[Cite as State v. Bryant, 2024-Ohio-1192.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MIAMI COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee

v. 

KAMRON M. BRYANT

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 2023-CA-17

Trial Court Case No. 23CR49

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

. . . . . . . . . . .

O P I N I O N

Rendered on March 29, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

TIMOTHY B. HACKETT, Attorney for Appellant

 

BRANDON S. MYERS, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Kamron M. Bryant appeals from his convictions in the 

Miami County Court of Common Pleas after he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated 

robbery and one count of misdemeanor assault and was sentenced to an aggregate term 

of 5 to 71⁄2 years in prison. He was also ordered to pay $25,192.06 in restitution. For the 
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reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On the evening of October 28, 2022, 17-year-old Bryant entered the Golden 

Bowl Buffet in Troy with the intention to eat but not pay. He ate his meal, and then he 

lured the manager of the restaurant, Jian Li, into the restroom under the guise of the toilet 

being clogged and ] violently assaulted him. When Gang Chen, another employee, 

entered the bathroom to investigate the commotion, Bryant beat him as well and then fled 

in a waiting car driven by his girlfriend. 

{¶ 3} Police and medics were called, and the victims were transported to a Miami 

County hospital. Chen had suffered a laceration below his mouth which required stitches.

Li was seriously injured; in addition to superficial cuts and bruises, he suffered a brain 

bleed and concussion. Due to the severity of his condition, Li was transported to Miami 

Valley Hospital for treatment of his injuries. 

{¶ 4} When the first responders arrived on the scene, Bryant was not present, but 

he soon returned and spoke with several officers. Sergeant Matt Mosier noticed blood 

smeared on Bryant’s hands and arms and recounted that Bryant had told him inconsistent 

stories, eventually saying it was “dine and dash” situation. Bryant told Officer Cody 

Compton that he had struck the victims so he could get out of the restaurant without 

paying for his food. According to Officer Compton, after being placed under arrest, Bryant 

became very belligerent and threatened to kill him, his family, and other officers on the 

scene. 

{¶ 5} A few days later, the State filed a complaint alleging that Bryant was a 
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delinquent juvenile by way of having committed aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony 

if committed by an adult, and assault, a first-degree misdemeanor if committed by an 

adult. On October 6, 2022, the State filed an amended complaint adding felonious assault. 

It then filed a motion to certify Bryant as an adult and asked the juvenile court to transfer 

the case to the Miami County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, for prosecution. 

{¶ 6} On October 28, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a probable cause hearing. 

After considering testimony from the victims and officers, the court found probable cause 

that Bryant had committed aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and assault, and 

ordered a forensic evaluation. It then set the amenability hearing for January 31, 2023. At 

that proceeding, the parties stipulated to the forensic evaluation by Dr. Carla Dreyer, and 

the court heard from Officer Compton and Officer Tony Petrovich, Bryant’s juvenile 

probation officer. After considering the testimony, the forensic report, and Bryant’s 

juvenile record, the court found that he was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within 

the juvenile system and transferred the case to the general division (“adult court”). 

{¶ 7} Bryant was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated robbery, 

felonious assault, and assault. On April 11, 2023, he pleaded guilty to Count 1,

aggravated robbery, and Count 3, assault; in exchange for the guilty pleas, the State 

agreed to dismiss the felonious assault charge in Count 2. 

{¶ 8} On May 22, 2023, Bryant appeared in court again, this time for the 

disposition. At the hearing, the court heard oral statements from Bryant, his attorney, and 

the State. The court also stated that before the hearing it had reviewed the presentence 

investigation (PSI) and victim impact statements from Li and Chen. Bryant was sentenced 
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to 5 to 71⁄2 years on the aggravated robbery and 180 days of local incarceration (to be 

served concurrently to the prison time) for the misdemeanor assault. He was also ordered 

to pay restitution to his victims in the amounts of $24,492.06 to Li and $700 to Chen. 

{¶ 9} Bryant filed a timely appeal. We will address his arguments in an order that 

facilitates our analysis.

II. Transfer of the case to adult court

{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, Bryant asserts that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion when it transferred his case to adult court “without sufficient credible 

evidence of non-amenability.” His argument is that, because “additional untested 

rehabilitative options still remained,” he should have been kept in the juvenile justice 

system instead of being bound over to adult court. We disagree.

{¶ 11} Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged to be 

delinquent, but if a child is old enough and is alleged to have committed an act that would 

be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court may transfer jurisdiction to adult 

court for criminal prosecution. In re D.M.S., 2021-Ohio-1214, 170 N.E.3d 61, ¶ 16 (2d 

Dist.). (In some cases, the court may be required to transfer jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 

2152.12(A), but those circumstances do not apply here.). 

{¶ 12} After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child by 

reason of committing one or more acts that would be a felony offense if committed by an 

adult, the juvenile court may transfer the case if it finds all of the following: (1) the child 

was 14 years of age or older at the time of the act charged; (2) there is probable cause 

to believe that the child committed the act; and (3) the child is not amenable to care or 
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rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that 

the child be subject to adult sanctions. R.C. 2152.12(B)(1)-(3).

{¶ 13} Juv.R. 30(A) stipulates that, upon a motion to transfer jurisdiction, the 

juvenile court “shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to 

believe that the child committed the act alleged and that the act would be an offense if 

committed by an adult.” If probable cause is established, and after determining that the 

child is at least 14 years old, the court “shall continue the proceeding for full investigation. 

The investigation shall include a mental examination of the child by a public or private 

agency or by a person qualified to make the examination. When the investigation is 

completed, an amenability hearing shall be held to determine whether to transfer 

jurisdiction. The criteria for transfer shall be as provided by statute.” Juv.R. 30(C).

{¶ 14} In determining whether to transfer the child’s case to adult court, the juvenile 

court must consider the following factors and any other relevant factors in favor of a 

transfer: 

(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or 

serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.

(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the 

alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or 

psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.

(3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.

(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a 

gang or other organized criminal activity.
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(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or under the child’s 

control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of 

section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission 

of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the 

firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.

(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or 

disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, 

or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.

(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that 

rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.

(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for 

the transfer.

(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile 

system.

R.C. 2152.12(D).

{¶ 15} The juvenile court must also consider factors militating against the transfer 

of the youth, such as:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.

(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act 

charged.

(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time 

of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion 
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of another person.

(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have 

reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in 

allegedly committing the act charged.

(5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child.

(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature 

enough for the transfer.

(7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability.

(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system 

and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a 

reasonable assurance of public safety.

R.C. 2152.12(E).

{¶ 16} There is no requirement that every factor must be “resolved against the 

juvenile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding that the juvenile is not 

amenable to treatment.” State v. Haynie, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA93-12-039, 1995 WL 

55289, *5 (Feb. 13, 1995). Because the statutory scheme does not dictate how much 

weight should be given to any specific factor, the ultimate decision rests in the discretion 

of the juvenile court. See State v. Gregory, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28695, 2020-Ohio5207, ¶ 32; State v. Cuffie, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-8, 2020-Ohio-4844, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 17} In this case, the juvenile court weighed the factors as required by R.C. 

2152.12(D) and (E). It specifically found that the victims’ injuries were severe, especially 

Li’s, who was transferred to Miami Valley Hospital to deal with the magnitude of the harm 
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caused (Factor 1). The court further found that Li’s age exacerbated the physical harm

(Factor 2). Bryant was also on probation with the juvenile court probation department at 

the time of the incident and had been for three years (Factor 6). As to Factor 7, the juvenile 

court found that “rehabilitation in the juvenile system for the current charges is not 

possible.” It recounted Bryant’s many contacts with the juvenile court dating back to early 

2018 and highlighted the sanctions and programs that had been offered to the child to 

help with rehabilitation, none of which were successful. Addressing Factor 9, the court 

noted that the psychological evaluation showed that Bryant was both emotionally and 

psychologically similar to other 17-year-olds and indicated that he was not mentally ill or 

intellectually disabled. The court noted that:

Dr. Dreyer concluded that the youth is not amenable to rehabilitation in the 

juvenile system at this time. This court agrees, and specifically finds that 

Kamron Bryant is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. 

The court specifically finds there is insufficient time to rehabilitate the 

defendant/youth within the juvenile system.

Amenability Entry at 4. The juvenile court did not state that any of the factors weighing 

against transfer were met but did “find that the applicable factors in favor of transfer under 

R.C. 2152.12(D), outweigh the applicable factors against the transfer under R.C. 

2152.12(E).” Id. 

{¶ 18} Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused 

its discretion when it found that Bryant was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile 

system and transferred the case to adult court. 
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{¶ 19} Nevertheless, Bryant makes some additional arguments that a sanction (or 

sanctions) within the juvenile system was a more appropriate outcome than transfer to 

adult court. He first argues that “the juvenile court acted unreasonably when it concluded 

further rehabilitation was not possible, without even considering the array of dispositional 

options still available to it.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. While we understand that a sanction 

such as a disposition to DYS instead of transfer to adult court would have been more 

palatable to Bryant, “there is no requirement that a juvenile first be committed to the DYS 

before he may be transferred to the general division for trial as an adult offender.” State 

v. Whisenant, 127 Ohio App.3d 75, 91, 711 N.E.2d 1016 (11th Dist.1998). This argument 

also ignores the steps that were taken by the juvenile court prior to this case.

{¶ 20} The record indicates that since 2018, Bryant had had numerous contacts 

with the Miami Couty juvenile justice system (see chart below) and that the court had tried 

many corrective measures. The juvenile court stated that attempts at rehabilitation 

included: letters of apology, essays, online parenting class, online anger/rage class, 

community service, CROPS, online THC class, online nicotine class, Outreach Program, 

online cognitive thinking program, Independent Living Program, many stays at West 

Central Juvenile Detention Center, probation, restitution, electronic home monitoring, no 

contact orders, and house arrest. It cannot be said that the court simply “jumped * * * to 

full-scale adult prison.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. It merely concluded that adult court was a 

more appropriate venue to address Bryant’s conduct.

Offense Disposition Date

Disorderly Conduct March 7, 2018

Unruly January 7, 2019
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Domestic Violence M4 (amended from 

M1)

May 23, 2019

Criminal Trespass August 7, 2019

Contempt August 7, 2019

Theft August 9, 2019

Tamper/Property August 12, 2019

Domestic Violence December 23, 2019

Aggravated Menacing December 23, 2019

Tobacco Law December 23, 2019

Failure to Control January 14, 2020

Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle January 14, 2020

Contempt August 4, 2020

Probation Violation August 4, 2020

Probation Violation August 18, 2020

Probation Violation December 19, 2020 (2019 case tolled 

due to COVID)

Tobacco Law January 7, 2021

Probation Violation January 7, 2021

Menacing February 24, 2021

Contempt February 24, 2021

School Truancy July 7, 2021

Assault M1 (amended from Felonious 

Assault F2)

September 9, 2021

Disorderly Conduct January 11, 2022

Unruly October 17, 2022

Unruly-Disobey October 17, 2022

Aggravated Robbery (transferred to adult 

court)

February 6, 2023

Felonious Assault (transferred to adult 

court)

February 6, 2023

Assault (transferred to adult court) February 6, 2023

Probation Violation February 15, 2023

{¶ 21} Bryant also argues that the juvenile court misinterpreted and 

mischaracterized Dr. Dreyer’s forensic evaluation to reach its conclusion that his case 

should be transferred, but he ignores the straight-forward conclusion of the report. After 

finding that there were no factors weighing against the transfer, Dr. Dreyer stated: “Given 

his history and presentation, it does not appear that Kamron would benefit from further 
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services or intervention provided within the juvenile court system.” She went on to 

conclude that “given his risk for future violence and reoffending, risk factors, lack of 

protective factors, and history, Kamron is not amenable to rehabilitation in the 

juvenile system at this time.” (Emphasis sic.) Forensic Evaluation at 12. 

{¶ 22} Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court 

abused its discretion when it determined Bryant was not amenable to further interventions 

within the juvenile justice system. The second assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Transfer of misdemeanor count to adult court

{¶ 23} In his first assignment of error, Bryant argues that the juvenile court erred 

when it transferred his assault charge to adult court because misdemeanor offenses are 

not subject to bindover. As a result, he believes the misdemeanor assault conviction is 

void because the adult court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 24} While both parties agree that misdemeanors – by themselves – cannot be 

transferred from juvenile court to adult court, they disagree about whether misdemeanors 

– when combined with felonies – can be transferred. 

{¶ 25} A juvenile may be bound over to adult court if the child was at least 14 when 

the crime(s) was/were committed, there is probable cause to believe that he or she 

committed the crime(s), and the child is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile 

system or community safety requires it. R.C. 2152.12(B)(1)-(3). This assignment of error, 

however, turns on the statutory language just before those bindover requirements. R.C. 

2152.12(B) states: 

[A]fter a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child
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by reason of committing one or more acts that would be an offense if

committed by an adult and if any of those acts would be a felony if

committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing may transfer the

case[.]

(Emphasis added.) Bryant believes that the focus should be on the phrase “if any of those 

acts would be a felony.” This interpretation of the statute seems to narrowly focus on the 

felony acts – which everyone agreed could be transferred to the adult court – but ignores 

any other crime that may have been committed. The State, on the other hand, highlights 

“may transfer the case.” This reading of the statute is more “big-picture,” and the focus 

is on all of the crimes committed – the entire case. We agree with the State’s interpretation 

and conclude that once probable cause is found, both felonies and misdemeanors 

stemming from the youth’s criminal conduct and included in the complaint may be 

transferred to adult court. The plain language of the statute calls for the case to be 

transferred, not just the felonies. 

{¶ 26} There are other indications that the legislature intended for the entire case 

to be transferred to adult court as well. R.C. 2152.12(I)(2)(a) states that “[t]he transfer 

abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in 

the complaint in the case,” and R.C. 2152.12(I)(2)(b) notes that “[u]pon the transfer, all 

further proceedings pertaining to the acts charged in the complaint in the case shall be 

discontinued in the juvenile court.” The plain language of those two sections makes it 

clear that once probable cause is found and the case gets transferred from the juvenile 

court to adult court, the juvenile court no longer has any ability to proceed. It would not 
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make sense for misdemeanors to be left behind if the juvenile court cannot do anything 

with them. 

{¶ 27} Further, on April 4, 2023, the legislature enacted a statute that codified the 

meaning of “case.” R.C. 2152.022(A) states:

[I]f the juvenile court under section 2152.10 and division (A)(1) or (B) of

section 2152.12 of the Revised Code is required to transfer the “case” or is

authorized to transfer the “case” and decides to do so, as used in all

provisions of the Revised Code that apply with respect to the transfer,

“case” means all charges that are included in the complaint or

complaints containing the allegation that is the basis of the transfer

under division (A)(1) or (B) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code and for

which the court found probable cause to believe that the child committed

the act charged, regardless of whether the complaint or complaints are filed

under the same case number or different case numbers.

(Emphasis added.) Applying that definition here, all three charges – aggravated robbery, 

felonious assault, and assault – were part of the case and had to be transferred. Although

this section was enacted after Bryant was charged, it is another indication that, in a 

situation such as Bryant’s, all of the charges – both felonies and misdemeanors – should 

be transferred to adult court. 

{¶ 28} Finally, even putting aside the clear statutory indications that misdemeanors 

can be transferred to adult court, Ohio case law is replete with examples of this same 

scenario happening. See State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 
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297, ¶ 11 (juvenile court found probable cause for both felonies and misdemeanor and 

transferred all to adult court); State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-1169, 188 N.E.3d 280, ¶ 3-4 (8th 

Dist.) (juvenile court found probable cause for both felonies and misdemeanors and 

transferred the case to the general division); State v. Watkins, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 

CA2017-03-013, 2018-Ohio-46, ¶ 2, 6. 

{¶ 29} Bryant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Sentencing requirements

{¶ 30} In his third assignment of error, Bryant contends that his prison sentence is 

“unauthorized by and contrary to law because the trial court plainly failed to comply with 

the mandatory sentencing provisions of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b),” which require courts to 

consider youth before imposing adult prison time. 

{¶ 31} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2), which provides that an appellate court may increase, decrease, modify, 

or vacate and remand a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds either that the record 

does not support the lower court’s findings or that the sentence is contrary to law. State 

v. Worthen, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29043, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13, citing State v. 

Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. 

{¶ 32} In sentencing, the trial court must consider the purposes and principles of 

sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors found in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), “the sentencing court shall consider the need for 

incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, 

rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, 
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or both.” Similarly, R.C. 2929.12 contains a list of factors to be considered “regarding the 

offender, the offense, or the victim” to determine whether the offender’s conduct is more 

serious or less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense and to establish

whether the offender is more or less likely to commit crimes in the future. State v. Spencer, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112058, 2023-Ohio-3359, ¶ 21.

{¶ 33} R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 are not fact-finding statutes and, while the 

sentencing court must “consider” the factors, it is not required to make specific findings 

on the record regarding its consideration of the factors. Id. at ¶ 22. “On a silent record, a 

trial court is presumed to have considered the statutory purposes and principles of 

sentencing, and the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors” State v. Goldblum, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 25851, 2014-Ohio-5068, ¶ 50.

{¶ 34} In 2021, the legislature enacted R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)(b), which requires the 

trial court to consider additional mitigating factors when the offender was under 18 at the 

time the crime was committed. The statute states, in relevant part:

(b) if the offense was committed when the offender was under eighteen 

years of age, in addition to other factors considered, consider youth and its 

characteristics as mitigating factors, including: 

(i) The chronological age of the offender at the time of the offense 

and that age’s hallmark features, including intellectual capacity, 

immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences;
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(ii) The family and home environment of the offender at the time of 

the offense, the offender’s inability to control the offender’s 

surroundings, a history of trauma regarding the offender, and the 

offender’s school and special education history;

(iii) The circumstances of the offense, including the extent of the 

offender’s participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 

pressures may have impacted the offender’s conduct;

(iv) Whether the offender might have been charged and convicted of 

a lesser offense if not for the incompetencies associated with youth, 

such as the offender’s inability to deal with police officers and 

prosecutors during the offender’s interrogation or possible plea 

agreement or the offender's inability to assist the offender's own 

attorney;

(v) Examples of the offender’s rehabilitation, including any 

subsequent growth or increase in maturity during confinement.

R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)(b)(i)-(v). 

{¶ 35} Bryant asserts that “the trial court did not discuss, recite, or comply with the 

mandatory requirements” of R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)(b). He believes that the court was

required to address the mitigating effects of youth and, because the statute is not 

mentioned in either the transcript or the judgment entry, “it clearly affected the court’s 

decision.” Because this is a relatively new statute, and it does not appear that we have 

dealt with this issue before, we look to other appellate districts to determine what 
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appropriate consideration of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) entails. 

{¶ 36} With State v. Spears, 2023-Ohio-187, 205 N.E.3d 1261 (5th Dist.), the Fifth 

District appears to be the first appellate court to address the question of what is 

appropriate consideration of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). It compared the analysis of R.C. 

2929.19(B)(1)(b) to that of the sentencing considerations found in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12, which mandate that the trial court consider the principles and purposes of 

sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors before pronouncing a prison 

sentence. Id. at ¶ 36-40. There is no requirement to make specific findings in that context. 

Id. Specifically, the Spears court noted: “While precedent does not require the trial court 

to produce findings, our holdings with regard to R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require 

that the ‘necessary findings can be found in the record,’ or that ‘the record reflects that 

the trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the seriousness 

and recidivism factors[.]’ ” (Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 40. The Fifth District 

ultimately concluded that, because R.C. 2929.19’s mandate that the trial court consider 

specific factors was sufficiently similar to the language found in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12, the same analysis should apply. “Consequently, while the trial court need not 

specify findings regarding the factors listed in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b), we must review the 

record to determine whether it affirmatively shows the court failed to consider those 

factors.” Id. 

{¶ 37} In the months since Spears, the Third and Eighth Districts have adopted the 

same analytical framework. See State v. Bush, 2023-Ohio-4473, __ N.E.3d __ (3d Dist.); 

State v. Spencer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112058, 2023-Ohio-3359. Today we join them 
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and hold that our review is limited to whether the record affirmatively demonstrates that 

the court failed to consider the R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) factors. 

{¶ 38} In this case, while the trial court failed to mention any of the mitigating 

factors found in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b), the record confirms that there was evidence 

pertaining to them before the court. For instance, the court stated that it had considered 

Bryant’s PSI, which included his juvenile criminal history and dispositions (which showed 

that juvenile justice system interventions were not succeeding), his social and family 

history (which described his “chaotic” home life, his troubled relationship with his mother 

due to her constant drug use, physical abuse from his mother’s boyfriend and possible 

sexual abuse at the hands of a cousin), his school record (he dropped out in high school), 

and a police report. In addition to considering the PSI, the sentencing court discussed on 

the record all of Bryant’s juvenile offenses and particularly noted some acts of violence 

including multiple domestic violence charges and a 2021 first-degree misdemeanor 

assault that was amended down from felonious assault, a second-degree felony. It stated, 

“Mr. Bryant, this was a very troubling case to the court. Very troubling. And I think it’s 

primarily by the fact of your – your young age, and the fact that you’ve had multiple –

numerous interventions with regard to this type of behavior.” Sentencing Tr. at 13. The 

court went on to note that this crime was just the next step in a course of conduct that 

had lasted for years. “It’s a matter of protection of the public, and that’s my job. * * * This 

isn’t just an immature decision on your [part], it’s an intentional decision.” Id. at 14-15. 

Bryant’s counsel, likewise, spoke of his age, his “rough childhood” in which he moved 

constantly, suffered abuse, and never met his father. Defense counsel also noted Bryant’s 
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history with the juvenile court. 

{¶ 39} In addition to the statements made at the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

also had in its possession Bryant’s forensic evaluation completed by Dr. Dreyer. That 

document encompassed several of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) factors and went into detail

about Bryant’s mental and emotional health, how his maturity level compared to his peers, 

his history, and Dr. Dreyer’s opinion about his amenability.

{¶ 40} Based on the statements made at the sentencing hearing and other 

evidence in the record, we cannot say that the record affirmatively demonstrates that the 

court failed to consider the R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) factors. Bryant’s third assignment of 

error is overruled.

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 41} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.