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THE THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 

EMANATING FROM PAKISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 3, 2011 

Serial No. 112–21 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

VACANCY

VACANCY

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Vice Chair 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

KEVIN GUNDERSEN, Staff Director 

ALAN CARROLL, Subcommittee Clerk 

STEPHEN VINA, Minority Subcommittee Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence ........................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence .................................................................................................... 3 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .................... 5 

WITNESS

Mr. Frederick W. Kagan, Resident Scholar and Director, American Enterprise 

Institute Critical Threats Project: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Mr. Seth G. Jones, Senior Political Scientist, The Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Mr. Stephen Tankel, Visiting Fellow, South Asia Program, The Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

(1) 

THE THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 

EMANATING FROM PAKISTAN 

Tuesday, May 3, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan [Chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Meehan, Cravaack, Quayle, Rigell, 

Long, Marino, King (ex officio), Speier, Sanchez, Cuellar, and Higgins. 

Mr. MEEHAN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. 

The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony about the 

threat to the U.S. homeland emanating from Pakistan. 

Let me take a moment to make an opening statement. I would 

like to welcome everybody to today’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hearing. I look forward to hearing from the 

witnesses on the on-going danger emanating from Pakistan to the 

United States and the intent and capability of the various terrorist 

organizations operating in Pakistan to strike the U.S. homeland. 

At the outset I want to let everyone know that today’s hearing 

will be interrupted at 3 p.m. due to a classified briefing from CIA 

Director Panetta, NCTC Director Leiter, Vice Chairman Cartwright 

and Deputy Secretary Steinberg. I ask patience from our witnesses 

and thank you ahead of time to the extent you are able to accommodate this. 

Today’s hearing is the third hearing the subcommittee has held, 

and it is aimed at educating Members about the myriad terrorist 

threats to the homeland from various parts of the world. So far we 

have heard from experts on the threat posed by AQAP in Yemen 

and the ramifications of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa on U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 

Today’s hearing also comes at a historic moment in the global 

war on terrorism. In the last 48 hours, and at the direction of 

President Obama, and as a result of the incredible work of the U.S. 

military, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, alQaeda leader and 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden was killed by 

U.S. forces deep inside Pakistan. 

This is a critical blow to al-Qaeda and the ideology of militant 

Islam. It is a victory for the United States and our allies around 
2 

the world. As President Obama stated, the world is a safer, more 

secure place as a result of Osama bin Laden’s death. 

I commend President Obama and his National security team for 

the planning, the execution of the mission, and for taking the enormous risk to eliminate bin Laden. The Nation is grateful for his 

leadership. We are also deeply grateful to the men and women who 

carried out the mission. Their dedication, professionalism, and sacrifice exemplify the best of our fighting forces. 

Today’s hearing was originally aimed at delving deeper into the 

various terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan and their intent and capability to strike the U.S. homeland. We will still conduct that important examination, but, however, in light of the 

events of the last 72 hours, we will try to make sense of the important questions in the wake of the bin Laden killing, including the 

extent to which Pakistan is cooperating in the fight against terrorism. 

I would like to highlight the fact that Pakistan has provided 

enormous assistance in the last decade and in the fight against alQaeda, including critical intelligence and military operations. In 

fact, they have been a critical ally to the West for decades. They 

have lost thousands of soldiers and innocent civilians in the fight 

against Islamic militancy. They have also been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan by a large 

margin. Their efforts should be commended, and the United States 

must continue to foster this United States-Pakistan relationship. 

We must make this relationship work. 

But despite bin Laden’s killing, the fact is that the threat from 

al-Qaeda and affiliate groups remains as dangerous as it did last 

Friday. In fact, CIA Director Panetta warned yesterday that terrorists almost certainly will attempt to avenge him, and we must remain vigilant and resolute. If anything, the threats are even more 

dangerous in the days and weeks ahead after his demise. 

This was most obvious last May when a Pakistani-born U.S. citizen named Faisal Shahzad drove an SUV into Times Square in an 

attempt to kill hundreds of people. Shahzad traveled to Pakistan 

and received training from TTP and indicated at his sentencing 

hearing that his attack was retribution for U.S. drones in Pakistan. 

Retribution has been a driver of attacks in the past, and we must 

be on guard. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses on the myriad 

of terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and their intent and capability to strike the homeland. These amorphous and continually 

evolving groups present huge challenges to the United States, and 

it is critical that we, as Members of Congress, do everything we can 

to completely understand the threat, especially in light of bin 

Laden’s killing and its ramifications. 

Nevertheless, certain facts are as clear as they are disturbing. 

Osama bin Laden was the world’s most wanted terrorist. He was 

discovered not in the caves of Tora Bora, nor in Saudi Arabia, or 

in Yemen, or even Iran, as Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman 

Malik suggested when visiting Members of Congress traveled to 

the area in 2009. He was discovered in a mansion fortress prominent for its size as well as its location, in Abbottabad, a well-populated city just a short way from Pakistan’s military academy. 
3 

The President’s counterterrorism adviser John Brennan stated 

today that Osama bin Laden lived in that compound for 6 years. 

In John Brennan’s words, it is inconceivable that bin Laden did not 

have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain 

there for an extended period of time. 

Members of Congress have a responsibility to ask what kind of 

support system or benefactors could have allowed bin Laden to 

maintain this safe haven? What should Pakistani officials have 

known about such a support system, and who should have known 

it? How is it that a mansion complex with 18-foot walls and barbed 

wire capping can avoid the scrutiny of investigative, military, and 

government officials who make it their business to know what is 

going on around them? Why did Pakistani officials not investigate? 

At a tremendous time of fiscal challenge here at home, the 

United States is asking citizens to support the expenditure of billions of dollars of military and foreign aid to Pakistan. 

Before I turn to the Ranking Member, I would like to make one 

more important point about Osama bin Laden’s killing. I am heartened to know the last thing Osama bin Laden saw before death 

was an American soldier bearing down on him with an American 

flag on his shoulder. That he reportedly died using a woman as a 

human shield is an image that cements the true nature of his character, and such cowardice will be part of his legacy. 

Bin Laden’s demise will not diminish the pain and loss for the 

families of victims of September 11, nor will it significantly diminish the threat of terrorism that emanates from this complex region, 

but it closes a chapter and fulfills our Nation’s promise that with 

respect to bin Laden, we would not rest until justice is served. 

I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the 

subcommittee and the gentlewoman from California Ms. Speier for 

any statement that she may have. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for holding 

this hearing today on the threats from terrorist groups in Pakistan. 

On Sunday night, this hearing took on a completely new dynamic 

when the world learned that the mastermind of 9/11 and the inspirational leader for numerous other terrorist plots was killed in a 

firefight with U.S. Special Forces. The death of bin Laden, as many 

have stated, marks a monumental achievement in our Nation’s effort to defeat al-Qaeda. 

Many people deserve recognition for their steadfast efforts and 

sacrifices over the last 10 years; three Presidents, our military, and 

our homeland intelligence community. But, we must not rest on 

our laurels either. While al-Qaeda may be symbolized by bin 

Laden, the terrorist network is now much bigger than just him. So 

we must remain vigilant as affiliated groups and radicalized individuals pursue attacks against us. 

With bin Laden’s death we are left asking, what is next for alQaeda? How real is the threat of retaliation? How will our relationship with Pakistan be impacted? 

Pakistan has been a key ally in our counterterrorism efforts 

against al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the region. Scores 

of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting against the 
4 

Taliban and al-Qaeda, and the Pakistani government has helped us 

disrupt and dismantle terror networks since 9/11. 

But what did they know and what should they have known about 

bin Laden’s whereabouts and the massive compound about 30 

miles outside of Islamabad where he was living? Bin Laden was 

not found in a cave. His compound was less than 2 miles away 

from an elite Pakistani Army training academy, and we have to 

question how he was able to hide in plain sight for such a long period of time. 

We have also heard several disturbing reports, including a recent 

statement by Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, indicating that some members of Pakistan’s intelligence services have ties with certain terrorist groups. 

We must attempt to answer these critical questions because our 

relationship with the Pakistani government hinges on what we discover. 

Pakistan appears to have become a breeding ground for a variety 

of terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda. While bin Laden’s 

compound demonstrates that extremist elements are spread 

throughout the country, much of the terrorist threat is concentrated in the FATA on the western border of Afghanistan. This 

fiercely autonomous area has been home to numerous terrorist organizations since 9/11 and is so perilous that Western aid workers 

can’t provide any effective services there. 

What social forces make these areas ripe for terrorists, and how 

can we change that dynamic? Although we have had some success 

in targeting key militants in this area since 9/11, the terrorist networks have proven resilient, simply relocating to other parts of the 

country. Now we must determine how to snuff out bin Laden’s legacy and to what extent al-Qaeda will continue or speed up plotting 

against the West. 

Throughout the FATA and beyond, new groups have sprouted up 

and have rivaled al-Qaeda with their deadliness and willingness to 

attack the United States. TTP, the Pakistani Taliban, has been 

gaining momentum for the past several years and displayed a 

reach that shocked many American officials when the TTP-trained 

Pakistani-American, Faisal Shahzad, attempted to detonate a car 

bomb in Times Square in New York. TTP and many other groups, 

including the Haqqani network, operate hand-in-hand with alQaeda in Pakistan, making the region a hotbed of extremism. 

It has become widely apparent that the existing groups in Pakistan have embraced the ideological cancer of al-Qaeda, and while 

we once believed they posed little threat to America, we now are 

gravely concerned. 

At the top of this list is LeT, a group that signaled its evolution 

into a global jihadist organization by carrying out the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Various media reports have speculated that LeT, 

like the Pakistani Taliban, may have grown closer to al-Qaeda both 

ideologically and operationally. 

Will the death of bin Laden bring these loosely associated groups 

closer together and raise the threat to the United States homeland? 

We certainly know that the radicalism preached by these groups 

presents a serious danger to religious minorities; such as, the 

Ahmadis, women, and political opposition leaders in Pakistan. 
5 

Their message also seems to be gaining support and weakening the 

will of the Pakistani government to work with us. When the Pakistani government has mustered the political will, however, the 

army has been effective in launching devastating attacks against 

the militants. 

How do we ensure that Pakistan is working with us to combat 

all terrorist groups in the region? Shouldn’t we also proactively attack the source of the extremism by investing more in economic 

and social opportunities in Pakistan to prevent the youth from 

turning to terrorism? 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ testimony today, because 

finding solutions to these questions requires a better understanding of an extremely complex threat environment. 

Again, I would like to commend the President for his courage, 

and all the brave men and women that put their lives on the line 

for our security, and thank them for the sacrifices that they have 

made for all of us here at home. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

I am also pleased to have the attendance today of the Chairman 

of the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. King from New York, 

and I would like to invite Mr. King to make any kind of opening 

statements he may wish to do. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman Meehan. Let me commend you 

for this hearing and for the series of hearings you have conducted 

this year in your capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence. You and the Ranking Member 

have done an outstanding job, and I truly commend you for it. 

Let me also join with everyone here in commending the President of the United States for the killing of Osama bin Laden. This 

took courage by the President and people I have spoken to who 

were very involved with the whole operation. 

The fact is that when the President made his decision, there was 

no specific evidence at all that bin Laden was in that compound. 

There was a collection of circumstantial evidence, but it took courage by the President to make the decision to go ahead, because if 

that operation had—not failed, he certainly would have received 

the blame for it. He put himself and the country on the line, and 

he succeeded. It, again, showed true capacity as Commander-inChief, and I commend him for it. 

I also, of course, commend the Navy SEALs who carried out that 

operation under extraordinary conditions at night, not knowing 

what was going to await them when they went into that compound, 

also not knowing if on the flight back to Afghanistan they could be 

intercepted by Pakistani jets. So all in all this was an extraordinary achievement, and we have to commend all of them. 

Your hearing today is particularly topical. Just a little over an 

hour ago, I met with the Pakistani Chief of Mission to the United 

States and expressed to her the real concerns that I and many people have about Pakistan’s role in the war against terrorism. 

I remember back in 1998, when the African embassies were attacked, and President Clinton wanted to retaliate by firing rockets 

through the al-Qaeda compounds in Afghanistan. We advised the 

Pakistan government that the rockets would be going through their 

airspace, and the result was al-Qaeda was tipped off. Bin Laden 
6 

was not killed. He could have been killed on that day 13 years ago, 

and things would have been so much different. 

So we have had this mixed relationship with Pakistan all along. 

I remember just 2 days after September 11 meeting with President 

Bush at the White House when he told us the first priority was to 

have the Secretary of State tell President Musharraf of Pakistan 

that really it was time to be with us or against us on this. At that 

time Pakistan did cooperate for a period of time at least. 

But since then the record has been mixed. There is no doubt that 

there have been elements in the ISI which have not been supportive of opposition, which have at least a dual loyalty. But there 

was a feeling that we got more from the relationship than we lost. 

On balance Pakistan, because of its strategic position, possession of 

nuclear weapons, the access that it did have to intelligence, that 

this was a relationship that on balance was in our favor. 

But the events of the last several weeks, just learning that you 

had this compound right, as the Chairman pointed out, so close to 

a major military academy in Pakistan, the fact that the ISI maintained their headquarters very close by, the fact that that neighborhood in particular was populated by many prominent retired 

military and intelligence officials, and to learn that for 6 years 

Osama bin Laden was living in that compound, it really raises— 

there is only one answer to me. There are the two possibilities and 

one answer. One is that there was direct facilitation by elements 

of the Pakistani government, or Pakistani intelligence is entirely 

inept. That has not proven to be the case over the years. In fact, 

some of us raised the issue, does the ISI spend more time tracking 

down members of the CIA than it does members of al-Qaeda? 

So this is really a crossroads, I believe, in our relationship with 

Pakistan. We have had, as I said, good days or bad days with Pakistan. They are, I believe, essential to the success of the war against 

terrorism. But we cannot allow situations to exist where the most 

notorious terrorist, murderer, mass murderer in the world was literally living right under the nose of top Pakistani government officials. 

So I look forward to the hearing today. I hope we can find a way 

forward with Pakistan, but, again, the events of the last several 

days to me mark a definite crossroads in that relationship. 

In conclusion, let me thank all of the witnesses for being here 

today. To give of your time and your expertise is very important 

to us. 

Let me give a special thanks to Dr. Kagan, who I had the pleasure of meeting with a number of times over the years, the first 

time being back in 2007 when he was formulating the surge policy 

in Iraq, which everyone said could never work. Thank God the 

President listened to Dr. Kagan, and it did work. So thank you for 

all of your services, and especially you, Dr. Kagan. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have four distinguished witnesses before us 

today on this important topic, and let me remind the witnesses 

that your entire written statement will appear in the record, and 
7 

so I would ask you to do the best you can to focus your comments 

with appreciation for the 5-minute bell. 

So today’s first witness is Frederick Kagan. It is my understanding you have to leave the hearing early to attend a personal 

issue, but I am very grateful. I want to remind the Members that 

we may have questions from others for you which will be submitted 

to you in writing, and I hope that you would be able to be responsive. 

Due to the time constraints, I am going to dispense with providing long biographies on today’s witnesses, but I will point out 

that Dr. Kagan was one of the principal authors of the surge in 

Iraq, and I want to thank you for your contribution during that difficult time in our Nation’s history. I also understand you just returned from Afghanistan, so you have a fresh perspective from that 

theater. We will make available to anybody who asks the full biographies as we had prepared for our very distinguished panel. 

So, Dr. Kagan, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR 

AND DIRECTOR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT 

Mr. KAGAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your kind words. Also, thank you, Chairman King, for your very 

kind words, and thank you to the entire subcommittee for holding 

this series of hearings and for the way that they have been framed. 

I am going to try to keep my remarks focused exactly as, I think, 

the committee has posed this series of questions, which is to say 

let us focus on diagnosing the problem. Let us focus on understanding the challenge in detail and in nuance, and let us understand that there is no immediate, obvious ‘‘therefore’’ clause that 

emerges at the end of the long series of ‘‘wherefores’’ that we can 

lay out here, because I will not opine on the degree of complicity 

of the Pakistani Government in this al-Qaeda—in bin Laden’s presence for the raid, because I don’t know, and I won’t offer opinions 

about it. 

But I will say that the comments of all, of Chairman King and 

the Chairman and Ranking Member here, are absolutely right. At 

the end of the day, there is no simple solution to the problems that 

we face with Pakistan. As challenging and frustrating as the relationship has been, we have experimented with simple solutions like 

cutting Pakistani aid completely and throwing Pakistan over. We 

have experimented with more generous. It is not clear what effect 

any of that behavior has. 

But it is clear that in general terms things don’t go well for us 

when we simply decide to treat Pakistan as an enemy, and whatever degree of support or—for either our enemies or for us the Pakistani state is showing, I think we need to recognize it, I think we 

need to understand it, and then I think we have to develop what 

will have to be inevitably a frustrating and nuanced, complicated 

policy approach that will serve our interests and not merely satisfy 

our pique, which is understandable, but at the end of the day is 

not a sufficient basis for making this kind of call. 
8 

The roll call of bad organizations, dangerous organizations in 

Pakistan is very long, and, in fact, we could all take more than the 

5 minutes allotted for our statements simply to list them all. The 

bottom line is that Pakistan is home to probably the densest concentration of the most dangerous militant Islamist organizations in 

the world, and a number of those have been allowed to run fairly 

free within Pakistani territory for a variety of reasons. 

Al-Qaeda Central, it should be noted, has been whittled down 

substantially from the fairly sizeable number who fled to Pakistan 

in 2001 to a handful of core leadership, with their support, including bin Laden, most recently killed. The Pakistanis have cooperated with that, and the Pakistani cooperation has been essential to 

making that happen. We should note that and the sacrifices the 

Pakistanis have made. 

In addition to al-Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, I think the Ranking Member mentioned, is an incredibly dangerous organization, 

and it is an organization that hysterically—historically, Freudian 

slip—we have tended to underestimate because it has been seen 

traditionally as a Kashmiri separatist movement and something 

that is focused on the fight in Kashmir. 

The truth is it was never a Kashmiri separatist movement. It 

was always an Islamist militant movement sharing a common ideology with al-Qaeda, and in some cases a common fraternity with 

al-Qaeda. It chose to focus on Kashmir when that seemed appropriate, but it has always harbored larger ambitions than that, including ambitions that would set the entire subcontinent on fire if 

carried out, which they nearly did, and ambitions to strike us directly as well. 

I think the threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba is extremely significant. 

I think, unfortunately, although the Pakistanis periodically arrest 

or house arrest or detain senior members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, fundamentally Pakistan has taken no real action against this group 

that has had significance, and that is a matter of concern. 

The Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan is another group where nuanced 

understanding is essential because the TTP was formed to oppose 

Pakistan. The TTP was formed initially to serve as an umbrella organization for groups that opposed Musharraf’s complicity with us 

in fighting against Islamists. I have details in my testimony about 

how the TTP has broken down into northern and southern groups 

that are more or less anti-Pakistani. 

But there is a group of the TTP that has now focused in 

Waziristan and Orakzai agencies that goes beyond the simple hatred of Pakistan and actually seems to be willing potentially to be 

refocused on us, including most notably with the Times Square attack. That is a group that we have to be very concerned about. It 

is ironic the Pakistanis have shed quite a lot of blood fighting TTP, 

and, in fact, have driven it out of its most significant safe havens 

in South Waziristan, and are now fighting it in Bajaur and 

Mohmand agency with also significant loss of blood and effort. 

However, it is not clear that the Pakistanis will fight to eliminate 

that group, and it is also not clear that that group—the Pakistani 

operations will eliminate the threat to the United States from that 

group. 
9 

There are a number of other organizations which I don’t need to 

mention, because this panel of experts will certainly bring them up. 

So let me just close quickly by framing a policy problem—framing 

the policy problem, but not offering you a recommendation, and 

apologies for that. 

Three things are going to have to happen in Pakistan, in my 

view, before Pakistan is really able to get a handle on the challenge 

of militant Islamism in ways that secure its own stability from that 

threat and in ways that ensure our own security. First, Pakistan’s 

ruling elite will have to come to a consensus that supporting some 

militant Islamist groups as proxies either in Afghanistan or in 

India is a failing strategy. This is where I think the importance of 

carrying through on the comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign General McChrystal began and General Petraeus is carrying 

on is so essential. We must demonstrate to them that this is not 

going to succeed. 

Second, they will have to come to a consensus that all militant 

Islamists pose a threat to Pakistan, and that none are at the end 

of the day able to be controlled by the state and used reliably and 

safely as proxies. 

Third, and this will probably be most difficult, they will have to 

come to a consensus about the need to conduct what will be long, 

very bloody, expensive, and difficult operations against a number 

of these organizations that are rather deeply rooted in Pakistani 

society and that go beyond the FATA into the Punjab, into Sind, 

into the Pakistani heartland. 

I believe that U.S. policy can directly affect the first of those 

things by making it clear to Pakistan that its proxies in Afghanistan will fail, and I think a strategy as some are advocating now 

of negotiating with the Taliban, of trying to wrap this thing up, is 

the worst thing we could possibly do from the standpoint of longterm stability in the region and the well-being of Pakistan, because 

it will merely reinforce the notion that fighting by proxy is a successful strategy. 

As for the others, we will have to develop a complicated and 

nuanced strategy for influencing Pakistan to develop these consensus after or in tandem with our efforts to show them that proxy 

warfare will not succeed. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

[The statement of Mr. Kagan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN

MAY 5, 2011 

The death of Osama bin Laden is highly unlikely to mark a turning point in the 

conflict between the United States and its allies on the one hand and militant 

Islamism epitomized by al-Qaeda on the other. President Obama deserves much 

praise for ordering the operation to get bin Laden, and the brave Americans who 

carried that operation out so skillfully deserve the thanks of a grateful Nation. But 

al-Qaeda itself, to say nothing of the numerous franchises and affiliated movements 

sharing common goals with it, will not be defeated by the death of a single leader, 

even its founder and figurehead. Nor is it clear that its operational capabilities even 

in Pakistan will be seriously degraded with bin Laden’s passing—available information suggests that he abandoned day-to-day operational control over the moment 

long ago, and the organization has survived the deaths of many senior leaders more 

actively involved in its activities. There is cause for celebration in the death of a 

deeply evil man with much blood on his hands and more innocent deaths in his 
10 

mind, but no cause to waver in our determination to press forward in this conflict 

against a determined foe. 

Public speculation about the complicity of the Pakistani government or security 

services either in harboring bin Laden or in supporting the U.S. operation that 

killed him is idle. Policy-makers and strategists would do much better to focus on 

the demonstrable facts about the threat militant Islamists based in Pakistan pose 

to Pakistan itself, its neighbors, our forces, and our homeland. 

Those facts are distressing enough. With bin Laden dead, al-Qaeda’s leadership 

in Pakistan remains robust and significant. Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, an Egyptian 

with ties (both friendly and hostile) with the Muslim Brotherhood, is a more gifted 

theorist and better writer than bin Laden ever was, although far less rhetorically 

effective and unlikely to be an inspirational leader. Abu Yahya al Libi, a Libyan as 

his honorific denotes, is a skilled and determined operator. Zawahiri is, in fact, potentially very dangerous over the long term as a strategist. In the early years of 

the Iraq war, he strenuously objected to the efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu 

Musab al Zarqawi to ignite sectarian conflict in Iraq in order to fuel the Sunni opposition. Zarqawi launched a terror campaign against Iraq’s Shi’a majority in a deliberate effort to incite reprisal attacks against Iraqi Sunnis, hoping thereby to convince the Sunnis that al-Qaeda was their necessary champion. Zawahiri opposed 

that approach, arguing that their Islamist agenda was best served by focusing first 

on fighting the infidels together with the Shi’a, however impure their religion was 

in his view. In the short term, Zarqawi’s policy prevailed—he did incite vicious sectarian reprisals against the Sunni that did for a time create support for al-Qaeda 

in Iraq. But his terrorism went too far. By 2006, al-Qaeda in Iraq was alienating 

Sunnis almost as rapidly as Shi’a, and the al-Qaeda pressure on them combined 

with the pressure from the surge of troops and change in strategy in 2007 persuaded Iraq’s Sunnis to give up the fight altogether. Zawahiri was shown there to 

be the shrewder strategist, giving us good cause for concern about a movement of 

which he is the leader. It is also noteworthy that the change in leadership in alQaeda will result in the replacement of the Saudi bin Laden, whose roots and essence were in the Arabian Peninsula, with an Egyptian and a Libyan. Will that 

change result in a refocusing of the al-Qaeda effort toward North Africa, more than 

would have occurred naturally? We shall see, but the prospect is worrying given the 

stalemate in Libya and the precariousness of Egypt. Nevertheless, bin Laden was 

a charismatic figure and a romantic figure in the eyes of many militant Islamists— 

the wealthy Saudi who gave up his luxurious life for jihad (although the location 

of his death undermines that story considerably). It will be a blow to Islamist morale and set off a leadership struggle within the movement. It is thus significant, 

even though it is not likely to prove decisive. 

Al-Qaeda is not, unfortunately, the only Islamist group in Pakistan with regional 

or global aims. The largest and best organized such organization, rather, is the 

Lashkar-e Tayyiba—Army of the Pure, which is responsible most recently for the 

2008 Mumbai attacks. LeT has deep roots in Kashmir and has historically focused 

its attentions on India. In that guise, it is more than dangerous enough, since its 

atrocities brought two nuclear powers close to war a few years ago and could readily 

do so again. But LeT is not a Kashmiri organization. Its ideology is pan-Islamist 

rather than Kashmiri nationalist, and its headquarters are in Punjab, near Lahore, 

rather than in Kashmir. LeT has entwined itself with the Pakistani military establishment and state. It provides foot soldiers and agents provocateurs for raids on 

Kashmir or in India. In the form of various charitable organizations it has organized 

relief for victims of the massive floods in Pakistan, runs schools (madrassas), and 

provides rudimentary shari’a justice in backward and lawless areas. It has also been 

active, although in a much more limited form, supporting Taliban insurgents fighting U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. LeT agents have attacked the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh. LeT poses an enormous challenge to any Pakistani leader who 

wanted to constrain it, let alone shut it down. Its pervasiveness throughout Pakistan gives it the potential to conduct terrorist and even guerrilla attacks even in 

the heartlands of Punjab and Sindh. Its wealth and organization give it a high degree of autonomy from any financial support it might receive from elements of the 

ISI. It is, thus, a terrorist organization with a broad and deep base of support, significant wealth, and an Islamist ideology not very different from al-Qaeda’s—and 

the prospects of the Pakistani state taking it on any time soon approach zero. 

Pakistan is also home to the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan (TTP), an anomalous organization determined to fight someone but possibly willing to negotiate about 

whom. The TTP was formed as an umbrella organization for a number of militant 

Islamist groups that began fighting Pakistan when President General Pervez 

Musharraf declared his support for the U.S. War on Terror and fight in Afghanistan. It has historically had two more or less distinct centers—one in Waziristan, 
11 

particularly in South Waziristan, and the other in the northern part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), especially Mohmand and Bajaur agencies. 

It was that northern branch, including the sub-group known as Tehrik-e Nafaz-e 

Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), that pushed west into Dir and ultimately into Swat, 

thereby goading Kayani into a series of attacks that have driven the group back to 

its mountain bases in Mohmand and Bajaur (where Pakistani military operations 

are on-going as we speak). The TNSM grouping has proven reliably hostile to 

Islamabad, and the Pakistani military has shown little hesitation to attack it. The 

Waziristan sub-group, however, seems more amenable to negotiation, at least after 

a major Pakistani military operation in 2010 cleared it out of most of South 

Waziristan. It has since dispersed somewhat to bases in Orakzai, Khyber, and North 

Waziristan, although some TTP fighters appear to be re-infiltrating South 

Waziristan as well. The TTP fighters in North Waziristan are part of a melange of 

tribal and Islamist groups that includes al-Qaeda, Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur’s 

tribesmen, the Haqqani Network, and the small but vicious networks of Uzbek militants that have made Pakistan their home for many years. Those groups are generally more interested in fighting the United States in Afghanistan than in fighting 

Pakistan, and the pressures on the TTP there to join them in the jihad against the 

infidels across the Durand Line before worrying about Islamabad are greater than 

in the northern FATA. The TTP claimed responsibility for the failed attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square and has repeated its determination to carry out 

attacks against the United States. 

North Waziristan is the base of the Haqqani Network, a group of Islamist fighters 

formed during the anti-Soviet war under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a 

legendary mujahid. The Haqqani Network is now run by his sons, Sirajuddin and 

Badruddin, and extended family as Jalaluddin has gotten old and infirm. With the 

passage of leadership from generation to generation, the group’s aims and methods 

have also evolved. The Haqqani Network is now notorious for its spectacular attacks 

in and around Kabul and its willingness to kill Afghan civilians despite the formal 

prohibition against such killings by Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. Siraj 

also appears to be more interested in becoming a more significant player in the regional and global Islamist movement than his father, whose interests were mostly 

confined to his historic tribal lands in southeastern Afghanistan (especially the 

provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika). Recent open-source reporting suggests 

that the Haqqani Network is gaining greater access to routes of attack into Afghanistan, moreover. Reporting indicates that the ending of a long-standing feud between 

the militant Islamist groups and the Shi’a Turi tribe that inhabits strategic terrain 

in Kurram Agency, just north of North Waziristan, has given the Haqqanis access 

to the main routes leading to Parachinar and from there directly into eastern Khost, 

Paktia, and Logar Provinces—and the shorter road to Kabul. Some of the reporting 

suggests that the Pakistani military has abetted this ‘‘resolution’’ of the feud by 

pressuring the Turi so as to facilitate Haqqani movement into and through their 

areas. 

Pakistan is also home to the headquarters of Mullah Omar’s branch of the 

Taliban insurgency in Quetta. This group sees itself as a government-in-exile, having ruled Afghanistan before 2001, and maintains shadow governors for almost 

every province and many districts in Afghanistan. It had maintained unquestioned 

safe-havens in Afghanistan’s southern provinces, particularly Helmand and 

Kandahar, until the addition of forces and change of strategy ordered by President 

Obama and overseen first by General Stanley McChrystal and now by General 

David Petraeus, took those safe havens away. Another, smaller Afghan insurgent 

group known as the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), also has its main bases in 

Pakistan. 

One could list a host of other groups that threaten Pakistan’s internal cohesiveness and one—Jundallah—that conducts terrorist attacks in Iran from Pakistani 

territory, but it is not necessary to belabor the point. Pakistan is host to a large 

number of extremely dangerous militant Islamist organizations whose aims vary 

from simply destroying the Pakistani state to destroying the entire Western way of 

life. The threat from these groups in Pakistan is severe. 

The Pakistani state, police, and military have taken very limited steps against 

most of these groups. On the positive side, Pakistan has generally tolerated American military strikes against key leaders in the FATA and has likely cooperated in 

efforts against al-Qaeda that have reduced the size and capabilities of that group 

to a small core leadership with limited operational ability. The Pakistani military 

took dramatic and painful steps to protect its people from encroachments by the 

Islamists into Swat and then continued the drive to clear their bases in South 

Waziristan, Bajaur, and now Mohmand. The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps 

have lost thousands of soldiers in these battles, and thousands of Pakistani civilians 
12 

have suffered and died at the hands of Islamist militants and during these operations. The success of those efforts remains unclear in some areas, but the overall 

impact is not—TNSM and TTP have been driven out of Swat and are very much 

on the defensive in their traditional strongholds in the FATA, which remain under 

pressure. The scale of the efforts was great—multiple Pakistani regular army divisions were involved, including some from the corps stationed along the Indian border that would be essential in an Indo-Pakistan conflict, the deployment of which 

to fight in Pashtun lands indicates the seriousness with which the Pakistani military leadership took that particular threat. The Pakistani military and police have 

also operated against Baluchi separatist fighters and against some of the worst sectarian groups in Karachi and elsewhere. We should not diminish or dismiss the efforts or the losses Pakistan has made and taken in these actions simply because 

Islamabad has focused on the groups that threaten Pakistan itself rather than on 

those that threaten its neighbors or us. 

It is a fact, however, that Pakistan has taken no meaningful action against LeT, 

the Haqqani Network, HiG, or Mullah Omar. Pakistan’s XII Corps headquarters are 

in Quetta, near Mullah Omar’s primary bases, but have conducted no operations 

against his group. An entire Pakistani regular division is stationed in North 

Waziristan, near the Haqqani headquarters in Miram Shah, and has conducted no 

operations against that group. Musharraf formally outlawed LeT, but did not dismantle the group and, although LeT leaders have periodically been jailed or placed 

under house arrest, they have also been periodically released with no further action 

taken against them. LeT bases and madrassas are obvious and well-known, as are 

some of the Haqqani madrassas. Pakistan has not shut them down. It is not even 

necessary to discuss the accusations of Pakistani support for the Taliban, the 

Haqqanis, or LeT to see that Pakistan’s performance against militant Islamist 

groups to date has been uneven, inconsistent, and inadequate. 

That observation based on cold and incontrovertible fact brings with it no obvious 

short-term policy solution, however. These conditions have persisted when the 

United States gave aid to Pakistan generously and when the United States withheld 

all aid. They have persisted during periods of greatest tension between Islamabad 

and Delhi and during periods of relative detente. They have persisted when civilians 

nominally or actually ruled the country and when the military has done so. Three 

things will have to occur, in all likelihood, before these conditions dissipate. First, 

Pakistan’s ruling elite will have to come to the consensus that supporting some militant Islamists as proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir is a failed strategy. Second, 

they will have to agree that all militant Islamists pose a threat to Pakistan’s survival and well-being and are, at the end of the day, beyond the ability of the state 

and even the army to control as proxies. Third, they will have to make the hard 

decisions not only to act against groups that can cause them great pain, but also 

to seek and accept the assistance of the United States and other would-be allies in 

an internal struggle that is likely to be long, expensive, and bloody. Pakistani longterm stability and even state viability rests on its leaders making these decisions, 

but the scale of the challenge they face in carrying through on them would make 

any policy-maker blanch. 

Of these things, the United States can only directly affect the first. The current 

American and NATO strategy in Afghanistan is designed to degrade the Afghan 

Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and HiG within Afghanistan and to demonstrate beyond question that those groups will be unable to direct the course of events in Afghanistan even after Western forces hand over security responsibilities to the Afghan government and are significantly reduced in number. Demonstrating that 

those groups will fail will compel anyone in Pakistan who believes supporting them 

as proxies to be a plausible strategy for securing Pakistan’s interests to re-evaluate 

that approach fundamentally. The challenge for American strategy toward Pakistan 

will be finding ways to accompany progress against Islamist proxies in Afghanistan 

with efforts to help Pakistan’s ruling elite come to consensus on the overall dangers 

that Islamist groups within Pakistan pose and on the need to accept the costs and 

risks of combating and defeating them within Pakistan itself. The worst thing we 

could do now would be to take bin Laden’s death or the progress made to date in 

Afghanistan as an excuse to withdraw forces prematurely, thereby easing the pressure on militant Islamist groups in Afghanistan just as we would otherwise approach the point of maximum pressure on them and those who support them. Now 

is the time to reinforce success by exercising patience in Afghanistan and allowing 

the strategy designed to persuade everyone in Afghanistan and in Pakistan that the 

militant Islamists in Afghanistan will fail to continue to work. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Dr. Kagan. 
13 

Our next witness will be Dr. Seth Jones. The senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation has written extensively on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in the region, and has spent years working with U.S. Special Operations 

Forces. 

Dr. Jones, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, SENIOR POLITICAL 

SCIENTIST, THE RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman 

King, and thank you, Ranking Member. Thank you, all the Members of the committee, for having this hearing. It is very important, 

I think, to have a frank discussion of this issue, because it is one 

that risks American lives. 

Let me first start out by saying, as the Chairman noted earlier, 

I recently left the U.S. Special Operations Command, working out 

the Pentagon, and before that Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and would like to thank those colleagues that participated in 

the raid against Osama bin Laden both for their bravery and for 

their patriotism. I had the pleasure of working with some of them 

and salute what they have done for the Nation. 

Let me begin by focusing on what I consider a very important 

question that the United States now faces. Now, I will come back 

to the Pakistan one in a second, but the question is now that 

Osama bin Laden is dead, how will the nature of the threat emanating from Pakistan evolve, the threat to the U.S. homeland? This 

is, again, one that threatens American lives, so setting aside for the 

purposes of this hearing Yemen, Somalia, and other areas, which 

are, of course, important, I will focus my comments on this. 

The way I see this trending, and we have already seen movement 

in this direction, is probably slightly more decentralized and diffuse 

threat facing the U.S. homeland from Pakistan. This has, in my 

view, enormous implications for how to think about and counter 

these efforts. 

There remains probably five—I would characterize them five 

tiers to monitor. One is the central al-Qaeda that continues to exist 

in Pakistan. So we have questions certainly now about bin Laden 

and his hideout. Similar questions one can also ask about alQaeda’s No. 2, possibly now No. 1. Where is Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

and how much knowledge does the Pakistan government have of 

his whereabouts? We know historically he has been targeted by the 

United States in Pakistan in 2006, in January. He was targeted by 

U.S. forces in the Bajaur agency. That targeted effort was not successful, but I think certainly there are similar questions. 

There are also affiliated groups. We have seen the threat to the 

homeland from groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 

Yemen. 

Third, we have allied groups of al-Qaeda, and certainly in Pakistan we see a threat to the U.S. homeland from several of them, 

including TTP and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of which have been 

mentioned here, which, in my personal view—which will potentially pose a more serious threat to the U.S. homeland over the 

next several years. 
14 

Fourth, we have allied networks, some of which have been involved in serious attacks overseas, including the London attacks in 

2005; and then finally, as we have seen at Fort Dix and other 

areas, simply inspired attackers. 

In my view, as we have seen, and as the Ranking Member mentioned earlier, we have come very close, I would say lucky, from 

being attacked by terrorists who trained in Pakistan, the Shahzad 

case being certainly one example, Zazi being another. 

I think the threat from Pakistan is extremely serious right now. 

We see active plots from individuals like Ilyas Kashmiri, based in 

Pakistan, against targets in India, in Europe, and also potentially 

against the U.S. homeland. 

We have al-Qaeda Americans in Pakistan right now, Adam 

Gadahn from Riverside, California; Shukrijumah, Adam el 

Shukrijumah, who, among other places, lived in Florida, operating 

out of Pakistan right now. So I would say we have a very serious 

and vested interest in continuing to capture or kill these threats 

to the homeland, including from Americans. 

I would say, as we look down the line at the issue of Pakistan, 

this could move in one of two directions. One would be an unfortunate reality. The relationship that the United States had in the 

1990s, after the Pressler amendments were enacted, where the relationship was virtually nonexistent in a serious strategic way. The 

other is where the relationship moved after the September 11 attacks, a more productive relationship that captured Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Ramsi bin al Sheeb, Abu Faraj alLibbi, the capture of serious al-Qaeda members. 

In my personal view, Pakistan has a very serious series of options right now. We have the bulk of al-Qaeda central leadership 

operating in Pakistan. Will it help us capture the rest of this organization? Only facts on the ground will be able to tell. 

The last thing I will just note very briefly is one particular concern I would have, and I continue to have, is that the United 

States has identified Pakistan government relations with two 

groups that are of concern. One is the Haqqani network. The other 

is Lashkar-e-Taiba. Both of those groups, I would add, have direct, 

senior-level relationships with al-Qaeda. That is unacceptable for 

the United States, in my personal view, and must change for that 

relationship to become more productive. 

Finally, this is a long war. As Winston Churchill observed over 

a century ago during the British struggles in the Northwest Frontier, time in this area is measured in decades, not months or years. 

But I would say based on the threat streams coming out of Pakistan, we do not have much time. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES

MAY 3, 2011 

Even before the killing of Osama bin Laden, with the growing instability across 

the Arab world, it had become de rigueur to argue that the primary al-Qaeda threat 

now comes from the Persian Gulf or North Africa. While these regions certainly 

present a threat to Western security, al-Qaeda’s primary command and control 

structure remains situated in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda and allied groups continue to 

present a grave threat from this region by providing strategic guidance, overseeing 
15 

1See, for example, Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar (New York: Henry Holt and 

Company, 1994); John Holland, Hidden Order (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1995); Kevin 

Dooley, ‘‘A Complex Adaptive Systems Model of Organization Change,’’ Nonlinear Dynamics, 

Psychology, and Life Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1997, pp. 69–97. 2 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 

2006), p. 285. 3 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 

or encouraging terrorist operations, managing a robust propaganda campaign, conducting training, and collecting and distributing financial assistance. As demonstrated over the past year, for example, key operatives such as Ilyas Kashmiri 

have been involved in plots in Europe and the United States. On May 1, 2010, 

Faisal Shahzad, who was trained in Pakistan, packed his Nissan Pathfinder with 

explosives and drove into Times Square in New York City on a congested Saturday 

night. Only fortune intervened, since the improvised explosive device malfunctioned. 

It may now be tempting to focus on terrorist threats to the United States only 

from Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Egypt, and other countries in the Arab world. But this 

would be a dangerous mistake. The United States continues to face a serious threat 

to the homeland from al-Qaeda and several allied groups based in Pakistan, including Lashkar-e Tayyiba and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. What has likely changed, 

however, is the nature of the threat from Pakistan, which will likely become more 

decentralized and diffuse. 

I. AL-QAEDA’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

A current understanding of the threat to the U.S. homeland from Pakistan requires a nuanced appreciation of al-Qaeda and its allies. With a leadership structure 

still in Pakistan, al-Qaeda is a notably different organization than a decade ago and 

can perhaps best be described as a ‘‘complex adaptive system.’’1 The term refers to 

systems that are diverse (composing multiple networks) and adaptive (possessing 

the capacity to evolve and learn from experience). One key element of complex 

adaptive systems is they include a series of networks, which are often dispersed and 

small. Different nodes can communicate and conduct their campaigns with some coordination. As terrorist expert Bruce Hoffman argued, al-Qaeda is ‘‘in the main flatter, more linear, and more organizationally networked’’ than it has previously been.2

The killing of bin Laden may accelerate this decentralization. 

Al-Qaeda today can perhaps best be divided into five tiers: Central al-Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups, allied networks, and inspired individuals.3

First, central al-Qaeda includes the organization’s leaders, who are based in Pakistan. Despite the death of key figures—such as Osama bin Laden, chief financial 

officer Shaykh Sa’aid al-Masri, and external operations chief Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman 

al-Najdi—several top leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, continue to provide 

strategic-level guidance. Al-Qaeda’s goals remain overthrowing regimes in the Middle East (the near enemy, or al-Adou al-Qareeb) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate, and fighting the United States and its allies (the far enemy, or al-Adou alBaeed) who support them. As demonstrated over the past year, Ilyas Kashmiri has 

been involved in thwarted plots to conduct Mumbai-style attacks in Europe and to 

target a newspaper in Copenhagen that published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Yahya al-Libi continues to act as one of al-Qaeda’s senior ideologues and 

religious figures. There are also a range of Americans in central al-Qaeda, including 

Adam Gadahn and Adnan El Shukrijumah (aka Jafar al-Tayyar). 

The second tier includes a range of affiliated groups that have become formal 

branches of al-Qaeda. They benefit from central al-Qaeda’s financial assistance and 

inspiration, and receive at least some guidance, training, arms, money, or other support. They often add ‘‘al-Qaeda’’ to their name to identify themselves as affiliated 

organizations, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda East Africa. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, retain a degree of oversight and, when necessary, may discipline members of these groups for failing to follow guidance. 

The third involves allied groups that have established a direct relationship with 

al-Qaeda, but have not become formal members. This arrangement allows the 

groups to remain independent and pursue their own goals, but to work with alQaeda for specific operations or training purposes when their interests converge. In 

Pakistan, one example is Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose interests remain largely 

parochial in South Asia, though they have been involved in attacks overseas—including the U.S. homeland. Another is Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which is based in Pakistan and has historically operated in India and Kashmir, though it has expanded 

its interests to include Afghanistan, Europe, and perhaps the United States. Outside 

of Pakistan, there a range of other allied groups, such as al Shabaab, which oper-
16 

4Testimony of Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 

Hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee, February 9, 2011. 5Stephen Biddle, ‘‘Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan,’’ The American 

Interest, July–August 2009. 

ates in Somalia but has a relationship with diaspora communities across the world, 

including in the United States. 

The fourth tier involves allied networks—small, dispersed groups of adherents 

who enjoy some direct connection with al-Qaeda. These groups are not large insurgent organizations, but often self-organized small networks that congregate, 

radicalize, and plan attacks. In some cases, they comprise individuals who had prior 

terrorism experience in Algeria, the Balkans, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or perhaps 

Iraq. In other cases, they include individuals that have traveled to camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan for training, as with Mohammed Siddique Khan and the British 

Muslims responsible for the successful July 2005 London bombing. 

Finally, the inspired individuals include those with no direct contact to al-Qaeda 

central, but who are inspired by the al-Qaeda cause and outraged by perceived oppression in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestinian territory. They tend to be 

motivated by a hatred toward the West and its allied regimes in the Middle East. 

Without direct support, these networks tend to be amateurish, though they can occasionally be lethal. In November 2004, a member of the Hofstad Group in the 

Netherlands, Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh 

in Amsterdam. But many others, such as the cell led by Russell Defreitas that plotted to attack New York City’s John F. Kennedy International Airport in 2007 (code 

named ‘‘chicken farm’’), were rudimentary and would have been difficult to execute. 

Taken together, al-Qaeda has transformed itself by 2011 into a more diffuse—and 

more global—terror network. While Pakistan is its home base, it has a growing 

array of allied groups and networks on multiple continents. In fact, the death of 

Osama bin Laden suggests that the main threat to the U.S. homeland from Pakistan is perhaps more diffuse than at any time since September 2001, especially from 

allied groups and networks. 

II. DEBATING THE THREAT FROM PAKISTAN

There has been growing skepticism about the threat to the U.S. homeland from 

Pakistan. In his 2011 testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland 

Security Committee, Michael Leiter, director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism 

Center, remarked that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is ‘‘probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland.’’4 Others have argued that al-Qaeda has a nearly 

endless supply of sanctuaries in weak states, such as Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, 

Sudan, and even Iraq. ‘‘Many of these countries,’’ notes Stephen Biddle from the 

Council on Foreign Relations, ‘‘could offer al-Qaeda better havens than Afghanistan 

ever did.’’5

While this argument seems reasonable, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

certainly poses a clear threat to the U.S. homeland, the evidence suggests that alQaeda leaders retain an unparalleled relationship with local networks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier. Ayman al-Zawahiri and several senior al-Qaeda leaders 

have a 30-year, unique history of trust and collaboration with the Pashtun militant 

networks located in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These relationships are deeper and 

more robust than the comparatively nascent, tenuous, and fluid relationships that 

al-Qaeda has developed with al Shabaab in Somalia, local tribes in Yemen, or other 

areas. Indeed, al-Qaeda has become embedded in multiple networks that operate on 

both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Key groups include the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan, Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba. Al-Qaeda has effectively established a foothold with several tribes or sub-tribes in the region, such as 

some Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds, Utmanzai Wazirs, Mohmands, Salarzais, and 

Zadrans. The secret to al-Qaeda’s staying power, it turns out, has been its success 

in cultivating supportive networks in an area generally inhospitable to outsiders. 

Al-Qaeda provides several types of assistance to Pakistan militant groups in return for sanctuary. One is coordination. It has helped establish shuras (councils) to 

coordinate strategic priorities, operational campaigns, and tactics against Western 

allied forces. In addition, al-Qaeda operatives have been involved in planning military operations, such as launching suicide attacks, emplacing improvised explosive 

devices, and helping conduct ambushes and raids. It also helps run training camps 

for militants, which cover the recruitment and preparation of suicide bombers, intelligence, media and propaganda efforts, bomb-making, and religious indoctrination. 

Al-Qaeda provides some financial aid to militant groups, though it appears to be a 

small percentage of their total aid. Finally, it has cooperated with Pakistan militant 
17 

6Mark Sagemen, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 133, 140. 7 U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, United States of America Against 

Najibullah Zazi, 09 CR 663(S–1), February 22, 2010. 8Fernando Reinares, ‘‘The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism,’’ Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2, 

April–May 2010, pp. 83–104. 

groups to improve and coordinate propaganda efforts, including through the use of 

DVDs, CDs, jihadi websites, and other media forums. 

Some pundits have argued that al-Qaeda operatives primarily reside in Pakistan, 

not Afghanistan. But the 1,519-mile border, drawn up in 1893 by Sir Henry 

Mortimer Durand, the British Foreign Secretary of India, is largely irrelevant. 

Locals regularly cross the border to trade, pray at mosques, visit relatives, and— 

in some cases—target NATO and coalition forces. Indeed, al-Qaeda migration patterns since the anti-Soviet jihad show frequent movement in both directions. Osama 

bin Laden established al-Qaeda in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1988, though he and other 

Arab fighters crossed the border into Afghanistan regularly to fight Soviet forces 

and support the mujahedeen. When bin Laden returned to the area in 1996 from 

Sudan, he settled near Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan and later moved south to 

Kandahar Province. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime, however, most of the 

al-Qaeda leadership moved back to Pakistan, though some settled in neighboring 

Iran. 

Other skeptics contend that informal, homegrown networks inspired by al-Qaeda 

have become the most serious threat to the West.6 Ayman al-Zawahiri and central 

al-Qaeda have become extraneous, according to this argument. Skeptics contend 

that impressionable young Muslims can radicalize through the internet or interactions with local extremist networks. They don’t need a headquarters, the argument goes. These skeptics contend that the threat to the West, therefore, comes 

largely from a ‘‘leaderless jihad’’ in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North America rather than a relationship with central al-Qaeda located in Pakistan. As discussed in the next section, however, there is sparse evidence to support this argument. 

III. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Many of the recent terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland have been connected 

to al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, though a few have been tied to such areas 

as Yemen. Sparsely few serious attacks have come from purely homegrown terrorists. Central al-Qaeda, headquartered in Pakistan, has long focused on attacking the 

U.S. homeland. 

More recently, however, the United States has faced a growing threat from allied 

groups and networks operating in Pakistan. In September 2009, for example, 

Najibullah Zazi was arrested for planning attacks on the New York City subway. 

Najibullah Zazi pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to ‘‘conspiracy to use weapons 

of mass destruction’’ and ‘‘providing material support for a foreign terrorist organization’’ based in Pakistan.7 Several al-Qaeda operatives, including Saleh al-Somali 

and Adnan Gulshair el Shukrijumah, were involved in the plot. According to U.S. 

Government documents, Zazi’s travels to Pakistan and his contacts with individuals 

there were pivotal in helping him build an improvised explosive device using 

triacetone triperoxide, the same explosive used effectively in the 2005 London subway bombings. In October 2009, Chicago-based David Coleman Headley (aka Daood 

Sayed Gilani) was arrested for involvement in terrorist activity. He is a PakistaniAmerican who had cooperated with Lashkar-e Tayyiba and senior al-Qaeda leaders 

to conduct a series of attacks, including the November 2008 Mumbai attack and a 

plot to attack a newspaper in Copenhagen that had published a cartoon of the 

Prophet Muhammad. His base in Chicago made him ideally suited for a future attack in the U.S. homeland. 

In December 2009, five Americans from Alexandria, Virginia—Ahmed Abdullah 

Minni, Umar Farooq, Aman Hassan Yemer, Waqar Hussain Khan, and Ramy 

Zamzam—were arrested in Pakistan and later convicted on terrorism charges. Better known as ‘‘Five Guys,’’ a reference to the hamburger chain close to their homes 

along Route One in Alexandria, they radicalized in the United States and went to 

Pakistan for training and operational guidance. In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device in Times Square in New York 

City after being trained by bomb-makers from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. 

Europe has faced similar threats. The 2004 Madrid attacks involved senior alQaeda leaders, including Amer Azizi.8 The 2005 London attacks and 2006 transatlantic airlines plot involved senior al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, who were involved in strategic, operational, and even tactical support. Jonathan Evans, the Di-
18 

9 Jonathan Evans, ‘‘The Threat to National Security,’’ Address at the Worshipful Company of 

Security Professionals by the Director General of the Security Service, September 16, 2010. 10Seth G. Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al 

Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2008). 

rector General of MI5, the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence agency, recently 

acknowledged that at least half of the country’s priority plots continue to be linked 

to ‘‘al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where al-Qaeda senior leadership is 

still based.’’9 Over the last decade, there have been a laundry list of plots and attacks in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, France, India, and 

other countries with links to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups with a foothold in 

Pakistan. 

IV. COUNTERING THE THREAT

While the al-Qaeda threat from Pakistan has remained severe, the United States 

has struggled to pursue an effective counterterrorism strategy. In 2001, less than 

100 CIA and U.S. Special Operations personnel, supported by punishing U.S. airpower, toppled the Taliban regime and unhinged al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. 

In examining 648 terrorist groups, I found that most groups end in one of two 

ways. Either they join the political process, or else small networks of clandestine 

intelligence and security forces arrest or kill the leadership. Large-scale, conventional military forces have rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist 

groups, and few groups achieve victory.10 Military forces may help penetrate and 

garrison an area frequented by terrorist groups and, if well sustained, may temporarily reduce terrorist activity. But once the situation in an area becomes untenable 

for terrorists, they will transfer their activity to another location. Terrorists groups 

generally fight wars of the weak. They do not put large, organized forces into the 

field, except when they engage in insurgencies. This means that military forces can 

rarely engage terrorist groups using what most armies are trained in: Conventional 

tactics, techniques, and procedures. In some cases, such as when terrorist groups 

ally with large and well-equipped insurgent groups, conventional forces may be 

more apropos. 

By 2011, however, U.S. policymakers seemed to better understand the utility of 

clandestine efforts. The United States and Pakistan increased covert efforts against 

al-Qaeda, improving their intelligence collection capabilities and nearly tripling the 

number of drone strikes in Pakistan from 2009 levels. Recognizing the importance 

of al-Qaeda’s local hosts, the United States and Pakistan stepped up efforts to recruit assets among rival sub-tribes and clans in the border areas. 

In Pakistan, there were a range of senior-level officials killed—such as Osama bin 

Laden, chief financial officer Shaykh Sa’aid al-Masri, and external operations chief 

Abu ’Abd al-Rahman al-Najdi—through a combination of U.S. Special Operations 
19 

11Pew Research Center, Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global Image of U.S. 

Continues to Benefit (Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 2010). 

and intelligence efforts. This left perhaps less than 300 al-Qaeda members in Pakistan, though there were larger numbers of foreign fighters and allied organizations. 

In late 2010, Ayman al-Zawahiri ordered al-Qaeda operatives to disperse into small 

groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, away from the tribal areas, and cease most 

activities for a period of up to 1 year to ensure the organization’s survival. In Afghanistan, intelligence and U.S. Special Operations activities disrupted al-Qaeda, 

which became less cohesive and more decentralized among a range of foreign fighters. Al-Qaeda retained a minimal presence in Afghanistan, with perhaps less than 

100 full-time fighters at any one time. This estimate is larger if one counts alQaeda-allied foreign fighter networks operating in Afghanistan. 

What does this fragile progress mean? For starters, the number of al-Qaeda 

operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan shrunk from 2001 levels, where it was likely over 1,000 fighters. More importantly, however, Western efforts disrupted alQaeda’s command and control, communications, morale, freedom of movement, and 

fund-raising activities. Central al-Qaeda was a weaker organization, though not defeated. The death of senior leaders also forced al-Qaeda to become increasingly reliant on couriers, hampered communication because of operational security concerns, 

delayed the planning cycle for operations, and exposed operations to interdiction. 

V. CONCLUSION: A LONG WAR

The landscape along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda is largely headquartered, is strangely reminiscent of Frederick Remington or C.M. Russell’s 

paintings of the American West. Gritty layers of dust sap the life from a parched 

landscape. With the exception of a few apple orchards, there is little agricultural 

activity because the soil is too poor. Several dirt roads snake through the area, but 

virtually none are paved. In this austere environment, central al-Qaeda has been 

disrupted. Its popularity has also declined. 

FIGURE 2: POLL OF AL-QAEDA11

How much confidence do you have in Osama bin Laden to do the right thing regarding world affairs? 

Yet there are still several challenges. One is the absence of an effective campaign 

to counter al-Qaeda’s extremist ideology. Public perceptions of al-Qaeda have plummeted. According to a 2010 public opinion poll published by the New America Foundation, more than three-quarters of residents in Pakistan’s Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas opposed the presence of al-Qaeda. A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center indicated that positive views of Osama bin Laden significantly declined across the Middle East and Asia between 2001 and 2010, including in Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon. In addition, there has been 
20 

widespread opposition to al-Qaeda’s ideology and tactics among conservative Islamic 

groups, especially al-Qaeda’s practice of killing civilians. Public opposition of alQaeda, especially from legitimate Muslim religious leaders, needs to be better encouraged and publicized. 

In addition, Pakistan has done a remarkable job against some militant groups in 

areas like Swat and northern parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 

where scores of Pakistan army, Frontier Corps, police, and intelligence units have 

died in combat. Yet Pakistan’s continuing support to some militant groups, including Lashkar-e Tayyiba and the Haqqani Network, needs to end. Even more disturbing, both Lashkar-e Tayyiba and the Haqqani Network have a direct, seniorlevel relationship with some al-Qaeda leaders. Supporting militant groups has been 

deeply counter-productive to stability in South Asia—including in Pakistan—and 

has had second- and third-order effects that threaten the U.S. homeland. The struggle against al-Qaeda and allied networks operating from Pakistan remains a long 

one. As Winston Churchill observed over a century ago during the British struggles 

in the Northwest Frontier, time in this area is measured in decades, not months 

or years. It’s a concept that doesn’t always come easy to Westerners. Still, a failure 

to adequately deal with the terrorist threat in Pakistan will not only prolong this 

struggle, but it will severely undermine on-going U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, risk 

the further destabilization of a nuclear Pakistan, and ultimately threaten the U.S. 

homeland. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Dr. Jones. I am very grateful for your 

testimony. 

Our next witness is Mr. Steven Tankel, a visiting fellow at the 

Carnegie Mellon Endowment for International Peace. Thank you, 

Mr. Tankel, and you are now recognized for your testimony, please. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN TANKEL, VISITING FELLOW, SOUTH 

ASIA PROGRAM, THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. TANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Speier, Chairman King and Members of the subcommittee, for inviting me here today. Others have spoken about some of the—what 

are the ramifications of Osama bin Laden’s demise and the impact 

this will have on the state of the U.S. Pakistan-relationship, so I 

am going to keep the focus of my testimony on Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

the group I was asked to speak specifically about today, though I 

do want to concur with others about the importance of the U.S.- 

Pakistan relationship and the need to find ways to make that relationship work better than it is right now. 

LeT’s continued existence has become a major contributor to tensions between United States and Pakistan, particularly since the 

2008 Mumbai attacks. The group’s position within Pakistan remains relatively secure for three reasons. First, that country is facing an insurgency, and LeT’s policy remains to refrain from launching attacks against the state. The security establishment appears 

to be taking what amounts to a triage approach, focusing first on 

those groups launching attacks in Pakistan and avoiding any action that could draw LeT as an organization further into the insurgency. This is despite the fact that some members within LeT are 

currently contributing to the war in Pakistan. 

Second, the Pakistan Army and ISI have long considered LeT to 

be the country’s most reliable proxy against India, and elements 

within those institutions still perceive it to provide utility in this 

regard. 

Third, LeT is more than just a militant group. It is also a missionary organization that places a strong emphasis on preaching 
21 

and social welfare and hence has significant societal support and 

influence. 

My aim today is threefold: To detail briefly LeT’s capabilities for 

threatening U.S. citizens at home or abroad, to assess the group’s 

intent in this regard, and to highlight several courses of possible 

U.S. action. 

LeT boasts robust capabilities, as others have alluded to, that enable it to contribute to attacks against U.S. interests in the following ways. First, as a training provider, the group has a history 

of providing training to local as well as Western recruits. As collaboration with other outfits in Pakistan has increased, so, too, has 

cross training. 

Second, it is a gateway organization that Western would-be terrorists can use to access other outfits, including al-Qaeda. 

Third, it can act as a facilitator for terrorist attacks, providing 

logistical and financial support to other outfits via its transnational 

networks, which, conservatively speaking, stretch across South 

Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. 

In addition to acting as part of a consortium, LeT is capable of 

a unilateral attack against U.S. or Western interests. That scenario 

is, however, less likely, and this brings us to the issue of LeT intent. 

The core LeT organization continues to prioritize India as its 

main enemy, and the group has never considered itself to be an alQaeda affiliate; however, it has also always been a pan-Islamist 

group since its formation. Liberating Kashmir and then the Indian 

subcontinent is the first rather than the final step in a wider jihad 

for the group, and it has contributed to al-Qaeda’s fight against the 

United States and its allies since 9/11. Operational collaboration 

between these groups has grown closer in recent years. 

According to interlocutors in Pakistan, the ISI continues to pressure LeT leaders to refrain from launching another terrorist spectacular in India as this could trigger a war or an attack against 

America, and this may reduce the chances of a unilateral LeT attack against the homeland, at least in the near term. 

However, the current threat to U.S. interests comes from a conglomeration of actors in Pakistan, al-Qaeda, TTP, LeT and others, 

and thus LeT does not need to take the lead role in an attack in 

order for its capabilities to be used against the U.S. homeland or 

American interests abroad. Furthermore, individuals or factions 

within LeT can utilize its domestic infrastructure, as well as 

transnational capabilities, to pursue their own operations without 

the leadership’s consent. 

Because members who leave LeT do not necessarily cut ties with 

the group or may bring elements within it with them, the threat 

also comes from the Lashkar alumni network. Because LeT remains influenced by regional dynamics, I think it is worth considering briefly how bin Laden’s death might reshape its environment. 

The Kashmir conflict, which is where it made its name, remains 

torpid, and it would be difficult for LeT to regenerate the insurgency there. Its members continue to integrate further into the Afghan insurgency, but unlike the Taliban, it doesn’t have a major 

constituency in Afghanistan. 
22 

Bin Laden’s death could create space for a political solution, and, 

if so, LeT may find itself with an active open front for the first time 

in two decades. This will impact its behavior and group cohesion 

and may lead some to seek other opportunities, particularly terrorist attacks against India, Pakistan, or the United States; however, it might also provide an emphasis for others to demobilize. 

If I may, I have a few brief recommendations I would like to offer 

that are specific to LeT. That being said, fully dismantling the 

group must be a gradual process in order to avoid a backlash, and 

it will require a paradigm shift within the Army and the ISI, and 

thus one in India and Pakistan relations. 

What courses of action should the United States consider? First 

accelerate actions necessary for a global take down of LeT. Continue to pursue counterterrorism cooperation with and support to 

India and Bangladesh, and increase this cooperation with Nepal, 

Sri Lanka and the Maldives, where LeT networks are currently expanding. The United States must also push for greater cooperation 

and intelligence sharing vis-a`-vis LeT from allies in the gulf. 

Second, with regard to Pakistan specifically, in the near term, 

continue to signal the severe repercussions that would result were 

LeT or elements within it to be involved in an attack upon American interests, and continue to press Pakistan for intelligence regarding LeT’s international networks and to begin taking steps to 

degrade its training apparatus. 

Toward the medium term, increase the focus on building up 

Pakistan’s counterterrorism capacity via civilian law enforcement 

and intelligence agencies. Finally, to prepare for the long term, 

push for designing a deradicalization, demobilization, a reintegration program, and explore the costs, benefits, and feasibility of 

doing so, perhaps by working with a third party such as Saudi Arabia. 

Now, I understand these recommendations do not offer immediate gratification, yet as the world witnessed Sunday night, persistence and preparation do pay off. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Tankel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN TANKEL

MAY 3, 2011 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure or LeT) is one of Pakistan’s oldest and 

most powerful militant groups. India has been its primary enemy since the early 

1990s and the group has never considered itself to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, but LeT 

did begin contributing to al-Qaeda’s global jihad against the United States and its 

allies after 9/11. The spectacular nature of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and target selection suggested LeT continued to prioritize jihad against India, but was moving 

deeper into al-Qaeda’s orbit. Despite repeated calls by a chorus of U.S. officials on 

Pakistan to take actions against the group in the wake of Mumbai, LeT’s position 

remains relatively secure. There are several reasons. First, Pakistan is facing a serious insurgency and LeT remains one of the few militant outfits whose policy is to 

refrain from launching attacks against the state. The security establishment has 

taken a triage approach, determining that to avoid additional instability it must not 

take any action that could draw LeT further into the insurgency. Second, the Pakistan army and its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) have long 

considered LeT to be the country’s most reliable proxy against India and the group 

still provides utility in this regard. LeT also provides potential leverage at the negotiating table and so it is therefore unrealistic to assume support for the group will 
23 

1 Author interview with Abdullah Muntazir, international spokesman for Jamaat-ul-Dawa, 

Dec. 2008 Pakistan. 2The year of its formation is given as both 1990 and 1993 by Lashkar’s literature. One of 

the original MDI founders, who was a member of the Jamaat-ul-Dawa senior leadership at the 

time the author interviewed him, confirmed the date was 1990. A former Lashkar member, who 

belonged to the group in 1990, also confirmed that date. Author interview with member of 

Jamaat-ul-Dawa senior leadership, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with former 

Lashkar-e-Taiba member, Jan. 2009 in Pakistan. 3 Hafiz Abdul Salam bin Muhammad, Why We Do Jihad? (Muridke: Markaz al-Dawa-walIrshad, May 1999). 

cease without a political payoff from India in return. As a result, the consensus 

among the Pakistani security establishment appears to be that, at least in the short 

term, taking steps to dismantle the group would chiefly benefit India, while Pakistan would be left to deal with the costs. Finally, LeT provides social services and 

relief aid via its above-ground wing, Jamaat-ul-Dawa, and its activities in this 

sphere have led to a well of support among segments of the populace. 

To understand LeT and how it grew so powerful, one must recognize the two dualities that define it. The first is that it is a missionary and a militant organization 

that for most of its history has placed an equivalent emphasis on reshaping society 

at home (through preaching and social welfare) and to waging violent jihad abroad. 

The second is that its military activities are informed both by its pan-Islamist rationale for jihad and its role as a proxy for the Pakistani state. LeT was able to 

grow into a powerful and protected organization in Pakistan as a result of its ability 

to reconcile these dualities. Jihad against India to liberate Muslim land under perceived Hindu occupation aligned with LeT’s ideological priorities and also with state 

interests. This enabled the group to become Pakistan’s most reliable proxy, which 

brought with it substantial benefits including the support needed to construct a robust social welfare apparatus used for missionary and reformist purposes. However, 

this approach also necessitated trade-offs and compromises after 9/11, since preserving its position vis-a`-vis the state sometimes forced the group to sublimate its 

pan-Islamist impulses. As the decade wore on, internal tensions increased over who 

LeT should be fighting against. 

India remains its primary enemy, but, as mentioned, the group became involved 

in the global jihad after 9/11. The Mumbai attacks marked an acceleration of this 

trend and one of their objectives was to generate momentum for LeT, which by 2008 

was in danger of being eclipsed by other outfits deemed more committed to confronting America and its allies. The group’s integration with these other outfits has 

deepened in the past 3 years and the scope of its jihad has expanded, but internal 

tensions remain. As a result, the threat comes both from the organization and from 

factions within it. 

OVERVIEW: HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Before turning to the issue of LeT’s intent and capability to threaten the homeland or U.S. interests abroad it is useful to explore briefly its ideological outlook as 

well as to situate it within the militant environment in Pakistan. LeT’s original parent organization, the Markaz al-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), was formed in 1986 during 

the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.1 MDI officially launched LeT as its military 

wing around 1990, after which the former was technically responsible for dawa and 

the latter for jihad.2 MDI was dissolved in December 2001, several weeks prior to 

the government’s official ban of LeT, and replaced by Jamaatul-Dawa (JuD). JuD 

remains legal in Pakistan, which means LeT continues to have a legitimate front 

organization through which to operate. The group claims that JuD and LeT have 

no connection, but in reality they remain two sides of the same coin. For purposes 

of clarity, I will refer to the group as LeT except in those instances where JuD’s 

specific above-ground activities or infrastructure is in question. 

From its inception LeT was committed to pan-Islamist jihad, which is to say it 

viewed itself as fighting on behalf of the entire umma.3 Al-Qaeda also has a panIslamist rationale for action, but its agenda is far more explicitly anti-American. AlQaeda’s primary enemy is the United States, whereas LeT historically prioritized 

jihad against India. Many jihadist outfits, including LeT, experienced a hybridization after 9/11, whereby they began including America and its allies among their 

list of adversaries to be fought even as they continued to prioritize other enemies. 

Unlike al-Qaeda, which also endorses the overthrow of what it considers to be apostate Muslims regimes, LeT does not support revolutionary jihad at home because 
24 

4 Hafiz Abdul Salam bin Muhammad, ‘‘Jihad in the Present Time’’ Markaz al-Dawa-walIrshad website, undated. Author’s collection. 5 Bin Muhammad, Why We Do Jihad. 6 Author interview with Abdullah Muntazir, Dec. 2008 in Pakistan. 

7 Information regarding the presence of LeT militants in Iraq from: Author interview with 

Western intelligence official. U.S. Department of Treasury, ‘‘HP–996: Treasury Targets LET 

Leadership.’’; Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘‘Britain Aided Iraq Terror Renditions, Government Admits,’’ Guardian, February 26, 2009. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (London: Penguin, 

2008) p. 228. 8 Author interview with high-ranking official in Jamaat-ul-Dawa, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with Lashkar-e-Taiba member, May 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview with 

former Lashkar-e-Taiba member, Jan. 2009 in Pakistan. 9 Yoginder Sikand, ‘‘Islamist Militancy in Kashmir: The Case of the Lashkar-i Tayyeba,’’ South 

Asia Citizens Web, Nov. 20, 2003. 

the struggle in Pakistan ‘‘is not a struggle between Islam and disbelief.’’4 According 

to one of its tracts, ‘‘if we declare war against those who have professed Faith, we 

cannot do war with those who haven’t.’’5 In other words, jihad against the infidels 

must come first. In lieu of jihad against the state, the group seeks gradual reform 

through dawa. The aim is to bring the people of Pakistan to LeT’s interpretation 

of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam and, by doing so, to transform the society in which they live.6

In keeping with LeT’s pan-Islamist ideology some of its militants joined the jihadi 

caravan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and fought on multiple open fronts during the 1990s, including in Tajikistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 

possibly Chechnya. Its militants have fought in Afghanistan during this decade, and 

a handful also ventured to Iraq.7 Most importantly for LeT, is has also been fighting 

in Indian-administered Kashmir since 1990. The ISI began providing support for the 

group not long after it entered the Kashmir front, and this assistance was escalating 

significantly by roughly 1995. Although state support contributed to the group’s devotion to the Kashmir cause, LeT’s leaders have historically viewed Kashmir as the 

most legitimate open front. They argued Indian-administered Kashmir was the closest occupied land, and observed that the ratio of occupying forces to the population 

there was one of the highest in the world, meaning this was among the most substantial occupations of Muslim land. Thus, LeT cadres could volunteer to fight on 

other fronts, but were obligated to fight in Indian-administered Kashmir.8 However, 

it would be a mistake to suggest the group’s leaders viewed this simply as a territorial struggle. Rather, they asserted that Hindus were the worst of the polytheists 

and that the Kashmir conflict is the latest chapter in a Hindu-Muslim struggle that 

has existed for hundreds of years.9 Once Kashmir was liberated, they argued, it 

would serve as a base of operations to conquer India and restore Muslim rule to 

the Indian subcontinent. 

LeT was only one of many groups the army and ISI were supporting during the 

1990s. Most of these militant outfits adhered to the Deobandi school of thought, as 

do the Taliban. LeT is not Deobandi, but rather Salafi, and so it was historically 

somewhat separated from these other groups for sectarian reasons. It was also focused exclusively on Kashmir from the mid-1990s through to the end of the decade, 

unlike the Deobandi groups, which were active in Afghanistan where they fought 

alongside the Taliban as well as in Kashmir. Some were involved in sectarian violence in Pakistan too. Pakistan was supporting all of these outfits for nationalist, 

rather than Islamist purposes, but so long as this support remained extant, official 

policy aligned with jihadist objectives. When the government of President Pervez 

Musharraf allied with America against al-Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11, it fractured this alignment. The Musharraf regime subsequently divided militant outfits 

into ‘‘good jihadis’’ and ‘‘bad jihadis’’ based on the perceived threats that a group 

posed to the state and utility it continued to offer. This was not a purely binomial 

division, and treatment existed on a spectrum. LeT was the most reliable in 

Islamabad’s eyes and fared the best. Unlike the Deobandi outfits, it had no strong 

allegiance to the Taliban and therefore was viewed as less of a threat to the state. 

In addition, it had a robust social welfare infrastructure (described in the following 

section), which provided the state with leverage. Finally, LeT was the most Indiacentric of Pakistan’s proxies, meaning its priorities aligned most closely with those 

of the Musharraf regime. All these reasons help to explain why the group reacted 

with more restraint than the Deobandi outfits after 9/11 and, hence, why it was 

treated better. 

Pakistan’s policy of playing a double game has proved to be an unsustainable 

model. By the end of the decade it was facing a jihadi-led insurgency, making it 

both a supporter and victim of jihadi violence. LeT’s leaders also tried to have it 

both ways after 9/11. They continued to view liberating Kashmir as the most legitimate jihad and placed a premium on protecting the group’s infrastructure in Paki-
25 

10 Indictment in United States of America vs. Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, July 19, 2006. 11 United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of Georgia, ‘‘Terrorism Defendants Sentenced: Ehsanul Islam Sadequee Receives 17 Years in Prison; Co-defendant Syed Haris Ahmed 

Receives 13 Years,’’ Dec. 14, 2009. 12 Ewen MacAskill and Luke Harding, ‘‘Ambassador denies Pakistan linked to bombs,’’ The 

Guardian, July 18, 2005. Andrew Gilligan, ‘‘On the conveyor belt of terror,’’ The Evening Standard, Aug. 24, 2006. 13 Author interview with first Western intelligence official. Author interview with second 

Western intelligence official. 

stan. As a result, LeT remained focused primarily on the fight against India and 

on expanding the group’s social welfare infrastructure in Pakistan. However, the 

global jihad was impossible to ignore, and LeT also began contributing to the fight 

against America and its allies almost immediately after 9/11. Examining the means 

through which it has done so sheds light on LeT’s capabilities and the ways in 

which it threatens both the U.S. homeland as well as American interests abroad. 

CAPABILITY TO THREATEN U.S. INTERESTS: AT HOME AND ABROAD

LeT has transnational networks stretching across South Asia (and perhaps into 

East Asia via Thailand), the Persian Gulf, and Europe, with a particularly strong 

connection to the United Kingdom. In the past, the group’s connections also reached 

into the United States, Canada, and Australia, though from the open source it is 

unclear whether its networks in these countries remain active. In addition to these 

networks abroad, LeT militants and trainers in Pakistan are considered to be 

among the most tactically adept. The group also has a robust above-ground infrastructure that may be used as a first point of contact for would-be jihadists. Finally, 

it is among the wealthiest jihadist organizations and so can contribute financially 

to operations. As a result, it is able to threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad 

in the following ways: 

Training Provider.—The army and ISI trained many of LeT’s trainers, and some 

of them are former soldiers who took early retirement to join the group. As a result, 

it boasts a stable of men who can provide instruction in small-unit commando tactics, reconnaissance, counterintelligence, and the construction and use of explosive 

devices. As LeT has deepened its collaboration with other outfits, cross-pollination 

among trainers and trainees has occurred. Training collaboration with other groups 

of concern to the United States takes place primarily in FATA as well as in certain 

areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It appears less pronounced in Pakistan-administered 

Kashmir and the neighboring Mansehra District (also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), 

where the group’s camps appear mainly used for operations against India. Crosstraining takes three forms: LeT runs joint camps with other outfits, LeT trainers 

work in camps run by other outfits, and LeT camps provide training to militants 

from other outfits. Thus, significant concern rightly exists that LeT trainers or 

camps—either with or without the leadership’s sanction—might be used to prepare 

militants for attacks against U.S. interests at home or abroad. 

Gateway Organization.—LeT has a robust above-ground presence in Pakistan, run 

via JuD. Its mosques, madrassas and offices provide an entry point for Western 

would-be jihadists looking to access militant organizations in Pakistan. Because this 

infrastructure remains legitimate, those seeking training can present themselves at 

a JuD facility to link up with the group. From there they could either make their 

way to an LeT training facility or take advantage of LeT’s connections, at the organizational or grassroots level, to access other outfits. For example, in 2005 a wouldbe jihadist from Atlanta, Syed Haris Ahmed, sought to train with the group. He intended to enroll at a madrassa and then move on to train with LeT.10 Ahmed and 

his colleague Ehsanul Islam Sadequee earlier had taken video surveillance of possible targets for a terrorist attack in the United States, which they sent to a suspected talent spotter for LeT with whom they were in contact.11 Ahmed ultimately 

failed to access LeT’s camps, which is possibly explained by the fact that he arrived 

in Pakistan 10 days after the 7/7 attacks in London and thus at a time when the 

group was under an enormous amount of pressure. At least one of the 7/7 bombers 

(Shahzad Tanweer) is believed to have attended LeT training sessions focused primarily on indoctrination several years prior. In advance of his final trip to Pakistan 

during which time he trained with al-Qaeda for the 7/7 attacks, Tanweer reportedly 

placed an unknown number of phone calls from his home in Britain to Lashkar’s 

compound at Muridke.12 He and his colleague, Mohammad Sidiqque Khan, are also 

believed to have availed themselves of LeT safe houses en route to al-Qaeda’s camps 

in the Tribal Areas.13
26 

14 Judgment in Republic of France vs. Rama et. al., Magistrates’ Court of Paris, June 16, 2005. 15Dexter Filkins and Souad Mekhennet, ‘‘Pakistani Charity Under Scrutiny In Financing of 

Airline Bomb Plot,’’ New York Times, Aug. 13, 2006. Joshua Partlow and Kamran Khan, ‘‘Charity Funds Said to Provide Clues to Alleged Terrorist Plot,’’ Washington Post, Aug. 15, 2006. 

Henry Chu and Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘Three Britons convicted of plot to blow up planes,’’ Los Angeles Times, Sept. 8, 2009. John Burns, ‘‘3 Sentenced in London for Airline Plot,’’ New York Times, 

July 12, 2010. 16Praveen Swami, ‘‘Evidence mounts of Pakistan links,’’ The Hindu, Aug. 12, 2006. 17 Jean-Louise Bruguie`re, Ce que je n’ai pas pu dire (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2009), pp. 469– 

472. 18 Judgment in ‘‘Republic of France vs. Rama, et. al.’’ Appeal Judgement in ‘‘Fahim Khalid 

Lodhi vs. Regina,’’ New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Dec. 20, 2007. ‘‘Frenchman 

Played ‘Major’ Role in Australia Terror Plot, Court Hears,’’ Agence France-Presse, Feb. 8, 2007. 19 ‘‘Committal Hearing of Faheem Khalid Lodhi,’’ Downing Centre Local Court, Sydney, Australia, Dec. 17, 2004. Natasha Wallace, ‘‘Court Battle Over Secret Evidence,’’ Sydney Morning 

Herald, Dec. 18, 2004. 20 Appeal Judgement in Fahim Khalid Lodhi vs. Regina. 21 Author interview with former member of the Australian security services. Martin Chulov, 

Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism from Within and Without, (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2006), p. 143. Liz Jackson, ‘‘Program Transcript: Willie Brigitte,’’ ABC, Feb. 9, 2004. 22 Author interview with high-ranking official in Jamaat-ul-Dawa, May 2009 in Pakistan. 

Recruitment and Facilitation for Terrorist Attacks.—LeT’s transnational networks, 

particularly in Europe, mean it is capable of talent-spotting, recruiting, and vetting 

radicalized Westerners. It must be noted that LeT is a historically selfish organization and generally sought to use Western operatives to support its own operations 

in South Asia. Nevertheless, it could recruit for other outfits or decide to use Western operatives for terrorist attacks abroad. Those same networks that can recruit 

Western operatives may also be used to support terrorist attacks against the West, 

and there is evidence LeT has employed them to this effect. For example, activists 

in Paris associated with the group are suspected of providing some logistical support 

to the ‘‘shoebomber’’ Richard Reid. French investigators suspected, though they 

could not prove, that LeT’s representative provided logistical and financial support 

to Reid in Paris as well as facilitating contact for him with a person or persons in 

Pakistan.14 LeT operatives in the United Kingdom are also suspected of providing 

money to those involved in the 2006 attempt to bomb transatlantic flights from the 

United Kingdom using liquid explosives.15 Notably, several of those involved may 

have used a LeT relief camp as a jumping off point to access training camps in 

FATA as well.16

A Unilateral Attack.—It is conceivable that rather than contributing to some portion of an attack on the homeland or U.S. interests abroad (either via training, as 

a gateway organization, as a recruiting agent or through the provision of logistical 

support) that LeT could execute an operation unilaterally. There is precedent for 

this. From late 2001 through early 2002 a French convert to Islam named Willie 

Brigitte trained with the group. Sajid Mir (a.k.a. Sajid Majid), a commander responsible for managing LeT’s overseas operatives who was recently indicted for his role 

in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, became Brigitte’s handler and directed him to return 

to Paris to act as a point of contact for any LeT operative transiting through 

France.17 Roughly a year later, Sajid ordered Brigitte to travel to Australia and arranged for members of the group’s network in Paris to provide him with money for 

the trip.18 Brigitte was dispatched to assist Faheem Khalid Lodhi, who had trained 

with the group on multiple occasions.19 Both men remained in contact with Sajid, 

who an Australian court later found was endeavoring to coordinate a liaison between them so that ‘‘the prospect of terrorist actions in Australia could be explored.’’20 Australian security officials said the two men intended to select a suitable 

target and purchase the chemicals necessary to build a large bomb, but that they 

were planning to bring in a foreign explosives expert to assemble it. There were reports that this explosives expert worked in LeT’s camps, but whether he was a 

member of the group or a freelancer who contracted out his services is unknown.21

It is unclear from the open source whether Lodhi was directed to execute the attack 

in Australia by LeT leaders or if he germinated the idea and reached out to the organization for assistance. In either case, this was an instance in which LeT appears 

to have been acting unilaterally and is evidence of its capability to do so. 

GAUGING INTENT

Debates took place within LeT immediately after 9/11 (and President Pervez 

Musharraf’s decision to ally with America) about whether to attack the United 

States and/or Pakistan.22 The leadership decided not to turn on the state, though 

as explained earlier, it did begin contributing to attacks against America. Tensions 

over how involved to be in the global jihad were exacerbated during the middle of 
27 

23 Author interview with Jamaat-ul-Dawa member, Jan. 2009 in Pakistan. Author interview 

with senior officer in Pakistan security services, May 2009 in Pakistan. 24 ‘‘Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National Investigative Agency,’’ June 

3–9, 2010. Author in possession of hard copy. 25 Author interview with former Lashkar-e-Taiba member, Jan. 2009 in Pakistan. 

the decade when state support for the Kashmir jihad declined at roughly the same 

time the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan gained strength. LeT became more 

involved on the Afghan front, which necessitated an increased presence in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and greater integration with the militants based there, many of whom were fighting not only in Afghanistan but also 

against Pakistan. This further increased internal tensions about where the group 

should focus its energies and how close it should remain to the state. Indeed, while 

some LeT members were working with militants from other outfits launching attacks in Pakistan, the ISI allegedly was using other LeT members to eliminate militants from those same outfits.23 Thus, different cliques co-existed within LeT, which 

in turn existed in a space where various actors with overlapping and competing 

agendas were present. The exploding array of opportunities for collaboration meant 

the group’s members could shop around for like-minded allies. 

As a result of escalating tensions within LeT and increasing access to other outfits, factionalization within the organization and freelancing by its members grew 

from roughly 2006–2007 onwards. According to David Headley, the Pakistani-American operative originally named Daood Gilani who conducted surveillance for the 

2008 Mumbai attacks, these internal dynamics contributed to the LeT leadership’s 

decision to expand the scope of the Mumbai attacks. What began as a modest 1– 

2 person operation against the Taj Mahal Hotel became the 10-person terrorist spectacular that captured the world’s attention. Several targets, including the Chabad 

House and the Leopold Cafe ́, were added only months before the operation was 

meant to take place.24 Both guaranteed foreigners would be killed, in particular 

American and Israeli Jews at the Chabad House, which would bring LeT credibility 

within the jihadist community. It is important to recognize that the leadership appears to have felt compelled to expand its target set as a result of pressure—internally and from other jihadist outfits—to show greater results vis-a`-vis the global 

jihad. Equally important is that, although the Mumbai attacks were operationally 

successful and secured LeT significant notoriety, they failed to quell the tensions 

within the organization over how involved it should be in the global jihad. 

At the organizational level, regional dynamics continue to exert considerable and 

direct influence on LeT. The leadership retains an element of nationalism that is 

distinctly at odds with al-Qaeda and still finds common ground, as it has since the 

1990s, with elements in the army and ISI. LeT and its backers remain co-dependent: Each afraid of the repercussions that might stem from splitting with the other, 

and bound together by their belief that India is a mortal enemy. Furthermore, unlike al-Qaeda Central, which confronts a challenging security environment, LeT controls a robust social welfare infrastructure and its leaders value the influence that 

comes with it. In the 1990s the group needed the state to build up its infrastructure, 

whereas now it is reliant on the army and ISI not to tear it down. It is worth highlighting the leadership’s devotion to dawa through the delivering of social services 

and the fact that protecting its domestic infrastructure has at times limited its military adventurism. This leadership operates out of Lahore and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, not from a hidden redoubt somewhere along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, even though the group has increased it presence there significantly. 

This freedom of movement carries with it a number of benefits, but also serves as 

another leverage point that can be used to constrain LeT’s activity. As a result, significant elements within the group are still ‘‘tamed by the ISI’’ as one former member observed.25

It is questionable whether Osama bin Laden’s death will significantly impact 

LeT’s behavior as an organization in the short term, particularly as the group never 

considered itself to be an al-Qaeda affiliate. Because LeT does remain influenced by 

regional dynamics, it is worth considering how bin Laden’s death might reshape the 

environment in which the group operates. The Kashmir conflict remains torpid and 

it would be difficult for LeT to regenerate the insurgency there. LeT will not disappear from the Kashmiri scene in the near term, but a return to its glory days 

on that front is unlikely. This leaves the group with four areas on which to focus: 

fighting in Afghanistan; launching terrorist attacks against India; participating in 

the global jihad via terrorism against the United States and its allies; and non-violent activism in Pakistan, primarily through the provision of social services. LeT 

members continue to integrate into the Afghan insurgency, but the group remains 

a secondary player there. The United States was already moving toward a phased 
28 

withdrawal and pursuing the possibility of a political reconciliation with the 

Taliban, a condition of which would be the Taliban’s willingness to break with alQaeda. Bin Laden’s death could make such a separation more viable and create 

space for a political solution. Of the main players supported by the army and ISI 

in Pakistan—the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and LeT—LeT is the only 

one without a major constituency in Afghanistan. In other words, should a settlement emerge, LeT may find itself without an active open front for the first time in 

two decades. This will impact its behavior and group cohesion. On the one hand, 

a reduction in hostilities in Afghanistan might remove pressure from the rank-andfile to engage more vigorously in the global jihad. On the other hand, it could lead 

those unwilling to lay down arms and robbed of an open front to seek other opportunities, particularly terrorist attacks against India, Pakistan, or the United States 

and its Western allies. 

According to interlocutors in Pakistan, the ISI continues to put pressure on the 

group to refrain from launching either another terrorist spectacular in India, which 

could trigger a war, or an attack against America or its allies. Yet, as should be 

evident, there is cause for concern that in the case of attacks against the United 

States or its allies, this presumes a level of influence by the ISI and by LeT leaders 

that is at odds with the ground reality. The current threat to Western interests 

comes from a conglomeration of actors in Pakistan who are working in concert. 

Thus, LeT need not take the lead role in an attack in order for its capabilities to 

be used against the U.S. homeland or its interests abroad. Notably, working as part 

of a consortium enables LeT to earn credit from its fellow militants while also providing it cover, since shared responsibility makes it easier for the group to conceal 

its fingerprints from the United States or other possible targets. Furthermore, the 

threat comes not only from LeT as a stand-alone organization or from its collaboration with other actors. Rather, individuals or factions within LeT can utilize its domestic infrastructure as well as transnational capabilities to pursue their own operations. Enhanced organizational integration with other outfits heightens the opportunities for freelancing, thus increasing the chances that some of the group’s capabilities might be used for attacks without the leadership’s consent. Because members who leave do not necessarily cut ties with the group, or may bring elements 

within it with them, the threat also comes from LeT’s alumni network. Thus, when 

assessing the dangers of LeT’s expansion in terms of its intent in the medium term 

as well as how it might respond in the near term following bin Laden’s death, one 

must consider the capability of current and former members both to steer the organization in an increasingly internationalist direction as well as to leverage its infrastructure for these purposes whether or not the leadership approves. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Dismantling LeT must be a gradual process in order to avoid provoking a major 

backlash that could destabilize Pakistan or cause the group’s transnational 

operatives to be unleashed. All of the recommendations that follow are LeT-specific 

and intended to spur debate about how to move this process forward. They do not 

focus on the need for or mechanisms by which the United States should continue 

to support Pakistani efforts to achieve reforms in areas including education, the 

economy, or the judiciary, all of which could benefit the process of action vis-a`-vis 

LeT. 

First, accelerate actions necessary for a global takedown of LeT: 

• Continue to pursue counter-terrorism cooperation with, and support to, India 

and Bangladesh. Doing so is necessary for tracking, degrading, and dismantling 

LeT’s networks in Pakistan’s near abroad, which is where they are strongest. 

Providing counter-terrorism assistance to India, particularly in areas that contribute to a more robust homeland security capability, also decreases the utility 

LeT offers to Pakistan. 

• Pursue greater counter-terrorism cooperation with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the 

Maldives, where LeT networks are currently expanding. Arresting this tide 

now, before these operatives secure too strong a foothold, is important for containing the short-term threat and for reducing the chances of an escalation in 

the future. 

• Continue to pursue counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing visa`-vis LeT with allies in Europe and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia, Dubai, 

and the United Arab Emirates). This should include not only interdicting financial support, but also monitoring and perhaps infiltrating networks that could 

be used to recruit operatives or provide logistical support for terrorist attacks. 

Second, consider the following when it comes to action by Pakistan against LeT: 
29 

• In the near term, continue to signal to the Pakistan army and ISI the severe 

repercussions that would result were LeT or elements within it to be involved 

in an attack on the homeland or American interests abroad. The United States 

must also continue to signal the need for Pakistan to restrain LeT from launching another major terrorist attack against India. Moreover, the United States 

should continue to press Pakistan to provide intelligence regarding LeT’s international networks, to interdict Westerners attempting to access the organization’s above-ground infrastructure and to begin taking steps to dismantle LeT’s 

training apparatus. While the most pressing need may be to degrade LeT’s operations in FATA, where it is most closely integrated with other outfits that 

threaten the homeland, all of its camps are capable of training militants who 

threaten U.S. interests. • In the medium term, increase the focus on building up Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capacity via civilian law enforcement and civilian intelligence agencies. 

These entities will be on the front end of any effort to combat a possible backlash from LeT and have utility against other militant outfits currently threatening the state. The United States should also consider contributing to alternative relief mechanisms in Pakistan to reduce the above-ground JuD’s influence and fundraising capability. • At present, there is no significant effort underway to disarm, demobilize, or reintegrate (DDR) any of the militant outfits or networks present in Pakistan, either those allied with or attacking the state. With a view toward the longerterm, the United States should explore the feasibility, costs, and benefits of prevailing on a third party, such as Saudi Arabia, to begin working with Pakistan 

to build a program for DDR. Such a program would have utility for LeT as well 

as for other militants, though obviously it would take time to construct and 

would be of limited utility without political shifts vis-a`-vis India and Afghanistan. Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) has acted as a repository for decommissioned militants in the past, suggesting some members are willing to forsake militancy in 

favor a social welfare or proselytizing mission. Thus, it provides a possible 

means for shifting the organization fully toward non-violent activism over the 

long-term. The leadership’s commitment to dawa and hence to protecting its social welfare infrastructure suggests this path deserves exploration. However, 

several caveats are in order. First, this must be accompanied by a real and sustained crackdown on LeT’s militant apparatus. Otherwise, this approach risks 

legitimizing the above-ground wing of a terrorist organization. Second, this approach could have serious political and social repercussions within Pakistan 

given JuD’s Islamist agenda. Third, while some militants might accept a glide 

path from LeT to JuD, others almost certainly would fight on and would likely 

do so either against Pakistan or in pursuit of a wider global jihadi agenda. Despite these very real dangers, various interlocutors in the Pakistani security establishment have mooted this approach and thus the United States should explore its possible costs and benefits. Intrinsic to this will be developing the 

metrics necessary to confirm JuD is being used as a means of demobilizing LeT, 

and no longer as a front for it. 

Demobilizing LeT militants and dismantling its military apparatus is unlikely absent a fundamental shift in India-Pakistan relations or, at this stage, some resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Yet this is no reason not to consider the aforementioned actions in order to lay the groundwork in the event such a breakthrough 

is reached. As the world witnessed with elimination of Osama bin Laden, persistence and preparation do pay off. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Tankel. 

I neglected to say that you are finishing your book. I need to give 

you a plug for ‘‘Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkare-Taiba.’’ So a very learned presence here today. 

Mr. TANKEL. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Let me take one more bit of housekeeping. I ask 

unanimous consent that Mr. Marino from Pennsylvania, a Member 

of the full committee, be allowed to sit on the dais for this hearing. 

Without objection, so ruled. Thank you, Mr. Marino. 

Now for our final testimony, the witness is Shuja Nawaz. Mr. 

Nawaz is the director of South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council 

of the United States. A native of Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz provides expertise on the region in a multitude of forums and is the author 
30 

of the 2008 book, ‘‘Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the 

Wars Within.’’ 

Mr. Nawaz, you are now recognized to summarize your testimony 

for 5 minutes. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF SHUJA NAWAZ, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA 

CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. NAWAZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, 

and Members of the subcommittee. I am honored to speak before 

you on this critical subject that is of concern to the United States, 

Pakistan and, need I say, the rest of the world. I shall take a 

macro approach to the situation in Pakistan and especially to the 

relationship with the United States. 

As Steve Tankel has already talked of the LeT, I am not going 

to dwell at length on that particular organization or any of the 

other individual organizations, but I should recognize that Pakistan today is a magnet and a haven for terrorists from around the 

globe. It has an internal conflict, a weaponized society, and a sagging economy and a defunct educational system that is not preparing its youth adequately for the 21st Century. 

The killing of Osama bin Laden will not alter these underlying 

conditions that spawn terrorism, but it is an inflection point that 

could help us change the relationship with Pakistan, perhaps for 

the better. As the Chairman said, we must make this relationship 

work. 

I believe that the issues of militancy and terrorism have to be examined both from a national and a regional perspective. There is 

no silver bullet answer. As the Beatles told us, ‘‘Money can’t buy 

you love.’’ So throwing money at the problem is not a real solution, 

as our nearly $1 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven already. 

Just as we do, our partners around the world are looking for respect, consistency, and honesty in relationships. The United States 

needs to think long-term and act even in the short term with those 

longer-term objectives in mind. 

In supporting an autocratic military regime in the past, we ignored the needs of the people of Pakistan and led to their disenfranchisement by civil and military elite. Both the Soviet-Afghan 

war and after we had exited the scene, Pakistan took on a deeper 

regional role focusing on its historical rival, India, and fomenting 

uprisings across the eastern border in Kashmir. These chickens 

came home to roost in later years as the armed warriors of this 

jihad outgrew their controllers’ grasp and widened the scope of 

their activities beyond Kashmir to India proper, and now perhaps 

to Europe and North America. 

Meanwhile, the sudden appearance of globe-shrinking technologies and the ability to raise funds from across the globe and 

to train people allowed these groups to attract fanciful warriors 

from the homelands in the West. The military regime that we supported in the 1980s left a legacy of Islamicized education systems 

that degraded learning institutions, stunted administrative machinery, and relied on political engineering or manipulation to 

manage the polity to its liking. Today we face a huge challenge inside Pakistan. 
31 

A demographic time bomb is ticking. With a median age of about 

20 years, roughly 60 million youth out of a population of 180 million are between 16 and 25 and are largely illiterate and unemployed. They live in the Rentier state that has spawned unbridled 

kleptocratic behavior among its leaders. 

While attention has been focused on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, I believe the greatest influence on the rise of terrorism in 

Pakistan is the lack of governance. The country faces an economic 

crisis due in part to global shocks, but to a larger extent governmental ineptitude and lack of basic reforms. The confluence of poor 

governance and external and internal shocks to the economy and 

polity of health create a perfect backdrop to the violent culture of 

terrorism in Pakistan. 

Countering the hydra-headed insurgencies and militancies that 

inhabit Pakistan today is a huge task for which Pakistan has largely relied on military force. In the past, the army has changed its 

training regimen to focus on counterinsurgency, but it still doesn’t 

have the relationship between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in mind. As Mr. Tankel just explained, that is the weakness 

of the system inside Pakistan. It also needs many tools, helicopters 

for mobility, drones for tracking, and attacking highly mobile terrorists in a difficult border terrain. 

Most of all, it will need the political will to undertake these efforts, particularly inside the Punjab, and it will need to improve its 

policing procedures and processes. Now, the United States is already working with some elements of civil society, but much more 

needs to be done. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the committee, the 

United States can and should play a role in advising and assisting 

Pakistan in order to prevent the rise of terrorism that could attack 

the homeland, but I believe that it is in Pakistan’s own interests 

to undertake the difficult policy changes that will allow it to focus 

on all terrorist groups operating inside its borders. 

We must insist on an honest dialogue and reward honesty with 

honesty. We must follow a two-pronged policy, helping change the 

socioeconomic and political landscape, and helping Pakistan set up 

a broad-based counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operation. 

The United States should also invest in signature infrastructure 

projects that will become a lasting reminder of U.S. assistance. 

The largest single potential, in my view, for improving Pakistan 

security and economy is the normalization of relations with India, 

a process that is now beginning to show signs of revival. Just to 

give you an idea, increased trade between these two countries, rising from about 2 billion a year to between 40- and 100 billion a 

year, would radically alter the lives of people on both sides of the 

border. 

A prosperous Pakistan will be a more confident and secure Pakistan. In my view, a stable and secure Pakistan can help create a 

stable South Asia and a safer United States. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Nawaz follows:] 
32 

1http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4426336. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHUJA NAWAZ

MAY 3, 2011 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Speier, Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to speak before you on this critical subject that is of concern to the United 

States, Pakistan, and the rest of the world. Indeed, I spend much of my time addressing this issue in the day-to-day work of our South Asia Center at the Atlantic 

Council that is designed to ‘‘wage peace’’ in our area of responsibility that includes 

South Asia, The Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The death of Osama bin 

Laden, a man who brought death and destructions to thousands around the world, 

does not change the underlying causes of militancy and unrest around the world but 

especially in our area of responsibility: Greater South Asia. Indeed, the long and 

costly campaign to bring him to justice is a good example of how long festering conditions in authoritarian societies give rise to terrorism with its attendant pain and 

suffering. 

I believe that the issues of militancy and terrorism have to be examined both from 

a national and a regional perspective. They arise out of complex underlying conflicts 

and national and regional narratives. There is no Silver Bullet answer to the perplexing problem of terrorism in Pakistan and other countries in its wider neighborhood today. Throwing money at the problem does not offer a solution, as our nearly 

a trillion dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven. As a youth of the 1960s, I 

can assure you that the Beatles were correct when they sang ‘‘Money can’t buy you 

love’’. We must recognize that our friends and partners in many parts of the world 

are looking for respect, consistency, and honesty in relationships. As does the 

United States. America does not like being taken for a ride. In short, it needs to 

think long-term and act even in the short-term with those longer-term objectives in 

mind rather than being distracted by shorter time horizons. 

Pakistan today is a magnet for terrorists from around the globe. It has an internal 

conflict, a weaponized society, and a defunct educational system that is not preparing its youth adequately for the 21st Century. We have contributed to that condition since the 1980s by pulling out of the region abruptly, leaving a military dictatorship to deal with the debris of war in the neighborhood and its blowback. In supporting an autocratic military regime, we ignored the needs of the people of Pakistan and led to their disenfranchisement by a civil and military elite that increasingly began to see itself as the arbiter of the country’s future, without reference to 

the needs and the will of the people. 

Pakistan took on a deeper regional role in our absence, focusing on its historical 

rival India and fomenting uprisings across the eastern border in Kashmir. These 

chickens came home to roost in later years, as the armed warriors for this ‘‘jihad’’ 

outgrew their controllers’ grasp and widened the scope of their activities beyond 

Kashmir to India proper and now perhaps to Europe and North America. When the 

Pakistani authorities distanced themselves from the Jihadi groups in order to seek 

peace with India in 2004–2005, there was no plan to demobilize, disarm, and deradicalize these groups. They simply cut them loose. 

Meanwhile the sudden appearance of globe-shrinking technologies and the ability 

to raise funds from across the globe and to train people, using the latest internetbased systems, allowed these groups to advertise their wares and attract fanciful 

warriors from the homelands in the West. A continuous stream of a selective historical narrative about the Western and Indian ‘‘other’’ fed the young minds in Pakistan. The military regime that we supported in the 1980s left a legacy of Islamicized 

education systems that degraded learning institutions, stunted administrative machinery, and relied on political engineering or manipulation to manage the polity to 

its liking. 

Today we face a huge challenge inside Pakistan. A demographic time bomb is ticking. With a median age of about 20 years, roughly 60 million youth out of a population of 180 million between 16 and 25, and are largely illiterate and unemployed. 

They see and hear what is happening across the globe and in their neighborhood. 

They dream big dreams. And they are looking for an opportunity to become part 

of a successful dream. But they live in a Rentier State that has spawned unbridled 

kleptocratic behavior among its leaders. The elites of Pakistan have conspired to live 

off the state’s decreasing asset base, giving little in return. Only 2 million of them 

pay income taxes. Leading political figures sometimes pay none or less than $100. 

According to one report based on the Election Commission of Pakistan data, the 

Prime Minister and many of his senior colleagues in the cabinet had not paid any 

income tax for the 5 years leading up to the 2008 elections.1 According to The New 
33 

2http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/world/asia/19taxes.html. 

York Times, ‘‘The country’s top opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif, reported that he 

paid no personal income tax for three years ending in 2007 in public documents he 

filed with Pakistan’s election commission’’ while he was in exile.2 This is the example that Pakistani political leaders are setting for its people! 

A vicious cycle persists: Government fails to deliver services. People refuse to pay 

for services or even taxes that would allow the government to provide them with 

services. Even the parliament and government refuses to pay power companies for 

electricity, forcing them to shut down their power generation plants, reducing energy in a country whose industries are operating at half capacity, as a result. 

Our ‘‘investments’’ have been in governments of this nature for decades in Pakistan. And the bulk of our assistance has been to the military in order to garner its 

support for our war in Afghanistan. The United States offered cash in return for 

this assistance and then demanded receipts. Then we rejected the validity of some 

receipts, and held up payments. The result: An ever-growing Trust Deficit that cannot be removed by short-term measures or statements of intent, nor by outsiders. 

Pakistan has to start by taking charge of its problems and once it begins dealing 

with them, then external assistance can and should play a positive role. 

DOMESTIC FACTORS

While attention has been focused on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, I believe the 

greatest influence on the rise of terrorism in Pakistan is lack of governance. Pakistan’s protracted periods of military rule have stunted the political system and eviscerated the superstructure of the government that is provided by the bureaucracy. 

Government is unable to perform, as a result. Political engineering by autocratic regimes has cumulatively reduced most political parties to opportunistic cabals vying 

for a share of the spoils that come with being part of government. Not unlike other 

dysfunctional ‘‘democracies’’, most of Pakistan’s political parties are run as family 

businesses. They do not have internal democracy. Their leadership is decided on a 

hereditary basis. This widespread condition persists today in the ruling Pakistan 

Peoples Party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), the Pakistan Muslim League 

(Q), the Awami National Party, among others. 

All this would not matter if the economy were growing, and people had enough 

food, prices were held in check, and energy was abundant for industrial growth. 

This is not the case. The country faces an economic crisis: Due in part to global 

shocks, but to a larger extent governmental ineptitude and lack of basic reform. 

Pakistan today is facing rising inflation, close to 15 percent now but rising to 25 

percent, continuous deficit financing that fuels this inflation, and increased dependence on funding from the United States and the International Monetary Fund instead of the markets. Food prices have risen dramatically and since the poorest 

spend half their income on food, they suffer the most. As a senior minister confided 

to me not long ago: The government does not have the vision nor the political will 

to undertake the reforms it promised the IMF. A serious indictment, indeed. The 

confluence of poor governance and external and internal shocks to the economy and 

polity have helped created the perfect backdrop to the violent culture of terrorism 

in Pakistan. 

THE TERRORIST THREATS

The hydra-headed terrorist threat that has made its home in Pakistan’s heartland 

and in the borderland with Afghanistan is worth identifying in detail. • Al-Qaeda continues to use Pakistan as base, in the cities that offer it a hiding 

place, and the remote mountainous reaches of the north west. Most key figures 

of al-Qaeda have found refuge in the towns and cities of Pakistan proper and 

not in the inhospitable hills and mountains of the border region. Osama bin 

Laden was no exception, seeking shelter in Abbottabad in a town that was 

dominated by the military of Pakistan. • A number of Sunni extremists groups, arising out of the sectarian conflict in 

the Punjab, including the Lashkar e Jhangvi, Sipah e Sahaba, and Jaish e Muhammad operate autonomously and also as franchisees of al-Qaeda. AQ has also 

found support from elements in mainstream Islamic parties, including the 

Jamaat I Islami, some of whose members hid AQ targets. These Punjabi 

Taliban are a growing menace, since they arise from the area that also now recruits most of the new entrants to the Pakistan army. Elements of these groups 

have been reportedly involved in attacks against the Pakistan army. 

• The Tehreek e Taliban of Pakistan (TTP) grew out of the movement of Pakistani forces into the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas at the request of the 
34 

3See ‘‘Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency’’ by Shuja 

Nawaz, Atlantic Council 2011. 

United States. It grew into a potent brand name but now is on the decline, its 

leadership having been dislocated from the Mehsud heartland of South 

Waziristan and partially destroyed by the CIA drone attacks. The TTP is at war 

against the Pakistani state and provides training facilities for a growing number of wannabee Jihadis from Europe, North America, and elsewhere. • The Laskhar e Tayyaba remains a powerful entity, having grown beyond the 

control of its official handlers who once trained it to support the uprising in 

Kashmir against India. It has a vast financial network of support form private 

Pakistanis and external sources, from the Gulf. Its target is now all of India 

and more dangerously the globe, wherever it sees enemies of Islam. Reports 

have linked current or former officers of the ISI to the LeT. Many ISI officials 

were removed summarily in the mid 1990s when a new director general was 

appointed in place of an Islamist general and the overtly Islamist elements 

were let go. But there was no attempt to track or control them. Clearly they 

found a home in the groups whom they were once handling. • The Afghan Taliban, including the Mullah Umar group, the Haqqani group, and 

the Hizb I Islami all operate in the border region, using Pakistani territory as 

sanctuary, as needed. Their focus is on Afghanistan and fighting the coalition. 

Countering these groups is a huge task for which Pakistan has relied largely on 

military force and only in the northwest, where counterinsurgency operations have 

been conducted for about 7 years. In the past 2 years, the army has revamped its 

training regimen to focus on COIN or Low Intensity Conflict. But it does not involve 

close collaboration with the civil authorities before or after operations, following the 

U.S.-inspired continuum of COIN operations: Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer. 

Hence, the Army has managed to Clear and Hold but successfully Build or Transfer 

most of the territory it cleared, except in Swat where induction of retired military 

personnel into the police allowed it to transfer security to civil authorities and exit 

to some extent. 

Pakistan has learned COIN by doing. It has rapidly transformed its training institutions to shift from a focus on purely conventional warfare to unconventional war. 

It has yet to create a viable nexus between COIN and Counterterrorism.3 For its 

COIN operations, Pakistan still needs many tools: Helicopters for mobility and 

drones for tracking and attacking highly mobile terrorists in a difficult border terrain. But in the next phase of this internal war, Pakistan will need help and guidance from many sources as it crafts its own CT operations in the heartland. It will 

need to learn from the experience of the Saudis, Indonesians, Singaporeans, and 

others. It will need financing and information. 

But most of all, it will need the political will to undertake these efforts inside the 

Punjab. As a necessary part of that effort will be the need to improve its policing 

procedures and legal processes so that forensics and evidentiary systems could assist the government in prosecuting alleged terrorists and reduce their ability to get 

away by taking advantage of lax laws and poor police work. The United States is 

working with some elements in Pakistan civil society to focus on some of these 

needs. But much more needs to be done with the civil authorities in addition to the 

military-to-military aid relationships for a stable and more viable CT situation to 

develop in Pakistan. In that process, Pakistan will need to cut through the undergrowth of a police system with some 19 different Federal and provincial agencies 

tripping over each other, all largely underequipped and poorly trained. 

And it will be critical for the government to finally complete work on its National 

Counterterrorism Authority that has been in limbo for nearly 2 years now largely 

because of debate on where it ought to be located. It is currently under the Interior 

Ministry but will likely not get support from the provinces or the military because 

of that location. An autonomous entity in the Prime Minister’s office is most desirable but there has been no progress on this matter for over a year and especially 

since the departure of the first director general, who left in frustration. 

WHAT TO DO?

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the committee, the United States 

can and should play a role in advising and assisting Pakistan as a way of preventing the rise of terrorism that could attack the homeland. But, more important, 

I believe that it is in Pakistan’s own interest to undertake the difficult policy 

changes that will allow it to focus on all terrorist groups operating inside its borders 

and not differentiate between them. It cannot control them. So, we must follow a 

two-pronged policy: Helping Pakistan change the socio-economic and political land-
35 

scape to reduce the ability of the forces of terror to spawn, and by helping Pakistan 

set up an effective COIN and CT operation that involves both the civil and the military. If Pakistan fails to do this, no amount of external advice or aid will work. We 

have tried to do a lot with the 13-odd groups that provide the basis for the engagement of the Special Representative’s office with Pakistani counterparts and via the 

Strategic Dialogue. I believe we have to focus on key areas and do them well. Education, for example, which is the focus of a combined British and Pakistani joint 

task force headed by Sir Michael Barber and Ms. Shahnaz Wazir Ali. The United 

States is participating in this effort. This will give it greater heft and lay the ground 

for longer-term development that Pakistan sorely needs. The United States should 

also invest in signature infrastructure projects that will become a lasting reminder 

of U.S. assistance. A major dam or two to help Pakistan meet its energy and water 

shortage, and a highway and railway network linking say the port of Gwadar to Afghanistan would alter the economic landscape of Pakistan’s backward Balochistan 

province and create possibilities for trade with Central Asia. 

The largest single potential for improving Pakistan’s security and economy both 

is the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan, a process that is beginning to show signs of revival. Increased trade between the two countries to reach 

the levels of trade that existed at the time of independence would raise their current 

trade level from about $2 billion a year to between $40 and 100 billion a year and 

radically change the lives of people on both sides of the border. This would especially benefit the districts that are now the breeding ground of the Punjabi Taliban 

and that are contiguous with Indian Punjab. The United States can use its strategic 

partnership with both India and Pakistan to encourage and to some extent underwrite projects and moves in the direction of greater regional trade between them 

and their neighbors in Central Asia. It goes without saying that trade and peopleto-people contact between India and Pakistan will make it difficult for the forces 

that favor conflict between these neighbors and reduce the need for unproductive 

military spending. With that in mind we at the Atlantic Council are engaged in a 

number of projects to examine water conflict between the two countries and to begin 

engagement between their militaries. A prosperous Pakistan will be a more confident and secure Pakistan. It is not there yet and the obvious lack of trust that 

was signaled by the U.S. unilateral action against Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad 

2 nights ago is a good example of the gap that exists between the United States 

and Pakistan. 

Let me end on the words I used in my opening segment: We need to work with 

Pakistan with respect for an ally, but be consistent and honest in our exchanges 

and interactions so there is no disconnect between what we say and what we do. 

Let us agree on longer-term goals. The United States and Pakistan have been 

friends for a long time. As friends, we can disagree from time to time but the vision 

of a safe and secure world and the growth and development of Pakistan remains 

key to the success of this endeavor. Counterterrorism often falls into the trap of tactical and technological solutions. I believe we have to broaden the aperture and 

identify and adopt measures that affect the human terrain and over a longer time 

frame than our domestic politics sometimes allow. On its part Pakistan must return 

the favor of honesty and openness, so we can work with it without fear of being deceived. 

A stable and secure Pakistan can help create a stable South Asia and a safer 

United States. I believe it is worth the effort we are putting into it and much more. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Nawaz, and I want to thank each of the members of this very distinguished panel for your testimony. 

We are facing very difficult circumstances in that we have got 

some hearings—not just the hearings, but we have got to attend a 

classified briefing at 3 p.m., which is now, I am told, going to be 

followed by a series of votes. So as in recognition of what that significant delay would mean, and out of the respect for your time as 

well, I am reluctantly going to limit the questioning to myself and 

the Ranking Member for some limited questions now. Perhaps at 

some point in time, if we have the agreement of the committee, we 

can follow up again on this very, very important topic with you as 

panelists, because I think there is some significant questioning 
36 

that can be done. I thank you for your preparation, and I am hoping we can we can do more to follow up on it. 

But allow me just for a moment to begin a few limited questions 

at this point in time. Let me start with you, Mr. Kagan. You made 

a comment about not dealing with the Taliban. Am I correct in that 

assessment? Is that something that you said? 

Mr. KAGAN. I said this is not the moment to pursue a negotiated 

settlement for the Taliban, in my opinion. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Most of the analyses that I have read recently 

seemed to suggest that that may be a critical aspect to our ability 

for the United States to unwind its current military commitment 

to that region, it may be including the idea of finding some kind 

of a political solution with Taliban, and it is your belief at this 

point in time that that would be an unwise strategy? 

Mr. KAGAN. I will keep my answer short, but it is, in fact, very 

long. First of all, there are not all that many insurgencies—I can’t 

think of any off-hand—that were actually resolved by a negotiated 

settlement with the armed fighting wing of the insurgency. It is an 

odd historical model; I am not sure, I think it is an import actually 

from the Bosnia-Kosovo model that is informing this thinking. But 

those were not insurgencies, those were civil wars. So, I am not 

sure what the historical basis is or examples of this kind of negotiation. 

But in particular what I would say right now is that we have— 

we are changing the situation, the military situation, on the ground 

in Afghanistan dramatically this year. I believe that we will begin 

to see changes in the political dynamic in Afghanistan as well. We 

have just made progress, some symbolic progress if nothing else, 

with the death of bin Laden. 

One negotiates best at moments of strength, and we have not yet 

reached our position of greatest strength and success yet. Nor, I believe, have the Taliban yet reached their position of greatest weakness. I think that we have to be very, very alert to the danger of 

seizing a deal prematurely because it serves our own domestic concerns and so forth that will not, in fact, lead to stability. 

Last, I would just say it is extremely important to understand 

the Taliban, particularly the Mullah Omar branch of the Taliban, 

does not represent Afghanistan’s Pashtuns. They do not represent 

the aggrieved population that has been fueling this insurgency. 

They have capitalized on them, but making a deal with that leadership will not inevitably or, I think, even likely bring along with it 

those who are most aggrieved who have been supporting conflict in 

Afghanistan. 

So I think the notion that we can wrap this up with some Dayton-like agreement with Mullah Omar or some of his henchman 

and have—bring peace thereby to Afghanistan I just think misunderstands the situation in the country at this point. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you for your comments on that. 

I just have a quick question for you, Mr. Jones. You also discuss 

the concept of Dr. Jones, the concept of our search for al Zawahiri, 

and the belief that at one point in time he may have been in Pakistan, we were to continue to be looking for him, but simultaneously 

open to the concern you have for the collaboration, that it appeared 

to be existing or at least the—to some extent the relationship that 
37 

existed between the LeT, Haqqani network and some facets of Pakistani leadership. 

Now, this goes to sort of one of the fundamental questions that 

I don’t—we want to talk about so many various elements of what 

is going on there and the threat emanating from the region, but we 

are dealing in the aftermath of the bin Laden situation, and we 

know the tremendous commitments that have been made from the 

Pakistanis. 

But you identified an issue in which there is a little bit of divided 

loyalties. Let us face it, there is an elephant in the room right now, 

and it is not just soldiers on the front line, it is a Nation here in 

the United States that has been victimized by terror that is similarly asking its citizens to make a substantial commitment with its 

young men and women on the front lines on behalf of the countries, 

and then in addition with its treasure. 

Now, bin Laden was in there for 6 years before he was discovered, and I think Americans are asking how they could have gone 

undetected for that long in that kind of an environment, and does 

it reflect in some extent some kind of divided loyalty or complicity 

in some part, or incompetence, or both? I am going to ask the panel 

to help us resolve that issue so we can move forward in trying to 

find some collaboration or opportunity. I am asking you sort of with 

a—to give a quick sort of observation, because my time is running 

out. 

Mr. JONES. The answer to the question, there is a lot obviously 

at this point we do not know about the specifics regarding who 

knew what about bin Laden’s location. 

What I will say is this: Pakistan clearly had an interest, after 

9/11, in cooperating with the United States to capture and/or kill 

senior al-Qaeda leaders on its soil, and there are a wealth of examples, including the mastermind of the September 11 attacks, 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was captured, as have several 

leaders in urban areas to demonstrate that. 

Those types of arrests or killings have tailed off. So I would say, 

at the very least, whether there was complicity or incompetence, at 

the very least there has not been a high priority in targeting senior 

al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. Based on the threat streams coming 

from this area, those interests have to change, in my view. I do not 

believe it has been a high priority. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, thank you. I reluctantly appreciate the 5- 

minute time limit on my ability to ask questions, and I know we 

would like to have extended the questioning throughout the entire 

panel, but I have to conclude right now, and I turn it over to the 

Ranking Member Speier for her questions. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you for your testimony. It is very troubling, though, because on the one hand, I think you are all basically saying, and correct me if I am wrong, that our presence in Pakistan must remain; 

is that true? Does anyone disagree with that? 

Mr. KAGAN. In some form. I think it is not—I don’t know—speaking for myself, I don’t know that this particular relationship in this 

particular structure is the right one, but in some way we must 

maintain a relationship with Pakistan. 
38 

Ms. SPEIER. So do the American people—we say we have spent 

over a trillion dollars in the last 10 years in Iraq and Pakistan, we 

have spent close to $20 billion in Pakistan, and we had to go in 

ourselves to take out bin Laden. I agree with the Chairman, there 

is elephant in the room, and it really comes down to trust. 

For all the money we have spent, how can we develop a relationship of trust with the Pakistani government when, in fact, you 

have what I would call a fairly weak President and an ISI that is 

rogue at the very least? 

So, my question to you is, where do we go from here in terms 

of creating that trust? Money alone hasn’t gotten us that trust from 

the Pakistani government. 

Mr. NAWAZ. If I may, let me suggest that the beginning of trust 

has to be a closed-door, honest discussion with our Pakistani counterparts. We have been talking through the media quite a lot, and 

we don’t recognize that we talk separately with the civilian government and separately with the military authorities. So we have created or added to the dysfunctional polity of Pakistan by having 

these two parallel dialogues. 

I think it is very critical for us to bring all of them together in 

the room. This happens so infrequently for our leadership when it 

goes to Pakistan or when people come from Pakistan to Washington that it yields some benefit when we have them all in the 

same room together. It is very critical to talk to them together, 

have them understand the facts of life, have them understand that 

the United States is not prepared to pour money down a rat hole, 

and that, given the current situation in the United States of belt 

tightening, it is not going to be possible to rely on money as a resource. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Next. 

Mr. TANKEL. Thank you. 

Just to echo those remarks and expand on them very briefly, I 

think it is important, in the interest of transparency and when we 

have that honest dialogue, first to acknowledge that at the very 

least both countries don’t perceive themselves as having the same 

strategic interests. We often talk as if the United States and Pakistan are on the same page in terms of their medium- and long-term 

strategic interests. I think that when that honest dialogue happens, it is important to acknowledge that right now I think Pakistan perceives its strategic interests differently than the United 

States perceives its strategic interests. So there is a disconnect. 

Let me also just say that I think when having that debate and 

that dialog and that discussion, that interlocutors are going to be 

important as well. To date, for operational reasons, there has been 

a lot of reliance on the military-to-military relationship. In the long 

term we need to be taking greater steps to build up civilian governance within Pakistan, and that is going to mean moving away from 

those interlocutors even if the civilian government of Pakistan is 

quite weak. But ultimately continued reliance on military and ISI 

is not going to be a recipe for long-term stability. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

Dr. Jones. 
39 

Mr. JONES. I think one important step on the trust issue is to 

be honest. Both sides have made mistakes over the past several 

years. The United States has publicly criticized Pakistan in ways 

that have been unhelpful. It has also conducted some operations 

and missions in Pakistan without Pakistan’s knowledge that have 

been unhelpful. 

At the same time I would say that Pakistan has to admit privately—I have served both on the Government side and in the 

think tank side. The Pakistan government has to admit at least 

privately that it has supported some militant groups. It has to be 

honest in private to U.S. Government officials. If it is not, there is 

no way to have a trusting relationship. That honesty simply has 

not been there over the past decade. 

So I would say both sides at this point can say, we have made 

mistakes, but both sides also then have to admit what those mistakes are and then begin to find ways to mutually address them. 

If we can’t even be honest on the mistakes we have made, we will 

never move forward. 

Ms. SPEIER. My time is up, but maybe Dr. Kagan can respond. 

Mr. KAGAN. I think we are a long way from trust with Pakistan. 

I think it is going to be a very long time before they trust us or 

we trust them, given the history of our relationship. 

I think that the suggestions that have been made by the other 

panelists are generally sound, and I would second them. I would 

only add this: There are two narratives that have persisted in 

South Asia—one of them for a long time, and the other since 9/11— 

that decimate any trust that people in the region would have in us. 

One is that we will always abandon them, and we will always, at 

the end of the day, grow tired of the game and leave, and they will 

be stuck with whatever is left there. The other is, since 9/11, that 

all we care about is getting bin Laden, and once we get bin Laden, 

we will go, and everything else is a tool to that end. 

I think we stand at a very important precipice in American policy right now, because if we take actions now that reinforce those 

beliefs, first of all, the repercussions will not just be felt in Pakistan, they will also be felt in the countries benefiting from or going 

through the throes of the Arab Spring; they will be felt around the 

world because they are very profound tropes of American foreign 

policy. 

But I think even more importantly, it is essential that we find 

ways not only to communicate our frustration to Pakistan—which 

we do, and which we need to do—but also to communicate the fact 

that we are not leaving, whatever leaving means. That is not to say 

we will have 150,000 troops in Afghanistan forever, it is not to say 

we will be giving billions of dollars to Pakistan forever, but it is 

to say that we will not, whatever we do, repeat the mistakes of the 

1990s when we wearied of the struggle or thought we had won, and 

simply abandoned the region to its fate and played no further role 

until we were attacked. I think it is critical that we find ways to 

send a message that we are not going to do that, and to show in 

that region, as in many other places, sending messages is much 

less important than what you actually do. 

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I want to thank our witnesses for your very, 

very valuable testimony. Again, I regret, but it is the reality of 
40 

these circumstances that we have these other issues that have 

come in conflict with our schedule. I would ask the witnesses to 

please respond to any questions in writing if, in fact, there should 

be some that would come from Members that were not able to ask 

questions today. I thank you for your testimony, and the hearing 

record will remain open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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