# 1

- ,) ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 23-0253
ADAM PUMMILL, an individual, and ADAM PUMMILL and KURTIS ROBERTSON as a member ofBlack Gold Enterprises, LLC, members of, and on behalfofBLACK GOLD ENTERPRISES, LLC,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v. JOSHUA T. PATTERSON a/k/a JOSH PATTERSON, as an individual and d/b/a PATTERSON ENTERPRISES, INC., also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT, INC., p/k/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN JCB, INC., also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN RENTAL SPECIALISTS, LLC, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN RENTAL, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT OF MISSOULA MONTANA,

Defendants and Appellants, and JIM GALIPEAU,

Receiver and Appellee. 

### JUN 2 0 2023
Bowen Cit,-erivvuod Clerk of Supreme Couri State of Montana

ORDER

Receiver and Appellee Jim Galipeau (Galipeau) has moved to dismiss this appeal. DefendantsandAppellantsJoshuaT. Pattersonand PattersonEnterprises,Inc.(collectively Patterson), oppose Galipeau's motion. As a preliminary matter, we have amended the caption to reflect the parties on appeal despite Patterson's assertion to the contrary. In the response to the motion to 06/20/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0253dismiss, Patterson argues that Galipeau has no standingto seek dismissal becausehe is not

a party to this appeal. Patterson asserts that Galipeau fails to cite any authority for the proposition thathe may participate inthis appeal when he isnot aparty litigant. However, we do not fault Galipeau for this alleged deficiency as Galipeau has fully participated as if he were a party to this litigation—not only in filing the motion that resulted in the order Patterson seeksto appealbut also appearingasAppellee in a previous appeal in this case— apparently with no previous objection from Patterson as to Galipeau's status as a party. Although Patterson provides no authority in support ofhis argument that Galipeau is not a proper party to this appeal, we generally agree that receivers are normally not considered a partyto a lawsuit asthereceiver's role is to act as a fiduciary representingthe court and all parties in interest. The court order appointing the receiver defines the receiver's authority. Equity Trust Co. v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d 334, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). In this case, theDistrict Court defined the receiver's duties to include the power to bring and defend actions in the receiver's own name, as receiver. The court authorized the receiver to bring supplemental proceedings, and further provided, "The Receiver shall be entitled to payment of fees from Black Gold Enterprises, LLC's estate's funds for his serviceathisstandardrateof$225.00 perhour,plussuch otheramounts asmaybeawarded by the Court after a hearing upon notice to the parties and all counsel ofrecord." It is from a District Court order directing the payment ofGalipeau's fees submitted under the authority granted to Galipeau in the Order Appointing Receiver from which Patterson now seeks reliefon appeal. Galipeau had the express authority to request such fees andtheconcomitanta,uthorityto defendhisrequest on appeal;tohold otherwisewould be to deny Galipeau due process. As for the substance of Galipeau's motion to dismiss, he argues that the District Court'sMay2, 2023 Order GrantingReceiver'sMotion for Summary JudgmentRegarding Fixture Filing and Denying Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's March 8, 2023 Order and Stay Dispersal ofFunds is not properly before this Court. He maintains
no justiciable controversy exists because the court's order was interlocutory. Galipeau
2admits M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g) provides that an aggrieved party may appeal from an order

giving directions with respect to a receivership, but he claims the order does not direct the Receiver to do anything, but merely authorizes the payment of attorney and other professional fees to the Receiver. Patterson disagrees, arguing that Rule 6(3)(g) applies to any "order

. . . giving directions with respect to a receivership," not only those orders that explicitly direct a receiver to act. Here, the District Court's order provides for the immediate payment of nearly $250,000 from the approximately $313,000 that Patterson has on deposit with the court. Patterson argues the court's order that the Clerk transfer these funds to Galipeau constitutes "directions with respect to a receivership." We agreewith Patterson. In this instance, the order Patterson seeks to appeal gives directions with respect to a receivership and it is therefore immediately appealable under M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g). Although Galipeau arguesthat such an interpretation would fail topreservejudicial economy by making every order issued in a receivership proceeding to be immediately appealable, his interpretation ofthe Rule is incorrect. First, the Rule is not so broad, but applies only to orders that give directions with respect to the receivership. Second, M. R. App. P. 6(3) provides that certain orders are appealable only if the order at issue is the court's final decision on the referenced matter. Thus, our interpretation doesnot mean that every order isappealable underRule 6(3)ifthe case involvesareceivership. Appealability remains constrained only to such orders as meet the Rule's requirements. IT ISTHEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant shall prepare, file, and serve its Opening Briefon this appeal no later than 30 days from the date ofthis Order. The Clerk is cnt

t zt!d to provide a copy ofthis Order to all counsel ofrecord. Dated this

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-day ofJune, 2023.

ChiefJustice 34 Justices