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THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FIRST RESPONDERS: 

SHARING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST 

ATTACKS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 18, 2014 

Serial No. 113–71 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ................. 1 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES

Mr. John Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 

New York City Police Department, New York, New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. James H. Schwartz, Chief, Arlington County Fire Department, Arlington, 

Virginia: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. James Hooley, Chief, Boston Emergency Medical Services: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Dr. Brian A. Jackson, Director, Rand Safety and Justice Program, The Rand 

Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 29 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John Miller .......................... 55 

Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James H. Schwartz ............. 55 

Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for James Hooley ...................... 56 

Questions From Honorable Susan W. Brooks for James Hooley ......................... 57 

Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Brian A. Jackson ................. 58 

(1) 

THE CRITICAL ROLE OF FIRST RESPONDERS: 

SHARING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST 

ATTACKS 

Wednesday, June 18, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Broun, Barletta, Hudson, Brooks, Sanford, Thompson, Jackson Lee, Clarke, Keating, 

Payne, and Vela. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. The committee is meeting today to examine testimony regarding the critical role first responders play in the protection of the homeland. 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

The United States continues to face an ever-evolving terrorist 

threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and others. We are seeing the 

rise of radical Islam in Africa, attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan 

and Afghanistan, and the civil war in Syria has provided a safe 

haven for terrorists to train, which is now flowing deep into Iraq. 

As I speak, a terrorist organization too extreme for al-Qaeda continues to march towards Baghdad leaving a trail of death, looting, 

and prison breaks. 

These terrorists, and others around the world like AQAP, are intent on attacking the homeland. Just as we must continue to combat those threats overseas, we must also remain vigilant at home 

and be prepared to respond to attacks that reach our shores. 

Today’s hearing examines these terrorist events; first responder 

efforts before, during, and after these attacks; and the lessons 

learned. 

Each day, first responders save lives and enhance the overall resiliency of our Nation. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks forever 

changed the role of our emergency response providers. Since that 

day, these brave men and women have been the first on the scene 

during the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, among others. 

These tragic events remind us of the critical role first responders 

play in the Nation’s ability to react quickly, whether it be to a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Lessons learned from previous ef-
2 

forts are vital to increasing our ability to prepare for and respond 

to future incidents. 

We owe it to these heroes and the American people to focus our 

efforts on doing all we can to ensure first responders are properly 

prepared for whatever catastrophe they encounter. From every incident, there are aspects of the response that went well and things 

that can be improved. We can and must learn from both. 

This committee was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to better 

protect the American people against a terrorist attack and fulfill its 

mission by ensuring that first responders, law enforcement personnel, and the Department of Homeland Security have the capabilities, training, and tools needed to prepare for, to prevent, and 

respond to future attacks. 

In addition to the vital response and recovery mission, first responders are critical partners in preventing attacks. State and local 

law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical responders know 

their communities and will be the first to identify suspicious behavior and other potential security threats. First responders should 

have access to real-time threat and suspicious behavior reports, 

which are key to directing and detecting and stopping terrorism. 

In turn, first responders must have access to all applicable Federal information so that they can do their job to the best of their 

ability. This was clear in the tragic Boston bombing last year. 

Members of this committee are committed to seeing that the recommendations in the Boston Marathon bombing report are implemented, and most importantly, that information sharing between 

Federal, State, and local partners is improved. 

I would like to recognize the first responders testifying here before us today, as well as those in the audience and across the country, for always answering the call. A simple ‘‘thank you’’ is not 

enough to express our gratitude for your efforts to protect the 

American people. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

With that, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank the Chairman for holding today’s hearing. 

I also want to recognize the volunteers, first responders, and the 

citizens affected by the powerful tornadoes that ripped through the 

small town of Pilger, Nebraska. In a time of catastrophe, such as 

this, the first responder community runs to unsettled and unknown 

territory while others flee to safety. 

I also thank the witnesses for their service and their dedication. 

Chief Schwartz, Deputy Commissioner Miller, and Chief Hooley are 

gentlemen who deserve commendation for their efforts. 

I also thank Dr. Jackson for recognizing their efforts in his research. 

Resilience and response are two of the reasons why almost a decade after September 11 New York City remains a global powerhouse. Resilience and response are two of the reasons why over 

30,000 military and civilian personnel continue to serve at our Nation’s defense headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Resilience and 

response are two of the reasons why a year after the Boston Marathon bombing, Boston remains strong. 
3 

Mr. Chairman, as we rightfully commend today’s panel, it would 

be a disservice to them not to address one of their main needs, 

which is funding. 

In April this committee held a hearing on the Boston Marathon 

bombing. At that hearing Sergeant Pugliese, of the Watertown Police Department, testified that local municipal governments are not 

financially equipped to take on the increasing burden of catastrophic attacks, like Boston. 

Last year at the Committee on Homeland Security’s first hearing 

on the Boston Marathon bombing former Commissioner Davis stated that without grant funding the response would have been much 

less comprehensive than it was, and without the exercises supported through the Urban Area Security Initiative funding there 

would be more people who died in those attacks. Even today, Chief 

Schwartz is testifying that Federal grants serve as an incentive for 

bringing all agencies together before a terrorist event happens. 

Throughout several Congresses, Members have heard about the 

importance of these grant programs and success stories involving 

them. Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the administration’s 

proposal to morph the Homeland Security Grant Program into an 

all-hazards grant. That proposal would shift focus away from supporting State and local efforts to develop terrorism-related prevention and preparedness capabilities. 

I am not convinced that the administration’s underfunded grant 

consolidation proposal would provide sufficient support for first responders across America to build and maintain the capabilities necessary to respond effectively. I cannot support any grant reform 

proposal until I am convinced that it would provide the support 

necessary to maintain terrorism preparedness capabilities we have 

spent over a decade building. 

Also I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore the information sharing between Federal, State, and local authorities needs 

strengthening. Since September 11, information-sharing silos that 

the 9/11 commissioners recommended be addressed continue to be 

exposed after tragic events. We need to work together to develop 

ways to fix this problem post-haste. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we continue this conversation 

with the Department of Homeland Security. We will hear about the 

challenges first responders have with working with both FEMA 

and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, but we need to open 

hearings on what the Department is doing to address these matters. In that forum we may find ways that we can use our legislative platform to assist both DHS and the first-responder community. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 18, 2014 

I want to recognize the volunteers, first responders, and the citizens affected by 

the powerful tornadoes that ripped through the small town of Pliger, Nebraska. In 

a time of catastrophe such as this, the first responder community runs to unsettled 

and unknown territory while others flee to safety. 

I also thank the witnesses for their service and dedication. Chief Schwartz, Deputy Commissioner Miller, and Chief Hooley are gentlemen who deserve commenda-
4 

tion for their efforts. I also thank Dr. Jackson for recognizing their efforts in his 

research. Resilience and response are two of the reasons why almost a decade after 

September 11, New York City remains a global powerhouse. Resilience and response 

are two of the reasons why over 30,000 military and civilian personnel continue to 

serve at our Nation’s defense headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Resilience and response are two of the reasons why a year after the Boston Marathon bombings, Boston remains strong. 

Mr. Chairman, as we rightfully commend today’s panel, it would be a disservice 

to them not to address one of their main needs which is funding. In April, this committee held a hearing on the Boston Marathon bombing. At that hearing, Sergeant 

Pugliese of the Watertown Police testified that local municipal governments are not 

financially equipped to take on the increasing burden of catastrophic attacks like 

Boston. 

Last year, at the Committee on Homeland Security’s first hearing on the Boston 

Marathon bombings, former Commissioner Davis stated that without grant funding, 

the ‘‘response would have been much less comprehensive than it was’’ and without 

the exercises supported through Urban Area Security Initiative funding, ‘‘there 

would be more people who died in those attacks.’’ And even today, Chief Schwartz 

is testifying that Federal grants serve as an incentive for bringing all agencies together before a terrorist event happens. 

Throughout several Congresses, Members have heard about the importance of 

these grant programs and success stories involving them. Accordingly, I urge Members to oppose the administration’s proposal to morph the Homeland Security Grant 

Program into an all-hazards grant. That proposal would shift focus away from supporting State and local efforts to develop terrorism-related prevention and preparedness capabilities. I am not convinced that the administration’s underfunded grant 

consolidation proposal would provide sufficient support for first responders across 

America to build and maintain the capabilities necessary to respond effectively. I 

cannot support any grant reform proposal until I am convinced that it would provide 

the support necessary to maintain terrorism-preparedness capabilities we have 

spent over a decade building. 

Also, I agree with the Chairman that we cannot ignore that information sharing 

between Federal, State, and local authorities needs strengthening. Since September 

11, information-sharing silos that the 9/11 Commissioners recommended be addressed continue to be exposed after tragic events. We need to work together to develop ways to fix this problem post haste. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we continue this conversation with the Department of Homeland Security. We will hear about the challenges first responders have 

with working with both FEMA and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. But we 

need open hearings on what the Department is doing to address these matters. In 

that forum, we may find ways that we can use our legislative platform to assist both 

DHS and the first-responder community. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Other Members are reminded they may submit opening statements for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel here before us 

today. 

First, Deputy Commissioner John Miller. He is the deputy commissioner of intelligence for the New York City Police Department. 

Prior to this position, he was the senior correspondent for CBS 

News. 

Commissioner Miller is also a former ABC News reporter, perhaps best known for conducting a May 1998 interview with Osama 

bin Laden. He is a former associate deputy director of national intelligence for analytical transformation and technology; and he was 

an assistant director of public affairs for the FBI, serving as the 

bureau’s National spokesman. 

Thank you, sir, for being here today. 

Next we have Chief James Schwartz—if we could have some 

water? Chief James Schwartz is the chief of Arlington County Fire 

Department, a position he has held since 2004. The Arlington 

County Fire Department consists of 320 personnel and serves a 
5 

community of 26 square miles and 210,000 residents. The department was the lead agency for the response to the September 11 attack at the Pentagon. 

Additionally, Chief Schwartz chairs the International Association 

of Fire Chiefs’ Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 

and served on the advisory council for the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordinating Group at the National Counterterrorism 

Center. 

Thank you, sir, for being here today, as well. 

Next we have Chief James Hooley, is the chief of the Boston 

Emergency Medical Services, a public safety agency that provides 

basic life support and advanced life support throughout the city of 

Boston. Boston EMS employs over 350 EMTs and paramedics who 

responded to an average of 300 emergencies per day. 

A 32-year veteran of Boston EMS, he was appointed to the position in 2010. Prior to that he served as superintendent and chief. 

What was left out of here I want to mention is the heroic efforts 

you and your force performed after the tragic events in Boston to 

save so many lives. With 260 maimed and injured, it is nothing 

short of a miracle that none of those maimed and injured actually 

died, and I want to thank you for those heroic efforts. 

Finally, Dr. Brian Jackson is senior physical scientist at the 

RAND Corporation, director of RAND’s safety and justice program, 

and a professor at Pardee RAND Graduate School. He focuses on 

homeland security, terrorism preparedness, safety management, 

and large-scale emergency response situations. 

The full written statements of the witnesses will appear in the 

record. 

Chairman now recognizes Commissioner Miller for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENTS OF JOHN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Commissioner MILLER. Congressman McCaul, Congresswoman 

Clarke, Congressman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and 

Members of the committee, in the last 121⁄2 years since September 

11 the fight against al-Qaeda and its network has uncovered a very 

adaptable enemy that has continued to mature in its ability to 

spread its message as well as shift in its shape and its tactics. In 

response, the law enforcement community across the country has 

had to undergo fundamental changes. 

In New York City, like every city and town, we have had to reevaluate everything, from how we gather and analyze intelligence 

to how we plan to police major events. After 9/11 the New York 

City Police Department, under the leadership of Police Commissioner Ray Kelly, formed two new bureaus—the Intelligence Bureau and the Counterterrorism Bureau—to spearhead our efforts 

and Commissioner Bratton as well as Mayor de Blasio have made 

it clear that they would like to continue to build on, modernize, and 

sustain those efforts to protect the largest city in America from terrorist activity. 

Today I want to spend a little time discussing lessons learned not 

just from 9/11 but also from other terrorist plots since then. Looking at some of the most recent and most significant, we take these 
6 

lessons: We have learned that if al-Qaeda can find sympathizing 

people on U.S. soil that they will turn them into terrorists, willing 

and able to attack the very country they call home. 

The cases of Najibullah Zazi, in the New York City subways plot 

in 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square truck bomb plot in 

2010, are just two examples of Americans, both recruited by alQaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, who attempted bombing of New 

York City. Law enforcement and intelligence was critical in thwarting those attacks. 

We have also come to learn the power of al-Qaeda’s use of social 

media and on-line messaging for operations and recruiting and 

communications. The Boston Marathon bombings, if anything, confirmed what we already always suspected, which is that major public events with large crowds are going to continue to be a terrorist 

target. 

The instructions likely used by the Boston Marathon bombers to 

make pressure cooker bombs came from the now infamous article 

in al-Qaeda’s on-line publication, Inspire magazine, ‘‘How to Make 

a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.’’ Those same instructions 

were used by Jose Pimentel in New York City, who built bombs intending to blow up military and recruiting stations as well as other 

targets. 

Recent issues of Inspire magazine call for al-Qaeda’s followers to 

attack New York City as well as Washington, DC; Los Angeles; and 

Chicago. It is specific as to targets and timing. 

The fact that we have seen people accept this call to arms reminds us that these threats can emanate from a camp hidden in 

the tribal areas of Pakistan or from an apartment in the Washington Heights section of Manhattan. 

Counterterrorism is a major component of city planning and requires significant financial investments. Whether it is the Israeli 

Day Parade, which we had just a couple of weeks ago on 5th Avenue, or the New York City Marathon, each plan comes with a complex what we call ‘‘counterterrorism overlay.’’ 

Some of it you see, some of it is invisible, but all of it requires 

additional equipment, additional officers, intelligence analysts, detectives, and investigators. We deploy specialized equipment, from 

radiation detection pagers worn on people’s belts to detect a dirty 

bomb or dispersal device attack, to a portable network of cameras 

to scan crowds. 

To that end, I would like to thank this committee, the Congress, 

the President, the Department of Homeland Security for the continued critical support to New York City’s Counterterrorism Grant 

funding. This funding has played a crucial role in helping the 

NYPD carry out its mission of keeping the city and its citizens safe. 

The work and the equipment that goes with it, along with the 

personnel, is very expensive. The Counterterrorism Bureau receives money from eight funding streams, including UASI, for a 

total of $169.8 million. We have utilized these funds to deploy and 

develop adaptive approaches to countering threats, be they foreign 

or domestic. 

Two major Federally-supported counterterrorism programs that I 

am talking about refer to: 
7 

The Domain Awareness System: It is an innovative law enforcement application that aggregates real-time data from counterterrorism sensors and law enforcement databases, providing members 

of the NYPD with a comprehensive view of potential threats as 

well as criminal activities. 

The Securing the Cities Program: This is a program through 

which the NYPD purchases but also distributes radiation detection 

equipment to over 150 law enforcement and public safety agencies 

across the region, providing training, conducting exercises, and this 

develops a region-wide concept of operations for radiation detection. 

These programs are critical to protecting New Yorkers, the region, and the Nation, and funding them remains an urgent priority. 

Information sharing is also crucial to our efforts. Regional efforts 

in training and information sharing among law enforcement and 

first responders provide us with the necessary comprehensive response. 

The NYPD is the lead agency for Securing the Cities Initiative, 

that interagency collaboration and capacity-building effort to protect the metropolitan region from nuclear or radiological attack. 

Examples of information sharing include interagency conference 

calls before major events; interagency meetings and tabletops with 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to discuss potential threats. 

Public-private partnerships are also critical for first responders. 

The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, or LMSI, is a public-private partnership that creates an information-sharing environment 

with the private sector, the NYPD, and other first responder agencies. This partnership leverages the security resources in place at 

some of the city’s most high-profile target buildings and institutions, but it also forges partnerships that will facilitate an integrated response to incidents if there is an incident at any of these 

facilities or in that area. 

The NYPD SHIELD program is a partnership with private-sector 

security managers with the goal of protecting the city from a terrorist attack. SHIELD includes members who work in a wide range 

of critical sectors, including the energy sector, and exchange information of concern as regards to terrorism and security. 

On the Federal level, our Federal partners at DHS provide access 

to the Homeland Security Data Network, or HSDN, that enables 

information exchanges of both tactical and strategic intelligence 

and other homeland security information. The NYPD’s partnership 

with the FBI also provides the NYPD with access to National Classified intelligence, but it is also a means by which the NYPD can 

disseminate its own intelligence and analysis at the Federal level 

to other Federal law enforcement agencies. 

We continue to train in table-tops, live field exercises with multiple agencies to hone our response to the potential of another terrorist attack or active-shooter situation, or even natural disaster. 

With every drill, with every exercise, we glean lessons to better respond to real-world security threats. 

The lessons learned post-9/11 focus on two key elements I have 

highlighted today. Resources: It takes additional resources—specialized equipment, training, and more money—to ensure police 

and first responders can effectively respond to events. 
8 

And coordination: We have learned again and again about the 

importance of sharing information and coordinating efforts. This is 

true on the Federal, State, and local level. We are safer and stronger when we work together as regions and coordinate across a range 

of first-responder entities. 

The NYPD is a proud partner with the Federal Government in 

combating the threats to our National security. I thank you again, 

and especially this committee, for all your help to ensure the safety 

of the city of New York from these threats, and I pass along the 

thanks of our police commissioner, Bill Bratton, and Mayor de 

Blasio, in your support for those efforts. 

[The prepared statement of Commissioner Miller follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER

JUNE 18, 2014 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee. 

In the 121⁄2 years since the horrific events of September 11, 2001, the fight 

against al-Qaeda and its network has uncovered an adaptable enemy that has continued to mature in its ability to spread its message as well as shift in shape and 

tactics. In response, the law enforcement community has undergone fundamental 

changes. In New York City, like every city and town, we have had to re-evaluate 

everything from how we gather and analyze intelligence, to how we plan for and 

police major public events. After 9/11, the New York City Police Department formed 

two new Bureaus, the Intelligence Bureau and the Counterterrorism Bureau, to 

spear-head our efforts to protect the Nation’s largest city from terrorist activity. 

Today, we examine the lessons learned not just from the 9/11 attacks, but also 

from the 16 other plots devised by al-Qaeda, or from those taking its cues, which 

have targeted New York City. Looking at some of the most recent and most significant, we take these lessons. 

In 2009, Najibullah Zazi and three other men plotted to place more than a dozen 

backpacks filled with explosives on the New York subways. This plot was intended 

to kill scores of people and injure many more. Zazi traveled with his friends from 

Queens to Afghanistan in order to fight U.S. Forces, however, al-Qaeda recruited 

them to return to New York to launch these attacks once it was discovered that they 

were Americans, flying under the radar, with U.S. Passports that would easily allow 

them to return to the United States. Zazi was trained in explosives by none other 

than Rashid Rauch, who was al-Qaeda’s top explosives expert at the time. Zazi also 

met with Saleh al-Somali, al-Qaeda’s chief of external operations. From this case, 

we have learned that if al-Qaeda can find U.S. persons who are willing to fight and 

die in the fields of Afghanistan, they have a greater advantage in turning them back 

to launch attacks on the country they once called home. 

This lesson was reinforced by the case of Faisal Shahzad. He traveled to Pakistan 

in an attempt to join fighters attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but the Pakistani Taliban quickly identified him as an individual who could return to the United 

States and fight the war in our streets. Shahzad placed a large amount of explosives 

in an SUV in Times Square on May 1, 2010. However, a small technical error in 

his bomb-making saved our crowded Theater District in the streets off Times Square 

from destruction. We also learned from Shahzad that his pre-operational surveillance was conducted in a way that was unlikely to attract the attention of law enforcement. He chose his target by watching crowded conditions on different streets 

through streaming video over the internet from cameras in and around Times 

Square. 

We have also come to learn the power of al-Qaeda’s use of social media and online messaging to operatives that the terrorist leaders will never meet, or in some 

cases, may never even know are followers. 

Jose Pimentel was a 27-year-old New Yorker who followed al-Qaeda’s message 

through its on-line publication, Inspire magazine as well as the videos extolling violence by the charismatic al-Qaeda commander Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki, born in 

New Mexico, spoke in perfect, unaccented English and his call to violence has resonated with a dozen plotters in the United States who have sought to kill their fellow 

Americans. Pimentel was arrested by NYPD Emergency Service Unit and Intelligence Bureau detectives while putting the final touches on a bomb he hoped to use 

to attack military recruiting stations. 
9 

Mohammed Quazi Nafis came to New York from Bangladesh and, inspired by alQaeda’s magazine and al-Awlaki’s videos, he set out to find partners to attack New 

York City’s financial hub near Wall Street. He parked what he believed to be a 

thousand-pound bomb, hidden in the back of a white van, in front of the U.S. Federal Reserve and placed six calls from his cell phone to the number he thought was 

connected to the bomb’s detonator. However, he had no idea that the bomb was designed by the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorist Task Force not to function. 

We learned from the Boston Marathon bombing what we already suspected; major 

public events, which attract large crowds, continue to be a terrorist target. The instructions likely used by the Boston bombers to make the pressure-cooker bomb 

came from the now infamous article, ‘‘How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your 

Mom,’’ in Inspire magazine. Those same instructions were used by Jose Pimentel in 

New York City. 

Recent issues of Inspire magazine feature stories idolizing the Marathon bombers 

as well as Jose Pimentel. The latest issue contains a set of instructions for a car 

bomb against a backdrop of pictures of Times Square. The article calls for those who 

believe in al-Qaeda’s message to attack New York as well as Washington DC, Los 

Angeles, Chicago, and other major cities. The fact that we have seen people accept 

this call to arms, and to use the instructions that appear in Inspire magazine and 

similar publications, reminds us that the threat from al-Qaeda, whether through its 

central command, or its prolific propaganda machine, is still real. It can emanate 

from a camp hidden in the tribal areas of Pakistan or from an apartment in the 

Washington Heights section of Manhattan. 

This is why it takes additional resources, specialized equipment, and more money 

to police events that used to simply require police personnel for crowd and traffic 

control. Whether it is the Israeli Day Parade, the Super Bowl Boulevard events in 

Times Square this past February, or the New York City Marathon, each plan comes 

with a complex counterterrorism overlay that requires additional equipment, officers, and investigators. We deploy specialized equipment from radiation detection 

pagers to detect a dispersal device attack to a portable network of cameras to scan 

the crowds. To that end, I would like to thank the committee, the Congress, and 

the Department of Homeland Security for the continued support to New York City’s 

counterterrorism grant funding. This funding has played a crucial role in helping 

the NYPD carry out its mission of keeping the city and its citizens safe. It might 

be helpful to break that down: 

The Counterterrorism Bureau receives money from 8 funding streams and 22 ac- tive grants, for a total of $169.8 million. These sources are: • Urban Areas Security Initiative • State Homeland Security Grant • Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program • State Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program 

• Securing the Cities 

• Transit Security Grant Program 

• Port Security Grant Program 

• National Nuclear Security Administration 

Major Counterterrorism Bureau grant-funded projects include: 

• Domain Awareness System.—An innovative law enforcement application that 

aggregates real-time data from counterterrorism sensors and law enforcement 

databases, providing members of the service with a comprehensive view of potential threats and criminal activity. 

• Securing the Cities Program.—The NYPD purchases and distributes radiation 

detection equipment to over 150 law enforcement and public safety agencies 

across the region, provides training, conducts exercises, and develops a regionwide Concept of Operations for radiation detection. 

• Regional Counterterrorism Training 

• World Trade Center Campus Security Plan and Environmental Impact Statement.—A comprehensive vehicle security perimeter around the World Trade 

Center Campus, increasing stand-off distances from the buildings to reduce the 

risk of catastrophic damage from a vehicle-borne explosive device. 

• Explosive Detection Equipment Program 

• Transit Security-Related Programs and Purchases 

• Port Security-Related Programs and Purchases 

In addition to the grant funding, which is critical to our counterterrorism mission, 

information sharing is also crucial to our efforts. Examples of our information-sharing initiatives include: 

• The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative is a public-private partnership that 

creates an information-sharing environment to leverage the security resources 

in place at some of the city’s most targeted buildings and institutions and to 
10 

forge partnerships that will facilitate an integrated response to incidents at 

these facilities. 

• The Joint Terrorism Task Force is a natural information-sharing environment 

between stakeholders including investigators, analysts, linguists, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 

• The NYPD’s partnership with the FBI provides the NYPD with access to National Classified intelligence and is also a means by which the NYPD can disseminate its own intelligence and analysis at the Federal level and to other law 

enforcement agencies. 

• A representative from the Metropolitan Transit Authority (‘‘MTA’’), New York 

State Courts, Federal Air Marshal Service, U.S. Marshal Service, and the Department of Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’) Federal Protective Services are detailed to the Counterterrorism Division and share information from their respective agencies. 

• A Senior Intelligence Officer from the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

disseminates DHS-generated reporting, information from DHS Fusion Centers, 

and joint seal products like Joint Intelligence Bulletins. 

• The NYPD is the lead agency for the Securing the Cities Initiative, an interagency collaboration and capacity-building effort to protect the metropolitan region from a nuclear or radiological attack. Examples of information sharing include inter-agency conference calls before major events like the Fourth of July 

and New Years Eve where Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies 

discuss potential threats. 

• NYPD SHIELD is a partnership with private-sector security managers with the 

goal of protecting NYC from terrorist attack. SHIELD includes members who 

work in a wide range of critical sectors, including the energy sector, and exchange information on issues of concern. 

• DHS provides access to the Homeland Secure Data Network (‘‘HSDN’’). HSDN 

enables information exchange of both tactical and strategic intelligence and 

other homeland security information up to the SECRET level. 

• Access to Suspicious Activity Reports. 

Using Homeland Security funding and working with DHS partners in research 

and development, we have expanded our use of ‘‘Vapor Wake Dogs’’, the bomb detection K–9s that can identify if a suspicious package left unattended contains explosives, but can also detect the invisible vapor trail that indicates an explosive in a 

bag or a backpack is moving through a crowd on a busy street or public event. We 

have helped in the testing and development of virtual simulators that can put officers in ‘‘active-shooter’’ situations where they move down hallways and face the 

challenges of identifying shooters, rescuing hostages, or dealing with the wounded, 

while making critical tactical decisions. Controllers at the big screen see the same 

images being flashed through the officer’s goggles to gauge and critique their tactical proficiency. We have applied Federal funding to the acquisition of highly-sensitive radiological detection equipment on-board our helicopters and harbor units 

that could detect a nuclear device aboard a cargo ship miles before it entered New 

York harbor. We continue to train, in table-tops and live field exercises with multiple agencies to hone our response to another terrorist attack, active-shooter situation, or natural disaster. With every drill, with every exercise, we glean lessons that 

will be invaluable if, or more likely when, we are faced with one of these real-world 

challenges in our streets. 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Please give him our thanks, as well. 

Just for the record, the first city I visited was New York, recognizing it is still the biggest target, unfortunately. 

Chairman now recognizes Chief Schwartz for—I am sorry, 

Chief—yes, Schwartz, for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF, ARLINGTON 

COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. I 

want to thank you all for holding this hearing this morning as we 

look at lessons learned from past incidents of terrorism and devise 

strategies to better prepare our Nation for future events. 
11 

At 9:37 a.m. on September 11, 2001 American Airlines flight 77 

crashed into the Pentagon as part of a large-scale attack upon the 

United States. I arrived on the incident scene at 9:48 and assumed 

incident command for the response. 

There was an overwhelming response to the incident that included localities from the National Capital Region, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and multiple Federal agencies. This attack resulted in the deaths of 184 people. 

Additionally, 106 patients received medical care by EMS and 

were transported to local hospitals, care centers, and clinics. Of 

those 106, only one person perished during treatment from her injuries received during the attack. 

In the aftermath of that report the county undertook an after-action report that was eventually funded by the U.S. Department of 

Justice’s Office for Domestic Preparedness. That report identified 

235 recommendations and lessons learned that, along with other 

after-action reports in the last 13 years, have guided decisions that 

both the Arlington County public safety agencies and the National 

Capital Region have made to improve our preparedness levels. 

On 9/11 it was extremely helpful that our fire department had 

a good working relationship—an amazing working relationship, I 

would say—with the FBI’s Washington Field Office, the Military 

District of Washington, and other fire and rescue departments in 

the National Capital Region. These pre-existing working relationships at the incident command level and the existing automatic 

and mutual aid agreements throughout the region provided an experienced leadership team and necessary resources during the 

opening minutes of the response. In addition, we were able to use 

the incident command system to establish a unified command 

framework in which other resources and agencies could operate. 

The after-action report also identified a number of challenges at 

the incident scene. Despite the coordination at the command level, 

we still had to contend with the challenges of self-dispatching and 

a lack of proper credentialing that—as we deployed our resources 

and strived to establish scene security. 

One of our greatest challenges was in effectively triaging, treating, and tracking patients during this mass-casualty event. As has 

been well-documented, we had problems with operability and interoperability of our public safety communication systems, and logistics and resources for a long-term, large-scale incident proved at 

that time to be a challenge. 

The Nation since then has transformed its emergency response 

system. The Federal Government has now established a National 

Preparedness Goal and 31 core capabilities to prevent, protect, 

mitigate, respond, and recover from a future incident. It also sponsored training exercises to improve preparedness and coordination 

at all levels of government. The Federal Government has also spent 

approximately $37 billion since 2002 on grant programs to support 

us at the State and local level in our preparedness efforts. 

We have made important achievements to improve the coordination of response to future acts of terror. The adoption of the National Incident Management System allows jurisdictions across the 

Nation to work together during a response. That approach and a 
12 

doctrinaire of using the same incident management system has assisted greatly in incidents since 9/11. 

Multidisciplinary exercises bring together Federal, State, Tribal, 

territorial, and local agencies to plan and prepare for future events. 

The grants, such as those that we have already heard about from 

UASI and those from a previous program known as MMRS, have 

long served as incentives to bring stakeholders to the table to work 

on the common goals of preparing our communities. 

Since 9/11, one major focus has been the improvement of public 

safety communications. This committee has taken a leading role in 

addressing this issue. 

DHS and its Office of Emergency Communications, and Office of 

Interoperability Compatibility, and SAFECOM program are facilitating improved public safety communications interoperability. The 

President and Congress have played a major role in improving future public safety communications by establishing the First Responder Network Authority and giving it the adequate spectrum 

and funding to establish a Nation-wide public safety broadband 

network. 

Even though there have been many accomplishments since 9/11, 

we are still learning to respond to the threat of terrorism. For example, there have been many initiatives to improve informationsharing between Federal, State, Tribal, and local partners. 

However, there are still many barriers. The need for security 

clearances is still a barrier for many fire departments to obtain information about threats in their communities. In other cases, information may be over-Classified or not presented properly for practically-minded first-responder audience trying to develop capabilities necessary for response. 

I want to commend the NCTC’s approach to bringing first responders into the intelligence community to both share information 

from our perspective at the local level in the wake of the sunsetting 

of the ITACG, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordinating Group, the National Counterterrorism Center established 

the JCAT, the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, that develops intelligence products with practical information for first responders and their communities. 

We also must continue to focus on reducing barriers to collaboration. The NIMS adoption requires a change in culture for many organizations and we need to still bridge both the organizational and 

professional biases that are inherent in our organizations on a 

daily basis. 

We should review NIMS training to ensure that all the participants in response to an incident are adopting NIMS and operating 

within it. Also, we have to support the current efforts to develop 

effective, Nation-wide credentialing system. 

We also need to make sure that the lessons learned are being 

shared across the homeland security enterprise. The Pentagon response demonstrated that important and diligent planning and 

training at a regional-level paid dividends. 

So that all stakeholders can learn from each other, we need to 

develop a clearinghouse for successful uses of grant programs and 

effective policies for countering threats to terrorism. In other 

words, when we have a success somewhere in the country, espe-
13 

cially when it is a success realized through the grant programs, 

replicating that elsewhere is in everyone’s best interest. 

We also need to make sure that local first-responder agencies are 

being reimbursed for their mutual aid activities. In some cases it 

has taken years for local agencies to be reimbursed for their participation to responses like Hurricane Katrina and the October 

2007 California wildfires. 

In many jurisdictions budgets remain tight, and a local fire and 

EMS department cannot wait long to be reimbursed. The IAFC is 

concerned that local fire and EMS departments will not be as responsive in the future to requests for assistance if challenges to reimbursement remain a problem. 

On behalf of the leadership of the Nation’s fire and EMS service, 

I again want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Using the lessons of 9/11 and the accomplishments to date from 

those lessons learned has made the Nation, I think, stronger and 

has improved our overall preparedness. 

However, the terrorist threat remains a continuing concern of all 

of ours and we must adapt to those concerns. I look forward to answering your questions as the committee hearing goes on. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Schwartz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ

JUNE 18, 2014 

Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished 

Members of the committee. I am James Schwartz, chief of the Arlington County 

(Virginia) Fire Department (ACFD) and chairman of the Terrorism and Homeland 

Security Committee of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). The 

IAFC represents the leadership of the Nation’s fire, rescue, and emergency medical 

services (EMS), including rural volunteer fire departments, metropolitan career departments, and suburban combination departments. I thank the committee for this 

opportunity to discuss lessons learned from past incidents of terrorism. 

THE RESPONSE TO THE INCIDENT AT THE PENTAGON ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

At 9:38 a.m. on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight No. 77 crashed into 

the Pentagon as part of a large-scale terrorist attack upon the United States. I arrived on scene at 9:48 a.m. and assumed incident command of the response. The 

main focus in the early hours of the response was to control the fires resulting from 

the crash and provide emergency medical care for the victims at the Pentagon. 

Sadly, the attack on the Pentagon claimed the lives of 184 people. Overall, the response to the Pentagon incident involved resources from across the National Capital 

Region (NCR), the commonwealth of Virginia, and multiple Federal agencies. The 

Arlington County Fire Department was the lead agency for unified command for 10 

days and turned over primacy of command to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) on September 21. 

In the early days of the response, Chief Ed Plaugher, my predecessor, instituted 

a process for collecting details of the response, so that they could be analyzed to 

create lessons learned. This analysis was produced as an after-action report by the 

Titan Systems Corporation that was funded with the support of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office for Domestic Preparedness. The report included 235 recommendations and lessons learned. In addition, the 9/11 Commission also reviewed 

the response to the attack on the Pentagon and made recommendations based on 

the analysis. The findings of these reports have been discussed in articles, conferences, and Congressional hearings over the past 13 years. 

Despite the unfortunate loss of life, analysts have described the response to the 

Pentagon attack as being a successful one. During the response, 106 patients received medical treatment by area hospitals, care centers, and clinics. Of these 106 

patients, only one person perished during treatment from her injuries. 
14 

During the Pentagon response, there were a number of factors that led to a successful response, mitigation, and recovery effort, and a number of challenges that 

the ACFD and other responding agencies faced. Among the factors that helped us 

were four major points: 

(1) The ACFD had strong pre-existing relationships with surrounding jurisdictions and the affected Federal agencies.—Due to years of working together, the 

ACFD had strong support from the city of Alexandria; Fairfax, Prince William, 

and Loudoun county fire departments; the Metropolitan Washington Airports 

Authority; and other departments within the NCR. The FBI Washington Field 

Office established a fire liaison position in 1998 to work with local fire departments. The close working relationship between FBI Special Agent Chris Combs, 

a former New York firefighter, and the ACFD incident command staff played 

an especially beneficial role in ensuring a coordinated response. 

Many of these relationships were developed through planning exercises. For example, the Military District of Washington hosts a major table-top exercise each 

year, which allows the leaders of Federal and local government organizations 

to learn to work together. In addition, Arlington County had conducted a May 

2001 table-top exercise with military authorities about a scenario which featured a commuter airplane crashing into the Pentagon. This exercise helped the 

agencies to become familiar both with their own disaster plans and the plans 

of their military and civilian counterparts. 

(2) Unified command through the Incident Command System ensured an effective response.—Within 3 minutes of the crash, then-Battalion Chief Bob 

Cornwell arrived on scene and established incident command. I arrived within 

10 minutes of the crash and assumed incident command. Because the primary 

agencies responding to the incident all understood the Incident Command System (ICS), we were able to establish incident command within minutes and 

most of the other supporting agencies were able to operate within the framework. The fire departments in Northern Virginia began using ICS in the late 

1980s and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) adopted 

the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) in March 2001, 

so that there already was a common command system in place. While the Military District of Washington has its own command structure, it cooperated with 

the ACFD as a member of unified command and provided necessary resources. • (3) A well-designed and exercised mutual aid system provided timely resources.— At the time of the incident, and continuing today, Arlington County was a partner in the Northern Virginia Response Agreement wherein the jurisdictions provide automatic aid based on the closest fire and EMS unit, not jurisdictional 

boundaries. The departments operate under the same standard operating procedures and dispatch protocols. Also, there was a mutual aid agreement between 

the member governments of COG which was developed following the Air Florida 

crash in 1982. Finally, there was a State-wide mutual-aid agreement which enabled outlying jurisdictions to respond or to backfill for Alexandria and Fairfax 

County stations, while their units provided assistance to the ACFD. 

• (4) The Metropolitan Medical Response System laid the groundwork for successful coordination between emergency response and public health officials.—After 

the 1995 sarin nerve agent incident in Tokyo, the ACFD realized that American 

first response agencies did not have the capability to respond to such an attack. 

At the request of Chief Plaugher and the ACFD leadership, the COG requested 

Federal assistance in building this capability. By working with the U.S. Public 

Health Service, the ACFD was able to develop the Nation’s first locally-based 

terrorism response team with a hazardous materials, medical management, and 

mass-casualty decontamination capability, the Metropolitan Medical Strike 

Team (MMST). This capability became the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and National Medical Response Team. The frequent use of exercises by the MMST and technical rescue teams provided for a coordinated response by the ACFD and surrounding jurisdictions. For example, the Arlington 

technical rescue team was able to integrate its personnel with the Alexandria 

team to form three teams of 19 persons each. 

Despite the number of factors that led to a successful response, the ACFD also 

faced a number of challenges. The seven main challenges were: 

• (1) Self-dispatch created problems with the response.—As news of the attack 

spread throughout the city, first responders from around the NCR arrived on 

scene to help with the response. These responders began aiding with the response without the request of the incident commander or knowledge of the host 

organization. In every major incident, self-dispatch is a problem. Unrequested 

volunteers are well-meaning, but they can complicate response operations by 

creating confusion at the incident scene. Also, if the incident commander is un-
15 

aware of their actions, the self-dispatchers can put themselves at risk if they 

become injured or trapped. For long-term response and recovery operations, 

self-dispatched volunteers frequently do not come with the necessary food and 

shelter that they require, which creates an additional burden on the community 

trying to deal with the existing incident. 

• (2) Public safety communications were problematic during the Pentagon response.—During the first hours of the response, cell phone networks were 

jammed, and cellular priority access service was not provided to emergency responders. Radio channels and phone lines to the emergency communications 

center also were jammed. In addition, there were problems with interoperability 

between jurisdictions. Pagers and runners proved to be the most effective form 

of communication. On September 12, the Incident Command Operations Section 

re-organized the fire suppression units into four divisions. This improved communications during the second day of operations. 

• (3) The Pentagon response identified room for improvement in the emergency 

medical response.—During the response, triage tags were not used to document 

the care of victims. In addition, there was no system to document where patients were sent for treatment. The after-action report also identified the need 

for a clearinghouse hospital to coordinate communications on behalf of the medical community and disseminate patient disposition and treatment information. 

• (4) Logistics proved to be a challenge during the long-term incident response.— 

Like many jurisdictions, the ACFD did not have the logistical infrastructure for 

dealing with an incident of the magnitude or duration of the Pentagon response. 

The stock of personal protective equipment (PPE), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), batteries, medical supplies, and equipment for reserve vehicles 

were not sufficient for sustained operations. Fuel was a major requirement: In 

the first 24 hours, 600 gallons of diesel fuel were consumed. The resupply effort 

required 12 tractor-trailer loads for shoring operations, more than 5,000 pairs 

of gloves, thousands of Tyvek hazmat protection suits, and hundreds of respirators, SCBA, and air bottles. The Arlington County government, surrounding 

jurisdictions, like Fairfax County, and local business and relief organizations 

provided vital assistance in meeting this challenge. 

• (5) The need for credible situational information was a challenge during the incident.—During the first 2 days of the response, it was important to get accurate 

situational information. The Pentagon incident scene had to be evacuated three 

times in the first 25 hours due to reports of incoming aircraft. These evacuations delayed some of the response operations and caused confusion at the incident scene. 

• (6) Resources also proved to be a challenge during the response.—The after-action report identified the need for Arlington County to have a facility designed 

and equipped as an emergency operations center. It also recommended that the 

Arlington County Police Department upgrade its mobile command unit and that 

the fire department obtain a mobile command vehicle for on-scene incident 

management. The report identified improvements that needed to be completed 

in the emergency communications center to enhance communications and operations during another major incident. In addition, ACFD and other departments 

did not have access to a deployable supply of mass casualty supplies, which 

meant that medical supplies had to be taken from EMS units. 

• (7) The Pentagon response demonstrated the need for a credentialing system for 

first responders.—During the response and recovery effort, it was important to 

make sure that authorized first responders had access to the incident scene. 

Unfortunately, there was no credentialing system to identify personnel and 

their skills. The DHS has worked on a number of reports and pilot projects over 

the years to address this system, but it currently remains unresolved. A First 

Responder Access Card was pilot-tested, but it proved to be too expensive and 

too hard for jurisdictions to maintain the database. The DHS’ Office of Infrastructure Protection has developed a new system with State and local first responders, which has been adopted by four States. Another six States are in the 

process of adopting it. 

APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED

The Nation has transformed its emergency response system since the attack on 

the Pentagon. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission Report) described the 

events leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the attacks themselves, and the response. In 

addition, it made a number of recommendations, many of which Congress has implemented through legislation. Overall, Federal, State, and local agencies; the private 
16 

1 It is important to note that FirstNet will originally cover only broadband data communications, such as streaming video. Local first responders will need to continue to rely upon landmobile radio for mission-critical voice communications for at least the next 10 years. 

sector; and members of the American public have made many changes over the 

years based on the responses to 9/11 to better prepare the Nation for future terrorist 

threats. 

The Federal Government has become an important partner in the effort to prepare for the next terrorist attack. It has established a National Preparedness Goal 

and 31 core capabilities to help the Nation to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, 

and recover from an incident, whether from natural or human cause. In addition, 

the Federal Government has sponsored training to respond to terrorist attacks, and 

exercises at the Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local level. The Federal Government also has spent approximately $37 billion since 2002 on grant programs to 

help State and local agencies develop the training, equipment, and staffing resources required to meet the terrorist threat. 

One important development is the adoption of the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS). The NIMS is the comprehensive, Nation-wide approach to incident 

management. Based on the ICS that the fire and emergency service uses, it allows 

jurisdictions around the country to work together in response to an emergency. 

Much as fire departments were able to coordinate and respond together during the 

9/11 response to the Pentagon, response agencies from around the Nation will be 

able to work together to respond to future all-hazards events using NIMS. NIMS 

is scalable and can be used for any National incident, no matter the size or duration. The NIMS system is focused on defining core terminology and defining resources, so that a fire chief can request an asset from anywhere in the United 

States and have a reasonable expectation of what is being received. Federal grant 

programs provide assistance in NIMS adoption, because a grantee must comply with 

NIMS in order to receive grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). 

In addition, there is an improved focus on mutual aid and collaboration. Mutual 

aid from surrounding departments played a major role in the response to the Pentagon attack. There is a greater emphasis now on multidisciplinary exercises that 

bring Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local agencies together to build partnerships and prepare for future threats. One of the most important lessons from the 

Pentagon response is that it is important for the leaders and staff of Federal, State, 

Tribal, territorial, and local agencies to work and plan before any incident occurs. 

These existing relationships will create an effective response when it is needed. It 

is important to highlight the role that Federal grant programs, such as the Urban 

Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and MMRS, serve as incentives for bringing all of 

the agencies together before a terrorist attack happens. 

One primary focus since the Pentagon incident is the need to improve communications interoperability. DHS offices, including the Office of Emergency Communications and the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, have played an important role in facilitating improved communications between State and local public 

safety agencies. SAFECOM is a Federal effort, led by local first responders, to improve multi-jurisdictional and intergovernmental communications interoperability. 

It trains emergency responders to be communications unit leaders during all-hazards emergency operations, and coordinates grant guidance to use Federal funding 

to encourage interoperability. SAFECOM focuses both on technology and the need 

for jurisdictions to develop an effective command interoperability plan. President 

Obama and Congress also made an important decision to improve future public safety communications by setting aside 20 MHz for a dedicated Nation-wide public safety broadband network and establishing the First Responder Network Authority 

(FirstNet) to govern it as part of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 

of 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112–96).1

There also is an increased focus on improving information sharing between Federal, State, and local response agencies. The Federal Government has helped to fund 

78 fusion centers around the Nation that serve as focal points for receiving, analyzing, and sharing threat-related information between Federal, State, local, Tribal, 

and territorial partners. In addition, programs like the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ campaign allow first 

responders to report possible threats in their jurisdictions. 

At the local level, jurisdictions around the NCR implemented changes to improve 

their response to future terrorist attacks. Funding by the UASI program allowed the 

NCR agencies to develop standardized regional capabilities, including mass casualty 

units and ambulance buses; bomb teams; and air units to refill firefighters’ SCBAs 

during an incident. The NCR jurisdictions also used UASI funds to interconnect the 
17 

local fiber optic networks into one ‘‘NCR Net.’’ This system uses the seamless transition of critical data, including computer-aided dispatch systems, throughout the region to improve situational awareness and reduce emergency call processing time. 

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

It is important to recognize that, even though the attack on the Pentagon took 

place 13 years ago, we are still learning to respond to the threat of terrorism. New 

threats continuously appear and we must adapt to them. For example, while we still 

must prepare for an explosive attack on a major transportation hub or an act of bioterrorism, we also have to prepare for the use of fire as a weapon in a terrorist attack or an active-shooter assault by a small team as happened in Mumbai in 2008 

and Nairobi in 2013. 

In recognition of this fact, I would like to raise the following issues for the committee’s jurisdiction: 

• (1) We need to continue to focus on NIMS adoption.—One of the keys to any 

successful response is the ability for various units to communicate and operate 

together. The adoption of NIMS requires a culture change, and we still need to 

bridge organizational and professional biases. We need to review NIMS training 

and ensure that Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners are all 

adopting NIMS and operating with it. 

• (2) We need to make sure that lessons learned are being shared to improve the 

homeland security enterprise.—We need to better broadcast successful uses of 

grant programs and encourage the adoption of successful policies. For example, 

the NCR developed a patient tracking system to track victims’ basic information 

and conditions, which allows them to be distributed to hospitals and tracked 

throughout their time in the system. If another jurisdiction is interested in developing a similar system, it should be able to find out about it at a clearinghouse instead of having to re-invent the wheel. 

In addition, we should support the development of regional response systems. 

The Pentagon response relied upon resources throughout the Washington and 

Northern Virginia areas. This coordination was established years before 

through the activities of the COG. One of the IAFC’s concerns with the National 

Preparedness Grant Program proposal is its State-centric focus, which we think 

might break down the sort of regional coordination required to effectively respond to cross-border incidents. 

• (3) We need to improve information sharing both about the potential for terrorist 

activity and during an incident.—The attacks on 9/11 exposed a host of information-sharing problems at the Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local level, 

both before and during the incident. During the Pentagon response, the incident 

scene had to be evacuated three times, due to the perceived threat of another 

incoming airplane. At least two of these incidents were caused by Federal officials arriving in Washington to help with the Federal response to these attacks. 

The Federal Government needs to make sure that accurate information is being 

relayed to the first responders on scene so that they can make the appropriate 

decisions. 

In addition, problems still remain with the information-sharing enterprise. The 

need for a security clearance remains a barrier for some fire chiefs to access 

information. However, once a chief receives information, he or she is limited 

with what can be done with it, because command staff may not have clearances. 

In other cases, information may be over-Classified or not written with a practical purpose. The National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team helps to solve this problem by bringing local first 

responders to the NCTC to work with intelligence analysts to develop intelligence products with practical information that first responders can use to protect their communities. To help fire chiefs better understand how to access 

threat information for their communities, the IAFC developed the Homeland Security Intelligence Guide for Fire Chiefs. 

• (4) We need to ensure that local first-response agencies are being reimbursed for 

their mutual aid activities.—The National Preparedness Goal aims to create a 

National network of resources and capabilities. However, it is important to recognize that State and local governments spend approximately $218 billion annually for public safety. When a resource is dispatched from a locality across 

local or State lines to help with a mutual aid response, the local first response 

agency potentially can lose those resources for weeks and will have to backfill 

to protect its community. For major emergencies, such as Hurricane Katrina 

and the October 2007 California wildland fires, a local fire department can be 

left waiting for months or even years to get reimbursed. In many jurisdictions, 
18 

budgets remain tight and a local fire and EMS department cannot wait that 

long to be reimbursed. The IAFC is concerned that fire and emergency departments will not be as responsive to future requests for assistance during major 

National emergencies if the reimbursement system is not reformed and improved. 

CONCLUSION

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the response 

to the Pentagon attack on 9/11 and the lessons learned from it. The events of 

9/11 were a terrible tragedy. The Nation has made many improvements to its National preparedness system to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. However, the terrorist threat continues to adapt, and we must adapt to meet it. Both 

the IAFC and I look forward to working with the committee to face these new challenges and protect our communities. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Chief Schwartz. 

Chairman recognizes Chief Hooley. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES HOOLEY, CHIEF, BOSTON EMERGENCY 

MEDICAL SERVICES 

Chief HOOLEY. Morning. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member 

Thompson, and Members of the committee and staff, I want to 

thank you for your invitation to testify today on the critical role of 

first responders and sharing lessons learned from past attacks. 

My name is James Hooley. I serve as the chief of department at 

Boston EMS. 

Boston EMS is responsible for the provision of emergency medical services for the city of Boston. We are best described as a municipal third service EMS system, in that we are part of the city’s 

health department and are separate from fire or police, who we do 

work closely with. 

I wish to thank the mayor of Boston, Martin J. Walsh, and the 

executive director of the Boston Public Health Commission, Dr. 

Barbara Ferrer, for their support of my participation here today. 

I also want to acknowledge the dedicated EMTs and paramedics 

from across our country, and in particular, the men and women of 

Boston EMS who distinguished themselves on April 15, 2013 and 

play a critical role in ensuring the safety and health of Boston 

every day. 

On Patriots’ Day—Monday, April 15, 2013—two IEDs were detonated 10 seconds apart on the sidewalk of Boylston Street in Boston. The sites were crowded with spectators watching the Boston 

Marathon. 

In an instant a large sporting event and day of civic pride was 

transformed into a mass casualty incident. Three persons were 

killed immediately while 118 survivors would require transport by 

ambulance due to the nature of their injuries. 

Within minutes, 30 patients were categorized as critical, 25 as 

serious, and the remainder with non-life-threatening injuries. 

Those critical and serious patients were rapidly identified, given 

life-saving treatment, quickly transported to hospitals. The patients with lower-acuity injuries were transported next. The scene 

was cleared within 22 minutes and the last of the non-acute patients was transported within the hour. 

Boston’s hospitals enacted their mass casualty operations plans 

to effectively care for this surge of patients. In the hours that followed, approximately 260 patients would seek medical treatment. 
19 

We acknowledge the loss—excuse me—while acknowledging the 

loss, the pain, and the suffering still felt today by survivors and 

their loved ones, I can say that the medical response to this attack 

was a success. It was successful because of a system that was built 

in Boston which put us in the best posture to succeed. 

A lot of things went right. There was extensive pre-event planning by public safety, hospital, and public health agencies. Those 

plans were tested in drills and table-top exercises. Staging and 

loading areas had been pre-determined. 

A large contingent of EMS and other first responders—medical 

volunteers—were prepositioned for the response, and they did not 

hesitate to render aid and assist with the extrication of patients despite the risk of other bombs. 

Interoperability worked. We were able to immediately communicate with all the emergency rooms in the city at once. We could 

immediately communicate with several ambulance services simultaneously. 

Boston EMS coordinated the triage care and rapid transport of 

118 individual patients and we distributed them across 9 area hospitals. Patients were triaged, provided essential life-saving treatment such as tourniquets, and transport was expedited. 

Boston CMED assigned ambulances to hospitals based on their 

capacity and capability. Boston has five Level-1 adult trauma centers as well as a Level-1 trauma center that is specific for pediatrics. 

Private citizens stepped up and became first responders that day. 

Information sharing was supported by us having a medical intelligence center, which was activated. 

There were some issues that did not go as well. In the immediate 

aftermath there was some apprehension and confusion as reports 

of possible other attacks in the city had to be investigated. In 

transporting that many acute patients so quickly, many of whom— 

who had altered mental status or missing personal effects, that delayed patient identification. 

In some cases, the rules of privacy and restrictions on sharing 

patient information resulted in delays in reuniting patients with 

their loved ones. This did not impact the survivors’ care, but the 

frustration felt by their families added to their stress. 

Fortunately, most things did go right that day, but we were left 

to wonder the ‘‘what-ifs.’’ What if the attack had occurred somewhere else, at a different time of day, or if other complicating factors had been present? 

There are valuable lessons learned that I can share. 

Ambulance surge capacity is vital. As I pointed out, half the patients required immediate transport. Having sufficient ambulances 

available was life-saving. 

Planning works. The Boston Regional Mass Casualty Plan ensures that assisting agencies will have the same language, procedures, and equipment. Having sound operational plans with realistic assumptions makes those plans adaptable. 

Be prepared. Never assume that an attack, accident, or natural 

disaster won’t happen in your city. In fact, assume that it will. 

Training works. Over the years we took part in many WMD 

trainings and drills, mass-casualty drills, including training with 
20 

the Boston Police Department to provide EMS in high-turn environments, such as bombings or in mass shootings. So when the real 

event did occur, our personnel were rehearsed. 

EMS can operate in unsecured scenes. As in our case, EMTs with 

PPE and trained to understand the risks and taking precaution can 

quickly operate and maximize patient survival while under the protection of law enforcement. 

Plan for bystanders to respond. Dozens of bystanders stepped in 

to help that day. Many of them had medical training or prior military experience and they were invaluable. We need to be able to 

quickly identify those force multipliers at future events. 

In the days and weeks that followed, we worked hard to capture 

the lessons learned. Boston EMS solicited input from our members, 

including a series of after-action meetings that we held, and also 

we had one-on-one interviews. 

We also hosted sessions with our private ambulance partners 

who assisted us. We attended the after-action reviews at Boston 

hospitals to share best practices and what will improve future 

events. 

We are incorporating these lessons learned into planning for future events, and many have already been put into operation. 

I believe that the Federal Government was very helpful in preparing us for the series of events that occurred that week in Boston. In the past, Boston has benefitted from State Homeland Security grant and MMRS programs. 

In recent years the UASI program has proven to be very beneficial at providing training, exercises, PPE, and equipment. In Boston the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management effectively administers this grant. Investment areas that support multiple jurisdictions and disciplines in all hazards are the ones more likely to 

be approved. 

EMS, hospitals, and public health have had significant input in 

the Boston UASI program, and as a result we were all better prepared. 

I would ask Congress to continue their support to the UASI program, as it has proven value. I would also recommend that communities across the country that receive Homeland Security grants include EMS, hospitals, and public health, as their roles and needs 

must be represented. 

EMS and health care should also have inclusion within fusion 

centers. Boston EMS has been fortunate to assign one of our members to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center since 2007, and 

that has served us well. 

Thank you all for the opportunity to address you today, and 

thank you for your on-going efforts in protecting our homeland. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES HOOLEY

JUNE 18, 2014 

BOSTON EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Boston EMS is the lead agency for the provision of emergency medical services 

within the city of Boston, Massachusetts and a bureau of the Boston Public Health 

Commission. As a municipal public safety department, Boston EMS is separate from 

both the Police and Fire Departments, but an active partner in the provision of 
21 

9–1–1 emergency services. In 2013, Boston EMS processed 116,637 9–1–1 emergency medical incidents, resulting in 142,341 ambulance responses and 83,144 patient transports to hospital emergency departments. The service is comprised of 375 

full-time positions, including EMTs and paramedics, as well as uniformed supervisors and command staff, certified mechanics, support and administrative personnel. In addition to the 24 front-line ambulances staffed during peak day and 

evening shifts, Boston EMS is responsible for the city’s medical 9–1–1 dispatch center, which supports call-taking, dispatching, and managing the region’s Central 

Medical Emergency Dispatch (CMED) communication between EMS personnel and 

receiving hospitals. 

BOSTON MARATHON AND THE BOMBINGS

The marathon is one of Boston’s largest annual special events, although less than 

3 miles of the actual course are within the city itself. In 2013, there were approximately 27,000 registered runners, 8,000 volunteers, and hundreds of thousands of 

observers lining the streets along the route. With the finish line in the heart of Boston, most medical assets, including both Boston EMS personnel and Boston Athletic 

Association volunteers, were concentrated in this area. 

At 2:49 p.m. the first explosion occurred by the finish line, at Copley Square. Ten 

seconds later the second bomb was detonated. Boston EMS personnel assigned to 

the zone by the finish area were able to immediately confirm there had been explosions. This was followed by a notification over the radio that ‘‘two devices went off’’. 

All units were notified to take extreme caution. Personnel at Alpha Medical Tent 

were told to prepare to receive patients and hospitals were notified via a disaster 

radio that there had been a mass casualty event. Private ambulance mutual aid was 

requested at 2:55 p.m. via the Boston Area Mutual Aid network (BAMA) and the 

first patient was transported at 2:58 p.m. A total of 118 individuals were transported by ambulance in the aftermath of the bombings. Within minutes, 30 patients 

were categorized as critical, 25 as serious and the remainder with non-life threating 

injuries. Those critical and serious patients were rapidly identified, given life-saving 

treatment and quickly transported to hospitals. The patients with lower acuity injures were transported next. The scenes were cleared in 22 minutes and the last 

of the non-acute patients was transported within the hour. Boston’s hospitals enacted their mass casualty operations plans to effectively care for this surge of patients. In the hours and days that followed, approximately 260 patients would seek 

medical treatment. 

WHAT WENT RIGHT

While acknowledging the loss, pain, and suffering still felt today by survivors and 

their loved ones, the medical response to the attack was a success, serving as a testament to the level of preparedness, planning, and training our city and State have 

achieved. Everyone who left the scene alive is still alive today, a remarkable outcome given the severity and number injured. 

In exploring what went right, it is imperative to first address the circumstantial 

elements that worked in our favor, such as: (1) The proximity of the bombs to ready 

medical assets, (2) the availability of qualified personnel to commence rapid and appropriate triage, treatment, and transport, (3) the optimal running conditions, resulting in reduced marathon-related illnesses and injuries, allowing resources to be 

appropriately redirected to those injured by the two bombs, (4) the incidents occurred immediately before hospital shift change, resulting in added staffing in the 

midst of the patient surge. It is also important to note that Boston has 6 level-1 

trauma centers, one of which exclusively serves pediatric patients (Boston Children’s 

Hospital), allowing the most critical patients to promptly receive the care they needed. By acknowledging the elements that worked in our favor, we recognize the possibility that maybe next time they won’t (for us or another city), and we plan for it. 

Focusing on the elements of the response where we did have influence, it is important to highlight the years of behind the scenes planning, coordinating, drilling, 

exercising and training that allowed us to have the best possible outcome, given the 

circumstance. 

Homeland Security Grants 

From the time Homeland Security grants first became available to us, both the 

State and city have worked actively to make the most of the opportunities they have 

afforded. We are grateful for the years of State Homeland Security Program and 

Urban Areas Security Initiative funding. Many of the investments we have made 

with these dollars served a direct benefit in response to the bombings, including 

trainings, exercises, equipment, and PPE. 
22 

Emergency management and homeland security grant investments in the region 

have a long-standing history of being inclusive of not only EMS, but also non-public 

safety partners, such as hospitals, health centers, long-term care centers, and businesses. With most training, drills and exercises being both inter-jurisdictional and 

inter-disciplinary, the response to the bombings was inevitably inclusive and coordinated. Personnel utilized shared protocols, shared ICS language, and understood 

what and how they needed to communicate to others and what they could depend 

on them for. 

Joint Training and Exercises 

The joint trainings and exercises have been invaluable, not just for the experience 

of the participants, but also the many months of planning that bring agencies across 

disciplines together. Even departments that respond jointly on a routine basis, benefit from shared trainings and exercises to prepare for the less routine. As an example, Boston EMS trains extensively with the Boston Police Department SWAT and 

Bomb Squad units, so that our EMTs and Paramedics are appropriately integrated 

into their responses. 

Learning From Others 

Just as others listen and learn from our experiences, we have spent the last 2 

decades, doing the same with other communities across the country and the world. 

Whether it was the terrorist attacks in London, Oklahoma, Madrid, New York, 

Mumbai, or Columbine; or the natural disasters that swept through New Orleans, 

the Texas coast, and New Jersey, we critically examined what we would have done 

if the same were to happen in Boston. We tried to incorporate the successes we saw 

the other first responders implement and did our best to apply their lessons learned. 

Extensive Inter-Agency Pre-Event Planning 

Meetings to prepare for the race commence a year prior, with an extensive array 

of stakeholders, including emergency management, public health, EMS, hospitals, 

police, and the American Red Cross. Prior to the race, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency hosts a table-top exercise focused on a particular disaster scenario/race disruption. Through years of exploring what could go wrong, 

much was done to prepare, including pre-identified shelters, staging locations and 

loading areas, in addition to pre-positioned mass casualty supplies. Many of the existing plans for the marathon, such as taking all critical patients to the back of 

Alpha Medical Tent, where Boston EMS had a designated treatment and ambulance 

loading area, worked well in response to the bombings. 

Special Events As Planned Disasters 

Over the years, Boston saw the potential for large-scale special events, such as 

the Boston Marathon, to not only be locations of heightened risk for attacks, due 

to their high-profile nature and large crowds, but also serve as opportunities to implement, test, and gain familiarity with NIMS and ICS practices. In fact, we began 

referring to special events as ‘‘planned disasters’’, given that they inherently share 

many of the same characteristics. Between 1- and 2,000 runners seek medical care 

at a course medical station and/or hospital during the Boston Marathon, many partner agencies are involved, streets are congested, and access can be compromised. Incorporation of the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System, as well as utilizing equipment, resources, and systems designed for 

large-scale emergencies helps with the overall medical consequences of the event. 

And, the experience provides personnel an opportunity to gain familiarity with disaster response protocols, a practice that also allows for a seamless transition if/when 

a real emergency arises, whether it is an evacuation at the Boston Pops Fourth of 

July celebration, due to a thunderstorm, or terrorist attacks at the Boston Marathon. 

There Were Ready Medical Assets That Did Not Hesitate to Render Aid 

Understanding both the potential for a significant volume of marathon-related illnesses and injuries, as well as the risk for something worse, Boston EMS personnel, 

other first responders and medical volunteers were heavily concentrated near the 

finish area. We had nearly a third of our workforce, a total of 116 EMTs and paramedics, assigned to Zone 1, the finish area. An additional 13 ambulances, and associated personnel, were staged at the event and 26 were working city-side, two above 

the normal day-shift complement. When the bombs exploded there was an immediate shift to mass casualty mode. A second device had already detonated and there 

was a possibility of more, yet, there was no hesitation in going directly to the blast 

sites and expediting extraction, care, and transport. 
23 

Boston EMS coordinated the care and rapid transport of 118 individual patients, 

distributing them across 9 area hospitals. Patients were triaged, provided essential 

life-saving treatment, such as tourniquets, and transport was expedited. Boston 

CMED then assigned ambulances to hospitals based on their capacity and capability. 

Interoperability Worked 

When the request was sent for ambulance mutual aid support, the response was 

immediate. With years of coordination and shared training, they reported directly 

to the designated staging area, allowing for fluid loading and transport, with the 

most critical being transported first. Similarly, Boston EMS was able to communicated via disaster radios to all emergency departments in the city at once, as 

planned. When they received the notification they understood the implications and 

took necessary actions to prepare. 

Patient Distribution 

The survival of a patient in critical condition is dependent upon receiving appropriate care, making not just rapid transport, but also the availability and capability 

of the hospital, essential. Many post-disaster best practices have emerged over the 

years, cautioning the tendency to transport to the closest hospital. Taking note, we 

have spent years coordinating with our EMS and hospital partners to plan for patient distribution during a multi-casualty incident. At the end of the day, no one 

hospital was overwhelmed by the volume of patients they received, in response to 

the bombs; we consider this to be the best measure of successful patient distribution. 

WHAT WENT WRONG

Aside from the most egregious wrong, the fact that Boston experienced a terrorist 

attack, three lost their lives, 16 suffered amputations and many more were injured; 

Boston has spent many months evaluating how we could have done a better job. 

In the immediate aftermath, there was some apprehension, confusion, and reports 

of other possible attacks. Transporting such a high volume of acute patients so 

quickly, with many unresponsive or missing identification, coupled with privacy rule 

restrictions on sharing information, resulted in delays for identifying some patients 

and reuniting them with loved ones. It did not affect the survivors’ care, but the 

frustration experienced by their families was real. 

Fortunately, most went right and we were left to wonder the ‘‘what ifs’’: Had the 

attacks occurred elsewhere, at a different time of day or if other complicating factors 

had been present. People speak of the Boston Standard, but ultimately, the challenge is on us to ensure we can meet that standard in other scenarios. 

LESSONS LEARNED

EMS Surge Capacity is Vital to Patient Survival During an MCI 

The experiences of April 15, 2013 and the week that followed highlighted both 

strengths and areas for improvement in our public safety response capabilities. 

Speaking from the emergency medical services perspective, our greatest success also 

points to one of our most significant challenges. Having experienced and trained 

professionals on scene, able to provide immediate treatment and transport saved 

lives, but this EMS surge capacity was in many respects artificial; it is not part of 

daily operations. 

EMS has a public safety role that complements the Fire and Police functions. Regardless whether EMS is embedded within another organization, a private agency 

or a municipal third service, we as a country must critically examine its ability 

surge. As we push health-care functions to become less costly and more efficient, 

reducing periods of ambulances not being assigned to calls to as close to zero as possible, we expose ourselves to a point of self-organized criticality, where we can’t respond to the ‘‘what-if’’ scenarios. We are grateful to our private ambulance mutual 

aid partners, who answered the call when we requested their assistance on April 

15, but it is uncertain where ambulances would come from should an incident happen on a different day of the year. Fiscal realities affect municipal as well as private 

ambulance capacity and staffing. 

Chance Favors the Prepared 

Louis Pasteur once said, ‘‘chance favors the prepared mind,’’ a phrase that is wellsuited for the field of homeland security. Having frequently employed NIMS and 

ICS protocols in real incident and special event response efforts, their use was natural and automatic after the explosions. For years, we would imagine the unimaginable and then take action to expand our knowledge and capabilities in that area. 
24 

We have hosted conferences on various potential threats, including improvised explosive devices, invested in medical supplies for trauma care, spent years training 

and drilling our personnel on triage and mass casualty incident response, and participated in multiple full-scale exercises, a number of which included blast incident 

scenarios and lent experience to skills in interagency coordination and patient distribution. 

Initially focused on supporting the added logistical challenges associated with the 

central artery tunnel project, known as the Big Dig, the Boston EMS Special Operations Division, has evolved into an essential element of preparedness within the 

Department and the city. The division coordinates medical consequence resources 

for over 500 special events each year, as well as providing logistical support for unplanned emergencies. Having such an integral component of the Department dedicated to planning for the expected and unexpected, fosters a Department-wide culture of preparedness. 

Training and Exercises Work 

Department of Homeland Security grant funding has been invaluable in supporting inter-disciplinary inter-jurisdictional training and exercises. The integration 

of public safety agencies from multiple cities and towns, as well as non-public safety 

partners, including hospitals and public health, has not just increased individual 

staff knowledge, but has also helped agencies understand how to respond together 

in a collaborative manner, respecting each other’s roles and strengths. The more we 

are able to provide opportunities for personnel to train and exercise together, the 

more it becomes second nature. We are appreciative of a supportive Office of Emergency management, which has prioritized such opportunities, and for FEMA for approving them. 

The more responders understand the protocols and priorities of other disciplines, 

the more they are able to work collaboratively, in support of a shared success. International Trauma Life Support standards promote principals in trauma care for EMS 

that mirror combat care in the military, focusing on rapid assessment, treatment, 

and transport; if public safety partner agencies understand this, they may better 

recognize how they can support this function, such as securing routes for ambulance 

ingress and egress from an incident to maximize patient survival. 

In addition to local trainings, I can personally attest to the benefit of programs 

focused on strategic leadership, such as the Naval Post Graduate School, Center for 

Homeland Defense and Security, where I joined a cohort of local, State, and Federal 

representatives, from both public and private sectors. This executive-level program 

provided an invaluable opportunity to more critically examine issues in homeland 

security and share lessons learned with other public safety and emergency management leaders. This program serves as a reminder of how important it is to be continually learning, particularly when we work in a field where we are expected to protect the public from ever-evolving threats. 

Planning Works 

In Boston, EMS, hospitals, and public health are well integrated into planning 

teams. Having diverse representation for this component helps mitigate false assumptions about a discipline’s capabilities and serves as an opportunity to communicate priorities that may not be readily apparent to others. By seeking value in 

such partners, emergency management has benefited from a broader platform of 

subject-matter experts and built a more cohesive and prepared community. 

As a coordinated effort with our private EMS partners, Boston has a regional MCI 

plan. And, all large-scale special events, such as the Boston Marathon have a medical consequence plan that is updated and reviewed each year. Such plans are successful because they are well-practiced and adaptable. We can write planning documents, train, exercise, and invest in equipment, but ultimately, we have to trust in 

our personnel to improvise, adapt, and overcome. If they can understand the endgoal of what they are being asked to do, they won’t need a scripted step-by-step 

guide, nor will they be daunted when a component of the plan is curtailed. In the 

case of the response to the bombings, we had spent much time establishing a process and protocol for designating which hospital each patient would go to; it would 

be done by a loading officer, who would be able to assign patients across the hospitals allowing for even distribution. With the two blast sites, the rapid load and 

go of patients and more than one transport location, the mechanism by which patients were assigned hospitals immediately changed to a role managed by CMED 

at the dispatch center, where additional personnel could support hospital assignments and even distribution across the facilities. This was not a senior commandlevel decision, this was everyone understanding the essential nature of successful 
25 

patient distribution and taking necessary action. We have since revised our plans 

for complex incidents to this format. 

Intelligence and Information Sharing 

Much has been documented and discussed about the importance of strengthening 

intelligence and information sharing across Federal, State, and local partners, as a 

consequence of the bombings. In focusing on this priority, it is important to take 

a broader look at what constitutes the local-level intelligence community. Since 

2007, Boston EMS has assigned a seasoned paramedic to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), the city’s fusion center. He has benefited from analyst training, offered through Homeland Security investments, although the position itself 

has always been paid for by Boston EMS. Having a paramedic assigned to the BRIC 

helps foster routine information sharing, on matters such as narcotic and violencerelated incidents, and establishes a trusted partnership for sharing threat intelligence (as permitted). In addition to better connecting our two departments, our 

paramedic is able to serve as a broader health and medical subject matter expert, 

allowing for a unique perspective and contribution. There are public health emergencies that police benefit being informed of, public safety matters that may have 

health and medical consequences, and, given the broad scope of patients seen by 

medical providers, there is the potential for EMTs, paramedics, doctors, or nurses 

to identify a potential criminal threat (either within the home of a patient or in 

their symptoms). Having an established avenue by which information can be shared 

across the law enforcement and health care community has been proven to have extensive benefit. EMS is uniquely qualified to serve as a bridge between the public 

safety and health care communities, as it encompasses both. 

Looking more specifically within the health care community, we recognized the 

need for modeling some of the strengths and benefits of an EOC, but with a health 

and medical focus, allowing the 60-plus health and medical departments in Boston, 

including hospitals, health centers, EMS’ and public health to better coordinate with 

each other and share information during emergencies. This idea came to fruition 

when we secured Federal grant funding in 2008 to convert a conference room into 

a regional Medical Intelligence Center (MIC). Named after a former Boston EMS 

deputy superintendent, Stephen M. Lawlor, who promoted interagency collaboration, 

the MIC has shown much value over the years. During the marathon and the week 

that followed the bombings, health and medical information sharing was supported 

by public health, hospital, and EMS personnel assigned to the MIC. 

Responding to an Unsecure Scene 

Every day, EMTs and paramedics risk their lives to save the lives of others, 

whether it is stepping onto an unprotected ledge, being hit, bit, spit on, or even shot 

at. We do what we can to protect our personnel, they are trained in self-defense, 

they are assigned personal protective equipment, including ballistic vests, but ultimately, when they sign up for the job they understand there is a certain amount 

of risk. When a representative from Israel, who came to speak at a conference we 

hosted, was asked how they sent their personnel into unsecure scenes, knowing the 

risk of secondary devices, he explained that ‘‘you do everything you can to prepare 

them, you try to get them in and out as quickly as possible, but ultimately, this 

is the job they signed up for.’’ The safety of our personnel will always be paramount, 

but when everything they are taught focuses on caring for the injured, we can expect that they will respond. This is what happened on April 15, everyone knew the 

risk and they responded. Ensuring EMS personnel across the country receive necessary training and personal protective equipment is now being recognized more 

broadly as a priority. 

Planning for Others to Respond 

Just as we can expect first responders to enter unsecure scenes when there are 

people in need of medical care and transport, we should also plan for members of 

the public to respond, as we saw on April 15. The skills of those who assisted varied, 

although not having a public safety or medical background was not necessarily a 

limitation, many asked what they could do; some were instructed on the application 

of tourniquets and others served vital roles in supporting patient movement. During 

an incident as we experienced in Boston, the initial priorities were quite simple: (1) 

Immediate trauma care, such as the application of a tourniquet, if necessary, (2) extraction to a point where they can be loaded into an ambulance, and (3) transport 

to a hospital. While assistance can be helpful in the first two steps, it is important 

to ensure others understand that if their presence hinders any of these elements, 

it is best if they stay back. Congestion, particularly if it inhibits ingress or egress 

of ambulances, can have a negative consequence for patient survival. Ultimately, 

the onus is on us, members of public safety and homeland security, to ensure it is 
26 

broadly understood that a disaster is defined by the impact to human life and that 

for those suffering traumatic injuries, rapid ambulance transport is essential. Plans, 

trainings, protocols, and guidance should focus on supporting these priorities, within 

the first response and emergency management community, as well as with the public at large. 

The Role of EMS Extends Beyond the Immediate Response to Injuries 

Boston EMS has been asked to speak of the immediate triage, transport, and distribution of patients in the aftermath of the bombs, but what is less recognized is 

the role our personnel played in the events that continued throughout the week. Department personnel were assigned to the blast site for the duration of the road closure and every public event that occurred to honor those who were injured; we 

worked in partnership with the Boston Police Department, were on scene during 

each of the captures, and transported both suspects. 

The Value of Experienced Personnel 

At Boston EMS, our EMTs have an average of 10 years of experience on the job 

and our paramedics have 25 years. When we invest in training, equipment, and exercises, the experience is applied to an individual member of the department. Over 

time, this investment, coupled with the skills they garner from years on the job, becomes a tremendous asset to the department and the city they serve. By focusing 

on EMS as a career, by fully recognizing EMTs and paramedics as public safety officers, we make our communities better prepared for potential emergencies of any 

scale. Boston EMS had over 140 department members provide direct care to those 

injured by one or both of the blasts, either directly on scene or while in transport. 

Even more were involved with events that transpired over the following week. Just 

the one day, April 15, represented more traumatic injuries than people with more 

than 30 years on the job have ever seen. In the aftermath of the experience, Boston 

EMS’ sick time went down and the injury rate went down, people worked harder 

and worked through what might otherwise have kept them out, because they knew 

they were needed. Having dedicated and highly-qualified EMS personnel is something we hope our experience will lend broader recognition and appreciation for Nationally. Just as we need career police officers and fire fighters, we need career 

emergency medical technicians and paramedics. 

CAPTURING LESSONS LEARNED

Boston EMS hosted two compensated internal 4-hour after-action meetings open 

to all personnel on May 2, 2013, during the day and evening shift. A paramedic was 

assigned to perform more in-depth one-on-one interviews to capture additional feedback. Personnel were asked to submit any additional comments verbally or in writing, if desired. An interagency meeting with our private EMS partners, as well as 

attending hospital after-actions, helped us draw from and better understand their 

experiences. A number of other after-action meetings took place within the city and 

State. 

INCORPORATING LESSONS LEARNED TO IMPROVE PREPARATION AND RESPONSE TO

FUTURE (OR POTENTIAL FUTURE) EVENTS

When we read about and spoke to the first responders from other communities 

who had just experienced a natural disaster or terrorist attack, we thought through 

what we would have done in a similar situation, but also understood that we should 

add any new best practices to our overall all-hazards approach. There were no 

planes that attacked us, no floods, no chemical agents or structural collapse, but 

there were many lessons learned we applied from 9/11, Hurricane Katrina and 

Sandy, the Tokyo Sarin attacks, earthquakes, and tornadoes. It is our hope that others hearing about our story, look beyond the possibility of a bombing and draw from 

the many other practices that will save lives regardless the nature of the disaster. 

More than anything, the experience validated much of what we were already 

doing. Certain measures wound up working well in response to the bombs; if they 

were not already built into plans, they now are. In talking to others, we also learned 

how their plans were influenced by expectations we had established. For example, 

we spent many years coordinating and exercising with hospital partners; this experience reinforced the fact that during mass casualty incidents, EMS would use 

triage tags. They grew to expect this and made the determination that triage classifications assigned by EMS would be an initial guide for prioritizing patients upon 

receipt. When the first patients did not have triage tags, this had a direct impact 

on the hospitals that we had never expected. While the most critical patients were 

transported first, this was an important lesson learned, reinforcing the fact that we 

are integrally connected in the continuum of patient care. Steps have now been 
27 

taken to forward-deploy triage tags during special events, to increase the likelihood 

that tags will be applied to patients from the onset, should it become necessary. 

SHARING LESSONS LEARNED

To date, presentations and speaking panels have been the principal means for 

communicating our experience, although we hope to complete an official after-action 

report. Homeland Security funding was utilized to fund a Massachusetts After-Action and Improvement Plan. 

THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Boston EMS has long benefited from Department of Homeland Security funding, 

particularly Urban Areas Security Initiative grants, which have paid for training, 

exercises, and equipment. As a regional grant, it has helped foster regional and 

interdisciplinary coordination and standardization. That said, there is currently no 

requirement to use any homeland security grant funding to support EMS. While we 

have been fortunate to have a supportive emergency management office that includes EMS, we have not seen that to be consistent when we speak to our partners 

in other parts of the country. We commend FEMA for making emergency victim care 

a priority, but ultimately, without directly tying priorities to funding and required 

outcomes, it is at the discretion of the local and State recipients whether or not sufficient investment is made to strengthen such capabilities. The funding has been invaluable, but the more it can focus on promoting inter-disciplinary and inter-jurisdictional coordination, the better a community will be prepared to handle disasters 

of all scale and scope. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

I would also ask Congress to continue support to the UASI program as it has 

proven value. Recognizing that disasters do happen, as much as we try to protect 

against them, it is imperative that homeland security be inclusive of EMS and the 

broader health care community. EMS as a discipline and as a critical function needs 

to be viewed within the lens of public safety for the purpose of homeland security. 

In doing so, there will be life-saving benefits on a daily basis, as well as during disasters. The fact that emergency medical services may be different in each city or 

town, should not diminish the importance of the function and discipline; emergency 

victim care is vital in any disaster; EMTs and paramedics who operate ambulances 

are the first responders. 

I wish to thank Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Ranking Member Bennie G. 

Thompson, the Members of the committee, Boston Mayor Martin J. Walsh, and the 

executive director of the Boston Public Health Commission, Dr. Barbara Ferrer for 

allowing me to submit this written testimony. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Chief Hooley. Let me again commend you for your life-saving, heroic measures that day in Boston. 

Chairman now recognizes Dr. Jackson. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN A. JACKSON, DIRECTOR, RAND SAFETY 

AND JUSTICE PROGRAM, THE RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you. 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of 

the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning 

and to be part of such a distinguished panel. 

In my written testimony I address three areas where Congress 

can play a significant role in maintaining the National preparedness and response system that supports first responders to future 

incidents, and which lessons from past response operations indicate 

should still be important priorities: The need for better ways to assess and measure preparedness, continuing to support and improve 

upon programs that protect emergency responders’ health and safety at large-scale incidents, and improving the adaptability and agility of the National response system by more effectively learning 

lessons from the preparedness exercises that we have heard about 
28 

held at the local level to tell us about the National response system. 

Action in these areas via Congressional support and oversight 

could contribute to better preparing the country to contain the 

human and financial costs of future attacks, incidents, and natural 

disasters. In my oral remarks I will focus on the first two of these. 

The men and women of the fire service, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and the wide range of other Government 

and non-Government organizations that are called on for often 

large and very complex response operations are absolutely central 

to the Nation’s ability to deal with a future that will always be uncertain and will always hold the risk of terrorist attack, natural 

disaster, and other damaging incidents. 

These organizations play that role while also responding to the 

much smaller-scale everyday emergencies that affect their jurisdictions and populations, the demands of which already stretch some 

of these organizations’ resources. 

To enable responders to do their jobs during large-scale incidents 

and attacks it is critical that the National Preparedness System, 

from the Federal to the local level, work together and support them 

effectively. Concerns regarding the performance of that system led 

to substantial legislative and executive actions in the wake of both 

September 11 and the Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 

Performance at subsequent response operations has demonstrated that these actions have produced significant improvements in National preparedness, and the contrast between well-executed recent responses like Boston or to Hurricane Sandy and to 

Hurricane Katrina is striking. 

However, trends in both the future risk environment—particularly increasing numbers of large-scale, response-intensive natural 

disasters—and a challenging fiscal environment, that we have 

heard about, is putting pressure on response organizations, emphasize the importance of continued focus on the health and functioning of the National response system. Given such challenges, 

there are areas where Congressional focus would be valuable, and 

I will discuss two of these that have been the subject of significant 

RAND research. 

First, the issue of improved evaluation and preparedness assessment. To support first responders at large incidents there needs to 

be a clear picture of the capabilities of the National Preparedness 

System. Significant strides in preparedness measurement have 

been made since 2001 by both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services, but this 

is not yet a solved problem, as recent GAO reports have highlighted. 

Effective measures are necessary to have confidence that the National Preparedness System will be able to support first responders 

and also to educate the public about what they should and should 

not expect when disaster strikes. Measurement becomes even more 

critical under fiscal austerity, since without good measures it is difficult to have an educated public debate about preparedness and 

make trade-offs with a clear understanding of the implications of 

funding allocation choices. 
29 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT211.html. 

Second, protecting the safety of emergency responders. Responders clearly take risks as the assist others, and the Nation relies on 

them to do so. Providing both the necessary equipment and safety 

management structures to minimize risk to them is not just the 

right thing to do, it is in the Nation’s interest as well. 

The experience of 9/11 and the extensive health impacts on many 

responders to those attacks have demonstrated the significant personal, organizational, and financial costs that can result. Since 

2001 there has also been major progress on improving safety management for response operations, coming out of focused efforts to 

learn from those responses and others. 

There have been broad efforts involving a wide range of organizations to improve both the doctrine and practice of safety management, including processes for monitoring health and safety of responders before, during, and after deployment at large-scale response operations. However, the experience at the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and cleanup has shown that challenges remain. 

In conclusion, the Nation obviously relies on first responders to 

act and act effectively when major incidents and terrorist attacks 

occur while simultaneously responding to all of the emergencies 

that occur on a daily basis. For the Nation to be prepared for largescale events, the National Preparedness System needs to effectively 

support those initially local responders who will always be the first 

ones on the scene. 

Again, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and 

Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to submit 

testimony on this important issue. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN A. JACKSON 1 2

JUNE 18, 2014 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify this morning and to be a part of such a distinguished panel. 

Today I am going to talk to you about three areas where Congress has a significant role in maintaining the National preparedness and response system that supports first responders to future incidents—and where lessons from past response operations indicate a continuing need for focused attention: • Developing better ways to assess and measure preparedness to maintain both 

responders’ and public confidence that the National preparedness system will 

be there when they need it; • Improving the adaptability and agility of the National response system by more 

effectively learning lessons from preparedness exercises; • Continuing to support and improve upon capabilities and programs that protect 

emergency responders’ health and safety at large-scale incidents and disaster 

responses. 

Action in each of these areas—via Congressional support and oversight—can contribute to both better supporting responders to future incidents and to better pre-
30 

3For example, Kellerman, A.L., What Should We Learn from Boston? CT–395, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 2013. 4Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘FEMA’s Preparedness 

for the Next Catastrophic Disaster—An Update,’’ OIG–10–123, September 2010; Dodaro, G.L., 

‘‘Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing 

Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,’’ GAO–11–940T, September 8, 2011. 5Smith, A.B. and R.W. Katz, ‘‘US billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: data sources, 

trends, accuracy and biases,’’ Natural Hazards, Volume 67, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 387–410; Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, ‘‘FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next 

Catastrophic Disaster—An Update,’’ OIG–10–123, September 2010; Kostro, S.S., A. Nichols, A. 

Temoshchuk, ‘‘White Paper on U.S. Disaster Preparedness and Resilience: Recommendations for 

Reform,’’ Washington, DC: CSIS, August 27, 2013. 6Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, ‘‘The Impact of the 

Economic Downturn on American Police Agencies,’’ October 2011; Police Executive Research 

Forum, ‘‘Policing and the Economic Downturn: Striving for Efficiency Is the New Normal,’’ February 2013; Cooper, M., ‘‘Struggling Cities Shut Firehouses in Budget Crisis,’’ New York Times, 

August 26, 2010. 7Pines, J.M. et al., ‘‘Value-Based Models for Sustaining Emergency Preparedness Capacity 

and Capability in the United States,’’ The Institute of Medicine Forum on Medical and Public 

Health Preparedness for Catastrophic Events, January 2014. 

paring the country to reduce the human and financial costs of future attacks, incidents, and natural disasters. 

The major incidents the country has faced in recent years—including both terrorist attacks and others—clearly demonstrate the critical role played by first responders in containing such events and addressing their consequences. The men and 

women of the fire service, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and the 

wide range of other Government and non-Government organizations that are called 

on for often large and very complex response operations are absolutely central to 

the Nation’s ability to deal with a future that will always be uncertain and always 

hold the risk of terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other damaging incidents. 

And the responder community plays that role while responding on a daily basis to 

the much smaller scale, every day emergencies that affect their jurisdictions and the 

populations they protect, the demands of which already stretch some of these organizations’ available resources.3

To enable responders to do their jobs during future large-scale incidents and attacks, it is critical that the National preparedness system—from the Federal to the 

local level—work together and support them effectively. Concerns regarding the performance of that system led to substantial legislative and executive actions in the 

wake of both the September 11, 2001 attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Performance at subsequent response operations has demonstrated that those actions 

have produced significant improvements in National preparedness.4 The contrast between well-executed recent responses like those in Boston or to Hurricane Sandy 

and the response to Hurricane Katrina is striking. 

However, two trends emphasize the importance of continued focus on the health 

and functioning of the National response system: • The first is that responders’ tasks and missions are not getting any easier over 

time. Statistics on large-scale natural disasters requiring substantial response 

efforts show an increasing trend, requiring more extensive—and more expensive—response operations.5 Concern about terrorist attacks has also remained 

prominent in the years since 2001, with cases like the attacks in Boston demonstrating the unique response challenges of such incidents. First-responder organizations have also been challenged by other incidents of mass violence, with 

their own distinct response demands. • Second, the Nation has also just gone through the most serious financial and 

economic crisis in recent history. During and after the crisis, fiscal austerity at 

the State and local level drove reductions in budgets of responder organizations—with predictable effects.6 In recent years Federal spending in this area 

has also declined,7 and there is significant concern about controlling Federal expenditures going forward. Though a robust debate about the right amount to 

spend on preparedness efforts is worthwhile and appropriate, resource constraints nonetheless do represent a challenge to maintaining and further 

strengthening National preparedness. 

Given such concerns about both the future risk and fiscal environment, there are 

areas where Congressional focus on the National preparedness system would be valuable. I will highlight three that have been the subject of significant RAND research: 

• Improved evaluation and preparedness assessment.—To support first responders 

to major incidents, there needs to be a clear picture of the capabilities of the 

National preparedness system. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
31 

8Maurer, D.C., ‘‘National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, But Additional Steps Are 

Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities,’’ GAO–13–637T, June 25, 2013; 

Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘National Preparedness Report,’’ March 30, 2013; Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, ‘‘Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State,’’ February 2008; ‘‘National Health Security Preparedness Index,’’ on-line at http://www.nhspi.org/ 

. 9For example, National Association of County and City Health Officials, ‘‘Indicators of 

Progress in Local Public Health Preparedness,’’ May 2008. 10 Jenkins, Jr., W.O., ‘‘Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress 

in Assessing National Capabilities,’’ GAO–11–260T, March 17, 2011; Caldwell, S., ‘‘Homeland 

Security: Performance Measures and Comprehensive Funding Data Could Enhance Management of National Capital Region Preparedness Resources,’’ GAO–13–116R, January 25, 2013; 

Maurer, D.C., ‘‘National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, But Additional Steps Are 

Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities,’’ GAO–13–637T, June 25, 2013. 11 Jackson, B.A., The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing 

‘‘Response Reliability’’ as Part of Homeland Security Planning, OP–234–RC, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2008; Nelson, C. et al., ‘‘Conceptualizing and Defining Public Health Emergency Preparedness,’’ Am J Public Health, Volume 97 (Suppl 1), 2007, pp. S9–S11; Jackson, 

B.A., K.S. Faith, H.H. Willis, ‘‘Are We Prepared? Using Reliability Analysis to Evaluate Emergency Response Systems,’’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 19, Issue 

3, 2011, pp. 147–157; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, H.H. Willis, Evaluating the Reliability of Emergency Response Systems for Large-Scale Incident Operations, MG–994–FEMA, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, 2010; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, ‘‘The Challenge of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: Integrating Component Metrics to Build System-Level Measures for Strategic National Stockpile Operations,’’ Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Volume 

7, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 96–104. 12 ‘‘Are We Prepared? Measuring the Impact of Preparedness Grants Since 9/11,’’ Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on 

Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia, June 25, 

2013, on-line at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/emdc/hearings/are-we-preparedmeasuring-the-impact-of-preparedness-grants-since-9/11. 13 ‘‘Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program,’’ https://www.llis.dhs.gov/hseep. 14 ‘‘Funding and Guidance for State and Local Public Health Departments,’’ http:// 

www.cdc.gov/phpr/coopagreement.htm. 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) have made significant 

strides in preparedness measurement since 2001, including the development of 

the National Preparedness Report and the National Health Security Preparedness Index.8 Efforts by nongovernmental organizations and analysts have also 

contributed.9 Nonetheless, recent reviews by the Government Accountability Office have identified areas where improvement is needed.10 That this is not yet 

a fully-solved problem should not be a surprise, given the complexity of evaluating the ability of diverse sets of response organizations across the country to 

come together and effectively respond to incidents as varied as floods, activeshooter incidents, and bioterrorist attacks. Work at RAND on these challenges 

has argued that evaluations must distinguish between response systems’ theoretical capacity to respond (based on the resources that have been put in place) 

and whether they will be able to reliably deliver capabilities in the uncertain 

post-disaster environment.11 Though much more difficult to measure, it is the 

ability to reliably deliver capability that is the true measure of preparedness. 

The need for measurement is tied to good Government goals, including the effective management of Federal investments in preparedness.12 But the need for 

preparedness measurement goes beyond questions of management and accountability. Measures are necessary to have confidence that the National preparedness system will be able to support first responders in the future, and to educate the public about what it should—and should not—reasonably expect when 

disaster strikes. Measurement becomes even more critical under fiscal austerity, 

since without good measures it is difficult to have an educated public debate 

about preparedness and make trade-offs with a clear understanding of the implications of funding allocation choices. 

• Supporting agility and continuous improvement in the preparedness system.— 

Maintaining preparedness in the face of evolving risks requires mechanisms for 

identifying lessons from past response operations and applying them to improve 

preparedness Nation-wide. However, just relying on what we can learn from actual response operations is not enough to adequately prepare for uncertain future threats. 

Exercises and drills—for example, those carried out under the DHS’ Homeland 

Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 13 or DHHS’ public health preparedness cooperative agreements 14—are held as part of individual jurisdictions’ pre-
32 

15For example, Dausey, D.J., J.W. Buehler, N. Lurie, ‘‘Designing and conducting tabletop exercises to assess public health preparedness for manmade and naturally occurring biological 

threats,’’ BMC Public Health, Volume 7, 2007, pp. 92–101; Biddinger, P.D. et al., ‘‘Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness Exercises: Lessons Learned,’’ Public Health Reports, Volume 125 

(Suppl 5), 2010, pp. 100–106. 16 Jackson, B.A., and S. McKay, ‘‘Preparedness Exercises 2.0: Alternative Approaches to Exercise Design That Could Make Them More Useful for Evaluating—and Strengthening—Preparedness,’’ Homeland Security Affairs, Volume VII, 2011; Nelson, C. et al., New Tools for Assessing 

State and Local Capabilities for Countermeasure Delivery, TR–665–DHHS, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2009; Jones, J.R., et al., ‘‘Results of Medical Countermeasure Drills Among 

72 Cities Readiness Initiative Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2008–2009,’’ Disaster Medicine and 

Public Health Preparedness, Volume 6, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 357–362; Jackson, B.A., K.S. Faith, 

‘‘The Challenge of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: Integrating Component Metrics to Build 

System-Level Measures for Strategic National Stockpile Operations,’’ Disaster Medicine and 

Public Health Preparedness, Volume 7, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 96–104 (and references therein). 17Faith, K.S., B.A. Jackson, and H. Willis, ‘‘Text Analysis of After Action Reports to Support 

Improved Emergency Response Planning,’’ Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Volume 8, Issue 1, December 2011 (see also more recent similar work by others in 

Savoia, E., F. Agboola, P.D. Biddinger, ‘‘Use of After Action Reports (AARs) to Promote Organizational and Systems Learning in Emergency Preparedness,’’ Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health, Volume 9, 2012, pp. 2949–2963.) 18 ‘‘Lessons Learned Information Sharing,’’ https://www.llis.dhs.gov/. 19 Jackson, B.A., et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks, CF–176–OSTP/NIOSH, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002; Jackson, B.A., et al., 

Protecting Emergency Responders, Volume 3: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response, MG–170–NIOSH, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004. 20For example, ‘‘National Response Framework,’’ http://www.fema.gov/national-responseframework; ‘‘Emergency Response Resources,’’ http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres/ 

responders.html; ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and Response,’’ https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/ 

emergencypreparedness/; National Response Team, ‘‘Health and Safety,’’ http://www.nrt.org/. 21 ‘‘Emergency Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance,’’ http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ 

topics/erhms/. 22Kitt, M.M. et al., ‘‘Protecting Workers in Large-Scale Emergency Responses: NIOSH Experience in the Deepwater Horizon Response,’’ Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Volume 53, Number 7, July 2011, pp. 711–715; Michaels, D. and J. Howard, ‘‘Review of 

paredness programs.15 Beyond just contributing to bolstering preparedness 

where they are held, such exercises can be a source of insight into preparedness 

more broadly to guide National improvement efforts. In past RAND work examining exercise design, we have developed and recommended approaches to make 

it possible for exercises to produce more useful information to inform assessment and improvement efforts.16 Similarly, our research analyzing the after-action reports from both exercises and incident response operations has demonstrated they too can be a source of insights—a source which to date has not 

been fully utilized—on the health of the National preparedness system.17 Measuring the effectiveness of efforts to disseminate lessons learned to the many organizations within the National response system (e.g., DHS’s Lessons Learned 

Information Sharing System 18) also merits attention—since lessons not effectively disseminated and applied are not actually lessons learned from a system 

perspective. • Protecting the safety of emergency responders.—Lessons learned from past response operations have also demonstrated the importance of providing first responders at major incidents the protection they need to fulfill their critical roles. 

Responders clearly take risks as they assist others, and the Nation relies on 

them to do so. Providing the necessary equipment and safety management 

structure to minimize risks to them is not just the right thing to do, it is in 

the Nation’s interest as well. The experience of September 11, 2001 and the extensive health impacts on many responders to those attacks have demonstrated 

the significant personal, organizational, and financial costs that can result from 

the risks involved in some response operations. 

Since 2001, there has been significant progress on improving safety management for response operations, coming out of focused effort to learn from past 

responses. RAND, in collaboration and with the support of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, facilitated a set of research projects 

to gather responder safety lessons from those and previous response operations.19 The resulting products have contributed to broader efforts involving 

many organizations and agencies to significantly improve responder safety management doctrine and practice,20 including processes for monitoring the health 

and safety of responders before, during, and after deployment at large-scale response operations.21 However, the experience at incidents such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response and clean-up 22 has shown that challenges remain in effectively protecting responders at large-scale incidents. 
33 

the OSHA–NIOSH Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Protecting the Health and 

Safety of Clean-up Workers,’’ PLoS Currents, July 18, 2012. 

The Nation relies on first responders to act, and act effectively, when major incidents and terrorist attacks occur—and to do so while simultaneously responding to 

the much smaller-scale emergencies and crises that occur on a daily basis. For the 

Nation to be prepared for large-scale events, the National preparedness system— 

made up of agencies and individuals from the Federal to the local level, inside and 

outside Government—needs to effectively support the initially local responders who 

will always be the first on the scene. 

Congress, through its oversight role, can contribute to strengthening both the efficiency and effectiveness of the National preparedness system by continuing to support and to encourage agency programs focused on improved preparedness measurement and evaluation, increasing focus on improving the value and effectiveness of 

preparedness exercises, and supporting on-going efforts to improve protection of responders at large-scale response operations. 

Again, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to submit testimony on this very important National issue. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you, Dr. Jackson. 

Chairman recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Commissioner Miller, you and I discussed in the back room about 

the rising threat that we see. It seems like with every briefing I 

get the threat seems to be getting worse overseas, and I believe 

that with that, too, comes a greater threat to the homeland. 

One only need turn on the television today to realize what we 

have realized for the past year, and that is there is a growing alQaeda presence and training ground in Syria and Iraq that I believe is rivaling if not surpassing what we saw in Pakistan and Afghanistan. ISIS—and it very much concerns me. 

We are very privileged to have someone from New York; Arlington, where the Pentagon was struck; and of course, Boston—the 

three biggest targets that we have seen on 9/11 and since then. So 

we have your expertise, I think, to draw on. 

The biggest complaint after 9/11 was we were not connecting the 

dots, we were not sharing information. Then a decade later we had 

Boston, and I was disappointed to see that we are still not getting 

it right. 

I had Ed, Ed Davis, the police commissioner, testify that even 

though he had four members of his police department on the JTTF, 

that they knew nothing about the Russian warning; they knew 

nothing about the FBI opening an investigation into Tamerlan; 

they knew nothing about his travel—foreign travel overseas even 

though he was on four watch lists. Even though CBP knew about 

that, we don’t know if that was even shared with the entire JTTF 

or the FBI. 

We know in this business we get it right most of the time, but 

if we don’t get it right the consequences can be very, very severe 

and very damaging, as we saw on 9/11 and in Boston. 

So my question to the three of you is: Where are we since 9/11 

in terms of this information-sharing process, not only with FBI and 

DHS but the JTTFs and the fusion centers? Are we where we need 

to be or can we—do we need to do a better job? 

I will start with you, Commissioner. 

Commissioner MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say 

from New York City’s perspective we are in as good a shape as we 

could be. 
34 

To take your question in the arc it was delivered, we have a high 

degree of concern in that there are more foreign fighters in Syria 

right now in a 3-year war than during the entire pendency of the 

war with the Russians in Afghanistan the last time, and that is 

largely owed to the marketing piece of social media that sends out 

a global message that will bring them there. Twelve thousand of 

them are—12,000 to 15,000 are estimated to be Westerners from 

United States, Canada, Europe—visa-waiver countries where they 

are a plane ticket away from the United States, and that is of great 

concern. 

So within the framing of your question, in that kind of threat environment, when you have to ask yourself, ‘‘Will they be hardened, 

radicalized, trained in weapons and explosives, and who and where 

will they be when they come back?’’ Within the structure of the 

New York City Counterterrorism Program we have the Intelligence 

Bureau, we have the Counterterrorism Bureau. We have over 100 

detectives assigned to the JTTF. 

Addressing the issues of my good, close, personal friend, Commissioner—former Commissioner Ed Davis, from Boston, part of the 

difficulty they had to deal with was that they only had four detectives on the JTTF and that they lived within the threat squad that 

ran leads. Our investigators are spread out across every single 

squad in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, so that delivers us a 360- 

degree view of the activities of that task force across all programs. 

Behind that we have a briefer that comes up from the National 

Counterterrorism Center every week and, within our secured compartment and information facility, conducts Classified briefings for 

the command staff of intelligence and counterterrorism on the current threat pictures as it is amalgamated in NCTC from overseas, 

as well as regular briefings that we have between our analysts and 

the analysts at the FBI. 

If anything, Mr. Chairman, the challenge we face is drowning in 

intelligence, information, and leads in the busy threat stream 

across a number of platforms. But a lack of connectivity or information sharing is not a New York City problem. 

Chairman MCCAUL. That is very encouraging. I do think—I have 

always said—that the local police and first responders know the 

streets better than anybody. They are the eyes and ears. I think 

the FBI can leverage that to their benefit if the information is 

properly shared. 

I do think New York has stood up, and I commend you for your 

efforts. 

Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley, you are in a little different position. It is more fire fighting, EMS, but I do think there is a benefit to the sharing of information in terms of being prepared. 

Like, sir, in Boston I think there was a threat prior to that, not 

related to Tamerlan, so the—Boston did stand up its EMS operation. I think in Arlington, being so close to the Nation’s capital, 

it would be of benefit, I think for the two of you, can you sort of— 

can you tell us where you are with information sharing? 

Chief HOOLEY. Yes, sir. I definitely think that we are in a better 

place than we were right after 2001. 

You know, Boston started its local regional intelligence center— 

its fusion center several years ago. In 2007 we did place a full-time 
35 

paramedic—a veteran person from our department—over there, 

and that is his primary assignment. 

Over the years he has been offered a lot of training that came 

through DHS for analysis training, has access to the GIS and to 

other analysts that are in there, is able to sit in on daily briefings, 

has received a lot of training about, you know, how to handle material and how to pass it on. 

Now how—what can be passed on? What comes through is another thing and I can’t always speak to that. 

But having somebody in there as a trusted partner is a good first 

step, because sometimes you only need a little bit of lead time to 

start to put yourself in a position to prepare for something. There 

was an incident several years ago where I mentioned to one of the 

staff—you know, I don’t think it was anything sensitive; I think it 

was Law Enforcement-Sensitive—about a truck that was missing, 

stolen, whatever, up in eastern Canada somewhere that had a 

large amount of cyanide with it. Again, no threat with it or anything, but just that little bit of information that did come down to 

us, you know, reviewed our treatment, signs, and symptomology for 

that, our stores of the antidote that we had, what P.V. do we need 

to effectively care for people. So it gave us the ability quietly, behind the scene, for the managers and the medical directors to be 

ready for that. 

So again, nothing happened. It didn’t evolve. But having that— 

having people in places like that does give us that early head start. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Chief Schwartz, my time is expiring, but if 

I could touch on interoperability, you mentioned that in your opening statement, that 9/11 Commission recommended greater interoperability. We are still not there. Congress has acted, as well, and 

there is a $7 billion initiative called FirstNet to develop that interoperability. 

Do you feel that the first responders have been adequately consulted with regarding the development of FirstNet? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would say that, you know, so 

far the efforts at FirstNet are still maturing. We are not too far 

down the road yet, you know, in terms of results. 

But I think that we are confident, you know, to date that we are 

being consulted. Chief Jeff Johnson, former president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, is on the board. He is doing a 

great job, along with some of his colleagues, to do a lot of outreach 

and inform local communities, local leaders about what this is 

going to mean. 

So I don’t think we are too far along yet, but I think we are 

pleased with where we are to date. We are watching it very closely. 

Chairman MCCAUL. That is certainly good to hear. 

Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I really appreciate the expertise that our witnesses bring to this 

hearing. 

Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley, the Metropolitan Medical Response System has been credited with building local and regional 

capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks involving hazardous material and other mass casualty events. However, we have not provided funds for that program since 2011. 
36 

Has the lack of this funding, in your professional opinion, affected capabilities for your departments to respond to mass casualty events, and how has your region maintained that capability 

with the lack of these funds? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Congressman, we have been very fortunate in 

both Arlington and the NCR to be in an area that receives UASI 

funding, so it is hard for me to tell you that the amount of money 

that we were getting with MMRS has been a tremendous loss because we still have other funds coming through the UASI program 

that enables us to do, you know, some of the same things that we 

were doing through MMRS. 

What I would say is that MMRS, in my estimation, was less 

about the amount of money that we received; it was more about 

how it sort-of catalyzed a systems approach to preparedness. It got 

the right stakeholders to the table to interact around the various 

threats that a particular community might face and caused them 

to do planning and the development of capabilities in a way that 

recognized that everybody has to work together, that there isn’t 

any one profession—or in the case of regional applications, any one 

jurisdiction—that has, you know, the full solution or a full set of 

capabilities. 

So I would say that in those jurisdictions that, you know, are not 

the beneficiaries of UASI money, MMRS played a far greater role 

in getting people to the table even though it didn’t provide a lot of 

money. If I am not mistaken, I think the entire program never exceeded $70 million. 

On a local level we were receiving little more than, you know, $150,000 or $200,000 a year. That wasn’t buying an awful lot, but 

it did certainly facilitate getting stakeholders to the table to figure 

out how to do things together, and that resulted in better performance in the operating environment, in my view. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Chief Hooley. 

Chief HOOLEY. Congressman Thompson, yes, I really have to 

echo what I just heard from my new friend here from Arlington. 

The MMRS program in a lot of ways was the little engine that 

could. 

I think the largest amount of funding we maybe saw in 1 year 

for that might have been around $300,000. But it did pull together 

a lot of stakeholders because it was specific to hospitals and to prehospital. 

Just to give you a couple of examples from when we did a lot of 

work with that group to build our staff-sharing agreements between hospitals. We built a lot of our capability to respond to a 

nerve agent, a chemical attack, and to buy antidote, stockpile that, 

do the training for that. 

We were able to keep that in place, but sustaining that now does 

mean that we have to draw our other dollars. You either take it 

from operational money, you take it from UASI, or you don’t do it. 

So that is one of the—our legacies from that. 

The other one was we were able to build up a pretty good capability around the medical management of patients if there was a 

dirty bomb by involving the radiation safety offices from all the 

hospitals in Boston, who just—the hospitals donate their time to us 

so we could work on building portals, building other things. They 
37 

maintain—they keep them available for us to use if there is a mass 

care event. 

So with a small—relatively small investment from MMRS we 

were able to build some pretty good systems that we are still benefitting from today. 

Mr. THOMPSON. My point is sometimes we can provide the seed 

monies to get people to the table to do something big, and that was 

kind-of the reason we kind-of pushed those funds. 

Dr. Jackson, do you think the Federal Government is doing everything it can to ensure first responders have equipment and technology they need to protect themselves during disaster responses, 

based on your research? 

Mr. JACKSON. Setting the bar at ‘‘everything that can be done’’ 

is a very high one. I mean, certainly the investments that have 

been made in the grant programs have built capability over time, 

sort-of as I cited in my testimony, the change that we have seen 

since 9/11 and since Katrina really is impressive. 

One of the challenges that has come up in our research sort-of 

trying to understand this from an outside really is the problem of 

measurement. I mean, some of the things that we have heard 

about here are the relationships, you know, building the relationship between agencies so they can work together effectively. Figuring out how to measure that to determine, you know, whether 

the capability that was built between agencies, you know, 5 years 

ago before staffs change will still be available 5 years from now, 

you know, when people have retired, when people have been promoted gets to the question about, you know, sort-of how do we ensure that we maintain the preparedness that we have built over 

time? 

So the—sort-of continuing those investments, but also continuing 

the investments in understanding how to measure it so we know 

how much confidence we should have in this system is still something that I—that there is a need to focus on at the Federal level. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Chairman now recognizes the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank all the witnesses, and especially thank Chief 

Schwartz for what your department did at the Pentagon attacks of 

9/11, Chief Hooley for the outstanding work that the EMS did after 

the marathon bombings last year. As the Chairman said, it is really amazing that 263 people had severe injuries and no one died. It 

is really a testament to the outstanding job that you did. 

Commissioner Miller, it is good to see you here today. You have 

a long record in law enforcement—NYPD, FBI, director of National 

Intelligence Office, and now back with the NYPD. 

You know, there is a lot of talk about—excuse me—Federal funding that goes to different police departments around the country, 

including the NYPD. There are also a lot of unreimbursable expenditures. Can you just give some example—for instance, how 

many NYPD police officers and civilians are focused on counterterrorism and intelligence? 

Commissioner MILLER. As you know, Congressman, one of the 

things that those funds rarely if ever apply to is personnel costs. 
38 

The NYPD’s commitment to the counterterrorism mission is second 

to none in that between those two bureaus we have devoted over 

1,000 people to this on a full-time basis, and then pull in additional 

officers from around the city on ad hoc missions to support the 

counterterrorism effort every day. 

Mr. KING. As you said, that is largely unreimbursable as far as 

the personnel cost attached to that. 

Commissioner MILLER. Yes. 

Mr. KING. Right. There are also many threats that are not reported where you have to send detectives out there or officers out 

there to monitor a situation, which goes unreported but does obviously run up the expenses. 

Commissioner MILLER. Yes. That is correct. 

Mr. KING. Also, you mentioned about New York being a target. 

Could you give some examples—for instance, from Inspire magazine; rather than just a generic attack on New York, they actually 

give specific examples? 

Commissioner MILLER. New York as a primary target for terrorism is based first on empirical data. When you tick through the 

16 plots targeting New York City before and after 9/11, starting 

with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and moving 

forward, but I think when you look at some of the more recent 

plots, whether it was Najibullah Zazi’s plot to put 16 backpacks on 

the New York City subway system to cause mass casualties or the 

plot that followed that involving Faisal Shahzad’s delivery of a 

truck bomb to Times Square, both of them would say that they 

were inspired in large part by the videos and messages of Anwar 

al-Awlaki. 

As you know from your briefings on this committee, Anwar alAwlaki then aligned himself with a young American from North 

Carolina via Queens named Samir Khan, who started Inspire magazine. From its first issue, Inspire magazine has always focused on 

driving forward—this is an on-line publication of al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula, carrying al-Qaeda’s narrative—driving forward 

the idea of the homegrown terrorist acting out within the capacity 

of what they could do without the actual support of the headquarters component of al-Qaeda. 

We have seen that in a number cases, including Mohammad 

Quazi Nafis, who drove what he believed to be, as part of an FBI 

undercover sting operation in concert with the NYPD, a 1,000- 

pound truck bomb to the front of the Federal Reserve in the middle 

of a crowded Wall Street lunch hour, and dialed the phone to set 

that bomb off while watching from a hotel window above six times. 

When we looked at that device you saw the detonator hooked up 

to the cell phone with the six missed calls. 

In addition, the most recent issue of Inspire magazine takes the 

mistakes that they claim caused Faisal Shahzad’s Times Square 

truck bomb not to function and says that they have remedied those 

technical errors with a new recipe and instruction manual for a car 

bomb. The magazine is quite clear in its copy to say that the purpose of this bomb is not to blow up the Federal building, or recreate Oklahoma City, or destroy structures; its specific purpose and 

design is to kill people in crowded areas. The picture that comes 

with that accompanying article shows a Ford van coming down 
39 

Broadway in Times Square with a red circle on it at the corner of 

47th Street and Broadway, which was the same place Faisal 

Shahzad planted his device. 

They suggest actual attacks against New York City right down 

to citing specific events and crowd conditions that would be optimal. So this is a theme and drum beat that we continue to see. 

The Pakistani Taliban has now launched its own magazine called 

Azan, along the Inspire model, and it also focuses on attacking 

within the United States, attacking large cities, specific references 

to New York City, and urges its readers not to reinvent the wheel. 

If you can’t get a gun, get some other kind of weapon and do what 

you can. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. Chairman, if we have a second round I would like to discuss 

Secure the Cities with Commissioner Miller. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Chairman now recognizes in the order of appearance, Mr. Keating, from Boston. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is great to see you here, Chief Hooley, in particular. 

I have a couple questions. One is, quickly, I think one of the most 

important parts of training is to develop the chain of command so 

that is there. Could you comment on that? Because in my own experience, when there are emergencies of lesser scale, and you had 

fire personnel, emergency personnel, police personnel even within 

the same areas of government, that was a problem. 

But how important is that, so that that is established ahead of 

time? 

Chief HOOLEY. Having a chain of command established and having people routinely employ ICS or NIMS is of great importance. 

When events happen, such as we experienced that day in Boston, 

people knew—the people I know in my department, and suspect 

also in police and fire, everyone knew what their positions, duties, 

and zones of responsibility were that day. They knew who the supervisors were above them. 

But they also—the supervisors above them, more importantly, 

knew how much that they could delegate and let people improvise 

on the plan to accomplish the mission. 

Mr. KEATING. Great. You just segued to one of my other questions from the EMS side. 

In the Boston Marathon bombing there was so much that was accomplished through just the good common-sense people exercised. 

They put people in—not in medical vehicles, many times, but just 

in cars that weren’t equipped, just to get them to the hospital in 

time. 

What lessons were learned from doing that? What resources are 

necessary in the future? One of the things—things like QuikClot 

and other things that are there, more accessible to first responders 

that are important? 

Could you comment on what you learned through some of the improvising that occurred and what you saw in terms of the need for 

additional resources? 

Chief HOOLEY. One of the biggest things we saw was, you know, 

the willingness of the public to step up and become first responders, as well. You know, in a city like Boston, and I am sure in New 
40 

York and the Capital Region here, there are a lot of folks who either have medical training, or they have worked in medical settings, they have prior military experience, and they are all willing 

to step up when they see, you know, fellow citizens injured. 

Being able to supply them with quick material—for example, 

when you mentioned tourniquets, well we have always carried 

them, we have always deployed them going back many years. You 

know, now we have since more than doubled that. 

All the first responders in Boston now have been equipped with 

that because we saw just how quick, simple, mechanical tool it is. 

You know, it requires a minimal amount of training. 

Mr. KEATING. So, if I—just jump, because my time is limited, to 

the panelists as a whole: 9/11 identified one of the most serious 

needs to be increased communication. In 2012 we have appropriated $13 billion to help that. We have the FirstNet going on; we 

have—which would be years away. 

Where are we now, from your perspective, in terms of increased 

communication? Because that will save lives. It was identified in 

the 9/11 Commission report as something that if it had been at a 

better level would have saved lives. 

Where are we now with that communication on the ground? 

Chief HOOLEY. Well, for the base interoperability—and I will go 

real quick—we have made a lot of advances, really thanks to the 

Federal Government. Our EMTs and paramedics on—just on the 

radios they carry have hundreds of channels where they can immediately talk to other agencies if they need to, and even the surrounding cities and towns around Boston, all by agreement. There 

have been a lot of advances there. 

The Federal Government also sponsored us being able to build a 

Boston Area mutual aid network, where we are able to put consoles 

in the private ambulance companies, because we really depend on 

the privates to help in a mass care event. If this had been 5 years 

prior, we would have been forced to go through our rolodex of 

phone numbers and call companies individually. This way, we hit 

a button, like on this, we are able to talk to them all. 

Mr. KEATING. Great. 

Chief Schwartz. 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I was just going to say, using 

Virginia as an example, one of the things that we have done is divided—or using the regions that were already established in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, and within each of those regions, developed regional interoperability committees that join together both 

jurisdictions and professions—the different disciplines—to work on 

the problems, you know, regionally of interoperability. Then the 

State-wide interoperability coordinator has the role of sort of knitting together what each of those regions is doing. 

I think we have made vast improvements in the last almost 13 

years now, but, as you say, there is—you know, there is still some 

work to do. You know, one of the things that I think we need to 

focus on is that there are an awful lot of jurisdictions out there 

that simply do not have the resources of a New York of the National Capital Region, and that is where I think we can take greater advantage of sharing infrastructure, you know, that each jurisdiction doesn’t necessarily need to build its own capability; it can 
41 

share infrastructure with other jurisdictions, thereby reducing cost 

and facilitating interoperability. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. 

My time is up. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Chairman now recognizes the chair of the 

Emergency Response and Preparedness Subcommittee, Mrs. 

Brooks. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

hosting this hearing. 

Thank you all so very much for what you do. 

Good to see you again, Chief Schwartz. You have appeared before 

our subcommittee and really appreciate you returning. 

You have listed, actually, a number of things that you brought 

up, as well, before the subcommittee. I am curious from your colleagues that are here with you today what are the top priorities 

that you would like to see fixed. Because you listed a number of 

things, which I think are very important—security clearances for, 

whether it is EMS or fire, to sit on JTTFs; over-Classification of 

Classified information, possibly that issue of over-Classifying information which first responders might very much need to have. 

Chief Hooley, you mentioned that you need that information so 

you can be prepared with respect to antidotes and how to take care 

of patients, and so forth. 

So I am very curious from each of you, what is it that you need? 

We certainly know that the funding is critically important, but 

what are the top concerns that you actually have for first responders, particularly with respect to terrorism, which—and as we have 

heard from the deputy commissioner, with the thousands of people 

that we are concerned might be returning—thousands of Westerners returning to this country, what are your top priorities? 

Deputy Commissioner, just out of curiosity? 

Commissioner MILLER. I think you have actually framed it very 

well. From the New York City standpoint, with the bandwidth we 

have, though, as has been a bit of a theme behind the questioning 

here and our testimony submitted for the record, funding is still 

the top priority in that the counterterrorism overlay, the training 

that comes with it, the equipment that comes with it, even, as Congressman King pointed out, while we absorb a lot of that cost in 

the personnel area, the idea of networking the region together, having a common operational picture, getting common operational 

equipment so we are operating on a common standard—all of this 

is dependent on the support of the DHS funding, the UASI program, and so on. 

The FirstNet issue is critical in that that real estate in the communications world needs to be mapped out, needs to be wellthought-out. Of course, the training, which relates back to the 

funding. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Chief Schwartz, of all the things that you listed, what would be 

your top priority? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. So I am not going to repeat the—you know, 

what we have all talked about in terms of the funding, but I think, 

you know beyond the funding there is, you know, dare I call it a 
42 

behavioral aspect to some of this, you know, what people in positions of leadership are held accountable for. 

So as an example, we have talked a little bit about information 

sharing and, you know, how we at the local level get our information. One of the things that we have discovered is that the people 

who are amassing that information—the analysts—don’t often understand what we do or why we need that information or why it 

needs to be characterized in a way that would lead us to develop 

capabilities in response to these threats. 

That is why I cite, you know, the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team at the NCTC. We have undertaken in the National 

Capital Region an effort to—something we call Take Your Analyst 

to Work Day. We actually have the analysts from the intelligence 

community come out and ride fire trucks, ride ambulances, ride in 

cop cars so they can see our job, how we do it. It actually makes 

it clear to them why the information that typically and traditionally they are producing for high-level Federal decision-makers has, 

in some cases, applicability to us. 

Mrs. BROOKS. While that is an incredible example of a best practice, you have also mentioned that we as a country aren’t doing a 

very good job sharing the best practices. 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Correct. Correct. We are spending a lot of 

money on some very good things in our jurisdictional or regional 

areas, but for all of the money that we are spending, we are not 

leveraging the best practices. 

It seems to me that it would be easy enough in the grant programs to look at some of the success and promote those, incentivize 

those in subsequent years—adapted for local conditions, obviously, 

or regional conditions, because not everything is a one-to-one fit. 

But I think there is not enough out there—not enough awareness 

of what has worked in other areas. 

Patient tracking, as an example. We have heard a couple of 

times about the Boston experience and other experiences. 

In the NCR we have created what we believe is a very robust patient tracking system that overcomes the difficulties of, you know, 

where patients are during a crisis. How do we promote that beyond 

our own, you know, marketing of that? How do we get FEMA to 

say, ‘‘This is important and we are going to put money into this so 

that everybody can enjoy the successes that the National Capital 

Region has’’? 

Mrs. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, because I know that Chief Hooley 

and Boston have been outstanding in looking at best practices, I 

could just ask Chief Hooley to respond what—how you have studied best practices, if I am not mistaken, from around the country. 

Can you share a bit with the committee about that? 

With that, I will yield back after his answer. 

Chief HOOLEY. Thank you. 

You know, we take advantage of every event to try to learn from 

not only formal after-actions reports that come out later, but whenever we have an opportunity, you know we have expended dollars— 

sometimes operational dollars or even some grant dollars—to bring 

some of the folks who dealt with the situations on the ground there 

in to talk with us. 
43 

One example, after Katrina we brought up some folks from the 

local hospitals and EMS, as well as law enforcement and fire down 

there, to really give us an idea of what would work, what wouldn’t 

work here to test us. We did that with the Gulf Region for some 

hospital evacuations. 

As it relates to terrorism, we brought over folks from Northern 

Ambulance Service after their attacks on their subways to find out 

what worked in the mass care setting, what worked as far as setting up either a field hospital versus getting people out of there. 

We have talked to people from the Israeli Defense Forces about 

how to deal with secondary devices, suicide bombers, so that we 

could maximize our effectiveness if—when our day came. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, there are so many incredible things 

that these departments are doing, it just seems that with modernday technology we as a country ought to be able to figure out how 

to share these incredible best practices, which I don’t think we are 

doing right now as a country. 

With that, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I completely agree with the gentlelady. 

Chairman recognizes now the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman and I thank the Ranking Member for this important hearing. 

To all of the witnesses, each of you have had first-hand experience or you have had involvement in the research of this very important component to our National security. Every time I address 

this question in homeland security I like to use the terminology 

‘‘National security,’’ because each of you are really on the international front lines, only because many of what you have had to 

encounter has generated from entities beyond these shores. So I 

thank you very much for your first-hand knowledge and involvement. 

Let me mention the obvious that both the Chairman and the 

Ranking Member have already made mention of. First of all, I believe the Chairman made mention of ISIS, which is now, in essence, having a large part of Iraq under siege, and as we speak, 

are moving toward any number of cities and confronting the Iraqi 

National Security Forces, which are finding it very challenging to 

deal with these both heinous and violent, horrific, and moral-less 

terrorists. They represent a threat to Iraq, but the represent the 

existence of entities that are hungry for publicity and the ability 

to show their prowess. 

We just returned from Nigeria less than 24 hours ago, and you 

may have heard of something called Boko Haram. Today some 

would say that that is a small entity in an isolated northeast part 

of Nigeria, but the delegation that went saw them as vile, moralless thugs and terrorists that are decapitating police officers, and 

slitting the throats of women, and kidnapping children. They are 

connected to the terrorists that are in the Sahel and they are worth 

taking note of. 

I say this because it is well that America has first responders 

and a new view of intelligence sharing that gives us some comfort 

since 9/11. But it is always important to be vigilant. 
44 

So one of the things that we established—two points—and to my 

Ranking Member, I support wholeheartedly his analysis regarding 

using something called all-hazards grants as opposed to the grant 

process that we had before that would allow the various first responders to seek particular resources and they would be focused on 

National security and homeland security. I hope that we can continue to work with the administration to see that importance. 

I want to read a sentence from Deputy Commissioner Miller, 

from your statement that said, ‘‘That is why it takes additional resources, specialized equipment, and more money to police events 

that used to simply require police personnel for crowd and traffic 

control.’’ It is a new day, is it not? 

Would you speak to the importance of dollars that impact intelligence sharing and interoperability? I say that because none of you 

are from the fourth-largest city in the Nation, which is Houston, 

but we also face our challenges and need to have those resources. 

But would you speak to that, please? 

Commissioner MILLER. I would be pleased to, Congressman Jackson Lee. 

The counterterrorism overlay that we referred to, if you look at 

an event like the Boston Marathon and then you have a major public event, whether it is another race or a major parade, deploying 

the people who are going to be conducting the countersurveillance 

in the crowd, looking for operators who might be planning something in the crowd, looking for those Tsarnaev brothers; the deploying of not just a bomb detection canine that is going to look at a 

package and say ‘‘does it contain explosive or not’’ if it is sitting 

there, but the more highly-trained and more costly vapor-wake 

dogs that are going to be able to move through a trail and actually 

pick up the vapor wake, the unseen odor that only one of those 

dogs can detect of somebody wearing a backpack or carrying a bag 

that contains a device moving through a crowd. 

When you look in the incredibly scalable world of port security 

and you want to push that threat outward from a city, the idea of 

having the sophisticated radiation detective—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is very important. 

Commissioner MILLER [continuing]. Equipment on your aircraft 

or on your boats to detect that threat before it enters your port, all 

of this is enormously costly. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Chief, may I just thank you. 

Chief, may I just ask you the question of interoperability and the 

importance of having grant dollars to improve interoperability— 

both the chiefs that are there, between your services and other 

services? 

Chief HOOLEY. Well, it is important—it is important, you know, 

to maintain it, because as we make advances in communication 

equipment and we keep expanding our abilities to talk to each 

other we want to be able to stay current with technologies. 

Again, the interoperability then extends beyond us and shared by 

the public safety agencies. You know, we have built up interoperability now with Mass Highway, so we can talk when—you know, 

they can direct us from their control centers when there is traffic 

things with Mass Port for incidents over at the airport. The poten-
45 

tial to just keep expanding it, you know, now that you have a base 

and—is very good. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. 

Chief SCHWARTZ. I would just add that, you know, this entire effort in the wake of 9/11, it seems to me, has been to develop really 

a National capacity to respond to a crisis, whether it be, you know, 

terrorism or something more naturally occurring. Every after-action report that has been written has pointed to the issue of communications, the lack of interoperability. 

You know, I think the grant money as a way to facilitate people 

coming together and working on what really are not technological 

problems, you know, but are problems governance, they are problems of, you know, people sitting down and figuring out what it is 

they need to get out of the situation, I think is certainly assisted 

by the grant money to facilitate those relationships. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman for his extra time. 

I thank the witnesses for that special insight on protecting our 

National security. 

I thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Chairman now recognizes Mr. Barletta. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the hard work of our witnesses and the men and 

women that they represent, who are key members of our communities. 

We must train for disasters, and I fully support efforts to train 

our first responders. As a former mayor for 11 years I know how 

important this is. I have supported firefighters grants, cops grants, 

regional information-sharing system. So I certainly understand 

that. 

But we must also prevent—work to prevent a terrorist attack. An 

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and my good friend, 

Michael Cutler, who was an ICE agent, would tell me, ‘‘When it 

comes to terrorism, an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure.’’ 

Now the best thing that we can do to help our first responders 

is to prevent a terrorist attack in the first place. Now the 9/11 

Commission report was given to Congress to do just that—to make 

recommendations of what we can do to prevent another attack. It 

was passed by Congress and signed by the President. 

The first paragraph of the preface of the 9/11 Commission staff 

report on terrorist travel begins with the following paragraph: ‘‘It 

is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and carry 

out attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the 

country. Yet prior to September 11th, while there were efforts to 

enhance border security, no agency of the United States government thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism 

arsenal. Indeed, even after 19 hijackers demonstrated the relative 

ease of obtaining a U.S. visa and gaining admission into the United 

States, border security is still not considered a cornerstone of national security policy.’’ 

Now, the 9/11 Commission study on terrorist travel went on to 

detail numerous examples of instances where terrorists not only 

made use of visa and immigration fraud to enter the United States, 

but to also embed themselves in the United States. Page 47 of this 
46 

report notes, ‘‘Once terrorists have entered the United States their 

next challenge was to find a way to remain here. Their primary 

method was immigration fraud.’’ 

Another paragraph—and this is found on page 98—it said that 

‘‘terrorists in the 1990s as well as the September 11th hijackers 

needed to find a way to stay in or embed themselves in the United 

States if their operational plans were to come to fruition.’’ 

Our borders are not secure. We do not have a biometric exit system to identify when someone overstays their visas. We are not enforcing our immigration laws to prevent immigration fraud. 

So we have not taken the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report. 

My question is, to each of you: Doesn’t this make you nervous? 

Commissioner MILLER. From the standpoint of New York City, 

given all the context we have discussed at this hearing, we go to 

bed nervous every night, and we wake up nervous every day. It is 

a state of being in the post-9/11 world. 

But to address those concerns, intelligence is, at its simplest, understanding a problem. Good intelligence analysis is understanding 

it well enough to do something about it. Part of that has to be 

about being well-placed to collect and analyze—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. But if I could just—if intelligence tells us that the 

best way to prevent a terrorist attack is to stop it in the first place, 

and we know that terrorists use visas as a method of entry into the 

United States, and we know that they use immigration fraud as a 

method to embed themselves, wouldn’t intelligence then tell us that 

we should enforce our immigration laws and secure our borders? 

Commissioner MILLER. It would be within the Government’s capacity to do it. You are asking a local official about a Federal problem, but I think where I was going with that is we have, as well 

as people in London, Tel Aviv, Oman, Abu Dhabi, Singapore, 

NYPD people embedded within those services to watch. We also— 

and I will be meeting with this person after this hearing—have 

people here at Interpol, but also at Customs and Border Protection. 

One of the great relationships we have between the NYPD and 

the Federal agency, aside from the FBI, is with CBP, in terms of 

keeping track of who is coming in, making sure that suspects we 

are investigating aren’t getting out, and an alert system that goes 

both ways on that. I think that between our agencies that works 

very well. 

The larger problem that you frame is beyond the scope of the 

NYPD to address. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Chief Schwartz, does it make you nervous that we 

are not following this report? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Well, Congressman, I would, you know, echo 

the commissioner’s observations. There is a lot about international 

travel that, you know, that has me concerned, and that is one element that—you know, the one you are describing is unfortunately 

one that I have little influence or control over. 

As concerning to me is the people, you know, the legitimate people in this country who are, you know, potentially traveling to 

areas of conflict right now, picking up, you know tactics, techniques, and procedures that they might bring back here and use. 
47 

As the commissioner indicates, our ability to get the intelligence on 

those folks and properly prepare—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. I understand that. I appreciate that. You know, 

it is remarkable—the intelligence of what we are able to do, but 

aren’t we missing step No. 1 is to prevent it in the first place? If 

we can stop an attack from someone even coming here and embedding themselves here, shouldn’t that be a priority? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I wouldn’t argue your point. Absolutely. It is just that from where I sit I have little influence on 

that. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Chief Hooley. 

Chief HOOLEY. Well, as you said in the beginning, an ounce of 

prevention is worth a ton of cure. Can’t disagree with that. 

I guess, you know, as far as, you know, my influence as a local 

EMS provider is a little bit—not much when it comes to international travel or those type of matters. 

Mr. BARLETTA. But isn’t the best thing we could do for the EMS 

is to not put them in harm’s way in the first place? 

Chief HOOLEY. Oh, sure. Because our response is based on having to respond to something and consequence management—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Dr. Jackson. 

Mr. JACKSON. Certainly the challenge here is understanding the 

right approach to get the most benefit towards this problem. Immigration and border control is one part of that, but as we have heard 

about, you know, interagency relationships, really this is a systems 

problem. We have heard discussions about—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. If you think of enforcing—but again, we are glazing over, because there is a political aspect to this, but there is a 

National security aspect to this. I get it. I understand the political 

aspects of it, but I am worried about our National security. We 

should not be playing politics with the security of the American 

people. 

If we know that terrorists embed themselves in the United 

States and use immigration fraud as a way to do it, should we be 

doing that? 

Mr. JACKSON. Well, certainly immigration and border protection 

is one part of this overall system. But there is a resource question 

here, and it is a question of where in that system an investment 

in the resources will get the most safety. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Isn’t the way to get the most safety is to not allow 

them into the United States in the first place? Seems pretty obvious to—— 

Mr. JACKSON. In the ideal, depending on what the relative price 

of getting better there versus getting better—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. What was the price of 9/11? 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Time is expired. 

The Chairman now recognizes the ever-patient Ms. Clarke, from 

New York. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is so good that you 

should mention that. I just want to put on the record, I got one— 

you owe me one. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
48 

To the Ranking Member, as well, thank you. 

To our panelists, thank you for sharing your expertise this morning. It has been quite edifying. I think that there are some recurrent themes that, you know, remain a challenge for us. 

Let me welcome back the NYPD and welcome back to Capitol 

Hill Deputy Commissioner John Miller. I wanted to ask—I will 

start with a question to you, sir—unfortunately, due to the experience of 9/11 and not—and out of the necessity of having thwarted 

several terrorist attempts since, New York City has developed expertise that serves as a model for counterterrorism planning and 

programs. 

Since you have been in your current position, what counterterrorism programs have you changed, and what programs have you 

found most effective or ineffective? For example, many Americans 

in and outside of New York—the New York-New Jersey area—were 

a bit troubled by a few years back when we learned that NYPD officers were dispatched to New Jersey to conduct surveillance activities at mosques and other social gathering places of Muslim Americans. 

In the wake of 9/11 we understand that singling out and targeting individuals based on religion is not the way to go. Violent 

extremism transcends religion. Can you comment on that? 

Then, please share any concerns that your agencies have regarding consolidation of grant programs, maintenance of effort, and its 

impact on remaining vigilant, stood-up, and forward-leaning in the 

face of ever-evolving and multi-faceted terrorist threats. 

Commissioner MILLER. Let me try and go in order, and if I miss 

something just bring me back. 

As far as concerns about NYPD and the so-called Muslim Surveillance Program, there is nothing called the Muslim Surveillance 

Program; that is a term kind-of coined by the newspapers so that 

has become a bit of a bumper sticker. On the other hand, there 

were concerns about the scope and breadth of NYPD’s efforts to 

gain information at the onset of its intelligence program and its coordination with other jurisdictions. 

In the time that I have been back at the NYPD, which is a mere 

6 months at this point, what we have done is increase our coordination, I would say in the extreme with the FBI, not just in New 

York but also in the Newark field division in New Jersey. We have 

increased an already fairly good coordination with the counterterrorism entity in the attorney general’s office in the State of New 

Jersey. 

In terms of the optics issue about, well where were they looking 

and what were they looking for, part of that is to understand that 

while jurisdictional borders between law enforcement agencies are 

critical to be mindful of, both in procedure and in some cases in 

law, terrorist plotters don’t actually honor those borders. The people who built the World Trade Center bomb in 1993 built it in New 

Jersey. Most of the plot against the Federal Reserve was—the 

bomb was constructed in Long Island. 

So it is incumbent upon the NYPD to have a richer picture in 

terms of understanding not just New York City but the surrounding areas. Part of the issue there is the community outreach 

and community relations issues, which is how were those efforts 
49 

framed? Were the earliest efforts reflective of what we are doing 

today—and the answer there would be no. I think there was also 

a bit of a learning curve over those years. 

So to get a better understanding and get clearer optics, one of 

the things that we have done in the past 6 months is to increase 

our outreach to those communities within the greater metropolitan 

area. We have had three major meetings with stakeholders in the 

Muslim community, as well as some of the very groups that are engaged in litigation against us, to bring them to the table, to take 

their questions, to try and give some answers, to address their concerns. 

Today, as we sit here in this room, the New York City Police Department is doing its pre-Ramadan briefing, where they bring in a 

large number of people from the Muslim community and religious 

leaders to talk about, before the holiday season, their concerns, 

from issues as simple as parking during prayer time at mosques 

to as complex as radicalization—whatever they want to discuss. 

The police commissioner has met with them personally; I have addressed those concerns, and that is a dialogue we intend to continue. 

I just want to close on that issue by saying: Very much in the 

universe that we lived in in Los Angeles, where we competed with 

the message of gangs in the streets for the attention of children 

and teenagers and young people, we are competing with an equally 

powerful message coming through social media and the publications that go by the narrative of al-Qaeda that is urging young men 

to travel overseas to fight, to die, to martyr themselves or be 

maimed or killed, or to come back and bring that narrative back 

home to the United States. 

My message to those stakeholders in the community has been 

more, ‘‘I need a partner here in a counter-narrative to that message 

that I cannot be the deliverer of the government, the police department, an intelligence entity can’t be the one to deliver that message. I need your voices because there is a powerful message coming from the other side and we need to engage in this effort together.’’ 

That may mean a little more transparency on my part. I get that, 

and that is what they are seeking. But I need more help from the 

community as well. 

Ms. CLARKE. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Chairman recognizes Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking Member. 

To the panel, thank you for your testimony today. 

Deputy Commissioner Miller, I know your work with the NYPD. 

I grew up across the river in Newark, New Jersey, but as a youngster I remember you more on NBC channel four, disseminating information to the community. 

Chief Schwartz, I was fortunate enough to have TEEX training 

in Texas, and they used your experience on 9/11 as the scene, and 

what you were able to do that day in the circumstances that you 

found yourself is commendable. 
50 

Chief Hooley, to know that you were able to get those people to 

the hospital within 22 minutes of that function is incredible. 

You know, Chief Schwartz, in your testimony, you know that 

communications problems posed challenges during, you know, the 

response activities at the Pentagon on 9/11. Can you talk about 

how States, regions have improved interoperable communication 

capabilities since 9/11? Can you also talk about the important role 

of State-wide interoperability coordinators and the regional interoperability working groups? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Congressman. I mentioned in a previous question just a little bit about some of the things that we are 

doing in Virginia with regard to regional groups that are working 

on the interoperability problem, and that has been facilitated by 

the State-wide interoperability coordinator, through what, you 

know, again, as we have talked about in a number of different dimension here, you know, by using some of the grant money as sortof the hook to get people to the table and get them to cooperate 

with each other, and it is our hope that, you know, some of the 

things that we have accomplished there will be continued. 

Two other things that we have done in Virginia under the auspices of the interoperability coordinator is to create a linkage between the State’s radio system and that of all the local radio systems. The State had a previous architecture that they had invested 

in, and it was important that, as an example, the State police be 

able to communicate with local law enforcement, fire, rescue, and 

so they were able to create a linkage between those two disparate 

systems. 

Then last, and it, you know, it is a relatively, you know, minor 

issue in the overall scheme of things, but it is not unimportant in 

the operating environment, and that is the State interoperability 

coordinator moved everybody towards a common language, which, 

as you may remember during 9/11, you know, was especially problematic with the use of 10 codes and different terminology that 

really complicates communication. 

So I would just add to this discussion about interoperability that 

the interoperability can’t be seen as, you know, sort-of the Holy 

Grail. It has to be part of an operating system that includes an effective incident command system, incident management system. In 

my view, I have seen too many times where interoperability is used 

as a kind-of a reason not to co-locate and actually make joint decisions. 

So I think interoperability needs to be looked at through the lens 

of operability—you know, the total system of incident management, 

of which our ability to talk to each other mechanically is but one 

part. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. 

You know, during the discussion, you know, the grants that have 

been very useful to your different agencies have come up, and, you 

know, there is a proposal—the NPGP, or the National Preparedness Grant Program—to consolidate UASI and all the grants into 

one sum of money and have everyone compete. There are many 

Members in Congress that don’t think that is very wise. 

I know what UASI has meant to Newark, New Jersey, and to 

have those dollars all come together and then disseminated to the 
51 

State and then, you know, in Newark, cross our fingers and hope 

that we still continue to get the funding that has been so vital to 

the success of, you know, our homeland work in Newark that we 

hope that the State decides, ‘‘Well maybe, Newark, you don’t need 

as much.’’ The direct funding to the entities, you know, on the 

ground is important. 

What is your feeling about—of that? 

Chief SCHWARTZ. Well, Congressman, we have—you know, both 

the International Association of Fire Chiefs and and our partner 

organizations, the professional organizations, I think have been on 

record. I think this proposal has come forward now three times, 

and each time we have been of the view that, you know, we don’t 

understand enough about what is trying to be achieved here. 

We are concerned about the transparency; we are concerned 

about—I would say we are concerned about even the competitive 

nature—the proposal that includes competitiveness, because what 

we are really trying to do is create a collaborative spirit here, 

right? How do we build systems in which people can work across 

the traditional boundaries? 

So, you know, I think our position has been not to dismiss it outof-hand, but not enough information has come forward that gives 

us the confidence that we can achieve some of the same successes 

that we have had to date under the proposal that has come forward 

now a few times. 

Mr. PAYNE. Commissioner Miller. 

Commissioner MILLER. From the simplest perspective, I have always believed, as the former head of counterterrorism and intelligence for the city of Los Angeles Police Department and now New 

York City, that the money should go where the threats are and 

where the targets are. That is a basic principle. 

I would also say that one of—reflecting on the chief’s comments, 

one of the great successes of the UASI program in its current form 

is that it has pushed the money where the threats are, despite the 

expansion of UASI regions. But it has also at the same time, to 

Chief Schwartz’s point, developed regional partnerships and strategies in how to exploit that money best within the regions where the 

threats and targets are. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I wasn’t planning on opening up to a second 

round of questions. 

Mr. King does have a question, and I would like to recognize 

him. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Of course, if the other Members would like 

to, that is fine as well. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I regret that I had to leave for another meeting, but I just 

want to follow up on something. 

First of all, let me just say, Commissioner Miller, besides being 

on this committee I am also on the Intelligence Committee. I do get 

Sensor briefings. When I see the threats and potential threats and 

possible threats against the city of New York and the outstanding 

work that you do and the NYPD does, and knowing that people in 
52 

the community could participate in those threats and how important this is to prevent them and to monitor what is happening, I 

want to commend the NYPD for respecting Constitutional rights 

and protecting the safety and liberty of the people of the city of 

New York. 

In that regard, the Secure the Cities program has been funded 

now for a number of years, and there are questions as to how far 

into the future that funding should go. I believe it should be extended. I think it is vitally important. But if you could explain the 

significance of the program and also how that technology is transferable throughout the country? 

Commissioner MILLER. The Securing the City program has been 

vital to the New York City Region, and I say ‘‘region’’ with an underline on the region part. This was a program that started with 

base funding of $18 million to develop this program where we 

would have radiation detection across the region. The regional 

piece is critical because, as the President of the United States said 

when he was asked an international affairs question recently, he 

said, ‘‘What keeps me up at night is the thought of a nuclear device 

in New York City. Regional conflicts will come and go.’’ 

We have seen that go from $18 million to $16 million to $11.5 

million, and then plans to take it down to the $4 million-plus area. 

Building this out in New York City and then getting the common 

operational picture through the region, the common operating 

equipment, the same standards, the same vendors has given us the 

ability—again, back to the World Trade Center example—you 

know, they are not going to construct a nuclear device in New York 

City. It is going to come in through a port; it is going to be built 

on an off-site—in an area outside New York City, which means 

that detection equipment radiating out from the urban center that 

could be a target is critical, and we have built that incrementally 

over time. 

I would like to thank you for your efforts personally for helping 

us with the Department of Homeland Security and our efforts to 

maintain that funding as we complete that building process. 

To the back end of your question, is how could that help other 

regions, we were the first to do this regional Securing the Cities 

thing, with New York City serving as, for lack of a better term, the 

executive agent and helping the smaller agencies as they radiated 

out—150 of them within that region. I think what we have learned 

over time and what we have developed in terms of a program is 

transferrable. 

It is the conversations we have been having with my former colleague in LAPD, Mike Downing, about how to apply those lessons, 

and form, and format to their efforts, as well as Superintendent 

Gary McCarthy, in Chicago. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Commissioner. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the extra time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

I want to thank the witnesses. 

I would be remiss, Commissioner, if I didn’t allow you a few minutes to share with this committee your interview with Osama bin 

Laden. 
53 

Commissioner MILLER. It was something that happened in the 

last days of May 1998, a few years before September 11, back, I 

think, before that was within our concept. But I would like to say 

this: In sum and substance, what Osama bin Laden said to me over 

the course of an hour sitting face to face in that tent on a mountaintop in Afghanistan was this, that the system is more important 

than the organization. 

When I asked him if he was concerned about being captured or 

killed by the United States, his answer was, ‘‘I am building an organization that is going to outlive me and whoever comes behind 

me by networking the message and the groups together.’’ 

But he also said on May 28, 1998, ‘‘I predict a black day for 

America, after which nothing will be the same, that this war with 

the United States will be greater than our battle with the Russians, and that you will only come to understand this when you 

leave our lands dragging your bodies in shameful defeat and the 

coffins and the boxes.’’ 

I think at the time he said those words to me in 1998 it sounded 

a tad, Mr. Chairman, hyperbolic. Who was this individual who was 

not the leader of a state nor the general of an army, who had access to funds but not National treasure, to declare war on the 

United States and to predict that kind of outcome? 

I think Chief Schwartz and Chief Hooley and Dr. Jackson would 

agree that had that interview been done on September 10, 2001 

and reviewed later in that week, it would have sent—it would have 

sounded a lot less hyperbolic. 

So from that I take a lesson in context, which is, right now, 

through the very Classified briefings that you and Congressman 

King and the other Members of the Homeland Security Committee 

sit in, we are seeing an unraveling of a security picture that seems 

very far away in places like Iraq and Libya and Syria, and we are 

seeing the emergence of a group of new potential Osama bin 

Ladens who are claiming leadership and ability to extend their 

reach and power in terms of threat and action. 

So I would like to commend my fellow first responders at the 

table for their continued attention, heroism, and commitment for 

what they do, because more than a decade after 9/11 the threat 

stream is not an awful lot brighter and the picture is changing 

minute-to-minute. 

I commend the committee and thank you all, individually and as 

a group, for the support, perspective, and wisdom you bring to this 

fight. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Well let me just say, sir, thank you for sharing that very powerful story and reminder that the threat is still, 

unfortunately, very much alive and well. 

I see we had one Member show up at the last minute. 

Mr. Vela, would you like to be recognized for questions? 

Okay. 

Did the Ranking Member have any additional questions? 

With that, I want to thank the distinguished witnesses for your 

compelling testimony. It is very helpful to this committee. 

Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR JOHN MILLER

Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information developed in a JTTF 

to outside organizations, such as State and local law enforcement, and fusion centers? 

Answer. This would have to be done very carefully. JTTFs are both collectors and 

consumers of intelligence, but the primary role of the JTTF is to run investigations. 

The primary role of fusion centers is not to do investigations (this is always a temptation, because everybody wants to be in the game) but to do analysis and share 

that. Once a fusion center becomes a detective squad doing investigations, it loses 

its focus on the analysis role. In the same vein, a JTTF should not become the font 

of intel to the State and local police units. 

Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and fusion centers? 

Answer. The best model I have seen is in Los Angeles. The LA Regional Intelligence Center (J–RIC). At the JRIC, they have an ‘‘all crimes, all hazards’’ approach. They deal with crime and CT. This is reinforced by the theory that many 

terrorist plots had their roots in other crimes. The FBI has embedded the ‘‘Threat 

Squad’’ there. By doing this, the FBI Threat Squad takes all the incoming threat 

info and teams up with local officers who run the leads on the ground. This keeps 

the fusion center in the loop. At the same time FBI analysts are embedded on the 

Classified side of the fusion center. This way, the JTTF does its job on the main 

cases. The Threat Squad runs out all the leads keeping the fusion center involved. 

The fusion center does its job by providing threat info and analysis tailored to the 

community it serves. 

Question 1c. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can make the best 

use of the resources in the fusion centers. 

Answer. All fusion centers should be ‘‘All Threats,’’ meaning they should study, 

collect, and analyze intel on all crimes. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR JAMES H. SCHWARTZ

Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information developed in a JTTF 

to outside organizations, such as State and local law enforcement, and fusion centers? 

Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and fusion centers? 

Question 1c. Do you have any suggestions as to how we can make the best use 

of the resources in the fusion centers? 

Answer. This question concerns the relationship between the JTTFs and fusion 

centers. As the Nation has invested in the development of fusion centers, it is fair 

to say that a division of labor or relationship needs to be better defined between 

the JTTFs and fusion centers. While a few like the Los Angeles JRIC are very good 

at integrating the fusion center and JTTF missions, my experience is that that is 

not the case in many fusion centers. 

In the National Capital Region (NCR), there are examples of good coordination 

between the FBI Washington, DC field office and the Northern Virginia Regional 

Intelligence Center (NVRIC). However, as I testified, there is a long-standing history of the field office working with local fire and EMS departments that could be 

replicated in all field offices. This relationship was a key component during the response to the 9/11 incident at the Pentagon where critical intelligence was shared 

in the command post and influenced numerous decisions. Even now, the field office 

hosts twice-monthly conference calls in which they include the fire chiefs of the NCR 

to update them on threats and operations. Over the last 13 years every piece of significant information that I have received as a local official, information that caused 

me to rethink my preparedness efforts, has come from the FBI. Information that 

which has been provided by the fusion center has in every instance been that al-
56 

ready provided by the Bureau or was available in open sources, normally the news 

media. 

It is worth assessing whether the return on investment from fusion centers is 

worth the cost. More than a decade after their formation across the Nation many 

fusion centers have shifted the majority of their focus to ‘‘all crimes’’ which may be 

appropriate given the real but relatively small threat from terrorism when compared to daily crime in many communities. In these centers there is often a close 

link with the investigation functions separate from the JTTF. Consideration should 

be given to letting fusion centers focus on local and regional crime, which was the 

role of criminal intelligence before 9/11, and requiring that when there is a terrorism nexus, the issue be turfed to the JTTF who would then be responsible for 

coordinating with locals. Additionally the practice of adding fire/EMS representatives to the JTTF as is done in New York and Los Angeles, should become standard 

practice. Redirecting some of the resources now dedicated to a murky mission in the 

fusion center to a JTTF would not only facilitate greater information sharing with 

locals but would provide the Bureau with an operational perspective many do not 

currently have. 

Question 2a. Many fusion centers have developed Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 

programs, which are one way ‘‘non-traditional partners,’’ including the fire service 

and EMS, can gain situational awareness on current terrorist tactics, techniques, 

and practices. 

Question 2b. Do your departments have dedicated Terrorism Liaison Officers? 

Answer. In general, there are a number of good TLO programs across the Nation. 

The cities of Phoenix, Arizona and Los Angeles, California probably have the best 

example of a TLO program. 

In NCR, we do not have a TLO program. The Northern Virginia region has placed 

a fire/EMS representative at the NVRIC and developed a fire chief’s intelligence 

committee that works closely with the fusion center representative. However, fire 

and EMS participation at the NVRIC is limited to that person. We are not allowed 

to provide substitutes when the representative takes leave, or add extra staffing 

(even though the jurisdictions have offered to cover the cost of additional fire and 

EMS representatives) and there is no executive representation from the fire and 

EMS community on the NVRIC governing board. This issue can present problems 

in developing a strong relationship between the fusion center and fire departments 

that it serves. 

Question 2c. Do your local fusion centers provide training to the TLOs on how to 

properly report suspicious activities that may be observed on call? 

Answer. The Arlington County Fire Department developed a suspicious activity 

reporting (SAR) policy many years ago, and it was adopted by other agencies in the 

Northern Virginia region. Training has been provided to all personnel in the region. 

Any suspicious activity is reported to both the Fire/EMS representative at the 

NVRIC and local law enforcement agencies, which have representatives at the 

JTTF. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR JAMES HOOLEY

Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information developed in a JTTF 

to outside organizations, such as State and local law enforcement, and fusion centers? 

Perhaps some sort of integration between the JTTFs and fusion centers? 

Question 1b. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can make the best 

use of the resources in the fusions centers? 

Answer. Let me begin by describing the relationship of my department, Boston 

Emergency Medical Services (Boston EMS), with the local fusion center and the 

JTTF. Boston EMS is what has been described as a ‘‘non-traditional partner’’ within 

the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), the city’s fusion center, located at 

the Boston Police Department (BPD). Boston EMS has had a paramedic assigned 

to the BRIC full-time, 5 days a week, since 2007. 

Boston EMS is a member of the Massachusetts Anti-Terrorism Advisory Committee, which is co-chaired by the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts and the SAC of 

FBI Boston. Although we are not a member of the JTTF, several BPD members 

from the BRIC, with whom we work with regularly, are assigned to the JTTF. From 

my perspective, our law enforcement partners at the BRIC are integrated at the 

JTTF and EMS depends on those officers to represent us at the JTTF, much like 

other non-traditional partners, such as public health and fire services. I do think 

that the BRIC representatives to the JTTF would be comfortable sharing information they receive from the JTTF with EMS, as security levels permit. Having said 

this, I believe the JTTF would be more likely to share information once they deter-
57 

mine it necessary. It is my hope that the JTTF’s look beyond law enforcement, to 

understand the threat-intelligence needs of non-traditional partners and how soon 

they would require this information. 

The JTTFs should have regularly scheduled briefings with non-traditional partners. This dialogue would promote better understandings of each other’s needs. For 

example, if a JTTF were to comprehend the capacities, capabilities, or risks to EMS, 

hospitals, or public health departments, it may influence what information they 

share and when they choose to do so. 

Another suggestion on how to best use resources from fusion centers is to establish practices that streamline the ability to take higher-security classification material and revise it to a level where it can be disseminated to more stakeholders. 

As a hypothetical (non-terrorism) example, imagine the FBI or DEA issues a Law 

Enforcement Sensitive report warning of a serious contamination or additive to illicit drugs being trafficked on the streets. Security requirements would prohibit the 

representative from sharing this information with non-law enforcement personnel, 

including EMS field providers, drug outreach workers, hospital emergency department clinicians or poison control center staff. There is a process to review and redact information that would lower it to FOUO, allowing it to be shared at lower levels. Admittedly I am not familiar with the time required for such approval or any 

remaining limitations on sharing. I would recommend that JTTFs and fusion centers discuss and plan for a process by which information can be shared with necessary public safety, public service, and public health and health care entities, as 

appropriate, to ensure the right information gets to the right people in sufficient 

time to meet the desired objective of protecting the public. 

Question 2a. Many fusion centers have developed Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) 

programs, which are one-way ‘‘non-traditional partners,’’ including the fire service 

and EMS, can gain situational awareness on current terrorist tactics, techniques, 

and practices. Do your departments have dedicated Terrorism Liaison Officers? 

Question 2b. Do your local fusion centers provide training to the TLOs on how 

to properly report suspicious activities that may be observed on a call? 

Answer. I have read about various Terrorism Liaison Officer programs in other 

jurisdictions. Boston EMS does not have a dedicated TLO per se, however, our EMS 

liaison at the BRIC has been offered and received several DHS and other agencysponsored trainings. This includes but is not limited to analyst trainings, conferences, exercises, training in the proper handling of Classified materials, a security clearance, suspicious activity reporting, and regularly receiving bulletins and 

briefings that may be of interest to EMS. In his capacity as our representative to 

the BRIC he will train our personnel in the field on what they should look for and 

consider reporting. Our EMS representative at the BRIC does not enter SAR data 

directly into the database. He provides the data to staff at the BRIC who vet the 

information and decide whether to enter it. The EMS representative will also share 

information from threat assessments, particularly as they relate to large public 

gatherings or events, to EMS providers in the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region as well as the hospitals and public health agencies. 

Currently, the BRIC is working to develop the TLO concept and bring in more 

non-traditional partners. I wish to emphasize that although it is important to receive the necessary training and clearances to participate in a fusion center; those 

are only the first steps. To be truly effective as a member of a fusion center, law 

enforcement and non-traditional members must be trusted members of the team. 

They should be present for the daily briefings. They should have access to analysts, 

GIS specialists, the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility when needed and 

other resources at the fusion center, as our EMS representative has. Developing 

that relationship as a trusted agent in a fusion center will enhance the likelihood 

that critical information is shared and utilized, not merely collected. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE SUSAN W. BROOKS FOR JAMES HOOLEY

Question 1. In 2012, FEMA reduced the period of performance for grants from 3 

years to 2 in an effort to address the amount of funding that had yet to be drawn 

down by grant recipients. Has the reduction in the period of performance had an 

impact on your ability to expend the grant funds on projects that truly address your 

capability gaps? 

Answer. The FEMA-reduced period of performance for grants from 3 years to 2 

has presented a significant challenge to the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region, negatively impacting the ability to develop and sustain core capabilities. This 

approach is creating a bias towards buying more assets, rather than implementing 

the life-cycle planning envisioned by the National Preparedness Goal. 
58 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT411z1.html. 3 Jackson, BA., ed., ‘‘The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society: A Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency,’’ Santa 

Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, 2009. 

Prudent grant management requires extensive procedures allowing for accountability and compliance as funding is transferred from the Federal level to the State, 

from the State to the region, and then from the region to a local department or a 

vendor, in addition to EHP reviews. While each step is in many respects essential, 

they can create time-consuming delays and chokepoints. 

With each investment, extensive effort is placed on determining how best to spend 

the grant dollars. Regrettably, a 2-year grant cycle leaves minimal time for the final 

and most essential step of spending the grant funding. Investments in planning, exercises, and systems development take time and an on-going commitment of stakeholders, in identifying appropriate contractors and in managing the work through 

to completion. With the 2-year grant cycle and no extensions, we have found ourselves again and again in a position where investments must be prioritized based 

on their time to completion, rather than their benefit to the region, resulting in a 

disproportionate investment in equipment. While funding may be spent in a timelier 

manner, the downstream effect has been a compromise to the overall objectives of 

the grant. 

As a first responder, I see the direct benefit of the Homeland Security grant funding. Being mindful of how each dollar is invested impacts our safety and our ability 

to protect the public. On April 15, 2013, we were able to utilize not just the equipment, but also the years of planning, exercises, training, and preparedness to maximize life-saving efforts. As the chief, I also oversee our operational budget; I understand the challenges associated with fiscal accountability and the need to work 

within stringent annual time lines. Ultimately, it is my hope that we can work toward building efficiencies within the grant management process to reduce delays, 

but also allow the awarding jurisdiction sufficient time to effectively meet the goals 

of the grant. 

Question 2. FEMA has indicated that it would be willing to ‘‘reevaluate the feasibility and appropriateness of returning to a 3-year period of performance.’’ Provided 

we can ensure that an efficient and effective draw-down of these grant funds continues, would you be supportive of a return to a 3-year period of performance? 

Answer. I, and the Metro Boston region as a whole, would be in full support of 

the return to a 3-year period of performance. It would enhance our ability to meet 

our preparedness goals. Adequately addressing an identified capability gap includes 

developing a strategy that will incorporate planning, training, and exercising, in addition to equipment. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR BRIAN A. JACKSON 1 2

APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST RESPONSE OPERATIONS TO STRENGTHENING

NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS ADDENDUM

Question 1a. How can we improve the sharing of information developed in a JTTF 

to outside organizations, such as State and local law enforcement, and fusion centers? 

Question 1b. Perhaps some sort of integration between JTTFs and fusion centers? 

Question 1c. Do you have any other suggestions as to how we can make the best 

use of the resources in the fusion centers? 

Answer. The sharing of information from JTTFs to other organizations clearly has 

to be done with care, given concerns regarding maintaining the integrity of criminal 

investigations and eventual prosecution. This has been a challenge identified for domestic intelligence more generally, not just with respect to the JTTFs.3 A recent report by three of my RAND colleagues based on discussions with a number of State 

and local law enforcement officials took on the issue of JTTFs and intelligence sharing directly. Though the group was not a scientific sample of the community, it did 

represent a set of senior representatives from a number of major departments and 
59 

4 Jenkins, B.M., A. Liepman, H.H. Willis, ‘‘Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist 

Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information 

Sharing,’’ Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, 2014. 5Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, ‘‘Federal Support for and Involvement In State and Local 

Fusion Centers,’’ Majority and Minority Staff Report, Washington, DC, October 3, 2012. 6For example, Jackson, B.A., ‘‘How Do We Know What Information Sharing is Really Worth?’’ 

Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, 2014. 

agencies at varied levels of government.4 Those participants highlighted continuing 

challenges with the interaction between JTTFs and local law enforcement, as well 

as complaints about the nature of the information that was shared. There was also 

the suggestion of some local departments pulling back from participation in JTTFs 

because of perceptions of continuing information-sharing problems. 

Questions were also raised in those discussions about the effectiveness of information sharing between fusion centers and police departments, though there is clearly 

variation across the country. The group specifically took on the question of whether 

fusion centers could be used to better link JTTFs to State and local police departments, and few participants thought that was the right solution. Differences that 

exist between fusion centers also make it hard to generalize—and the absence of 

good and objective measures of what they are producing means that there isn’t a 

common yardstick to use to identify, for example, particularly effective fusion centers as candidates to potentially play this bridging role. In the absence of such 

measures, seeking to use fusion centers in that sort of bridging function could be 

piloted in one or more sites to assess the viability and effectiveness of the approach. 

More systematic measures and assessment of fusion centers would also make it 

possible to better identify what resources currently exist in individual centers— 

which are generally viewed to vary considerably in capability across the country— 

and is a needed first step to determine how they could be better leveraged. Following the 2012 Senate report on the fusion center program,5 some researchers— 

including at RAND—have made progress to developing methods for such evaluation.6

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