Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

ALASKA TRUSTEE, LLC, 

ROUTH CRABTREE OLSEN, PS,

and RICHARD N. ULLSTROM, 

Petitioners, 

v. 

ELISABETH B. BACHMEIER, 

Respondent. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-13978 

Superior Court No. 3AN-09-08695 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 6935 – August 8, 2014 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)
 

)
 

)
 

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Petition for Review from the Superior Court of the State of 

Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Sharon Gleason, 

Judge. 

Appearances: Richard Ullstrom, Routh Crabtree Olsen, PS, 

Anchorage, for Petitioners. Debra J. Fitzgerald and Jonathon 

A. Katcher, Pope & Katcher, Anchorage, for Respondent. 

Joe Solseng, Robinson Tait, PS, Seattle, Washington, for 

Amicus Curiae United Trustee’s Association. Todd J. 

Timmermans, Hartig, Rhodes, Hoge & Lekisch, P.C., 

Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Alaska Land Title 

Association. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

STOWERS, Justice.
 

BOLGER, Justice, with whom FABE, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I. INTRODUCTION
 

In 2009 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of 

trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested 

a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure, as is permitted by the foreclosure 

statute.1 Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which 

included foreclosure costs that were not attorney’s fees or court costs, the only items the 

foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. 

Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm 

aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh 

2 Crabtree Olsen), alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the

foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices 

and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA).3 Bachmeier also argued that her deed of trust did 

not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. 

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the inclusion of 

the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to 

nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee petitioned for review. We granted review on 

two questions: (1) the scope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement 

amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and 

(2) whether the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. 

We hold that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be 

returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska 

Trustee can include in Bachmeier’s reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred 

1 AS 34.20.070(b). 

2 These parties will be collectively referred to as Alaska Trustee. 

3 AS 45.50.471-.561. 

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pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier’s 

deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. We further hold that 

the UTPA does not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

In 2007 Elisabeth B. Bachmeier executed a note and deed of trust in favor 

of Richard Waner to secure the $80,000 balance due on her purchase of a residential 

condominium from Waner. In March 2009 Bachmeier defaulted on her payment 

obligations under the note and deed of trust. At Waner’s request, Alaska Trustee began 

a nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosure. Bachmeier contacted Alaska Trustee and 

requested a quote for the amount she needed to pay to stop the foreclosure and reinstate 

her loan under the foreclosure statute. This statute gives a defaulting borrower the right 

to cure the default anytime before the sale “by payment of the sum in default other than 

the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or 

court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default.”4 

Alaska Trustee responded with a quote that included all the costs it had 

incurred pursuing the nonjudicial foreclosure. The reinstatement quote itemized the 

costs and showed that most of them were not attorney’s fees or court costs. The total 

reinstatement amount was $6,720.40, $2,315.40 of which was for foreclosure expenses. 

Of these expenses, $1,500 was labeled as attorney’s fees, but these fees were for work 

done by Alaska Trustee, not by an attorney. 

Bachmeier paid the sum under protest and then sued Alaska Trustee. 

Bachmeier requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. She argued that 

Alaska Trustee had violated the UTPA and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices 

4 Former AS 34.20.070(b) (2003). 

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5 Act (FDCPA) by: (1) including fees that were not attorney’s fees or court costs as 

permitted by the foreclosure statute; (2) failing to provide Bachmeier with the correct 

amount needed for reinstatement; (3) not adequately describing Bachmeier’s breach 

when informing her it was foreclosing on her home; and (4) not informing Bachmeier 

that she had a right to stop the foreclosure by paying the reinstatement amount. 

Bachmeier moved for partial summary judgment. Alaska Trustee filed a cross-motion 

for complete summary judgment, arguing that its actions were “governed by neither the 

[UTPA] [n]or [the] FDCPA,” and that both the deed of trust and the foreclosure statute 

permitted the inclusion in the reinstatement amount of all foreclosure costs. 

Superior Court Judge Sharon Gleason heard oral arguments and issued both 

oral and written decisions granting partial summary judgment in favor of Bachmeier. 

The court ruled that the inclusion of foreclosure costs was impermissible because “[i]t 

is a violation of AS 34.20.070(b) for [Alaska Trustee] to add on to a homeowner’s 

‘reinstatement’ amount fees that are not due and payable to a lawyer or law firm.” The 

court further held that the UTPA applies to “non-judicial foreclosures of a borrower’s 

residence.” The court ultimately denied summary judgment on the other issues because 

it believed genuine issues of material fact existed. 

Alaska Trustee petitioned this court for review, and we granted review on 

two issues: “the scope of permissible charges to be included in the ‘cure’ (reinstatement 

amount) given to homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures under AS 34.20.070(b)” 

and “whether Alaska’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act ([UTPA]) 

applies to non-judicial foreclosures.”6 

5 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012). 

6 Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier, 3AN-09-08695 CI (Alaska Supreme 

Court, Nov. 4, 2010). We are not called upon in this appeal to decide whether the Fair 

(continued...) 

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III.	 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and making all reasonable inferences 

in its favor.7 Summary judgment will be upheld if there is no genuine issue of material 

fact.8 Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law to which we apply our 

independent judgment.9

 “We interpret Alaska law ‘according to reason, practicality, and 

common sense, taking into account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as 

the intent of the drafters.’ ”10 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A. 	 Alaska Statute 34.20.070(b) Allows For The Inclusion Of All 

Reasonable Foreclosure Costs In The Reinstatement Amount.

 A borrower who defaults has a right to cure the default anytime before the 

sale “by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be 

due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the 

trustee due to the default.”11 Bachmeier argues that this statute does not allow for the 

6

(...continued) 

Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1962p, applies to 

nonjudicial foreclosures. 

7 Witt v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030, 1033 (Alaska 2003) (citing 

Spindle v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., 61 P.3d 431, 436 (Alaska 2002)). 

8 Parson v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 189 P.3d 1032, 

1036 (Alaska 2008) (citing Parker v. Tomera, 89 P.3d 761, 765 (Alaska 2004)). 

9 Alderman v. Iditarod Props., Inc., 32 P.3d 373, 380 (Alaska 2001). 

10 Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936, 939 (Alaska 2006) (quoting Native Vill. 

of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1999)). 

11 Former AS 34.20.070(b) (2003). 

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inclusion in the reinstatement amount of any costs besides attorney’s fees or court costs 

and that Alaska Trustee violated the statute by including costs that were neither 

attorney’s fees nor court costs. Alaska Trustee contends that the phrase “sum in default 

other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred” includes 

the costs the trustee incurred in processing the foreclosure before the reinstatement. 

In Hagberg v. Alaska National Bank, a bank challenged the 

constitutionality of the foreclosure statute’s redemption provision on the grounds that, 

as applied, it violated the United States Constitution’s Contract Clause, which forbids 

any state from passing a law that alters existing contracts in ways that “unreasonably 

affect the value” of the contractual rights.12 We held the statute did not violate the 

Contract Clause as applied because the borrower “must still pay the principal and interest 

and, in case of default, the beneficiary is still entitled to foreclosure and to his costs.”13 

We concluded that the foreclosure statute’s redemption provision “does not reduce the 

value of a beneficiary’s note or the security ensuring payment in any perceptible way” 

because the lender is only “deprived of his right to insist on payment of the entire debt 

as a condition to stopping the non-judicial foreclosure process where the overdue amount 

is brought current and costs are paid.”14 

Though Hagberg does not explicitly state which costs must be paid to 

reinstate a loan, logically, in order for the uncompleted foreclosure not to financially 

harm the beneficiary, all of the reasonable costs the beneficiary incurred in pursuing the 

12 585 P.2d 559, 561 (Alaska 1978). The Contract Clause provides that “[n]o 

State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” 

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 

13 Hagberg, 585 P.2d at 561. 

14 Id. at 561-62. 

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foreclosure must be repaid. Otherwise, each time the borrower redeems a defaulted loan, 

which the statute allows twice before the borrower loses the right of redemption,15 the 

lender would lose money spent on the uncompleted foreclosure. Before the foreclosure 

statute was enacted, a lender would have to pay the costs for only one foreclosure during 

the life of a loan; now under AS 34.20.070(b) it might have to pay the costs for as many 

as three foreclosures — a more expensive prospect. 16 Thus, as we held in Kuretich v. 

Alaska Trustee, LLC, because Hagberg established that parties must be returned “to their 

status quo prior to the default,” “the costs of non-judicial foreclosure, other than 

attorney’s fees and court costs,” may be included in the sum in default, “in so far as it is 

necessary to return the parties to their status quo ante.”17 In Albrecht v. Alaska Trustee, 

LLC, we reaffirmed this holding, explaining that “relief from forfeiture by reinstatement 

places the lender and borrower in the ‘position they were before default,’ ” and that “only 

through the inclusion of [nonjudicial] foreclosure fees in the reinstatement amount would 

the parties be in ‘their status quo prior to default.’ ”18 

Kuretich and Albrecht involved situations very similar to Bachmeier’s. In 

both cases a borrower whose mortgage had entered default challenged the inclusion in 

the reinstatement amounts of foreclosure costs that were neither attorney’s fees nor court 

15 AS 34.20.070(b). 

16 See Kuretich v. Alaska Tr., LLC, 287 P.3d 87, 93-94 (Alaska 2012) (noting 

that “a borrower’s default is not a cost-free occurrence to the lender”). 

17 Id. at 94. 

18 286 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2012) (quoting Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 89) 

(internal alteration omitted). 

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costs.19 We held these foreclosure costs were properly included in the reinstatement 

amount.20 

Notwithstanding these similarities, Bachmeier argues that Kuretich and 

Albrecht are not controlling here because in both cases the deeds of trust “expressly 

permitted recovery of all non-judicial foreclosure costs as part of the reinstatement 

amount,” (emphasis in original) and Bachmeier’s deed of trust does not provide for the 

reinstatement amount to include anything besides “monthly mortgage payments, 

attorney’s fees, and court costs.” Bachmeier contends that because there are “no express 

terms in the Bachmeier deed of trust and promissory note that allow anything more than” 

these limited costs, no other costs from the uncompleted foreclosure can be included in 

her reinstatement amount. 

Bachmeier’s argument misconstrues our holdings in Kuretich and Albrecht. 

Assuming without deciding that Bachmeier’s deed of trust does not expressly allow all 

nonjudicial foreclosure costs to be included in the reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee 

may still include all reasonable foreclosure costs because the beneficiary has a right to 

be returned to its “status quo ante” each time a borrower’s loan is reinstated.21 The 

foreclosure costs do not need to be contracted for in the deed of trust because their 

inclusion is provided for by the foreclosure statute.22 In Hagberg we did not find the 

statute to be constitutional because the parties could, if they desired, contract for their 

status quo ante. Rather, we held that the law itself restores parties to their status quo ante 

and “does not reduce the value of a beneficiary’s note or the security ensuring payment 

19 Id. at 1061-62; Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 90. 

20 Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 89; Albrecht, 286 P.3d at 1063-64. 

21 Kuretich, 287 P.3d at 87-88, 94. 

22 AS 34.20.070(b). 

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in any perceptible way.” 23 Indeed, because the deed of trust in Hagberg did not provide 

for reinstatement at all, it did not specify which costs could be included in 

reinstatement.24 We nonetheless held that the foreclosure statute’s redemption provision 

would not affect the value of the contract because in order to reinstate the loan, “costs 

are paid” by the borrower.25 Therefore, whether the parties included a provision in 

Bachmeier’s deed of trust allowing all reasonable foreclosure costs to be included in the 

reinstatement amount is irrelevant. 

Bachmeier further argues that even if she is liable for all foreclosure costs 

in the case of default, because her deed of trust does not state that these costs can be 

included in her reinstatement amount, Alaska Trustee must allow her to reinstate her loan 

without paying the foreclosure costs, and then it can initiate a lawsuit in court to collect 

them. But this arrangement would defeat the purpose of the nonjudicial foreclosure 

statute — avoiding expensive legal costs and alleviating congestion in the courts. We 

reiterate that AS 34.20.070(b) and our decisions in Hagberg, Kuretich, and Albrecht 

allow for the inclusion of all reasonable foreclosure costs in a reinstatement amount. It 

was error for the superior court to grant partial summary judgment on this issue to 

Bachmeier, and we reverse that decision. 

B.	 The UTPA Does Not Apply To Alaska Trustee’s Nonjudicial 

Foreclosure Of Bachmeier’s Deed Of Trust. 

Bachmeier argues that Alaska Trustee violated the UTPA by “deceptively 

padding her reinstatement amount.” Alaska Trustee counters that the UTPA does not 

23 Hagberg v. Alaska Nat’l Bank, 585 P.2d 559, 562 (Alaska 1978). 

24 Id. at 560. 

25 Id. at 561-62. 

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apply to nonjudicial foreclosures. The superior court agreed with Bachmeier and granted 

partial summary judgment on the issue. 

For the past thirty years we have consistently held that “the sale of real 

property is not within the regulatory scope of the [UTPA].”26 In State v. First National 

Bank of Anchorage, we held that the UTPA does not apply to “real property” because 

“the Act is directed solely at regulating transactions involving products and services sold 

to consumers in the popular sense.”27 

In Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, we held that a home loan is not a 

good or a service. In that case, the borrower stopped making payments on his loan and 

the servicer eventually foreclosed on the property.28 The borrower sued, alleging 

violations of the UTPA.29 The borrower argued that “the mortgage . . . was a ‘good,’ or 

alternatively, that the mortgage and the subsequent servicing arrangements were a 

provision of ‘services.’ ”30 We held that the UTPA did not apply to the borrower’s home 

loan because a “loan . . . is not a ‘good’ under the [UTPA].”31 Because the servicer’s 

“principal business [was] not debt collection,” the servicer was not an independent debt 

26 State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 1982); 

see also Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC, 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 

2011). 

27 660 P.2d at 413 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

28 815 P.2d 857, 859-60 (Alaska 1991). 

29 Id. at 860. 

30 Id. at 861. 

31 Id. 

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collector providing a service either.32 Accordingly, we held as a matter of law that the 

loan was neither a good nor a service and that “the [UTPA] does not apply to . . . 

mortgage[s].”33 

We reiterated our holding that the Act covers only “goods or services,” not 

real property, in Aloha Lumber Corporation v. University of Alaska.

34 In Western Star 

Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equipment Services, Inc., we explained again that “sales and 

services involving real estate [are distinct] from those involving other property and 

services” and that “real estate transactions were not intended to be covered by the 

[UTPA].”35 

In 2011 we held, once again, that the UTPA does not cover real estate 

transactions.36 We noted that “the legislature responded to our holding in Barber and 

chose to include certain mortgage practices within the UTPA,” but that “the legislature 

has not amended [the UTPA] to include real estate transactions . . . despite our clear 

statement in Western Star Trucks that real estate transactions fall outside the UTPA’s 

scope.” 37 We rejected the argument that a landlord is a “provider of consumer 

32 Id. 

33 Id. 

34 994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) (holding that the UTPA does not cover 

a timber sale). 

35 101 P.3d 1047, 1048 (Alaska 2004). 

36 Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 

2011). 

37 Id. at 1062-63. 

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services,”38 and held that a lease is more akin to a real property transaction than a 

service.39 

Despite this abundance of precedent, Bachmeier contends that two recent 

40 41 amendments to the UTPA, one in 2004 and one in 2007, overturned our holding in 

Barber and extended the protections of the UTPA to some nonjudicial foreclosures. But 

the 2007 amendment — which extended the UTPA’s definition of an unfair practice to 

include violations of AS 06.60.340, the Mortgage Lending Regulation Act42 — does not 

apply to Alaska Trustee. 43 And the 2004 amendment, which defined goods or services 

to include “goods or services provided in connection with . . . a transaction involving an 

indebtedness secured by the borrower’s residence,” 44 also does not help Bachmeier. The 

2004 amendment elaborated what types of goods and services are covered by the Act, 

38 Id. at 1062. 

39 Id. 

40 Ch. 55, § 9, SLA 2004 (codified at AS 45.50.561(a)(9)). 

41 Ch. 50, § 8, SLA 2007 (codified at AS 45.50.471(b)(52)). 

42 Id. 

43 The Mortgage Lending Regulation Act regulates the activities of “[a] 

person who is required to be licensed under this chapter and a person who is licensed 

under AS 06.20.” AS 06.60.340. The Act requires mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, 

mortgage loan originators, loan processors, and certain loan underwriters to be licensed. 

AS 06.60.010(a); AS 06.60.012(a); AS 060.60.013(a). Alaska Statute 06.20, the Alaska 

Small Loans Act, requires those issuing loans valued at $25,000 or less, and with an 

interest rate over the normal statutory limit, to apply for a special license. 

AS 06.20.010(a). Alaska Trustee does not fall into either category, and the Act itself has 

no implication for non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures. 

44 AS 45.50.561(a)(9); see also Ch. 55, § 9, SLA 2004. 

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but did not change the longstanding definition of goods and services itself — a definition 

that has never encompassed real property transactions. 

“When interpreting a statute, [we] look[] to three factors: the language of 

the statute, the legislative history, and the legislative purpose behind the statute.”45 We 

have “rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule,” and adopted an 

approach where “the plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence 

of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.”46 

Notably, the 2004 amendment includes only “goods or services provided 

in connection with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower’s 

residence.”47 Confirming UTPA coverage for “goods or services” transactions involving 

indebtedness secured by the borrower’s residence does not eliminate the requirement that 

the transaction must still be for “goods or services.”48 And we have consistently defined 

45 W. Star Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1050 

(Alaska 2004). 

46 Id. 

47 AS 45.50.561(a)(9) (emphasis added); see also Ch. 55, § 9, SLA 2004. 

48 The 2004 amendment only expanded the UTPA to cover certain 

transactions involving “goods or services” that might otherwise be thought of as outside 

the scope of the UTPA because they include the use of residential property as security. 

The amendment makes clear that a “goods or services” transaction that involves an 

associated debt secured by a deed of trust covering the debtor’s residence, i.e., using a 

deed of trust as security for a “goods or services” transaction, does not turn the 

transaction into a real estate transaction outside the coverage of the UTPA. 

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“goods or services” as excluding transactions involving real property.49 Thus, the 

amendment does not expand UTPA coverage to real property transactions. 

The legislative history does not lead us to conclude otherwise. The 2004 

amendment originated in House Bill 15, which was intended to establish a “no-call” list 

for Alaska.50 The original title for the Bill was: 

An Act relating to establishing the Alaska No-Call list, a 

database of residential telephone customers who do not wish 

to receive telephone solicitations; requiring telephonic sellers 

and paid solicitors to purchase the database; requiring 

telephonic sellers to identify themselves; requiring telephonic 

solicitors who are otherwise exempt from registration as 

telephonic solicitors to file with the Department of Law and 

pay the database access fee; and providing for an effective 

[ ] date. 51

This draft did not contain the definition of goods and services now at issue. The only 

mention of home loans was in a sentence in the last paragraph of the sponsor statement: 

“House Bill 15 will begin the process of eliminating those unsolicited phone calls asking 

you about your mortgage rate or if you want aluminum siding.”52 

49 Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., 249 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 

2011); W. Star Trucks, Inc., 101 P.3d at 1048; Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 

994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999); Barber v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 861 

(Alaska 1991); State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 414 (Alaska 1982). 

50 Ch. 55, §§10-24, 28-33, SLA 2004. 

51 Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement for H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 1st Sess., 

available at Alaska Leg. Microfiche Collection No. 2484-86. 

52 Id. 

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The Bill was put on hold after Congress passed its national “do-not call” 

legislation.53 But in 2004 the Bill was revived in order to “complete the process for 

Alaska.”54 New House Bill 15 was written to “accomplish what the original version 

sought to do, without the need for Alaskans to sign up again in state.” 55 The sponsor 

statement again touted a “quieter dinner hour for Alaskans” and stated that the Bill 

“sen[t] a clear message to telemarketers that these people do not wish to be called.”56 

The new version of the Bill contained the goods and services definition. 

On March 1, 2004, the House Finance Committee changed the name of the 

Bill from the unwieldy designation quoted above to, “AN ACT relating to fair trade 

practices and consumer protection; relating to telephonic solicitations; relating to 

charitable solicitations; and providing for an effective date.” 57 This unanimous change 

was made with no discussion.58 

The Bill was passed by the House and was transmitted to the Senate, where 

it was considered by the Labor & Commerce Committee.59 In the Senate Labor & 

Commerce Committee there was extensive discussion regarding whether the Bill would 

53 Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 

(2003); Minutes, H. Finance Comm. Hearing on H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 

(Feb. 19, 2004) (opening remarks of Rep. Hugh Fate). 

54 Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement for CS for H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 2d Sess., 

available at Alaska Leg. Microfiche Collection No. 11178-79. 

55 Id. 

56 Id. 


57
 2004 House Journal 2791-92.
 

58 Id.
 

59
 2004 House Journal 2824-26, 2834; 2004 Senate Journal 2403. 

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apply to magazine subscriptions in cases where the customer placed the telephone call 

to the magazine.60 There was even testimony from the Magazine Publishers of America 

on this narrow issue.61 No other issues of consequence were discussed before the Bill 

left the Senate Labor & Commerce Committee in April 2004. After passing the Senate 

Judiciary and Finance Committees in May 2004 the Bill was promptly passed by the 

House and the Senate.62 

It is clear that the Alaska Legislature did not anticipate the argument that 

Bachmeier makes. Nowhere in the committee minutes, committee files, or bill drafts is 

there any discussion of goods and services or any discussion of the UTPA. Critically, 

there was no discussion, or even the hint of a suggestion, that the amendments were 

intended to include nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures in the UTPA. In this situation 

the court must “guess what [the legislature] would have intended on a point not presented 

to its mind, if the point had been presented.”63 

Amending the UTPA to include nonjudicial foreclosures would have been 

a significant and controversial change to existing law. There would have been extensive 

debate reflected in the committee minutes;64 instead there was a brief debate about 

60 Minutes, Sen. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 

2d Sess. (Mar. 25, 2004). 

61 Id. (testimony of Mr. Robert Flint, Direct Marketing Association and 

Magazine Publishers of America). 

62 2004 Senate Journal 3632; 2004 House Journal 4249-50. 

63 Beck v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 837 P.3d 105, 117 (Alaska 

1992) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, 173 (2d 

ed. 1972)). 

64 Gillis v. Aleutians East Bor., 258 P.3d 118, 123 (Alaska 2011) (noting that 

(continued...) 

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magazine subscriptions. 65 There would have been testimony from banks, trustees, and 

homeowners; instead there was testimony from the Magazine Publishers of America, 

AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired Persons), and the Older Persons 

Action Group.66 

The purpose, sponsor statement, and sectional analysis of House Bill 15 do 

not support Bachmeier’s argument that the 2004 amendment expanded the UTPA to 

cover real estate transactions, as well as transactions for goods and services. At most, 

the legislative history and purpose evince an intent to bring telephonic solicitation of 

mortgage origination under the purview of the UTPA. Moreover, the plain language of 

the amendment, that the UTPA now covers “goods or services provided in connection 

with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower’s residence,”67 

does not eliminate the requirement that the transaction must still be one for goods or 

services. We have consistently held that real property transactions are neither a good nor 

64(...continued) 

if a statutory provision were intended to be a significant change in legislative land 

disposal policy “we would expect a more thorough legislative debate . . . and a much 

richer legislative history supporting [that] position”). 

65 Minutes, Sen. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 

2d Sess. (Mar. 25, 2004). 

66 Id. (testimony of Mr. Robert Flint, Direct Marketing Association and 

Magazine Publishers of America); Minutes H. Labor & Commerce Comm. Hearing on 

H.B. 15, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2003) (statements of Rep. Hugh Fate and testimony 

of Marie Darlin, Coordinator, Capital City Task Force, AARP; Rosalee Walker, Older 

Persons Action Group; James Carroll, Juneau Retired Teachers Association, AARP; John 

Furuness, Juneau Chapter Number 2088, National Association of Retired Federal 

Employees, AARP). 

67 Ch. 55, § 9, SLA 2004 (emphasis added). 

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a service, and the 2004 amendment did not change that longstanding definition.68 Thus, 

we hold that the 2004 amendment did not bring non-judicial deed of trust foreclosures 

by trustee into the ambit of the UTPA. Consequently, it was error for the superior court 

to grant Bachmeier partial summary judgment on this issue. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We REVERSE the superior court’s rulings that AS 34.20.070(b) does not 

permit the beneficiary to include all foreclosure costs in the reinstatement amount and 

that the UTPA applies to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. We REMAND to the 

superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

68 Shea v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Ret. & Benefits, 267 P.3d 624, 636 

n.33 (Alaska 2011) (citing Young v. Embley, 143 P.3d 936, 945 (Alaska 2006)) (“We 

assume the legislature is aware of the common law when it passes legislation.”); see also 

Joseph v. State, 293 P.3d 488, 492 (Alaska App. 2012) (“[T]he legislature is presumed 

to be aware of pertinent court decisions when it amends a statute.”) reh’g denied (Dec. 

31, 2012). We said specifically in Barber v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska that “as a matter of 

law . . . the [UTPA] does not apply to . . . mortgage[s],” 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 

1991), and the legislature gave no indication in the 2004 amendment that it was 

intending to overrule Barber. 

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BOLGER, Justice, with whom FABE, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting in part. 

I agree with the portion of the court’s opinion that explains the foreclosure 

fees and costs that may be demanded by a beneficiary as a condition of reinstatement 

under AS 34.20.070(b). But I respectfully disagree with the court’s holding that the 

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA) does not apply to 

nonjudicial foreclosures. In my opinion, the plain language of the Act covers 

transactions related to a debt secured by residential real estate. 

This dispute is focused on the definition of “goods or services” covered by 

the UTPA, which was added to the statute in 2004.1 According to this definition, 

“goods or services” includes goods or services provided in 

connection with a consumer credit transaction or with a 

transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the 

[ ] borrower’s residence . . . . 2

When we interpret a statute, we begin with the plain meaning of its 

language.3 The legislative history of a statute can sometimes alter its literal terms, but 

“the plainer the language of the statute, the more convincing contrary legislative history 

must be.”4 “Even if legislative history is ‘somewhat contrary’ to the plain meaning of 

a statute, plain meaning still controls.”5 And we will not rewrite a statute to promote 

purposes espoused in the legislative history, even if we think the legislature made a 

1 Ch. 55, § 9, SLA 2004.
 

2 AS 45.50.561(a)(9).
 

3
 Ward v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 288 P.3d 94, 98 (Alaska 2012). 

4 Id. (citation omitted). 

5 Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) 

(citation omitted). 

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mistake.6 Finally, because the UTPA is a remedial statute, its language should be 

liberally construed.7 

It seems clear that a nonjudicial foreclosure is a “transaction involving an 

indebtedness secured by the borrower’s residence.”8 Nevertheless, the court concludes 

that, construed in light of the legislative history and our precedents, the statutory 

definition of “goods or services” quoted above cannot mean what it says. 

In reaching this conclusion, the court’s opinion asserts that “we have 

consistently defined ‘goods and services’ as excluding transactions involving real 

property.” And, because the amendment defines “goods or services” as “ ‘goods or 

services provided in connection with . . . a transaction involving an indebtedness secured 

by the borrower’s residence,’ ” the court assumes that the legislature’s new definition 

incorporates the definition of “goods or services” established in our earlier UTPA 

decisions. The court therefore concludes that, although “[t]he 2004 amendment 

elaborated what types of goods or services are covered by the act, [it] did not change the 

longstanding definition of goods or services itself — a definition that has never 

encompassed real property transactions.” 

But that conclusion misconstrues our precedents. We have never held that, 

as a matter of English usage, “goods or services” cannot include services provided in 

6 See State, Dep’t of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev. v. Alyeska Pipeline 

Serv. Co., 262 P.3d 593, 598 (Alaska 2011); Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. 

Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 192 (Alaska 2007) (“[T]he extent to which the express language of 

the provision can be altered and departed from and the extent to which the infirmities can 

be rectified by the use of implied terms is limited by the constitutionally decreed 

separation of powers which prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting 

defective statutes.” (citations omitted)). 

7 State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 412 (Alaska 1982). 

8 AS 45.50.561(a)(9). 

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connection with real estate transactions. Rather, in First National Bank of Anchorage, 

the case in which this question was first presented, we concluded that the UTPA did not 

cover real estate transactions because its list of “unfair methods of competition” and 

“deceptive acts or practices” did not mention real property, “[n]or [did] any other 

provisions of the Act suggest that the legislature intended the sale of real property to 

come within the Act’s purview.”9 And each of the other decisions the court’s opinion 

cites merely followed First National Bank’s holding.10 

But when the legislature amended the definition of “goods or services” in 

2004, it included within the scope of the UTPA one type of real property transaction not 

previously covered: “a transaction involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower’s 

residence.” Therefore, the reasoning behind First National Bank — that “goods or 

services” do not include real property transactions because the Act does not mention real 

property 11 — does not apply to the statute as amended. Similarly, in Roberson v. 

Southwood Manor Associates, LLC, we recognized that, through a 2007 revision to the 

Act, “the legislature responded to our holding in Barber and chose to include certain 

mortgage practices within the UTPA.”12 

9 660 P.2d at 412-13. 

10 See Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC, 249 P.3d 1059, 1061 

(Alaska 2011) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d at 412-13); W. Star 

Trucks, Inc. v. Big Iron Equip. Serv., Inc., 101 P.3d 1047, 1051 (Alaska 2004) (citing 

First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d at 412); Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Univ. of Alaska, 

994 P.2d 991, 1002 (Alaska 1999) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d at 

412); Barber v. Nat’l Bank of Alaska, 815 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1991) (citing First 

Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d at 413). 

11 First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d at 412-13. 

12 249 P.3d at 1062-63. 

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The court’s opinion also argues that Roberson, which was published seven 

years after the 2004 amendment, confirms that “the legislature has not amended [the 

UTPA] to include real estate transactions.” But because the transaction at issue in 

Roberson — a lease — is clearly not “a transaction involving an indebtedness secured 

by the borrower’s residence,” the parties did not raise, and we had no occasion to 

consider, the effect of the 2004 amendment.13 

Nor does the legislative history support the court’s construction of the 

amendment. Evidence of legislative intent would have to be quite convincing to 

overcome the unambiguous language of this statute, and the legislative history the court 

cites does not satisfy that significant burden. 

Although the bill that added this definition of “goods or services” did, in 

part, target telephone solicitation,14 there was nothing in the language of the bill that 

reflected an intent to limit “goods or services provided in connection with” mortgage 

transactions to services provided over the telephone. If the legislature had wanted to 

affect only telephone solicitation, it could have added a new section to AS 45.50.471(b), 

which defines violations, rather than modifying the definitions section. Or the legislature 

could have added language to the definition itself to clarify that it applies only to 

telephone solicitations. But the amendment contains no such limitation, and we should 

not assume that the legislature failed to include one by mistake. 

The court also notes that the sectional analysis for the 2004 bill states that 

the new definition of “goods or services” “includes solicitations by credit organizations 

13 See id. at 1060-63. 

14 See Ch. 55, §§10-24, 28-33, SLA 2004. 

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offering financing arra[nge]ments.”15 Although this language recognizes that the 

amendment includes certain telephonic solicitations, it does not suggest that the new 

definition is limited to such solicitations. 16 If the legislature had intended the meaning 

suggested by the court, it could have specifically stated that the definition applies only 

to “services related to the solicitation of mortgage loans.” In context, it seems more 

likely that the sectional analysis was intended to clarify that the definition was intended 

to cover “goods or services” that were merely solicited in addition to those that were 

actually provided.17 

The draft opinion also relies on the fact that the bill’s sponsor statements 

focused on the need to limit telephone solicitations.18 Although “statements made by a 

bill’s sponsor during legislative deliberations are relevant evidence when the court is 

trying to determine legislative intent,”19 “[t]he remarks of a single legislator, even the 

15 Rep. Hugh Fate, Sectional Analysis of Proposed H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d 

Sess., at 2 (Feb. 24, 2004). 

16 See AS 01.10.040(b) (“When the words ‘includes’ or ‘including’ are used 

in a law, they shall be construed as though followed by the phrase ‘but not limited 

to.’ ”). 

17 See AS 45.50.561(a)(9) (“ ‘goods or services’ includes goods or services 

provided in connection with a consumer credit transaction or with a transaction involving 

an indebtedness secured by the borrower’s residence.” (emphasis added)). 

18 See Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement, H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan 

21, 2003); Rep. Hugh Fate, Sponsor Statement, H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 24, 

2004). 

19 Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 193 (Alaska 

2007) (citations and alterations omitted). 

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sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.”20 Therefore, we should not 

assume that isolated assertions by the bill sponsor accurately represent the intent of the 

entire legislature or the purpose of the entire bill. 

It is also worth noting that, when the new definition of “goods or services” 

was added to the bill, its title was amended to include “fair trade practices and consumer 

protection.”21 This amended title confirms that the focus of the bill had expanded with 

the addition of the new language. 

Finally, my construction of this definition is consistent with other 

authorities suggesting that the UTPA covers the debt collection practices at issue in this 

case. When we interpret the UTPA, we are required to give great weight to the cases 

interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act,22 which includes violations of the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act.23 Other courts have recognized that nonjudicial 

foreclosure services are among the debt collection services encompassed by these federal 

statutes.24 So the case law construing these federal statutes is consistent with the 

legislative amendment to the definition of “goods or services” in 2004. The UTPA 

applies to debt collection services “involving an indebtedness secured by the borrower’s 

residence,” services that include a nonjudicial foreclosure. 

20 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979). 

21 H.B. 15, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 24, 2004). 

22 AS 45.50.545; ASRC Energy Servs. Power and Commc’ns, LLC v. Golden 

Valley Electric Ass’n, Inc., 267 P.3d 1151, 1158-59 (Alaska 2011). 

23 State v. O’Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 529-30 (Alaska 1980). 

24 Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461-63 (6th Cir. 2013); 

Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg, PLLC, 443 F.3d 373, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2006); Shapiro & 

Meinhold v. Zartman, 823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992). 

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In summary, there is nothing in the legislative history that discusses the 

meaning of “goods or services” in a manner inconsistent with the language of 

AS 45.50.561(a)(9). Therefore, there is no evidence of a contrary legislative intent that 

should override the plain meaning of this statutory definition. I would hold that 

nonjudicial foreclosures are covered by the plain language of the UTPA. 

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