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WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 6, 2012

Serial No. 112–151

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jim Zumwalt, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................... 5

Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies (former Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council) .......... 20

Mr. Daniel S. Lipman, senior vice president, Westinghouse Electric Company 31

Mark Peters, Ph.D., deputy laboratory director for programs, Argonne National Laboratory .................................................................................................. 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Jim Zumwalt: Prepared statement ................................................................. 7

Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 23

Mr. Daniel S. Lipman: Prepared statement .......................................................... 32

Mark Peters, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .............................................................. 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Mike Kelly, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Material submitted for the record ............................. 60

(1)

WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 6, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald A. Manzullo 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. MANZULLO. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will 

now come to order. On Sunday, June 25, 1950, the armies of North 

Korea attacked South Korea in a misguided attempt to forcefully 

alter the future of the Korean peninsula. Sixty-two years later, we 

continue to grapple with the consequences of that war. Much has 

changed for South Korea, however, since that faithful day so many 

years ago. 

South Korea has undergone a dramatic transformation from a 

developing nation to one that is modern, vibrant, and full of promise, and opportunity. The Korean people deserve our full praise and 

admiration for their role in building a nation that is not only an 

economic powerhouse, but one that serves as a beacon of democracy 

and freedom for those oppressed around the world. This is the 

South Korea of today. A country that is standing on its own right, 

alongside advanced democracies in Western Europe, Japan, and 

even the United States. Given the positive changes in South Korea, 

it is only proper for us to consider real ways to improve the U.S.-

Korean alliance beyond a security-focused relationship. 

The future of the U.S.-Korea alliance remains largely unwritten. 

It is an opportunity for us to decide whether we shoot for the stars 

or embrace the status quo. If we choose the path of the status quo, 

then we forfeit a tremendous opportunity to forge a lasting, mutually beneficial relationship for generations to come. This is why I 

urge President Obama, and policy makers on both sides of the Pacific, to think big when it comes to the future of the U.S.-Korean 

alliance. 

First, we must not shy away from having a real discussion regarding the importance of South Korea’s application for a broader 

123 Agreement on civilian nuclear energy. It is in our own interest, 

in the best interest of the United States, to enable Korea to develop 

a reliable source of domestic energy, particularly given the positive 

impact on American jobs in our own manufacturing sector. Korea 

has come a long way since the Cold War and it is my strong conviction that we must negotiate an agreement that reflects not only the 

2

current situation in South Korea, but one that is flexible in the future. 

Developing a closer, more integrated economic relationship with 

South Korea is also in the best interest of the United States. I dare 

say we in the U.S. can learn something from Korea’s intense focus 

on research and development, and its continuing effort to deliver 

excellence in manufacturing. Indeed, Korea’s global brands are now 

at the forefront of the marketplace and there is nothing wrong with 

developing a closer partnership so that we can also benefit from 

their best practices. This is why I believe we should issue more H1B visas so that highly-skilled professionals from South Korea can 

work side-by-side with Americans to help propel America’s economy 

into the future. 

Finally, I want to make clear my stance on an issue that is very 

important to Koreans and Americans of Korean descent, namely 

the issue of the East Sea. I believe it is important for the United 

States not to take sides in a debate between Korea and Japan. 

Both nations are close friends and allies of the United States and 

we should honor both countries by saying once and for all that both 

the name ‘‘East Sea’’ and ‘‘Sea of Japan’’ should be used side-byside. 

The story of Korea is nothing short of a miracle when one considers the progress the nation has made in the past 60 years. I recently traveled to Korea to examine for myself the extent of Korea’s 

development. Let me tell you, I was not only impressed by the 

warmth of the Korean people, but I was blown away at how advanced and refined that country is today. The people of Korea have 

taken full advantage of the peace and security guaranteed by the 

alliance to build a remarkable nation. 

As we celebrate the 60th anniversary of D-Day and the sacrifices 

of the great generation, let us also take a moment to recognize the 

sacrifices of Korean veterans on this important occasion of Memorial Day in Korea. I now recognize the ranking member for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you 

for holding this hearing about the expanding U.S.-Korean alliance 

and I commend the Obama administration for their successful passage of the U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement which will create 

about 70,000 jobs for American workers. The U.S.-Korean Free 

Trade Agreement also promises to increase U.S. gross domestic 

product somewhere between $11 billion to $20 billion in new U.S. 

exports annually. It will also expand U.S. businesses’ access to the $1 trillion South 

Korean market. For now, the U.S. continues to be South Korea’s 

third-largest trading partner and South Korea is the United States 

seventh-largest trading partner. Two years ago, trade between the 

U.S. and South Korea totaled over $86 billion. Given the historic 

nature of the passage of the U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement 

last year, I want to publicly acknowledge the grassroots efforts of 

Mr. Dong-Suk Kim, founder and former president of the KoreanAmerican Voters’ Council. 

Mr. Kim gathered Korean-American business leaders from all 

over the country, urged Congress to pass the U.S. Free Trade 

Agreement, and I applaud him for all that he has done for increasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:06 Jul 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AP\060612\74636 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

ing Korean voter turnout from less than 5 percent in 1996 to over 

65 percent in 2008, and also for his work during the 110th Congress, which led to the successful passage of House Resolution 121; 

a resolution calling upon the Government of Japan to issue a formal apology for the Imperial Armed Forces coercion of some 

200,000 Asian-Pacific young women into sexual slavery during 

World War II. 

Many of these young women were Korean. They are still awaiting their apology from the Government of Japan. Particularly, I 

want to thank my colleague, Congressman Mike Honda of California, for introducing the legislation, and on a bipartisan basis, 

the late Chairman Tom Lantos was also very much a part of that 

legislative activity. Also want to thank Mr. Tom Kim for his tireless efforts in representing the Korean Embassy here in the United 

States. All of us know how hard Mr. Kim had worked to garner 

support for the passage of this legislation. 

I especially commend Korea’s Ambassador to the United States. 

He is actually a former Prime Minister, Han Duck-soo, for his leadership in resolving differences in getting the deal done. Also want 

to express my appreciation for Chairman Kim Seung-youn of the 

Hanwha Group who personally made the time to visit Washington 

and rally support for passage of the U.S.-Korean Free Trade Agreement. Once more, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this 

afternoon. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Congressman Kelly, do you have an 

opening statement? 

Mr. KELLY. I do, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this 

hearing. First of all, I think the relationship between the United 

States and Korea could not be stronger. The Republic is so strong 

with us right now. We have one of the strongest relationships in 

that part of the world and I think the passage, of course, is a good 

example of how we are working closely and geopolitically, how important it is to the United States and the Republic, and, Mr. Kim, 

thank you so much for your tireless work on that. I appreciate it. 

We also have another opportunity to strengthen our trade partnership and advance national security interest in the area of energy. In our second panel today, we are going to hear from the 

Westinghouse Corporation. I got to tell you, after 40 years of our 

really close partnership in nuclear energy, it is now time to renew 

our 123 Agreement with Korea to strengthen our cooperation in 

this area. 

A solid 123 Agreement will create good jobs for Americans in a 

key industry. I am talking about red, white, and blue jobs. I am 

talking about evening the playing field for American energy companies that are competing with foreign companies and ensure American global leadership through energy exports with strong domestic 

energy companies such as Westinghouse. So, Chairman, I want to 

thank you. And again, this is very timely with Memorial celebrations in Korea. 

And this is a partner. The Republic has been a partner with us 

since 1950 in every endeavor we have had militarily. They don’t 

wait for the call, they don’t wait for somebody to say, we need your 

help. They are there and they stay until it is over. So I want to 

4

publicly thank you for that commitment and you need to get that 

same commitment back from the United States, and I think we can 

provide that for you. So, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, along with my 

colleagues, will congratulate Tom Kim for all of his hard work in 

regard to the relationship that we have with Korea. I don’t want 

to be redundant, but a lot of my colleagues here are too young to 

remember the Korean War, but I remember it, and millions of people had to be killed, or wounded, or left their homes when the Communists invaded from the North, and when the Chinese then came 

in as well. 

And we, along with the United Nations’ allies, fought and made 

sure that South Korea remained free. And if you look at that country after the decades since the Korean War, you see what a great 

economic miracle that has taken place in South Korea and you go 

just north of there to North Korea, we were just up there on the 

38th Parallel at Panmunjom just a couple weeks ago, and there is 

no comparison. It is just a disaster. You got a line here and on one 

side you have got complete poverty, and tyranny, and dictatorship, 

and on the other side you have got a miracle that took place since 

the war ended. 

And as my colleagues both have had, or my others have said, 

they have been a friend and an ally forever. We value that friendship. We are committed and will remain committed, I hope, as an 

ally and a supporter of Korea to make sure that we don’t see a revisiting of the Korean War. And I hope that 20, 25, 30 years from 

now our relationship has even grown stronger economically as well 

as militarily. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing 

and I really appreciate you yielding to me. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think all of us realize 

that South Korea has been a long ally, an important ally, for the 

United States and I think relations between our two countries 

stand to become even stronger as the benefits of KORUS, as the 

benefits of this trade agreement, are realized. I think passage of 

the legislation was historic and it is going to bring benefits to both 

the American and Korean economies. Unfortunately, it took years 

for the administration to act and that allowed the European Union 

to gain a foothold in the Korean market at the expense of U.S. 

businesses. 

And I think that took away U.S. marketshare that won’t be easily regained. But now that the legislation is in force, this is an important point. I would like to just speak for a minute about another 

important challenge and that is North Korea, because I think it is 

disappointing that we do not have a proactive policy to change the 

regime in North Korea. Success cannot be built on wishful thinking 

about a regime that has shown a desire only to extract concessions 

from us and from South Korea. 

I think we need to make human rights a central part of our 

agenda. This committee is long focused on the atrocities carried out 

by the regime against its own people. We have heard from numerous North Korean dissidents who have told us of unspeakable cruelties that they have undergone themselves and I am glad that 

5

South Korea has placed an even greater focus on North Korean 

human rights as was evidenced by the massive street demonstrations against China’s repatriation of North Korean refugees. 

Human rights needs to be a centerpiece of this alliance and we 

have yet to fully explore how we can push a human rights agenda 

formed together with our South Korean ally. I think working together with South Korea on this mission, given the suffering that 

is occurring in the North, is very important. I thank you and I 

yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Our first witness is Deputy Assistant 

Secretary James Zumwalt with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He previously served as the Embassy Tokyo Deputy 

Chief of Mission. I met Jim in Beijing a few years ago at the home 

of the Ambassador, when Ambassador Kelly had just returned from 

the initial six party talks and briefed us there at that time. Mr. 

Secretary, we look forward to your testimony. 

Your testimony and the written testimony of all the other witnesses will be made part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JIM ZUMWALT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. ZUMWALT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a 

written statement for the record. Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Faleomavaega, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss our relationship with 

the Republic of Korea. The alliance between the United States and 

the Republic of Korea remains a lynchpin of security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. This alliance has never been stronger. It 

has served us well in countering the threats from North Korea. 

Before discussing our partnership with the Republic of Korea, I 

would note that the greatest challenge our alliance faces continues 

to be North Korea, and the United States is fully committed to the 

defense of the Republic of Korea, and we will continue to stand 

shoulder-to-shoulder in the face of North Korean provocation. We 

will continue to coordinate closely with the Republic of Korea and 

other allies and partners on North Korea policy. 

We are committed to the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but we also remain deeply concerned about the dire human 

rights situation in North Korea. And I agree with the members’ 

comments that we need to work very closely with our allies on addressing North Korean human rights issues. 

The U.S.-Republic of Korea comprehensive strategic partnership 

is based on our common values, our shared interests, and trust 

built up over decades of cooperation. Our common values of commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, along with the 

close ties between the Korean and the American peoples, form a 

foundation of an increasingly global partnership between our two 

great nations. 

The Republic of Korea embraces its role as one of the world’s 

wealthiest nations with the capacity and the responsibility to contribute to resolving global problems. The United States and the 

rest of the international community benefit from Korea’s growing 

global leadership and engagement. Our bilateral ties are growing 

6

and deepening. In the last 3 months, our relationship marked three 

major milestones. 

The first, as many of you mentioned, was the coming into force 

of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. The second was President 

Obama’s third visit to Korea as President. And the third was the 

Republic of Korea cementing its status as a country with global interests when it hosted more than 50 world leaders for the 2012 Nuclear Securities Summit. 

The United States and the Republic of Korea already enjoy one 

of the world’s most vibrant economic relationships. The entry into 

force of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement will lead to even 

more trade and investment between our two countries. Extensive 

people-to-people relations, including robust flows of Korean travelers and Korean students to the Untied States, form a strong base 

for our bilateral relationship. Recent polling shows that 72 percent 

of Koreans hold favorable views of the United States and an even 

larger number see the alliance as strong. 

In closing, I would like to mention that we announced yesterday 

that the United States will host the second ever meeting of our foreign and defense ministers in Washington on June 14th. This 

meeting will enhance our solidarity as our alliance takes on an increasingly global scope. This so-called two-plus-two dialog among 

Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, Korean Foreign Minister 

Kim Sung Hwan and Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan Jin, will 

even further strengthen our alliance, advance our partnership on 

a broad range of global and regional issues, and enhance our close 

coordination on North Korea. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify on this important topic. Congressional support for the Republic of Korea and for our alliance 

and partnership has been critical to the success of our relationship. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zumwalf follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Could you inform us of the status of the administration’s negotiations with South Korea regarding civilian nuclear cooperation and 

what happens if an agreement cannot be reached by 2014 when the 

current 123 Agreement expires? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. As you mentioned, we are talking with the Republic of Korea about a successor agreement on civil nuclear cooperation and I agree with you that negotiating, successfully, a successor 

agreement is very critical and we share the desire to see a vibrant 

South Korean civil nuclear industry. And there are several reasons 

for that; one, of course, we want to see Korea’s economy prosper, 

but also, the U.S. nuclear industry is very closely tied with counterparts in South Korea, so the success of South Korea’s civilian nuclear industry is also a success for the United States. 

And a good example of that was when South Korea successfully 

got a contract to export nuclear reactors in the Persian Gulf and 

that Korean proposal included many components manufactured 

here in the United States. So this was an example of how success 

in the South Korean nuclear industry really is a win-win; a win, 

also, for the United States. So we share that goal to negotiate a 

successor agreement that will lead to Korea’s nuclear industry continuing to prosper. 

We also, of course, and South Korea shares this concern with us, 

have concerns about proliferation of material that could be used in 

manufacturing nuclear weapons. So we are now in the process of 

negotiating an agreement that will meet both of these objectives at 

the same time. We are in the middle of a negotiation. I hesitate, 

a little bit, to answer your question about what would happen if 

we fail because we don’t plan on failing. We plan on succeeding and 

I think, right now, all of our attention is on negotiating an agreement that will be a worthy successor to the agreement we presently have. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Let me rephrase that second question. If the 

agreement expires on its own in 2014, what is the impact of that? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. Yes. I think we agree that having a successor 

agreement is very important and so our intention on both sides, I 

think, is to negotiate so that we can have an agreement and we realize that time is short, so we need to work on this very closely. 

But success is very important to the United States and important 

to Korea. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Congressman Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony this afternoon. It is 

quite obvious, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot talk about U.S.-Korean relations without also including North Korea. A couple of 

months ago we had a hearing on the situation dealing with North 

Korea. We had all kinds of experts that came and testified and how 

well they were very familiar with the situation in North Korea, and 

what we should do, and what the other countries should do, but no 

one ever mentioned the fact that maybe we ought to consult, also, 

with South Korea as part of the equation and the problems that 

we are faced with. 

15

And let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, is the administration seriously consulting with South Korea on all aspects dealing with the 

Korean Peninsula? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. Cooperation with regional partners is very, very 

important and I agree with you completely that it is very important 

for us to consult closely with South Korea, also with Japan, China, 

Russia, and other countries on North Korea. We do consult very 

closely, in fact, Chairman Manzullo, when you were in Seoul, actually, I was there as well with Ambassador Glyn Davies, our special 

envoy for North Korea, who was meeting in Seoul with Korean and 

Japanese counterparts for a trilateral discussion on what we 

should do regarding North Korea. 

He went on to Beijing and then on to Tokyo as well. Ambassador 

Robert King, our Ambassador for North Korea human rights 

issues, was just in Brussels for meetings with friends on North 

Korea human rights issues and his counterparts from Republic of 

Korea, from Japan, and other places, had good discussions——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I didn’t mean to interrupt 

your statement, but I just want to cut to the chase of what I am 

trying to say expressing my sense of concern. There is a feeling 

amongst some of our Asian allies that we do things but sometimes 

they don’t seem to be consulted fully as an equal partner in the 

process. I remember years ago when there was a big debate in the 

Philippines whether or not we should continue having Subic Bay 

and Clark Air Force Base, and guess what, the Philippine Senate 

decided not to have us around because they felt our real purpose 

for being in the Philippines was to provide the strategic and military capability to defend Japan and not necessarily the Philippines. 

So I just wanted to get to that idea. Are we really serious in looking at South Korea as a co-equal partner in the process, and not 

only at our convenience, and not seriously as a co-equal? That is 

the basis of what I am trying to suggest to you or ask you here 

with this question. Are we serious? Is South Korea an equal partner in the process? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. Thank you for that clarification. I agree with you 

that we need to consult very closely with our friends and counterparts in the Republic of Korea about North Korea policy. The next 

opportunity for us to do so will be next week when the Korean foreign and defense ministers come to Washington for meetings with 

Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. And one of the main things 

we will be talking about is our policy——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Secretary Gates? Is he still——

Mr. ZUMWALT. Sorry. Excuse me. Secretary Panetta. Excuse me. 

So that will be the next opportunity for us to have these consultations. But I agree with you completely that full and complete consultations with our counterparts in the Republic of Korea is very 

important as we address North Korea. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The question about the six party talks, and 

quite obviously, it hasn’t gotten anywhere. Do you think that perhaps the negotiation process should actually involve China, the 

United States, North and South Korea? Why is Japan and Russia 

included in the process? Do they have a, literally, direct interest in 

this process? It seems to me that North Korea really wants to deal 

16

more with China and the United States, and as well as with South 

Korea. Why include Russia and Japan in the process? 

Correct me if I am wrong, but would you say that the six party 

talk has been a failure? Why do we continue if it is a failure? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I think we are all very frustrated with our lack 

of progress in talking with North Korea about seeking a different 

path, but we remain determined. If North Korea chooses a different 

approach, we remain prepared to engage with North Korea. But 

really, the problem is not Russia or Japan, or including certain people, the problem really has been in North Korea. And so I think 

our attempt has been to engage regional partners——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt you. My 

time is about ready to go and I just want to say to the chairman 

as a matter of observation. How do you de-nuclearize a country 

that is already nuclear? I just want to leave that with question. 

Okay? Because my time is up. I am sorry. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. You are not going to attempt to answer that 

question, so I will go on to Congressman Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Zumwalt, I know the implementation of the course was a big accomplishment. I think it 

took much too long, but we can’t do anything about what happened 

before. So the implementation right now, is it going smoothly and 

is it improving the relationships that we needed to have with the 

Korean people? 

Because I know in the elections, it hurt the conservative party, 

the fact that we couldn’t get there quicker to the agreement, and 

so since the implementation now, just kind of give us a thumbnail 

sketch of what you see happening and the State Department working with South Korea to make sure that we get the maximum benefit for both countries out of that agreement. 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I think implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free 

Trade Agreement is a very important issue going forward because 

we want to make sure that both sides get the benefits that were 

promised from this agreement. We have a system setup whereby 

there is an oversight committee looking at problems with implementation and the first meeting of that, which was chaired by U.S. 

Trade Representative Kirk here in Washington, occurred just last 

month. 

And actually, this week, we have three committees looking at 

various issues regarding implementation. All reports are, so far, 

the implementation is going well. But another issue in addition to 

implementation, obviously, is making sure that the benefits of the 

agreement are understood by the business communities in both 

countries. And so one other area we want to work on very closely 

is making sure that U.S. companies understand the benefits and 

can take advantage of the benefits that KORUS implementation 

will make available to them. 

Mr. KELLY. And I understand the relationship we are developing. 

Is there anything else you think we can do? Is there anything that 

State Department is looking at? Anything else, other than what 

you have already talked about? I know that that was a tough hurdle to get over and really, it was our dragging our feet on it that 

caused the problem in the Republic. So I like the fact that we the 

17

have open dialog, but the opportunities are really off the charts for 

job creation in both countries and that region of the world. 

It is just really, with a lot of emerging economies, we have a tremendous opportunity right now. 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I agree with you. We do have a tremendous opportunity. Another area where I think the U.S. economy will benefit 

is, I think we will be successful at attracting additional investment 

into the United States because of the additional opportunities that 

KORUS provides. I was just talking with a third-country company 

and they are investing in pork production in the United States, 

partly to export to their home market, but also, they see the benefits of KORUS, and see, potentially, the U.S. as a place from which 

to export to Korea as well. So I think there will be benefits, also, 

in the area of investment as well as trade. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. Excellent. Thank you. I am going to yield back, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. You know, I sometimes wonder why we even talk 

to these guys. We talked years ago with Mengistu in Ethiopia, I 

don’t know if you remember him or not, and we sent truckloads, 

tons, and tons, and tons of food, and he couldn’t distribute the food 

to the people who were starving to death there. Well, he could, but 

he didn’t. So because he couldn’t distribute it the way he wanted 

to, we gave him the trucks to distribute the food, and then he sold 

it, and the people just starved. You can’t trust these tin-horn dictators. 

And what really bothers me about our negotiations with South 

Korea is like that—or North Korea rather, this food aid program 

that we had last year. It smacks of the same thing. You give them 

the food aid, and it goes through the government, and Lord only 

knows where it goes; certainly, probably doesn’t get to the people 

it is intended to help. And these negotiations with them really 

bothers me. 

You know, back in the Clinton administration, we negotiated 

with them on some nuclear reactors and they were going to curtail 

their nuclear program and they didn’t. They lied again. And we 

keep negotiating with them. I just don’t understand it. It seems 

like we ought to draw a line in the sand and say, this is it. We 

are not going to negotiate anymore. Here is what you got to do and 

if you don’t want to do it, you know, you take the initiative and 

we will respond, and we will respond very strongly. 

But it seems like that is the way politicians and leaders do anymore. We negotiate, negotiate, negotiate, like Chamberlain, until 

something like 50 million or 60 million people get killed, then we 

say, oops, we made a little mistake there. You can’t negotiate with 

these dictators; these tyrants. You got to let them know that you 

are not going to go any further with them. 

And then North Korea, with their new constitution, this revised 

constitution which proclaims their country as a nuclear armed nation. They no longer try to veil it. They are now saying, we are a 

nuclear armed nation. So this facade that we have dealt with all 

these years that they were going to start cutting back on their nuclear program was just a wasted amount of time. 

18

So let me just ask one question, I don’t have a lot, I have already 

got my opinions made, so you are not going to change them, I don’t 

think. I don’t like those Communists. I never have. I think they destroy everything, but have we thought about, and some people have 

talked about this, or have we talked to anybody in the South Korean Government about us putting some of our nuclear weapons on 

the South Korean Peninsula as a deterrent, under our control, or 

have we negotiated with them at all in their potential ability to develop weapons of their own? 

I just like to know what the administration’s position is on that 

and what you think about it. 

Mr. ZUMWALT. Thank you very much and I realize I may not 

change your mind, but I would agree with you that we don’t want 

to talk to North Korea just for the sake of talk. And so, unless we 

see a change of policy on the part of North Korea, we are not interested in negotiations just for the sake of a negotiation. So I would 

agree with that comment. Concerning the deterrent, one of the purposes of our alliance is to deter North Korean provocation. And obviously, the deterrent that we provide, including the full range of 

possibilities on the part of the U.S., is very important to us. 

I don’t believe we have had discussions about nuclear weapons 

on the Peninsula because I think the deterrent and the commitment we have made to South Korea is very clear, and we are able 

to meet our security alliance commitments with the present array 

that we now have. Thank you. 

Mr. BURTON. Make one more comment real quick. We have been 

talking to, off and on, the tyrants in Tehran, and it isn’t working, 

and it is not going to work. They just buy more time. And I can’t 

remember any place where we worked and talked with tyrants we 

ever achieved a great deal and I don’t think we are going to there 

either. I think at some point you have to show strength and just 

say, hey, that is it. You want to mess with us, you are going to be 

in big trouble. I know that is a hard line and I know that most people wouldn’t agree with that. 

I mean, you have got to be diplomatic. I just don’t think it is 

going to work. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that is 

changing in North Korea are the attitudes of people as a result of 

watching the DVDs, this influx of DVDs that you have heard 

about, and that brings up this issue of public diplomacy. As people 

watch these South Korean DVDs, we already here the reports from 

studies that show the North Korean Government now has to back 

away from the—you know, they say, well, you live in a worker’s 

paradise and everything is really, really bad in South Korea. 

And now, people know that that is the opposite of being true. 

They know that things are really rough. I have been in North 

Korea. Things are really rough in North Korea, but in South Korea, 

the standard of living is quite high. And so it shatters the myth 

and this gives people second thoughts about the regime they are 

living in. And they are also, of course, learning about what is going 

on in China, the changes in China, but the hermit kingdom is not 

going through any of this. 

19

How can we better use technology to bring information to North 

Koreans? I know that Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel both said 

that it was the radio broadcasts that they and their people were 

listening to in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, that created this change 

in attitude where, after some months of sort of changed approach 

that occurred under the Reagan administration, the reports back 

that I have gotten from those that were involved at the time were 

that, people just changed their attitude, and it was time for 

change, and time for evolution. How do we tap into that? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I agree with you that the more contact that citizens in North Korea have with the outside world, the more likely 

that you will see change occurring. You had mentioned the advent 

of DVDs and people watching DVDs. I think two other noteworthy 

developments are the increase in the use of cell phones, some of 

which have some contacts with ethnic Koreans living in China, for 

example. And the other important vehicle may be medium-wave 

radio broadcasting and——

Mr. ROYCE. And RFA and VOA, we need to do more in terms of 

medium-wave and we need to be a little more provocative, because 

if you will notice, we changed our approach in Eastern Europe 

when we decided it was time to really let people know the truth 

about what was going on and to try to change those regimes. 

And with all the information we are getting from defectors now 

about conditions in the concentration camps, or work camps, whatever you want to call them, getting that information about the regime in real time, and the mistakes being made by the regime, as 

kind of a surrogate news broadcasting service, is really crucial in 

terms of waking people up about the conditions they are living 

under, and the opportunity to change those conditions. 

I am not just talking about people who are farmers. It has a 

marked impact on civil service and on the military. I have talked 

to colonels who have defected and senior civil service who have defected as a result of listening to these broadcasts. But it takes a 

certain change in attitude about what we are going to be willing 

to push and it takes using ex-pats from North Korea and getting 

them, like Mr. Shin, up on the air talking about what they have 

experienced and contrasting that with what they are seeing with 

their eyes in China and South Korea today in order to get people 

to recalibrate their thinking. Could more of that be done? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I think you point out a very good opportunity, 

both government broadcast, like VOA, but also, as you point out, 

they are in South Korea. There are many non-governmental organizations who are also doing broadcasts about information from 

North Korea. And so I think both of those avenues are very important and things that we should continue to support. 

Mr. ROYCE. And how could you help advance that? 

Mr. ZUMWALT. I think, obviously, that is a very important area 

that we need to consider how we can advance more because I do 

think that radio broadcasting is one of the most promising channels for getting more information to people inside North Korea. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Maybe we can talk later about some additional 

ideas. Maybe you all could come up with some. Maybe go back and 

talk to some of the people that handled Eastern Europe, and see 

how they did it, and come up, maybe, with a little bit more aggresVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:06 Jul 17, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AP\060612\74636 HFA PsN: SHIRL
20

sive plan for communication with people, and for more DVDs; ways 

to get those into the country in order to enlighten people in North 

Korea. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Thank you, Secretary 

Zumwalt; I appreciate it. 

If we could have the staff get the next three witnesses and while 

they are being seated I am going to read their biographies. Dr. Victor Cha is Director of Asian Studies, holds the D.S. Song Chair in 

the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at 

Georgetown University. In 2009, he was named as senior advisor 

and the inaugural holder of the new Korea Chair at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 

He left the White House in May of 2007 after serving as Director 

for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council since 2004. At 

the White House, he was responsible, primarily, for Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands 

national affairs. Dr. Cha is also the Deputy Head of Delegation for 

the U.S. at the six-party talks in Beijing and received two outstanding service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. 

Mr. Dan Lipman assumed his position in September 2009 as senior vice president of operation support at Westinghouse Electric 

Company. He’s responsible for corporate operating groups, which 

includes the global supply chain, quality assurance, and continuous 

improvement, IT, corporate strategy, risk management, environmental health and safety, sustainability, and anything else that 

has to be done at Westhinghouse. From 2005 to 2009, Mr. Lipman 

served as senior V.P. of nuclear power plants, responsible for managing the global deployment of new power plants. He has served 

as president of Westinghouse Asia, with regional duties for China, 

South Korea, and Taiwan. 

Dr. Mark Peters is the deputy laboratory director for programs 

at Argonne National Laboratories. His responsibilities include 

management and integration of the lab’s science and technology 

portfolios, strategic planning, the Laboratory Directed Research 

and Development program, and technology transfer. His duties also 

include technical support to the Department of Energy Fuel Cycle 

R&D Program, where he was previously national technical director 

for used fuel disposition. 

Prior to his current position, Dr. Peters served as the deputy associate lab director for the Energy Sciences and Engineering Directorate. The responsibilities of this position included the management and integration of the lab’s energy R&D portfolio. 

We are going to start with Dr. Cha. Dr. Cha, I understand you 

have a train that leaves at 4 o’clock, and so any time that you want 

to leave to catch that train you can feel free to get up and leave. 

How does that sound? Go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

(FORMER DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Faleomavaega, members of the committee, it is an honor to be here 

with you today. I have submitted a statement for the record and 

21

I will offer a brief summary of my remarks. I have testified before 

this committee before, and I would say without hesitation, the challenges of dealing with Korea remain quite difficult. But in terms 

of the alliance, which we are here to talk about today, as you have 

said, it is at an all-time high. The relationship between the Presidents could not be any better. 

The tone in the relationship is very good, but it is not just the 

personalities that are involved, it is the issues. South Korea has 

really stepped up to be a global player, whether the issues have to 

do with climate change, or non-proliferation, or overseas development assistance. Korea has really become a big player and that has 

been very important for the overall relationship. The North Korea 

threat has also brought the two leaders much closer together and 

the two governments much closer together. 

With regard to the future, I would hazard a guess as to say that, 

you know, with elections, we have elections here, but there are also 

elections in Korea. Congressman, you were there a couple of weeks 

ago and saw what the atmosphere was like over there; quite intense politically. But I think in terms of the overall alliance relationship, it is going to be okay. I think the outer bounds, whether 

it is the progressives or the conservatives that get elected, the 

outer bounds of the agendas in which the two sides could go, I 

think, has narrowed quite a bit and moved much more to the center. 

The tone won’t be as superlative as it is today and I think that 

is just politics. As a new administration comes in they are going 

to want to distance themselves from the previous administration, 

so the tone will go back to normal, but overall, I think it will be 

okay. Having said this, I do think we need to think about a new 

framework for the alliance as we go forward. 

I was in Seoul a couple of weeks ago, as you were in Seoul a couple of weeks ago, and the South Koreans were pressing on issues, 

but they are outside of a broader framework. And I think we really 

need to think about the broader framework as we contextualize 

these different negotiations. So what I would offer; three things. 

The first is, I think we need to think about this alliance in terms 

of its global scope. The U.S. and Korea not only deal with issues 

on the Peninsula, they operate in the world globally, and both of 

them contribute to the public goods of the international system, 

whether that is climate change, G-20, nuclear security, proliferation security initiative, all these sorts of things, Korea and the 

United States are working together. And I think it is in this context that they should work together and think about how they can, 

together, help to promote a global civil nuclear energy regime that 

is transparent, that is accountable, but one in which South Korea 

can be a leading supplier of global nuclear energy. 

Second would be the regional role. And here, the alliance and its 

main mandate is try to shape a region in which China will make 

the right choices. South Korea, in many ways, is the frontline state. 

It is the only real ally of the United States that is connected to the 

continent and Asia has always been a maritime relationship and a 

continental relationship. And Korea has always been sort of the 

frontline continental state for us. In that sense, it is critical. And 

so I think in this regard, it is very important for the United States 

22

and Korea to work with Japan, the three countries together, in 

terms of shaping an environment that helps to make China make 

the right choices. 

Specifically here, more cooperation between Japan and Korea on 

certain security agreements that they are now working on, a military information sharing agreement, and a couple of other agreements that should be finished, because I think that is good for both 

countries as well as good for the United States. 

Finally, the third aspect would be the Peninsula scope of the alliance. And here, the critical issue, of course, is how the alliance 

deals with a nuclear North Korea. It is a U.S. responsibility that 

as it goes through military transformation on the Peninsula, to create a force presence and an alliance that fits with dealing with the 

new challenge of a nuclear North Korea. And again, it is in this 

context that I think the United States and Korea should look at the 

NMG, the new missile guidelines, and come up with a solution that 

will help to enforce and ensure deterrence on the Peninsula to 

deter a nuclear North Korea. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Congressman Faleomavaega. Oh, I am sorry. 

Forgive me. 

Mr. Lipman.

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL S. LIPMAN, SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY 

Mr. LIPMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Faleomavaega, 

members of the subcommittee, and of course, subcommittee staff. 

I am pleased to be here today. Unlike Dr. Cha, this is my first time 

testifying before Congress, so forgive me in advance if I am a little 

tense. I would say that I am not at all anxious, however, in forthrightly testifying in support of the U.S.-Korean 123 Agreement. I 

consider it a vital part of the strategic relationship with benefits 

that, of course, relate to jobs, but also, in the areas of nuclear safety and strategic partnership. 

It is important that we allow this 30-year technical cooperation 

to continue uninterrupted. I think commercial nuclear trade between our two countries has been very significant. Nineteen of the 

23 reactors in Korea are based on Westinghouse technology. I find 

it helpful to characterize the nuclear trade in, sort of, three main 

areas. The first would be exports that come directly from the 

United States to Korea. That has been a very healthy export trade. 

The second area that has really emerged, only in the last decade, 

have been Korean exports into the American nuclear program. I 

know you are aware of nuclear power plants being built now in 

South Carolina and the State of Georgia. Those do have many 

manufactured goods, large nuclear components, that are fabricated 

in Korea. A very important part of the nuclear renaissance is our 

partnership with Korea and Korean companies. 

And the third aspect is something that was touched on before, it 

is kind of new twist in the relationship, and it involves third countries. So this would be countries other than Korea and the United 

States where we partner with Korean companies to take advantage 

and derive value out of those export markets. Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Zumwalt mentioned the United Arab Emirates. That was 

a contract won by KEPCO, but there is very significant American 

scope in that contract in the United Arab Emirates. 

There are approximately 1500 full-time jobs in 14 different states 

involved in manufacturing, and engineering, and other technical 

jobs that will continue for 6 or 7 years. To me, that is a trade and 

a value worth keeping. 

Finally, I think one other impact well beyond the trade agenda 

has to do with nuclear safety. This is a non-partisan issue. Certainly, in the post-Fukushima environment, nuclear safety is on the 

top of everyone’s agenda. And really, allowing Korea, but also other 

markets, access and continued access to American nuclear technology, which in my view, is the most advanced, the safest, with 

the best operating practices, is something that is very important to 

continue to reinforce. 

In summary, I think the 123 Agreement is something that needs 

to be focused on, that needs to be expeditiously negotiated in 

Korea, and of course, I think this subcommittee will hear, in the 

32

coming months and year, about other nuclear cooperation agreements in the region as well. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipman follows:]


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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Dr. Peters. 

STATEMENT OF MARK PETERS, PH.D., DEPUTY LABORATORY 

DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS, ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Chairman Manzullo, Ranking Member 

Faleomavaega, and the distinguished members of this subcommittee for your invitation to testify here today. My name is 

Mark Peters and I am the Deputy Laboratory Director for Programs at Argonne National Laboratory, however, today I am speaking on behalf of the American Nuclear Society. Mr. Chairman, I 

ask that my full written testimony be entered into the record and 

I will summarize it briefly here. 

I appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the American Nuclear Society, or ANS, on used nuclear fuel recycling as a 

means to achieve an integrated solution to energy and waste management policy. The ANS is a not-for-profit international scientific 

and educational organization with nearly 12,000 members worldwide; our core purpose being to promote awareness and understanding of the application of nuclear science and technology. 

We also wish to acknowledge our longstanding professional collaboration with the Korean Nuclear Society. For more than 40 

years, our two organizations have worked together to promote the 

safe and secure use of nuclear technology and materials. For decades, the United States has grappled with the multiple challenges 

of crafting a long-term solution for the management of used nuclear fuel. These persistent challenges have taken on new urgency 

in the wake of the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 

Power Plant, which has focused international attention on used nuclear fuel storage. 

Although the challenges of waste management require close scrutiny, these issues are most effectively considered within the context 

of a integrated policy for nuclear energy and nuclear waste management. Unfortunately, the United States is unique in its lack of 

such an integrated policy. Most other nations that rely on nuclear 

energy, including France, Russia, China, Japan, and the Republic 

of Korea, have policies in place, or a plan, that promote development of used fuel recycling and advanced fast reactors in order to 

ensure the long-term sustainability of their nuclear investments. 

We must consider our nuclear energy technology collaborations 

and partnerships within this global context. At present, the United 

States’ strategic investments in advanced nuclear energy technologies are lagging. As a result, we rely increasingly on collaborative arrangements with foreign research institutions to conduct 

research in these areas. These collaborations provide advantages to 

both parties and the United States has benefitted from them. 

However, close alignment between the government and nuclear 

industries in these nations speeds the international deployment of 

these cooperatively developed technologies, such as used fuel recycling and fast reactor technologies, while the United States has 

moved much slowly in its option. The Republic of Korea has publicly expressed its interest in incorporating electrometallurgical reprocessing technology, commonly known as pyroprocessing, into its 

38

long-term nuclear fuel cycle plans. Pyroprocessing offers several potential benefits over current aqueous recycling techniques, such as 

the PUREX process being used in France and Japan today. 

These include the ability to recover minor actinides, which otherwise contribute significantly to long-term radiotoxicity in used nuclear fuel, fewer releases of fission gases in tritium, and the lack 

of production of pure plutonium, which, with proper integration of 

safeguards, helps to address proliferation concerns. Clearly, there 

will be engineering challenges inherent in the development of 

pyroprocessing technology, as there are with any advanced manufacturing process. However, these challenges can be addressed 

through joint research and development activities, and solving 

these challenges will have important implications for the United 

States as well as the Republic of Korea. 

The American Nuclear Society believes that nuclear fuel recycling has the potential to reclaim much of the residual energy in 

used fuel currently in storage as well as used fuel that will be produced in the future, and that recycling offers a proven alternative 

to direct disposal of used fuel in a geologic repository. In other nations, recycling nuclear fuel with proper safeguards and materials 

controls, under the auspices of the IAEA, has demonstrated that 

high-level waste volumes can be reduced safely and securely while 

improving the sustainability of energy resources. 

It is the opinion of the ANS that the United States should begin 

planning a thoughtful and orderly transition to nuclear fuel recycling in parallel with the development of a geologic repository. Recycling would enhance the repository’s efficiency, eliminating the 

need for more complex and expensive engineering barriers, and reducing the time frame of concern from more than 100,000 years to 

a few hundred years. The ANS also believes that the United States 

should accelerate development of fast spectrum reactors, which are 

uniquely capable of generating energy while consuming long-lived 

waste. 

Six decades ago on December 20, 1951, scientists and engineers 

from Argonne National Laboratory started a small electrical power 

generator attached to an experimental fast reactor, creating enough 

energy to power four 200 watt electrical bulbs. That historic 

achievement demonstrated the peaceful use of nuclear energy and 

launched today’s global commercial nuclear industry. It should not 

be overlooked that the first electricity generated through nuclear 

energy was produced using a fast reactor. 

In closing, let me reiterate that the ANS believes that nuclear 

energy has a significant role to play in meeting the global energy 

demands of the 21st century and the global expansion of nuclear 

energy can be achieved safely and securely. And I look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Now we are ready for Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Cha, I noted 

with interest you made a very interesting observation about thinking outside the box as you had suggested. And you mentioned three 

areas about global scope of the U.S.-Korean alliance, the importance of, also, the regional geopolitical impetus of this whole thing, 

am I correct in reading that, currently, our South Korean neighbors 

are only allowed to fire missiles that can go only a distance of 123-

something miles, and in the meantime, North Korea is capable now 

of firing missiles that can 2500 miles? 

Our we willing to help South Korea to give a deterrent capability 

in that regard or is South Korea totally dependent on the U.S. for 

its security as well? I am a little fuzzy on this. 

Mr. CHA. Well, thank you for the question. I think that it is a 

difficult issue between the two countries. It is a difficult negotiation right now. And I think the South Koreans do feel like, as you 

said, with the North Koreans pushing for missiles in ranges of 

2000, 3000 kilometers, the South Koreans are limited by MTCR 

guidelines and seek some sort of exception to that, not that they 

would export, but for their own defense and deterrence. And so it 

is a problem in the sense that South Korea wants a credible deterrent. As they move to OPCON transition in 2015, they want a credible deterrent against North Korea. 

You know, I think the problem right now is that the issue is just, 

we are at the end of two administrations, and so the two sides are 

fighting over issues without putting them in a broader contextual 

frame work, and I think that is what we really need right now if 

we are going to move forward on NMG guidelines between the two 

countries. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I had raised the question earlier with Secretary Zumwalt about the idea that sometimes we have become a 

little paternalistic, or what is another word, patronizing, that we 

don’t really share in a way that our Asian allies feel that we are 

truly co-partners rather than just someone lesser. The idea that we 

tend, sometimes, to talk down to these people and not say, hey, you 

are just as important as we are. And am I correct in, right now, 

the sense of the Korean people that, if I am correct, 63 percent of 

the people said they are sick and tired of the intimidations they get 

from North Korea and just, somehow, they are not able to return 

the favor, so to speak, if they keep making this intimidating conduct against the people of South Korea. What do you think of that? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think at a military level, if there is another 

North Korean provocation there is no doubt in my mind that this 

time the South Korean military will respond kinetically, point of 

origin, supporting systems and maybe even command systems. I 

mean, I think after the events of 2010, it is pretty clear that is 

what they are going to do. And so they have a response to the next 

North Korean provocation, but for various reasons, they feel the 

need to do things new on the Peninsula that enhances their deterrence as the North Koreans continue to push for more nuclear capabilities and more long-range missile capabilities. 

So in that sense, it is an understandable demand on the part of 

the South Koreans. I think that one of the problems is, is that, 

46

from a U.S. perspective, we want to see them, if they want to have 

this capability they have to also have some of the bridging capabilities in terms of intelligence, ISR, C4I, command and control capabilities that would allow them to efficiently operate these systems, 

and that if they were to have such systems, they should be under 

some sort of joint, sort of, command and control guidelines between 

the U.S. and ROK within the alliance. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Lipman, I am interested that you mentioned something about nuclear safety, and I am very curious, how 

many nuclear reactors has Westinghouse built for Japan as well as 

with South Korea; if there is that data available? 

Mr. LIPMAN. The earliest Japanese nuclear power plants that 

were pressurized water reactors were built by Westinghouse directly. Soon thereafter, that would be in the 1970s and ’80s, the 

Japanese began to take a Westinghouse design, Kansai Electric 

Power Company——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I hate to interrupt you, but my time is killing me. I just wanted to make an observation. We are concerned 

about nuclear safety if we are to export in South Korea, but isn’t 

it just as important an issue that we can’t even find a place to put 

our own nuclear waste? Yucca Mountain in Nevada and all the 

issues that we spent a $100 billion in setting up this Yucca Mountain that we can’t even export nuclear waste to. Isn’t that a very 

serious issue even within our own country? 

Mr. LIPMAN. I think, certainly, the U.S. domestic nuclear program would benefit greatly if there were a waste repository in 

America, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to mention to Dr. Peters, you have Three Mile Island, you have 

got Chernobyl, you got Fukushima, and I wanted to ask ten more 

questions about that, but I will forego my time. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to direct most of 

my questions to Mr. Lipman because I am very familiar with Westinghouse. In fact, I have some slides that I would like people to 

take a look at. This is an area in Western Pennsylvania. I think 

the footprint is about 104 acres, 105 acres, Mr. Lipman, and if you 

were to see it today, and I think we can show it today, what the 

end product was, this is the new Westinghouse facility in Cranberry Township just north of Pittsburgh. 

And so my point is, we talk about the global economy, we talk 

about global opportunities, we talk about our energy strategy, we 

talk about all these things, but I think to the average American, 

they don’t understand what we are talking about because opportunity is only there for so long and you either win the prize or you 

come in second, and nobody gets an award for second place. So, Mr. 

Lipman, I have watched Westinghouse over the years, and the impact that it has had, and the global opportunities. And in a country 

that now is so desperately looking for jobs and looking for opportunities. 

Maybe you can just take a few minutes to tell people the importance of our relationship with the Republic of Korea, and the expiration of Section 123, and the fact that it takes so long for us to 

47

get things done, and time is of the essence. And I would agree that, 

you know, it is good to talk about it, and it is good to vet it, and 

it is good to get it out there for everybody to have a chance to talk, 

but in the meantime, you don’t compete—I am an automobile dealer, so I compete against the guy next door to me, or the guy down 

the street, you compete against countries. 

Your company, Westinghouse, competes against Russia, competes 

against France, and until we begin to understand the relationship 

that we better start to have, and understand who it is that we are 

competing against, because quite frankly, I don’t want to be in a 

fair fight with anybody. I want to make sure that we win and we 

have everything right now at our disposal. If you could just talk a 

little bit about Westinghouse, and what Westinghouse has done, 

and the tremendous global opportunities for a country that is 

aware and has a strategy to aggressively go after what is out there. 

Mr. LIPMAN. Thank you, Congressman. And in fact, those pictures you saw, it dawned on me that, we built that headquarters 

because we beat the Russians and we beat the French in an open 

competition in China, okay? We would not have built that facility, 

we would not have moved, and we would not have hired several 

thousand new employees, both young folks and mid-career folks, 

had we not won in China. And the point that you make is germane, 

not just to Westinghouse, Congressman, but to all of the nuclear 

industry, which is, we can never forget that, as private companies 

in America, this is, what I would simply call, smashmouth international competition. 

We are against the Russians. We are against the French. We will 

be against the Chinese some day. And everything that we can do 

as a country to coordinate our international export policies, to put 

in place concerted government effort for advocacy in these export 

markets, to leverage our technology, to put in place these agreements, not just this Korea agreement, but the other agreements to 

which I referred, which may be coming up in front of this subcommittee for Taiwan, for Malaysia, for Vietnam, the latter two 

being new markets, getting in place an export control policy, which 

is the purview of the Department of Energy, that is not as complex, 

that makes it easy for American companies to participate, and also, 

supporting nuclear liability regimes for insurance and so forth. 

This is a global nuclear industry. This is not like the Cold War 

where two countries had nuclear power and basically could sell and 

stipulate conditions whenever and to whomever they wished. This 

is a highly dynamic market. If this agreement is allowed to lapse, 

or if we cannot conclude agreements with other countries for one 

reason or another, other countries will step in and take that. It will 

be like taking food out of our mouths. 

And so the kinds of policies that we need involve significant U.S. 

Government coordination, the use of financing and other strategies, 

and the best advocacy that we can put together or we won’t be having that kind of economic development in this country. Thank you. 

Mr. KELLY. I appreciate your comments, but listen, we are in a 

battle, globally, and would you want to just explain the global market to Westinghouse. Where is your market right now; percentagewise? 

48

Mr. LIPMAN. Sure. We have gone from being a, what I would say, 

purely domestically-oriented company where 80 percent of our work 

was derived here in the United States to we are approaching just 

the converse. That is to say, three quarters to 80 percent of our 

business come from outside the United States, by the way, not all 

in new plants, but we sell nuclear fuel. We provide nuclear services 

and engineering in Europe, and Latin America, and in other parts 

of Asia, and frankly, that is where the growth is going to be. 

The growth in electricity demand is much more outside the 

United States, sir, than inside. And any company wants to position 

itself to where the market growth is. So this is really about international competition and international growth driving the health of 

American companies. 

Mr. KELLY. Okay. Thank you. And we are much too close to midnight to debate this much longer. We have got to get this taken 

care of, and get the 123 back on the board and ready to go. Thank 

you so much. Could I have time? Is that possible? 

Mr. MANZULLO. I will recognize Mr. Burton then you can yield. 

Mr. BURTON. I would be happy to yield some time to my colleague. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I appreciate that because, again, and I apologize to the other two witnesses, but a lot of times we talk down 

here. And the talk that we have may make sense to very few people in the room because that is what you do every day, but the 

American people are looking for jobs right now. And we are looking 

for jobs everywhere possible and we are looking for markets that 

are open to us and that we can lead in. And I really think when 

you talk about nuclear safety, when you set the pace, you also set 

the standard. And so the rest of the world has to keep pace with 

you. 

They can’t come out with an inferior product and say, well, we 

are going go ahead and push this out. So I think the criticalness 

of everything that we are doing right now and the alliance that we 

have, right now, with South Korea is so critical both from a business standpoint and a geopolitical standpoint, and my worry, constantly, is that sometimes we miss the bigger picture. We concentrate on one small thing and we think, this is the thing that 

really is the driver behind it and we forget about where our success 

would be, and it is the world. It is the world. 

And domestically, I think we have kind of looked beyond that, 

but we do have an opportunity right now in this relationship that 

we have had with the Republic of South Korea is so strong and so 

important. And I think that this opportunity is like this, when you 

can shed a light on that and the American people can understand, 

and when you bring that together, you know, American innovation 

and American leadership, the upside of this is so phenomenal. 

There is no reason for this country, ever, to be in second place to 

anybody, anywhere in the world. 

So again, I thank you for your leadership and I thank you for the 

aggressiveness of your company. And any way that I think that we 

can be helpful, just let us know. I think sometimes we get caught 

up in the minutia. We forget about, at the end of the game, we 

want to win. So thank you again. And I yield back. Thanks, Mr. 

Burton. 

49

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Kelly, I like the way you talk. A kinetic response. You know, a lot of people in the audience are wondering, 

what in the hell is he talking about? So why don’t you define a kinetic response? 

Mr. CHA. Well, as you know very well, in 2010, the North Koreans sunk a South Korean Naval Vessel——

Mr. BURTON. Oh, I know all that. Yes. 

Mr. CHA [continuing]. On a South Korean island. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. 

Mr. CHA. And the South Koreans have basically done a complete 

bottom-up review of how they respond militarily to these things. 

And basically, they are going to strike back. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, I know, but I want you to define the kinetic 

response. I mean——

Mr. CHA. They are going to blow up stuff. 

Mr. BURTON. There you go. There you go. We appreciate that. I 

just want to make sure everybody understood what you were talking about. 

Mr. KELLY. And I like the way you talk, Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Some of these people around here don’t have a 

Ph.D. in physics and stuff, so you know. Let me ask you this, about 

a week ago, I was up at Panmunjom on the 38th Parallel up there, 

and the Communist soldiers came out of that building up there, 

and came sticking their nose in the window, and trying to take pictures of all of us. I don’t know why. I don’t think I look that good 

anyhow. But nevertheless, they were taking pictures, and glaring 

at us, and making signs, and everything, and we understood we 

couldn’t make a sign back. We might start a war. So it was kind 

of interesting. 

But what do mean by a credible deterrent? They are 40 miles 

from Seoul and by the time Seoul could respond, they could have 

half the city destroyed and those people are crammed together in 

that city in these high-rise apartments like you wouldn’t believe. 

It is very densely populated. What I would like to know is, how can 

South Korea defend itself and respond if there is another movement like we saw with the ship and the other land? 

Mr. CHA. Well first, the core of deterrents has been the U.S.-

ROK alliance and in that sense, the North Koreans have attempted 

these small-scale provocations, but they have not, since 1950, tried 

another all-out invasion. And I think that is largely because they 

know that if they tried an invasion like that, they could do a great 

deal of damage to Seoul, but this would be a war they would lose. 

Mr. BURTON. Yes. Well, but, you know, you talk about a credible 

deterrence, and I am not sure you can answer this, but I would like 

to know what you think, and that is, you know, they attacked the 

ship, they have made a couple of attacks, they have killed a number of people, and there hasn’t been much of a response other than, 

you know, if you do it again we are going to poke you in the nose. 

And that usually doesn’t sit well with those people. Like I said before, tyrants like that only react to strength. And we had a peace 

through strength under Reagan. 

And I just wondered, you know, what would be something that 

would deter them from doing that again? They have done it twice. 

They have got this new young guy up there who is 20-something 

50

years old. I would just like to know what, in your opinion, would 

be a credible deterrent to really stop them from doing that sort of 

thing that would provoke and cause another exchange? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think the most credible deterrent would be to 

punish them for the next time that they do it. Short of that, I think 

very credible deterrents are things like ASW exercises, anti-submarine warfare exercises, in that part of the region, better 

counterfire artillery on the part of the South Koreans, and all these 

things have been developed between the U.S. and the ROK since 

the provocations of 2010. 

Ultimately, the test of deterrence, really, is their behavior. And 

if they don’t do anything, then we can say deterrence succeeded. 

But if they do take another action, the only way to uphold deterrence is to punish them. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, okay. I think that at least was an attempt to 

answer my question, so I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Punish them kinetically. 

Mr. CHA. Kinetically. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Kinetically. Mr. Sherman from Sherman Oaks, 

California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It is, indeed, America’s best named city. I am 

hearing reports of goods being manufactured in Kaesong in North 

Korea, and being shipped to South Korea for relabeling, and then 

designed for export to the United States. What systems do we have 

in force that would even catch that? I don’t know if any of our witnesses has a response. 

Mr. CHA. Congressman Sherman, you know the KORUS agreement better than I do. I think what was intended by the KORUS 

agreement was if there are activities related to Kaesong that are 

being sent to the United States, that would have to come under review as a part of the deliberation mechanism if either of us have 

problems with the implementation of KORUS. My understanding is 

that there may be—I mean, in Kaesong, there may be some packaging that is done by these workers in Kaesong of South Korean 

products, but I don’t know where the ultimate export destination 

for those products go. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Would they be eligible for favorable treatment 

under the trade agreement if the packaging work, or any other 

work on the product, was done in Kaesong? 

Mr. CHA. I don’t have an answer to you for that question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Got you. There is a lot of press coverage of this, 

but which gentleman here can describe how powerful is the current 

arsenal of nuclear weapons of North Korea according to unclassified information, and the weapons they have tested, how do they 

compare with the two weapons that were used in anger; Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki? 

Mr. CHA. I think the unclassified’s assessment is that they have 

enough plutonium for, maybe, 8 to 12 weapons. The first test, October 2006, was, I think, technically described as a fizzle. 

Mr. SHERMAN. There was a detectable explosion. I don’t know 

enough about nuclear physics to know how you have a nuclear explosion that is a fizzle, but that is the description I have had. 

51

Mr. CHA. That is the description. Yes. And the second one was 

more than a fizzle. I mean, there are aspects of this that we can 

talk about. We can’t talk about it in this forum. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Got you. 

Mr. CHA. But the second one was more than a fizzle and was determined to be a nuclear test as well. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Do you see North Korea as developing its nuclear 

weapons for its national security or as a lever to get aid and benefits from the Western World? 

Mr. CHA. I don’t think North Korea is building weapons to give 

them up. I think they are building them to keep them and to use 

them for coercive bargaining purposes. And we have been engaged, 

really, since Ronald Reagan, in a dialog with North Korea to try 

to get them to give up their nuclear weapons and I don’t think they 

are going to give them up. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now, one thing that the North Koreans had wanted was a non-aggression pact with the United States. I think they 

were rebuffed on the theory that the U.S. doesn’t sign non-aggression pacts. Is that something they still want and why in the hell 

didn’t we put that on the table as a possibility in the negotiations? 

Mr. CHA. In the last round of six party talks, we did put on the 

table something called a negative security assurance, in which we 

put in writing that the U.S. would not attack North Korea with nuclear conventional weapons. A non-aggression pact really doesn’t 

solve any problems because, that negative security assurance was 

the first time the United States has ever given a negative security 

assurance to a country, and it got us nowhere. The North Koreans 

simply pocketed that and moved on to the next thing that they 

wanted. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We didn’t give it to them. We indicated we might 

give it to them, so they weren’t able to put it in their pocket. 

Mr. CHA. Well, it was in the text of the 2005 joint statement, not 

a non-aggression pact, but the negative security assurance. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, but a negative security assurance, with all 

due respect to the Executive Branch of Government, is pretty 

meaningless without it being a treaty. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, for Mr. Lipman. A South Korean consortium recently signed a contract that will provide for commercial nuclear 

reactors to the UAE and that consortium includes Westinghouse. 

What factors helped South Korea win the UAE deal, if I could ask? 

Mr. LIPMAN. In other words, Congressman, why did they win it? 

Mr. ROYCE. Correct. 

Mr. LIPMAN. Okay. And there was a bit of a discussion before you 

walked in. They have a very aggressive commercial diplomacy 

which puts nuclear exports at the forefront of their foreign commercial policy. And that included visits by the President of Korea 

to the United Arab Emirates to discuss this deal with the Emirates. It included a very good financing package, which the Korea 

Electric Power Company were able to offer. I would also say that 

the Koreans have been very active in the Middle East in conventional construction and desalination. In other words, they have big 

footprint in the region. Korean companies are very active, not just 

in energy, but non-energy too. 

52

So you put those things together and they had, also, U.S.-origin 

technology. As I said earlier, their commercial reactor offering is an 

older type of Westinghouse nuclear power plant. And all things put 

together, it was a pretty powerful commercial package which they 

were able to offer the Emirates, which the Emirates took. 

Mr. ROYCE. I see. I see. I was going to ask, also, Dr. Cha a question. Thinking back to the time that you spent at the White House 

in looking at this issue of trying to engage North Korea, would you 

say more time was spent in negotiations, or planning negotiations, 

with the North Koreans, or more time spent trying to figure out 

how to get information into the country that would change the regime? I am just trying to figure out on the top of the to-do list, how 

much pure energy is spent thinking outside the box in order to 

change the equation versus how much time is just managing the 

crisis and figuring out how to continue the negotiations? 

Mr. CHA. Congressman, I would probably put the balance at 90 

percent negotiations and 10 percent thinking out of the box in 

terms of information input. 

Mr. ROYCE. Because, since the ’94 framework agreement, and we 

were here for the ’94 framework agreement, the same strategy has 

been deployed, and yet, the reports that I hear from defectors coming out of North Korea that indicate some hope for change in the 

calculus, really, to go to some of the quotes that we received from 

some of them. 

One North Korean defector said,

‘‘I like the dramas that we are now watching in North Korea, 

because they depict everyday life in South Korea. It is not that 

I am curious, but it is more that you can see how much South 

Korea has developed. It is easy to compare the living standards 

of North and South Korea when watching these dramas. And 

this then, causes people to rethink their support for the regime.’’

Another quote we had from another North Korean defector,

‘‘North Korea only shows beautiful images, but in South Korean dramas, there is fighting and I think this is realistic.’’

I think he is talking about in a family setting here.

‘‘This is realistic. There is also poverty. But in North Korea, 

they only show you good things so it is not real. It does not 

seem real.’’

So there is a disconnect for people between what their government 

is telling them about the society they are in and they are now realizing the reality of what is happening outside. 

And yet, the amount of effort that I have ever been able to uncover being invested in this, when we look at non-proliferation, I 

just remember how effectively the North Koreans managed to build 

that reactor on the Euphrates River and attempt to give Syria nuclear weaponry. And that all went on without us—we were sitting 

there in negotiations not even understanding that, not only were 

they breaking their agreement on that accord, but also, they were 

dual-tracking their weapons program, and we were late to pick up 

to any of that. 

53

But the fundamental answer would seem, to me, to be the one 

deployed in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union in Russia. It is to think outside the box and change the equation. Would 

you say in retrospect that, going forward, that might be where we 

want to put more of our energy? 

Mr. CHA. I think that very well may be, Congressman. You know, 

I think back now and I think I was maybe in a 100 meetings on 

six party related to de-nuclearization and maybe two on getting information into the country. I think one of the operational problems 

that we had is that, this has to be something that your body and 

others push upon the agencies that are responsible for this in the 

U.S. Government to take as a serious issue rather than as a side 

project, because, when it is a side project, the agencies that are in 

power to do these things keep wanting to push it off of one another 

because they don’t want to handle it. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, if I could close, that is one of the things that 

was communicated to me by some who were involved during Reagan’s tenure in the effort to have this impact in public diplomacy. 

There was a single-minded focus from the administration on down 

that we were going to get people the information that changed 

their attitudes and changed the balance in those societies. And it 

seemed to work like clockwork. 

Once the communication began to deliver the message that really 

resonated. Once they got the pulse of Eastern Europeans, and I 

was over there in Eastern Europe. I remember interviewing people. 

I was in Eastern Germany. I remember the way that caught on. 

I mean, in the polling, it shows how quickly the society’s attitudes 

changed. I would hope that we could rethink some of this. Thank 

you very much to the panel. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I have a question. Mr. Cha, your train leaves at 

4 o’clock. 

Mr. CHA. There are other trains. 

Mr. MANZULLO. All right. Thank you. I didn’t want to be responsible for you missing your train. I would call, Mr. Lipman, your attention to Page 4 of your testimony, if you want to take a quick 

look at it, where it talks about benefits of the 123 Agreements, and 

ask you the question, what happens if the United States and Republic of Korea do not come together on an agreement? What is the 

impact? 

Mr. LIPMAN. So I was very heartened to hear Deputy Assistant 

Secretary Zumwalt say that they were committed to closing the 

agreement, more or less, on time. 

Mr. MANZULLO. They have had one round. 

Mr. LIPMAN. Yes. So I am a nuclear guy, so we always think 

about what goes wrong. So on the assumption that the agreement 

goes on, what could go wrong? What would happen? My view, even 

if he indicated that it won’t go uninterrupted, I thought he said, 

but my response would be this. Many of the things that are subject 

of nuclear trade are long-lead items. What does that mean? That 

means you have to identify them, and order them, and put a contract in place, often, a few years in advance. 

So I worry, I could be concerned that as the deadline approaches, 

that there could be lost business opportunities. There could be contracts which are under negotiation, or could be under negotiation, 

54

that might not be consummated based on this agreement not being 

renewed. 

As I mentioned, one of the most fruitful parts of our cooperation 

with Korean companies has been in third markets. So when, as 

there are right now, potential deals out in the international marketplace, it could be that there is a desire to move away from 

American companies, not just Westinghouse, but away from American companies because we don’t have an overarching treaty which 

would govern commercial nuclear trade. Those are some of the 

things that, potentially, could go wrong. 

I also wonder, I mentioned the importation of Korean nuclear 

equipment to U.S. projects, I actually don’t know what the absence 

of a treaty would do to those imports. That would be something I 

would be keen to look at. So the bottom line is, there could be, as 

you say in this town, unintended consequences of this treaty not 

being renewed, and so I urge its rapid conclusion. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Dr. Cha or Dr. Peters, do either of you want to 

comment on that? 

Mr. CHA. I will speak about it from the perspective of the alliance. I think it would be a disaster for the alliance, because it 

would send the message, one, that we, the U.S., don’t trust the Koreans, and it would cause the Koreans to feel like they are a second-class ally when they have been stepping up all over the world; 

hosting the G-20, hosting the Nuclear Security Summit, sending 

troops to Afghanistan, really, in many ways, replacing Japan as 

sort of the key country in the region. 

So I think, from an alliance perspective, it would be a real disaster, and although this is not my area, I think it would also, basically, leave the field open to China, and Russia, and other countries, to basically, define the terms of the global civil nuclear energy regime, which we don’t want to happen. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Dr. Peters? 

Mr. PETERS. I can’t comment on the policy aspects, but I would 

stress the importance of the cooperative R&D that we are talking 

about between the Republic of Korea and the United States, and 

that——

Mr. MANZULLO. Could you expand upon that, please? 

Mr. PETERS. Yes. So there is currently a cooperative project in 

pyroprocessing, which is a particular kind of reprocessing where 

you actually are looking at taking spent fuel that comes out of a 

reactor and reprocessing it using an electrochemical process where 

you have molten salt, you chop up the fuel, it goes into the solution 

in the salt, and you do chemistry, and you are actually able to extract uranium, plutonium, and higher actinides, and make new fuel 

for recycling in reactors, and then take the residual waste and dispose of it in a repository. 

And the Koreans have been interested in exploring 

pyroprocessing, as I said in my summary, and there is a joint study 

between the United States, DOE, and the laboratories in the 

United States, Argonne and Idaho in particular, and KAERI, within the Republic of Korea, on a joint fuel cycle study. So that started, but the sensitive nuclear technology agreements and associated 

things with the renewal of the 123 would impact that if it didn’t 

continue. 

55

Mr. MANZULLO. So there are two tracks going on. One is the diplomatic track with the 123 and the other one is, what would be the 

outcome of the 10-year study with the Republic of Korea and the 

U.S.; the study being carried by Argonne and the Idaho nuclear 

lab? The Koreans obviously want to be in the same position as the 

Japanese, with the ability to reprocess their spent nuclear rods. My 

understanding is that it is possible there could be a diplomatic 

agreement restructuring the 123 with an open door for a possible 

change in the event that the 10-year study comes up with a new 

method of disposing of the fuel. Would that be correct, Dr. Peters? 

Mr. PETERS. I can’t speak to that directly, because I am just not 

in the know on the——

Mr. MANZULLO. That is a diplomatic question. Dr. Cha, did you 

want to answer that? 

Mr. CHA. I think that has been the U.S. proposal. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Is that viable? Is that acceptable to the Koreans? 

Mr. CHA. As far as I understand it, it is not acceptable to the Koreans. The Koreans are pushing very hard, basically, for advanced 

consent for ENR, uranium enrichment and reprocessing. They want 

it; we don’t want to give it to them. And that is where we are deadlocked. 

Mr. MANZULLO. But yet, are we not dependent upon South Korea 

with regard to certain components? Is that correct, Mr. Lipman? 

Mr. LIPMAN. It is. There are components for nuclear plants here 

in the United States which could be impacted, I don’t know the legalities, frankly, to comment completely, if the treaty goes into 

abeyance or goes away, but Dr. Cha mentioned something very critical, which is, you really lose leverage. You lose market opportunities, which countries such as France, and Russia, and eventually 

China, are going to fill with—by the way, I think, you know, much 

less emphasis on areas of nuclear safety and nuclear security of the 

type that we have and is covered in these agreements. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Dr. Peters? 

Mr. PETERS. Mr. Chairman, one thing on the technical aspects, 

you correctly pointed out that the fuel cycle study that I referred 

to is looking at options. So it is looking at a variety of different options within the pyroprocessing flowsheet, I will call it, for different 

ways of treating the waste. And so there will be a technical outcome at the end of 10 years that will provide some options for policy consideration. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Okay. Well, very interesting and very fruitful 

discussion this afternoon. I want to thank each of you for coming. 

As I said before, your entire written statements will be made part 

of the permanent record and this subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned at 3:50 p.m.] 

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