IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Antonia Davis :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, : No. 958 C.D. 2019

Appellant : Submitted: January 24, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: April 17, 2020

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 

Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), appeals from the Allegheny County Common 

Pleas Court’s (trial court) June 27, 2019 order sustaining Antonia Davis’ (Licensee) 

appeal from DOT’s three-month suspension of her operating privilege pursuant to 

Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code.

1 The sole issue before this Court is whether the 

trial court erred by preventing DOT from calling Licensee as a witness as on crossexamination in DOT’s case-in-chief. After review, we vacate and remand.

On January 3, 2019, at 5:47 p.m., Homestead Borough Police Officer 

Joseph Podolak (Officer Podolak) stopped Licensee due to an expired inspection

sticker on the 2010 Nissan sedan she was operating. During the traffic stop, Officer 

Podolak learned that Licensee was driving the vehicle without insurance. Officer 

 

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d) (relating to suspension of operating privileges for operating a motor 

vehicle without required financial responsibility in violation of Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code, 

75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(f)). 
2

Podolak cited Licensee for violating Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code.2 On April 

2, 2019, DOT mailed a notification to Licensee advising her that her operating 

privilege was being suspended for three months effective May 7, 2019, “because 

[she] failed to produce proof of financial responsibility [(insurance)] on [January 3, 

2019],” when she was stopped for a traffic offense. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 5a. 

On April 26, 2019, Licensee appealed to the trial court.3 On June 27, 2019, the trial 

court held a hearing4and sustained Licensee’s appeal. DOT appealed to this Court.5 

On September 4, 2019, the trial court filed its opinion.

DOT argues that the trial court erred by preventing DOT from calling 

Licensee as a witness as on cross-examination in DOT’s case-in-chief.

Initially, Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code states:

Any owner of a motor vehicle for which the existence of 

financial responsibility is a requirement for its legal 

operation shall not operate the motor vehicle or permit it to 

be operated upon a highway of this Commonwealth without 

the financial responsibility required by this chapter. In 

addition to the penalties provided by subsection (d), any 

person who fails to comply with this subsection commits a 

 

2 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(f) (relating to operating a motor vehicle without required financial 

responsibility).

3 Licensee also filed an appeal from a three-month suspension of her 2010 Nissan sedan’s

registration, which suspension was imposed pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code 

(relating to registration suspension due to lack of financial responsibility). See Davis v. Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 959 C.D. 2019, filed April 17, 2020).

4 The trial court held a single hearing relative to both of Licensee’s appeals. See R.R. at 13a, 

15a.

5

“Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings were 

supported by competent evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether the trial 

court’s determinations demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion.” Weaver v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 179 A.3d 122, 126 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

By January 24, 2020 Order, Licensee was precluded from filing a brief for failing to comply 

with the Court’s December 16, 2019 Order directing her to file a brief within 14 days. 
3

summary offense and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced 

to pay a fine of $300.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(f). Section 1786(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code further provides:

[DOT] shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a 

period of three months if it determines the required 

financial responsibility was not secured as required by this 

chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the 

owner or registrant for a period of three months if [DOT]

determines that the owner or registrant has operated or 

permitted the operation of the vehicle without the 

required financial responsibility . . . .

75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(1) (emphasis added). Section 1786(d)(4) of the Vehicle Code 

specifies:

The court’s scope of review in an appeal from an operating 

privilege suspension shall be limited to determining 

whether:

(i) the vehicle was registered or of a type required to be 

registered under this title; and

(ii) the owner or registrant operated or permitted the 

operation of the same vehicle when it was not covered by 

financial responsibility. The fact that an owner, registrant 

or operator of the motor vehicle failed to provide competent 

evidence of insurance or the fact that [DOT] received notice 

of a lapse, termination or cancellation of insurance for the 

vehicle shall create a presumption that the vehicle lacked 

the requisite financial responsibility. This presumption may 

be overcome by producing clear and convincing evidence 

that the vehicle was insured at the time that it was driven.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d)(4) (emphasis added). “Once [DOT] satisfies its burden of 

proving a prima facie violation, the burden shifts to the licensee to prove, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that the vehicle was insured at the time it was driven.” 

Pangallo v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2013).
4

DOT may use certified copies of a licensee’s guilty pleas and/or 

convictions for violating Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code to make out a prima 

facie case for suspensions under Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code. See Cangemi 

v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 8 A.3d 393 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); see 

also Pangallo; Stone v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 647 A.2d 287 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). However, because suspensions under Section 1786(d) of the 

Vehicle Code are not conviction-based, 

[i]t is well established that:

[DOT] is not required to introduce proof of a 

summary conviction under Section 1786(f) [of the 

Vehicle Code] in order to establish its prima facie

case supporting a suspension under Section 1786(d) 

[of the Vehicle Code]. To the contrary, [DOT] may 

introduce evidence independent of the criminal 

charges under Section 1786(f) [of the Vehicle Code] 

to establish its prima facie case in an appeal from a 

Section 1786(d) [of the Vehicle Code] suspension.

Baum v. Dep[’]t of Transp[.], Bureau of Driver Licensing,

949 A.2d 345, 349 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). See also 

Dubolino v. Dep[’]t of Transp[.], Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 816 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 

(although trial court found licensee not guilty of violating 

Section 1786(f) [of the Vehicle Code], [DOT] still satisfied 

its prima facie burden of proof for suspension under Section

1786(d)(1) [of the Vehicle Code] through testimony of 

officer who investigated accident that led to licensee’s 

citation); Williams v. Dep[’]t of Transp[.], Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 812 A.2d 736, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) 

(submission of accident report certified by Secretary of 

Transportation was sufficient to satisfy [DOT’s] initial 

burden of proof and shift burden to licensee); Smith v. 

Dep[’]t of Transp[.], Bureau of Driver Licensing, 747 A.2d 

1247, 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (trooper’s testimony 

constituted independent evidence that licensee drove her 

automobile without required insurance coverage through 

which [DOT] made out its prima facie case).
5

Pangallo, 65 A.3d at 1093-94. Accordingly, DOT may issue civil driver’s license 

and vehicle registration suspensions under Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code even 

if a licensee has not been criminally convicted of violating Section 1786(f) of the 

Vehicle Code.

In the instant matter, as the June 27, 2019 hearing commenced, the trial 

court asked Licensee: “[D]id you have insurance on the 3[rd] of January of 2019?” 

R.R. at 15a. Licensee responded: “I did not.”6 R.R. at 15a. She added: “I obtained 

insurance a few days later.” R.R. at 16a. When the trial court asked Licensee what 

she wanted the trial court to do, Licensee answered that she would like the suspension 

overturned. See R.R. at 16a. 

DOT’s counsel clarified to the trial court that Licensee had appealed 

from the citation for her violation of Section 1786(f) of the Vehicle Code, that Officer 

Podolak did not appear for the hearing in that action, and that the court found 

Licensee not guilty of the criminal summary offense. See R.R. at 17a-18a. DOT’s 

counsel further explained that, since suspensions under Section 1786(d) of the 

Vehicle Code are not conviction-based, DOT can nevertheless suspend Licensee’s 

operating privilege if it can prove, either by documentation or operator admission, 

that Licensee was driving without the requisite insurance coverage. See R.R. at 18a20a. The trial court responded: “I didn’t know that. Had I known that, I wouldn’t

have asked her.” R.R. at 19a. DOT’s counsel represented that he “would have asked 

both [Licensee] and [Officer Podolak] whether she produced proof of liability 

coverage.” R.R. at 19a. 

Officer Podolak testified for DOT at the hearing in the current civil 

action that, after he stopped Licensee on January 3, 2019, he asked her to produce her 

driver’s license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. See R.R. at 21a. 

 

6

It is not clear from the record whether Licensee’s admission was made under oath.
6

Although he could not recollect whether Licensee produced insurance coverage 

documents or if she verbally informed him thereof, he recalled that he “made a note 

that there was a State Farm policy and [he] documented the policy number and 

contacted [State Farm,] and [State Farm] stated that the policy was cancelled . . . .” 

R.R. at 21a. The trial court sua sponte declared that Officer Podolak’s testimony 

regarding what he learned from State Farm was hearsay. See R.R. at 21a-23a. When 

DOT’s counsel announced his intention to call Licensee as on cross-examination, the 

trial court declared:

THE [TRIAL] COURT: But she doesn’t remember . . . .

[DOT COUNSEL]: She just admitted a little while ago that 

she didn’t have liability coverage on her Nissan sedan on 

January 3 of this year at 5:47 p.m. Her admission is on the 

record.

THE [TRIAL] COURT: The [trial c]ourt takes 

responsibility for that. I didn’t know that that was an issue 

and I should never have asked her.

. . . .

I am going to sustain [the appeal].

R.R. at 23a-24a. The trial court thereby precluded DOT from meeting its burden of 

proving that Licensee owned the vehicle and that it was not insured while she was 

operating it on January 3, 2019.

This Court acknowledges:

A trial court has discretion to determine both the scope and 

the permissible limits of cross-examination. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, . . . 983 A.2d 1211, 1230 ([Pa.]

2009). The ‘trial judge’s exercise of judgment in setting 

those limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear 

abuse of that discretion, or an error of law.’ Commonwealth 

v. Birch, . . . 616 A.2d 977, 978 ([Pa.] 1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
7

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 335 (Pa. 2011). However, this Court has

specifically ruled:

[DOT] is entitled to call any witness, adverse or otherwise, 

to sustain its burden of proof. Thus, it is evident that the 

law of this Commonwealth allows [DOT] the discretion to 

call [a l]icensee as an adverse witness in its case-in-chief. 

See also Gaul v. Consol[.] Rail Corp., . . . 556 A.2d 892 

([Pa. Super.] 1989) (a witness may be called as on crossexamination when his interest is adverse to the party calling 

upon him to testify. The interest of the witness to be crossexamined must be involved in the suit in the sense that the 

judgment would operate on the witness’ legal rights and 

liabilities and that the interest in question would be 

promoted by the success of the adversary to the party 

calling the witness).

Leek v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 746 A.2d 1171, 1174-75 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2000). Because DOT was clearly entitled to call Licensee as on crossexamination in its case-in-chief, the trial court abused its discretion by ruling 

otherwise. 

Notably, the trial court recognized in its opinion: 

[The trial c]ourt agrees with [DOT] that [Licensee’s] 

admission that she did not have financial responsibility 

insurance on the date of the traffic stop, January 3, 2019, 

was sufficient to establish that she violated Section 1786(d)

[sic] of the Vehicle Code. Therefore, [the trial c]ourt’s 

[o]rder[] of June 27, 2019 should be vacated and the matter 

should be remanded to this [trial c]ourt.

R.R. at 41a. However, in order for DOT to meet its burden, it must prove not only 

that the 2010 Nissan sedan did not have the required insurance coverage while 

Licensee was operating it on January 3, 2019, but that she owned the vehicle and it 

was registered to her at the time. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1786(d).
8

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the trial court’s order is vacated, 

and the matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing at which DOT is 

permitted to call Licensee as a witness in its case-in-chief.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Antonia Davis :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing, : No. 958 C.D. 2019

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of April, 2020, the Allegheny County 

Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) June 27, 2019 order is vacated, and the matter is 

remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing at which the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, is 

permitted to call Antonia Davis as a witness in its case-in-chief.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge