J.S43042/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COU RT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

PAUL ANTHONY MASON, :

:

Appellant : No. 3009 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 27, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division No(s).: CP- 48

- CR -0000805-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and FITZGERALD, * JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2014

Appellant, Paul Anthony Mason, appeals from the judgm ent of

sentence entered in the Northampton County Court of C ommon Pleas

following his guilty plea to indecent assault 1 and corruption of minors. 2

Appellant challenges his designation by the trial court as a sexually violent

predator ( “SVP”) under the Sexual Offender Registration and Not ification

Act 3 (“SORNA”). We affirm.

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court

.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1).

3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (effective Dec. 20, 20 12).J. S43042/14

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We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by t he trial court.

See Trial Ct. Op., 3/4/14, at 1- 10. We reiterate that Appellant’s own expert

testified at the SVP hearing that Appellant met the criteria for classification

as a SVP. Id. at 9. Appellant timely appealed on Monday, October 28,

2013, and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 19 25(b) statement.

Appellant raises the following issue:

Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abu se its

discretion in finding Appellant to be a sexually viole nt

predator . . . pursuant to 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 9792 [si c 4 ]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Appellant suggests that he did not meet several of the statutory

criteria defining a SVP. He maintains he did not abu se multiple children

simultaneously, did not engage in violence or obsessive f orce, was not

sexually aroused by “cruelty, humiliation, or terror” o f his victim, and did not

select his victim by looking for preexisting vulnerabil ities. Id. at 16.

Appellant also opines that the court failed to weigh h is bipolar disorder

properly. 5 We hold Appellant is not entitled to relief.

We state the standard of review as follows:

A challenge to a determination of SVP status requires us

to view the evidence:

4 We note that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9792 expired on December 20, 2012, prior to

Appellant’s SVP hearing.

5 As noted above, Appellant’s argument relies on a statu te that expired prior

to his SVP hearing; we decline to find waiver, howeve r.J. S43042/14

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- In the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth. The reviewing court may not

weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court. The clear and

convincing standard requires evidence that is so

clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the

precise facts at issue.

The scope of review is plenary. An expert’s opinion, w hich

is rendered to a reasonable degree of professional

certainty, is itself

evidence.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to suppo rt

an SVP designation requires the reviewing court to acc ept

the undiminished record of the case in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth. The reviewing court

must examine all of the Commonwealth’s evidence withou t

consideration of its admissibility. A successful sufficien cy

challenge can lead to an outright grant of relief such as a

reversal of the SVP designation, whereas a challenge to

th e admissibility of the expert’s opinion and testimony i s

an evidentiary question which, if successful, can lead to a

new SVP hearing.

As a general rule, the standard of review of a

trial court’s evidentiary ruling is limited to

determining whether the trial court abused its

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be

found merely because an appellate court might

have reached a different conclusion, but

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness,

or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

Our task in either scenario is one of review, not one o f

reweighing or assessing the evidence in the first instance

.

Commonwealth v. Prendes , ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 3586262, at *14-*15

(Pa. Super. July 22, 2014) (citations and punctuatio n omitted).J. S43042/14

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As a prefatory matter, we acknowledge Appellant’s argu ment relies on

a statute that expired prior to his SVP hearing. Beca use SORNA is

substantially identical to the expired statute and the trial court applied

SO RNA, we decline to find waiver.

After careful review of the record, the parties’ brief s, and the well

reasoned decision by the Honorable Anthony S. Beltrami , we affirm based on

the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2-18 (rendering extensive

findings of fact and conclusions of law; holding, inter alia , (1) each statutory

factor need not be met and weight given to factors is l eft to court’s

discretion; (2) absence of Appellant’s sexual arousal by, inter alia , cruelty, is

not SVP factor; (3) record established Appellant selecte d victim based on

mental capacity; and (4) court considered Appellant’s bi polar disorder).

Accordingly, because the record substantiates the trial cour t’s factual

findings and we discern no error of law or abuse of di scretion, we affirm the

judgment of sentence. See Prendes , ___ A.3d at ___, 2014 WL 3586262,

at *14- *15.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/24/2014