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*********************************************** 
LISA FRONSAGLIA v. BENIGNO FRONSAGLIA

(AC 42685)

Lavine, Moll and Bishop, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and issuing certain financial

orders. Held:

1. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its financial orders by making a grossly disproportionate

property distribution in the plaintiff’s favor and assigning the majority

of the marital debt to the defendant; that court’s property distribution

was not grossly disproportionate, as the defendant had dissipated

$550,000 of marital assets in violation of the automatic orders, and the

court merely reattributed those assets to the defendant.

2. There was ample evidence before the trial court to support its finding

that the defendant had actual earnings of $160,000; evidence in the

record of the defendant’s past earnings and spending habits, as evinced

by his bank statements and credit card accounts, supported the court’s

finding, and the defendant’s reliance on Keusch v. Keusch (184 Conn.

App. 822) was misplaced, as the reasoning in that case on which he

relied had no bearing on the merits of this case.

3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred

by basing its alimony award to the plaintiff solely on his gross income

rather than on his net income; the record revealed that that court did

not rely solely on the defendant’s gross income in determining its alimony

award and that it did not state that it relied on the defendant’s gross

income, but merely referenced it; moreover, although the court did not

expressly state that it considered the defendant’s net income, this court

inferred that it considered the relevant statutory factors (§ 46b-82) and

all of the evidence submitted by the parties.

4. The defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding

alimony to the plaintiff to punish him for his purported misdeeds was

unavailing; that court was permitted to take into consideration all the

causes for the dissolution of the marriage in fashioning its alimony

award, including the defendant’s extramarital affair and poor business decisions.

Argued October 15, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the court, Grossman, J.;

judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain

other relief, from which the defendant appealed to this

court; thereafter, the court, Grossman, J., issued an

articulation of its decision. Affirmed.

William W. Taylor, for the appellant (defendant).

Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Johanna S.

Katz and, on the brief, Jon T. Kukucka, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BISHOP, J. The defendant, Benigno Fronsaglia,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving

his marriage to the plaintiff, Lisa Fronsaglia. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the court (1) abused its discretion in fashioning its financial orders by making a

grossly disproportionate property distribution in the

plaintiff’s favor and by assigning the majority of the

marital debt to him, (2) erred by basing its orders on

the defendant’s assumed earning capacity of $160,000,

where no evidence existed to support the earning capacity determined by the court, (3) erred in basing its alimony award on gross income rather than net income,

when there was no evidence to support a net income

based on the defendant’s assumed gross income, and

(4) abused its discretion by awarding alimony to the

plaintiff to punish the defendant for his purported misdeeds. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court or as

undisputed in the record, and procedural history are

relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties were

married on June 20, 1992, in Trumbull. They have two children, one of whom was a minor at the time of the dissolution. The plaintiff commenced the dissolution action

on November 28, 2016, seeking a dissolution of her

marriage to the defendant on the ground that the marriage had broken down irretrievably without the chance

of reconciliation. The plaintiff also sought, inter alia,

joint legal and primary physical custody of the minor

child, equitable distribution of all marital debts and

assets, and orders for payment of alimony, child support, postsecondary education, and attorney’s fees. At

the time of the dissolution proceeding, the plaintiff was

fifty-two years old and working as a registered nurse.

The defendant was fifty-four years old with a bachelor’s

degree in business and working as a self-employed businessman importing and selling furniture through his

limited liability company, Meeting International.

During the pendency of the action, the court incorporated into an order the parties’ pendente lite stipulation

in which the defendant agreed, inter alia, to continue

to pay the mortgage for the family home, cell phone

bills, automobile insurance, homeowners insurance,

and other household bills.

On November 7, 2018, after a five day trial, the court

issued an oral ruling, which was later signed as its

memorandum of decision, dissolving the marriage and

issuing financial orders. In its decision, the court found

the plaintiff’s gross income to be $115,000 per year, and

the defendant’s gross income for 2018 to be $160,000.

During the pendente lite period, the defendant terminated his association with emuamericas, LLC, a furniture wholesale company based in Italy with which he

had been doing business for many years. In doing so, the
defendant sold his 12.5 percent interest in emuamericas,

LLC, for $550,000 without the court’s permission and

without informing the plaintiff. The defendant disclosed

that he depleted the entire $550,000 sum pendente lite.

The defendant had also invested tens of thousands of

dollars in a restaurant, Thigh High Chicken Co., LLC,

pendente lite in violation of the automatic orders.1

The defendant did not file his tax returns for the two

years prior to the dissolution action. The court found

that he intentionally had delayed filing his taxes so that

he could file them when the dissolution proceedings

were over. Further, the court found that, because the

defendant had commingled his business and personal

finances and had no current employee who could attest

to his income, the only way to determine his income

was by looking at his historical annual earnings, his

profit and loss statements that he had submitted into

evidence, his bank account and credit card records,

e-mail exchanges between the defendant and the companies Pedrali and emuamericas, LLC,2

the testimony

of his former employee, and by taking judicial notice

of prior court orders and arrangements, such as the parties’ agreement that the defendant would continue paying the family’s household bills. The defendant also filed

two financial affidavits with the court, in which he listed

his total net weekly income, total weekly expenses and

liabilities, total cash value of assets, and total liabilities

after breaking down his expenses in detail.

On the basis of that evidence, the court found that

the defendant’s ‘‘actual income range [was] between

$150,000 and $175,000 annually.’’ Moreover, the court

determined that the defendant’s actual personal gross

earnings for 2018, the calendar year in question, were

$160,000.

Thereafter, the court ordered the defendant to pay

alimony to the plaintiff based on the length of the parties’ marriage, the reason for the breakdown of the

marriage,3

the disparity in the parties’ earnings, the parties’ earning capacities,4

‘‘as well as the myriad of factors

in [General Statutes §] 46b-82 . . . .’’ In doing so,

among other orders, the court awarded the plaintiff

alimony for twenty years, a nonmodifiable term, during

which the plaintiff was to receive $1500 per month from

the defendant, which was nonmodifiable for the first

five years. The court assigned any debts arising from

the defendant’s business ventures to the defendant, as

well as any tax liabilities in the defendant’s name and

those tax obligations arising from his businesses. The

defendant retained his interest in his companies and

any interest he had in his mother’s home. The plaintiff

was ordered to pay all of the debts that she incurred.

The court awarded the family home to the plaintiff.

The court found that the home had an approximate

value of $477,000 with $127,000 remaining on the mortgage, and liens on the home in the amount of $203,000
due to the defendant’s decision to use the home as

collateral for his business loans. Consequently, there

was only $147,000 of equity in the home. The court also

ordered that, because the defendant was responsible

for the business debts secured by the home, in the event

that the plaintiff was to sell the home in the future, the

defendant would be obligated to pay the plaintiff an

amount sufficient to satisfy any remaining liens so that

the net proceeds due to the plaintiff upon the sale would

not be reduced by the amount of those liens, other than

the mortgage, remaining on the property. The court

further ordered that, in the event that the defendant is

unable to pay the plaintiff or secure the release of the

liens prior to the sale of the home, he must pay the

plaintiff $18,000 per year until the full amount of the

lien balances has been reduced to zero. The court

ordered the defendant to make the $18,000 payments

in order to reimburse the plaintiff for any amount of

the sale proceeds that would have been used to pay

the liens before the sale of the home, thereby reducing

the amount of the encumbrances on the property. The

court also ordered that, should the defendant procure

releases or reductions for some of the liens prior to

any sale, ‘‘it [would] reduce the total amount due to

the [plaintiff] from him.’’ The court also ordered that

the defendant continue to seek releases of the business

debts after the marital dissolution in order to clear the

title to the home of the liens that were associated with

his business debts.

The defendant filed a postjudgment motion for articulation on November 26, 2018. He sought to have the

court articulate the factual basis for its findings as to

his purported gross income, net income, and the basis

for the court’s distribution of the parties’ assets and debts.

The court granted the motion in part and issued an articulation. In its articulation, the court stated that, in fashioning its distribution of assets award, it took into consideration the defendant’s dissipation of the $550,000

that he had obtained from the sale of his interest in

emuamericas, LLC. Specifically, in fashioning its property allocation award, the court stated that it had

included the $550,000 in the defendant’s portion of the

marital assets because it had found that he ‘‘received,

concealed and spent approximately $550,000 in marital

assets during the pendente lite period.’’ The court stated

that, by doing so, the parties were awarded an approximate equal share of the marital assets. The court also

clarified its reasoning regarding the distribution of the

parties’ debts. The court based its division of the marital

debts on its finding that the defendant had incurred

debt and spent money frivolously during the pendente

lite period in violation of the automatic orders. Particularly, the court had found that the defendant continued

to accumulate credit card debt while failing to pay the

household bills and mortgage as required by the pendente lite orders, and that the defendant also had
incurred debts associated with Thigh High Chicken Co.,

LLC. Noting that the defendant’s representations of

his financial status were given little weight due to his

numerous misrepresentations to the court, the court

explained that the defendant was assigned the debts

related to the many failed business ventures that he

had undertaken, most of which were undertaken without the plaintiff’s knowledge and over which she exercised no control. The defendant himself stated that the

plaintiff was not responsible for his business debts.

This appeal followed.

Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set

forth the well settled standard of review applicable to a

court’s decision regarding financial orders. ‘‘We review

financial awards in dissolution actions under an abuse

of discretion standard. . . . In order to conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the

court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Evans v. Taylor, 67 Conn. App. 108, 111, 786

A.2d 525 (2001).

‘‘In determining whether the trial court’s broad legal

discretion is abused, great weight is due to the action

of the trial court and every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Febbroriello v. Febbroriello,

21 Conn. App. 200, 202, 572 A.2d 1032 (1990). ‘‘We apply

that standard of review because it reflects the sound

policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity

to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore

in the best position to assess all of the circumstances

surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors

as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hughes v. Hughes, 95

Conn. App. 200, 203, 895 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 280 Conn.

902, 907 A.2d 90 (2006).

I

The defendant first claims that the court abused its

discretion in issuing its financial orders by making a

grossly disproportionate property distribution in the

plaintiff’s favor and assigning the majority of the marital

debt to the defendant. We are not persuaded.

‘‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court’s division of marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks,

or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consideration which it was [its] duty to regard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 275 Conn. 348,

355, 880 A.2d 872 (2005). The defendant claims that the

court made a grossly disproportionate property distribution in the plaintiff’s favor by purportedly awarding

the plaintiff $331,897 in assets while awarding him

$53,964. The defendant expounds on his argument by

positing that the court’s financial award essentially will

force him into ‘‘financial poverty’’ because the plaintiff
purportedly was awarded approximately 87 percent of

the total marital assets compared to the defendant’s 13

percent, where the defendant claims the total value of

marital assets was $385,861.

‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-81 governs the distribution

of the assets in a dissolution case. . . . That statute

authorizes the court to assign to either spouse all, or

any part of, the estate of the other spouse. . . . In fixing

the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned,

the court, after considering all the evidence presented

by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage,

the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity,

vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and

income. The court shall also consider the contribution

of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation

or appreciation in value of their respective estates.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Kent v. DiPaola, 178 Conn. App. 424, 430–31, 175 A.3d

601 (2017). Moreover, ‘‘[w]e have iterated that there is

no set formula the court is obligated to apply when

dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court is vested

with broad discretion in fashioning financial orders.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 441–42. As a

panel of this court once expressed, the court has ‘‘vast

discretion’’ in fashioning its orders. Damon v. Damon,

23 Conn. App. 111, 114, 579 A.2d 124 (1990).

At the outset, we note that the defendant’s claim

of disproportionality is factually untenable. The court

found that the defendant received approximately

$550,000 in lump sum payments over the course of a

few months after selling his 12.5 percent interest in

emuamericas, LLC, during the pendente lite period. The

court determined that the payments for the defendant’s

interest in emuamericas, LLC, were marital assets subject to division by the court because they were earned

entirely during the marriage. Notably, the court found

that the defendant had misappropriated the $550,000,

only later revealing that he had spent the entire sum.

The court also found that the defendant spent all of this

money on his own needs and wants and did not use any

of this sum to pay down any of the family’s debts or outstanding obligations. Specifically, the court found that

the defendant failed to ‘‘pay down and secure releases

for any of the over $200,000 worth of liens on the family

home.’’ In essence, the defendant dissipated a marital

asset. ‘‘[D]issipation in the marital dissolution context

requires financial misconduct involving marital assets,

such as intentional waste or a selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gong v. Huang, 129

Conn. App. 141, 153, 21 A.3d 474, cert. denied, 302 Conn.

907, 23 A.3d 1247 (2011). As correctly noted by the
court, the payments should have been ‘‘held secure or

subject to the automatic orders,’’ which the defendant

failed to do; instead, he spent the entire sum in violation

of the automatic orders.5

The defendant asserts that the court abused its discretion when it included the $550,000 payment in dividing

the marital assets because the funds were no longer

part of the marital estate. ‘‘[W]e reiterate that [t]he

power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s

ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.

Without this wide discretion and broad equitable power,

the courts in some cases might be unable fairly to

resolve the parties’ dispute . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn. 362.

Moreover, it has been established by our Supreme

Court that a trial court can take the dissipation of assets

into consideration when fashioning alimony orders in

a dissolution action. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn.

81, 102–104, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017) (court is authorized

to consider party’s dissipation of marital assets and to

reduce party’s share of marital assets accordingly where

party is found to have dissipated assets in violation of

automatic orders).

As noted previously herein, the court found that the

defendant was not a credible witness and, thus, gave

no credence to his claims that he believed that the

$550,000 belonged to him and that he could spend it

without restrictions. We will not disturb credibility

determinations made by the court. See Greco v. Greco,

supra, 275 Conn. 359 (on appeal, ‘‘[w]e cannot retry

the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)). We cannot say that

the court inaccurately determined that the defendant

dissipated the $550,000 and expended this amount on

himself where the record shows that he made expensive

purchases and supported his paramours financially

while the mortgage on the family home went unpaid

and one of the children’s cars was repossessed. See

Gershman v. Gershman, 286 Conn. 341, 346, 943 A.2d

1091 (2008). Moreover, the defendant often was found

to be in contempt during the pendency of this action

for not making payments on the household bills and

mortgage, as required under the pendente lite orders.

In Greco, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff

more than 98 percent of the marital property, alimony,

and attorney’s fees because the financial award far

exceeded the defendant’s income. Greco v. Greco,

supra, 275 Conn. 349–50. Unlike the defendant in Greco,

the defendant in the present case misappropriated and

dissipated a marital asset of $550,000 for his own benefit in violation of the automatic orders, as none of the

money was found to have paid off any of the family’s

obligations, including the liens levied on the family
home for debts owed as a result of the defendant’s poor

business decisions. The defendant fails to account for

the fact that the debts apportioned to him included

business obligations that he solely and unilaterally accumulated throughout the marriage, largely without the

plaintiff’s knowledge and over which the plaintiff had

no control.

Consequently, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion as the distribution was not grossly

disproportionate where the court found that the defendant misappropriated and dissipated $550,000 of marital

assets in violation of the automatic orders, and the court

merely reattributed those assets to the defendant, as

the law permits. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, supra, 326

Conn. 102–104; Shaulson v. Shaulson, 125 Conn. App.

734, 736, 739–42, 9 A.3d 782 (2010), cert. denied, 300

Conn. 912, 13 A.3d 1102 (2011).

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court erred

when it found that he had actual earned income or an

earning capacity of $160,000 per year because there

was no evidence to support such a finding. For the

reasons that follow, we are not persuaded.

The defendant argues that the court erred in finding

that he had an earning capacity of $160,000 in gross

income per year. In making this claim, the defendant

appears to have conflated earning capacity with actual

earnings, as the transcript clearly shows that the court

determined his actual earnings, not his earning capacity.6 Because the court’s orders were based on the defendant’s actual earnings and not his earning capacity, we

need to determine only whether the court had evidence

before it from which it could have determined the defendant’s actual earnings.

In finding that the defendant had actual earnings of

$160,000, the court considered the defendant’s past

earnings and his spending history. Specifically, due to

the defendant’s lack of candor toward the court regarding his financial status, as noted previously in this opinion, in order to determine the defendant’s actual earnings, the court took into consideration the defendant’s

past earnings from documents, such as those he submitted to the court detailing his historical earnings and

liabilities, his bank accounts and credit card statements,

and e-mail correspondence between the defendant and

his employer and potential employer.

The defendant’s reliance on Keusch v. Keusch, 184

Conn. App. 822, 195 A.3d 1136 (2018), to argue that the

court’s finding was based on insufficient evidence is

misplaced. In Keusch, this court held that the trial court

abused its discretion when it calculated the defendant’s

child support obligation on the basis of the defendant’s

earning capacity rather than his actual earnings without

‘‘first stating the presumptive support amount at which
it arrived by applying the guidelines and using the parent’s actual income and second finding application of

the guidelines to be inequitable or inappropriate.’’

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 829. The reasoning in Keusch on which the

defendant relies has no bearing on the merits of the

present case because the holding in Keusch was constrained by the requirements delineated under the child

support guidelines and regulatory framework. See id.

Moreover, in the present case, the court indeed determined the defendant’s actual earnings on the basis of

ample evidence in the record. The evidence of his past

earnings and his spending habits, as evidenced by his

bank statements and credit card accounts, supported

the court’s finding that the defendant had actual earnings of $160,000. Thus, the defendant’s second claim

fails.

III

The defendant next claims that the court erred by

basing its alimony award solely on the defendant’s gross

income as opposed to his net income. Specifically, he

asserts that the court made no effort to determine his

net income in fashioning the alimony award and there

was no evidence presented from which the court could

have calculated his net income. We disagree.7

‘‘It is well settled that a court must base child support

and alimony orders on the available net income of the

parties, not gross income.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 209,

61 A.3d 449 (2013); see also Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn.

742, 747, 345 A.2d 21 (1974) (establishing that gross

earnings is not criterion for alimony awards, but net

income available to defendant should be considered).

‘‘Although our case law consistently affirms the basic

tenet that support and alimony orders must be based

on net income, the proper application of this principle

is context specific. . . . [W]e differentiate between an

order that is a function of gross income and one that

is based on gross income. . . . [T]he term based as

used in this context connotes an order that only takes

into consideration the parties’ gross income and not the

parties’ net income. Consequently, an order that takes

cognizance of the parties’ disposable incomes may be

proper even if it is expressed as a function of the parties’

gross earnings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Leonova v. Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285, 300, A.3d

(2020).

‘‘[We have] previously . . . overlooked the failure of

the trial court to make a finding as to a party’s net

income. . . . We have concluded that such an omission

does not compel the conclusion that the court’s order

was improperly based on gross income if the record

indicates that the court considered evidence from

which it could determine a party’s net income, and it
did not state that it had relied on the party’s gross

earnings to form the basis of its order. . . .

‘‘In Kelman v. Kelman, 86 Conn. App. 120, 123, 860

A.2d 292 (2004), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 911, 870 A.2d

1079 (2005), this court rejected a similar claim on the

ground that, although the trial court, in its decision, made

reference to the parties’ gross incomes, it did not

expressly state that it was relying solely on gross earnings in framing its order.’’ (Citation omitted.) Leonova

v. Leonov, supra, 201 Conn. App. 300–301. Generally,

when a court fails to state explicitly that an award for

alimony is based on net income, it has been established

that this failure does not automatically negate the validity of the award on appeal when there is ample evidence

from which the court could have determined the parties’

net income. See Febbroriello v. Febbroriello, supra, 21

Conn. App. 202–203 (trial court’s award is not solely

based on defendant’s gross income where court had

ample evidence ‘‘from which it could have determined

the defendant’s net income’’); Valentine v. Valentine,

164 Conn. App. 354, 368–69, 141 A.3d 884 (trial court

did not improperly base its decision on defendant’s

gross income because financial affidavits submitted as

evidence reflected parties’ net income after mandatory

deductions and court stated it considered amount and

sources of income in fashioning financial order), cert.

denied, 321 Conn. 917, 136 A.3d 1275 (2016); Hartney

v. Hartney, 83 Conn. App. 553, 558–59, 850 A.2d 1098

(trial court did not improperly base its alimony award

on defendant’s gross income where court did not make

repeated references or comparisons to defendant’s

gross income, it heard testimony about parties’ net and

gross income, and its memorandum of decision stated

that it took § 46b-82 into consideration when it fashioned award), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 920, 859 A.2d

578 (2004).

In the present case, the court found that the defendant was not credible because he made various misrepresentations to the court about his earnings and was

less than candid toward the court in an effort to ‘‘deprive

[the plaintiff] of financial support . . . .’’ The record

reveals that the court assigned to the defendant a gross

income of $160,000 for 2018 on the basis of the evidence

before it.

As noted, the defendant failed to provide any tax

information from which the court could ascertain his

net income, leaving the court to derive the defendant’s

net income from the evidence it had. The court’s decision reflects that it considered evidence such as the

defendant’s historical annual earnings, his profit and

loss statements, his bank accounts and credit card

records, various e-mail exchanges between the defendant and employers or potential employers, and the

testimony of his former employee. The court also took

judicial notice of prior court orders and arrangements
(such as the parties’ agreement for the defendant to

continue paying household bills). The defendant also

had filed financial affidavits with the court pendente

lite in which he had listed his total net weekly income

while notating mandatory deductions (such as mandatory state and federal income tax deductions), total

weekly expenses and liabilities, total cash value of

assets, and his total liabilities after breaking down his

expenses in detail. Although the court deemed the defendant’s financial documents and business records to be

untrustworthy standing alone, it took them and the

defendant’s spending habits into consideration in fashioning the alimony award.

Although the defendant argues that the court used

‘‘fictitious numbers’’ and had no evidence before it to

support a finding of his net income, that argument is

without merit for two principal reasons. First, as noted,

the court found the defendant totally lacking in candor

during the trial. Indeed, the court found that the defendant endeavored to misrepresent facts before the court.

We have often said that a party who fails to provide information to the court will not later be heard to complain

that the court made orders without sufficient information. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 115 Conn. App. 570,

581, 974 A.2d 40 (2009) (‘‘[w]here a party’s own wrongful

conduct limits the financial evidence available to the court,

that party cannot complain about the resulting calculation of a monetary award’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Second, the court had before it evidence of

the defendant’s historic spending and previous findings

regarding his routine deductions from gross income. In

sum, the court considered the defendant’s spending

habits when it looked to the defendant’s bank accounts

and credit cards statements, as well as the other bills

the defendant was required to and agreed to pay during

the pendency of the proceedings. Moreover, it is not

improper for a court to look at a party’s financial affidavits and to consider the ample evidence before it to

‘‘determine the [party’s] net income and the respective

financial needs and abilities of each party.’’ Hughes v.

Hughes, supra, 95 Conn. App. 206–207.

On the basis of our careful review of the record, we

cannot conclude that the court solely relied on the

defendant’s gross income to form the basis of its alimony award. We note, as well, that the court did not

state that it relied on the defendant’s gross income but,

instead, merely referenced it, which is not improper.

See id., 207. ‘‘Consequently, an order that takes cognizance of the parties’ disposable incomes may be proper

even if it is expressed as a function of the parties’ gross

earnings.’’ Id.

Additionally, even though the court did not expressly

state that it was basing the alimony award on the defendant’s net income, ‘‘[o]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly

held . . . that the trial court is not required to make
specific reference to the criteria that it considered in

making its decision. . . . [W]e are . . . of the opinion

that a trial court need not expressly state that it has

considered the appropriate factors in reaching its decision. According the court every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its decision, we

assume that the court considered the appropriate statutory and evidentiary underpinnings in fashioning its

financial orders.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 207–208.

Therefore, although the court did not expressly state

that it considered the defendant’s net income in

determining the alimony award, we infer that the court

considered the relevant statutory factors and all of the

evidence submitted by the parties.

Accordingly, this claim fails.

IV

The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused

its discretion by awarding alimony to the plaintiff to

punish him for his ‘‘alleged bad behavior.’’ We disagree.

The purpose of alimony is not to punish but ‘‘to meet

one’s continuing duty to support . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234, 449 A.2d

151 (1982); see also Greco v. Greco, supra, 275 Conn.

361. In determining whether to award alimony, the court

‘‘shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes

for the . . . dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and

sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills,

education, employability, estate and needs of each of

the parties and [any property] award . . . pursuant to

section 46b-81 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).8

Moreover, ‘‘[t]he court is not obligated to make express

findings on each of these statutory criteria.’’ Weiman

v. Weiman, supra, 234.

In essence, the defendant argues that the court erred

by taking his misdeeds into consideration when fashioning the alimony award and that doing so resulted in an

alimony award designed to punish him. In pursuing this

argument, the defendant ignores the breadth of § 46b82 (a), which, inter alia, permits the court to take into

consideration the causes for the breakdown of the marriage in fashioning its alimony award. Although the statute provides many factors that a court must consider

upon determining whether to award alimony, there is

no requirement that the court must weigh the factors

equally. See Horey v. Horey, 172 Conn. App. 735, 741,

161 A.3d 579 (2017) (‘‘The court is to consider these

factors [under § 46b-82 (a)] in making an award of alimony, but it need not give each factor equal weight.

. . . We note also that [t]he trial court may place varying degrees of importance on each criterion according

to the factual circumstances of each case. . . . There

is no additional requirement that the court specifically

state how it weighed the statutory criteria or explain in
detail the importance assigned to each statutory factor.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

The court’s findings that the defendant’s extramarital

affair with his twenty-two year old employee and his

unilateral, poor business decisions led to the breakdown of the marriage is amply supported by the record.

The court found that there was evidence that the defendant paid all of his paramour’s bills, including those

for her car insurance, car payment, gym membership,

student loans, and credit card bills. The court also determined that the evidence supported the finding that the

defendant and his paramour went on vacations or took

trips together where they shared a hotel room, and that

the defendant bought her expensive gifts and paid for

all of her expenses in violation of the court’s pendente

lite orders.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion by considering the defendant’s extramarital affair and poor business decisions in fashioning the

alimony award. The court is permitted to take into consideration all causes for the dissolution of the marriage

in determining whether to award alimony. See Dubicki

v. Dubicki, 186 Conn. 709, 715–16, 443 A.2d 1268 (1982).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The plaintiff provided the defendant with notice of the automatic orders

pursuant to Practice Book § 25-5, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]either party shall incur unreasonable debts hereafter, including, but not limited

to, further borrowing against any credit line secured by the family residence,

further encumbrancing any assets, or unreasonably using credit cards or

cash advances against credit cards.’’ Practice Book § 25-5 (b) (5).

2 After leaving emuamericas, LLC, the defendant entered into negotiations

with another company, Pedrali, for a potential employment opportunity.

After many months of negotiating, Pedrali eventually withdrew its offer

of employment.

3 The court found that the defendant was largely to blame for the breakdown of the marriage due to his extramarital affair with his twenty-two

year old employee.

4 As delineated in part II of this opinion, although the court referenced

the earning capacities of the parties in its decision, its orders were based

on the parties’ actual earnings as determined by the court.

5

‘‘[W]hile the dissolution proceedings are pending, no party shall sell,

transfer, [or] exchange any property without permission from the other

party or the court. . . . The automatic orders are intended to keep the

financial situation of the parties at a status quo during the pendency of the

dissolution action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn. 81, 101, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017); see Practice

Book § 25-5 (b) (1).

6 Of course, in the proper case, a court may base its orders on a party’s

earning capacity; see Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113–14, 70 A.3d

13 (2013); but because that was not the court’s undertaking in this case,

we do not discuss the propriety of finding earning capacity.

7 We note that the plaintiff asserts in her appellate brief that the record

is inadequate for us to review this claim because the defendant failed to

adequately preserve it by failing to file a motion for review, presumably of

the court’s articulation. This argument is of no avail because the record is

adequate for review as the basis of the court’s orders is plain in the record.

8 General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘At the time of

entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to

pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to
section 46b-81. . . . In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and

the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence

presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the

causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation,

the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning

capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of

each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant

to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor

children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s

securing employment.’’