J.S43042/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 : PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee : 

: 

 v. : 

 : 

PAUL ANTHONY MASON, : 

 : 

 Appellant : No. 3009 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 27, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County 

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-48-CR-0000805-2012 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 

Appellant, Paul Anthony Mason, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas 

following his guilty plea to indecent assault1

 and corruption of minors.2 

Appellant challenges his designation by the trial court as a sexually violent 

predator (“SVP”) under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification 

Act3(“SORNA”). We affirm.

 

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1). 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1). 

3

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (effective Dec. 20, 2012). 
J. S43042/14 

- 2 - 

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 3/4/14, at 1-10. We reiterate that Appellant’s own expert 

testified at the SVP hearing that Appellant met the criteria for classification 

as a SVP. Id. at 9. Appellant timely appealed on Monday, October 28, 

2013, and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

Appellant raises the following issue: 

Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its 

discretion in finding Appellant to be a sexually violent 

predator . . . pursuant to 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 9792 [sic

4

]?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Appellant suggests that he did not meet several of the statutory 

criteria defining a SVP. He maintains he did not abuse multiple children 

simultaneously, did not engage in violence or obsessive force, was not 

sexually aroused by “cruelty, humiliation, or terror” of his victim, and did not 

select his victim by looking for preexisting vulnerabilities. Id. at 16. 

Appellant also opines that the court failed to weigh his bipolar disorder 

properly.5 We hold Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

We state the standard of review as follows: 

A challenge to a determination of SVP status requires us 

to view the evidence: 

 

4

 We note that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9792 expired on December 20, 2012, prior to 

Appellant’s SVP hearing. 

5 As noted above, Appellant’s argument relies on a statute that expired prior 

to his SVP hearing; we decline to find waiver, however. 
J. S43042/14 

- 3 - 

In the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth. The reviewing court may not 

weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment 

for that of the trial court. The clear and 

convincing standard requires evidence that is so 

clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the 

precise facts at issue. 

The scope of review is plenary. An expert’s opinion, which 

is rendered to a reasonable degree of professional 

certainty, is itself evidence. 

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

an SVP designation requires the reviewing court to accept 

the undiminished record of the case in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth. The reviewing court 

must examine all of the Commonwealth’s evidence without 

consideration of its admissibility. A successful sufficiency 

challenge can lead to an outright grant of relief such as a 

reversal of the SVP designation, whereas a challenge to

the admissibility of the expert’s opinion and testimony is 

an evidentiary question which, if successful, can lead to a 

new SVP hearing. 

As a general rule, the standard of review of a 

trial court’s evidentiary ruling is limited to 

determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be 

found merely because an appellate court might 

have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, 

or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such 

lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. 

Our task in either scenario is one of review, not one of 

reweighing or assessing the evidence in the first instance. 

Commonwealth v. Prendes, ___ A.3d ___, 2014 WL 3586262, at *14-*15 

(Pa. Super. July 22, 2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). 
J. S43042/14 

- 4 - 

As a prefatory matter, we acknowledge Appellant’s argument relies on 

a statute that expired prior to his SVP hearing. Because SORNA is 

substantially identical to the expired statute and the trial court applied 

SORNA, we decline to find waiver. 

After careful review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the wellreasoned decision by the Honorable Anthony S. Beltrami, we affirm based on 

the trial court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2-18 (rendering extensive 

findings of fact and conclusions of law; holding, inter alia, (1) each statutory 

factor need not be met and weight given to factors is left to court’s 

discretion; (2) absence of Appellant’s sexual arousal by, inter alia, cruelty, is 

not SVP factor; (3) record established Appellant selected victim based on 

mental capacity; and (4) court considered Appellant’s bipolar disorder). 

Accordingly, because the record substantiates the trial court’s factual 

findings and we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence. See Prendes, ___ A.3d at ___, 2014 WL 3586262, 

at *14-*15.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/24/2014