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ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP): THREAT TO 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 8, 2014 

Serial No. 113–68 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, 

AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

ALEX MANNING, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ................. 1 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Hon. Trent Franks, A Representative in Congress From the State of Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

PANEL II 

Mr. Peter Vincent Pry, Congressional EMP Commission, Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, and Executive Director of the Task Force on 

National and Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Michael J. Frankel, Senior Scientist, Penn State University, Applied 

Research Laboratory: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22 

Mr. Chris Beck, Vice President, Policy and Strategic Initiatives, The Electric 

Infrastructure Security Council: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

(1) 

ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP): THREAT 

TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 

Thursday, May 8, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION, AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry presiding. 

Present: Representatives Perry, McCaul (ex officio), Clarke, and 

Vela. 

Also present: Representative Franks. 

Mr. PERRY. Ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Homeland 

Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the threats to critical infrastructure posed by electromagnetic pulse, or EMP. 

Before we begin today’s hearing, I ask unanimous consent that 

Congressman Franks be permitted to participate in today’s hearing, and, without objection, so ordered. 

At this time I would like to recognize the Chairman for a brief 

set of opening remarks. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Chairman and Mr. Perry for his leadership in chairing this committee hearing, Ms. Clarke as well. I 

just got back from the World War II memorial service. I spoke, 

talked about my father, who was a World War II veteran, bombardier. I mention that not to talk about my dad, but because this 

issue really goes back to the advent of the nuclear age, and it is 

an issue that the American people really don’t know much about. 

They are not familiar with this issue. 

Some would say it is a low probability, but the damage that 

could be caused in the event of an EMP attack both by the sun, 

a solar event, or a man-made attack would be catastrophic. We talk 

a lot about a nuclear bomb in Manhattan, and we talk about a cybersecurity threat, the grid, power grid, in the Northeast, and all 

these things would actually probably pale in comparison to the devastation that an EMP attack could perpetrate on Americans. 

We have extraordinary capability in this country to do great 

things. We are a responsible Nation with our power and with our 

might. But a nation, a rogue nation, with that type of capability 

in the wrong hands could be devastating. 

Again, I want to commend the Chairman. I want to commend 

Congressman Franks for his leadership. I don’t think any Member 
2 

of Congress knows this issue more than he does, and I know your 

testimony in the record will be very valuable as we look at developing legislation to deal with this very critical and important issue 

to our National security. 

With that, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I recognize myself at this time for an opening statement. 

I would like to thank everyone for attending today. Chairman 

Meehan is unable to attend, but as Vice Chairman of this subcommittee, I am honored and privileged and pleased to chair this 

important hearing on the threat and consequences to our Nation’s 

critical infrastructure from electromagnetic pulse, EMP. 

In 1962, the United States conducted a test named STARFISH 

Prime where the military detonated a 1.4-megaton thermonuclear 

bomb about 25 miles above Johnston Atoll in the in the Pacific. In 

space, six American, British, and Soviet satellites suffered damage, 

and 800 miles away in Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded, street 

lights blinked out, and phones, radios, and televisions went dead. 

While only 1 percent of the existing street lights were affected, it 

became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, could cause significant damage. 

EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results 

from certain types of high-energy explosions or from a suddenly 

fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is that EMP can be 

generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-occurring sources 

such as solar storms, or specialized non-nuclear EMP weapons. 

Nuclear weapon EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear 

weapon is detonated at a high altitude at approximately 30 kilometers, or 20 miles, above the intended target. The consequences 

of such an attack could be catastrophic. All electronics, I mention 

all electronics, power systems, and information systems could be 

shut down. This could then cascade into interdependent infrastructure such as water, gas, and telecommunications. While we understand that this is an extreme case, we must always be prepared in 

case a rogue state decides to utilize this technology. 

Now, currently the nations of Russia and China have the technology to launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran 

and North Korea may be developing EMP weapon technology. This 

is why we must remain vigilant in our efforts to mitigate the effects of an EMP attack. 

Since most critical infrastructure, particularly electrical infrastructure, is in the hands of private owners, the Federal Government has limited authority to mandate preparedness. While some 

people criticize the lack of DHS action on compelling the private 

sector to harden their systems against EMP, it is important to note 

that DHS has no statutory authority whatsoever to regulate the 

electric grid. My hope is that this hearing will be successful in educating the public on the threat of EMP and will alleviate some of 

the fears that people have on EMP attacks. 

I thank the witnesses at this time for their time and look forward to their testimony. 

[The statement of Vice Chairman Perry follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF VICE CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY

I would like to thank everyone for attending today. Chairman Meehan is unable 

to attend but as Vice Chairman of this subcommittee, I am honored and pleased to 

chair this important hearing on the threat and consequences to our Nation’s critical 

infrastructure from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP). 

In 1962 the United States conducted a test named STARFISH PRIME, where the 

military detonated a 1.4 megaton thermonuclear bomb about 25 miles above Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. In space, six American, British, and Soviet satellites suffered damage and 800 miles away in Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded, street lights 

blinked out, and phones, radios, and televisions went dead. While only 1% of the 

existing street lights were affected, it became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or 

EMP, could cause significant damage. 

EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from certain types 

of high-energy explosions or from a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is that EMP can be generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-occurring sources such as solar storms, or specialized non-nuclear EMP weapons. Nuclear 

weapon EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear weapon is detonated at high 

altitude, at approximately 30 kilometers (20 miles), above the intended target. The 

consequences of such an attack could be catastrophic; all electronics, power systems, 

and information systems could be shut down. This could then cascade into interdependent infrastructures such as water, gas, and telecommunications. While we 

understand this is an extreme case, we must always be prepared in case a rouge 

state decides to utilize this technology. 

Currently, the nations of Russia and China have the technology to launch an 

EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran and North Korea may be developing 

EMP weapon technology. This is why we must remain vigilant in our efforts to mitigate the effects of an EMP attack. Since most critical infrastructure, particularly 

electrical infrastructure, is in the hands of private owners, the Federal Government 

has limited authority to mandate preparedness. While some people criticize the lack 

of DRS action on compelling the private sector to harden their systems against 

EMP, it is important to note that DRS has no statutory authority whatsoever to regulate the electric grid. 

My hope is that this hearing will be successful in educating the public on the 

threat of EMP and will alleviate some of the fears that people have on EMP attacks. 

I thank the witnesses for their time and look forward to their testimony. 

Mr. PERRY. At this time the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, 

Ms. Clarke for a statement she may have. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman, and welcome to the 

gavel, and thank you for chairing this hearing on electromagnetic 

pulse and the threat to our critical infrastructure today. 

I, too, want to extend a warm welcome in return to our colleague 

Congressman Franks to our subcommittee. I believe that the last 

time you testified before us was back in 2012. Congressman Franks 

and I co-chaired the EMP Caucus here in Congress. Though we are 

from different ends of the continent, we share a concern about the 

vulnerability and resiliency of our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

I also want to welcome back Dr. Chris Beck, who will appear on 

Panel II. He was my past subcommittee director, and it is good to 

see. 

I am very interested in the testimony today and hoping to hear 

about how we can assess the risk of solar geomagnetic storms and 

other EMP threats that create vulnerabilities for our critical infrastructure. Since we know the electric grid is vulnerable to physical 

natural threats like heavy weather, EMPs from solar weather, and 

malicious cyber threats, it is important for the subcommittee to 

have a fuller understanding of the threats. 

As I see it, the main risk from a terrorist attack succeeding 

against the electric power industry would be a widespread power 

outage that lasted for an extended period of time. The most critical 
4 

components of the transmission system are the high-voltage and 

extra-high-voltage transformers, or EHVs, but we must not forget 

the other major components of the electric transmission system 

that are vulnerable to terrorist attack: The transmission lines, 

transmission towers, and control centers. 

Utilities rarely experience loss of an individual EHV transformer, 

but recovery from such a loss takes months, especially if no spare 

is available. Conversely, utilities regularly experience damage to 

transmission towers and substations due to weather and malicious 

activities and are able to recover from this damage fairly rapidly. 

Experts generally agree that a failure, for whatever reason, involving several key EHV transformers could cause blackouts lasting weeks and deteriorated service for an area that could last 

months, and that the economic consequences of such an attack 

would likely be large. 

We also know that public-private partnerships are the keystone 

to solving this challenge, especially because the large majority of 

our electric grid is privately held by investor-owned utilities, or 

they are part of the rural electric cooperatives network, utilities 

owned by their member customers in 47 States, or the public power 

municipal utilities. 

The Electric Power Research Institute, or EPRI, an industryfunded energy research consortium, is also addressing high-voltage 

transformer vulnerabilities, and in cooperation with the North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation, EPRI has been developing conceptual designs for recovery transformers which would enable rapid temporary replacement of damaged high-voltage transformers. High-voltage and extra-high-voltage transformers are very 

large, extremely difficult to transport, and, until 2009, primarily 

manufactured overseas, complicating rapid recovery and restoration efforts. 

The Department of Homeland Security has a variety of efforts for 

EMP and all-hazards risks including research on technologies to 

improve resiliency in the electric grid corridor. The DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate has co-sponsored with private utilities 

an exercise and a fast turnaround transformer replacement project. 

This effort is known as the Recovery Transformer Project, or RecX, 

and it hopes to increase the resiliency of the transmission power 

grid through the use of more mobile and modular transformers. 

This applied research effort has developed a prototype EHV 

transformer that can quickly be deployed to a site via a series of 

large trucks and trailers and then installed, assembled, and energized rapidly. The prototype RecX was demonstrated last year and 

installed in the grid at a host utility, and it is currently undergoing 

a 1-year observational period to verify its performance. 

However, within DHS, identifying specific EMP-threat-related 

programs in their budgets is difficult because EMP-specific preparedness and response is not the primary purpose of most programs generally characterized as all-hazards threats. Some see this 

as a problem; however, under the current sequester budgetary constraints, funding sources for mitigation and response preparedness 

for low-probability risk compete directly with today’s on-the-ground 

first-responder needs. 
5 

Unfortunately EMP events of all sorts have become the darling 

of the internet and late-night talk radio, forecasting ‘‘the end of civilization as we know it’’ conditions. They include all kinds of lurid 

descriptions of hypothetical catastrophic social events that will, 

without any doubt in their minds, occur when an EMP event happens, according to these soothsayers. It can be disturbing. 

EMP-related events have even been popularized in melodramatic 

TV shows. Books of science fiction have popularized EMP end-ofday scenarios; and, of course, the internet has innumerable EMP 

sites that tout the devastation to come. 

Since I have been on this committee, I and others have been 

careful not to use our positions of influence to promote fear in the 

public. While the threat of an EMP event is real, I believe we need 

to use scientific, risk-based, and, frankly, common-sense plans and 

exercises to give us a clearer picture of how to prevent and respond 

in the event of an EMP incident. More complete understanding of 

preparedness, response, and recovery activities related to any type 

of EMP incident could provide a thoughtful background that can 

assist the Nation’s resiliency if high-impact EMP events do occur. 

I look forward to the testimony today, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER YVETTE D. CLARKE

MAY 8, 2014 

I’m very interested in the testimony today, and hoping to hear about how we can 

assess the risk of solar geomagnetic storms and other EMP threats that create 

vulnerabilities for our critical infrastructure. 

Since we know the electric grid is vulnerable to physical natural threats like 

heavy weather, EMPs from solar weather, and malicious cyber threats, it is important for the subcommittee to have a fuller understanding of the threats. 

As I see it, the main risk from a terrorist attack succeeding against the electric 

power industry would be a widespread power outage that lasted for an extended period of time. 

The most critical components of the transmission system are the High-Voltage 

and Extra-High-Voltage transformers, or EHVs. But we must not forget the other 

major components of the electric transmission system that are vulnerable to terrorist attack—the transmission lines, transmission towers, and control centers. 

Utilities rarely experience loss of an individual EHV transformer, but recovery 

from such a loss takes months, especially if no spare is available. 

Conversely, utilities regularly experience damage to transmission towers and substations due to both weather and malicious activities, and are able to recover from 

this damage fairly rapidly. 

Experts generally agree that a failure, for whatever reason, involving several key 

EHV transformers, could cause blackouts lasting weeks and deteriorated service for 

an area that could last months, and that the economic consequences of such an attack would likely be large. 

We also know that public/private partnerships are the keystone to solving this 

challenge, especially because the large majority of our electric grid is privately held 

by investor-owned utilities, or they are part of the Rural Electric Cooperatives network, utilities owned by their member-customers in 47 States, or the Public Power 

municipal utilities. 

The Electric Power Research Institute, or EPRI, an industry-funded energy research consortium, is also addressing High-Voltage transformer vulnerabilities, and 

in cooperation with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, EPRI has 

been developing conceptual designs for ‘‘recovery transformers’’ which would enable 

rapid temporary replacement of damaged High-Voltage transformers. 

High-Voltage and Extra-High-Voltage transformers are very large, extremely difficult to transport, and until 2009 primarily manufactured overseas, complicating 

rapid recovery and restoration efforts. 
6 

The Department of Homeland Security has a variety of efforts for EMP and ‘‘allhazards risks’’, including research on technologies to improve resiliency in the electric grid sector. 

The DHS Science & Technology Directorate has co-sponsored with private utilities 

an exercise in a fast turnaround transformer replacement project. 

This effort is known as the Recovery Transformer Project, or RecX, and it hopes 

to increase the resiliency of the transmission power grid through the use of more 

mobile and modular transformers. 

This applied research effort has developed a prototype EHV transformer that can 

quickly be deployed to a site via a series of large trucks and trailers, and then installed, assembled, and energized rapidly. 

The prototype RecX was demonstrated last year, and installed in the grid at a 

host utility, and it is currently undergoing a 1-year observational period to verify 

its performance. 

However, within DHS, identifying specific EMP threat-related programs and their 

budgets is difficult, because EMP-specific preparedness and response is not the primary purpose of most programs generally characterized as ‘‘all-hazards threats.’’ 

Some see this as a problem. 

However, under the current sequester budgetary constraints, funding sources for 

mitigation and response preparedness for low probability risks, compete directly 

with today’s on-the-ground first responder needs. 

Unfortunately, EMP events of all sorts have become the darling of the internet 

and late-night talk radio forecasting ‘‘end of civilization as we know it’’ conditions. 

They include all kinds of lurid descriptions of hypothetical catastrophic social 

events that will, without any doubt in their minds, occur when an EMP event happens, according to these soothsayers. 

It can be disturbing. EMP related events have even been popularized in melodramatic TV shows. Books of science fiction have popularized EMP end-of-days scenarios, and of course, the internet has innumerable EMP sites that tout the devastation to come. 

Since I have been on this committee, I, and others, have been careful not to use 

our positions of influence to promote fear in the public. 

While the threat of an EMP event is real, I believe we need to use scientific, riskbased, and frankly, common-sense plans and exercises to give us a clearer picture 

of how to prevent and respond in the event of an EMP incident. 

A more complete understanding of preparedness, response, and recovery activities 

related to any type of EMP incident, could provide a thoughtful background that can 

assist the Nation’s resiliency, if high-impact EMP events do occur. 

Mr. PERRY. The Vice Chairman thanks the Ranking Member. 

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

Scientists tell us that it is likely that a powerful geomagnetic solar storm, capable 

of affecting parts of the U.S. and Canadian electrical grid could occur. When it will 

occur, we are not quite sure. 

What we do know is that last year, 2013 was forecasted as the next period of elevated solar activity, known as ‘‘solar maximum’’, and we are in a high-activity part 

of a cyclical process. 

The popularity of an EMP event occurring in the United States has taken on the 

dimensions of a doomsday—end of civilization as we know it—scenario, and it includes all sorts of catastrophic events surrounding possible solar storms, and other 

kinds of EMP attacks. 

These stories are rampant throughout current media—fiction books have been 

popularized about it, the internet has innumerable sites that tout the devastation 

to come, and it is the subject of late-night talk radio regularly. 

Since I have been on this committee, I have urged my colleagues not to use our 

positions of influence to promote fear in the public. 

While the threat of an EMP event is real, I believe we need to use common-sense, 

risk-based scenarios and exercises to give us a picture of how to prevent or respond 

to an EMP event. 

Many blame the current administration for their frustrations about EMP. However, no one from the Federal Government is here today to testify about the issue. 

Today, we will not hear from Government specialists and experts from the Department of Energy or Homeland Security on this issue. 
7 

It is the responsibility of this committee to know the probability of such an event, 

and the likelihood and severity of the effects on the electric grid and other critical 

infrastructure. 

What’s important to me is that in this time of increasingly tight budgets, and the 

current sequester budget for homeland security, we must depend on sophisticated 

risk analysis to guide us in making the tough decisions about our spending priorities. 

Furthermore, we need to explore how we can leverage this risk analysis to sensibly prioritize our spending and especially make use of the existing public/private 

partnerships to deal with such a threat. 

Mr. PERRY. We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of 

witness before us today on this important topic. The Honorable 

Trent Franks represents Arizona’s Eighth Congressional District, 

serving in Congress since 2003. Prior to coming to Washington, 

Representative Franks was president of Liberty Petroleum Corporation, a small oil exploration company established in 1996. He 

had previously held positions in the Arizona State Legislature and 

in the Governor’s Office for Children. 

Since coming to Congress, Representative Franks has been an 

advocate for robust preparation against a potential EMP event, 

natural or man-made. He launched the Congressional EMP Caucus 

and has pushed for passage of the Secure High-Voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act, or the SHIELD Act. 

Thanks for being here. Your full written statement will appear 

in the record. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Franks for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT FRANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Mr. FRANKS. Good afternoon, Chairman Perry, and Ranking 

Member Clarke, and fellow distinguished Members on the committee. I believe the subject of this hearing today is one of profound 

implication and importance to our country, and I am very grateful 

to you for allowing me to testify. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, America is so reliant on our electric grid that we specifically consider it, ‘‘critical infrastructure.’’ With each passing year our society becomes increasingly dependent on technology and an abundant supply of electricity. Our household appliances, food-distribution systems, telephone and computer networks, our communication devices, water 

and sewage plants would all grind to a halt without electric power. 

At the same time, the use of modern computerized control systems along with the increased size and integration of our grid has 

made it far more vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse or geomagnetic disturbance than ever before. Consequently, nearly every 

single facet of modern human life in America is now susceptible to 

being crippled by a major natural or man-made EMP event, and 

nearly every space, weather, and EMP expert recognizes the dramatic disruptions and cataclysmic collapses these pulses can potentially bring to electric grids. 

In 2004 and 2008, the EMP Commission, which some of the 

members of that will be here today, testified before those of us on 

the Armed Services Committee that the U.S. society and economy 

are so critically dependent upon the availability of electricity that 

a significant collapse of the grid precipitated by a major natural or 

man-made event, EMP or otherwise, could result in catastrophic ci-
8 

vilian casualties. Let me say that again. Could result in catastrophic civilian casualties. That conclusion is echoed by separate 

reports recently compiled by the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, the National 

Academy of Sciences, along with various other Government agencies and independent researchers. 

We now have 11 Governmental agencies’ studies on the severe 

threat and vulnerabilities we face from EMP and GMD, all of 

which came to very similar conclusions. In fact, you should have in 

front of you booklets both from the Center for Security Policy and 

the Heritage Foundation that give some insight into some of these 

studies. 

We as a Nation have spent billions of dollars over several decades hardening our nuclear triad, our missile defense capabilities, 

and numerous other critical elements of our National security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly 

the type of electromagnetic pulse that might be deliberately generated against us by an enemy; however, our civilian grid upon 

which the Department of Defense relies upon for nearly 99 percent 

of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind 

of danger. Mr. Chairman, our enemies are actually and acutely 

aware of that vulnerability, and it constitutes, in my opinion, an 

invitation to them to use the asymmetric capacity of an EMP weapon against us should they choose to do so. 

To address this National security threat, Chairman Pete Sessions 

and I have introduced the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, 

H.R. 3410, which is now before your committee, and we would like 

to specifically thank Ranking Member Yvette Clarke for co-sponsoring this critical legislation. H.R. 3410 enhances the Department 

of Homeland Security’s threat assessments for geomagnetic disturbances and electromagnetic pulse blackouts, which will enable 

practical steps to protect the electric grid that serves our Nation. 

This legislation will also help the United States prepare for such 

an event by including potential large-scale extended blackouts into 

existing National planning scenarios. It allows us to plan for protecting and recovering the electric grid and other critical infrastructure from an EMP event. Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Chairman, it advances an awareness program to educate and, I hope, 

motivate all of us inside and outside of Government to proactively 

protect against this potentially devastating danger to our country. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me suggest to you all that there is 

a moment in the life of nearly every problem when it is big enough 

to be seen and still small enough to be addressed. I believe we now 

live in that moment as it relates to the threat of natural or 

weaponized EMP. 

The challenge to ultimately and comprehensively protect our people and Nation from all of the various perils of natural or manmade EMP will be long and lingering, but the time to protect our 

Nation from the most devastating scenario is now. The threat is 

real, and the implications are profoundly sobering. Your actions 

today to protect America may gain you no fame or fanfare in the 

annals of history; however, it may happen in your lifetime that a 

natural or man-made EMP event so big has an effect so small that 

no one but a few will recognize the disaster that was averted, and 
9 

for the sake of our children and future generations, I pray it happens exactly that way. 

I thank you, and God bless you all. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Franks follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT FRANKS

Good afternoon Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Clarke, and fellow distinguished Members on the committee. I believe the subject of this hearing is one of 

profound implication and importance and consequently I am grateful to you all for 

allowing me to testify here today. 

With each passing year, our society becomes increasingly dependent on technology 

and an abundant supply of electricity. Our entire American way of life relies upon 

electrical power and technology. Our household appliances, food-distribution systems, telephone and computer networks, communication devices, water and sewage 

plants would grind to a halt without it. Nearly every single facet of modern human 

life in America is susceptible to being crippled by a major Electromagnetic Pulse or 

Geomagnetic Disturbance event. We are so reliant on our electric power grid that 

we specifically consider it ‘‘critical infrastructure’’. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, it strikes at my very core when 

I think of the men, women, and children in cities and rural towns across America 

with a possibility of no access to food, water, or transportation. In a matter of weeks 

or months at most, a worst-case scenario could bring devastation beyond imagination. 

The effects of geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulses on electric infrastructure are well-documented, with nearly every space, weather, and EMP expert 

recognizing the dramatic disruptions and cataclysmic collapses these pulses can 

bring to electric grids. In 2008, the EMP Commission testified before The Armed 

Services Committee, of which I am a member, that the U.S. society and economy 

are so critically dependent upon the availability of electricity that a significant collapse of the grid, precipitated by a major natural or man-made EMP event, could 

result in catastrophic civilian casualties. This conclusion is echoed by separate reports recently compiled by the DOD, DHS, DOE, NAS, along with various other 

Government agencies and independent researchers. All came to very similar conclusions. We now have 11 Government studies on the severe threat and vulnerabilities 

we face from EMP and GMD. 

RECENT EVENTS

Mr. Chairman, as you can see, we have known the potentially devastating effects 

of sufficiently intense electromagnetic pulse on the electronic systems and its risk 

to our National security. More troubling, our enemies know. 

More than a year ago, an unknown number of shooters with AK–47s knocked out 

17 large transformers during a highly-choreographed assault on the PG&E Metcalf 

Transmission Substation in California. While the power company was able to avoid 

blackouts, the damage to the facility took nearly 4 weeks to repair. 

This is not an isolated incident and world-wide adversaries are taking notice in 

the vulnerability of our grid. Just last month, Connecticut officials released a report 

discussing their efforts to protect utility and distribution companies because hackers 

and cyber attackers around the world have made attempts to penetrate their systems. 

THE THREATS

We as a Nation have spent billions of dollars over the years hardening our nuclear triad, our missile-defense capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of 

our National security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by 

an enemy. However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon 

for nearly 99% of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind of 

danger. This constitutes an invitation on the part of certain enemies of the United 

States to use the asymmetric capability of an EMP weapon against us. 

We also face the threat of a natural EMP event. Since the last occurrence of a 

major geomagnetic storm in 1921, the Nation’s high-voltage and extra-high-voltage 

systems have increased in size more than ten-fold. We are currently entering an interval of increased solar activity and are likely to encounter an increasing number 

of geomagnetic events on earth. 
10 

LEGISLATION

To this end, I introduced The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, H.R. 3410, 

which currently lays before your committee. I’d like to thank Ranking Member 

Clarke, and my EMP Caucus co-chair for cosponsoring this critical legislation. H.R. 

3410 enhances the Department of Homeland Security’s threat assessments for geomagnetic disturbances and electromagnetic pulse blackouts which will enable practical steps to protect the electric grid that serves our Nation. This legislation will 

also help the United States prepare for such an event by implementing large-scale 

blackouts into existing National planning scenarios. It allows us to plan for protecting and recovering the electric grid and other critical infrastructure from an 

EMP event. In addition, it advances an educational awareness program to protect 

critical infrastructure and constructs a campaign to proactively educate emergency 

planners and emergency responders at all levels of government. 

SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, the challenge to ultimately and fully protect our people and Nation 

from all of the various perils of natural or man-made electromagnetic pulse will be 

long and lingering. But the time to protect our Nation from the most devastating 

scenario is now; the threat is real, and the implications are sobering. 

Your actions today to protect America may gain you no fame or fanfare in the 

annals of history. However, it may happen in your lifetime that a natural or manmade EMP event so big has an effect so small that no one but a few will recognize 

the disaster that was averted. For the sake of our children and future generations, 

I pray it happens exactly that way. 

Thank you and God bless all of you. Thank you and I yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman thanks Representative Franks and 

welcomes you to the dais at this time. 

Mr. FRANKS. Were there any questions, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. PERRY. Are there any questions, Ms. Clarke? We don’t have 

any questions at this point. 

Mr. FRANKS. I would then also refer you once again to the materials that we brought to the committee. 

Mr. PERRY. Absolutely. If the other panel will be seated. While 

they are doing so, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record 

a statement by Rules Committee Chairman Pete Sessions, who 

wanted to attend this hearing today, but was delayed on the floor. 

Without objection. 

[The statement of Mr. Sessions follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE SESSIONS

Last month’s anniversary of the attacks on the Metcalf Power Station remind us 

that attacks on key elements of the Nation’s bulk power distribution system—popularly known as the ‘‘electric grid’’—have exposed a serious lack of resiliency in this 

critical infrastructure. We are on notice that, if as a result, the power was to be 

disrupted for protracted periods; the consequences could be nothing short of catastrophic. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the subcommittee for holding this hearing to address what is arguably the most serious of the threats to the grid: The possibility 

that a single nuclear weapon detonated in space high over this country could unleash intense electromagnetic pulses (EMP), disrupting for many months—if not indefinitely—the supply of power to large area. 

Until recently, information about EMP was Classified and many of us have little 

knowledge of the serious danger such threats represents to everything we hold dear. 

Unfortunately, even if those who wish to do this country harm know about our 

grid’s vulnerability to EMP choose not to exploit it, the bulk power distribution system will be subjected to effects similar to what are known as the E–3 pulses caused 

by nuclear detonations in space. 

Roughly every 150 years, the sun emits in the earth’s direction an intense coronal 

mass ejection, or solar flare, that can severely damage or destroy unprotected electronic devices and electric systems. Such solar storms are known as ‘‘Carrington 
11 

Events,’’ named for the scientist who first identified the phenomenon when it last 

occurred in 1859—155 years ago. 

Whatever its source, the consequences of such electromagnetic pulses could be 

devastating for many millions of people who would be left without access to potable 

water, food, bank accounts, medications, communications, transportation, and many 

other important electronically-based activities—possibly for the indefinite future. 

Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Threat Commission, believes that, 

if the power goes out and stays out for even 1 year’s time, as many as 9 out of 10 

of us would perish. 

Fortunately, Mr. Chairman, we need not face such a horrific prospect. We know 

how to protect electrical and electronic devices from the effects of EMP. In fact, the 

Department of Defense has been doing it with respect to the military’s nuclear deterrent and command-and-control systems for over 50 years. 

There are, in short, proven and easily implementable techniques that can now be 

applied to ensure the resilience ofthe U.S. electric grid and the things that depend 

upon it in 21st Century America—which is just about everything. 

A first step towards such corrective action would be for the adoption ofthe Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA), H.R. 3410. It will require the Department of 

Homeland Security to make EMP one of its National planning scenarios. This legislation represents the first step toward raising awareness about the gravity of the 

threats to our grid and the other critical infrastructures that depend upon it. 

I commend the subcommittee for focusing on this potentially existential danger 

and urge your Members to give early and favorable consideration to the CIPA. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, gentlemen. I will start with introductions. 

Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is the executive director of the Task Force 

on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory 

board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from 

electromagnetic pulse and other threats. Dr. Pry is also the director 

of the United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, an advisory body to 

Congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. Dr. 

Pry has served on the staffs of the Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the U.S. from an EMP Attack, the House Armed 

Services Committee, as an intelligence officer with the CIA, and as 

a verification analyst at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency. 

Dr. Michael Frankel is a senior scientist at the Penn State—and 

I must pause for a moment. We are, just in case you are wondering 

who I am, where I went to school—at the Penn State University 

Applied Physics Laboratory, and one of the Nation’s leading experts on the effects of nuclear weapons. Formerly he served as the 

executive director of the Congressional Commission to Assess the 

Threat to the U.S. from EMP, and as the chief science officer for 

L–3 Communications. In prior Government service, Dr. Frankel 

served various National security capacities, including with the Office of Advanced Energetics and Nuclear Weapons at the Department of Defense, the Nuclear Phenomenology Division at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and as a research physicist at the 

Naval Surface Weapons Center. Also known for his expertise in directed energy and advanced energetic materials, he has made seminal contributions to key strategic defense programs and has been 

active in international scientific exchanges. 

Dr. Chris Beck is the vice president for policy and strategic initiatives for the Electric Infrastructure Security Council. Dr. Beck 

is a technical and policy expert in several homeland security and 

National defense-related areas, including critical infrastructure 

protection, science and technology development, WMD prevention 
12 

and protection, and emerging threat identification. Dr. Beck served 

on the staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security, as well 

as a staffer for Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez. Before Government service, Dr. Beck was a post-doctoral fellow and adjunct professor at Northeastern University. 

Thank you all for being here. The full written statements of witnesses will appear in the record, and at this time the Chairman 

recognizes Dr. Pry for 5 minutes for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT PRY, CONGRESSIONAL EMP 

COMMISSION, CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE COMMISSION, AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE 

ON NATIONAL AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. PRY. Thank you for this opportunity to testify at your hearing on the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse to critical infrastructure. 

Natural EMP from a geomagnetic super-storm like the 1859 

Carrington Event or the 1921 Railroad Storm, a nuclear EMP attack from terrorists or rogue states as practiced by North Korea 

during the nuclear crisis of 2013 are both existential threats that 

could kill 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal collapse. 

A natural EMP catastrophe or nuclear EMP attack could black 

out the National electric grid for months or years and collapse all 

the other critical infrastructures, communications, transportation, 

banking and finance, food and water, necessary to sustain modern 

society and the lives of 310 million Americans. 

Passage of the SHIELD Act to protect the National electric grid 

is urgently necessary. In 2010, after the House unanimously passed 

the GRID Act, if one Senator had not put a hold on the bill, today 

in 2014 the Nation would already be protected since it would take 

about 31⁄2 years to harden the grid. Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, H.R. 3410, to create a new National planning scenario focused on EMP is urgently necessary. As the National planning scenarios are the basis for all Federal, State, and 

local emergency planning, training, and resource allocation, an 

EMP National planning scenario would immediately and significantly improve National preparedness for an EMP catastrophe. 

The single most important thing Congress could do to protect the 

American people from EMP and from all the other threats to critical infrastructures is pass the Critical Infrastructure Protect Act, 

which bill is soon or will be before this committee for consideration. 

Thousands of emergency planners and first responders at the 

Federal, State, and local level want to protect our Nation and their 

States and communities from the EMP threat, but they are seriously hindered and even prohibited from doing so because the EMP 

threat is not among the 15 canonical National planning scenarios 

utilized by the Department of Homeland Security. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would immediately mobilize thousands of emergency planners and first responders at all levels of government and educate millions of others 

about the EMP threat and how to prepare for it. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would immediately help States that are frustrated with the lack of action on 
13 

EMP in Washington and are trying to launch initiatives protecting 

their electrical grids from EMP, as is being attempted now in 

Maine, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Florida. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would educate all States about the EMP threat and help them protect their 

critical infrastructures. For example, projects in New York and 

Massachusetts to harden their State grids against severe weather 

caused by climate change should include protection against an 

EMP event, which is the worst threat to the grid. If the grid is protected against EMP, it will mitigate all lesser threats, including 

cyber attack, sabotage, and severe weather. 

Given the amounts of money being spent in New York and Massachusetts on grid hardening against severe weather, significant 

EMP protection can probably be accomplished now within their 

current budgets, but the cost of EMP protection will increase significantly if they delay and attempt remediation later. 

EMP is a clear and present danger. A Carrington-class coronal 

mass ejection narrowly missed the earth in July 2012. Last April, 

during the nuclear crisis with North Korea over Kim Jong-Un’s 

threatened nuclear strikes against the United States, Pyongyang 

apparently practiced an EMP attack with its KSM–3 satellite that 

passed over the U.S. heartland and over the Washington, D.C.-New 

York City corridor. Iran, estimated to be within 2 months of nuclear weapons by the administration, has a demonstrated capability to launch an EMP attack from a vessel at sea. The Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard Navy commenced patrols off the East Coast 

of the United States in February. 

Thank you for your attention to EMP, which is the least understood but gravest threat to our society. This concludes my remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pry follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT PRY

MAY 8, 2014 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify at your hearing on the threat posed by 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to critical infrastructure. 

Natural EMP from a geomagnetic super-storm, like the 1859 Carrington Event or 

1921 Railroad Storm, and nuclear EMP attack from terrorists or rogue states, as 

practiced by North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 2013, are both existential 

threats that could kill 9 of 10 Americans through starvation, disease, and societal 

collapse. 

A natural EMP catastrophe or nuclear EMP attack could blackout the National 

electric grid for months or years and collapse all the other critical infrastructures— 

communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water—necessary to 

sustain modern society and the lives of 310 million Americans. 

Passage of the SHIELD Act to protect the National electric grid is urgently necessary. In 2010, after the House unanimously passed the GRID Act, if one Senator 

had not put a hold on the bill, today in 2014 the Nation would already be protected, 

since it would take about 3.5 years to harden the grid. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA) to create a new National Planning Scenario focused on EMP is urgently necessary. As the National 

Planning Scenarios are the basis for all Federal, State, and local emergency planning, training, and resource allocation, an EMP National Planning Scenario would 

immediately and significantly improve National preparedness for an EMP catastrophe. 

The single most important thing Congress could do to protect the American people 

from EMP, and from all other threats to critical infrastructures, is pass the Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Act, which bill is or soon will be before this committee for 

consideration. 
14 

Thousands of emergency planners and first responders at the Federal, State, and 

local level want to protect our Nation and their States and communities from the 

EMP threat. But they are seriously hindered and even prohibited from doing so because the EMP threat is not among the 15 canonical National Planning Scenarios 

utilized by the Department of Homeland Security. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would immediately mobilize 

thousands of emergency planners and first responders at all levels of government, 

and educate millions of others, about the EMP threat and how to prepare for it. 

Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would immediately help 

States that are frustrated with lack of action on EMP in Washington, and are trying 

to launch initiatives protecting their electrical grids from EMP, as is being attempted now in Maine, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Florida. Passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would educate all States about the EMP threat and help 

them protect their critical infrastructures. 

For example, projects in New York and Massachusetts to harden their State grids 

against severe weather caused by climate change should include protection against 

an EMP event, which is the worst threat to the grid. If the grid is protected against 

EMP, it will mitigate all lesser threats, including cyber attack, sabotage, and severe 

weather. 

Given the amounts of money being spent in New York and Massachusetts on grid 

hardening against severe weather, significant EMP protection can probably be accomplished now within their current budgets. But the cost of EMP protection will 

increase significantly if they delay and attempt remediation later. 

EMP is a clear and present danger. A Carrington-class coronal mass ejection narrowly missed the Earth in July 2012. Last April, during the nuclear crisis with 

North Korea over Kim Jong-Un’s threatened nuclear strikes against the United 

States, Pyongyang apparently practiced an EMP attack with its KSM–3 satellite, 

that passed over the U.S. heartland and over the Washington, D.C.-New York City 

corridor. Iran, estimated to be within 2 months of nuclear weapons by the administration, has a demonstrated capability to launch an EMP attack from a vessel at 

sea. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy commenced patrols off the East Coast 

of the United States in February. 

Thank you for your attention to EMP, which is the least understood but gravest 

threat to our society. This concludes my remarks. 

ATTACHMENT

WHAT IS EMP?

Nuclear, Natural, and Non-Nuclear EMP 

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a super-energetic radio wave that can destroy, 

damage, or cause the malfunction of electronic systems by overloading their circuits. 

EMP is harmless to people biologically, passing through their bodies without injury, 

like a radio wave. But by damaging electronic systems that make modern society 

possible, that enable computers to function and airliners to fly for example, EMP 

can cause mass destruction of property and life. 

A single nuclear weapon detonated at high altitude will generate an electromagnetic pulse that can cause catastrophic damage across the entire contiguous 

United States to the critical infrastructures—electric power, telecommunications, 

transportation, banking and finance, food and water—that sustain modern civilization and the lives of 310 million Americans. Nature can also generate an EMP causing similarly catastrophic consequences across the entire contiguous United States— 

or even across the entire planet—by means of a solar flare from the Sun that causes 

on Earth a great geomagnetic storm. Non-nuclear weapons, often referred to as 

radio frequency weapons, can also generate an EMP, much more limited in range 

than a nuclear weapon, that can damage electronics, and could cause the collapse 

of critical infrastructures locally, perhaps with cascading effects over an area as 

large as a major city. 

NUCLEAR EMP

Any nuclear warhead detonated at high altitude, 30 kilometers or more above the 

Earth’s surface, will generate an electromagnetic pulse. The immediate effects of 

EMP are disruption of, and damage to, electronic systems and electrical infrastructure. EMP is not reported in the scientific literature to have direct harmful effects 

on people. Because an EMP attack would detonate a nuclear warhead at high-altitude, no other nuclear effects—such as blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout—would be experienced by people on the ground or flying through the atmosphere. However, because modern civilization and life itself now depends upon elec-
15 

tricity and electronics, an EMP attack is a high-tech means of killing millions of 

people the old-fashioned way—through starvation, disease, and societal collapse. 

Gamma rays, and the fireball from a high-altitude nuclear detonation, interact 

with the atmosphere to produce a super-energetic radio wave—the EMP—that covers everything within line-of-sight from the explosion to the Earth’s horizon. Thus, 

even a relatively low-altitude EMP attack, where the nuclear warhead is detonated 

at an altitude of 30 kilometers, will generate a damaging EMP field over a vast 

area, covering a region equivalent to New England, all of New York, and half of 

Pennsylvania. A nuclear weapon detonated at an altitude of 400 kilometers over the 

center of the United States would place an EMP field over the entire contiguous 

United States and parts of Canada and Mexico. 

The EMP generated by a nuclear weapon has three components, designated by 

the U.S. scientific-technical community E1, E2, and E3. 

E1 is caused by gamma rays, emitted by the nuclear warhead, that knocks electrons off of molecules in the upper atmosphere, causing the electrons to rotate rapidly around the lines of the Earth’s magnetic field, a phenomenon termed the Compton Effect. The E1 component of nuclear EMP is a shockwave, transmitting thousands of volts of energy in mere nanoseconds of time, and having a high-frequency 

(short) wavelength that can couple directly into small objects, like personal computers, automobiles, and transformers. E1 is unique to nuclear weapons and is too 

fast and too energetic to be arrested by protective devices used for lightning. 

The E2 component of a nuclear EMP is comparable to lightning in its energetic 

content and medium (milliseconds) frequency and wavelength. Protective devices 

used for lightning are effective against E2. 

E3 is caused by the fireball of a nuclear explosion, the expanding and then collapsing fireball causing the Earth’s magnetic field to oscillate, generating electric 

currents in the very large objects that can couple into the low frequency, long (seconds) wavelength part of the EMP that is E3. The E3 waveform can couple directly 

only into objects having at least one dimension of great length. Electric power and 

telecommunications lines, that run for kilometers in many directions, are ideally 

suited for receiving E3. Although E3 compared to E1 appears to deliver little energy, just volts per meter, this is multiplied manifold by power and telecommunications lines that are typically many kilometers long, building up E3 currents that 

can melt Extremely High-Voltage (EHV) transformers, typically designed to handle 

750,000 volts. Small electronics can also be destroyed by E3 if they are connected 

in any way to an E3 receiver—like a personal computer plugged into an electric outlet, which of course is connected to power lines that are ideal E3 receivers, or like 

the electronic servo-mechanisms that operate the controls of large passenger airliners, that can receive E3 through the metal skin of the aircraft wings and body. 

Protective devices used for lightning are not effective against E3, that can build 

up energy sufficient to overwhelm lightning arrestors and bypass them through electrical arcing. 

EMP and its effects were observed during the U.S. and Soviet atmospheric test 

programs in 1962. The 1962 U.S. STARFISH nuclear detonation—not designed or 

intended as an EMP generator—at an altitude of about 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, surprised the U.S. scientific community by producing EMP. Some electronic systems in the Hawaiian Islands, 1,400 kilometers distant, were affected, causing the failure of street lights, tripping circuit breakers, 

triggering burglar alarms, and damage to telecommunications. In their testing that 

year, the Soviets executed a series of nuclear detonations in which they exploded 

300 kiloton weapons at approximately 300, 150, and 60 kilometers above their test 

site in South Central Asia. They report that on each shot they observed damage to 

overhead and underground buried cables at distances of 600 kilometers. They also 

observed surge arrestor burnout, spark-gap breakdown, blown fuses, and power supply breakdowns. 

In the years since 1962, the U.S. scientific and defense community established incontrovertibly, by means of nuclear tests and EMP simulators, that an EMP attack 

could have catastrophic effects by destroying electronic systems over broad regions— 

potentially over the entire contiguous United States. 

Because so much information about EMP was largely Classified for so long, myths 

abound about EMP, that the EMP Commission has endeavored to correct in its Unclassified reports and briefings. For example, a high-yield nuclear weapon is not 

necessary to make an EMP attack. Although a high-yield weapon will generally 

make a more powerful EMP field than a low-yield nuclear weapon, ALL nuclear 

weapons produce gamma rays and EMP. The EMP Commission found, by testing 

modern electronics in simulators, that ANY nuclear weapon can potentially make 

a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. Even a very low-yield nuclear 

weapon—like a 1-kiloton nuclear artillery shell—will produce enough EMP to pose 
16 

a catastrophic threat. This is so in part because the U.S. electric grid is so aged 

and overburdened, and because the high-tech electronics that support the electric 

grid and other critical infrastructures are over 1 million times more vulnerable to 

EMP than the electronics of the 1960s. 

The EMP Commission also found that, contrary to the claim that high-yield nuclear weapons are necessary for an EMP attack, that very low-yield nuclear weapons of special design can produce significantly more EMP than high-yield nuclear 

weapons. The EMP Commission found further that Russia, probably China, and possibly North Korea are already in possession of such weapons. Russian military 

writings call these ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapons, and credibly claim that they can 

generate 200 kilovolts per meter—many times the 30 KVs/meter attributed to a 

high-yield (20 megaton) nuclear weapon of normal design. Yet a Super-EMP warhead can have a tiny explosive yield, perhaps only 1 kiloton, because it is specially 

designed to produce primarily gamma rays that generate the E1 electromagnetic 

shockwave component of the EMP effect. Super-EMP weapons are specialized to 

generate an overwhelming E1, and produce no E2 or E3 but do not need to, as their 

E1 is so potent. 

In 2004, credible Russian sources warned the EMP Commission that design information and ‘‘brain drain’’ from Russia had transferred to North Korea the capability 

to build a Super-EMP nuclear weapon ‘‘within a few years.’’ In 2006 and again in 

2008, North Korea tested a nuclear device of very low yield, 1–3 kilotons, and declared these tests successful. South Korean military intelligence, in open-source reporting, independently corroborates the Russian warning that North Korea is developing a Super-EMP nuclear warhead. North Korea’s proclivity to sell anything to 

anyone, including missiles and nuclear technology to fellow rogue nations Iran and 

Syria, makes Pyongyang’s possession of Super-EMP nuclear weapons especially worrisome. 

Another myth is that rogue states or terrorists need a sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile to make an EMP attack. In fact, any missile, including shortrange missiles that can deliver a nuclear warhead to an altitude of 30 kilometers 

or more, can make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States, by launching 

off a ship or freighter. Indeed, Iran has practiced ship-launched EMP attacks using 

Scud missiles—which are in the possession of scores of nations and even terrorist 

groups. An EMP attack launched off a ship, since Scuds are common-place and a 

warhead detonated in outer space would leave no bomb debris for forensic analysis, 

could enable rogue states or terrorists to destroy U.S. critical infrastructures and 

kill millions of Americans anonymously. 

NATURAL EMP

Mother Nature can also pose an EMP threat. The Sun emits solar flares and coronal mass ejections that can strike the Earth’s magnetosphere and generate a natural EMP in the form of a geomagnetic storm. Geomagnetic storms rarely affect the 

United States, but regularly damage nations located at high northern latitudes, 

such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Damage from a normal geomagnetic storm can be severe. For example, in 1989 a geomagnetic storm over Canada destroyed the electric power grid in Quebec. 

The EMP Commission was the first to discover and report in 2004 that every hundred years or so the Sun produces a great geomagnetic storm. Great geomagnetic 

storms produce effects similar to the E3 EMP from a multi-megaton nuclear weapon, and so large that it would cover the entire United States—possibly even the entire planet. Geomagnetic storms, even great geomagnetic storms, generate no E1 or 

E2, only E3, technically called the magnetohydrodynamic EMP. 

Nonetheless, E3 alone from a great geomagnetic storm is sufficient to end modern 

civilization. The EMP produced, given the current state of unpreparedness by the 

United States and every nation on Earth, could collapse power grids everywhere on 

the planet and destroy EHV transformers and other electronic systems that would 

require years to repair or replace. 

Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within 

days of a blackout across the United States, a blackout that could encompass the 

entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications 

would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities 

would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout. Government and industry also need electricity in order to operate. 

The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current 

unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse. 
17 

The last great geomagnetic storm was in 1859, called the ‘‘Carrington Event’’ after 

the astronomer who noted the phenomenon. The 1859 great geomagnetic storm 

caused fires in telegraph stations and burned the just-laid transatlantic cable, but 

its effects were not catastrophic because electronic systems were few and not essential to society in 1859. Great geomagnetic storms are recognizable in historical 

records because they produce highly unusual effects, like the appearance of the Aurora Borealis at the equator, that even common people often record in letters and 

diaries. No great geomagnetic storm has occurred in the modern era, in which society depends for its very existence on electronics. Most specialists believe a great geomagnetic storm is overdue, since this once-a-century phenomenon last occurred in 

1859. Many scientists believe a great geomagnetic storm is most likely to occur during the solar maximum, when solar flares and coronal mass ejections that cause 

geomagnetic storms increase sharply in frequency. The solar maximum recurs every 

11 years, next in 2012–2013. 

NASA and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a blue-ribbon study 

independently confirming the warning of the EMP Commission about the threat 

posed by a great geomagnetic storm. The EMP Commission and the NASA–NAS reports, and several subsequent independent studies, conclude that if a great geomagnetic storm like the 1859 Carrington Event happened today, millions could die. 

NON-NUCLEAR EMP WEAPONS

Radiofrequency weapons of widely varying designs—some using conventional explosions to generate an EMP, others using microwave emitters to direct energy at 

a target, for example—can destroy, damage, and disrupt electronic systems at short 

ranges. Non-nuclear EMP weapons seldom have ranges or a radius of effect greater 

than 1 kilometer, and usually much less than this. 

Some scientists credibly claim that non-nuclear EMP weapons can be developed 

having a radius of effect of tens of kilometers. However, no nation has yet demonstrated such a capability, including the United States, which has worked to develop advanced radiofrequency weapons for many years. Even such advanced nonnuclear EMP weapons would still be limited and localized in their effects, compared 

to the Nation-wide effects of a nuclear EMP attack or the planetary effects of a 

great geomagnetic storm. 

Microwave radiation is the lethal mechanism usually employed by non-nuclear 

EMP weapons, an effect somewhat comparable but not identical to E1 from a nuclear weapon. Radiofrequency weapons produce no E2 or E3 pulse. 

Terrorists, criminals, and even lone individuals can build a non-nuclear EMP 

weapon without great trouble or expense, working from Unclassified designs publicly available on the internet, and using parts available at any electronics store. 

In 2000, the Terrorism Panel of the House Armed Services Committee sponsored an 

experiment, recruiting a small team of amateur electronics enthusiasts to attempt 

constructing a radiofrequency weapon, relying only on Unclassified design information and parts purchased from Radio Shack. The team, in 1 year, built two radiofrequency weapons of radically different designs. One was designed to fit inside the 

shipping crate for a Xerox machine, so it could be delivered to the Pentagon mail 

room where (in those more unguarded days before 9/11) it could slowly fry the Pentagon’s computers. The other radiofrequency weapon was designed to fit inside a 

small Volkswagon bus, so it could be driven down Wall Street and disrupt computers—and perhaps the National economy. 

Both designs were demonstrated and tested successfully during a special Congressional hearing for this purpose at the U.S. Army’s Aberdeen Proving Ground. 

Radiofrequency weapons are not merely a hypothetical threat. Terrorists, criminals, and disgruntled individuals have used home-made radiofrequency weapons. 

The U.S. military and foreign militaries have a wide variety of such weaponry. 

Moreover, non-nuclear EMP devices that could be used as radiofrequency weapons 

are publicly marketed for sale to anyone, usually advertised as ‘‘EMP simulators.’’ 

For example, one such simulator is advertised for public sale as an ‘‘EMP Suitcase.’’ 

This EMP simulator is designed to look like a suitcase, can be carried and operated 

by one person, and is purpose-built with a high energy radiofrequency output to destroy electronics. However, it has only a short radius of effect. Nonetheless, a terrorist or deranged individual who knows what he is doing, who has studied the electric grid for a major metropolitan area, could—armed with the ‘‘EMP Suitcase’’— 

black out a major city. 

A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

Emphasis is warranted that the nuclear EMP threat is not merely theoretical— 

it is real, a clear and present danger. Nuclear EMP attack is the perfect asymmetric 
18 

weapon for state actors who wish to level the battlefield by neutralizing the great 

technological advantage enjoyed by U.S. military forces. EMP is also the ideal 

means, the only means, whereby rogue states or terrorists could use a single nuclear 

weapon to destroy the United States and prevail in the War on Terrorism or some 

other conflict with a single blow. The EMP Commission also warned that states or 

terrorists could exploit U.S. vulnerability to EMP attack for coercion or blackmail: 

‘‘Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles 

armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city 

or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or 

a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack.’’ 

The EMP Commission found that states such as Russia, China, North Korea, and 

Iran have incorporated EMP attack into their military doctrines, and openly describe making EMP attacks against the United States. Indeed, the EMP Commission was established by Congress partly in response to a Russian nuclear EMP 

threat made to an official Congressional Delegation on May 2, 1999, in the midst 

of the Balkans crisis. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Russian delegation and a former 

Ambassador to the United States, warned: ‘‘Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted 

to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia 

could fire an SLBM and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over 

the United States. The resulting EMP would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything.’’ 

China’s military doctrine also openly describes EMP attack as the ultimate asymmetric weapon, as it strikes at the very technology that is the basis of U.S. power. 

Where EMP is concerned, ‘‘The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than 

any other country in the world’’: 

‘‘Some people might think that things similar to the ‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the 

‘Pearl Harbor Incident’ of the 21st Century if a surprise attack is conducted against 

the enemy’s crucial information systems of command, control, and communications 

by such means as... electromagnetic pulse weapons... Even a superpower 

like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, 

cannot guarantee its immunity . . . In their own words, a highly computerized 

open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks 

from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems 

and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer 

networks... When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and 

technologically . . . it will become increasingly dependent on modern information 

systems... The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.’’ 

Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of international terrorism—in military writings 

openly describes EMP as a terrorist weapon, and as the ultimate weapon for prevailing over the West: ‘‘If the world’s industrial countries fail to devise effective 

ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults, then they will disintegrate within a few years... American soldiers would not be able to find food 

to eat nor would they be able to fire a single shot.’’ 

The threats are not merely words. The EMP Commission assesses that Russia 

has, as it openly declares in military writings, probably developed what Russia describes as a ‘‘Super-EMP’’ nuclear weapon—specifically designed to generate extraordinarily high EMP fields in order to paralyze even the best protected U.S. strategic and military forces. China probably also has Super-EMP weapons. North 

Korea too may possess or be developing a Super-EMP nuclear weapon, as alleged 

by credible Russian sources to the EMP Commission, and by open-source reporting 

from South Korean military intelligence. But any nuclear weapon, even a low-yield 

first generation device, could suffice to make a catastrophic EMP attack on the 

United States. Iran, although it is assessed as not yet having the bomb, is actively 

testing missile delivery systems and has practiced launches of its best missile, the 

Shahab–III, fuzing for high-altitude detonations, in exercises that look suspiciously 

like training for making EMP attacks. As noted earlier, Iran has also practiced 

launching from a ship a Scud, the world’s most common missile—possessed by over 

60 nations, terrorist groups, and private collectors. A Scud might be the ideal choice 

for a ship-launched EMP attack against the United States intended to be executed 

anonymously, to escape any last-gasp U.S. retaliation. Unlike a nuclear weapon detonated in a city, a high-altitude EMP attack leaves no bomb debris for forensic analysis, no perpetrator ‘‘fingerprints.’’ 
19 

EMP VULNERABILITIES

Today’s microelectronics are the foundation of our modern civilization, but are 

over 1 million times more vulnerable to EMP than the far more primitive and robust electronics of the 1960s, that proved vulnerable during nuclear EMP tests of 

that era. Tests conducted by the EMP Commission confirmed empirically the theory 

that, as modern microelectronics become ever smaller and more efficient, and operate ever faster on lower voltages, they also become ever more vulnerable, and can 

be destroyed or disrupted by much lower EMP field strengths. 

Microelectronics and electronic systems are everywhere, and run virtually everything in the modern world. All of the civilian critical infrastructures that sustain 

the economy of the United States, and the lives of 310 million Americans, depend, 

directly or indirectly, upon electricity and electronic systems. 

Of special concern is the vulnerability to EMP of the Extra-High-Voltage (EHV) 

transformers, that are indispensable to the operation of the electric grid. EHV transformers drive electric current over long distances, from the point of generation to 

consumers (from the Niagara Falls hydroelectric facility to New York City, for example). The electric grid cannot operate without EHV transformers—which could be 

destroyed by an EMP event. The United States no longer manufactures EHV transformers. They must be manufactured and imported from overseas, from Germany 

or South Korea, the only two nations in the world that manufacture such transformers for export. Each EHV transformer must be custom-made for its unique role 

in the grid. A single EHV transformer typically requires 18 months to manufacture. 

The loss of large numbers of EHV transformers to an EMP event would plunge the 

United States into a protracted blackout lasting years, with perhaps no hope of 

eventual recovery, as the society and population probably could not survive for even 

1 year without electricity. 

Another key vulnerability to EMP are Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 

systems (SCADAs). SCADAs essentially are small computers, numbering in the millions and ubiquitous everywhere in the critical infrastructures, that perform jobs 

previously performed by hundreds of thousands of human technicians during the 

1960s and before, in the era prior to the microelectronics revolution. SCADAs do 

things like regulating the flow of electricity into a transformer, controlling the flow 

of gas through a pipeline, or running traffic control lights. SCADAs enable a few 

dozen people to run the critical infrastructures for an entire city, whereas previously 

hundreds or even thousands of technicians were necessary. Unfortunately, SCADAs 

are especially vulnerable to EMP. 

EHV transformers and SCADAs are the most important vulnerabilities to EMP, 

but are by no means the only vulnerabilities. Each of the critical infrastructures has 

their own unique vulnerabilities to EMP: 

The National electric grid, with its transformers and generators and electronic 

controls and thousands of miles of power lines, is a vast electronic machine—more 

vulnerable to EMP than any other critical infrastructure. Yet the electric grid is the 

most important of all critical infrastructures, and is in fact the keystone supporting 

modern civilization, as it powers all the other critical infrastructures. As of now it 

is our technological Achilles Heel. The EMP Commission found that, if the electric 

grid collapses, so too will collapse all the other critical infrastructures. But, if the 

electric grid can be protected and recovered, so too all the other critical infrastructures can also be restored. 

Transportation is a critical infrastructure because modern civilization cannot exist 

without the goods and services moved by road, rail, ship, and air. Cars, trucks, locomotives, ships, and aircraft all have electronic components, motors, and controls 

that are potentially vulnerable to EMP. Traffic control systems that avert traffic 

jams and collisions for road, rail, and air depend upon electronic systems, that the 

EMP Commission discovered are especially vulnerable to EMP. Gas stations, fuel 

pipelines, and refineries that make petroleum products depend upon electronic components and cannot operate without electricity. Given our current state of unpreparedness, in the aftermath of a natural or nuclear EMP event, transportation systems would be paralyzed. 

Communications is a critical infrastructure because modern economies and the cohesion and operation of modern societies depend to a degree unprecedented in history on the rapid movement of information—accomplished today mostly by electronic 

means. Telephones, cell phones, personal computers, television, and radio are all directly vulnerable to EMP, and cannot operate without electricity. Satellites that operate at Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) for communications, weather, scientific, and military purposes are vulnerable to EMP and to collateral effects from an EMP attack. 

Within weeks of an EMP event, the LEO satellites, which comprise most satellites, 

would probably be inoperable. In the aftermath of a nuclear or natural EMP event, 
20 

under present levels of preparedness, communications would be severely limited, restricted mainly to those few military communications networks that are hardened 

against EMP. 

Banking and finance are the critical infrastructure that sustain modern economies. Whether it is the stock market, the financial records of a multinational corporation, or the ATM card of an individual—financial transactions and record keeping all depend now at the macro- and micro-level upon computers and electronic 

automated systems. Many of these are directly vulnerable to EMP, and none can 

operate without electricity. The EMP Commission found that an EMP event could 

transform the modern electronic economy into a feudal economy based on barter. 

Food has always been vital to every person and every civilization. The critical infrastructure for producing, delivering, and storing food depends upon a complex web 

of technology, including machines for planting and harvesting and packaging, refrigerated vehicles for long-haul transportation, and temperature-controlled warehouses. Modern technology enables over 98 percent of the U.S. National population 

to be fed by less than 2 percent of the population. Huge regional warehouses that 

resupply supermarkets constitute the National food reserves, enough food to feed 

the Nation for 30–60 days at normal consumption rates, the warehoused food preserved by refrigeration and temperature control systems that typically have enough 

emergency electrical power (diesel or gas generators) to last only about an average 

of 3 days. Experience with storm-induced blackouts proves that when these big regional food warehouses lose electrical power, most of the food supply will rapidly 

spoil. Farmers, less than 2 percent of the population as noted above, cannot feed 

310 million Americans if deprived of the means that currently makes possible this 

technological miracle. 

Water too has always been a basic necessity to every person and civilization, even 

more crucial than food. The critical infrastructure for purifying and delivering potable water, and for disposing of and treating waste water, is a vast networked machine powered by electricity that uses electrical pumps, screens, filters, paddles, and 

sprayers to purify and deliver drinkable water, and to remove and treat waste 

water. Much of the machinery in the water infrastructure is directly vulnerable to 

EMP. The system cannot operate without vast amounts of electricity supplied by the 

power grid. A natural or nuclear EMP event would immediately deprive most of the 

U.S. National population of running water. Many natural sources of water—lakes, 

streams, and rivers—would be dangerously polluted by toxic wastes from sewage, 

industry, and hospitals that would backflow from or bypass wastewater treatment 

plants, that could no longer intake and treat pollutants without electric power. 

Many natural water sources that would normally be safe to drink, after an EMP 

event, would be polluted with human wastes including feces, industrial wastes including arsenic and heavy metals, and hospital wastes including pathogens. 

Emergency services such as police, fire, and hospitals are the critical infrastructure that upholds the most basic functions of government and society—preserving 

law and order, protecting property and life. Experience from protracted storm-induced blackouts has shown, for example in the aftermath of Hurricanes Andrew and 

Katrina, that when the lights go out and communications systems fail and there is 

no gas for squad cars, fire trucks, and ambulances, the worst elements of society 

and the worst human instincts rapidly takeover. The EMP Commission found that, 

given our current state of unpreparedness, a natural or nuclear EMP event could 

create anarchic conditions that would profoundly challenge the existence of social 

order. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. Pry. 

The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Frankel for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FRANKEL, SENIOR SCIENTIST, 

PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, APPLIED RESEARCH LABORATORY 

Mr. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, honorable Members. 

My name is Mike Frankel. As the initial bio mentioned, I am a theoretical physicist by trade. I have spent much of my career in Government service with a focus on understanding nuclear weapons 

and their effects. I am appearing before you today pursuant to my 

service as the executive director of the EMP Commission during 

the entire span of its activity. I have provided extended remarks 

for the record, and what I wish to do in the few moments here is 

just make a few summary remarks and recommendations. 
21 

There are a number of important legacies of the Commission; not 

the least, as Dr. Pry just mentioned, is highlighting the effects of 

a so-called supersolar storm, which was first identified as a vulnerability by the Commission and I think is now part of the regular 

discourse, and which the Nation is still, as far as I can see, unprepared to deal with. 

Another important analytic insight provided by the Commission 

was its understanding and raising the alarm for the prospect of simultaneous failures of the system. All engineers design their systems against single-point failure. We saw an instance of that. Recently there was an incident reported in the Wall Street Journal 

where a PG&E substation was attacked by an individual, individuals with rifles. The entire substation went off-line. Transformers 

were damaged, but the population didn’t notice anything. It was a 

single-point failure of a single station. The control systems functioned as they were supposed to. Electricity was rerouted, et cetera. 

It was the large number of failures that the EMP Commission 

analyzed that fall within a large geographical area provided by the 

EMP footprint which kind-of raised the alarm of many multiple 

failures. Nobody designs against multiple failures. Here and there 

you may find some engineers who design against two simultaneous 

failures. But these failures can be affected not just by EMP. They 

could be affected by cyber. The important thing is that if there are 

simultaneous failures over large areas, the analysis of the Commission was things are very likely to fail, and restoration will take a 

very long time. 

Another important point which I would like to make here, which 

wasn’t made by the EMP Commission in its report, is the nexus between EMP and cyber. Both of those are modes of attack on our 

electronic systems which sustain our society. They work even kindof in the same way. They reach out through the electrical distribution system, and they inflict currents, voltages on the system so the 

system will not operate the way the owner expects them to. If resources are being allocated to prevent the cyber threat, it seems 

foolish not to also address at the same time one end of the cyber 

threat, which is the EMP, kind-of the ‘‘stupid cyber’’, if you will. 

Finally, what I would like to do in the last minute or so that I 

have left is touch on the reception which the EMP Commission’s 

recommendations received. The recommendations were pointed towards both the Defense Department and to the Department of 

Homeland Security. The Secretary of Defense considered the recommendations; in fact, concurred with most of them. An action 

plan was promulgated. Funds were allocated in the outyears. The 

Defense Science Board was stood up, and essentially EMP research 

and alertness was reinvigorated within the Department of Defense 

and the acquisition community there. 

No similar reaction was noted in the Department of Homeland 

Security. There was no office of responsibility designated at a confirmed level. Funds weren’t POM’d. There are still 75 recommendations pointed towards the Department of Homeland Security within 

its purview that could increase the resilience, survivability, and recovery of our electric grid were it subject to such an event, and it 

will be, at least through the natural EMP of the sun; and something needs doing, and now is the time to do it. 
22 

I thank you for the opportunity to make these remarks, and that 

concludes my own remarks. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Frankel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FRANKEL

MAY 8, 2014 

Mr. Chairman and Honorable Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about an important but relatively neglected vulnerability that 

affects the resilience of all of our Nation’s critical infrastructures. My name is Mike 

Frankel. I’m a theoretical physicist by trade and presently a member of the senior 

scientific staff at Penn State University’s Applied Research Laboratory. I’ve spent 

a career in Government service developing technical and scientific expertise on the 

effects of nuclear weapons, managing WMD programs, and performing scientific research in a variety of National security positions with the Navy, the old Defense 

Nuclear Agency, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I appear before you 

today pursuant my service as the executive director of the EMP Commission during 

its entire span of activity, commencing with authorization if the Floyd D. Spence 

National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 and culminating with delivery of its 

final, Classified, assessment to the Congress in 2009 The conclusions of the Commission were documented in a series of five volumes, three of them Classified, and 

in particular the Commission’s perspectives related to infrastructure protection were 

documented in an Unclassified volume ‘‘Critical National Infrastructures,’’ released 

in November 2008. What I’d like to do is expand on some of the Commission’s conclusions in light of recent developments since submitting our final report. I should 

also like to emphasize a new topic that was not referenced in that final report, and 

that is the nexus between the cybersecurity threat and EMP. 

One of the major insights of the EMP Commission was to highlight the unique 

danger to the electric grid caused by simultaneous failures induced by the large 

number of components that fall within an EMP’s damaging footprint on the ground. 

As first reported in the journal Foreign Affairs and picked up a month later by the 

Wall Street Journal, on the night of April 16, 2013, a locked PG&E substation was 

infiltrated and a number of high-voltage transformers attacked by still-unidentified 

individuals firing rifles. Damaged transformers went off-line but the SCADA controls automatically re-routed the electrical distribution along alternate paths. In this 

case, standard engineering practice which designs around the possibility of single 

point failure, kicked in just as it should, and little effect was noticed by the general 

population. However, it took nearly a full month to repair the damaged transformers and return them to service. An important analytic contribution of the Commission was to highlight the possibility of highly multiple numbers of component 

failures, as might be expected within the wide area encompassed by an EMP event 

footprint. No one designed against such a possibility and it was the Commission’s 

conclusion, based on its own analyses and on a close collaboration with power industry engineers, that such a scenario would inevitably lead to very wide-spread, and 

very long-term collapse of the Nation’s electric grid, with potentially devastating 

economic and ultimately physical and health consequences. The PG&E incident 

should remind us that the Commission’s analytic insight extends far beyond EMP. 

While in this case only a single substation was attacked, had there been a coordinated physical attack against many simultaneous targets, or for that matter by localized EMP sources such as readily available HPM/RF sources, it seems inevitable 

that electric service to much larger fraction of the population would have been compromised and for an indefinitely prolonged period. And of course, the same result 

could be achieved by simultaneous cyber-attack, with much reduced physical exposure by the perpetrators. So there’s a real vulnerability there that needs to be addressed. 

I should also like to turn some attention to the generally unremarked overlap between electromagnetic vulnerability of the type described by the EMP Commission 

and the more general issue of cyber vulnerability. While not often considered in tandem, it is more correct to consider EMP vulnerabilities as one end of a continuous 

spectrum of cyber threats to our electronic-based infrastructures. They share both 

an overlap in the effects produced—the failure of electronic systems to perform their 

function and possibly incurring actual physical damage—as well as their mode of 

inflicting damage. They both reach out through the connecting electronic distribution systems, and impress unwanted voltages and currents on the connecting wires. 

In the usual cyber case, those unwanted currents contain information—usually in 

the form of malicious code—that instructs the system to perform actions unwanted 
23 

and unanticipated by its owner. In the EMP case, the impressed signal does not contain coded information. It is merely a dump of random noise which may flip bit 

states, or damage components, and also ensures the system will not behave in the 

way the owner expects. This electronic noise dump may thus be thought of as a ‘‘stupid cyber’’. When addressing the vulnerability of our infrastructures to the cyber 

threat, it is important that we not neglect the EMP end of the cyber threat spectrum. And there is another important overlap with the cyber threat. With the grid 

on the cusp of technological change in the evolution to the ‘‘smart grid’’, the proliferation of sensors and controls which will manage the new grid architecture must 

be protected against cyber at the same time they must be protected against EMP. 

Cyber and EMP threats have the unique capability to precipitate highly multiple 

failures of these many new control systems over a widely distributed geographical 

area, and such simultaneous failures, as previously discussed, are likely to signal 

a wider and more long-lasting catastrophe. 

Another important legacy of the EMP Commission was to first highlight the danger to our electric grid due to solar storms, which may impress large—and effectively DC—currents on the long runs of conducting cable that make up the distribution system. While this phenomenon has long been known, and protected against, 

by engineering practices in the power industry, the extreme 100-year storm first 

analyzed by the Commission is now widely recognized to represent a major danger 

to our National electrical system for which adequate protective measures have not 

been taken and whose consequences—the likely collapse of much of the National 

grid, possibly for a greatly extended period, may rightly be termed catastrophic. At 

this point, the only scientific controversy attending the likelihood of our system 

being subject to a so-called super solar storm, is related to the time-constant. But 

these events have already occurred within the last century or so, they will occur 

again. We should be ready. 

The most important legacy of the EMP Commission however, was in the recommendations which were provided that would, if acted upon, protect key assets of 

both the civilian and military infrastructures, and it is here that I should like to 

point to an important divergence in the Government’s response. The (Classified) recommendations that were provided to the Department of Defense were formally considered, in the large main concurred with, and then acted upon. The Secretary of 

Defense issued a Classified action plan, out-year funding was POM’d in the FYDP, 

an office and an official of responsibility were appointed, a standing Defense Science 

Board committee was stood up, an active research program is maintained, and survivability and certification instructions were issued by both DOD and by 

USSTRATCOM. Today, while vigilant oversight continues to be warranted, an EMP 

awareness pervades our acquisition system and operational doctrine. The response 

on the civilian side of the equation was not so rosy. The final report of EMP Commission contained 75 recommendations to improve the survivability, operability, resilience, and recovery of all the critical infrastructures, and in particular of the most 

key of all, the electrical grid. Most of these recommendations were pointed towards 

the Department of Homeland Security. While there have been some conversations, 

it has been hard to detect much of an active resonance at all issuing from the Department. They have not, as far as I know, even designated EMP as a one of their 

10 of 15 disaster scenarios for advanced planning circumstances. And this at a time 

when they do include a low-altitude nuclear disaster—certainly disastrous but not 

one that would produce wide-ranging EMP. 

In the end, it is hard to deal with 75 recommendations, all at once. But the solution is not to ignore all of them. If there is only a single essentially a no-cost step 

I would leave this committee with, it would be to task the Department of Homeland 

Security with responding to the still-languishing recommendations of the EMP Commission. The Department of Defense did issue a response, as mandated by the legislation which originally created that Commission. But no such mandatory response 

was levied at the time on the Department of Homeland Security, which did not even 

exist when the Commission legislation was passed as part of the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2001. The DHS should be required to explain which recommendations they concur with and/or with which they non-concur, and why. They 

should be asked to prioritize amongst the 75 and come back with implementation 

recommendations, or explain why they think it is unnecessary. And finally, I would 

also urge the committee to support passage of the Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Act. 

I wish to thank the committee for this opportunity to present my views of this 

most important issue. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. Frankel. 

The Chairman will now recognize Dr. Beck for his testimony. 
24 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS BECK, VICE PRESIDENT, POLICY AND 

STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, THE ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE 

SECURITY COUNCIL 

Mr. BECK. Thank you, very much, Chairman Perry, Ranking 

Member Clarke, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Vela. Thank you for holding 

this hearing on one of the most significant threats to our National 

and homeland security. 

As was mentioned earlier, before I joined EIS Council, I did work 

for this committee focusing on critical infrastructure protection and 

science and technology issues, and it was through that exposure to 

this particular threat that I found it to be so significant that I 

wanted to work on it full time. 

The Electric Infrastructure Security Council’s mission is to work 

in partnership with Government and corporate stakeholders to host 

National and international education, planning, and communication initiatives to help improve infrastructure protection against 

electromagnetic threats, or E-threats, and other hazards. The summary of my remarks basically are gleaned from international summit meetings that EIS Council hosts, and which are chaired by Mr. 

Franks and Ms. Clarke, and with that, I want to give a summary 

of some of the findings of those discussions as well as other discussions. 

The problem with EMP or GMD is that developed nations are 

vulnerable to serious National power grid disruption from electromagnetic threats, both natural and malicious. The severity can 

range from regional blackout with serious economic consequences 

to, in the worst-case scenario, a catastrophe that would threaten 

societal continuity. 

The timing of the events for severe space weather—the most recent severe events occurred roughly 90 and 150 years ago, but the 

timing of the next such occurrence, as with all extreme natural disasters, is unknown. Local, or nonnuclear, or subcontinental, or nuclear EMP could also occur at any time, possibly encouraged by ongoing vulnerability or triggered by changing geopolitical realities. 

Key questions that need to be addressed are: What should our 

National strategy be? We could take a couple of approaches there: 

Hope for the best and accept the status quo; or encourage cost-effective resilience, restoration, and response planning. Looking at 

response, it is important to define the path, who should be involved, and how broad our response should be. 

A common theme of all the many summit deliberations, Government reports, et cetera, over the past several years is that the risks 

associated with severe E-threats are serious. It is hard to find anyone who would assert that in today’s world hoping for the best is 

a good strategy for GMD, EMP, or intentional electromagnetic interference, or IEMI. 

The path forward consists of organization and coordination. 

Given the grid’s organic design, the consensus of Government studies is that a coordinated planning and standards will be important. 

Finding the best possible balance between broadly-accepted 

proactive corporate coordination and Government action will be important to assure fast, effective progress in achieving an E-threatresilient grid. 
25 

Who should be involved? Given the likelihood of a large regional 

power outage after a National or malicious e-threat, power companies will need to be operating in an environment of extensive response and recovery support from Federal and State government 

authorities, as well as community response, nongovernmental organizations. So the evolution of planning to address these concerns 

should include the broadest possible involvement of all of these 

stakeholders, each contributing in its own domain of authority and 

expertise. 

For all E-threats under consideration here, efforts of prevention, 

if they are to be effective, must primarily be focused where the impact will occur, in the power grid. For severe space weather, there 

is clearly no other alternative. For malicious threats, EMP and 

IEMI, U.S. and allied government security officials and experts at 

the highest level agree that neither deterrence nor active military 

measures can alone guarantee the security of our homeland against 

a determined aggressor prepared to use such weapons. 

In conclusion, I should note that there appear to be no significant 

technical or financial barriers to mitigating this threat. The technologies and operational procedures needed are well understood, 

and the cost, based on both Government estimates and recent corporate experience, is reasonable. 

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of these points 

in greater detail, and this concludes my prepared testimony, and 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beck follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS BECK

MAY 8, 2014 

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for holding this hearing on one of the most significant 

threats to our National and Homeland Security. As many of you know, before I 

joined EIS Council, I worked for this committee, focusing on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection and Science and Technology issues. It was through that work that I first 

became aware of the threats facing our critical electric infrastructures, and I found 

the issue to be so important that I felt compelled to focus on it exclusively. 

The Electric Infrastructure Security Council’s mission is to work in partnership 

with Government and corporate stakeholders to host National and international 

education, planning, and communication initiatives to help improve infrastructure 

protection against electromagnetic threats (e-threats) and other hazards. E-threats 

include naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) from nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear EMP from intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) devices—the focus of today’s hearing. 

EMP—DEFINING THE ISSUE

The Problem.—Developed nations are vulnerable to serious national power grid 

disruption from e-threats, both natural and malicious. 

The Severity.—The impact can range from a broad regional blackout with serious 

economic consequences to, in the worst case, a catastrophe that would threaten societal continuity. With even the most benign scenarios projecting high societal costs, 

the committee is correct to focus on this as an issue deserving serious attention. 

The Timing.—For severe space weather, the most recent events occurred roughly 

90 and 150 years ago, but the timing of the next such occurrence, as with all extreme natural disasters, is unknown. Either local (non-nuclear) or sub-continental 

(nuclear) EMP could occur at any time, encouraged by on-going vulnerability, and 

triggered by changing geopolitical realities. 
26 

KEY QUESTIONS

1. What Should Our National Strategy Be? 

At top level, there are two alternative paths: 

a. Hope for the best: Accept the status quo. 

i. For severe space weather, this means hoping the most optimistic projections will turn out to be correct, and the impact will not be catastrophic. 

ii. EMP has been called, ‘‘The most powerful asymmetric weapon in history.’’ This approach means hoping no terrorist organization or rogue state 

will ever take advantage of the power of such devastating weapons. 

b. The other alternative: 

Encourage cost-effective resilience, restoration, and response planning. 

2. If We Respond, What Is the Path? 

How should we address interconnect-wide interdependence, and how should we 

proceed with implementation? 

3. If We Respond, Who Should Be Involved? 

Who should take responsibility to define the path, and implement it? How should 

the balance between public mandates and private, corporate initiative be determined? 

4. How Broad Should Our Response Be? 

Should both GMD and EMP be included? 

CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Hope vs. Preparation: Choosing a Strategy 

A common theme of all the many Government reports studying these risks, also 

reflected in the deliberations of the Electric Infrastructure Security Summits over 

the last several years, is that the risks associated with severe e-threats are serious. 

It is hard to find anyone who would assert that, in today’s world, ‘‘hoping for the 

best’’ is a good strategy for GMD, EMP, or IEMI. 

2. What Is the Path? 

Our National power grid is organic in design, but administratively complex. This 

means approaches are needed that address both of these factors. 

• Organization and coordination.—Given the grid’s organic design, the consensus of Government studies is that coordinated planning and standards will 

be important. Finding the best possible balance between broadly-accepted, 

pro-active corporate coordination and Government action will be important to 

assure fast, effective progress in achieving an e-threat resilient grid. 

• Technical.—A key point, not always recognized, is there is no need to ‘‘gold 

plate’’ the system. 

For Severe Space Weather, there is already growing discussion of a range 

of strategies, and none of the approaches under active discussion—from planning measures to comprehensive automated hardware protection—appear 

high in cost, relative to existing logistics budgets and investment models. 

For EMP, protection planning can focus—not on hardening every component in the power grid—but on protection of a fraction of grid facilities and 

hardware. In other words, enough resilience investment, and associated restoration planning, to protect enough generation resources and critical loads 

to allow for both effective restoration and for prioritized support to critical 

users and installations. 

2. Who Should Be Involved? 

Given the likelihood of a large regional power outage after a natural or malicious 

e-threat, power companies will need to be operating in an environment of extensive 

response and recovery support from Federal and State government authorities, as 

well as community-response NGOs. Thus, the evolution of planning to address these 

concerns should include the broadest possible involvement of all of these stakeholders, each contributing in its own domain of authority and expertise. 

3. How Broad Should Our Scope Be? 

For all the E-threats under consideration here, efforts at protection, if they are 

to be effective, must primarily be focused where the impact will occur—in the power 

grid. For severe space weather, there is clearly no other alternative. For malicious 

threats, EMP and IEMI, U.S. and allied government security officials and experts 

at the highest levels agree that neither deterrence nor active military measures can 
27 

alone guarantee the security of our homeland against a determined aggressor prepared to use such weapons. 

In conclusion, I should note that there appear to be no significant technical or financial barriers to mitigating this threat. The technologies and operational procedures needed are well understood, and the cost—based on both Government estimates and recent corporate experience—is reasonable. One of the primary needs is 

for education to increase awareness and therefore willingness to address the problem, and for coordination to address the administrative complexity of our Nation’s 

power grid. 

This summary of consensus-based themes and recommendations reflects, I believe, 

not only the conclusions of the many major Government studies of these issues, but 

also the deliberations of the past four international Electric Infrastructure Security 

Summits, with participation by the highest levels of many departments and agencies of the U.S. and allied governments, and of a broad range of scientists and domain experts working in this field. 

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of these points in greater detail. 

This concludes my prepared testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Dr. Beck. 

The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. These generally go out to each one of you, and one just came 

to mind as Dr. Beck was talking. 

So let me ask you this. If we do harden and protect the grid, but 

this affects potentially all electric and electronic devices, so even 

though we harden the grid and power stations and can produce 

power and so on and so forth, will the systems in individual homes 

and businesses, like refrigerators and heating and cooling systems, 

will they be affected to the point where they will all need to be replaced, or even while we have power to our homes, none of the 

lights will come on and so on so forth? Can anybody illuminate the 

answer to that question? 

Mr. PRY. Well, it depends on the scenario. If you are talking 

about a geomagnetic storm, it puts at the wavelength of that, 

which we call E3, or magnetohydrodynamic EMP is so long that it 

needs to couple into long lines, like power lines, railroad tracks. It 

won’t couple into automobiles, refrigerators, personal computers, 

and things of that sort. So under that scenario, yes, if you basically 

keep the electric grid on, you will be able to recover the rest of the 

society pretty promptly. 

In the nuclear case of a nuclear EMP, it has an electromagnetic 

shock wave that we call E1. This can couple into personal computers, automobiles, and the like, and so you will have deeper societal damage; but then, again, it depends on the kind of weapon 

used. If it is a primitive, first-generation nuclear weapon, you 

know, it is not likely to do that across the whole country. It would 

be more limited to a several-State-size region. If it is the worst-case 

kind of a nuclear weapon, like a super EMP weapon, which is what 

we think Russia, China, and probably North Korea have, you know, 

then you are talking about a scenario where you are having massive, deep damage to personal computers, and refrigerators, and 

lights and the rest. But if you don’t have the bulk power system 

surviving, there is no hope of recovery under those circumstances. 

Under that worst-case scenario, what you are doing is you are mitigating a catastrophe and turning it into a manageable disaster, a 

situation where you won’t have massive loss of life, hopefully. 

Mr. PERRY. Next question I have is we know that the EPA has 

promulgated a bevy of regulations on power plants under the cur-
28 

rent administration. Probably the most obtrusive regulation has 

been the Mercury and Air Toxics rule, or utility MACT, which has 

shut down numerous power plants across the country, and there is 

a claim that some power plants are grandfathered in and avoid updating their facilities in order to avoid new regulations from the 

EPA. 

Do you have any knowledge, is it possible that some power 

plants are unwilling to update their facilities and protect against 

EMP attacks in order to avoid new regulations from the EPA? Is 

there any knowledge here based to answer that question? It might 

not necessarily be for you folks here, but—— 

Mr. FRANKEL. I have no specific knowledge about that, but I do 

know that the power companies are generally reluctant go in and 

try to refit the generation plants. Any time you ask people to spend 

money and that it sounds like a mandate to them, there is a reflexive negativity to that. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

How would you rate the likelihood that the United States will 

face an EMP event from either a high-altitude electromagnetic 

pulse, a HEMP, or a massive solar storm? 

Mr. FRANKEL. I will take that one. You guys can as well. 

I think that the likelihood that the United States will face at 

some point a so-called massive solar storm, and thus our entire 

system will be under the footprint, if you will, of a massive solar 

storm, is about 100 percent. It will happen. The uncertainty here, 

I believe, is the time constant. It could happen next year, it could 

be 100 years, but probably not 1,000 years. 

The probability that we will be faced with a nuclear HEMP I 

would say is unknown. I don’t call it high. I don’t call it low. I 

would say it is an unknown probability. 

Mr. BECK. I would agree with both of those statements. 

Mr. PRY. I would concur and also point out that the National Intelligence Council that writes the Classified National intelligence 

estimates and speaks for the whole U.S. intelligence community 

considered this issue so important that they put out an Unclassified study called Global Trends 2030, which is available on the 

internet, that describes eight black swan scenarios that could alter 

the course of global civilization by or before 2030. In the judgment 

of the National Intelligence Council, the recurrence of something 

like a Carrington Event, a geomagnetic superstorm, is one of those 

events that by or before 2030 could change the course of global civilization. 

Mr. PERRY. That is hardly comforting. 

My time, however, has expired, so the Chairman recognizes the 

Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Ms. Clarke, for questions. 

Ms. CLARKE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our witnesses for their testimony here today. 

I just wanted to clarify for the record from Dr. Pry and Dr. 

Frankel, I see that both of you served as staff on the EMP Commission in 2004 or thereabouts, but I am trying to get a sense of what 

organizations you are representing today, and how can we learn 

more about those organizations? 

Mr. FRANKEL. I am representing only my status as a senior scientist at the Penn State University. I am not representing—I do 
29 

* The information is retained in committee files. 

some work for the Department of Defense, but I am in no way representing them. 

Ms. CLARKE. You are not representing Penn State either, are 

you? 

Mr. FRANKEL. No. Penn State, I would say, does not have a position about EMP. 

Mr. PRY. We both served on the Congressional EMP Commission 

through its life, from 2001 to 2008. I am currently the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, which 

was an effort to continue the EMP Commission, because the Commissioners, including the chairman, believed it was terminated prematurely before its work was completed. So this task force is an 

attempt to continue the EMP Commission in some way. Dr. Graham, for example, who is the chairman of that Commission, is the 

chairman of my task force, and I am here today representing the 

task force. 

Ms. CLARKE. Okay. Very well. Thank you very much. 

First of all, I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, if we could submit 

for the record the international E-Pro report. This report was prepared by Dr. Beck under a DOE contract and describes EMP status 

internationally. 

Mr. PERRY. Without objection, so ordered.* 

Ms. CLARKE. For our colleagues, there are additional copies on 

the table for those who may be interested. 

Dr. Beck, we all know that extreme atmospheric weather and 

solar weather that could potentially produce EMPs and other natural disasters can threaten lives, disable communities, and devastate generation transmission and distribution systems. Efforts to 

harden the electricity grid must focus on three elements: Prevention, recovery, and survivability, and these elements will apply to 

a situation in which a potential EMP event is involved. 

A recent storm such as Hurricane Sandy, which affected my district, pinpointing affected areas was problematic as was finding a 

clear route for crews through streets that were blocked by fallen 

trees. As a result, crews were sometimes idled because they could 

not reach affected areas. 

First, preventing this kind of damage in the distribution system 

will require changes in design standards and construction guidelines, maintenance routines, and inspection procedures. Second, recovery and resiliency planning ought to provide for rapid damage 

assessment and readily available replacement components. Third, 

survivability refers to the ability to maintain some basic level of 

electrical functionality to individual consumers and communities in 

the event of a complete loss of electrical service from the distribution system. 

Would you give us your views on how DHS can help the electricity sector focus and plan for an EMP event involving what it 

commonly refers to as resiliency issues which would incorporate 

prevention, recovery, and survivability? 

Mr. BECK. Thank you for the question. I think that the position 

for DHS of what DHS can provide really is leadership. The DHS 

is not a regulatory agency. It functions by enhancing public-private 
30 

partnerships and information dissemination, and as such they have 

the ability to work across multiple sectors. They work with the 

first-responder community, they work with science and technology, 

they work with industry to provide frameworks and guidelines for 

all, the whole spectrum that you mentioned. That can be from protecting or mitigating equipment themselves, that can be about 

operational procedures, and it can also be about educating first responders and local authorities on what the situation might look 

like in the event of one of these events and how best to prepare 

for planning. 

So as an example, with Superstorm Sandy, you mentioned that 

debris, downed lines, these kinds of things were a major problem. 

There was flooding, et cetera. In an EMP or GMD scenario, that 

particular issue will probably not be something to worry about, but 

there would be other planning. You mentioned the electricity crews. 

Well, as Dr. Frankel mentioned, with a Nation-wide footprint, 

there could be outages in a lot of areas, and so preparation for having electrical crews be ready for the kind of restoration that will 

be needed, that kind of thing I think is the area where DHS could 

provide the best leadership. 

Ms. CLARKE. My time has lapsed, but, gentlemen, was there anything that you wanted to add to that response? Yield back. 

Mr. FRANKEL. Well, I would add that the recommendations of the 

EMP Commission directed at the Department of Homeland Security are still kind of languishing out there, and I think they are 

still pretty good. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman thanks the gentlelady for the first 

round anyhow, and the Chairman recognizes Representative 

Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was struck by the last remark that you made. As you know, the 

Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 stood up the Department of Homeland Security and created a Presidentially-appointed 

position for an assistant secretary for infrastructure protection. 

That is the quote. The mission is to recommend measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the 

United States in coordination with other agencies of the Federal 

Government, but in your estimation you are suggesting that that 

hasn’t been fulfilled. Do you think that passing this Critical Infrastructure Protection Act would catalyze some change in that direction? I will pass that to you, Dr. Frankel, and if anyone else wants 

to address it. 

Mr. FRANKEL. I absolutely do think that that is almost a necessary first step. Now, you mentioned the Department of Homeland 

Security was stood up in 2002 or 2003. It was actually stood up 

after the legislation which created the EMP Commission, and, as 

such, only the Secretary of Defense was mandated to actually take 

a look and respond. He could have rejected them, or, as it turned 

out, he looked at them and accepted them, but there was no such, 

you know, belly button identified within the Department of Homeland Security, which, of course, didn’t exist at the time, and so it 

was hard to find anybody who owned the problem. 

There indeed was an assistant for infrastructure protection. In 

fact, I believe I recall going in with Dr. Graham and briefing him, 
31 

or perhaps General Lawson, and—but nevertheless, you know, 

kind-of the ripples died out, and there is no detectable resonance 

these days. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the military seems to get it. I mean, it doesn’t 

seem to be a fact—I have heard, in the very highest echelons of our 

military command in the United States, them deem this or term 

this cybersecurity and EMP as kissing cousins because they affect 

the same networks, and because in a sense EMP is like an ultimate 

cybersecurity threat because if you have no electricity, you have no 

networks. 

But with that said, NERC is currently undergoing a rulemaking 

procedure to look at protecting the grid from GMD, not so much 

EMP yet, and from my vantage point it appears that they may be 

using some faulty science or data that justify inadequate standards 

that, in my judgment, don’t go far enough. It also appears that the 

standard may include only procedural and operational changes, 

and it leaves, in my judgment, our citizens at risk. 

It appears to me that hardware-based solutions eliminate, to a 

large extent, the worst of the most catastrophic element that might 

happen here. Can you tell me and this committee the importance 

of using hardware-based solutions versus just procedural methods 

to protect just against vulnerabilities? I would like to start over 

here with Dr. Pry and go through the group here, because I may 

not have another opportunity. 

Mr. PRY. Before answering that question, I would like to add 

that, you know, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act is 

provisioned to establish a scenario focused on EMP. A National 

planning scenario on EMP was one of the core recommendations of 

the EMP Commission, so that legislation would be realizing this 

long-delayed goal of the Commission. 

A hardware-based solution to this is absolutely necessary. Operational procedures alone are not going to work against either a geomagnetic disturbance or—and certainly not against a nuclear EMP 

attack. The United States—well, not the United States, NERC, but 

the NERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 

has been resisting that and trying to argue that operational procedures would be sufficient for dealing with a geomagnetic storm, a 

Carrington-class geomagnetic storm, and frankly it has been junk 

science. 

I know this and can say this because I have been on their Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force, and other members of my task 

force are still on the NERC Geomagnetic Disturbance Task Force. 

They can’t keep us off it. Under the law they have to allow outside 

independent observers, and we have been able to watch that process and see the junk science process in action where they basically 

cook the books to try to convince people that operational procedures 

will suffice. 

The most notorious example of this was the NERC’s 2012 report 

that asserted that if a Carrington-class geomagnetic superstorm 

happened today, that they would be able to recover the grid in 24 

hours, and then weeks after they delivered that report, we had a 

weather event sweep through Washington, DC, that caused a 

black-out of large parts of the area that lasted more than a week, 

you know, which showed that they can’t even cope using oper-
32 

ational procedures with normal terrestrial weather, let alone an 

unprecedented thing like a Carrington Event. 

Moreover, our closest NATO allies in the United Kingdom, who 

are also very concerned about this, within a few weeks of the 

NERC 2012 report coming out put out their own report that also 

assessed that they had to harden their grid because operational 

procedures alone wouldn’t be sufficient to protect against either a 

natural or nuclear EMP. 

You know, NERC stands alone in this belief among all the studies that have been done by the U.S. Government and even by our 

allies that operational procedures will suffice, and, you know, I 

think we are just seeing the same old story again where industry 

will do whatever it can to resist having to spend the money on the 

hardware, just like the cigarette industry, just like I like to think 

of the zeppelin industry in the 1920s that convinced everybody, you 

know, that travel by hydrogen balloon was safe, that they could use 

operational procedures to make zeppelin travel safe even though 

helium was available and it would cost a little more to use it, and 

in effect NERC has got us all on the Hindenburg, and we are flying 

toward a rendezvous with a geomagnetic catastrophe in the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know if the others had any response. I know I am certainly out of time. Yield 

back. 

Mr. PERRY. If you ask the question, the others can respond. 

Mr. FRANKEL. I concur with Dr. Pry that hardware solutions are, 

indeed, called for. I am not as familiar with the specific studies 

that he is referring to, but it is my impression that we have a problem of overfamiliarity, if you will, for the NERC. This is a wellknown physics phenomenon, the inducing of these currents by 

these geomagnetic storms, and the power industry has known 

about this pretty much forever. They have procedures and things 

in place to prevent that sort of thing, and I think they are just a 

tad too comfortable with their ability to deal with this thing, and 

the thing that we are now talking about is the possibility that will 

be of an intensity that they simply have not prepared for. Yes, it 

is low frequency, but it is very high probability—I think I said 100 

percent before—that it will happen at some point, scale it on the 

100-year scale. I think they are not willing to go that—like, yes, 

they know about geomagnetic storms; yes, they have indeed protected against geomagnetic storms, but they haven’t really taken 

that final step to protect against the kind of the super-Katrina 

kind-of analogue, and I feel that is what we are faced with here. 

Mr. BECK. I would just comment that FERC Order 779 is a twophase approach where the first phase was operational measures, 

and the second phase had to do with the more detailed analysis up 

to and including hardware-based solutions. The trade-off is one basically of complication and ability to respond in a timely manner. 

Operational procedures may be effective in a manageable-sized 

geomagnetic disturbance when there is decent warning, which may 

be available if the storm is slow moving. For massive solar storms, 

typically the velocity is higher; the warning time is less. This would 

really put stress on the operators as they tried to go through those 

procedures. But it was a place to start because it could be done im-
33 

mediately where there needs to be more analysis and understanding of some of the hardware-based solutions. 

But ultimately a mixture would probably be best, and certainly 

if you include EMP, where warning time would be zero, then operational procedures would be unbelievably challenging for the operators to be able to deal with an EMP event using operational procedures alone. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman thanks the gentlemen. 

We are going to, without objection, move to the second round. I 

would like to start with Dr. Pry. 

You mentioned in your testimony a satellite passing over the 

Washington-New York corridor. I would like you to describe the importance or the potential importance of that, and in that context 

also please describe the National electric grid interconnection, what 

regions of the country are most vulnerable to grid collapse as a result of EMP attack. 

Mr. PRY. Well, the KSM–3 satellite was orbited by North Korea 

in December 2012, about 3 months before we had our gravest nuclear crisis with North Korea when in February 2012 they ignited—they conducted their third nuclear test, violating international law, and when the United States international community 

moved to impose additional sanctions to punish North Korea for 

this, they started threatening to make nuclear strikes against the 

United States. There was a nuclear crisis so grave during the period from February 12 through the end of April that, you know, the 

President was sending B–2 bombers over the demilitarized zone to 

do practice bombing runs and demonstration exercises; strengthened the National missile defense, including moving a THAAD interceptor to Guam just in case Kim Jong-Un tried to deliver on 

these nuclear threats. 

In the midst of this crisis, the KSM–3, which was still orbiting, 

its orbit followed the exact orbit that the Soviets had come up with 

in the Cold War for a secret nuclear weapon to conduct a surprise 

nuclear attack called a fractional orbital bombardment system. It 

is basically a space launch vehicle that uses a nuclear weapon disguised as a satellite, and instead of launching over the North Pole 

and following a normal ballistic trajectory toward the United 

States, it launches south and crosses over the south polar region 

and comes up from—approaches from the south because we don’t 

have any ballistic missile early warning radars in that location or 

interceptors, and we are blind to the south and defenseless, and so 

you would be able to detonate a warhead and do an EMP attack 

and catch us by surprise. That was the plan during the Cold War, 

and the trajectory and the altitude of this satellite were precisely 

the same as the kinds of fobs that the Soviets had used. 

Between April 8 and the 16th of April, it went from the center 

of the United States, and on the 16th was passing over the Washington, DC/New York corridor, which is the ideal location for putting down a peak field, because if you look at where our EHV 

transformers are located, they are most deeply located, the largest 

numbers of them, the map is just almost a solid block of red because it is so densely concentrated, the EHV transformers in that 

area. If you wanted to take down the eastern grid, that would be 

the best place to place a peak EMP field. Taking out the eastern 
34 

grid is really all you have to do because 75 percent of our power 

is generated in the eastern grid. The western grid is the next most 

important, and the Texas grid is the third most important. But 

that was the KSM–3 threat and its relationship to the grid system. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

Speaking of those, the transformers, it has been noted that the 

Extremely High-Voltage, the EHV transformers which are indispensable to the electric grid, are expensive and hard to replace. If 

you know, what is the lead time for manufacturing new or replacement transformers, and given that there are limited manufacturers 

in the United States, where are the suppliers located? 

Mr. PRY. There are two places that manufacture these for export, 

South Korea and Germany, and we are still dependent on them. I 

know there is a DHS briefing going around that says we have limited capabilities to manufacture EHV transformers in the United 

States. In fact, we currently don’t really have demonstrated capability to manufacture these transformers in the United States yet. 

They have to be made by hand the way they were made back in 

Nikola Tesla’s day, the inventor of the EHV transformer. 

So every one is custom made, every one has a unique role to play 

in the grid. They aren’t mass produced. It is not easy. There is a 

lot of—they have to be custom made, and there is a lot of 

artisanship, as it were, that goes into the making of these transformers. Brazil tried to become independent of making its own 

EHV transformers, oh, maybe a decade ago, and it took them 5 

years before they were able to start attempting to make their first 

transformers, and they didn’t perform well. So now Brazil gave up 

on that, and it has to import them. 

So it remains to be seen if the United States can actually manufacture any of its own EHV transformers yet. We haven’t manufactured one and put them out in the field and seen if they last and 

stand up to this. It takes 18 months under normal conditions to 

build one of these transformers. 

Mr. PERRY. Has the United States ever manufactured them, or 

is it something that we did and then got out of? 

Mr. PRY. We did. We invented them. We invented all of the technology that goes into the electric grid, you know, back near the 

turn of the century. Nikola Tesla. The first electric grid in the 

world was up near Niagara Falls, the first hydroelectric station, 

and the thing that makes the grid possible, the cornerstone of our 

modern civilization, is the EHV transformer invented by Nikola 

Tesla because it makes it possible to take power from a place like 

Niagara Falls and project it long distances, down to New York City, 

for example. Then there is another transformer at the end of the 

line that steps it down so it can be used locally. But like so many 

things that we invented and we used to manufacture and exported 

to the world, we don’t make it here anymore. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman’s time has expired. 

Recognize the Ranking Member. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to add to the DHS question that I had raised earlier that one of the observations of the Sandy event was the unintended consequence of the grid going—the electricity going out was 
35 

that people forgot that fuel stations are run through—by electricity, 

and so we ended up having a fuel crisis at the same time. 

So there is sort of a collateral damage piece to this that I hope 

is acknowledged as we go through this discussion about what happens in areas when just in a short period of time electrical shortages occur or the grid goes out, because even if you were trying to 

move physical assets, if you don’t prepare for things like fuel stations that are run by electricity, you will have a massive issue. 

Dr. Beck, I wanted to talk about the international nature of what 

we are talking about here, because your report speaks to that, and 

I know in your London conference on grid security last year, there 

were representatives from business and industry in addition to governments. Could you describe the conversations and discussions 

about how the insurance industry is viewing EMP and geomagnetic 

disturbances in the electric industry? 

Mr. BECK. Yes. The past Washington summit was a first meeting 

of what we called the three-sector roundtable, which was the electric power sector, Government, and the insurance industry representatives, that met to try to talk through some of these issues 

about how they might be addressed. 

The insurance sector has long been the sector with the most expertise on risk analysis, which is basically what they do and how 

they develop their products. It is difficult in occurrences like this 

where the typical traditional risk analysis method is to use an actuarial method where you have a large database of previous events, 

and you can look at probabilities over time. It becomes much more 

difficult to do that when you have events like a large geomagnetic 

storm that don’t occur very often and haven’t—very large storms 

have not occurred during the time that we have had a ubiquitous 

and electric grid. 

So that is a challenge, but it is—and those discussions are ongoing. It is a difficult question to address, but it is very encouraging that those discussions have begun, and that they are getting 

input from the electric power sector, from governments. It is a way 

perhaps beyond or in addition to a regulatory approach that could 

incentivize the industry. It could provide a business case or a cost 

mechanism, as the insurance industry has done in other industries, 

for example with fire codes. Fire insurance, you can get a better 

deal on your fire insurance if you have a sprinkler system. Well, 

perhaps an electric utility could get a better deal on their insurance, have they done engineering analysis on their system on what 

their GMD vulnerability is, for example. 

As I said, those are on-going discussions that are in their early 

stages, and so I don’t have any specifics on. There aren’t recommendations yet, but that kind of approach where you have the 

insurance sector playing a role and paying attention to this—you 

know, this threat is, I think, a very encouraging sign. 

Ms. CLARKE. How do you plan to propose international standards 

if there are so many different individualized systems that need specialized mitigation? I mean, just another case in point, when there 

was a major Northeast corridor blackout, and it originated actually 

in Canada and then came all the way down and took out New York 

City, you know. How do we look at the differences and come up 

with the specialized mitigation? 
36 

Mr. BECK. Good question. Basically, so first of all, you are absolutely right, the report that you mentioned earlier, EIS Council did 

a survey of 11 countries, their different experiences with geomagnetic disturbances principally, but also EMP, and their different approaches, which were a mixture of hardware and procedural approaches, and from that I would say you are correct that 

each country has a unique grid, but there are lots of similarities 

in that the physics of electric transmission generation is the same. 

So you have transformers, you have generators, you have transmission assets, you have generation assets, and you have loads. 

Those are the same everywhere, so while any specific mitigation 

method—for example, Finland has a very robust grid, and they 

don’t really use operational procedures; they are all hardwarebased. So they have very tough transformers. They compensate 

their long transmission lines with series capacitors which have an 

ancillary benefit of blocking currents. They use special reactors to 

ground that have a resistance that dampen currents that come in. 

So they have a very robust system based on hardware solutions. 

Another example of that is New Zealand that uses grounding resistors to protect some of their transformers. Other countries, including the United Kingdom, a mixture of some of the other Scandinavian countries use a more blended approach of procedural and 

hardware solutions. 

So I wouldn’t say—I think standards are excellent in—for example, used by the International Electrotechnical Commission or the 

IEEE that put out recommended standards for certain types of performance and parameters through—under which these components 

should operate safely, and that gives the industry something to 

guide on. But it is, I think, more of a question of information sharing so that there is a suite of options out there that are tested and 

peer reviewed that can then be used by the industry or by governments, et cetera, to address the problem. 

Ms. CLARKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chairman thanks the gentlelady. 

The Chairman recognizes Representative Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

forbearance and just the privilege you have given me to be on the 

dais here today. 

I just have two remaining questions really, and, Dr. Pry, just a 

quick response here. I know a lot of us as we consider this issue, 

we realize that if indeed we did lose our grid, in a worst-case scenario, and we are not projecting a worst-case scenario, but if it did 

happen, really the aftermath where society would begin to tear ourselves apart seems to be the most frightening aspect of it to me. 

So the cost of doing nothing is significantly high, and I think you 

have demonstrated that well, but could you give us a sense of how 

expensive it would be to harden our bulk power system enough to 

recover from a major event; in other words, where we keep our 

main components intact, and we can bring our grid back on-line? 

I have been told that a couple, $3 billion over 5 years might do it, 

and that might be less than $1 per year per ratepayer. Am I accurately expressing that? 

Mr. PRY. Yes. In fact, your estimate is high compared to the Congressional EMP Commission’s estimate, which was that it would 
37 

cost about $2 billion over 3 to 5 years to harden the bulk power 

system, and $10–20 billion over that same period, you know, would 

protect all of the critical infrastructures. 

The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission put out an estimate in 2010, in its 2010 report, that it could be paid for by—it 

would increase the rate, the average ratepayer’s electric bill. Your 

annual electric bill would be increased by 20 cents annually amortized over a period of years, so you would hardly even feel the pain, 

you know, that way. 

It is not necessary—in addition to the cost of hardening the country, perhaps we should also keep in mind the cost to States, because while the preferred solution, of course, is to do this Nationally, the Commission noted that it is possible for a State to island 

its grid, and some States are planning to do exactly that because 

they are so frustrated that Washington has not taken any steps 

since 2008 and the Commission delivery of its report. 

As I said last year, it has only taken a year for Maine to pass 

a bill. Virginia did so earlier this year, and Florida is working on 

passing the bill now to island its State, you know, in a State grid. 

I think that this is a germane example. North Carolina is interested in islanding its grid, and they are considering legislation as 

well. It would probably—it would cost something like $5–10 million 

to harden the whole State of North Carolina, which is less than 

what we are spending on a program in the Department of Defense 

called SPIDERS, which is spending $30 million to—— 

Mr. FRANKS. You said $5–10 million, correct? 

Mr. PRY. Five to ten million dollars for the State of North Carolina, which has six military bases in it, okay? The SPIDERS program from the Department of Defense is spending $30 million to 

provide energy security for just three military bases. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, that was the main point I was making was 

that, you know, when we were in Israel, some of us—in fact, some 

of you on the panel and I were in Israel about a year-and-a-half 

ago; I just returned from Israel. They—to use their terminology, 

they consider this a very attractive problem—and this is just to 

show you how the Israelis deal with these things—they said, because it represents something that is very dangerous, but very, 

very—something that can be addressed with reasonable cost. 

Mr. PRY. Yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. So they are moving forward in a very significant 

way. 

My last question, Mr. Chairman, it goes to all of them, and I will 

start down here with you, Mr. Beck. At present it is not really clear 

who is in charge of protecting the Nation against solar and nuclear 

EMP or IEMI. Would you be in favor of DHS taking the role? If 

not, who should do it? If you can each articulate briefly who you 

think should take the lead on this, what do you think really this 

represents to America in terms of threat and danger, how serious 

is it, what keeps you up, and what is the next step? 

Mr. BECK. Thank you. You saved the easy question for last, 

which is nice. 

Well, the U.S. electric grid is the most complicated in the world 

both by physical design; by the overlapping regulatory authority, 
38 

50 States, a Federal Government, 3,500 electric companies, et 

cetera. 

When we did the international study, it was pretty easy, and one 

of the things where lessons learned was easy was because you 

could look at Finland, which has one company and one regulator, 

right? So a much easier thing to deal with. Here it is—that does 

make it very difficult, and so I have to—in all honesty, and not to 

try to duck the question, but the answer is somewhat complicated 

because there are all these agencies, and there isn’t just one agency 

that is in charge. 

So I do think it makes sense, especially in the discussion that we 

are having before this committee, that DHS plays a major role because of, I think, the vast utility in addressing this issue through 

infrastructure protection. We talked about DOD can’t do it, it is 

not—at least certainly the solar threat, there is no deterrence possible, et cetera. So leading from an infrastructure protection standpoint is very important, and then the structures then that flow 

from that where you have the Department of Energy and Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission as the sector-specific agencies, that 

can make sense, but it certainly has to be done in coordination 

with the State-level governments as well. 

Mr. FRANKEL. Yes, certainly the Department of Homeland Security, I think, has the primary responsibility, but we should also not 

forget the Department of Energy. They have offices of energy assurance, and they should also be playing some role. Right now I 

don’t discern exactly what it is, but somewhere between those two, 

with DHS in the primary role, I think that is where you look for 

leadership. 

I want to at least mention the Department of Defense not in a 

leadership role in this instance, but they are doing a lot of relevant 

work developing hardening techniques. Worried about their own 

networks and things of that sort, but they have very important 

technology support to contribute to that sort of thing. But in the 

end it is not their responsibility, and it is not their mission, and 

they are not going to do it. You need to look at those two Departments for leadership. 

Mr. PRY. I agree with what has been said. The Department of 

Homeland Security, especially when you are looking at the role 

from the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act for planning, training, and resource allocation for emergency planners and responders—under the Department of Homeland Security, within the Department of Homeland Security, the logical regulatory authority to 

work most closely over the electric grid should be the U.S. Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission, the U.S. FERC, and this would be 

addressed by the SHIELD Act that Mr. Franks is sponsoring in 

front of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 

I think this is really like the—almost equally important with the 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Act in terms of its passage, because the reality and the reason we have this problem is because 

the electric power industry exists in a 19th Century regulatory environment. I mean, there is no Federal agency that has the kind 

of regulatory authority relative to the electric power industry that, 

for example, the Federal Aviation Administration has over the airline industry, you know. I think all Americans and even Tea Party 
39 

Republicans would agree that, you know, we need an FAA so you 

have independent inspectors who will go out and see, you know, is 

there metal fatigue in the wings of this aircraft, and when that airplane can’t fly, and that if an airplane crashes, you have an FAA 

to inspect the crash and find out what happened so that it never 

happens again. We do this because hundreds of lives are at stake, 

and we need to maintain the public safety. That is why we have 

an FAA. 

But the U.S. FERC doesn’t have that power. It can ask the 

NERC, which represents the industry, and previously was a trade 

association, by the way, and unofficially is a lobby for the electric 

power industry, and NERC is the one that is in charge. They regulate themselves through the NERC. The FERC can ask them to 

come up with a plan. 

I mean, here is a great example is the great 2003 Northeast 

blackout was caused by a falling tree branch that caused cascading—it took them 10 years for NERC to come up with a plan, 

vegetation management plan. So not just—you know, cyber 5 years; 

they were asked for a plan some 5 years before they started moving 

on that. 

So U.S. FERC, I say, would be the tip of the spear for dealing 

with the electric power industry. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for your forbearance, and thank you for the opportunity here today, and thank 

all of you. 

Mr. PERRY. Ladies and gentlemen, votes have been called. I want 

to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may have 

some additional questions, and if they do, we ask that you submit 

them in writing and so there can be responses. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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