it is the forces’ determination as 

to who they provide. My requirement is they provide a force that 

is capable to do the mission and is ready. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Haney, our QDR states that, quote: ‘‘We will pursue further negotiated reductions with Russia’’—talking about nuclear 

arms reductions. 

Given Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the mass amount of 

troops that they are putting on the border of Ukraine, do you support negotiated reductions with Russia? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, as I have stated both in a variety 

of statements publicly, any further reductions with Russia requires 

that it is done in a verifiable manner. It also has to be negotiated— 

not unilateral; bilaterally. And it has to be in full context of their 

world events, as well as in context of all of their capability. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, if the QDR, for example, was written prior 

to the invasion of Crimea, then that might change the calculation 

of whether or not we need to reduce nuclear weapons with Russia? 

Admiral HANEY. It has the possibility. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It is public knowledge that the State Department has confronted Russia about its violation of the Intermediate 

Nuclear Forces Treaty. And media reports indicate that the U.S. 

has known about these likely violations for years. 

Did this factor into these statements in the QDR about new negotiations for treaties with Russia that you know of? 

Admiral HANEY. The comment in the QDR associated with negotiations with Russia has been a comment that has been reinforced, 

both from Nuclear Posture Review 2010, the President’s Berlin 

speech. 

This has been a continual goal—the goal of continuing to reduce 

nuclear weapons in the world in general. But along with that goal 

has been a statement that as long as other nations have that capability, we will have a safe, secure, and effective capability, as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Do you believe Russia should be in compliance 

with its existing nuclear arms control treaties before we negotiate 

new ones? 

Admiral HANEY. I believe that treaties are an agreement that 

has to be dealt with seriously and that—no different than our exe-
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cution of New START Treaty today, that we are able to carry out 

what we signed up to do. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, if they would be in violation of old treaties, 

maybe we shouldn’t enter into new treaties? 

Admiral HANEY. I would rather not talk about a hypothetical 

case. I would rather this issue, which I think is being taken seriously—it is being looked at by our interagency, particularly State 

Department—and I think that piece needs to come to conclusion as 

we look forward at further treaties. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, what type of strategic adjustments have you had to 

make in light of what Mr. Snowden has taken from us as far as 

intelligence and how we go about business? How do you prepare for 

somewhat the unknown? 

I guess we do have some idea of what was taken and what information may be shared. But how do you prepare for the downfall 

of that? 

Admiral HANEY. Congressman, I think that first and foremost, 

the approach has been to take a hard look at what is all the material that has been potentially leaked—classified material leaked by 

Mr. Snowden. 

And then looking at that and adjusting based on those—on the 

categories and the specificity—the specifics of the associated material. I couldn’t go into more detail than that in this open forum. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. But that process is taking place and analyzing 

what we may need to change in order to keep up with what they 

may now know? 

Admiral HANEY. It is a process that is ongoing. It has specific attention, I think, of components to our Department of Defense and 

country at large, and that this is an ongoing assessment and evaluation. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Yes, I imagine it is pretty extensive. Because so 

much material was taken to figure out what we know they know. 

And then how do we adjust? And so, I appreciate your efforts in 

that regard. I am encouraged to know that it is ongoing. And I 

want to thank you both for your service. 

And, General, I don’t know if you have anything to add to that. 

General SCAPARROTTI. Only that just 2 days ago, I sat down with 

individuals who are analyzing all of this data to specifically come 

back for another time with me in terms of how it impacts my forces 

in Korea and what we do. So, they are constantly working this 

issue, and we are continuing to exchange as time goes on to determine what changes we need to make, what impacts it will have. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you both very much. Appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, that concludes the meeting in this room. We will adjourn to 2216 at this time. If you need a little break—say 12:00 

p.m., does that work for you? 

[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 2, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 2, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 2, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. There are various efforts in the Department, namely Air Force, 

Army, and DARPA, to provide rapid low cost launch solutions. How would this type 

of launch capability be a benefit to the warfighter, and in light of China’s advances 

in counterspace, how important is it that we prioritize these efforts? 

Admiral HANEY. Rapid low cost launch solutions could enable the warfighter to 

add, maintain or replenish capability should the need arise. Rapid launch may also 

help supply short-term niche space-based products and services in support of specific operational needs that may be beyond the scope or timeline of on-going programs. The current level of development priority for these capabilities is appropriate. While rapid launch will likely be a contributor in supporting response options to threats to our space systems, it is premature to determine if this path will 

provide our sole or most significant contribution. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. What would it take to fully implement the nuclear deterrent modernization plan laid out in FY14? Please provide any available analysis or charts 

showing what would be required to fully execute this plan. 

Admiral HANEY. The FY2015 Section 1043 Report (10 USC, Sec 495) is in final 

development for submission to the President and forwarding to Congress. The report 

outlines the plans and resource requirements to ensure the U.S. continues to meet 

its strategic deterrence objectives and extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners. These resource requirements are reflected in the President’s 

FY2015 Budget submission. The total estimated budget requirement for Fiscal 

Years 2015 through 2019 is nearly $125B—$45.6B for the DOE, NNSA; $61.2B for 

the DOD nuclear weapons delivery systems capability sustainment; and $17.9B for 

the DOD nuclear command and control capability sustainment. 

Mr. COOPER. The Defense Science Board in a recent report, ‘‘Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies,’’ concluded that monitoring for nuclear proliferation should be a top national security objective, but one for which ‘‘the 

nation is not yet organized or fully equipped to address.’’ Do you agree? Why is 

verification important for strategic stability? 

Admiral HANEY. I agree monitoring for nuclear proliferation should be a top national priority. Monitoring and verification are important components in our strategy to reduce nuclear threats to United States’ vital interests. As the report points 

out, today’s complex security environment presents new and evolving challenges in 

the early identification of clandestine nuclear weapon programs. New technologies 

and approaches are required as part of a comprehensive strategy to mitigate these 

threats. Many of these same technologies are also necessary to enhance verification 

of compliance of current and future arms control agreements that seek to reduce nuclear stockpiles as well as delivery systems. 

Mr. COOPER. Why is Russia concerned about U.S. missile defense and conventional prompt global strike efforts? How is this affecting their nuclear deterrent 

force posture and doctrine? 

Admiral HANEY. Despite the fact the U.S. continues to assure Russia that European BMD is not sized, positioned, nor capable of offsetting Russian ICBMs, the 

Russians continue to publicly oppose U.S. missile defense in Europe, stating they 

believe these interceptors to be a threat to their nuclear strategic deterrent. Publicly, Russia has expressed concerns about the survivability of its future nuclear deterrent in the face of U.S. and allied ballistic missile defenses and conventional strategic arms. Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov may have best summarized 

these Russian concerns when he spoke at an October 2007 NATO-Russia Council 

Meeting: 

‘‘. . . Global missile defense cannot be discussed apart from strategic offensive 

weapons. The undeniable link between U.S. missile defense and its strategic offensive weapons is axiomatic. Taken together they become a strategic complex 

capable of delivering a ‘‘disarming first strike’’ . . . Furthermore, we see a direct 
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link between U.S. plans for global missile defense and the prompt global strike 

concept which means the ability to strike any point on the globe within an hour 

of the relevant decision. This concept, when combined with global missile defense, becomes a means for world domination, politically and strategically. This 

is a rather serious factor which undermines the principles of mutual deterrence 

and mutual security and erodes the architecture of strategic stability . . .’’ 

From our perspective, their concern is unwarranted as the planned number of 

interceptors is insignificant compared to the total number of ballistic missiles they 

have available. 

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that, ‘‘While the GMD system 

would be employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches 

from any source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or 

Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with 

those countries.’’ We continue to follow this policy in our acquisition and procurement decisions. 

We continue to monitor Russia’s upward trajectory to modernize its nuclear triad 

by 2021 that interestingly includes its own precision-guided weapons development 

program as well as the fielding of missile defense systems. The last two Russian 

strategic nuclear forces exercises have included media coverage of precision guided 

cruise missile strikes as well as launches of anti-ballistic missiles in response to an 

incoming ICBM strike. Russia’s nuclear forces are undergoing a substantial modernization in the face of this new generation of missile defense capabilities. During 

the most recent Russian nuclear forces exercise (8 May 2014), Russian Defense Minister Shoygu informed President Putin that new ICBMs and SLBMs were entering 

the active force in large numbers. Shoygu also noted that the new Yars Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and the Bulava Sea Launched Ballistic Missile systems that 

were being put in service contained, among other improvements, enhanced capabilities to overcome missile-defense systems. 

Mr. COOPER. What is STRATCOM’s advice on avoiding an arms race with Russia? 

What is the value of verifiable nuclear weapons reductions? 

Admiral HANEY. An arms race is not in our mutual interests. Therefore, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. should continue talks and cooperation 

with Russia on strategic stability issues to enhance confidence, improve transparency, and reduce mistrust. Verifiable strategic nuclear arms reductions under 

the New START Treaty support these goals reducing the potential for misperception 

that could lead to unhealthy nuclear competition. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The United States Government signed agreements with the Republic of Korea to relocate United States military forces from Seoul and other bases 

to Camp Humphreys. While the majority of the relocation costs are being paid by 

the Republic of Korea, the Department of the Army is solely responsible for ensuring that adequate family housing meeting applicable U.S. standards is available, 

both on-post and off-post. I am concerned about the impact that a lack of adequate 

housing may have on the relocation effort. 

A. Can you please briefly provide an update on the status of the relocation? 

B. In addition, can you please provide an update on your requirement regarding 

the percentage and number of military families that need to be housed on Camp 

Humphreys and a discussion for when you need to have family housing available 

for the relocation to stay on schedule? 

C. Do you see any viable short-term solutions to any assessed lack of adequate 

housing? 

D. Can you elaborate on the anti-terrorism and force protection measures that 

will be implemented to ensure the safety of the large number of military members 

and their families stationed in Korea? 

General SCAPARROTTI. A: The Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership 

Plan relocation to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys remain on schedule to 

meet U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) objectives. B: USFK requires an additional 425 family housing units by mid-2016 for 40% of the command sponsored families at USAG 

Humphreys. C: The Department of the Army is working to find housing solutions 

to meet our operational requirements in Korea. D: Currently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorism threat level in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is ‘‘Moderate,’’ and the overall criminal threat within the ROK is ‘‘Low.’’ USFK military 

housing offices work closely with local realtors to provide safe, high quality housing 

for military members. Although the Unified Facilities Criteria anti-terrorism standards do not apply to private off-post housing (in Korea or the United States), our 
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housing offices provide information sheets on features to look for to enhance force 

protection when selecting a rental unit. 

Additionally, ROK government agencies have very effective surveillance and 

counter-intelligence systems to identify individuals with possible ties to terrorist organizations or activities and swiftly take action to prevent incidents. The Command 

works closely with these ROK agencies to identify and mitigate any potential 

threats against USFK installations and personnel. 

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