1,) - ORIGINAL 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

DA 23-0253 

ADAM PUMMILL, an individual, and ADAM 

PUMMILL and KURTIS ROBERTSON as a 

member of Black Gold Enterprises, LLC, members 

of, and on behalf of BLACK GOLD 

ENTERPRISES, LLC, 

Plaintiffs and Appellees, 

v. 

JOSHUA T. PATTERSON a/k/a JOSH 

PATTERSON, as an individual and d/b/a 

PATTERSON ENTERPRISES, INC., also d/b/a 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT, INC., p/k/a 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN JCB, INC., also d/b/a 

ROCKY MOUNTAIN RENTAL SPECIALISTS, 

LLC, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN 

EQUIPMENT also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN 

RENTAL, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN 

EQUIPMENT OF MISSOULA MONTANA, 

Defendants and Appellants, 

and 

JIM GALIPEAU, 

Receiver and Appellee. 

JUN 2 0 2023 

Bowen Cit,-erivvuod 

Clerk of Supreme Couri 

State of Montana 

ORDER 

Receiver and Appellee Jim Galipeau (Galipeau) has moved to dismiss this appeal. 

Defendants and Appellants Joshua T. Patterson and Patterson Enterprises, Inc. (collectively 

Patterson), oppose Galipeau's motion. 

As a preliminary matter, we have amended the caption to reflect the parties on 

appeal despite Patterson's assertion to the contrary. In the response to the motion to 

06/20/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0253
dismiss, Patterson argues that Galipeau has no standing to seek dismissal because he is not 

a party to this appeal. Patterson asserts that Galipeau fails to cite any authority for the 

proposition that he may participate in this appeal when he is not a party litigant. However, 

we do not fault Galipeau for this alleged deficiency as Galipeau has fully participated as if 

he were a party to this litigation—not only in filing the motion that resulted in the order 

Patterson seeks to appeal but also appearing as Appellee in a previous appeal in this case—

apparently with no previous objection from Patterson as to Galipeau's status as a party. 

Although Patterson provides no authority in support of his argument that Galipeau 

is not a proper party to this appeal, we generally agree that receivers are normally not 

considered a party to a lawsuit as the receiver's role is to act as a fiduciary representing the 

court and all parties in interest. The court order appointing the receiver defines the 

receiver's authority. Equity Trust Co. v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d 334, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 

2009). In this case, the District Court defined the receiver's duties to include the power to 

bring and defend actions in the receiver's own name, as receiver. The court authorized the 

receiver to bring supplemental proceedings, and further provided, "The Receiver shall be 

entitled to payment of fees from Black Gold Enterprises, LLC's estate's funds for his 

service at his standard rate of $225.00 per hour, plus such other amounts as may be awarded 

by the Court after a hearing upon notice to the parties and all counsel of record." 

It is from a District Court order directing the payment of Galipeau's fees submitted 

under the authority granted to Galipeau in the Order Appointing Receiver from which 

Patterson now seeks relief on appeal. Galipeau had the express authority to request such 

fees and the concomitant a,uthority to defend his request on appeal; to hold otherwise would 

be to deny Galipeau due process. 

As for the substance of Galipeau's motion to dismiss, he argues that the District 

Court's May 2, 2023 Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 

Fixture Filing and Denying Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's March 8, 

2023 Order and Stay Dispersal of Funds is not properly before this Court. He maintains 

no justiciable controversy exists because the court's order was interlocutory. Galipeau 

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admits M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g) provides that an aggrieved party may appeal from an order 

giving directions with respect to a receivership, but he claims the order does not direct the 

Receiver to do anything, but merely authorizes the payment of attorney and other 

professional fees to the Receiver. 

Patterson disagrees, arguing that Rule 6(3)(g) applies to any "order . . . giving 

directions with respect to a receivership," not only those orders that explicitly direct a 

receiver to act. Here, the District Court's order provides for the immediate payment of 

nearly $250,000 from the approximately $313,000 that Patterson has on deposit with the 

court. Patterson argues the court's order that the Clerk transfer these funds to Galipeau 

constitutes "directions with respect to a receivership." 

We agree with Patterson. In this instance, the order Patterson seeks to appeal gives 

directions with respect to a receivership and it is therefore immediately appealable under 

M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g). 

Although Galipeau argues that such an interpretation would fail to preserve judicial 

economy by making every order issued in a receivership proceeding to be immediately 

appealable, his interpretation of the Rule is incorrect. First, the Rule is not so broad, but 

applies only to orders that give directions with respect to the receivership. Second, M. R. 

App. P. 6(3) provides that certain orders are appealable only if the order at issue is the 

court's final decision on the referenced matter. Thus, our interpretation does not mean that 

every order is appealable under Rule 6(3) if the case involves a receivership. Appealability 

remains constrained only to such orders as meet the Rule's requirements. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant shall prepare, file, and serve its 

Opening Brief on this appeal no later than 30 days from the date of this Order. 

The Clerk is cnttzt!d to provide a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 

Dated this ZÒ -day of June, 2023. 

Chief Justice 

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Justices