NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 17a0019n.06

Case No. 15-6353

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

1308 SELBY LANE, KNOXVILLE, TN 

37922, REAL PROPERTY,

Defendant,

KNOX COUNTY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION

BEFORE: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox 

County”) claims that the United States Attorney denied it, as a local taxing authority, due process 

in a forfeiture proceeding involving real property located at 1308 Selby Lane and 1525 Wembley 

Hill Road, Knoxville, Tennessee (collectively, the “Defendant Property”). Based on that 

premise, Knox County filed a motion for relief from judgement and to determine the validity and 

extent of tax liens it held on the Defendant property. The district court denied the motion finding 

the forfeiture proceeding was valid. Knox County appeals. Because Knox County did not 

properly intervene in the district court case, it was never a proper party to the lawsuit, and so this 
No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.

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Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding. Thus we DISMISS Knox County’s 

appeal.

I.

The United States initiated an in rem civil forfeiture action on October 1, 2010 against the 

Defendant Property. On September 27, 2012, the district court entered an ex parte Agreed 

Consent Order and Entry of Forfeiture (the “Ex Parte Consent Order”) purporting to forfeit the 

Defendant Property to the United States. On October 24, 2014 the United States informed Knox 

County that the Defendant Property was scheduled to be sold. On November 6, 2014, Knox 

County and the United States filed a Joint Motion for Agreed Order Holding Proceeds of Sale in 

Escrow (the “Joint Motion”) until the validity and extent of Knox County’s tax lien could be 

formally resolved. On December 12, 2014, Knox County filed a separate Motion for Relief from 

Judgment and to Determine the Validity and Extent of Tax Lien. On April 16, 2016, the district 

court issued a Memorandum and Opinion denying Knox County’s motion. On May 13, 2015, 

Knox County filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. On October 29, 2015, the district 

court denied this motion as well. Knox County filed the instant appeal on December 8, 2015.

II.

Although the parties did not raise the issue in their briefs, this Court has “an independent 

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a 

challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “If the court 

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the 

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). In the absence of jurisdiction, this Court’s only function is to 

announce the lack of jurisdiction and dismiss or remand the case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (citing Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1869)). 
No. 15-6353, United States v. 1308 Selby Ln., et al.

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Because this requirement “springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United 

States, [it] is inflexible and without exception.” Id. at 94-95, quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. 

v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).

“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal 

an adverse judgment is well settled.” Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam); 

Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987) (collecting cases); Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 512 

(6th Cir. 2008) (“Generally, non-parties cannot appeal from an order of the district court, unless 

they have first sought leave to intervene as a party.”). For this Court to have jurisdiction to hear 

Knox County’s appeal, Knox County must have properly become a party to this lawsuit. Id.; see 

also United States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because civil forfeiture 

is an in rem proceeding, the property subject to forfeiture is the defendant. Thus, defenses 

against the forfeiture can be brought only by third parties, who must intervene.”); United States 

v. All Funds in Banco Español de Credito, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Civil forfeiture 

actions are brought against property, not people. The owner of the property may intervene to 

protect his interest.”). There are three ways that Knox County could have intervened in this case. 

First, Knox County could have filed a verified claim stating its interest in the forfeited property 

pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, as required by 

the civil forfeiture statute relevant here. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A); One-Sixth Share, 326 

F.3d at 41. Second, Knox County could have moved to intervene before the district court 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Finally, Knox County could have asked us for 

permission to intervene post-judgment for purposes of appeal. See United Airlines, Inc. v. 

McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 (1977). Knox County did none of those things. We reviewed the 

district court records and it appears that Knox County never filed a motion to intervene. 
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Moreover, during oral arguments, Knox County conceded that it did not file a motion to 

intervene. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Because we lack jurisdiction, we express no opinion on the merits of Knox 

County’s claim.
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KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that we lack jurisdiction over the entirety of 

this appeal. True, we lack jurisdiction over the County’s appeal from the district court’s original 

consent judgment, if only because that judgment was entered more than four years ago. See Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). But the County also appeals the district court’s denial of the County’s 

own motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). And the County’s problem there is not jurisdictional, 

but rather that it is not a “party” entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). See generally Bridgeport 

Music, Inc. v. Smith, 714 F.3d 932, 939 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor is the County entitled to 

relief as a nonparty, not least because the appeal itself is plainly meritless. See id. at 939-42. I 

would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment rather than dismiss the appeal.