* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 1 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DELFINA ORTIZ DE NOGAL,

Petitioner,

v. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

Respondent. No. 96-9540 (Petition for Review) (INS No. A73 371 714)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.1 The Board of Immigration Appeals issued its final o rder of deportation on

September 30, 1996. On the same day, the Illegal I mmigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, was enacted, altering the availability, scope , and nature of judicial review in immigration cases. Because petitioner’s deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, and because the final decisio n of the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued before October 31, 19 96, neither IIRIRA’s permanent “new rules,” nor its interim “transitiona l rules” apply to this case. See id. §§ 306(c)(1), 309(a), (c)(1) & (4), as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-302, § 2, 110 Stat. 3657, set out in notes to 8 U.S.C. §§ 110 1, 1252. We therefore apply pre-IIRIRA standards.

-2- Petitioner Delfina Ortiz de Nogal petitions this co urt for review of a final order of deportation by the Board of Immigration Ap peals (BIA). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). 1 Because petitioner has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in finding that her d eportation would not amount to extreme hardship, we affirm the order, and deny the petition for review. Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered this country illegally in 1986, when she was eighteen years old. She is married to a Me xican citizen. At the time of the hearing, her two American-born children were ag es five and three. She and her husband both work and own a trailer free of enc umbrances. Petitioner is active in her church, and performs volunteer work f or the church. Petitioner has family in both the United States and Mexico -- two brothers and several uncles and cousins live in this country, and her mother an d three sisters live in Mexico.-3-

In August 1994, deportation proceedings were initiated against petitioner. She conceded deportability, but requested suspensio n of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. That section, prior to its repeal by IIRIRA, gave the Attorney General discretion to suspend deportation and admit for permanent residence an alien who: (1) had beenphysically present in the United States for at least seven years; (2) was a p erson of good moral character; and (3) was “a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien orto his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien l awfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1996) (now repe aled by IIRIRA). After a hearing, the immigration judge found that petitione r failed to demonstrate her deportation would result in extreme hardship to her self, her spouse, or her children. The BIA affirmed, and this petition foll owed. We review the Board’s determination regarding extre me hardship for an abuse of discretion. See Luna-Rodriguez v. INS , 104 F.3d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1997). The following nonexclusive factors are rele vant to the determination of extreme hardship: “the alien’s age; the length of [her] residence in the United States; [her] family ties in the United States and abroad; [her] health; the economic and political conditions in the country to which [she] may be returned; [her] financial status, business, or occupation; th e possibility of other means of-4-

adjustment of status; [her] immigration history; an d [her] position in the community. Id. (quotations omitted). The BIA’s decision will be reversed as an abuse of discretion only “where the hardship is uni quely extreme, at or closely approaching the outer limits of the most severe har dship the alien could suffer and so severe that any reasonable person would nece ssarily conclude that the hardship is extreme.” Id. (quotations omitted). Petitioner has not demonstrated this degree of hard ship. The record shows that she is young and healthy; that she lived in Me xico until adulthood; that she has close family ties in Mexico; that her husband i s a Mexican citizen; and that her children speak Spanish and are young enough to adjust to a new culture. Although deportation will cause petitioner and her family economic hardship, this factor alone does not establish “extreme hardship,” when considered in combination with the other factors listed above. S eeid. (holding that the inability to find work, without more, does not establish BIA abused discretion in finding no extreme hardship, and noting that “[i]t is only when other factors such as advanced age, severe illness, family ties, etc. combine with economic detriment to make deportation extremely hard on the alien or the citizen or permanent resident members of [her] family that Congress has authorize d suspension of the deportation order”) (quotations omitted).-5-

The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is AFFIRMED, and the petition for review is DENIED.

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby Circuit Judge