2020 IL App (4th) 190531-U 

NO. 4-19-0531 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

DANIEL P. MUELLER,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

KAYLA A. CARTER, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Sangamon County 

No. 17F434 

Honorable

Matthew Maurer, 

Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Petitioner failed to present a complete record for review from the trial court’s denial 

of his motion for parenting time with his minor child and the court’s judgment is 

affirmed. 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Daniel P. Mueller, an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections 

(DOC), appeals from the trial court’s denial of his “motion for visitation” with his minor child in 

the underlying parentage proceeding. On appeal, he argues the court erred by (1) denying his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, seeking an order requiring DOC to bring him 

before the court to testify; (2) denying his motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) 

to represent the minor child’s interests; (3) failing to interview the minor child in camera; 

(4) denying him parenting time with the minor child; and (5) denying his request for free hearing 

transcripts. We affirm. 

FILED

May 15, 2020 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Petitioner and respondent, Kayla A. Carter, are the parents of T.C., born January 

29, 2010. In December 2012, petitioner was incarcerated on pending criminal charges. Currently, 

he is serving a 30-year prison sentence for first-degree murder. 

¶ 5 In May 2017, petitioner pro se filed a petition to establish parentage of T.C. He 

named himself and respondent as T.C.’s parents, alleged that T.C. resided with respondent, and

asserted that there had been no previous finding or declaration of his paternity. Both petitioner and 

respondent were self-represented during the entirety of the underlying proceedings. 

¶ 6 In September 2017, petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus ad testificandum, asking the trial court to enter an order directing DOC to have him 

brought before the court to testify. He did not specify a date he desired to appear in court. Petitioner 

also filed a “motion for visitation,” alleging he had been denied visitation with T.C. since 

December 2012, that visitations could occur at the correctional facility where he was imprisoned, 

maintaining contact with petitioner was in T.C.’s best interests, and that the denial of visitation 

was damaging to T.C.’s mental and emotional health. Petitioner asked the court to order respondent 

to transport T.C. to visit him in prison twice a month, provide him with pictures of and letters about 

T.C. once a month, and inform him of T.C.’s “welfare, academic progress, and current address *** 

at least once a month.” 

¶ 7 In October 2017, petitioner filed a motion seeking the appointment of a GAL to 

represent T.C.’s interests. He alleged he had attempted communication with T.C. but been denied 

all contact. Petitioner asserted that the appointment of a GAL to represent T.C.’s interests was 

“necessary and appropriate *** to help avoid the potential for vindictiveness, manipulation[,] and 
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coercion of [T.C.] by any *** party in [the] action.” 

¶ 8 Relevant to this appeal, the trial court conducted hearings on petitioner’s various 

motions on April 19, May 24, and July 8, 2019. The record does not contain transcripts of any of 

the hearings. However, the court’s docket entries show that petitioner was present for each hearing 

by telephone and that respondent appeared in person. The docket entry for April 19, 2019, reflects 

that, following admissions by the parties, the court “establishe[d] [p]etitioner’s paternity of [T.C.]” 

It also denied petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, set the matter for further 

hearing, and stated petitioner “may participate by telephone.” On May 24, 2019, the court heard 

and denied petitioner’s motion for the appointment of a GAL. Finally, on July 8, 2019, the court

conducted a hearing on petitioner’s “motion for visitation.” The court’s docket entry states 

witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. It shows that the court denied the motion and 

awarded respondent sole decision-making authority over T.C. The court’s docket entry further

reflects that petitioner made a “request for a free transcript,” which the court also denied. 

¶ 9 On July 9, 2019, the trial court filed a “Parental Responsibility Order,” in which it 

set forth its factual findings and the factors it considered when rendering its decision as to the 

allocation of decision-making responsibilities over T.C. and the issue of petitioner’s visitation, i.e., 

parenting time. The court’s decision states as follows:

“[T]he court specifically finds [T.C.] has not seen or heard from his father since he 

was one year old. He has not had any relationship or interaction with his father in 

8 1/2 years. [Petitioner] was abusive to [respondent] in the presence of [T.C.] When 

[petitioner] showed up for parenting time after the party [sic] separation[,] he would 

usually be intoxicated and [respondent] would deny the parenting time. [Petitioner] 
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is serving a 30[-]year sentence for first-degree murder. [T.C.] is unaware that his 

father is incarcerated. [T.C.] is happy and actively involved in extracurricular 

activities. [Respondent] stated [T.C.] has a relationship with an individual he sees 

as a father figure. [Respondent] stated that [T.C.] does not ask or inquire about his 

father. She believes it would be harmful for him to learn that his father is 

incarcerated and will be there for approximately the next 23 years. 

The court denies [petitioner’s] request for parenting time with [T.C.] The 

court believes that any parenting time with [petitioner] would be harmful to the 

minor child and not in his best interests.” 

¶ 10 This appeal followed. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 A. Accelerated Appeal Filing Deadline

¶ 13 Initially, we note that this is an accelerated appeal under Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018). Under that rule, this court is required to issue its decision in an 

accelerated case within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal unless there has been “good 

cause shown.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). Here, petitioner’s notice of appeal was 

filed on July 26, 2019, and this court’s disposition was due to be filed by December 23, 2019. That 

filing deadline has passed. However, we note that petitioner filed numerous motions with this court 

on appeal. Significantly, he was granted three extensions of time to file his appellant’s brief. 

Ultimately, petitioner’s brief was filed on December 18, 2019, only days before this court’s filing 

deadline. Respondent was then given the opportunity to file an appellee’s brief, which she 

ultimately elected not to do. Based upon these circumstances, we believe there is “good cause” for 
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issuing our disposition in this case after the 150-day deadline. 

¶ 14 B. Incomplete Record and Petitioner’s Request for Free Transcripts

¶ 15 A second preliminary matter that we must address on appeal concerns petitioner’s 

failure to provide a complete record of the underlying proceedings for review. 

“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the 

proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record 

on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in 

conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise 

from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” 

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959 (1984). 

¶ 16 As stated, the appellate record does not contain transcripts of any pertinent hearing 

before the trial court. On appeal, petitioner argues he could not afford the cost of hearing transcripts

and, as a result, the trial court should have granted his request for free transcripts. Alternatively, 

he argues that given the accelerated nature of his appeal, the trial court “abused its discretion” by 

failing to ensure that hearing transcripts were prepared and transmitted to the appellate court 

without advance payment. 

¶ 17 First, petitioner does not cite any authority to support his alleged entitlement to free 

hearing transcripts. We note that in lieu of presenting a hearing transcript, an appellant may present 

a bystander’s report, or the parties may submit an agreed-upon statement of facts. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

323(c), (d) (July 1, 2017). In civil cases, “where a verbatim transcript is not obtainable because of 

[the] appellant’s inability to pay for it, a bystander’s report of proceedings could, and should be 

substituted.” Hall v. Turney, 56 Ill. App. 3d 644, 649, 371 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1977). 
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¶ 18 Second, to support his assertion that the trial court acted improperly by failing to 

ensure that hearing transcripts were prepared and submitted, petitioner cites Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018), which, as stated, sets forth procedures applicable to accelerated cases. 

That rule provides as follows:

“The record on appeal and the transcript of proceedings in a child custody or 

allocation of parental responsibilities case shall be filed in the Appellate Court no 

later than 35 days after the filing of the notice of appeal ***. Any request for 

extension of the time for filing shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the court 

clerk or court reporting personnel stating the reason for the delay, and shall be 

served on the trial judge and the chief judge of the circuit. Lack of advance payment 

shall not be a reason for noncompliance with filing deadlines for the record or 

transcript. Any subsequent request for continuance shall be made to the appellate 

court on motion with notice to all parties in accordance with rules.” (Emphasis 

added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(4) (eff. July 1, 2018). 

¶ 19 Although Rule 311(a)(4) does provide that the lack of advance payment will not 

excuse compliance with filing deadlines for hearing transcripts, it does not set forth any obligations 

or duties on the part of the trial court. Instead, for a hearing transcript to be included within the 

appellate record, an appellant must “make a written request to the court reporting personnel *** 

to prepare a transcript of the proceedings that [the] appellant wishes included in the report of 

proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). The court reporting personnel then prepares 

the requested transcript and files it with the clerk of the circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(b) (eff. July 

1, 2017). In this case, petitioner has not asserted that he made a proper request for hearing 
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transcripts from court reporting personnel pursuant to Rule 323, nor does the record reflect any 

such request. 

¶ 20 Here, as the appellant, petitioner had the burden of presenting a complete record 

for review. However, he failed to present transcripts for any pertinent hearing in his case; avail 

himself of an acceptable alternative to the presentation of transcripts, such as a bystander’s report; 

establish an entitlement to free transcripts; or demonstrate that he made any proper request for 

transcripts from court reporting personnel. Accordingly, any doubts arising from the lack of the 

hearing transcripts in this case will be resolved against him. 

¶ 21 C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum 

¶ 22 On appeal, petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus ad testificandum. He contends the court erred by denying his petition without 

allowing him to present any supporting argument. Petitioner also maintains that the court’s ruling, 

which prevented him from appearing personally before the court and resulted in his participation 

only by telephone, put him at a “distinct disadvantage” and “caused him severe prejudice.”

¶ 23 Section 10-135 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-135 (West 2016)) 

authorizes the trial court to enter an order of habeas corpus ad testificandum to bring an inmate 

before the court to testify. People v. Freed, 328 Ill. App. 3d 459, 466, 766 N.E.2d 253, 259 (2002). 

“The decision whether to grant a prisoner reprieve from his imprisonment and allow him to 

personally appear in a civil proceeding is within the trial court’s discretion.” Beahringer v. Roberts, 

334 Ill. App. 3d 622, 629, 776 N.E.2d 247, 254 (2002). 

¶ 24 Here, petitioner sought an order of habeas corpus ad testificandum so that he could 

attend some unspecified proceeding before the court and testify. During a hearing in April 2019, 
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which petitioner attended by telephone, the trial court denied his request. Because there is no 

transcript of that particular hearing, the record does not reflect what occurred at the hearing in 

relation to the petition, whether petitioner sought to argue his petition and was refused, or the 

court’s rationale for its denial of the petition. 

¶ 25 As expressed above, because petitioner had the burden of presenting a complete 

record, we resolve any doubts arising from the lack of a hearing transcript against him and presume 

that the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum was in 

conformity with the law. Additionally, we note that the record does show that petitioner was 

present by telephone for each hearing. With respect to the hearing on his “motion for visitation” 

the record reflects he testified on his own behalf and presented evidence, including exhibits, to the 

court. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by the court. 

¶ 26 D. Motion for the Appointment of a GAL 

¶ 27 On appeal, petitioner next argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

motion for the appointment of a GAL to represent T.C.’s interests. He asserts respondent had “been 

maliciously and vindictively keeping” T.C. from him and, because she and T.C. had conflicting 

interests, the appointment of a GAL was necessary to protect T.C.’s legal rights. 

¶ 28 The Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) provides for the appointment of 

a GAL to represent a minor if “the court finds that the interests of the child are not adequately 

represented.” 750 ILCS 46/613(b) (West 2016). Additionally, under the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act), the trial court may, on its own motion or the motion 

of a party, appoint an attorney to serve as a minor’s GAL “[i]n any proceedings involving the 

support, custody, visitation, allocation of parental responsibilities, education, parentage, property 
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interest, or general welfare of a minor or dependent child[.]” 750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West 2016). A 

trial court’s failure to appoint a GAL is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of 

Ricketts, 329 Ill. App. 3d 173, 182, 768 N.E.2d 834, 841 (2002). 

¶ 29 Here, in May 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on petitioner’s motion for 

the appointment of a GAL and denied the motion. Because petitioner failed to provide a complete 

record of the underlying proceedings, the record, again, does not show the arguments presented to 

the court or the rationale for its decision. Accordingly, petitioner cannot demonstrate error and we 

must presume the court properly denied the motion. 

¶ 30 E. The Trial Court’s Failure to Interview T.C. 

¶ 31 Petitioner next argues the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera 

interview of T.C. He asserts T.C.’s preferences regarding parenting time should not have been 

overlooked and contends that interviewing T.C. would have “greatly aided the trial court” and 

resulted in a different outcome. 

¶ 32 The trial court may interview a minor in chambers to ascertain his or her wishes as 

to the allocation of parental responsibilities. 750 ILCS 5/604.10(a) (West 2016). “[T]he standard 

of review on the decision to conduct an in camera interview is abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage 

of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 522, 819 N.E.2d 714, 732 (2004). 

¶ 33 Here, the record fails to reflect that either party sought an in camera interview of 

T.C. or to have his testimony presented to the trial court in any capacity. Additionally, in its written 

order, the court found “nothing to suggest that [T.C.] ha[d] the maturity or ability to express 

reasoned and independent preferences as to *** parenting time.” The record contains nothing to 

contradict the court’s finding and we find no abuse of its discretion from the lack of an in camera
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interview.

¶ 34 F. Parenting Time 

¶ 35 Finally, petitioner argues the trial court erred by denying his request for parenting 

time with T.C. He contends that maintaining a relationship with him is in T.C.’s best interest. 

¶ 36 Under the Parentage Act, the trial court applies standards set forth in the Dissolution 

Act when allocating parenting time. 750 ILCS 46/802(a) (West 2016). According to the 

Dissolution Act, the court must “allocate parenting time according to the child’s best interests.” 

750 ILCS 5/602.7(a) (West 2016). When determining the child’s best interests, the court is 

required to consider all relevant factors, including the following: 

“(1) the wishes of each parent seeking parenting time; 

(2) the wishes of the child, taking into account the child’s maturity and ability to 

express reasoned and independent preferences as to parenting time; 

(3) the amount of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions with 

respect to the child in the 24 months preceding the filing of any petition for 

allocation of parental responsibilities or, if the child is under 2 years of age, since 

the child’s birth; 

(4) any prior agreement or course of conduct between the parents relating to 

caretaking functions with respect to the child; 

(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and 

siblings and with any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best 

interests;

(6) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; 
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(7) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 

(8) the child’s needs; 

(9) the distance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of 

transporting the child, each parent’s and the child’s daily schedules, and the ability 

of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement; 

(10) whether a restriction on parenting time is appropriate; 

(11) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child’s parent 

directed against the child or other member of the child’s household; 

(12) the willingness and ability of each parent to place the needs of the child ahead 

of his or her own needs; 

(13) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close 

and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child; 

(14) the occurrence of abuse against the child or other member of the child’s 

household; 

(15) whether one of the parents is a convicted sex offender or lives with a convicted 

sex offender ***; 

(16) the terms of a parent’s military family-care plan ***; and 

(17) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant.” Id. § 602.7(b). 

¶ 37 Additionally, a court may restrict parenting time if, following a hearing, it “finds 

by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent engaged in any conduct that seriously endangered 

the child’s mental, moral, or physical health or that significantly impaired the child’s emotional 

development.” 750 ILCS 5/603.10 (West 2016). On review, the trial court’s decision will not be 
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overturned “unless the court abused its considerable discretion or its decision is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.” In re Marriage of Whitehead, 2018 IL App (5th) 170380, ¶ 15, 

97 N.E.3d 566. 

¶ 38 Once again, review of this issue is hampered by petitioner’s failure to provide a 

complete record of the underlying proceedings. The record shows that in July 2019, the trial court 

conducted a hearing on petitioner’s request for “visitation,” i.e. parenting time, with T.C. The 

court’s docket entry reflects that witnesses were sworn and evidence was presented. Because 

petitioner presented no transcript of the hearing or bystander’s report, we cannot fully review the 

evidence presented at those proceedings and petitioner is unable to support his arguments on 

appeal with citations to the evidence he believes supports his claims. 

¶ 39 In its written order, the trial court did summarize the evidence presented by the 

parties and set forth specific findings as to each statutory factor. Ultimately, the court denied 

petitioner’s request for parenting time, finding a restriction on petitioner’s parenting time was

warranted under section 603.10 of the Dissolution Act and that parenting time with petitioner was 

not in T.C.’s best interest. On this record, petitioner is unable to demonstrate error in the trial 

court’s factual findings and the record presented does not show an abuse of discretion.

¶ 40 Additionally, we note that in arguing error on appeal, petitioner relies heavily on 

the Second District’s decision in Frail v. Frail, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 370 N.E.2d 303 (1977), for 

the proposition that a parent should be deprived of visitation in only very extreme circumstances. 

In that case, the court determined it was in the minor children’s best interests to visit their mother 

in prison. Id. at 1015. In so holding, the court relied, in part, on an established “strong parent-child 

relationship” between the mother and her children. Id. Here, the court’s written order reflects 
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findings of the lack of any significant parent-child relationship between petitioner and T.C. In 

particular, the court determined that T.C. had not seen petitioner since he was one year old and 

that there had been no interaction between the two in eight and a half years. Thus, the facts as 

found by the trial court in this case, which petitioner is unable to contradict due to the incomplete 

record, are clearly distinguishable from those presented in Frail. 

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 43 Affirmed.