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91–143 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–463 

INDISPENSABLE PARTNERS— 

REENERGIZING U.S.–INDIA TIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND 

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 16, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

TIM KAINE, Virginia, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Biswal, Hon. Nisha D., Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Robert Menendez .................................................................................................................. 57 

Response to question submitted for the record by Senator Marco Rubio .... 58 

Curtis, Lisa, senior research fellow, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 39

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement ...................... 1 

Rossow, Richard M., Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ................................ 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Risch, Hon. James, U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement ....................... 3 

Searight, Amy, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and 

Southeast Asia, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ...................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Singh, Vikram J., vice president, National Security and International Policy, 

Center for American Progress, Washington, DC ............................................... 32 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 34 

Wisner, Hon. Frank G., Foreign Affairs advisor, Squire Patton Boggs, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

INDISPENSABLE PARTNERS— 

REENERGIZING U.S.–INDIA TIES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tim Kaine (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kaine, Risch, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator KAINE. If I could get everyone’s attention, this meeting 

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near 

East, South, and Central Asian Affairs will come to order. This is 

a very great set of panels on a very important topic. Senator Risch 

is on his way. He should be here in just a couple of minutes, and 

we expect other colleagues may join us during the hearing. But I 

want to welcome all to this hearing today. 

The title of the hearing is ‘‘Indispensable Partners—Reenergizing 

U.S.-India Ties.’’ I generally am not a fan of the word ‘‘indispensable.’’ There is a great quote attributed to De Gaulle: ‘‘The graveyards are filled with indispensable men.’’ No matter how much we 

think things are indispensable or people are indispensable, the 

answer is we are usually wrong. But in this case we advisedly 

chose to use that word because we do think the partnership 

between the United States and India meets the high standard of 

what ‘‘indispensable’’ means. 

This is an important and propitious time with a new Government 

in India and a forthcoming visit of the Indian Prime Minister, 

Prime Minister Modi, here to the United States in the fall. So we 

are very, very glad to have two good panels with witnesses both 

from the United States Government and longtime United StatesIndia experts who are here to illuminate us about opportunities 

and challenges and the path forward. 

I had the wonderful fortune of serving as Governor of Virginia 

and working very closely with both the Virginia Indian-American 

community, but also with significant trade opportunities with 

Indian businesses. One of the first business deals I did as Governor—I will always remember this—in a part of the State that 

had been hit very, very hard by NAFTA, that had lost a lot of jobs 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

after the NAFTA Treaty was signed, Danville, VA, on the North 

Carolina border, an economic development deal was done in a 

closed manufacturing plant, where Indian venture capitalists purchased an English plastic polymer company, decided that they 

needed to have a U.S. manufacturing facility, purchased the closed 

plant in Danville and hired a Spaniard to be the plant operator. 

When I went to the plant opening in Danville, VA, and I saw not 

only a United States and Virginia flag, but an Indian flag, a United 

Kingdom flag, and a Spanish flag, I knew something about the importance of this partnership. And it has worked out very, very well. 

But we are here at an important time. The United States-India 

relationship has grown tremendously in the 6 years since the signing of the landmark United States-India civil nuclear deal. Some 

examples of activity in the last 6 years: The United States and 

India participate in more than three dozen dialogues covering a 

wide array of cooperative activities: clean energy, peacekeeping, 

counterterrorism, health. 

Bilateral trade in goods and services between our nations has reached nearly $100 billion. In 2013 India was the single largest 

country market for the Export-Import Bank, with authorizations of 

$2.1 billion. The Partnership to Advance Clean Energy has mobilized $2 billion in public and private resources for clean energy 

projects in India. Our defense trade, which has kind of been a 

recent arrival on the scene in terms of cooperation, has taken off 

and been very successful, nearly $10 billion, with billions more in 

the pipeline. 

Over 100,000 Indian students are currently studying in U.S. universities. According to the latest Pew Global Attitude Survey, 

released just this week, over 55 percent of Indians hold a very positive view of the United States. 

When asked what country would most likely be India’s leading 

ally, the United States came in at numer one. 

It is not just about polls and it is not just about trade. It is also 

about common democratic values. Maybe that is the primary thing, 

the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy, 

and the people-to-people ties and the business linkages we have are 

very important. 

The 3-million-strong Indian Americans who contribute across 

this country to the professions and to the entrepreneurship and the 

civic life and academia and every other walk of life serve as and 

important bridge between our two countries. Global connections is 

a key to economic success today and a person is a global connection 

if that person has ties, as so many of our Indian-American citizens 

do. 

I was reminded of this last week at a dinner I attended hosted 

by the Indian Ambassador to the United States. CEO’s of major 

American companies, Pepsi and MasterCard, were in attendance. 

Both hale from the Indian-American community. Just in Virginia, 

more than 100,000 Indian-Americans call Virginia home, and we 

have some spectacular, successful businesses. 

One example in Virginia I am proud of, Husk Power. It is an 

innovative company. It was founded by graduates of the University 

of Virginia. I know that Nisha Biswal will approve of that as a 

Cavalier herself. The innovative company provides electricity to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

over 200,000 rural Indian households using biomass. So Indian 

American professionals from an American university, UVA, doing 

a wonderful project that is providing significant benefit in India. 

Now, any relationship between partners is bound to have some 

friction, and there has been friction in the last 6 years. That is necessary. You do not ever test a friendship until you have disagreements, and so disagreements occur and the test of the friendship 

is whether we can work through them. 

But the strategic rationale behind the partnership is only growing more important every day. There is increasing instability 

around the globe in Syria and Iraq, Russia and Ukraine, China in 

the South China Sea. Both India and the United States notice that, 

care about it, want to be productive in helping solve it. So cultivating this partnership in 2014 with the new government in India 

is critically important. 

The relationship is important today and it will grow. 

India is bound to become the world’s most populous nation and 

the third-leading economy by 2030. It is a democracy where the 

median age is 25. Fifty years from now the relationship will 

directly affect the strategic and economic interests of the entire 

United States and impact ordinary Americans, as it does today. 

So we need the United States and India to be joint stakeholders, 

to uphold global norms and rules of the road. 

India will need our partnership as it shoulders global responsibilities and expands its economy to meet its own developmental goals. 

So that is why we need to get the relationship right and that is 

why the committee is holding the hearing today. The engagement 

has to be driven by a sense of realism and realistic assumptions 

and shared interests. It has to avoid just being transactional and 

keep in mind both long-term strategic goals, but also a sense of the 

shared values that animate both nations. 

So I look forward to hearing today how the United States intends 

to capitalize on the new phase in the United States-India relationship, particularly in the areas of strategic and regional cooperation, 

defense ties, and our business and economic engagement. 

I would like to now ask my ranking member on the subcommittee, Senator Risch, for opening comments. Following that I will 

introduce panel one and we will get right to the testimony and 

questions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Kaine. 

It has been a while since this committee has taken the time to 

evaluate the United States-India relationship and it is appropriate 

that we do so at this time, particularly in light of the changes that 

we see going forward. Fortunately, changes in India present new 

opportunities to move our bilateral relationship forward. 

Specifically, I am encouraged by Prime Minister Modi’s victory 

and I know there is a lot of hope that Modi wants to revive India’s 

economic growth, rein in corruption, encourage the private sector, 

and create jobs. This will require tough decisions to be made, but 

the election provides him with a mandate to make them. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

Economic reforms will be incredibly important to create a fair 

and equal playing field to lure more foreign investment. This is 

why I hope we can conclude a bilateral investment treaty quickly, 

increase United States direct investment in India, and, very importantly, improve intellectual property protections. Those type of protections are absolutely necessary for any economy hoping to move 

forward. 

One area of particular interest to me is civilian nuclear cooperation. Much of the technical cooperation between the United States 

and India on nuclear power is led by the great people at the Idaho 

National Laboratory located in eastern Idaho. Just last week, the 

laboratory hosted the latest meeting of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 

Energy Working Group. This is a great partnership. 

However, we need to move beyond the technical cooperation and 

research. It has been 6 years since the United States-India nuclear 

deal was completed and we have yet to see United States nuclear 

companies have the ability to participate in India. I hope we can 

see improvement on the liability issues and I urge the parties to 

move quickly to resolve those issues. This will result in the relationship deepening and it will be a great benefit to both parties. 

Defense cooperation and security are also important arenas 

where we can and should increase our collaboration. India is a pivotal country and can be a crucial partner to maintaining stability 

in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States can help India modernize its military, especially in light of other powers that are 

advancing in the region. 

There is already good cooperation through the U.S.-India 

Defense, Trade, and Technology Initiative, but there is room for 

deeper engagement. India’s willingness to adhere to and increase 

United States technology protection agreements will be critical to 

moving the United States-India defense partnership forward. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I think it is very appropriate to hold this 

hearing at this time. Thank you for doing so. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Now on to the witnesses. We are glad to be joined by Senator 

McCain, who recently returned from a trip to India, and glad that 

he is with us as well. Our first panel has two witnesses. Nisha 

Biswal was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of State for South 

and Central Asian Affairs in October 2013. She has been before the 

Foreign Relations Committee a number of times recently. Previously she served as the Assistant Administrator for Asia at 

USAID. She holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of 

Virginia. 

Dr. Amy Searight is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

South and Southeast Asia. She is a principal adviser to senior leadership within the DOD for all policy matters that pertain to the 

development and implementation of joint defense strategies within 

this region. Dr. Searight, it is great to have you as well. 

I would like to begin with Secretary Biswal, if you would give 

your opening testimony, followed by Dr. Searight, and then we will 

move to questions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

STATEMENT OF HON. NISHA D. BISWAL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. BISWAL. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, thank 

you very much for inviting me to testify today and for holding this 

very timely hearing. I am pleased to be here with Dr. Searight, a 

close friend and colleague. In the interest of time, I will summarize 

my statement and ask that the full testimony be submitted for the 

record. 

Senator, this is indeed an important time to reexamine the 

United States-India relationship. The historic elections this spring 

conferred an unprecedented mandate on Prime Minister Modi to 

create a historic opportunity as well in reenergizing our relationship with India. I was in New Delhi last week with Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to meet with Prime Minister Modi and key members of his Cabinet. Our trip was on the heels of the visit by Senator McCain, who was there previously, the previous week, and 

again demonstrated that as far as the United States-India relationship is concerned that this is deeply a bipartisan supported relationship in the United States. 

In fact, we noted during our meetings that successive administrations, Democratic and Republican, have made the strategic bet 

that a rising India is fundamentally in the United States interest. 

Asian economies will play a greater role in shaping the global economic landscape in the years to come and will also be of greater 

consequence on ensuring regional security. A strong and prosperous India, with its democratic values, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, and its entrepreneurial spirit, will play a critical role in shaping that landscape and will be an increasingly important partner 

for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. 

But if India is to achieve its economic and strategic potential, it 

will need to address the myriad economic and governance challenges that it faces. Much of the excitement that has been generated by the new Modi government in India and around the world, 

and most notably in the business community, has been around this 

idea of accountable and effective government that can unleash 

India’s economic potential. 

As we are invested in the strategic importance of a rising India, 

we are also economically invested in India’s growth. We think our 

economies, our businesses, our universities, and our peoples can 

partner and collaborate in helping India realize its vision and its 

potential. Our two countries are already more heavily invested in 

each other’s prosperity than ever before. Our trade has grown fivefold since 2000, to almost $100 billion annually, and we are focused 

on growing that fivefold again to half a trillion, as Vice President 

Biden has challenged us. 

American companies recognize the tremendous potential of 

India’s economy and are eager to make long-term investments in 

India. As trade has grown, inevitably we have also had some areas 

of disagreement and some areas of friction, as you noted. We are 

committed to addressing those areas of friction through dialogue 

and engagement, and we are optimistic that this new government 

will take the necessary steps to promote long-term growth. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

Areas of cooperation include energy as one of the brightest areas, 

where India is meeting—we are helping India meet its growing 

energy needs, as well as creating opportunities for our own businesses, through contracts on the export of American liquefied natural gas, identifying unconventional energy resources, clean energy 

resources, and fulfilling the promise of delivering cutting edge 

United States nuclear energy technologies, as Senator Risch mentioned, collaborating on other areas of energy security. 

While my colleague Dr. Searight will discuss in more detail the 

defense partnership, I simply want to underscore the centrality of 

our security engagement with India to the United States-India 

partnership. We are committed to a strong and capable India that 

will advance stability and security across the Indo-Pacific. 

The locus of our convergent strategic interests is in Asia and, as 

Prime Minister Modi demonstrated with his invitation to regional 

leaders at his inauguration, India has set out that it will be a more 

consequential and influential relationship in the region. We welcome that initiative because strong Indian leadership is very much 

in our interest, whether in supporting a successful security and 

political transition in Afghanistan, bolstering trade and economic 

connectivity between South and Southeast Asia, improving relations between India and Pakistan, combating the threats of terrorism and violent extremism. 

Our bilateral engagements over the course of the next several 

months will reinforce our strategic, security, economic, and peopleto-people ties. As Secretary Kerry is planning to travel to New 

Delhi later this month to cochair the next round of the U.S.-India 

Strategic Dialogue, we see new possibilities for advancing that 

partnership. The strategic dialogue will kick off a series of highlevel engagements throughout the late summer and into the fall, 

culminating in the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Washington at 

the invitation of President Obama. 

But, Mr. Chairman, the true potential of this relationship was 

probably best captured by Prime Minister Modi when he said to us 

last week that this is a relationship not just about the benefits it 

brings to the Indian people or the American people, but that its 

true value is that when the world’s largest democracy and the 

world’s oldest democracy come together the world stands to benefit. 

We deeply appreciate that framing and we deeply appreciate the 

engagement and support that this relationship enjoys across the 

United States. The U.S. Congress and this body has played an 

important role in continuing to advance the partnership and we 

look forward to working with you as we move forward in the 

months ahead. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NISHA D. BISWAL

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, thank you for inviting me to testify 

before you today. It is an honor to appear before this committee, and I’m pleased 

to speak alongside my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South 

and Southeast Asia, Amy Searight. 

This is indeed an important time to reexamine U.S.-India relations. The historic 

elections this spring, which brought a record 530 million voters to the polls and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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conferred an unprecedented mandate on Prime Minister Narendra Modi and 

the Bharatiya Janata Party, also created a historic opportunity to reenergize our 

relationship. 

Mr. Chairman, successive administrations have made the strategic bet that a rising India is in the U.S. interest. Our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is premised on 

the consequential role the region’s 4.3 billion people will play in global politics, security, and economics in the 21st century. The continent’s success will depend on 

choices Asian nations and their partners make. A strong India will play a critical 

role in the coming decades in shaping this Asian landscape, and our partnership 

with India will play an increasingly important role in that context. 

But if India is to achieve its economic and strategic potential, it must grapple 

with the myriad economic and governance challenges it is facing, including slow 

growth, energy shortages, and flagging foreign investment. 

I had the opportunity to accompany Deputy Secretary Bill Burns to India last 

week to meet with Prime Minister Modi and key members of his cabinet to discuss 

their economic and security agenda, as well as the U.S.-India relationship. The Modi 

government has identified infrastructure, manufacturing, modernizing the military, 

energy security, attracting greater foreign investment, and expanding access to 

skills training and education as its key priorities. The Prime Minister, in inviting 

regional leaders to his inauguration, also signaled that India will play a greater 

strategic role in its immediate neighborhood and across the Indo-Pacific region. For 

India to achieve its potential, Prime Minister Modi has said that one of his top priorities will be efficient, effective, and accountable governance. 

In all the areas that the Modi government has identified as priorities, we think 

the United States, including our businesses and universities, can play an important 

role in helping address the challenges India faces and creating opportunities that 

benefit both countries. But the true potential of the relationship is best captured 

in what Prime Minister Modi said to Deputy Secretary Burns last week. He noted 

that he does not see our relations in terms of the benefits it brings to the Indian 

people or the American people—that goes without saying. The true power and 

potential of this relationship, he said, is that when the world’s oldest democracy and 

the world’s largest democracy come together, the world will benefit. 

Mr. Chairman, we are confident we can work in a strong and collaborative partnership with the Modi government to grow our economic and strategic relations 

with India in a way that benefits both countries and both economies. But we also 

believe the true measure of this partnership, which President Obama said will be 

one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, is its potential to address global 

challenges and, as the Prime Minister noted, to benefit the world. 

ECONOMIC AND TRADE PARTNERSHIP

Our two countries have never been more invested in each other’s economic future. 

India’s goal of building a strong and integrated economy that is led by private-sector 

growth and boasts a global reach, will offer sustainable, long-term market opportunities for U.S. firms. 

With annual two-way trade in goods and services of almost $100 billion in 2013— 

up 61 percent from 2009 and over 400 percent since 2000—we already enjoy an important commercial relationship with India. We’re focused on growing that fivefold 

again, a goal Vice President Biden set last year on his visit to India. To achieve 

that ambitious figure, American companies need to believe that the benefits of trade 

with India outweigh the costs and the challenges—and that India remains committed to growth over the long term. 

One way to strengthen two-way investment and ensure increased opportunities 

for U.S. businesses in India is through a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). A BIT 

with India would help support key economic objectives for both countries, from protection of investment interests overseas to the promotion of market-oriented policies 

and exports. 

A BIT would also greatly improve two-way investment flows. That’s good for the 

U.S. economy. Increasing Indian foreign direct investment in the United States 

would expand U.S. jobs in a variety of professional, scientific, and technical sectors 

that have traditionally attracted Indian investment. Trade expansion also benefits 

families and businesses by supporting productive, high-paying jobs in exports and 

increasing the variety of products available for purchase. 

American companies recognize the tremendous potential of India’s economy and 

are eager to make long-term investments in India. U.S. companies—boasting the 

highest standards and highest quality products and services—can play an invaluable role in transforming the Indian economy through partnerships for joint innovaFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

tion and development. Cross-pollination of U.S. and Indian businesses is a win-win 

for our economies and will create thousands of jobs in both our countries. 

Higher education is a vital part of our economic agenda. Indian students comprise 

the second-largest group of foreign students in the United States, with 100,000 

students studying in the United States in 2012–13. Not only do they contribute 

over $3 billion to the U.S. economy every year, they also advance innovation and 

research in our universities. 

Our education partnership is not focused only on universities. Mr. Chairman, in 

your home State of Virginia and throughout the United States, community colleges 

are working with Indian counterparts to strengthen the connection between industry and education. Working with the Indian Government, we are keen to help India 

adapt our community-college model to meet its skills needs and goal of building 

10,000 community colleges by 2030, so that India’s future workforce can benefit 

from one of our Nation’s greatest exports, knowledge, and skill development. 

As trade has grown by a factor of five in 15 years, inevitably we have also had 

some disagreements over trade. We’re committed to addressing trade frictions 

through dialogue and engagement. We appreciate the huge strides India has made 

over the past two decades, benefiting from trade liberalization and reappraising decades-old orthodoxies. While India is still ranked 134 out of 189 countries in the 

World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking, the new government is already taking decisive steps to make India more open to the foreign businesses and investment 

that can help stimulate greater growth. 

On July 10, the Indian Government unveiled its Union Budget for consideration 

by Parliament. There is much for us to take note of, including efforts by the government to stimulate growth; curb borrowing; and reduce barriers to investment in 

defense, insurance, e-commerce, transportation infrastructure, and real estate. We 

are studying the budget proposal closely, and we will continue to follow the parliamentary debates as the budget bill moves forward. In fact, a senior delegation 

led by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Arun Kumar, along with officials from 

USTR and the State Department, is in India right now, engaging with the new government on a broad range of economic issues. 

To fully realize its economic potential, India also needs to foster inclusive and sustainable growth. While women continue to rise to the highest positions in civil society, business, and government, in many ways the potential of women and girls in 

India remains untapped and underutilized as a force for growth and development. 

Fundamental issues of women’s security and opportunity need to be addressed, so 

that Indian women can achieve their full potential and make their contribution to 

India’s growth story. As President Obama has said, ‘‘When women succeed, nations 

are more safe, more secure, and more prosperous.’’ We know that securing equal 

rights and opportunity for women and girls is not only the right thing to do, but 

the smart thing to do. 

Climate change is another issue that all emerging economies, including India, are 

grappling with. For growth to be enduring, it must be environmentally sustainable. 

We enjoy a broad range of bilateral cooperation with India on clean energy and climate issues, including Secretary Kerry’s Climate Change Working Group. Our cooperation on mitigating the causes and effects of climate change, including investment and development of clean and renewable energy sources, is increasingly a 

whole-of-government effort. It is our hope this bilateral cooperation can lead to 

greater collaboration in multilateral fora. 

ENERGY AND INNOVATION

We have seen tremendous progress in our energy cooperation since the launch of 

the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue in 2005. This forum has brought our governments 

and private sectors together to expand cooperation on nuclear energy, electrical grid 

and power generation, energy efficiency, and oil and gas exploration. It has also 

expanded markets for renewable energy technologies and lowered barriers to clean 

energy deployment. The Energy Dialogue—along with the Energy Security Roundtable—has leveraged each country’s strengths in research, opened opportunities for 

American businesses and technologies, and strengthened India’s energy security and 

economic growth. 

Under the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy, we have mobilized over $2 billion of public and private investment in solar, biofuels, building efficiency, and other 

areas. Our energy relationship is also expanding through contracts for the export 

of American liquefied natural gas, by together identifying unconventional energy 

resources, and by fulfilling the promise of delivering cutting-edge U.S. nuclear 

energy technology to meet Indian energy needs. These are top priorities for the 

United States and India. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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One fast-growing area of partnership is our robust science and technology cooperation. Our collaboration sustains economic growth and job creation, while helping our citizens to live longer, healthier lives. We will showcase this partnership 

later this year in New Delhi at the U.S.-India Technology Summit, which will 

enable new partnerships in innovation and technology development, stemming from 

breakthroughs our scientists and engineers have already achieved together. 

The intersection of innovation and health will provide the next frontier of partnership for the United States and India, with global implications. Already, our two 

countries are deploying a rotavirus vaccine, ROTAVAC, the product of a publicprivate partnership that has the potential to save hundreds of thousands of young 

lives in India as well as around the world. 

We are also expanding our efforts in space exploration and science. NASA has collaborated with the Indian Space Research Organization to share navigation expertise for India’s Mars Orbiter Mission, and we are exploring even more opportunities 

for collaboration through our Civil Space Joint Working Group. 

SECURITY

While my colleague will discuss the future of defense trade and cooperation, I 

would like to underline the centrality of our security engagement to the U.S.-India 

partnership. We are committed to a strong and influential India in the security 

realm. 

Take, for instance, the impressive growth in our counterterrorism (CT) and security cooperation over the last several years. This includes the December 2013 conference in New Delhi on mega-city policing, which focused on domestic terrorism, 

emergency disaster response, corruption, and other challenges faced by major cities 

in both countries. 

India remains an active and strong CT partner of the United States. Our cooperation has already brought to justice several Mumbai terrorists, including David 

Headley and Ajmal Kasab. Five years after the terrorist assault on Mumbai, the 

United States stands with the people of India in mourning the loss of innocent lives, 

including six Americans, and seeking justice. As President Obama has stated, the 

Mumbai perpetrators, financers, and sponsors must be held accountable for their 

crimes, and we have called on all governments to do just that. We will also continue 

to work together to track and disrupt terrorism, including those responsible for the 

Indian consulate attack in Herat. 

REGIONAL COOPERATION

As I noted at the outset, the locus of our convergent strategic interests is in Asia. 

We are confident that a strong U.S.-India partnership will help us address shared 

challenges and seize shared opportunities. 

When Prime Minister Modi invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, 

and the leaders of South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries to his inauguration ceremony, he demonstrated his firm commitment to 

strengthening India’s ties with its immediate region. That’s good news for India and 

the region, and greatly beneficial to global stability. 

In South Asia, where intraregional commerce comprises only 5 percent of total 

trade, and intraregional investment a paltry 1 percent of investment flows, India 

has a chance to bring its entire neighborhood along with it, enhancing prosperity 

and peace by boosting trade and building connectivity throughout South Asia and 

the Bay of Bengal region. That India trades much more with Europe, the United 

States, and the Middle East than with its immediate South Asian neighbors is a 

global economic anomaly, one that India can help address by shaping a connectivity 

network between India, South Asia, and the rest of the continent. The United States 

welcomes the new government’s efforts to strengthen SAARC, and we were pleased 

to see Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj make her first official 

visit abroad to Bangladesh in late June. 

We are also confident that the United States can play a helpful role in facilitating 

trade and connectivity in South Asia, through our New Silk Road and Indo-Pacific 

Economic Corridor strategies. American firms have voiced strong support for our 

leadership in the region, noting that U.S. technology should be instrumental in 

developing cross-border ties in the region. 

Where do our comparative advantages lie? The United States has a tremendous 

opportunity to encourage physical connectivity by expanding port and ‘‘last mile’’ 

connectivity across the Bay of Bengal region, and linking key Indian, Bangladeshi, 

and Burmese transit hubs; to help shape regional regulatory architecture through 

regional trade and transit agreements, improving the investment climate for greater 

foreign direct investment, and reducing nontariff trade barriers throughout South 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

Asia; and to foster human connectivity by linking government officials, business 

leaders, think tanks, and civil society. 

We support increasing trade and investment between India and Pakistan, and 

reducing trade barriers. Increased economic cooperation will improve the long-term 

prosperity of both nations and the entire region. Trade between India and Pakistan 

in 2013 was a relatively meager $2.5 billion. There’s no reason that figure can’t 

quadruple to $10 billion, with steps to ease trade barriers and open up new market 

and investment opportunities. 

Further west, India shares our goal of a successful transformation in Afghanistan. 

We both want to ensure the peace and stability of a democratic Afghanistan, and 

help it economically integrate further into the South and Central Asia region. Our 

bilateral and trilateral discussions on Afghanistan help advance our economic, political, and security objectives. 

Both our nations watch developments in the Middle East with a close eye. We 

share concerns about the situation in Iraq. India has been supportive of the P5+1 

process and a partner in our efforts to limit Iranian oil exports as we seek a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. And our efforts to address trafficking 

in persons and labor concerns in the gulf benefit millions of expatriate Indian workers there. 

We have expanded our regional consultations with India to include South, Central, West, and East Asia. We will hold new rounds of several of these dialogues 

in the months to come, and are exploring how to elevate these discussions further. 

These consultations are not just a talk shop: The U.S.-India-Japan trilateral dialogue has deepened our partnership on our Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor agenda, 

maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster planning, as well as coordination in multilateral fora. Last year, with the support of India, we participated in 

the Indian Ocean Regional Association as a dialogue partner for the first time. 

While some believe our renewed strategic commitment to India comes at the expense of other regional powers, we see it differently. We welcome the rise of any 

power in Asia that upholds global norms and contributes to the stability and prosperity of the continent. We also welcome, with India, the opportunity to showcase 

the commonalities that bind the largest democracies in the Indo-Pacific region, including India, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, and the United States. 

LOOKING AHEAD

With a solid foundation to work from, our bilateral engagements over the course 

of the next several months will reinforce our strategic, economic, and people-topeople ties. Already, India’s newly appointed Minister for Health and Family Welfare, Dr. Harsh Vardhan, visited Washington and several other cities in the United 

States to explore how to enhance our U.S.-India Health Initiative, and make more 

progress together in improving child health in India. I was particularly pleased that 

earlier this month Senator McCain led a congressional delegation to New Delhi, 

where he met with Prime Minister Modi. 

Let me briefly touch on our U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. Secretary Kerry is 

planning to travel to New Delhi later this month to cochair the U.S.-India Strategic 

Dialogue with his new counterpart, Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj. 

This year, the Strategic Dialogue will highlight how U.S.-India ties promote shared 

prosperity in both countries. 

We expect that the Strategic Dialogue will kick off a series of cabinet- and subcabinet-level visits throughout the late summer and fall, culminating in the visit of 

Prime Minister Modi to Washington at the invitation of the President. 

Looking further out, we’re particularly excited about the private sector-led U.S.- 

India Technology Summit, scheduled for November 2014 in the New Delhi area. The 

Tech summit—as we have dubbed it—will spur the formation of new partnerships 

between our countries in science-, technology-, and innovation-related sectors. We 

expect that our most successful American firms will participate, and we’re confident 

large-scale events like this will help create jobs and build new partnerships in both 

countries. 

Today, we see the U.S.-India relationship on increasingly sure footing. But with 

countries as large as ours and with democratic systems that foster debate and dissent, we’re likely to have some disagreements. It is only natural. However, I can 

assure you that our systems are mature enough to address impediments with honesty and sincerity, and ensure that no one, isolated incident can jeopardize what we 

have built over three successive presidencies and between our 1.6 billion citizens. 

For India and the Indo-Pacific region to live up to their potential, they must create societies that encourage strong and inclusive economic growth; one where the 

private sector and not government leads economic development. They must quell 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

terrorism and counter violent extremism while at the same time advancing human 

dignity and protecting religious freedom. They must address barriers preventing 

women and minority groups from full political, economic, and social participation. 

Mr. Chairman, simply put, the Obama administration firmly believes that if the 

United States and India can continue to grow our trade and investment relationship 

and further enhance our already strong strategic partnership, we and the world will 

be better off. By reenergizing the U.S.-India relationship now, we are making future 

generations of Americans and Indians safer and more prosperous, and we are helping strengthen stability in Asia and around the world. 

Finally, I would be remiss not to acknowledge the strong support of the U.S. Congress and this committee in particular for the U.S.-India partnership. Many of the 

greatest accomplishments over the last decade were made possible by the advocacy 

and support of members of both Houses, and from both parties. I look forward to 

working closely with you as we embark on a new chapter of U.S.-India relations in 

the months and years to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering any questions that you 

and others from the committee may have. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Secretary Biswal. 

Dr. Searight. 

STATEMENT OF AMY SEARIGHT, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST 

ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Thank you for inviting me to be here today to participate in this timely hearing on a very important relationship. As 

you all know, the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense 

are committed to a long-term strategic partnership with India. We 

view India as a regional and emerging global power, as well as a 

provider of security and a strategic partner with shared interests, 

from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan and beyond. 

Defense relations continue to play a significant role in advancing 

the strategic partnership and we continue to make progress toward 

advancing United States-India defense cooperation to the point 

where it is both expected and routine across our multifaceted relationship. The bottom line is that we want India to have all of the 

capabilities it needs to meet its security demands and we want to 

be a strong partner in that effort. 

Our policy in this area has not changed and remains part of our 

broader rebalance to the region. We continue to maintain strong 

military-to-military ties and are building a growing record on 

defense trade. This partnership requires effort and persistence on 

both sides, and as we look ahead we see that there are even more 

areas where the two of us can cooperate. 

One of the pillars of our effort to build a strategic partnership 

with India on defense is to U.S.-India Defense, Trade, and Technology Initiative, or DTTI. Secretary Hagel when he was recently 

in Singapore for the Shangri-La Dialogue designated the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Mr. 

Frank Kendall, to be his lead for DTTI. Even as Under Secretary 

Kendall assumes this role, the Secretary himself will continue to 

play a very strong personal role in making sure of the success of 

this initiative. 

Only 2 months into Prime Minister Modi’s tenure, it already 

looks like we will have a very busy year. Under the auspices 

of DTTI, we are ready to move forward on a number of efforts, 

from coproduction and codevelopment proposals to procurement 

and sales. On the coproduction and codevelopment side, we have 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

continued to identify forward-leaning proposals from United States 

industry for cooperative projects with India. Once the new government shows interest in proposals already offered, we will follow up. 

We also remain supportive of finding ways to include industry 

leaders in existing official dialogues and will continue to look for 

opportunities to foster close ties between the United States and 

Indian defense sectors. We hope to see more joint partnerships take 

root, like we have seen between Lockheed Martin and Tata building C–130 components in Hyderabad. 

We will also continue to advocate on behalf of U.S. industry for 

needed changes in the Indian system, such as continued reforms to 

their offset system, and we will continue to emphasize that we offer 

a transparent export system in foreign military sales. On foreign 

direct investment, we are very encouraged by the Modi government’s proposal in the budget introduced last week to raise FDI 

caps in the defense sector to 49 percent. 

DTTI alone does not fully capture the scope of our engagement 

with the Indian Government. There are a wealth of opportunities 

for engagement already scheduled for this year and more are 

expected. We are now at the point where we can look toward the 

horizon and decide where we want to take the relationship further. 

We will continue to hold close consultations with India on Afghanistan and regional security and will look for opportunities to work 

together as our presence in Afghanistan draws down post-2014. 

India is currently participating right now in the Rim of the 

Pacific, or RIMPAC, 2014 exercise in Hawaii, where for the first 

time an Indian frigate has joined this large multilateral activity. 

And Japan will participate in Malabar this year, which is our largest bilateral naval exercise with India and is schedule to take place 

at the end of this month. 

Secretary Hagel will be traveling to India in early August to discuss bilateral defense ties with Indian officials. Under Secretary 

Kendall is expected to travel with him, as will I. This trip will follow the State Department’s strategic dialogue which, as Secretary 

Biswal mentioned, will be in New Delhi on July 31, but this trip 

will be our first opportunity to engage in a direct and meaningful 

way with India’s new leadership on defense and security issues 

that matter to us both. 

In addition, the 2005 New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense 

Relationship will be up for renewal in June 2015 and we are looking for opportunities to reinforce and potentially expand efforts 

under its guidelines. The framework was a breakthrough document 

and laid out the bilateral defense cooperation structure that we follow today. This year we have an opportunity to review our progress 

and set goals for the coming decade on where we want to take the 

relationship next. 

Thank you very much again for this opportunity and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Searight follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. AMY SEARIGHT

Thank you for inviting to me to be here today to participate in this very timely 

hearing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

OVERVIEW

As you all know, the U.S. Government, and the Department of Defense are committed to a long-term strategic partnership with India. We view India as a regional 

and emerging global power, as well as a provider of security and a strategic partner 

with shared interests from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan and beyond. 

Defense relations continue to play a significant role in advancing the strategic 

partnership, and we continue to make progress toward advancing U.S.-India defense 

cooperation to the point where it is both expected and routine across our multifaceted relationship. Bottom line: we want India to have all of the capabilities it 

needs to meet its security demands, and we want to be a strong partner in that 

effort. 

Our policy in this area has not changed, and remains part of our broader rebalance to the region. We continue to maintain strong military-to-military ties and are 

building a growing record on defense trade. This partnership requires effort and 

persistence on both sides, and as we look ahead, we see that there are even more 

areas where the two of us can cooperate. 

UPDATE ON THE U.S.-INDIA DEFENSE TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE

One of the pillars of our effort to build a strategic partnership with India on 

defense issues is the U.S.-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). 

Secretary Hagel designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Frank Kendall, as his lead for the DTTI at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue in June. Even as Under Secretary Kendall assumes this role, the Secretary 

will continue to take a personal interest in the success of this initiative. 

Only 2 months into Prime Minister Modi’s tenure, already it looks like we will 

have a very busy year. Under the auspices of DTTI, we are ready to move forward 

on a number of efforts, from coproduction/codevelopment proposals to procurement 

and sales. 

As you recall, DTTI was formulated in recognition that we needed to find a better 

way for our two systems to work together and to ensure that in cases where we 

wanted to collaborate, bureaucratic hurdles could be surmounted. It has paved the 

way for increased private sector ties, science and technology cooperation, defense 

trade, and potential for coproduction/codevelopment. 

Regarding export controls, we continue to review each dual-use and munitions 

export application on a case-by-case basis. DOD provides its recommended dual-use 

positions to the Department of Commerce and munitions positions to the Department of State. Over the past year and a half, India has succeeded in acquiring the 

vast majority of what it sought to obtain from U.S. industry, with DOD recommending approval of just over 90 percent of dual-use requests and about 95 percent 

of munitions requests. 

On the coproduction/codevelopment side, we have continued to identify forwardleaning proposals from U.S. industry for cooperative projects with India. Once the 

new government shows interest in the proposals already offered, we will follow up. 

Positive indications from the Indian side on these proposals would go a long way 

in helping us maintain the Initiative’s momentum, but we realize that the new government—not even 2 months old—may take some time in responding. 

We remain supportive of finding ways to include industry leaders in existing official dialogues, and will continue to look for opportunities to foster closer ties 

between the U.S. and Indian defense sectors. We hope to see more joint partnerships take root, like we have seen between Lockheed Martin and Tata building C– 

130 components in Hyderabad. 

We will also continue to advocate on behalf of U.S. industry for needed changes 

in the Indian system—such as continued reforms to their offset system—and continue to emphasize that we offer a transparent export system in foreign military 

sales. On foreign direct investment, we are very encouraged by the Modi government’s proposal in the budget introduced last week to raise FDI caps in the defense 

sector to 49 percent. 

WAY FORWARD

DTTI alone does not fully capture the scope of our engagement with the Indian 

Government. There are a wealth of opportunities for engagement already scheduled 

for this year, and more are expected. We are now at a point where we can look 

toward the horizon and decide where we can take the relationship further. 

We will continue to hold close consultations with India on Afghanistan and 

regional security, and will look for opportunities to work together as our presence 

in Afghanistan draws down post-2014. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

India is currently participating in the Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 exercise 

in Hawaii, where for the first time an Indian frigate has joined this large multilateral activity. Japan will participate in MALABAR this year, our largest bilateral 

naval exercise with India, scheduled for the end of this month. 

Secretary Hagel will be traveling to India in early August to discuss bilateral 

defense ties with Indian officials. Under Secretary Kendall is expected to travel with 

him, as will I. This trip will follow the State Department’s Strategic Dialogue, 

scheduled for July 31 in New Delhi, and will be our first opportunity to engage in 

a direct and meaningful way with India’s new leadership on defense and security 

issues that matter to us both. 

We also look forward to convening the Defense Policy Group (DPG) this year, now 

that Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Christine Wormuth, has been confirmed. 

As the premier defense dialogue between our two countries, it is extremely important for this group and its subgroups to be reenergized as we look toward a very 

busy year. 

The 2005 New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship will be up for 

renewal in June 2015, and we are looking for opportunities to reinforce and potentially expand efforts under its guidelines. The Framework was a breakthrough document and laid out the bilateral defense cooperation structure we follow today. This 

year, we have an opportunity to review our progress and set goals for the coming 

decade on where we want to take the relationship next. 

As we enter this window of opportunity on both sides, we need to ensure our 

bureaucracies do not prevent progress and further development of a vital strategic 

partnership. We will continue to urge both sides to keep moving forward, deepen 

our candor in discussions, and find new areas to collaborate in the coming years. 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you. 

We will do questions in 6-minute rounds and I will begin. Secretary Biswal, dig in a little bit more to your recent visit with Deputy Secretary Burns. You talked about direct dialogue with Prime 

Minister Modi and his clarity about the priorities that he views as 

his most pressing priorities. If you could talk a little bit about that 

discussion and the kinds of priorities where he wants to focus his 

initial energies, that would be helpful. 

Ms. BISWAL. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We did have 

a very good meeting with the Prime Minister, as well as with the 

Finance Minister, with the External Affairs Minister, and various 

other members of the Cabinet. Clearly the economic growth agenda 

is going to be one of the key agendas, and within that they have 

identified a desire for increased United States-India cooperation in 

infrastructure, in manufacturing, in the energy sector, and certainly looking at the whole issue of skills and how we can improve 

access to education and skills in terms of the Indian population. 

Those are all areas where we think that American educational 

institutions and American businesses, American technology, bring 

very significant added value, and we are looking to see how we can 

address some of those areas in more specificity as we look forward 

to the strategic dialogue and to the Prime Minister’s visit here this 

fall. 

Senator KAINE. One of the initial signs that I thought was very 

positive was in Prime Minister Modi’s inauguration, his decision to 

invite Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif, and not only to have him 

attend, as other heads of state did, but the opportunity that they 

took to then find time to speak together at some length. How do 

you see Indo-Pakistani ties today and how are they progressing? 

Can greater trade contribute to closer relationships and rapprochement in the region? 

Ms. BISWAL. You know, Mr. Chairman, both Prime Minister 

Sharif and Prime Minister Modi have come into office with a very 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

strong agenda and a very strong mandate for economic opportunity 

for their populations. We see an improvement and an opening in 

the economic relationship between India and Pakistan as one winwin opportunity that both leaders could and should pursue. We 

have seen some statements to that effect that make us think that 

such an easing of trade relations, improving of trade relations, is 

something that both are considering. So we would hope and we 

would encourage that this would be an important way to invest 

both countries in each other’s economies and in each other’s opportunities. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Dr. Searight, I was surprised as I was preparing for this hearing 

with staff to read—and just tell me if this is right—that the United 

States and India from a defense standpoint have as many joint 

exercises together as the United States has with any other nation 

in the world. The notion of this kind of joint activity is pretty significant. 

I wanted to ask in particular about cooperation on counterterrorism strategies. The United States is dealing with it and India 

has dealt with it as well. Talk to me a little bit about the level of 

cooperation between us on counterterrorism activities? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Mr. Chairman, you are correct that we do a broad 

range of military-to-military activities, including a number of exercises. In terms of specific counterterrorism exercises, I will have to 

get back to you with the specifics on that. 

Senator KAINE. How about, separate from exercises, just the 

state of the relationship on counterterrorism planning? Talk to me 

about that a little bit if you can, or Secretary Biswal, either way? 

Ms. BISWAL. Sure. We have very extensive areas of cooperation 

on counterterrorism. It is both a priority for the United States and 

one for the Indian Government. So we have a homeland security 

dialogue where we do both discussions on intelligence cooperation 

with respect to counterterrorism and on technology and training 

and capacity issues with respect to counterterrorism. We expect 

that the strategic dialogue later this month will have a strong component focused on counterterrorism as well, with participation from 

the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Counterterrorism, and other key players, to see how we 

can expand both the institutional aspects of cooperation as well as 

the operational aspects of cooperation. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much. 

One of the things we have been supportive of in the past has 

been Indian membership in multilateral export control regimes. 

There are four in particular where we have supported India’s participation in: The Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology 

Control Regime, the Wassenaar Agreement, and the Australia 

Group. What is the current status of India progressing into membership in these multinational export regimes? 

Ms. BISWAL. We continue to very much strongly support India’s 

inclusion in those four regimes, and India has been taking steps in 

terms of its own aspirations and applications to those regimes. It 

is an issue where it is not solely up to the United States and we 

continue to look for opportunities to advance India’s membership. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

Senator KAINE. We have a U.S.-India Higher Education Dialogue 

that has a number of purposes, one of which is to try to deal with 

a system that has a tremendous demand. They are overburdened 

by the demand and the United States and India are cooperating in 

dealing with it. What is the current status of that U.S.-India 

Higher Education Dialogue? 

Ms. BISWAL. This is a very important area of collaboration 

between our two countries. We hope to have a higher education 

dialogue later this year, both in terms of how we can expand access 

to American educational institutions for Indian students who are 

seeking to come to the United States and how we can expand 

opportunities for American institutions to partner with and provide 

opportunities in India. 

There is a very strong emphasis on access to education for the 

new government as they look to increase the skills base of their 

work force and I think that there is an opportunity here as we look 

at things like community colleges and the systems that have 

worked so well in our country, how we can partner and collaborate 

to provide those kinds of educational platforms in India as well. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you. 

Ms. Biswal, I want to go back to the matter I raised in my opening statement regarding civil nuclear power. As I explained, we are 

so proud of what we do in Idaho. We are the flagship—we have the 

flagship laboratory, the lead laboratory in America on civilian 

nuclear power. As a result of that, we do have relationships with 

other countries and we are proud of the relationship that we have 

with India, and particularly have the working group, and even 

going so far as to say it has been hosted there very recently. 

But we are disappointed that we have been 6 years now and 

have not really seen the participation of the U.S. nuclear industry, 

in particular the companies being able to participate there. It of 

course surrounds this issue of liability. What can you tell us about 

that? What work is being done? What are the prospects? What is 

our prognosis for how that is going to resolve, if it is going to 

resolve? 

Ms. BISWAL. Senator, we share your frustration in terms of the 

lack of progress over the last 6 years, while we did get some small 

progress and we were able to complete a small contract with 

respect to the previous government. We see some expanded areas 

of opportunity with the new government. While we have not yet 

had detailed discussions with the Modi government on the way forward on civil nuclear cooperation, we believe that there may be an 

opening to address nuclear liability issues either through a legal 

framework or through other frameworks that can help create more 

surety on what the application of liability might be, so that it is 

not unlimited liability, as the companies are rightly concerned. 

But this is going to be an area that is going to require much 

greater discussion between the United States and India and 

between the companies and NPCIL to see what the way forward 

is going to be. I think that we have heard from Westinghouse that 

they think that there is a greater scope for trying to make progress 

on this and we are going to pursue that in the coming months. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17 

Senator RISCH. I understand it is very early on in the Modi 

administration, but do you see some things there that give you 

some hope that there is going to be some movement in that regard? 

Ms. BISWAL. We certainly heard statements that make us feel 

like there is a desire to find a way forward. The devil is always in 

the details and for that we really do need to wait and see what the 

conversations disclose. 

Senator RISCH. Have you got any ideas or suggestions how we 

might move that forward a little by pushing a little bit on it? 

Ms. BISWAL. Well, I think we need to see whether there are 

options either in terms of legislative remedies or regulatory remedies that can help create a framework for discussions to proceed 

with respect to liability. Beyond liability, there are a host of other 

issues that also need to be addressed, which we have not really 

been able to engage in until the liability issues are addressed. 

Senator RISCH. Ms. Searight, next year the 10-year defense 

framework agreement expires. Do you have confidence we are going 

to be able to renegotiate that and get a new agreement to move 

forward? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, that is certainly very high on our priority list. 

We do see it as a real opportunity to take stock of what we have 

accomplished under the framework agreement and sketch out 

where we would like to go. So this will be one of the things that 

Secretary Hagel will discuss with his counterparts when he visits 

India this August. 

Senator RISCH. I assume from that statement that it is not moving forward yet, but you expect it to move forward soon? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, we have not yet really engaged with this new 

Indian Government under Prime Minister Modi on renewing the 

framework agreement, but we have indicated our strong interest in 

doing so. 

Senator RISCH. Have they reciprocated in that regard? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, they have indicated that they are happy to 

hold those discussions. 

Senator RISCH. Ms. Biswal, back to you on the intellectual property issue. Where are we headed in that direction with India? Has 

the new administration given us any signals that they understand 

the seriousness of this and the necessity that there be protections 

for intellectual property if we are going to do things right and move 

forward successfully? 

Ms. BISWAL. As India seeks to develop the knowledge economy, 

it is going to need to grapple with this issue of intellectual property 

from the perspective even of indigenous innovation in India. I think 

that too often the discussion has been too much about what the 

United States thinks India ought to do, but intellectual property 

protection is fundamentally in India’s own interest, and we think 

that Indian companies are increasingly making that fact known to 

the Indian Government. 

So we think that as this government looks at its own economic 

agenda that strengthening and beefing up intellectual property protection in India is going to naturally emerge as an area of priority. 

We will continue to make that case with respect to the perspective 

of American companies and their ability to do business in India 

and to provide modern cutting-edge technology to India. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18 

Senator RISCH. Referenced in your statement, kind of buried, was 

the statement that too often these are centered on what the United 

States thinks ought to be done. Is that a criticism that you hear, 

that we get regarding this issue? 

Ms. BISWAL. No. I think that we are very compelling and forceful 

advocates of what we think is the right thing to do. But often what 

that is interpreted as is something where the United States thinks 

you ought to do this, and what is lost in the process is that 

this is actually what is necessary and right for India for its own 

agenda, for its own growth. I think we need to emphasize that 

these are things that India needs to do to be able to achieve its economic ambition. 

Senator RISCH. I think with all countries sometimes you do not 

have the same—you know, our view of the intellectual property 

protection is based on personal property rights, which we as Americans seem sometimes to have a unique view of in the world. One 

of the things that has made us great is us having personal property 

rights; that we can accumulate and protect personal property. 

Sometimes what you read, what you see from other countries, is 

they do not have the same view that intellectual property is personal property. I do not know how you bring people to the realization that intellectual property is property that has value just as 

much as currency or a bushel of wheat or anything else that is personal property that needs protection. What are your thoughts on 

that? 

Ms. BISWAL. I think that that is a growing chorus that is heard 

within India, within the Indian private sector. I had the opportunity to meet with the head of NASSCOM, which represents 

kind of the technology sector in India, and I think that much of 

what we have articulated as being necessary for the investment climate—the business climate—in India to be attractive to American 

companies is also what the Indian private sector has also been 

articulating. 

I think that when you have a government coming in with the 

mandate that this government has and with an outright majority 

and a very pro-business mind-set in terms of how to grow the economy, I think that we will see hopefully that some of these issues 

will have greater resonance. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

Ms. Biswal, it was my clear impression from meeting with the 

Prime Minister that he wants to focus our partnership on an ambitious strategic agenda. Would you generally agree with that? 

Ms. BISWAL. That was certainly the impression we had as well 

in our conversation. 

Senator MCCAIN. What does the administration think the elements of that agenda might be? 

Ms. BISWAL. We think that we have a very strong opportunity in 

terms of the security cooperation, the defense partnership, as Dr. 

Searight elaborated. 

Senator MCCAIN. What specifically would that be? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

Ms. BISWAL. The Prime Minister in his conversation with us 

talked about defense manufacturing as a key area that India would 

like to pursue. We think that there is scope, and particularly, as 

Dr. Searight noted, the Indian budget did increase the FDI caps to 

49 percent—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I am not exactly sure that that is a strategic 

agenda. 

Ms. BISWAL. But I think that as we have a greater collaboration 

in the defense partnership and in the security partnership that we 

also are going to advance our ability to work together around strategic objectives in the region, whether it is in terms of India’s 

engagement in East Asia and working with us on issues of maritime security, whether it is in terms of India’s engagement across 

South and Central Asia and the role that it plays. I think that that 

is one aspect of it. 

We certainly look to increase our relationship with respect to 

how we are working together to address problems in the region and 

across the globe. I think that those are all areas that we need to 

strengthen the collaboration between our two countries. 

Senator MCCAIN. Strategic agenda? What is our overall strategy? 

Ms. BISWAL. Senator, as you noted in your comments while you 

were in-country, we think that as India grows, as India prospers, 

and as India increases its capabilities, that India—— 

Senator MCCAIN. No. 

Ms. BISWAL [continuing]. As a partner in the region—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Go ahead. But you still have not outlined the 

strategy. Strategy as I understand it are specific measures to 

ensure certain aspects of security. You have not mentioned China. 

You have not mentioned Japan. You have not mentioned that strategy and the threats that we are facing and the challenges that we 

are facing. 

Ms. BISWAL. We have a very strong relationship and a trilateral 

partnership between the United States, India, and Japan. We were 

about to hold the fifth iteration of the U.S.-India-Japan Trilat earlier this summer. We have had to reschedule that, but we have 

seen a tremendous growth in the amount of collaboration that we 

are able to have, not only in terms of sharing of intelligence and 

analysis, but also looking at active areas of cooperation. 

As Amy talked about, we will be doing joint exercises with Japan 

and India in the Malabar exercises later this fall. And we see 

opportunities for increasing the collaboration across Southeast 

Asia. We are engaging more frequently in consultations and dialogue with the Indians on ASEAN and look forward to increased 

and frequent consultations across the East Asia sphere. 

We are also engaging in conversations with the Indians and consultations with respect to Afghanistan. With Deputy Secretary 

Burns we talked quite a bit about where things are headed and 

what role India can play in terms of the current electoral and political impasse in Afghanistan and how we can try to work together 

with respect to our objectives there. 

But across the board, Senator, I think that the point that you are 

making, and we fully agree with, is that we have an opportunity 

here to engage more robustly with India in how the Asian landFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

scape unfolds, and we look forward to engaging with this new government in that agenda. 

Senator MCCAIN. I look forward to the articulation of a strategy. 

Mrs. Searight—Dr. Searight, I am sorry. The Prime Minister of 

India, Prime Minister Modi, and Indian leaders are deeply concerned about President Obama’s decision to fully withdraw United 

States troops from Afghanistan by January 2017 regardless of the 

conditions on the ground. Would you agree that that is generally 

the Indian position? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, Senator McCain, I am aware that they have 

strong concerns. We do consult with them regularly on our Afghanistan policy and our plans for post-2014. Afghanistan is actually 

not in my purview, so for a more detailed answer I would have to 

get back to you. 

Senator MCCAIN. But they are concerned about the situation in 

Afghanistan? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, they are. And we very much appreciate their 

efforts to provide development assistance and training and support 

to Afghanistan forces. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Biswal, has the administration had any 

discussions with the government about Indian involvement in the 

TPP? 

Ms. BISWAL. We have not yet been talking about Indian involvement in TPP, but we have talked to the Indians about what they 

see as their role in a global trade architecture. India itself has to 

make some decisions with respect to how it wants to open up its 

economy and engage in trade relations across Asia. 

Senator MCCAIN. As you know, one of the big obstacles—problem 

areas that we have had—is on the nuclear issue with the Indians 

because of their legislation that basically makes it untenable for 

our nuclear capabilities to be sold to India. What do you think the 

answer to that problem is? They were saying that they thought 

that they could have new interpretation to government regulations 

rather than passing new legislation. 

Do you think that that would be sufficient to satisfy the concerns 

of our manufacturers? 

Ms. BISWAL. I think it is going to be up to the individual manufacturers to see what the level of assurance they need to feel comfortable. I think that if there is some combination of some regulatory along with, I think they have been talking about, insurance 

pools as well, that that might prove sufficient for some. But I think 

again that the companies are going to have to engage in these discussions, these negotiations, and see if there is a framework that 

will work for them. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you confident that that can happen? 

Ms. BISWAL. I think we have to pursue this and see where it will 

go. I think that we see a willingness on the Indian side to enter 

into these conversations and to address the issue of liability, and 

we need to pursue that and see how far we can get there, get with 

that. I do think that it is a little bit premature right now because 

we have not had the detailed conversations to delve into exactly 

the specifics. But I think it is an opening that we are going to pursue and hopefully will be one aspect of the strategic dialogue coming up. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

I actually want to follow up. Senator McCain raised a point 

about the India-China relationship. I would love to hear from each 

of you about this. It is a very important one. It has a bit of economic cooperation, but also strategic rivalry. I know there has been 

some recent visits with the new Prime Minister. Given the aggressive posture that China is showing on a number of areas, including 

maritime disputes, what is the concern level about potential tensions, either along the disputed border or Tibet or other issues that 

might be flashpoints, and what was the attitude that you found in 

Prime Minister Modi in talking about those issues? 

Ms. BISWAL. Clearly, there are going to be areas between India 

and China of economic collaboration and there will be areas of competition. I think that we want to see an India that is able to thrive 

and rise and we want to see that all of the economies of Asia are 

able to grow in a way that is sustainable and that mitigates 

against the areas of conflict. 

With respect to the India-China relationship, I think you see that 

there will be areas where the United States and India will have 

great complementarity and collaboration and there will be areas 

where the United States and China will be working together, and 

there will be areas where India and China will be working 

together. I think that that is the era that we are walking into. A 

rising India is in some ways going to be an ameliorating influence 

on China, in China’s own growth and in China’s own behavior in 

the region. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Searight, from the defense standpoint? 

Dr. SEARIGHT. Yes, thank you. As India looks east and we pursue 

our strategic rebalance, there is a real strategic convergence there 

as we both are looking to the challenges and opportunities in East 

Asia today, of which a rising China is certainly a major part. So 

India has integrated itself into the ASEAN-led regional architecture, as have we. So we are beginning to cooperate much more with 

India on the kind of work that we do in ASEAN-based organizations, such as, from the defense perspective what is important to 

us is the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting, or ADMM-Plus 

framework. 

The challenges that those kinds of frameworks address are 

things like maritime security. There are obviously a lot of tensions 

in the maritime domain in the region right now. So those are the 

areas where I think there are concerns on India’s part, there are 

concerns on our part, there are concerns on many of the ASEAN 

nations’ part. Those are the discussions we are having in those 

frameworks and having separately with India. 

We have already mentioned a couple of times opportunities for 

trilateral cooperation with Japan. We have mentioned Malabar, 

that will be taking place off the coast of Okinawa later this month. 

USS John S. McCain will be participating in that exercise. So that 

is another example where there is a growing relationship between 

India and Japan, there is a growing relationship between India and 

ASEAN countries, Vietnam in particular. There is a new defense 

relationship growing there. We want to capitalize on that, and we 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

do not have to be in all of the discussions with those partners, but 

we want to support that activity and participate trilaterally or multilaterally where it is appropriate. 

Senator KAINE. One last question, Secretary Biswal, about sort 

of a diplomatic matter. The friction points—the Khobragade incident last year was a real friction point. These kinds of things will 

come up, but it almost seemed like the friction was more about the 

sort of communication and how it was handled than the initial incident, which could have been handled. 

Have we learned anything from that, both the United States and 

India, in the aftermath of that? And can we put those lessons to 

use to avoid this kind of friction in the future? 

Ms. BISWAL. Mr. Chairman, we have certainly spent many, many 

long hours discussing with our Indian colleagues ways to, one, 

ensure that we have greater understandings and greater clarity 

about our expectations of each other under each other’s laws and 

under each other’s systems. I think that that has been time well 

spent. 

We have also focused a great deal on ensuring that we have more 

clear and transparent communication to ensure that we anticipate 

problems before they happen, that we clearly communicate those 

problems, and that we resolve them. So I think that, despite the 

fact that we had this very uncomfortable and unfortunate situation 

that we had to work through, at the end of the day I think we have 

developed closer ties and closer communications with our two systems as a result. 

Senator KAINE. Then actually one more question. Talking about 

trilateral activities between the United States and India and Japan 

and then United States, India, and China within that trilateral, 

the United States and India may be complementary on some 

issues, China and India in some, United States-China in some. Are 

there trilateral opportunities. The United States-India-China is 

nearly half the world’s population, half the world’s economic output. What are the trilateral opportunities, if any, that we should 

be thinking about? 

Ms. BISWAL. It has been an area that has been tossed around in 

various fora. I think right now we do have track-two opportunities 

where we have members of the think tank community, academia, 

from the three countries who engage in those conversations and I 

think it bears watching to see if it might be an opportunity to 

develop that into a track-one opportunity down the road. 

Senator KAINE. Well, I would like to thank the witnesses on 

panel one for your testimony and again for your service. It is good 

to have you before us. I know Senators Risch and McCain join in 

the thanks. With that, we will move you aside for panel two. But 

thanks for being up with us today. 

If I could ask the second panel to come forward. While they are, 

for the audience let me just introduce our second panel members. 

We have a superb lineup in panel two: Ambassador Frank Wisner, 

who is currently an international affairs adviser at the Patton 

Boggs firm, where he uses international experience to help clients 

with strategic global advice. As all know, Ambassador Wisner 

served as Ambassador to India from 1993 to 1997, also served as 

Ambassador to the Philippines, Egypt, and Zambia, and as Under 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

Secretary of Defense for Policy. Ambassador Wisner, it is good to 

have you with us. 

Vikram Singh is vice president of National Security and International Policy at American Progress. Previously he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia at 

the Pentagon. Singh was also Deputy Special Representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State. 

Richard ‘‘Rick’’ Rossow is the senior fellow and holds the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Prior to CSIS, Mr. Rossow spent 

16 years working on a variety of capacities to strengthen the partnership between the United States and India. 

Lisa Curtis. We are glad to have Lisa with us. She analyzes 

America’s economic security and political relationships with India, 

Pakistan, and Afghanistan and other nations in South Asia as a 

senior research fellow at the Heritage Institute. Before joining Heritage in 2006, Ms. Curtis was a member of the professional staff 

of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Welcome back. It is 

good to have you on that side of the table. 

I will start with Ambassador Wisner and then we will just move 

across the table for each of your testimony, and then we will open 

it up for questions. As I say, I do expect Senator Risch will return. 

Ambassador Wisner, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. WISNER, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ADVISOR, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador WISNER. Senator, thank you very much. It is an 

honor to appear before your subcommittee. I, like the others who 

have gathered with me, will submit my formal testimony for the 

record. 

Senator KAINE. Absolutely. 

Ambassador WISNER. Instead, what I thought I might do is think 

out loud for a few minutes about the Indian-American relationship 

and how we might best advance it. In this regard, I would like to 

make five points. 

The first is pretty obvious and it springs from your testimony, 

your statement, and that is that India is truly important to the 

United States. It is important to us because India helps assure a 

balance of power in Asia in a time in which American interests in 

the most fundamental fashion will be challenged as we move increasingly into a Pacific century. 

The same is true in the opposite side. We are vitally important 

to India. We are India’s best market for technology, for trade, for 

defense cooperation. We are on the other side of the equation of 

balance. A strong India is good for America, a strong America is, 

in like manner, good for India. 

If you start with that point, then the next should follow. That is 

you can argue the United States and India could have done more 

with their relationship in recent years, but let us also remember 

that we have taken gigantic steps. A real sea change has occurred 

in the last 15 to 20 years in the way we have dealt with each other. 

Having said that, I truly believe that since 2010, the high water 

marked by President Obama’s trip, the relationship has been on 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

hold. If anything, I would say it has atrophied and requires attention. 

Which is my third point, and that is the unprecedented victory 

of Prime Minister Modi, the disarray of the opposition, the determination of Modi to shape the agenda of his country, means that 

the United States is facing an uncommon partner across the table, 

an uncommon opportunity, and one that is likely to be with us for 

a good 10 years. We should be planning that the partners we have 

in New Delhi today will be there for a substantial period of time. 

It behooves us therefore to make certain that we get the relationship right, our understandings right, now, so that we have the 

enduring capacity to engage India in the years ahead. 

My fourth point flows therefore from that, and it is: What are the 

main pillars of the relationship and how do we address those? I am 

going to argue that at core the relationship has rested on two pillars since it took off in its modern phase in the 1990s. The first 

is political. We have developed a new political relationship with 

India in the past decade and a half that is unlike anything that 

we have known before in our history. 

But I am also going to argue that since 2010 we have begun to 

lose the strategic thread in that relationship. I believe that is the 

point Senator McCain was driving this afternoon. What is the strategic view? How do we see India and therefore how does India 

judge where she fits into American strategy, especially at a time 

when India is trying to calibrate its relations with China, Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, and the other crises in the region. Where India fits 

in is going to be the basis of how Modi and his government decide 

to structure their national policies and develop a partnership with 

the United States. 

Now, it is more than general generalities. It is very specific. How 

does the United States intend to manage the rise of Chinese 

power? What does the United States intend to do with, and in, 

Afghanistan after the withdrawal of American forces in their great 

majority in 2014? Under what circumstances are we going to come 

to the assistance of Afghanistan or back the existing regime? How 

will India be able to relate to our objectives? 

And third, Pakistan. While India brooks no intermediation between the United States and Pakistan, India still needs to know 

how we will deal with the very difficult circumstances Pakistan is 

going through and the spillover effect across India’s borders. 

I believe, Senator, that these three particular questions and the 

broader strategic framework must be the top priority of Secretary 

Kerry and the President when Prime Minister Modi visits the 

United States in September. 

I believe it is also a challenge for this committee to think how 

to articulate American strategic purposes in Asia and toward India, 

as well as Japan and China. That remains a real task in front of 

all of us. 

I think we saw this afternoon the need to refine our thinking so 

that we can create partners in our activities abroad. 

The second aspect of our relationship, the second pillar, Senator 

Kaine, is the economic pillar. It has been a real driver in what got 

us here. In the last 4 or 5 years, there has been a loss of confidence 

in the American business community in the Indian market. India 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

has not grown rapidly. GDP rates have been down, inflation high, 

and government has not been able to take the steps which are necessary to push the relationship forward or, indeed, resume a high 

rate of Indian growth. 

Reversing that tide is the top priority in the Modi government, 

and it is also the top priority we have on the business side. There 

are lots of issues that have to be dealt with. Some have been mentioned this afternoon: questions of taxes, of intellectual property 

rights. I believe there are avenues forward. The nuclear question 

we have touched on. Defense sales and offsets; the Indian threat, 

occasionally voiced, of localization; the criminalization of commercial disputes that has today an American CEO in prison in an eastern Indian state, the Amway president; the long-term difficulties of 

infrastructure and power generation which impede the effectiveness of American business firms which invest or which wish to 

trade from and produce in India. 

Modi, the Prime Minister, intends to address these issues. He 

made that clear and his government made it clear to the delegation 

that visited India in late June from the United States-India Business Council headed by Chairman Ajay Banga. The USIBC represents the overwhelming majority of American companies doing 

business in India. The Prime Minister made it absolutely clear that 

we would see first steps in a new budget. While I conclude we have 

not seen a lot of hard facts in the budget, we have seen key directions and that is very important. 

Modi made it clear he wants to produce 15 million jobs a year 

and he knows, and his government knows, you cannot get there 

without foreign involvement, foreign investment, foreign technology, and without American involvement. 

Well, growth of the Indian economy is going to be good for us. 

It is going to be important for India. But I am going to take the 

argument one step further since you and this subcommittee want 

to look ahead. Where do we want to be in the future? Where does 

India want to be? How will it develop 15 million jobs? 

I argue that the only way there is a real shot at getting to that 

goal is for India to open itself up and become a competitive marketplace for trade and investment in the international system. Yes, as 

Assistant Secretary Biswal said, we would like to see the bilateral 

investment treaty passed. That is an important objective. We want 

to see India back in the WTO engaging in the service rounds. It 

is really important to see India in APEC and looking at the TransPacific Partnership, and indeed one day, Senator, perhaps we can 

dream, if we can take those initial steps, of a free trade agreement 

between the United States and India. 

For India today finds itself in the awkward position of being neither part of the Atlantic disposition nor the Pacific one and falling 

in between. But for India to reach the objective of an open and 

competative trade and investment regime takes a mind-set change. 

Will India open up? Rather than investment only flowing in, is 

India ready to join the international trading system and establish 

best investment practices. 

I believe it is important. I believe it is part, circling back to Senator McCain, of the strategic challenge. Do we want to leave India 

struggling at the door of APEC, trying to figure out how to get in? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

Or do we, the United States, want to be India’s partner in trying 

to help her think through the steps she will have to take? 

So political strategy and business come together again. 

For all of these things to happen, there are a number of fora. The 

Secretary and the Secretary of Commerce will be in Delhi. The 

President will be involved. Many other fora have been mentioned. 

They need to be launched, because we have real jobs to do. 

But I close by saying, Senator, that we really have an extraordinary opportunity with India and a demanding time in which to 

make that opportunity happen. I believe today and I believed for 

some time that, despite the progress we have made so far, the best 

years in our relationship are still to come. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wisner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR FRANK G. WISNER

Senator Kaine and Senator Risch, it is an honor to appear before your subcommittee and address the important question of ‘‘Indispensable Partners: Reenergizing U.S.-India Ties.’’ 

I come to these proceedings with experience in dealing with U.S.-India relations. 

I served as United States Ambassador in New Delhi from 1993–1997. I have chaired 

the U.S.-India Business Council and at present I am a member of its Board of Directors and its Executive Committee. Since leaving government service, I have participated regularly in fora which bring together Indian and American experts in public 

policy. I have also authored or participated in a variety of study groups which 

address the Indian American relationship. My professional obligations take me to 

India regularly and I returned from India in late June of this year, where together 

with a delegation from the U.S. India Business Council, I met members of the new 

government and leaders in the Indian business community. 

In my testimony, I intend to address the state of the U.S.-India relationship and 

what needs to be done to give it fresh energy and importance to our two countries. 

Before turning to this subject, I admit to being biased. I believe a strong U.S.- 

India relationship is good for the United States and the opposite is true as well. 

American strength in the world and prosperity at home are important to India, just 

as a secure and prosperous India benefits the United States. I have held these opinions firmly over nearly 20 years, despite the ups and downs in the Indian-American 

relationship. My reasons are simple. India is an emerging global power. Its weight 

is felt particularly in Asia where India plays a pivotal role in maintaining the balance of power among Asia’s great nations. India is coming into its own as a major 

international economic player whose trade with the United States means that India 

will be a valuable market for the exports of American goods and services as well 

as a source of two way investment and technology exchange for years to come. In 

a word, we need close political and economic ties to India. It is a nation with which 

we share common values, especially democratic ones. We also are a home to a large, 

productive community of Americans of Indian origin. 

It is on these common interests that our relationship with India has developed 

over the past quarter century. The strength of our political and economic relations 

with India have regrettably atrophied over the last 4 years and need attention if 

we are to set a stronger basis for our relationship and more effectively pursue our 

respective national interests. At the heart of the challenge is a strategic question. 

On our side we lost confidence in the last Indian Government’s ability to follow 

through with the undertakings we believe it made to us and to find common ground 

with us on a number of questions—trade being a notable example. The relationship 

took on the tone of a transactional undertaking. On the Indian side, many argue 

they do not understand American strategy in Asia, including in South Asia. They 

thought they understood the Bush administration’s approach to the continent’s security problems, especially our approach to China. They assert they have found no 

comparable clarity in the Obama administration’s views. Indians wish to understand our strategy for a good reason. They want to know their place in it. The definition will permit the Indian Government to make its choices. 

Indians are especially concerned with how the United States intends to deal with 

the rise of Chinese power. This Indian Government, like its predecessor, sees China 

as its principal, long-term strategic and economic competitor. India fought a war 

with China; it has unresolved border issues with China; its economic relationships 

are filled with points of friction. India’s defense posture is heavily dictated by the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

potential threat from China. And India’s new ties with Japan reflect Indian preoccupations with China. How does the U.S. intend to cope with China’s rise is the 

lead question on Indian minds. 

Indians also follow events in Afghanistan closely and believe that Afghanistan’s 

fate directly affects India’s security. Indian officials want to know how we plan to 

proceed after the withdrawal of American and NATO troops; how we will be engaged in supporting the Kabul regime and what steps we have in mind to keep the 

Taliban at bay. Across the border, Indians watch with growing concern deteriorating 

conditions in Pakistan and are directly threatened by the actions of the Pakistani 

Government and rogue radical terrorist across India’s boarders. Pakistani origin terror and involvement in Kashmir remain major questions for India. 

Prime Minister Modi has opened a dialogue with Pakistan’s Prime Minister. He 

and his colleagues do not seek American mediation nor direct involvement. Indians 

believe they can find their own way forward with Pakistan and that American 

involvement will complicate the ability of the two governments to manage their differences. Instead the Indian Government looks to us for encouragement and with 

respect to Pakistan, the Indians expect us to be clear what the steps we will take 

to nudge Pakistan toward a peaceful relationship with India. 

Our current strategic dialogue contains many channels for discussing political, intelligence and security matters. Our military exercises and defense trade strengthen 

our ability to deal with India’s national security establishment. But these activities 

need a strategic definition and that is the task before Secretary Kerry when he visits India this month. It is also the challenge the President will face when he meets 

Prime Minister Modi in September in Washington. It is important that we get our 

strategic definition right. Prime Minister Modi’s recent election is virtually unprecedented; he comes to office with great authority; the opposition is in disarray and 

will be so for sometime to come. We are wise to assume that the Prime Minister 

and his party may be in office for the next 10 years. It is a good time to define our 

political and security relationship. 

In defining national strategy, I believe your committee can play a key role and 

take part in the strategic dialogue between our two countries. I urge through these 

hearings and others like them and through your visits to India that you do so. 

The second pillar in our relationship with India is business. Our commercial and 

investment interests with India also need attention. In the 1990s, the engagement 

of the American business community in India was the driving force in the relationship. In recent years, American business has lost confidence in the Indian market. 

Indian rates of growth have slowed and the Indian Government’s restrictions on foreign ownership, its tax policies, approaches to intellectual property rights, its insistence on localization, the criminalization of civil disputes that has put an American 

CEO in jail, and failed attempts to secure legislation which would permit American 

investment in the nuclear power industry are all examples of why American companies have backed away from the Indian market. These issues must be addressed if 

there is to be renewed American investor confidence in India. 

This said, Prime Minister Modi’s government has sent a strong signal that it 

intends to be business friendly. In my judgment, India’s Government will address 

individual business problems American enterprises face, as well as the policies 

which lay behind them. Unlike its predecessor the Modi government is principally 

about growth. Its first budget, announced on July 10, signals new policy directions— 

a determined effort to strengthen India’s weak public finances, tackle inflation, revive the sluggish economy and build an investor friendly environment. The budget 

also addresses two issues of great importance to the United States—increased foreign ownership in the defense and in the insurance industries. 

Prime Minister Modi seeks investment in India. He wants to create 15 million 

new jobs a year. The challenge is enormous and he believes it can only be met in 

partnership with foreign, including American, enterprise. He will succeed if the 

business policies he sponsors create an atmosphere of predictability, consistency, 

and transparency. 

I believe that his ambition can best be met if he commits India to a more robust 

free trade and investment regime. I also am persuaded that our economic relationship with India needs a long-term objective which will drive action and capture 

imagination. Free trade and investment are precisely the right sort of priorities, for 

they bring reciprocal benefits to India and to the United States. This said, we have 

a long road to travel before we can reach a free trade destination. First, we need 

to complete our Bilateral Investment Treaty; we need India’s reengagement in WTO 

negotiations. Further along, India has a choice to make about APEC and the TransPacific trading regime. But we have a decision to make as well. We can let India 

struggle on its own or we can turn Indian interest in Pacific trade into a strategic 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

feature in our relationship. Finally, and at a future point in our history, we and 

India might set our sights on a bilateral free trade agreement. 

Free Trade and investment are important objectives. India should not let itself 

fall between the emerging Atlantic and Pacific trading regimes. But a commitment 

to freer trade and investment implies a tough choice for India. Is India ready to 

enter the world trading system wholeheartedly or is it more concerned about attracting investment and trade to its shores, protecting itself from international competition? I believe the first choice is the surer way to Indian prosperity and national 

economic strength. 

The United States and India have a variety of public and private fora to discuss 

trade and investment issues. Several, like the Trade Policy Forum, has lapsed and 

need to be reenergized. These institutions are part of the fabric of the U.S.-India 

relationship. However, they only find their logic when we and India agree on policy 

objectives which benefit both nations. Neither we nor India will ever achieve all of 

our objectives. Building the relationship calls for patience, forbearance, and for give 

and take; it also calls for determined action. Neither India nor the United States 

will accept dictation or pressure. If we handle our relationship with respect, the 

rewards are significant. India can emerge as one of this country’s major strategic 

and economic partners and in turn, we can help India strengthen India’s security 

and promote the welfare of its people. We both need that sort of relationship in our 

troubling and demanding world 

I appreciate the subcommittee’s attention to my arguments and I am open for 

questioning. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Rossow. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. ROSSOW, WADHWANI CHAIR IN 

U.S.–INDIA POLICY STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ROSSOW. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, first, let 

me also offer my sincere thanks for organizing this hearing. The 

title and tenor differs greatly from what we saw around Washington, DC, and the Hill just a year ago, when some troubling economic policies in India really tended to dominate our bilateral 

agenda. 

Commercial issues are real and quite serious and have been 

touched on already several times. But let us first remember, as has 

already been said, why partnership with India is important. I think 

every time that we see a fishing boat rammed in the South China 

Sea, I think every single time that an air defense identification 

zone is set up without consultation, every time that an island is 

created in the middle of the ocean attempting to expand territorial 

claims, we understand why we need strong regional partners. So 

I think the conversation here is quite timely with the election. 

This belief drove the United States to make an initial attempt at 

creating a powerful new partnership with India over a decade ago, 

highlighted most poignantly by the United States-India civilian 

commercial deal. However, the last Indian Parliament gutted the 

commercial aspects of this deal by passing the liability law that 

has been touched upon. At that point we really had to question 

India’s commitment to a strategic partnership. 

At that time we kind of fell back on commercial relations as 

really the driver of bilateral affairs, and when these economic policy decisions were taken even that fell off the rail. So that is where 

we started. 

There is a very different leadership team in Delhi now, though. 

The BJP is not guided by India’s traditional history of nonalignment. They have only been in charge in 6 of India’s years since 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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independence. So the past is not precedent for them. Instead of 

standing on lofty principles, which may in fact be at odds with 

their circumstances, the Modi government will strike out in bold 

new directions which meet specific goals. 

My good friend, Ambassador Hemant Singh, said the other day 

when he came through town: India’s actions will finally be aligned 

with her priorities. I think that captured it most poignantly. 

My biggest fear is the United States, both government and 

industry, suffer from failed expectation syndrome right now. Not 

everyone on our side of the ocean seems to understand the sea 

change in Delhi and how this could serve to deepen our partnership. We may not be prepared to make a second grand overture, 

as we did in the past, or be receptive should India signal its interest in striking out in bold new directions. 

My second fear is that we will approach the Modi government 

with the same agenda that we have used in recent years. We need 

to recognize the Modi government’s priorities, some of which have 

been discussed already today, and where these priorities intersect 

with our own, and this middle ground must become our shared 

agenda. 

So four areas that I would point to: First is manufacturing, 

which has already been touched on. Ambassador Wisner noted the 

need for 15 million jobs a year to be created. The other aspect on 

manufacturing: Almost 100 million people have moved to Indian 

cities in the last 10 years, and India’s trade deficit, particularly 

with China, of about $40 billion—they need to come up with opportunities and means to back those issues off and create opportunities for themselves. America can be a crucial partner in manufacturing, supplying capital equipment, financing, investment, and 

markets for the redevelopment of the Indian manufacturing sector. 

Second is on defense. Clearly this remains the brightest area of 

United States-India cooperation, but I will leave that for Vikram 

as the expert here. Internal security, border incident, or terror incident—most of us look at that in the Modi tenure as one of the biggest threats to derailing Modi’s governance over the next 5 years— 

another Mumbai-style attack and the feeling that he will have to 

react more forcefully than the Manmohan Singh government did. 

Here again, the United States has a great deal to offer on internal security, from equipment to intelligence-sharing, and this must 

include a much more collaborative approach on Afghanistan as we 

shape our planning for Afghanistan, not just telling them what we 

are going to do, but at least bringing them in the loop earlier in 

that process. 

Creating infrastructure. This is the fourth area that the Modi 

government is very interested in. Actually, I think that there is a 

little bit less opportunity for American involvement in this, though. 

As Ambassador Wisner vividly recalls, a lot of the early American 

investment after the reforms in the 1990s were in the energy sector, power plants built across India, and had a difficult time getting 

paid. So whether there is a real opportunity for America to get 

back involved in infrastructure depends on whether we can find a 

payment security mechanism to make sure our companies get paid. 

The investment treaty could actually go some way in making that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

happen. So infrastructure, I hope that there is more to be done 

there. 

When it comes to economic cooperation, Washington spends a 

great deal of time talking about liberalization as the thing that will 

unleash the animal forces. To be sure, increasing FDI caps will provide much-needed capital to spur additional growth in sectors like 

insurance, retail trade, defense, and a range of other industries. 

But even if nothing that we call reform happens in India, the biggest reform has already happened, which is having a businessfriendly government in charge in Delhi. 

Running a clean and fair spectrum allocation for telecom spectrum may not qualify as a reform, but if this Modi government is 

able to do it it will be an important boost of the telecom industry 

and for Internet penetration. Avoiding regulatory overreach would 

not qualify perhaps as liberalization, but it can avoid the collapse 

of an industry, as we saw with the life insurance industry in India 

in 2010, with the regulatory change that really gutted the growth 

rate of one of the fastest growing industries at the time. 

So business can operate in most environments as long as there 

is stable, consistent application of the rules, and that has not been 

the case in recent years. So we look at reforms, but I think the 

numbers are going to show that, irrespective of whether the FDI 

caps change—and I certainly hope they do—I think business is 

going to be a lot more bullish, and we are seeing the numbers tip 

up already. 

The last time the BJP was in power, in less than 6 years we 

went from nuclear sanctions to nuclear cooperation—6 years. When 

interests are aligned and leaders think big, the relationship can 

progress faster than most of us believe is possible. This Indian Government is not bound by precedents. The reasons for partnership 

with India are stronger now than they were a decade ago, and 

America needs to approach these next 2 months without putting a 

ceiling on how big we are thinking and without the baggage of the 

last 5 years. 

I thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rossow follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. ROSSOW

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, first let me 

offer my sincere thanks for organizing this hearing. The title and tenor differs 

greatly from what we saw from around Washington, DC, and the Hill last year 

when a small group of companies with serious concerns about economic policies in 

India dominated our bilateral agenda. 

The issues these companies raised are real and serious. But let us first remember 

why a strong India—and a deep partnership with India—is in our national interest. 

A large, democratic nation with similar values in that region will be a stabilizing 

force. Every time a fishing boat is rammed in Asia, an Air Defense Identification 

Zone is created over disputed territory without consultation, or an island is constructed in the middle of the sea to expand territorial claims—we are reminded of 

the need for strong regional partners. 

This belief drove the United States to make its initial attempt at creating a powerful new partnership with India over a decade ago. This partnership was illustrated most vividly by the U.S. India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. However, when 

the last Indian Parliament gutted the commercial meaning of the deal by approving 

a weak nuclear liability law, we had to question India’s commitment to a deeper 

partnership. U.S.-India relations relied once more on commercial ties. Even this 

aspect of the relationship became strained when the Indian Government introduced 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

a series of stopgap policy measures meant to shore up voter support ahead of this 

year’s election. 

Now there is a very different team in New Delhi. The BJP is not guided by India’s 

traditional policy of nonalignment. Instead of standing on lofty principles which 

may, in fact, be at odds with her circumstances, the Modi government will strike 

out in bold new directions which meet specific goals. 

My biggest fear is that the United States—both government and industry—suffer 

from ‘‘failed expectation syndrome.’’ Not everyone on our side of the ocean seems to 

understand the sea change in Delhi, and how this could serve to deepen our partnership. We may not be prepared to make a second ‘‘grand overture,’’ or be receptive 

should India signal its interest in bold new ideas. 

My second fear is that we will approach the Modi government with the same 

agenda we used in recent years. We need to recognize the Modi government’s priorities, and where these priorities intersect with our own. This middle ground must 

become our shared agenda. 

Four areas are emerging as particularly important to the Modi government. 

1. Creating infrastructure. India is amazingly deficient in infrastructure. Frankly 

speaking, the U.S. will not likely play a big role in building out India’s infrastructure unless we conclude the BIT or find another payment security mechanism. India 

needs long-term capital willing to take certain risks that are not always a good 

match for American investors and developers. 

2. Manufacturing. India desperately needs to create a stronger industrial base, to 

cut its trade deficit—which is far larger than America’s as measured as a percent 

of GDP—and to provide opportunities for its fast-growing urban population. America 

can be a crucial partner, supplying capital equipment, financing, investment, and 

markets. 

3. Defense. Clearly this remains the brightest area of U.S.-India cooperation. Next 

year our Defense Framework Agreement expires; renewal—and possible expansion—should be a priority. In addition, commercial defense relations will continue 

to thrive—especially if India liberalizes its offset and foreign investment rules. 

4. Internal security. A terror or border incident involving Pakistan ranks among 

the biggest threats to Modi’s agenda. India is very worried that the U.S. drawdown 

in Afghanistan will heighten the chances of an incident. The U.S. has a great deal 

to offer on internal security, from equipment to intelligence-sharing. This includes 

a more collaborative approach to engage New Delhi as we shape our planning for 

Afghanistan. 

When it comes to economic cooperation, in Washington we spend a great deal of 

time talking about ‘‘liberalization’’ as the key to increasing American trade and 

investment. To be sure, increased FDI caps will provide much-needed capital to spur 

additional growth in insurance, retail trade, defense, and a range of other industries. 

But even if nothing we call ‘‘reform’’ takes place, economic ties are going to get 

a great deal better. The biggest ‘‘reform’’ has already happened, through the election 

of a business-friendly government. 

Running a clean and fair spectrum auction may not qualify as a ‘‘reform,’’ but it 

would give an important boost to the telecommunications industry and for Internet 

penetration. Avoiding regulatory overreach is not ‘‘liberalization,’’ but can avoid the 

collapse of an industry as we saw with life insurance regulatory changes in 2010. 

Business can operate in most environments so long as there is stable, consistent 

application of the rules—which has not been the case in recent years. 

The last time the BJP was in power, in less than 6 years we went from nuclear 

sanctions to nuclear cooperation. When interests are aligned and leaders think big, 

the relationship can progress faster than most of us believe is possible. 

This Indian Government is not bound by precedence. 

The reasons for strategic partnership with India are stronger now than they were 

a decade ago. 

America needs to approach these next 2 months without putting a ceiling on how 

big we are thinking, and without the baggage of the last 5 years. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Singh. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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STATEMENT OF VIKRAM J. SINGH, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY, CENTER 

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch. It is a real honor to be here. As the other witnesses have 

done, I am submitting my testimony for the record as well, but I 

will touch on a few key areas briefly here which are going to echo 

a lot of what we have heard from my esteemed colleagues. 

It really is a pleasure to be with you and this hearing could not 

be better timed. We are looking toward the moment that will set 

the trajectory for the next several years, with the strategic dialogue 

coming up, with the high-level visits we are going to have, and 

with the Prime Minister and the President meeting. So I am very 

glad to have the opportunity and to have it now. Thank you for 

that. 

Interestingly, we are in virtually complete alignment with India 

on almost every major issue you could think about, at least in 

terms of where we want to go strategically. Terrorism, the environment, regional stability, counterproliferation. We agree that we 

need to have an international order based on rules and norms of 

behavior. We want secure energy flows, we want secure commerce. 

We want to combat global climate change. At home we have a lot 

of similar challenges. We face challenges in terms of the growth of 

the middle class and good jobs and providing good governance, protecting our citizens, securing energy and water for the future. 

Our administrations, the current administration, the prior 

United States administration, successive Indian administrations for 

quite a while, have made this relationship a central priority. And 

yet we have found that progress has fallen short of expectations. 

Even where we have had breakthroughs—defense, the civil nuclear 

deal—it is important to note that we have given ourselves a good 

foundation, but we have lacked measurable progress in terms of 

deals signed, projects launched, joint activities undertaken. 

There are some reasons for this, but we cannot gloss over them. 

There is a tendency in the United States-India relationship to have 

a little too much happy talk and then it is followed by excessive 

frustration. The bottom line is we are doing well, we are doing well 

together, and we could continue to do well together and be just 

fine, but we also have the potential in the next few years, we 

believe, at the Center for American Progress, we have the potential 

in the next few years to really move to another level in this 

relationship. 

We are launching a project in the next week called India: 2020, 

which is going to look specifically at what can we do, and what can 

we achieve in 5 years, because we think this is a particularly good 

moment to look at that. 

Prime Minister Modi ran on a campaign of what he called 

‘‘Surajya,’’ which means in Hindi good governance. He said: I am 

going to deliver good governance, I am going to deliver it to all 

classes, castes, and communities. That is the promise that he is 

going to be measured by. That is the promise that we should welcome and we should sort of measure him by ourselves. 

I know he has been a controversial figure, but I really do think 

that the warmth of his reception in the United States this fall is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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critical. We need to set the tone now. This is the world’s largest 

democracy and I think the Congress should invite him to a joint 

meeting. If the logistics work out, I think that needs to happen. 

To evaluate how things are going in the first few days of the 

Modi administration, I think we should look at the budget. The 

budget is a good first step, but it showed that he views his challenges as long term and it was a set of incremental steps. It was 

not a sea change. You saw some increases in foreign direct investment. You saw some commitments to things like smart cities and 

infrastructure upgrades, but these were not met by commitments 

of resources. So we really are in a period of seeing just how ambitious and how fast the Modi government is going to move. 

On defense, there are some near-term things that can be done to 

sort of show intent. There are pending sales, things like Apaches, 

Chinooks, the M777 howitzer. Those could all be done very soon. 

They could be done in time for Secretary Hagel’s visit in August 

that we just heard about from Dr. Searight. 

But there are longer things. That defense cooperation agreement 

she mentioned, the 2005 New Framework for Defense Cooperation 

is the agreement that governs this relationship. It has hit its 10- 

year mark. It was drafted as a 10-year agreement. It needs to be 

updated in a way that takes the vision for our security relationship 

to the next level. It should be updated to incorporate agreements 

for better communication and information-sharing and logistics cooperation, so that it actually enables us to do much more. 

On economic liberalization, which was one of the areas you asked 

us to touch on, Modi is focused on this because India ranks 134th 

in the World Bank’s ‘‘Doing Business’’ index. They have got a long 

way to go. I think it is good that we see the progress being made, 

but, to touch on what Ambassador Wisner said, issues like retroactive taxation, protection of intellectual property rights, the 

always emerging issues of local content requirements that have 

done things like made it very difficult for us to make progress even 

on renewable energy cooperation, those things need to be clarified 

and really clearly clarified. Some of these issues need to be put to 

bed by the Indian government if they are going to really attract the 

kind of investment it is going to take to have the kind of growth 

they want to see. 

On energy and climate, we could do tremendous amounts 

together. India is going to be the world’s largest coal consumer in 

a decade. India is already one of the largest emitters and it suffers 

great threat from climate change. So we could enhance cooperation 

in research and development. We could work together to reduce 

hydrofluorocarbons. We could build resilience, climate resilience. 

Our experience with Hurricane Sandy is very instructive. And we 

could model something on what we have done with them in terms 

of clean energy cooperation for building resilience and dealing with 

climate change. 

But it is going to take a significant effort to get there, and we 

would have to clear away some of the things that have been real 

obstacles. So in the energy sector, their energy mix has got to 

include natural gas, nuclear, and other things. How far can we get 

if we do not resolve—or address the nuclear liability issue? Those 

are difficult issues, but they have to be grappled with. I think the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

new administration in India is going to give us an opportunity to 

do that. 

I know everyone has talked a lot about the importance of India 

in the world and the region. I just want to say very briefly that I 

think it is important for us to start thinking about India as the 

anchor of a strategically vital part of the world, not as peripheral 

to South Asia or as peripheral to the Asia-Pacific, but as the 

anchor of the region that goes from the Middle East all the way 

to China, Japan, Australia, with India sitting in the center of it. 

Modi has made very positive steps, sent positive indications 

about what he is going to do. He invited all the neighbors to his 

inauguration. He is going to continue to help contribute to stability 

in Afghanistan. He has made indications that he is going to take 

steps to improve stability with Pakistan if he can find a good 

counterpart. 

We can work with them in the rest of the region—Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. But also, for Myanmar, where India is working 

on connectivity, to new cooperation with Japan and Australia, 

which are areas that Modi seems to be interested in. He has shown 

that he wants to have good relations with China, but on the campaign trail he was also willing to actually publicly say China 

should not be an expansionist power, but should be focusing on 

development, which indicates that he is going to have a willingness 

to take on tough issues. 

I think that the United States-India relationship has grown well, 

quietly, stably, in many ways. If you had said 10 or so years ago 

to me that we would have $10 billion in defense trade, I would 

have thought that was not even within the realm of possibility. But 

we have gotten there, and we should not rest on our laurels. I 

think the leadership of this committee and the opportunity before 

us, with new leadership in New Delhi, means that we are in a position to really capitalize on an opportunity and to take the relationship to the next level. 

I look forward to the discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VIKRAM J. SINGH

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, it is an 

honor to be with you today to discuss ‘‘Reenergizing U.S.-India Ties.’’ As Vice President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American 

Progress, I see the U.S.-India relationship as one of the most critical priorities for 

our country. The timing of this hearing could not be better, with a new government 

in place in New Delhi, the fifth Strategic Dialogue scheduled for the end of the 

month, and President Obama meeting Prime Minister Modi in September. 

All of you on the subcommittee and many members in the India Caucus have been 

vital to advancing the U.S.-India partnership. I’m pleased to be here with my dear 

friend and mentor, Ambassador Frank Wisner, along with two esteemed experts 

Richard Rossow and Lisa Curtis. I know you have also just heard from two true 

friends of this relationship, Assistant Secretary Biswal and Deputy Assistant Secretary Searight who succeeded me at the Pentagon. 

Today I will touch briefly on each area you have highlighted, with special emphasis in areas in which I have the most experience: defense, security, and the AsiaPacific region. 

Since the end of the cold war and the launch of economic reforms in India in the 

early 1990s, the United States and India have lived with a permanent sense of 

expectation. It seems that the world’s oldest and largest democracies are always on 

the cusp of becoming true strategic partners. The relationship has gained strong 

support across party lines in both countries. Cold-war-era gaps in trust have faded 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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even through periods of significant tension, and by every objective measure— 

increased trade and investment, collaboration on regional and global security, people-to-people ties—we are closer than ever. Successive Indian and U.S. administrations have made this relationship a central priority. 

Yet with a few notable exceptions, progress has fallen short of expectations. Even 

great breakthroughs in defense ties or the civilian nuclear deal have been accompanied by serious obstacles to real, measurable progress in terms of deals signed, 

projects launched, and joint activities undertaken. We have extremely deep and substantive ties today and are able to consult on a multitude of issues, but most observers of the day-to-day relationship continue to be underwhelmed. 

There is broad agreement that U.S. and Indian strategic requirements are in 

almost complete alignment on major issues including terrorism, the environment, 

regional stability, and counterproliferation. We agree on the need for an international order based on rules and norms of behavior, secure flows of energy and 

commerce, and global action to combat climate change. Our goals are most often in 

sync. The challenges our nations face at home are also surprisingly similar: ensuring the growth of the middle class and good jobs; providing good governance; dealing 

with violence and discrimination based on race, religion, gender; and securing sustainable energy and water for future generations. 

Not surprisingly, however, given our very different history and circumstances, 

American and Indian approaches to problems—the ways we choose to pursue these 

often similar ends—frequently differ and sometimes clash. This will remain true 

under a Modi administration, and leaders in both countries will need to confront 

this reality if they want to realize the potential of this partnership. 

Both the United States and India are coming through difficult periods. Both will 

do much better if they take this partnership to the next level. The diplomatic infrastructure exists to make substantial progress: we have a robust and broad Strategic 

Dialogue and a well-established set of bilateral defense forums. We see good signs 

of commitment from both sides with the early scheduling of a Strategic Dialogue in 

New Delhi and with rapid steps to restart the nearly defunct U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum. The early meeting of President Obama and Prime Minister Modi can 

give these efforts the strategic direction they require. 

At the Center for American Progress, we believe this new political phase in India 

provides an opportunity to make substantial progress in the next 5 years. Next 

week we are launching a project we call ‘‘India: 2020’’ to develop a vision for what 

our nations can realistically achieve by the end of this decade. Real progress will 

require high expectations from leaders in both nations and extreme candor about 

obstacles as well as opportunities. 

A WARM WELCOME AND HIGH EXPECTATIONS

Narendra Modi ran on a promise of delivering ‘‘surajya’’ or good governance to 

Indian citizens from all classes, castes, and communities. That is the bar against 

which he will be judged by the Indian electorate, and it is a promise the United 

States should welcome and help with wherever possible. 

Prime Minister Modi is sending good signals, especially to India’s famously complex bureaucracy, with rules against nepotism and steps to improve efficiency. But 

his to-do list is extraordinarily long and the release of his first budget suggests a 

careful, step-by-step approach, offering glimpses of what might lie ahead without 

any radical changes. 

Caps on Foreign Direct Investment for the defense insurance sectors were lifted 

to 49 percent. Defense spending was increased about 12 percent. A commitment to 

‘‘smart cities’’ and major infrastructure was restated, but resources were not allocated. No major changes were made to entitlements. The FDI cap increases will be 

welcomed by American business, but they are relatively minor changes that were 

advocated for by members of the previous government. It will take more than this 

to get India back to 8 percent growth. So while we should welcome these steps as 

an opening salvo, we await what future steps Modi will take. 

Modi’s commitment to good governance is the best way to engage on the difficult 

and often emotional issues that come with his elevation to power as a strong nationalist with conservative Hindu credentials. He is not likely to let lingering resentment over the denial of his visa in 2005 undermine U.S.-India cooperation in areas 

that will advance his national priorities. However, the warmth of his welcome in 

the United States this fall is important. There is no point in taking half measures 

with the duly elected leader of the world’s largest democracy. Congress should invite 

Prime Minister Modi to address a joint meeting, as was done by his two immediate 

predecessors, Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Vajpayee. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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This does not mean being timid about concerns: Prime Minister Modi’s commitment to secularism, human rights, and harmony among India’s majority and minority communities will ultimately define his legacy and India’s continued success and 

stability. But the United States must take a forward-looking approach. Modi has 

been cleared by Indian courts of any charges in the 2002 Gujarat riots, which 

claimed over 1,000 lives and elicited no apology or compensation for victims. Now, 

as the duly elected leader of the country, he has promised good governance, and that 

will require him to deliver justice for all Indian communities. 

Modi has made positive steps so far in the conduct of international affairs, starting with his invitation of all India’s neighbors, including Pakistan, to his inauguration. The United States will be able to engage with Modi on regional issues—not 

just on stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also on Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri 

Lanka, and the Maldives. We will be able to work with India on relations with countries from Myanmar to Japan to Australia. Modi is likely to seek a productive 

dynamic with China, but on the campaign trail he showed that he will be willing 

to stand up to China by criticizing Beijing’s expansionist tendencies. 

The potential to work with Modi is very high and crosses every important policy 

area. Challenges will come if he proves unable or unwilling to make the more difficult reforms that bring India into the global system or if he seeks to overcentralize control. India is a decentralized system, somewhere between the United 

States and the European Union in the way it functions. The states will demand a 

significant degree of control over how reforms play out in their own territories. 

DEEPENING THE DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP

A decade ago, defense sales were virtually zero. Today, sales have topped $9 billion and defense remains a consistent bright spot in U.S.-India relations. The 2005 

New Framework for Defense Cooperation set the stage for this robust defense trade, 

and U.S. systems like the P–8i to the C130–J have delivered capabilities and reliability that India needs without the scandals and corruption of many other Indian 

procurements. The U.S. and India have also continued to deepen a very substantial 

slate of defense exercises, including India’s full participation for the first time with 

22 other nations in RIMPAC, the world’s largest naval exercise underway right now 

off Hawaii. 

The Modi government seems committed to substantial reform of the Indian 

defense sector, with steps likely to include more flexible offset policies, greater foreign investment as seen in the FDI cap increase, and moves toward breaking up 

some of the state-run defense sector. These are the kinds of reforms that will make 

investment in India worthwhile for big international defense companies. 

These reforms are also necessary steps for India to be able to take advantage of 

the various offers pending from the Department of Defense through the Defense 

Trade and Technology Initiative, or DTTI. Launched by former Secretary Panetta 

and continued by Secretary Hagel, DTTI offers a breakthrough path to move from 

sales to high levels of coproduction and codevelopment of future defense systems. 

The initiative serves to identify possible joint projects of strategic value and streamline and make the U.S. technology transfer and licensing processes more transparent. It has not yet been fully matched by a similar effort on the Indian side, and 

the U.S. should encourage India to identify its own priorities for codevelopment and 

to analyze its own bureaucratic constraints on cooperation. 

The most exciting offer from the DTTI was for codevelopment of the next generation Javelin antitank missile, an offer the U.S. has made to no other country. India 

could procure Javelin to meet near term needs and join the U.S. in developing the 

next generation, which is something the U.S. Army and the Indian Army will both 

need. The U.S. government worked with industry to identify dozens of possible 

options for coproduction and codevelopment in everything from helicopters to communications equipment, and an Indian decision to move forward with one or more 

of these by the time Prime Minister Modi and President Obama meet in September 

would be a very strong signal that effort put into this partnership can pay off. 

Reform of the India’s Defense Public Sector will be key to making more of these 

coproduction and codevelopment deals feasible. U.S. companies will be more interested given the new 49 percent FDI cap, but they will be seeking to make a good 

business case, and that will be easier with private rather than public sector Indian 

partners. 

There are several short-term steps to take in order to set a positive tone for 

defense. First, some long-pending sales could be concluded. For example, Chinook 

and Apache helicopters, as well as M777 Howitzers could be finalized by the time 

Secretary Hagel visits India later this summer. Second, India and the U.S. could 

increase their mutual commitment to defense exercises. India was frustrated last 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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year when the U.S. canceled Red Flag air exercises due to the sequester, and the 

U.S. has been frustrated by India’s refusal to include multilateral partners in some 

U.S.-India exercises. The previous Defense Minister indicated an intention to reduce 

the overall number of exercises as well. Both nations should commit to a robust set 

of exercises of increasing complexity and to involving more multilateral partners, 

including a resumption of Japanese participation in the Malabar naval exercises. 

The defense relationship is governed by the 2005 New Framework on Defense 

Cooperation, which established a strategic partnership in defense and paved the 

way for remarkable progress. The New Framework created several regular forums 

to meet and discuss key issues, all reporting to the annual Defense Policy Group. 

The 2005 agreement was drafted for a 10-year term, and the time is now for the 

U.S. and India to take stock of that agreement and set forth a new vision to run 

through 2025. This should be a rigorous reappraisal, looking at both successes as 

well as where the framework came up short. It should ideally be reviewed as part 

of an effort led from the White House to rationalize the entire slate of U.S.-India 

cooperative forums. 

ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND TIES OF COMMERCE, ENERGY, AND BUSINESS

India was unprepared when financial turmoil struck. As growth stagnated, the 

previous coalition government was unable to drive through additional liberalization 

and resorted to short-sighted and damaging moves like retroactive taxation and 

curbs on capital outflows. Coupled with the continued inability to address major 

obstacles on trade and investment like Intellectual Property Rights, or IPR, protection and excessive local content requirements, these steps seemed to put economic 

liberalization in a deep freeze and drove away investment. 

India ranks 139th on the World Bank’s Doing Business Index, and Modi’s reforms 

will improve that rating if they can make India more appealing to international 

business. The BJP campaigned on a commitment to jump-start reform. The current 

budget is incremental with modest improvements in FDI caps and few changes from 

the interim budget of the prior government. Former Finance Minister Chidambaram 

went so far as to claim credit for the BJP budget as a continuation of his policies. 

This may have disappointed business, but it could give the Indian Government 

much-needed time to explain to the public what specific reforms it plans to undertake and how they will help the nation. 

Finance Minister Arun Jaitley tried to calm international business leaders still 

smarting under the retroactive taxation on companies like Vodafone, but he didn’t 

undo the taxation, saying instead, ‘‘The sovereign right of the Government to undertake retrospective legislation is unquestionable. However, this power has to be exercised with extreme caution and judiciousness keeping in mind the impact of each 

such measure on the economy and the overall investment climate. This Government 

will not ordinarily bring about any change retrospectively which creates a fresh 

liability.’’ 

Jaitley’s statement provides cold comfort to multinational firms who have been 

hoping for something more like what they heard in the campaign when Modi called 

retroactive taxation a ‘‘breach of trust’’ that could drive away investment. The new 

Indian Government also looks poised to block the World Trade Organization trade 

facilitation agreement reached in Bali last December over concerns about the impact 

on India’s food security program. The deadline is July 31. This could make India 

the cause of failure for the first significant WTO accomplishment in years. 

The United States and India have some options on trade. The best remains conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty, or BIT, but the negotiations have been 

mired since they started 5 years ago. U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman has 

made the right gestures by planning to restart the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum 

while holding firm on IPR and local content issues. The distance between the two 

sides on a BIT, especially with regard to a dispute resolution mechanism, could 

remain too great to bridge in the near term. Intensified negotiations with the new 

government are the only way to proceed, perhaps with a new and realistic target 

date for completion. It’s also worth introducing India to the idea of eventually joining a future Trans-Pacific Partnership, should that process prove successful. 

ENERGY AND CLIMATE

India faces significant and intertwined energy security, energy poverty, and climate challenges. It is currently on track to become the world’s largest coal importer 

in about a decade, and Prime Minister Modi aims to provide basic access to power 

and water for every Indian house in less than 10 years—an important and large 

task given that 300 million Indians currently lack electricity. India is also one of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, and is highly vulnerable to the impacts 

of climate change. 

With the United States simultaneously grappling with its own energy and climate 

challenges, there are untapped opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. 

Since 2010, CAP has cochaired a Track II dialogue on climate change and clean 

energy with India comprised of high-level former government officials, thought leaders, and influential individuals from the NGO and business communities. With 

annual meetings in Delhi and Washington, DC, the Track II has provided a forum 

for the exchange of new and innovative ideas, as well as produced insights that have 

helped to shape government policy and define new areas for enhanced bilateral cooperation. At its most recent meeting in February, it recommended: 

Enhancing cooperation on clean energy development: To enable the rapid growth 

of renewable energy, the U.S. and India should continue expanding their R&D collaboration, while also building capacity in science, engineering, and other business 

models to spur technological innovation and entrepreneurship in the field. It also 

should do so by avoiding trade disputes in the renewable sector. Both countries have 

immense opportunities for growth in renewable energy, yet we find ourselves locked 

in WTO disputes with one another over local source requirement, subsidies, and tariffs surrounding solar power. The two sides should seek to develop a set of principles 

to avoid future WTO filings. They should aim for prior consultation on national 

policy requirements, identify bilateral dispute resolution methods, and exercise 

restraint in filing disputes that affect renewable energy. Resolving the current solar 

dispute in ways that meet the aims of both nations will open the door to substantial 

cooperation on large solar projects. 

Reducing Hydrofluorocarbons: The U.S. and India have the opportunity to 

advance global action on phasing down hydrofluorocarbons, a short-lived but highly 

potent greenhouse gas. The U.S. and India can lead the pursuit of a global agreement on HFCs by pushing for technology-agnostic global standards to curb HFCs 

and ensure energy efficiency performance so that new technologies do not increase 

other greenhouse gas emissions. 

Building Climate Resilience: In addition to lowering emissions, the U.S. and India 

will need to ensure community resilience against climate impacts including sea-level 

rise, more frequent flooding, and extreme weather. Hurricane Sandy demonstrated 

how damaging intense storms can be, even in a prepared city. We need much more 

research on the most effective ways to respond to climate change. Urban and coastal 

resilience are two key areas for the U.S. and India to pursue joint research and pilot 

projects. The research partnership could be modeled on the existing U.S.-India Joint 

Clean Energy Research and Development Center. 

India is exploring other energy options that would reduce its coal dependence and 

expand energy access, such as through increased use of natural gas and nuclear 

power in its electricity mix. It is in the United States interest to engage India on 

the safe and responsible development and use of such fuels. This would include discussions about the safe development, transmission and use of natural gas. Engagement should also include discussion of the political and legal issues that surround 

development of nuclear power generation projects in India. They are difficult and 

complicated, but should be grappled with. 

INDIA’S ROLE IN THE REGION AND ASIA-PACIFIC

For the past decade, the United States has played a critical role in welcoming 

India’s rise as a global power. The Bush administration drove international acceptance of India as a responsible nuclear power outside the confines of the NonProliferation Treaty. It is easy to forget how controversial and politically difficult 

that was. The Obama administration welcomed India as a partner, with public calls 

for India to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. And the United 

States has supported Indian membership in global nonproliferation regimes and 

treats India as an adherent so long as it keeps its export controls in conformity with 

the regimes. In many ways the United States has embraced a form of Indian 

exceptionalism because it calculates that India will work to advance mutual interests. That is a good bet, and India is rising to the challenge of global and regional 

leadership. 

India is the anchor of the most strategically vital region on earth, stretching from 

the Persian Gulf and spanning northeast to Japan and southeast to Australia. The 

challenges across this region are growing and the United States and India should 

look to one another for ideas and leadership from the Middle East to Central Asia 

to East Asia. India will be deeply impacted by developments in the Middle East 

given its dependence on energy flows and large expatriate communities. It will play 

a critical role in the long-term stability and connectivity for Afghanistan and CenFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

tral Asia. It is leading efforts to build eastward connectivity given the new potential 

of a reforming Myanmar, and it is managing, what should now be termed major 

power relations of its own with Japan and China. 

The United States decision to treat India as a major power can continue to encourage India to take a greater role. The United States has important stake and 

conviction in maintaining free and safe trade lines and waterways throughout the 

Pacific, and while India has traditionally remained hesitant to active participation 

in maintaining regional security, it supports unimpeded rights of passage and maritime rights in accordance with international law. For example, India offers naval 

support to the counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden while refusing to join the 

multinational task force there. 

Seventy years ago, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated, ‘‘The 

Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as the nerve center 

of the world [and] though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise 

an important influence there . . . [and] is the pivot around which these problems 

will have to be considered.’’ Nehru’s words have proven true, and India is seeking 

a greater leadership role in the rest of Asia. It is welcomed by ASEAN nations and 

the United States. Total India-ASEAN trade increased by 37 percent in 2011–2012 

to reach USD79.3 billion and the total U.S.-ASEAN goods trade increased by 60 percent in the past decade, peaking at USD206 billion in 2013. The United States and 

India have a shared interest in collaborating to ensure global standards and international norms and should look instinctively to each other to mitigate territorial disputes and transnational threats that arise throughout this stretch. 

India’s eastern and western neighbors provide great economic opportunity and 

partnership within its own region. Managing these relationships will be a crucial 

challenge that will necessitate paramount energy and diplomacy. There have been 

positive signs from Pakistan and India’s new governments to seize this opportunity 

to build toward trade normalization and regional security, and there are high hopes 

that this remains a positive upward trajectory. 

The complexities of South Asia’s transnational problems, such as refugee crises 

stemming from ethnic violence to climate-related migration, defy national solutions. 

There is urgency for India and its neighbors to build cooperative relationship and 

promote a regional framework that incorporates the perspectives of all nations 

involved. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, let me close by saying that the 

U.S.-India bilateral relationship has quietly and steadily grown under the leadership of like-minded individuals across party lines in both countries. There remain 

gaps between what our two nations are doing and what our two nations are capable 

of doing. However, I do agree with President Obama that the U.S.-India relationship 

will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. This partnership will 

need continued engagement and nurturing and it’s a commitment that would reap 

mutual benefits. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Singh. 

Ms. Curtis. 

STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, 

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. CURTIS. Thank you, Chairman Kaine, for inviting me here 

today. It is an honor. 

The BJP’s victory and assumption of power provides an opportunity to build the United States-India relationship. I think it 

bodes well for the country’s economic prospects as well as its role 

in global affairs more generally. The previous Manmohan Singh 

government had been weakened by a series of corruption scandals. 

It was distracted by governance problems, which led to the stagnation of the relationship. Of course, you mentioned how ties were 

further strained by the Devyani Khobragade episode. 

So now we have an opportunity to move beyond that phase in the 

relationship and reinvigorate ties on a variety of fronts, whether 

it be defense, security, economic cooperation, counterterrorism, or 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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other issues of mutual concern. We have heard a lot about how 

Prime Minister Modi is expected to revive the Indian economy and 

encourage private sector growth. His track record in making Gujarat one of the most investor-friendly states gives confidence that he 

will implement policy changes that will help revive the economy. 

Regarding foreign policy, the Modi-led government is expected to 

pursue a more robust and assertive approach and enhance India’s 

influence and prestige on the global stage. While a more assertive 

approach to foreign policy could pose some challenges to the United 

States, I think by and large it will open up opportunities for the 

United States to draw closer to India with regard to defense and 

security issues. 

With regard specifically to China, the Modi government is likely 

to pursue a multifaceted approach which involves both simultaneously improving trade and investment ties while also focusing on 

building up its own strategic and military capabilities to guard 

against the possibility of Chinese aggression along their disputed 

borders. 

The BJP election manifesto did not mention China specifically. 

However, it did commit to a massive infrastructure development 

program along the Line of Actual Control, which is the disputed 

border between India and China in the states of Arunachal 

Pradesh and Sikkim. Modi’s call a few months ago for China to 

abandon its expansionist attitude shows that the Modi government 

is wary of Chinese territorial ambitions, especially in light of last 

April’s border incident in which Chinese troops camped for 3 weeks 

several miles inside Indian territory in the Ladakh region of 

Kashmir. 

The Modi government has been receptive to Chinese wooing over 

the last 6 weeks, including an early visit by the Chinese Foreign 

Minister to New Delhi just 3 weeks after Modi had assumed office 

and Monday’s meeting between Modi and the Chinese President on 

the fringes of the BRIC summit. 

Prime Minister Modi has also demonstrated interest in setting a 

positive tone in relations with Islamabad by inviting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony, but still a major 

terrorist attack inside India with links to Pakistan could quickly 

reverse this positive momentum. And having criticized Prime 

Minister Singh for being too soft on Pakistan, Modi would be under 

pressure to react strongly in the face of any new terrorist 

provocation. 

Moreover, there is growing concern about the impact on IndoPakistani relations of the United States drawdown from Afghanistan and whether this could in fact re-ignite the Kashmir conflict. 

So what initiatives can the United States pursue with the new 

Indian Government to take advantage of this opportunity to bolster 

the relationship? First is in the realm of cooperation in the AsiaPacific. Now, Indian officials were initially cautious in their 

response to the U.S. policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. 

But I think the Chinese border provocation of April 2013 may 

prompt New Delhi to become more open to this idea of a robust 

United States role in the region. 

You talked about trilateral cooperation. I think there is a real opportunity to build United States-India-Japan trilateral cooperation. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

Prime Minister Abe of Japan and Prime Minister Modi have a personal relationship. Modi has visited Japan. So I think there is a 

real opportunity to bolster that trilateral dialogue. 

I would just mention that the Heritage Foundation conducted a 

track two quadrilateral dialogue with an Indian think tank, a Japanese think tank, and an Australian think tank in December. I 

think it is important—even though the stage is not set for a formal 

quadrilateral dialogue, I think it is useful to have these track two 

dialogues so that, in the event where there might be a need to start 

an official quadrilateral dialogue, we can put that into place. 

Second is defense. As mentioned, the United States and India 

need to renew the 10-year defense framework agreement and build 

on the defense, trade, and technology initiative that was launched 

in 2012. Regarding civil nuclear cooperation, I think there is an 

opportunity to make a fresh push on changing the liability issue. 

While in opposition, the BJP certainly opposed the nuclear deal 

and pushed for this liability legislation that has complicated 

United States companies’ ability to get involved in the civil nuclear 

sector in India. However, now that the BJP is in power, I think 

there may be a willingness to soften their position and build a 

political consensus around resolution of this issue. 

Fourth, nonproliferation. The United States should be pressing 

for India’s membership in the major multilateral nonproliferation 

groupings, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and other groupings. This is something 

that the United States should be pushing for in the future. This is 

important to bring India into these groupings rather than have it 

be outside of this process. That is good for global stability. 

Fifth, Afghanistan and counterterrorism. We need to deepen this 

dialogue and certainly Afghanistan needs to be part of the counterterrorism dialogue and we need to increase our consultations. 

Lastly, I just want to flag very quickly the remote possibility that 

the religious freedom issue could become an irritant in United 

States-India relations. I think Modi has definitely distanced himself from communal politics during the election campaign and he 

focused instead on the economy and good governance. However, 

religious minorities in India remain concerned that the BJP could 

pursue a communal agenda that would be detrimental to their 

interests. So this is just something that we have to keep an eye on. 

So in conclusion, the election of the BJP government is likely to 

have a positive impact on the Indian economy and reestablish confidence in India as a global power. If the United States demonstrates its willingness to establish closer ties with the new government, the BJP is likely to reciprocate and we could both focus 

on achieving that vision of a durable and strategic partnership. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS

My name is Lisa Curtis. I am Senior Research Fellow on South Asia in the Asian 

Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony 

are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The 

Heritage Foundation.1

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) landslide victory in India’s recent parliamentary elections bodes well for the country’s future economic prospects, as well as for 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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its role in global affairs, including relations with the U.S. Having won 282 parliamentary seats, the BJP surprised even its own party members by becoming the 

first Indian party in 30 years to win a majority of seats on its own. This means 

that the BJP will not have to rely on coalition partners to remain in power, being, 

instead, in a relatively strong position to implement policies, including economic reforms and other measures that could help restore investor confidence and improve 

India’s GDP growth rate. 

The new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to pursue 

a more robust foreign policy than its Congress Party predecessor, and to enhance 

India’s influence and prestige on the global stage. While a more assertive approach 

to foreign policy than was pursued under the second Manmohan Singh government 

could pose some challenges to U.S. policymakers, it also will open opportunities for 

the U.S. to draw closer to India. New Delhi and Washington share similar strategic 

objectives, whether they involve countering terrorism, maintaining open and free 

seaways, or hedging against China’s rise. 

OPPORTUNITY TO REINVIGORATE U.S.–INDIAN RELATIONSHIP

The election of the BJP is welcome news for the beleaguered Indian economy. 

Prime Minister Modi was voted into power on promises to revive Indian economic 

growth, rein in corruption, and create jobs for the rapidly growing youth population. 

India’s GDP growth rate has recently dipped below 5 percent, down from around 

8 percent 2 years ago. 

Foreign investors have been optimistic that Modi’s election would help turn the 

economy around. Modi’s track record of making Gujarat one of India’s most investor 

friendly states when he served as its chief minister has sparked confidence that 

Modi will prioritize reviving the economy and encouraging private-sector growth. 

Some of this optimism was tempered following the introduction of the Indian budget 

last week, however. The budget, presented to the Parliament by Finance Minister 

Arun Jaitley on July 10, did not go as far in opening up the economy, adjusting fiscal imbalances, and cutting subsidies as international investors had expected, and 

markets reacted tepidly to the budget announcement. 

One of the main reasons why the U.S.-India relationship has foundered over the 

last few years, is that the previous Singh government was unwilling to enact necessary economic reforms. The Singh government also had been weakened by a series 

of corruption scandals and was distracted from building ties with the U.S. by domestic governance challenges during most of its second term. 

Indo-U.S. ties were further strained in December 2013 when the U.S. arrested 

Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade for underpaying her Indian maid while serving at the Indian consulate in New York. The details of Khobragade’s arrest, particularly reports that she was handcuffed in front of her children’s school and stripsearched while in detention, infuriated the Indian public.2 Washington, for its part, 

was taken aback by the fierce Indian reaction, which included withdrawing diplomatic privileges for U.S. diplomats and removing security barriers at the U.S. 

Embassy in New Delhi. 

The BJP’s assumption of power offers an opportunity to move beyond the 

Khobragade episode and revive ties by focusing on building cooperation on defense, 

security, economic and trade, counterterrorism, and other issues of mutual concern. 

The previous BJP-led government (1998–2004) was instrumental in elevating ties 

between Washington and New Delhi and in laying a solid foundation for a strategic 

partnership. 

ROBUST FOREIGN POLICY

The new Modi government is expected to pursue a more robust foreign policy than 

its Congress Party predecessor, and to enhance India’s influence and prestige on the 

global stage. The BJP election manifesto states that the BJP ‘‘believes a resurgent 

India must get its rightful place in the comity of nations and international institutions. The vision is to fundamentally reboot and reorient the foreign policy goals 

. . . so that it leads to an economically stronger India, and its voice is heard in the 

international fora.’’ 3 A greater Indian willingness to acknowledge external threats 

and take initiatives to mitigate those threats could result in increased U.S.-Indian 

cooperation on a variety of defense, security, nuclear, and maritime issues. 

China 

The new BJP government is likely to adopt a multifaceted policy toward China, 

entailing both greater economic engagement with Beijing and a willingness to stand 

up to any perceived Chinese aggression along disputed borders. At the same time, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43 

India will focus on building up its military and strategic capabilities in an effort to 

keep pace with Chinese military modernization. 

Sino-Indian trade dipped slightly in 2013 to $66 billion (from $74 billion in 2012), 

but China remains India’s biggest trading partner. While the BJP is likely to pursue 

closer economic ties with China, in February, Modi called on China to ‘‘abandon its 

expansionist attitude.’’ A major event that will shape the new government’s policymaking toward Beijing is the April 2013 border incident in which Chinese troops 

camped for 3 weeks several miles inside Indian territory in the Ladakh region of 

the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The incursion—probably the most serious by the 

Chinese in over two decades—has convinced Indian strategists that it must increasingly factor the potential threat of conflict over its disputed borders with China into 

its security planning and projections. 

Signs of India’s and China’s deep-seated border disagreements have been surfacing over the last several years, and it is likely that such friction will continue, 

given the unsettled borders, China’s interest in consolidating its hold on Tibet, and 

India’s expanding influence in Asia. In recent years, China has increasingly pressured India over the disputed borders by questioning Indian sovereignty over 

Arunachal Pradesh; stepping up probing operations along different parts of the 

shared frontier; and building up its military infrastructure, as well as expanding its 

network of road, rail, and air links, in the border areas. India accuses China of illegally occupying more than 14,000 square miles of its territory on its northern border 

in Kashmir, while China lays claim to more than 34,000 square miles of India’s 

northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh. India is a long-term host to the Dalai 

Lama and about 100,000 Tibetan refugees, although the Indian Government forbids 

them from participating in any political activity. 

The BJP manifesto does not mention China specifically, but it commits to a ‘‘special emphasis on massive infrastructure development, especially along the Line of 

Actual Control [the disputed border between India and China] in Arunachal 

Pradesh and Sikkim.’’ 4 Developing the areas along the disputed border allows India 

to strengthen its territorial claims and defend itself against any potential Chinese 

aggression. 

The Modi government has welcomed Chinese overtures, such as the early visit by 

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi just 3 weeks after Modi assumed 

office, and a bilateral meeting between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 

Monday on the fringes of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) 

summit in Brazil. It is unclear why Modi postponed a trip to Tokyo scheduled for 

early July, but the optics of Modi engaging two senior Chinese leaders before holding any meetings with Japanese officials demonstrates New Delhi’s interest in 

building positive momentum with Beijing. 

The BJP leadership likely wants to avoid any early controversies in the IndiaChina relationship like it experienced during its previous tenure when the BJP-led 

government cited the ‘‘Chinese threat’’ as justification for its nuclear tests in May 

1998. One year later, however, New Delhi was pleasantly surprised by Beijing’s neutral position on the Indo-Pakistani Kargil crisis, a position that helped spur a thaw 

in Sino-Indian relations. Then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a historic 

visit to Beijing in July 2003, during which each side appointed a ‘‘special representative’’ to upgrade and regularize their border discussions. 

Japan 

In the past few years, India has focused increasingly on buttressing security ties 

with Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam to meet the challenges of a rapidly rising 

China. Indo-Japanese ties, in particular, are expected to get a major boost under 

Modi’s administration since Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are both 

increasingly concerned about China and appear prepared to take new policy directions to deal with the challenges posed by Beijing’s rapid military and economic 

ascendance. They have also developed a close personal rapport. As chief minister, 

Modi traveled to Japan in 2007, marking the first time an Indian chief minister had 

traveled to the country. Modi was one of the first foreign dignitaries to congratulate 

Abe when he was reelected in 2012.5 The recent postponement of Modi’s visit to 

Japan is all the more perplexing, given the history of the personal relationship 

between Abe and Modi. 

For his part, Abe has been a longtime supporter of stronger ties between India 

and Japan, and initiated the idea of the Quad (the U.S.-Australia-Japan-India security grouping) during his previous tenure in 2006. Abe was also one of the first leaders to acknowledge that the Pacific and Indian Oceans should be linked strategically 

on the basis of the need to preserve free and open seaways, thus helping to coin 

the term ‘‘Indo-Pacific.’’ 6

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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While their economic ties pale in comparison to those between China and India, 

Indo-Japanese diplomatic engagement has intensified in recent years. Japanese 

Emperor Akihito paid a rare visit to New Delhi in late 2013. Indian Prime Minister 

Singh made a historic 4-day visit to Tokyo in May 2013, in which the two sides 

signed a joint statement pledging nuclear cooperation and expanded joint naval 

exercises. Japan also endorsed India for membership in the multilateral export control regimes, signaling Tokyo’s acceptance of India’s nuclear status. 

Russia 

India and Russia are likely to maintain their historically close partnership under 

the new Indian Government. Russia remains India’s top defense supplier, providing 

about 70 percent of India’s defense requirements. The uncertainty surrounding the 

withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan has brought New Delhi and 

Moscow even closer in their shared goal to prevent a Pakistan-supported Taliban 

from regaining power in Kabul. 

Differences in policies toward Russia could become a major irritant in India-U.S. 

relations, particularly if Russian President Vladimir Putin further extends Russian 

claims on Ukraine, and New Delhi continues to provide unqualified support for 

Putin. India tacitly supported President Putin’s annexation of the Crimea on March 

18, 2014, by acknowledging Russia’s ‘‘legitimate interests’’ there and deciding not to 

back U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia. 

Pakistan 

Modi has demonstrated interest in setting a positive tone in relations with 

Islamabad by inviting Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in 

ceremony, an unprecedented move by an Indian leader. Still, a major terrorist 

attack in India with links to Pakistan could quickly reverse the current positive trajectory in Indo-Pakistani relations. Former Prime Minister Singh had shown a great 

deal of forbearance toward Pakistan, and a personal commitment to maintaining 

peaceful ties with Islamabad, even following attacks in India that were traced back 

to Pakistan-based groups. Having criticized Singh for being too soft on Pakistan, 

Modi would be under pressure to react strongly in the face of a terrorist provocation. 

Moreover, there is growing concern about the impact on Indo-Pakistani relations 

of the international troop drawdown in Afghanistan and whether the Kashmir conflict could reignite. According to Indian officials, there was an increase in militant 

infiltration from Pakistani territory into Indian-held Kashmir in 2013. Last August, 

Indo-Pakistani military tensions escalated for a brief period when a series of incidents along the Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir led to the killing of five 

Indian soldiers and a Pakistani civilian. The incidents led to charged rhetoric on 

both sides and dashed hopes for a potential meeting of the Indian and Pakistani 

leaders on the fringes of the 2013 U.N. General Assembly. 

Modi is attempting to strike a balance between sounding a tough message on terrorism, while leaving the door open for improved Indo-Pakistani economic relations. 

In an interview with The Times of India in early May, Modi said that both countries 

faced the common enemy of widespread poverty and that he would be ready to 

‘‘write a new chapter’’ in relations if Pakistan demonstrates that it is committed to 

stopping terrorist attacks from being launched from its territory.7

When Indo-Pakistani tensions have escalated in the past, such as during the 

2001–2002 military standoff and in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 

U.S. played a key behind-the-scenes role in walking both countries back from the 

brink of conflict. But the U.S. inability to convince Pakistan to cut support to antiIndian militants over the last several years may lead the new Indian Government 

to conclude that it cannot rely on the U.S. to help de-escalate a potential future crisis with Islamabad, and instead must address the threat from Pakistan on its own. 

DEFENSE TRADE AND COOPERATION

The U.S. should continue to position itself to help India fulfill its defense modernization requirements and enable American companies to pursue partnerships 

that support India’s interest in developing its domestic defense production sector. 

The BJP’s election manifesto highlighted the need to modernize India’s Armed 

Forces and increase research and development in the defense sector, with the goal 

of developing indigenous defense technologies and ‘‘fast-tracking’’ defense purchases.8 The budget that was released in India last week raised total defense spending by 12 percent to $38 billion for the Indian fiscal year ending in March 2015.9

It also raised foreign direct investment caps in the defense sector to 49 percent, up 

from the current limit of 26 percent, but still short of what many defense investors 

had expected. India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) had 

recommended in May that the government make more drastic changes with regard 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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to FDI in the defense sector. The DIPP proposed allowing 49 percent FDI in defense 

projects where no technology transfer was involved; 74 percent in cases of technology transfer; and 100 percent for manufacturing state-of-the-art equipment.10

The U.S.-India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), launched in 2012, 

is aimed at breaking down barriers between the two countries’ defense bureaucracies and enhancing defense trade and technology exchange. India is expected to 

spend over $100 billion on defense equipment over the next 8 years. In 2013, U.S. 

military exports to India totaled $1.9 billion with delivery of C–17 heavy transport 

aircraft and P–81 long-range maritime reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare 

planes. The U.S. has signed over $13 billion in total defense contracts with India 

over the past several years, but still lags behind Russia as a defense supplier to 

India. 

Maritime Issues 

India has the world’s fifth-largest Navy and Asia’s only operational aircraft carrier.11 In its manifesto, the BJP made special mention of the need to refurbish 

India’s navy. A series of mishaps on Indian submarines and ships over the past year 

have raised questions about India’s ability to achieve its naval ambitions. The most 

serious problems have occurred with its Russian Kilo-class submarines. There was 

an explosion on the INS (Indian Naval Submarine) Sindhurakshak in August 2013 

that killed 18 officers and sailors, and a fire on the INS Sindhuratna in February, 

which led to the resignation of the naval chief.12

Nuclear Issues 

The previous BJP-led government, under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, surprised the 

world and invoked sanctions when it tested nuclear weapons shortly after assuming 

office in May 1998. The bold action says something about the BJP’s willingness to 

assert India’s national security interests, but the decision must also be viewed in 

context. Former Congress Party Prime Minister, Narasima Rao, was close to conducting nuclear tests in 1995, until the U.S. Government preempted the test by delivering a demarche to the Rao government based on intelligence it had collected 

on Indian test preparations. The 1998 decision to test also was related to negotiations surrounding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and India’s interest 

in ensuring that it tested its nuclear weapons before the CTBT came into force.13

POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK: COMMUNAL AGENDA

When U.S. President Barack Obama called Prime Minister Modi shortly after the 

election results were announced to congratulate him on his victory and to invite him 

to Washington, he sent a signal that the U.S. is ready to do business with Modi 

and move beyond the issue of the 2002 Gujarat riots. 

The U.S. had revoked Modi’s tourist visa in 2005 under the terms of its International Religious Freedom Act for failing to halt Hindu-Muslim riots in 2002 that 

killed more than 1,000 people—mainly Muslims—over the course of 3 days in the 

state of Gujarat. The riots followed an incident in which a group of Muslims set fire 

to a train carrying Hindu pilgrims destined for Ahmedabad and passing through the 

town of Godhra. Modi, who was Gujarat’s chief minister at the time, allowed funeral 

processions in the streets of Ahmedabad the next day, and the state government 

failed to control Hindu mobs that went on a systematic rampage murdering Muslims. Modi was accused of turning a blind eye to the violence, or worse, although 

the Indian courts have cleared him of criminal activity. 

U.S. officials should give Modi a chance to prove he will not be a divisive leader 

and will work instead to improve the Indian economy for everyone’s benefit. Modi 

stayed away from communal politics during the election campaign and focused instead on the economy and good governance. In his first speech to the Indian Parliament on June 11, he acknowledged that India’s Muslims lagged behind the rest 

of the nation in socioeconomic terms and noted the importance of addressing this 

challenge, saying: ‘‘If one organ of the body remains weak, the body cannot be 

termed as healthy . . . We are committed to this . . . We don’t see it as appeasement.’’ 

In the past, the BJP has supported policy positions considered divisive by the 

Muslim minority community. These include support for the construction of a Hindu 

temple at Ayodhya, where a mosque was destroyed by Hindus in 1992; the establishment of a uniform civil code, rather than allowing Muslims to maintain certain 

personal laws based on religious custom; and repeal of Article 370 of the Indian 

Constitution, which provides the state of Jammu and Kashmir special autonomous 

status. The BJP did not pursue these controversial issues when it held power previously (1998–2004), mainly because it lacked support from its coalition partners. 

Even though the BJP now holds a majority on its own, Modi will have to consider 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

46 

the costs of prioritizing a ‘‘hindutva’’ (Hindu religious and cultural nationalism) 

agenda in terms of political support at home and abroad, and the possibility that 

doing so could undermine his goals of building a strong and prosperous India with 

a positive global image. 

Christians, numbering about 25 million in India, have also faced harassment and 

violent attacks by organizations following a hindutva agenda. Christians feel especially vulnerable in states that have adopted anticonversion laws. The anticonversion laws are aimed at preventing ‘‘forced conversion’’ but have been misused by 

Hindu zealots to harass Christians and to legitimize mob violence. 

It remains to be seen to what degree the BJP might focus on trying to rebuild 

the Ram Temple. Hindus would like access to Ayodhya, as they believe it to be the 

birthplace of the Hindu god Rama, where a prominent Hindu temple (the Ram Temple) once existed. In 1992, BJP leader L. K. Advani led a protest march to the Babri 

mosque at Ayodhya that resulted in its destruction by Hindu zealots and ensuing 

communal riots that killed nearly 2,000. In September 2010, a high court in India 

ruled that the land at Ayodhya be divided into three segments: one-third for the reconstruction of the Ram Temple; one-third for the Islamic Sunni Waqf Board; and 

one-third for another Hindu group. The 2014 BJP manifesto expresses support for 

rebuilding the Ram Temple within the confines of the Indian constitution. 

U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The rise to power of the BJP, led by now-Prime Minister Modi, creates an opportunity to end the malaise that has taken over India-U.S. relations in the last few 

years. Modi’s upcoming visit to Washington on September 30 is an opportunity for 

the U.S. administration to demonstrate its commitment to moving relations forward 

with the new government. U.S. policymakers should consider initiatives in the following areas. 

The Asia–Pacific 

While Indian strategists assess Pakistan as posing the most immediate threat to 

India, they increasingly view China as the more important long-term strategic 

threat. Indian officials were initially cautious in their response to the U.S. policy 

of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific, but the Chinese border provocation in April 

2013 may prompt New Delhi to become more open to the idea of a robust U.S. role 

in the region. A BJP government also will not be constrained or influenced by leftist-leaning politicians who have a knee-jerk aversion to strategic cooperation with 

the U.S., as was the case with the Congress Party-led government. BJP leaders will 

continue to resist any policy construed as ‘‘containment’’ of China, however. Modi’s 

strong equation with Japanese Prime Minister Abe also could open opportunities for 

greater trilateral cooperation among the U.S., India, and Japan, although it is unclear why Modi postponed a trip to Tokyo scheduled for July 3. 

Defense 

India and the U.S. should renew the 10-year defense framework agreement they 

signed in 2005 and build on the progress of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. Indian willingness to adhere to U.S. technology protection agreements will 

be critical to moving the Indo-U.S. defense relationship forward. 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation 

The U.S. should make a fresh push to resolve the nuclear liability issue. While 

in opposition, the BJP opposed the civil nuclear deal and pushed for nuclear liability 

legislation that complicated U.S. companies’ ability to invest in civil nuclear projects 

in India. Now that the BJP is in power, the party leaders may be willing to soften 

their position and build a political consensus around a resolution to the liability 

issue that would allow U.S. firms to invest in the civil nuclear sector. 

Nonproliferation 

The U.S. should continue to press for India’s membership in the four major multilateral nonproliferation groupings: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR); the Australia Group (which seeks to control 

the export of chemical and biological weapons); and the Wassenaar Arrangement 

(which seeks to control the export of conventional arms and dual-use goods). The 

U.S. and U.K. support India’s admission to the NSG, but some NSG members have 

expressed concern that admitting India will erode the credibility of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), since India is not a signatory of the treaty. India 

should continue to improve its export control processes and the transparency of its 

strategic nuclear programs to help bolster its case for full membership in the multilateral nonproliferation groupings. The U.S. and other international partners need 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47 

to develop fresh thinking about India’s relationship to the NPT and nonproliferation 

system that takes into account the reality that India will not join the NPT as a nonweapons state. Though the NSG is closely associated with the NPT, it is also fact 

that the NSG was originally created in a way that France could join even though 

it had not yet signed the NPT.14

Afghanistan/Counterterrorism 

The U.S. should expand and deepen its counterterrorism dialogue and cooperation 

with India. The future of Afghanistan should be a key component of the Indo-U.S. 

counterterrorism dialogue, particularly given the alarming situation in Iraq, where 

Islamist extremists are making gains in the absence of a U.S. force presence in the 

country. The U.S. should encourage India’s economic and political involvement in 

Afghanistan, which helps bolster the Afghan Government’s efforts to fight terrorism. 

To kick-start the effort, the U.S. should send a high-level multiagency delegation 

(from the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center) to India to exchange views on regional terrorist threats. 

Indo-Pakistani Relations 

U.S. policymakers can take steps to reduce the possibility of deteriorating IndoPakistani relations. While U.S. officials should not seek a mediation role, they can 

work behind the scenes to encourage Indo-Pakistani dialogue and inject ideas for 

moving a peace process forward. Moreover, the U.S. must maintain pressure on 

Pakistan to crack down on Kashmir-focused terrorist groups. The Mumbai terrorist 

attacks of 2008 should be viewed as the culmination of U.S. failure to connect the 

dots between Pakistani support for Kashmir-focused terrorist groups and the broader international terrorist threat. Washington should also remain vigilant in monitoring the human rights situation inside Jammu and Kashmir, raising concerns 

with the Indian Government when necessary. In the summer of 2010 protests that 

turned violent in Kashmir led to the killing of 126 Muslim youth by Indian security 

forces. The U.S. should encourage trade, joint economic projects, and civil society engagement among the people from both sides of Kashmir. 

Religious Freedom 

While the new Indian Government is in its early days, so far there is reason for 

cautious optimism that it will focus on implementing policies beneficial for the 

Indian economy and that enhance India’s international role. Still, the U.S. should 

engage India on religious freedom issues to ensure that Modi follows through on his 

promises to meet the needs of all Indian citizens and stays away from controversial 

policies supported by hardliners within his party and associated organizations. 

CONCLUSION

The election of a BJP government is likely to have a positive impact on the Indian 

economy and reestablish international confidence in India as a global power. If the 

U.S. demonstrates its willingness to establish close ties with the new government, 

it is likely that the BJP will reciprocate and the two sides can refocus on achieving 

the vision of a durable and strategic partnership. 

———————— 

End Notes 

1The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported 

and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government 

or other contract work. 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. 

During 2012, it had nearly 700,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the U.S. Its 2012 income came from the following sources: Individuals 

81%; Foundations 14%; Corporations 5%. 

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 2 percent of its 2012 

income. The Heritage Foundation’s books are audited annually by the national accounting firm 

of McGladrey & Pullen. A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon 

request. 

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position 

for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees. 2 Annie Gowan and Anne Gearan, ‘‘U.S. Attorney Says Indian Diplomat Arrested ‘in the Most 

Discreet Way Possible,’ ’’ The Washington Post, December 18, 2013. 3 BJP Election Manifesto 2014. 

4 Ibid. 

5Palash Ghosh, ‘‘India 2014 Elections: BJP Leader Narendra Modi’s Bromance with Japan’s 

Shinzo Abe,’’ International Business Times, March 10, 2014. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

48 

6 Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth and Ted Osius, ‘‘India’s ‘Look East’ and America’s ‘Asia 

Pivot’: Converging Interests,’’ U.S.-India Insight, Vol. 3, No. 3 (March 2013). 7Dean Nelson, ‘‘India Election 2014: Narendra Modi Says India and Pakistan Should Be Allies 

in War on Poverty,’’ The Telegraph, May 6, 2014. 8 BJP Election Manifesto 2014. 

9 Andrew MacAskill, ‘‘Modi Eases Defense Investment Rules as India to Rebuild Forces,’’ 

Bloomberg, July 10, 2014. 10Dilasha Seth, ‘‘DIPP proposes 100% FDI in Defence Sector,’’ The Economic Times, May 30, 

2014. 11Walter Ladwig, ‘‘India Sets Sail for Leadership,’’ The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2010. 12 ‘‘Indian Navy: 11 Accidents, 22 Deaths in Seven Months,’’ DnaIndia.com, March 7, 2014. 13T. P. Sreenivasan, ‘‘More Continuity, Less Change,’’ The Indian Express, May 11, 2014. 14Lisa Curtis, ‘‘Enhancing India’s Role in the Global Nonproliferation Regime,’’ CSIS South 

Asia Program and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2010. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much. Great testimony all 

around, both the written testimony, which I found very provocative, 

and the presentations. 

Two opportunities that I think are available to us that I just 

want to mark here. Mr. Singh, you mentioned the idea of a joint 

address to Congress. I am a cosponsor of a resolution we are currently working in the Senate that talks about sort of the new relationship with the United States and India, but it also includes a 

resolution to invite the Prime Minister to address Congress. I think 

that would send a very positive signal. 

I also encourage and urge the administration to send a very positive signal in its choice of naming an ambassador to India. That is 

one of the strongest signals you can send. If you send someone— 

the kind of person you send, the identity of the person you send, 

the relationships that person already has in a country, and especially in a country whose partnership means so much to us, that 

is a very quick way to tell somebody how important they are. I 

really urge the administration to do that. 

We are wrestling with our own significant challenges here in the 

Senate, frankly, about confirming ambassadors. It has been really 

discouraging to me that so many nations in the world with which 

we have so much business on the table right now have had vacancies in their ambassadorial posts, largely due to process issues here 

in the Senate that we ought to be able to resolve. 

But to some degree, these matters also all begin with the administration naming a person. I think this particular vacancy gives the 

administration an opportunity to name someone that right away 

communicates a level of seriousness about the future of the relationship, and I encourage the administration to do it. 

A couple of you have touched on an issue that I think is interesting, which is if we are looking at a way to strengthen this relationship going forward, there are positive things we can work on, 

but the other way to look at it is, what are the negative concerns 

that we ought to kind of sweep out of the way? We have concerns 

on our side—intellectual property, et cetera. But you are all experts 

at this and you all know the way the Indian leadership class kind 

of looks at these issues. What are concerns that they have right 

now with this government and the kind of new reality about the 

United States, about the relationship with the United States, that 

we ought to be thinking about about moving aside in these meetings that are coming up in the September visit of the Prime Minister here? 

So educate me on, from the Indian perspective, what are concerns and issues that we ought to try to address and move aside 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49 

so that they are not obstacles to a very productive future path? In 

whatever order you want. You do not have to go in the order. 

Ambassador Wisner. I would be happy to throw the first stone, 

Senator. 

Senator KAINE. Please. 

Ambassador WISNER. In my testimony I made a point that I 

know is rooted in Indian perception. Indians are looking for a definition of how we intend to manage our affairs in protecting our security and the balance of power in Asia. They do not know what 

that is and it makes them profoundly uneasy because they do not 

know where they fit in, how we are going to manage Chinese 

power, how we are going to deal with Afghanistan, what are our 

plans toward Pakistan? 

If I pick, at the top of my list of risks it is the risk of talking 

past each other. We select lots of specific initiatives that we can 

launch, but Indians are looking for a framework, an intellectual 

framework that will give them the ability to predict how America 

will react in a very tough time in history. That is what I hope the 

President and Kerry, the Secretary, and Secretary Hagel will really 

focus on: Get that right and so much will follow; risk number one. 

Risk number two is known to all of us who have dealt with India 

over the years, and that is exaggerated expectations. India is not 

your normal ally; which accepts American solutions and from 

which we expect a degree of responsiveness to our ideas. India is 

a very reluctant partner, a very careful partner, a very suspicious 

partner. 

The way you make the relationship work is not by setting your 

goals and expecting India to meet them, but a very careful discovery of what Indian goals and yours are and coming up with a 

meld. It is a different kind of diplomacy than the United States has 

been used to exercising. But I would argue the failure to do that 

puts a risk in the relationship, because once again we will talk past 

each other. 

Mr. ROSSOW. I will just rattle off a couple of thoughts on this real 

quick. I think getting an ambassador to post, but at the same time 

I think what India would really like to see is somebody at the Cabinet level in the United States that they feel wakes up every day 

and thinks about India as one of the first few things. I think Ash 

Carter played that role. India felt that there was somebody in 

those high-level discussions that would think about India and their 

interests. But right now I do not know that they could point to 

somebody and say that that is our person. 

I also think that for India’s commercial interests the immigration 

bill, which the Senate passed and the House may take up at some 

point in the future, and its implications for IT service firms, also 

they continue to raise. I know this issue has never been quite elevated to that level of the totalization agreement on social security 

payments. 

The last thing I will mention real quick, too, is there are two 

things happening this fall that will have a very pointed effect in 

the relationship. The USTR’s out of cycle 301 review. Is India going 

to amend its patents law in a way that accommodates everybody’s 

interests? I do not think that is likely to happen. So the 301 is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

50 

going to be out there. It is going to be another roadblock we know 

is coming. 

And the International Trade Commission has a report on India’s 

trade barriers and I think even those of us that love the relationship realize there is a lot of barriers in India. The report is going 

to say that. So we have got two things coming up, two that we 

know are going to be poking at the relationship a little bit, mostly 

driven by things that the last government did. So reactions to that 

at the next government may be taken as unfair. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Rossow, just to follow up before the other 

witnesses answer the question, your point about the failed expectations syndrome; I guess there would be a danger if we as the 

United States deal with the new government kind of out of the 

basis of our experience with the previous government. That will be 

noticed and will not be appreciated. Your point was we kind 

of have to recognize that we have a big opportunity and if they 

set aside some precedent and do not feel bound by it then we 

should also approach it in a new way and not just based on past 

expectations. 

Mr. ROSSOW. There is a very specific thing underlying that, 

which is that we dealt with them the Manmohan Singh government before, which was not the government of India. Sonya Gandhi, president of the party—and when we talk about the fact that 

the government could not get things done, if you were to look at 

Sonya Gandhi’s legislative priorities she had almost a perfect batting record, including at the last minute, just months ago, passing 

a bill through Parliament amending the constitution to create a 

new state to try to save a few seats in their election. A very incredible legislative record, but that was not who we were dealing with, 

and that agenda was different than ours. 

So the fact that we are dealing with the person in which power 

is consolidated in Delhi is a huge difference. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. I echo a lot of what my colleagues have said, but I 

think the concerns of every Indian Government have been somewhat similar over the years. That is that if you get too close to the 

United States what does the United States get you stuck in? Where 

do you find yourself in an uncomfortable position? Where do you 

find yourself with deep ties, say on defense, that prove unreliable 

at a controversial time? 

The mistrust that we have had over the years I think has almost 

entirely been eradicated. In fact, before the Khobragade incident I 

think that the sense was that we had basically overcome all of that 

kind of mistrust. But because relations are complicated between 

nations and because things like that incident happened or Snowden 

revelations happened to friends like Germany, really any relationship is subject to these kinds of bumps in the road. 

But I think the Indians are particularly nervous about what 

being too close to the United States would actually mean. The 

shadow of nonalignment is not just a partisan thing. It is not just 

a Congress Party thing. It is there. It is a more positive vision 

when it comes from the current government, because it is not what 

we are not going to do; it is that we are going to be a nationalist 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

51 

government. And positive nationalism from this government could 

be a very powerful, useful thing, because it could give them a level 

of confidence to do things with us that have otherwise been 

thought of as somehow risky or suspect or things you would worry 

about. 

But I actually think that there is a bigger—their concerns are 

not necessarily the main threats to us having a productive relationship. I think a lot of those concerns are fairly misplaced, especially 

now that you have such strong support for India across the board. 

Just look at the dynamism not only of your subcommittee, but look 

at the India Caucus on the Hill. It is very robust. So you have sort 

of really broad bipartisan support for the relationship. 

But I think the thing that is a little more worrying, and it should 

be a concern to us and to them, is we are in a very complicated— 

it is a very complicated relationship and it is one where if it lacks 

leadership—that is to say, if the President and the Prime Minister 

are not fairly regularly making it clear to the two bureaucracies 

and the systems that their expectations are high and that problems 

should be resolved and that we should get through issues—we will 

not. The issues will eat us up in this relationship. The things that 

pop up, the obstacles, will—in anything we try to do, legal, policy, 

and other obstacles will pop up. 

Those can either become insurmountable if they are sort of left 

in a vacuum of leadership or they can probably be relatively easily 

surmounted if there is regular leadership from above. So it is not 

enough for the two leaders to meet now and say we love each other, 

we want to have a good relationship. There has to be some real 

consistent mechanism. The infrastructure is there with the strategic dialogue, the high-level dialogues on defense. There are all 

these pieces. But somehow if it does not have that top-level leadership consistently applied, I do not think—— 

Senator KAINE. The bureaucracies are not capable of managing 

the relationship. 

Mr. ROSSOW. Yes. They are very capable of bogging it down. 

Senator KAINE. Yes, right, right. Thank you. 

Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. I think one of the biggest concerns I hear coming 

from Indians is the future of Afghanistan and our withdrawal. 

They are afraid we are going to withdraw too quickly and that we 

are going to allow Pakistan to drive the future of the country. I 

think there is major concern on this. So anything we can do to 

allay those concerns would be useful. 

The second issue would be echoing what Rick mentioned in terms 

of the immigration issue and U.S. restrictions on the H1B visas 

and restriction on the numbers of highly skilled Indian workers 

coming into the United States. I think those would be the major 

issues. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask one other question and then I will see 

if Senator Risch has a question. I guess it was, Ambassador Wisner, your testimony was about this very ambitious economic goal 

of the 15 million jobs a year. Or, Mr. Rossow, was that your testimony? I cannot remember. So that is a huge and ambitious goal. 

So, going back to Ambassador Wisner’s answer to my previous 

question, if the idea needs to be not just here is what we want, but 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

52 

let us really listen to what it is that this new government of India 

says it wants and then try to meld all of our goals together, if they 

are placing a very high priority on economic development, and in 

a pretty specific way—they have got a metric that is out there, a 

need to create 15 million jobs a year to deal with the changes in 

the population, the move of a rural population to the cities—that 

could be a focus of ours. 

If we know that is their most significant goal, then there is a 

whole series of things—a manufacturing initiative, Mr. Rossow, you 

talked about—that we could do that I think would be mutually 

beneficial both for our interests and for theirs. But I am just kind 

of curious. Do all really see that significant economic acceleration 

as the primary goal right now that the Modi government wants to 

pursue and should we organize much of our thinking? We are not 

going to set side the good defense work we are doing, et cetera. 

Should we organize much of our thinking about how to work 

together around that very aggressive economic development goal? 

Ambassador WISNER. Well, I think it is certainly one of the key 

objectives we have to reach for. I do not want to ignore other 

requirements. We have got real security interests in the continent. 

We want to work with India on those. We have issues that have 

to be addressed in terms of the broad economic picture, not just 

India and not just job creation. 

But it really is vital, and it is going to be very tough. It is certainly a terrific focal point around which we can talk to Modi. Now, 

what really lies ahead? Fifteen million jobs, that is daunting. But 

at least we know that Modi is about growth. He is not about distribution first; he is about growth. So what kind of growth policies 

are going to work? He is looking for those. He is articulating them, 

and he has shown that once he finds them he uses the power of 

the office of the chief executive and he puts that strength behind 

it. He deals directly with his administration. His ministers really 

brand Modi’s product the Civil Service Implements. Modi’s India is 

more an executive model, less the classic Westminister model of 

Collective Cabinet Responsibility. 

But to get there, Senator, I am going to repeat myself in one 

regard. I do not think simply investments in infrastructure, education, health are going to get 15 million jobs in India. We are all 

going through a complex time in the world in which job generation 

is very difficult to achieve. Now, how is India going to do it? Here 

again, if it models itself on the rest of the world as an open, competitive economy, where it invites the best of examples on how to 

grow and it does not hide behind barriers and tries to preserve a 

protective trade regime, then it has a chance of making that 15 

million. 

But if it does not do that, it is going to be a struggle. I think one 

of our top priorities ought to be, helping India think about how to 

open herself so she is competitive, taking the best examples around 

the world, adopting them herself, and then forcing them through. 

Senator KAINE. Other thoughts about how the United States can 

help India achieve this goal? Mr. Singh? 

Mr. SINGH. We often talk about what our businesses need, what 

we need to be able to do these sorts of things. I think Indian leaders have had historically a failure of explanation to their own 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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people about why they need reforms to do things that Indian businesses need, that Indian workers need, that will actually help 

bring jobs. 

That is not something we can articulate for them, but I do think 

that we should be poised to encourage the new government to do 

something that I think has really never been done before. Reforms 

were made, but they were almost made like: Do not look here; we 

are still going to do more of the social security safety net, we are 

still going to do more handouts, we are still going to maintain subsidies, we are still going to do all these other things; but, oh, we 

have got the opportunity to do some reforms. 

What you have seen over the last 20 years is a plowing back. A 

lot of the economic benefit that came from the reforms started in 

the early nineties got plowed back into nonproductive activity. So 

they did not build themselves a virtuous cycle and they hoped for 

growth. They hoped for endless growth, and when growth stopped 

or stagnated they were caught even more unaware than some other 

countries in 2010. I think that was really a pretty rude awakening. 

So the challenge is for a country that is used to a huge public 

sector in defense it is particularly daunting. Defense public sector 

undertakings in India are massive and inefficient and not very well 

suited to the kind of future that they are talking about wanting. 

And it is not just this government; the previous government, too. 

But they have not been able to politically see their way through 

that. 

They have got to tell a good story. Modi has got to take the narrative ‘‘I will deliver good governance’’ and turn it into ‘‘And this 

is what that takes.’’ He has said a lot of ‘‘This is why we have to 

do hard things,’’ but what are those hard things and how do they 

deliver for the Indian people? And then he will have to show 

results. 

The jobs thing is one indicator. He has also said he wants electricity to every Indian home in about a decade. There are 300 million Indian homes without electricity, so that is the equivalent of 

trying to produce electricity to the entire United States of America. 

That is daunting, and it can only be done if, as Ambassador Wisner 

says, they make real reforms. 

Senator KAINE. Senator Risch had a back and forth with Ms. 

Biswal on the first panel about intellectual property and I thought 

she made an interesting point, and that was: We have very significant concerns about the intellectual property argument, but one of 

the ways that we would achieve what we would want is if the 

Indian private sector also came to realize, wow, better intellectual 

property protection is really going to help us as well. She seemed 

to indicate that there was a growing desire for more intellectual 

property protections within that domestic technology leadership in 

particular. 

Do you share that? Do you see more of an embrace of intellectual 

property protection as driving policy with this new government? 

Mr. ROSSOW. There is a couple of areas where industry has 

driven. We say ‘‘IP,’’ but you are talking about patents. 

Senator KAINE. Yes. 

Mr. ROSSOW. That is what has driven this discussion. But if you 

look broadly at IP, pharma is an area where India lives based on 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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generics production. It has never been leading edge in creating new 

molecules. But in other sectors that focus on IP—movies, TV, 

things like that, software, where India has been a leader—industry 

has done a lot of work to make sure that their government—that 

their interests are protected. 

So I think it is going to be tougher in patents. We say ‘‘IP.’’ I 

think in other areas of IP beyond patents there is a lot that has 

been done. For instance, on cable TV. There was rampant theft and 

illegal distribution of the channels that American companies and 

others created. They focused on digitization of cable TV, something 

that is being rolled out across the nation now, and 140 million 

homes have cable TV. This is a really big deal. And focusing on settop boxes, making sure you knew who got what channels, that kind 

of stuff. 

On films, it used to be that printed copies of films would be 

available on markets. So what India has done, industry-led, is 

digitization. So press of a button, they can transmit the films 

directly to the studios. So there is lots of work that the private sector has done and I think that kind of shows the case. 

But in pharmaceuticals the problem is they are not there yet. 

They are not thinking this is going to be in their interest yet. So 

they are much further behind. But there is work—the domestic sector did get the message. They have shown to be quite leading edge. 

Ambassador WISNER. Senator, to add a quick thought on what 

Rick said to you, to make it even sharper, we tend to say ‘‘intellectual property rights’’ and he is quite right, you have got to focus 

on those areas. One of the hottest topics for our pharmaceutical 

industry and what causes the most complaints is mandatory 

licensing. In fact the Indians have been involved in it only on rare 

occasions, but where they have done it they have frightened badly 

the international pharmaceutical industry. It believes steps taken 

in India will have international repercussions. 

So when the USIBC chairman saw Modi on our recent trip he 

said: Prime Minister, the really key point is to have transparency 

and predictability, not to surprise people. He actually suggested, 

and Modi liked the idea, of putting together an Indian, international, and Indian Government panel to look at pharmaceutical 

issues and review them before the government makes its choices. 

Government is sovereign; what industry wants is a fair hearing. 

So I think it is not going to be one law that can be written that 

is going to correct this, but a habit of consultation that will make 

a difference. 

Senator KAINE. Senator Risch, questions. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. I am going to yield back, Mr. Chairman. My questions were answered. So thank you very much. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Let me ask a question about Iran. This is partly directly related 

to the India-Iran relationship, which there is a cultural tie that it 

has had that relationship over time. We give Iran a waiver to our 

sanctions regime—we give India a waiver to the sanctions regime 

for use of Iranian energy, largely out of a recognition partly of that 

cultural tie, but also partly because of the tremendous Indian need 

for energy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

55 

What are the opportunities we might have to work with India— 

the civil nuclear power issue has been raised, or other areas— 

to help them develop their own native energy economy that might 

ultimately lead them to reduce their reliance upon Iranian energy? 

What opportunities are there? 

Mr. ROSSOW. Well, I think India’s got tough decisions to make for 

herself first, which is deregulating price controls of petroleum products. Most foreign companies will not go in and develop the 

resources. And the resources may be there. We have seen some 

large-ish natural gas and petroleum strikes over other rounds of 

licensing for private blocks for exploration and development. But 

foreign companies mostly have stayed away from doing that 

because you just do not know, with such a heavily regulated sector, 

as to whether or not whatever you find you are going to be able 

to market effectively at a price that makes it right. 

So they have made steps. Even the Congress government made 

steps on loosening some price controls and reducing subsidies in 

this area. A lot more needs to be done, though. Until it is a fully 

transparent market where the government is not putting their finger on the scale every day, I think a lot of companies are going to 

stay away from really taking the dive and doing that in a bigger 

way. 

Senator KAINE. But we would have an argument to make in consultation that the relaxation of that sort of overregulation or price 

control could achieve the 15 million year a goal of job growth. We 

could show our own track record of developing a really strong 

domestic energy economy and its connection to jobs if we are trying 

to help India reach that goal. 

Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. We mentioned the R&D and the work we are doing 

through the energy partnership on solar, which of course got subjected to local content requirements, which resulted in it being a 

trade dispute, basically. But trade disputes can bleed over into the 

energy cooperation. 

There are huge potentials for cooperation in the energy sector, 

both in R&D, but also the Department of Energy could help India 

with technology for its own potential exploration, for the gas 

reserves that might be there that Rick was talking about. 

It is interesting to note that I think one of the great signs of 

progress in our relationship was that India did make a concerted 

effort to reduce its purchasing from Iran when we were asking that 

that be something—when we were making it clear that that was 

something that was very important to the United States. And they 

did it in a way that I think really showed the maturing of the relationship as a strategic partnership. It does not prove that we are 

where we could be, but it was interesting to see how they handled 

that. 

They really did try. They really were transparent. It was sort of, 

here is what we think we can achieve, and then we were able to 

come back and the administration was able to work closely with 

Congress to say, okay, we have got to figure out a way to square 

the circle here. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

56 

But they need energy growth and they need diversification and 

they need greater independence. So I think there is a lot of potential. 

Senator KAINE. Lisa. 

Ms. CURTIS. What immediately comes to mind is access to U.S. 

LNG exports. I think including them in that circle is something 

that is of interest. 

But just to mention, with the relationship with Iran it is not just 

cultural, it is not just economics. They have strategic interest in 

the relationship with Iran because of their rivalry with Pakistan, 

but also because of the situation in Afghanistan, and their desire 

to prevent the Taliban from taking over there. They cooperated in 

the nineties against the Taliban in Afghanistan. So I just want to 

note that India also has strategic reasons for wanting to engage 

with Iran. 

Senator KAINE. One last question that I have, and I raised this 

briefly with the first panel: Counterterrorism cooperation, the 

Mumbai attack, the presence of LET and the continued concerns 

about what their designs might be. What is the current status of 

the relationship between the United States and India in the counterterrorism area and what are some opportunities that we would 

have, that I think would be appreciated if we approached them 

with seriousness to help them really deal with that challenge? 

Because, as Ms. Curtis indicated in her testimony, any kind of an 

attack in the future, given the campaign sort of promises of P.M. 

Modi, he might have to respond in a particular way. So the best 

thing we could do is do everything we could to avoid that happening, and that involves CT cooperation. 

What is the current status of the relationship? 

Mr. SINGH. I will speak to it briefly. Post-Mumbai, we really 

transformed both law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. It 

has been really one of the more successful areas. The homeland 

security dialogue within the framework of the strategic dialogue is 

very productive. The intelligence relationship has been much more 

productive than people would have expected prior to 2008. We 

really do share a lot. We share threat information, but we also are 

sharing a lot of best practices for counterterrorism and other 

engagement. FBI, DHS, it is broad engagement, and it is good. 

I think one area is cyber and intelligence-sharing, cyber in particular. I think the need for us to figure out a way to work more 

closely on cyber security could not be greater, and it has counterterrorism implications. We have a cyber security sort of information-sharing regime which sort of got going in 2010 or 2011, I 

think. It is the kind of thing that it needs to be updated almost 

constantly. Our engagement on cyber is really not something that 

you can just sort of do once and then say, okay, we are done. You 

have got to keep revisiting it. I think that would be an area to look 

to do more together. 

So homeland defense, cyber, and intel-sharing are all areas in 

which we could have very productive additional engagement over 

what we are doing now. 

Senator KAINE. Ms. Curtis. 

Ms. CURTIS. I think we need to increase our engagement on 

regional terrorist threats. In talking about the Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

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57 

which is, of course, a threat to India, it also is important to remember the group is a threat to the United States—to the international 

community. The United States putting out a $10 million reward for 

information leading to the arrest or conviction of the leader of the 

LET, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, was helpful because it showed that 

we are on the same page as India in terms of cracking down and 

trying to shut down these terrorist groups that are in the region. 

Senator KAINE. Any additional thoughts on that, on that question? [No response.] 

Well, let me just say this. This has been fantastic testimony. The 

written testimony was superb, provocative thoughts. We could stay 

here for hours and hours, but I want to take advantage of folks 

time. I really appreciate you all being here and helping us work 

through it. 

It is an exciting moment in the relationship and I think we need 

not let the burdens of past expectations, failed expectations syndrome, wear us down. I think we can approach it as a fresh 

moment and think, not incrementally, but with a bigger vision 

about where we can go. You have made that very, very plain. We 

appreciate your being here today and look forward to more work 

together. 

If there are members of the panel who do have questions to submit in writing, I will have them do that by 5 o’clock on Friday and 

would appreciate your solicitude in answering them should those 

questions occur. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF NISHA BISWAL TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Ambassador Wisner suggested in his testimony that in an effort to promote transparency, Prime Minister Modi may be open to the establishment of a 

panel made up of the Indian Government as well as international and domestic private sector representatives that would review pharmaceutical issues before the 

Indian Government took decisions that impacted the industry. 

♦ Has the U.S. raised the possibility of the establishment of this panel? 

♦ Please describe the nature of U.S. engagement with the new Indian Government 

on intellectual property issues, particularly in the pharmaceutical field. 

Answer. Protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) is a priority issue in the 

U.S.-India economic relationship. In our high-level engagements with India, notably 

in the Strategic Dialogue, Trade Policy Forum, and U.S.-India CEO Forum, we 

stress the benefits of creating an investor friendly environment, including by 

addressing IPR issues. 

Transparency in the Government of India’s decisionmaking process is one of the 

key issues detailed in the 2014 Special 301 Report. The United States would welcome any effort by the Government of India to make its system for protection and 

enforcement of IPR more predictable, transparent, and inclusive, including through 

the use of mechanisms such as panels, that would allow industries and service sectors, including the pharmaceutical sector, that rely on IPR to contribute to the 

policy- and decision-making process. 

The U.S. interagency is planning to conduct an out-of-cycle review of U.S.-India 

engagement on IPR later this year and we will continue to work closely with our 

stakeholders across the IPR spectrum to identify ways to enhance IPR protection 

in India. These efforts will set the agenda for our work with the new Indian Government on IPR issues, especially as they affect the pharmaceutical sector. 

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58 

RESPONSE OF NISHA BISWAL TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. I am deeply disturbed by the 2-month investigative detention of U.S. citizen and Amway India CEO, Bill Pinckney, on what are basically civil issues. He 

has been imprisoned since May 26 on charges related to Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act–1978. 

♦ Can you give me an update on his status and describe what the Department 

of State is doing to secure his release? 

♦ In your recent visits to India, have you brought up Mr. Pinckney’s case with 

your Indian Government counterparts? 

Answer. I am happy to report that Amway India CEO William S. Pinckney was 

released on bail on July 26. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi and the U.S. Consulate 

General in Hyderabad remain in close touch with Mr. Pinckney, Amway, and the 

Indian authorities, and Mr. Pinckney is being provided with all appropriate U.S. 

consular services. 

Mr. Pinckney’s 2-month detention greatly concerned me and other U.S. Department of State officials, and we raised our concerns with the highest levels of the 

Indian Government. We welcome his release and will continue to monitor the situation closely. 

Æ 

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