ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN: 

THE GERMAN DEFEAT 

IN THE EAST 

Earl F. Ziemke 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.C., 2002 
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67- 6000 I 

First Printed 1968-CMH Pub 3(}-5-1 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 

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ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES 

Stetson Conn , General Editor 

Advisory Committee 

(As of I September 1966) 

Fred C. Cole 

Washington and Lee University 

James A. Field,Jr. 

Swarthmore College 

Ernest R. May 

Harvard University 

Lt. Gen. August Schomburg 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Maj. Gen. B. E. Powell 

U.S. Continental Army Command 

Brig. Gen. Robert B. Smith 

U.S. Army War College 

Charles P. Roland Brig. Gen. Robert C. Taber 

Tulane University U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Col. Thomas E. Griess 

United States Military Academy 

Office of the Chief of Military History 

Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History 

Chief Historian 

Chief. Histories Division 

Chief, Editorial and Graphics Division 

Editor in Chief 

Stetson Conn 

Col. Paul P. Hinkley 

Col. Joseph S. Coulter 

Joseph R. Friedman 
The Author 

Earl F. Ziemke is a graduate of the University of '\,i.<;;consin, where he received 

a Ph. D. degree in history. In World War II he served with the U.S. Marine Corps 

in the Pacific theater. In 1951 he joined the staff of the Bureau of Applied Social 

Research, Columbia University, and in 1955 he moved to the Office of the Chief 

of Military History. Since 1967 he has been a member of the history faculty at 

the University of Georgia. 

Dr. Ziemke is author of The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-

1945 (Washington , 1959 ), and of chapters in Command Decisions (New York: 

Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959 ), A Concise History of World War II (New 

York: Frederick A. Praeger, In c., 1964 ), and Soviet Partisans in World War II 

( Madison: University of ,,yisconsin Press, 1965 ) _ His other publications include 

The Battle for Berlin: End of the Third Reich (New York: Ballantine, 1968 ), 

The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing OlTice, 1975 ), and The Soviet .fuggernaut (Alexandria, Va. : Time-Life 

Book.s, 1981 ). 
Preface 

Save for the introduction of nuclear weapons, the Soviet victory over Germany was the most fatelul development of World War II. Both wrought changes 

and raised problems th at have constantly preoccupied the world in the more than 

twenty years since the war cnded. The purpose o f this volume is to investigate 

onc aspect of the Soviet \·jelOry - how the war was won on the battlefield . The 

author sought, in following the march o f the Soviet and German armies from 

Stalingrad to Berlin, to depict the waf as it was and to describe the manner in 

which the Soviet Un ion emerged as the predominant military power in Europe. 

The author is gratel ul to Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, milita ry editor of the 

New York T imeJ, and to Dr. Stetson Conn, Col. Albert W. Jones, and ~Ir. 

Charles B. MacDonald of the Office of the Chief of Military H istory, for reading 

the manuscript and for their many valuable suggestions, to which he hopes he 

has done justice in the final vc . He is ind ebted to Gcncralohcrst a. D . Franz 

Halder for assistance in securing source materials and for encouragement in th e 

early stages of the writi ng. In hi;,; struggles with the vast German documents 

collec tions and th e numcrour;; dctails of German tactics and organization, the 

author received valu able advice from his colleagues in the former Foreign Branch, 

OCMH, Mrs. Magna E. Bauer, Mr. Detmar H. Finke, and Mr. Charles V. P. 

"on LUlliehau. The writing of the volume would not ha" e been possible without 

the help of Mr. Sherrod East and the oth er members of the World War II 

Reference Branch, National Archives and Records Service. The)' granted the 

author unrestricted access 10 th eir Gcnnan coll ec lions and gavc generously of 

their own time and efforl. 

1\1051 of th e burden of conn.Tt ing th e manuscript into a book was borne by 

other members of the OCMH staff. Mr. David J affe, editor, accomplished a 

thoroughgoing job, aidcd by ~rrs. r-.rarion P. Grimes, as.<;istant editor] and 5aw 

the hook through 10 publi cation. r-. l r. Elliot Dunay compil ed and supervised production of the n"I"- ~Ii " Ruth A. Phillips selected the photographs. The index 

was prepared by ~lr . Gay ~l rcnus Hammerman. 

pos.r;;iblc crrors and om "i~iun" ran only be atlrihuted to th c aUl hor's failure to 

profit from the assistance ;n"a ilablc to him. 

Washington, D.C. I September 1966 EARL F. ZIEMKE 

Contents 

Chapter 

I. INVASION I 

T he Gnnw" Commallri . 

BarbafOH{l 

Hitler in Command 

O/Joa/iou Blall 

I I. R ETR EAT' . . 

Thl' Soviet Command 

1942, Rl'Irt'at and Rcco['l'1)'. 

Ill. STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

Th e l1{h'allce OIl Stolil/urad . 

Th e Siege. . 

German EXj)cclatio1l r . 

Soviet i llteutiolls 

Sixth Army ElIcircled . 

lVillt crgcl{'itlrr . 

IV. STALINGRAD, THE T URNI NG POI NT, 

Sixth Army Isolated . 

Si\'I.h Aml)' Des/royed . 

V. THE COUNTERMARCH 

The Fight for SUfi'h:al 

The Last Cl'nllal/ VictOl)' 

VI. THE CENTER AND THE NORTH . 

At tlil' End of SUnl11l('1' 1942 . 

Partisan rl'ar/are 

A r:011l/J(lIIion PiNI' to Stolil/ glad . 

The Qlliel Frorlt 

On thl' D('lel/sh·() . 

VII. O PERATION ZITA DELI.E . 

T he Lull ill the Storm . 

vii 

Page 

3 

+ 

10 

11 

15 

23 

2J 

32 

37 

37 

.f( 

+7 

50 

53 

61 

66 

66 

75 

81 

81 

90 

98 

98 

1m 

10:; 

109 

III 

11 8 

liB 
Chapter 

VII. OPERATION ZITADELLE-Colllinued 

A Limited Offensive 

Zitadel1e 

VIIl. THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 

Troops and Tactics 

The Fourth Baltic of Kharkov . 

The Front i'l Flames 

To the Dnepr . 

IX. THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE. 

Army Group South 

The Dnepr Bridgehead, Army Group Center. 

X. THE RISING TIDE . . 

Breakthrough at Nevel 

The German Allies. . 

Leadership, Manpower, Strategy 

XI. OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK. 

The Battle Resumes West of Kiev . . . . 

The Cherkassy Pocket (Korsun' Shevchenkovskiy) 

Nikopol and Krivoi Rog . 

Dubno-Lutsk-Kovel' 

XII. OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK. 

OJ}eration Blau . 

An "Echo" in Finland. 

XIII. PAYING THE PIPER .. 

Mud and Strategy . . 

A Soviet Spring Offensive 

The Crimea . 

XIV. PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

[(arelia . 

Partisan J1 / arfare at Its Height . 

The W est and the East . 

XV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

Deception and Delusion . . . 

The Battle for Belorussia. . . 

Th a Battle Expands to tha Flanks . 

The Recovery 

VIII 

Page 

124 

133 

143 

143 

149 

157 

165 

174 

174 

189 

197 

197 

207 

211 

218 

218 

226 

238 

244 

248 

248 

267 

272 

272 

271 

291 

296 

296 

303 

309 

313 

313 

316 

329 

340 
Chapter 

XVI. T HE SOUTH FLANK 

Escape to the Car/Jathians 

The Front R ebuilt. . . 

XVII. RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

The Balkan Peni"sula 

Budapest 

XVIII. DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

The Finnish Armistice. 

Retreat From Northern Finland 

Army Group North's Retreat to Courland . 

XIX. THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE. . . . . . 

Two Fro'lls, the Fuehrer's Will, and German R eso urces 

Front the Visl1l1a to the Oder . 

East Prussia . . . 

The Budal,"st Relief . . . . 

XX. THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

Missions . . . . 

The Soviet ODensiue Falt ers 

Parr" alld Thrust- Vierl1la 

Closing In? 

XXI. BERLIN. . . 

The Eve of the Battle . 

The Encirclement 

The Last Act. 

XXII. CONCLUSION . 

Appendix 

A. TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS 

B. COMPARATIVE SIZES OF MAJOR COMMANDS. 

NOTE ON SOURCES 

GLOSSARY 

CODE NAMES 

INDEX ... 

IX 

Page 

346 

346 

356 

365 

365 

378 

387 

387 

391 

403 

410 

410 

421 

428 

433 

438 

438 

440 

450 

456 

467 

467 

-174 

483 

500 

505 

506 

507 

515 

518 

521 
Maps 

No. Page 

1. The 1941 Campaign and the Soviet Winter Offensive. 8 

2. The Situation, I May and 18 November 1942 . 16 

3. The Advance to Stalingrad, 17 July- 18 November 1942 . 38 

4. Stalingrad, No\'crnbcr- Decembcr 1942 . 51 

5. A Double Thrust at Rostov, 16 December 1942- 19 January 1943 . 67 

6. Army Group A, 19 January-18 February 1943 . 82 

7. Army Groups R and Don, :10 J anuary-I 8 February 1943 . 83 

8. The Army Group South Counteroffensive, 19 February-18 March 1943 95 

9. Soviet Offensive Against Army Groups Center and North, NovemberDecember 1942 . 99 

10. Army Group North, Winter, 1942-43 . I to 

11. Army Group Center, Winter, 19+2-43 . 114 

12. Proposed Operations HABICHT, PANTHER, ZITADELLE, March- April 1943 125 

13. Operation ZITADt:LLE and the H'ithdrawal to the HAGEN Position, 5 July18 August 1943 . 134 

14. The Fourth Battle of Kharko\', 3- 27 August 19'f3 . 150 

15. The Soviet Advance to the Dnepr, 18 August-2 October 19+4. 155 

16. The Battle for the Dnepr Line. 2 October- 21 December 1943 . 176 

17. The Dnepr Bridgehead, 1 October-26 December 1943 . 190 

18. Breakthrough at Ne,'cl, 6 October 1943- 18 January 1944 . 198 

19. The Battle West of Kiev, 2+ December 1943- 31 January 1944 219 

20. Breakout From the Pocket Ncar Cherkassy, 16 Fcbruary 1944 . 230 

21. Thc Nikopol Bridgchead and Krivoi Rog, 10 J anuary- 29 February 1944 239 

22. Dubno-Lutsk-Kovel', 6 J anuar),- I March 19+4 . 245 

23. Army Group North. 14 January-31 March 1944 . 252 

24. The Soviet Spring OfTensi"e, + March- 15 April 19+4 . 274 

25. The Crimea, 8 April- 13 May 19H . 292 

26. The Soviet Summer OO'ensivc Against Finl and, June- July J9·H 297 

27. The Battle for Belorussia, 22 June- IS July 1944, 317 

28. Army Group North Ukraine and the Ninth Army, 14 July- IS September 

1944. 331 

29. The North Flank of Army Group Center and Army Group North, 18 

July-3 1 August 1944 334 

30. Army Group South Ukraine. 19 August- 26 September 1944 , 347 

31. Army Group South, 5-29 OClOber 1944 , 36 1 

32. The Southeastern Theater, September J 9 .. 14- January 1945 . 366 

33. Army Group South, 29 October- 3D December 194+ . 379 

:14. The German Withdrawal From Finl and. 6 September 1944- 30 January 

1945 . 392 

35. The Soviet Offensive Against XIX Mountain Corps. 7- 28 October 1944 398 

36. Army Group North Retreat to Courland. 14 Septcmber-23 October 1944 402 

x 
No. 

37. The January 1945 OfTensive Against Army Groups A (Center) and 

Center (North) . 

38. The Budapest Relief Operation, 1- 26 J anuary 1945 

39. The Soviet OfTensi,·e Falters. 4-2+ February 1945 

40. The Vienna OfTcnsi,·e, March- April 19+5 . 

41. Closing In, 24 February-3D M arch 19+5 . 

42. Berlin, 16 April-7 May 19+5 . 

Note. \"'here solid-line boxes appear on a map. they denote Soviet 

where broken-line boxes appear, they denote Gennan units. 

units; 

Illustrations 

A Rus:-:.ian Highway. 

Adolf llitler Conferring with CClleralfcldmarscha ll \\'ilhelm Keitel and 

Ccm'ralobcr~l \V:dtef von Br uchit ~c h 

Street Sce nl' in Voronezh 

Soviet T3-1- Tank. 

Page 

415 

43·f 

44 1 

45 1 

458 

'f68 

7 

II 

19 

27 

Soviet PO\V\ after thl' Battlc of Kharko\' 35 

Germane; Advancing' Toward Stalin~rad -10 

Bridgi ng an Ann of the Don. +2 

Stalingrad in Flame, . 43 

Thl" Swastika On'r Rl'd Square, Slalingrad . ·1-5 

Gcrlllam Amid the R.uim of Swlingrad . +7 

Gcncralfcldmarschall j\'[aximiiian ,'on \Vcichs, General cler Pa nzertruppen 

Friedrich Paulus, and General def Artillcric \Va ltc r ,-on Seydlitz.Kurzbae h 60 

Dcva ... tation Along a Railroad 77 

\\'reekl'd Gl'rman Equipment. 80 

Genl'ral Lcytcnant Nik ita S. Kh rushehc,' and General Armii Rodion l. 

~1 inovskiy 87 

.\Ioullh·d Sovin Troop" Pas ... \\'rl'ek{'d Gl'rm:11l Ailcraft 88 

(:l'nn:H1'" Attacking South :",,lear tile MillS Line. 89 

Gl'lwlalfcldlllarsehall Fritz Erich \'on .\1an .. tl'in ;md Ilitll'f . 91 

SO\ il't (;un Emplacellll'nt :\'l'ar RAll'\ 100 

Pani .. alh in the Bryamk Fon'sl . 10-1-

SO\'il'1 T .. II1h.... Appro,H:h Vl'likiyl' Luki 107 

:vl.ar .. hal Carl .\1antll'rlwilll 108 

Gl'rlllan .. Chl'cking- Tl'iLophonc Lint'. Northern Front. 112 

Russian E'<lcut'('S on the Road . 116 

GeneralohlT,>t \\'aher .\I.odcl and Ct'nnal dn InLlI1tcril' Karl lI ollidt 139 

SO"iet .\ntiaircraft Gun Firin14 Near On'l 

SO\'iet Troops Nearing Orcl . 

SO\"iet Troops Storm :1 Btlrnin~ Town. 

Gnlll:H1 Sdf·Prop('lkd A .. ",ault Gun 

SO\'it'l 'rroops Boardillg a Raft on a Branch of thl' Dnl'pr 

XI 

1·10 

153 

158 

161 

172 
Ukrainian Evacuees. 

The Dnepr Below Kiev. 

Soviet Artillery Near Kiev. 

Generals Armii Ivan S. Konev and Georgi K. Zhukov 

Soviet Troops Crossing the Dnepr . 

Kiev Casualty . 

Panje Wagon in the Pripyat Marshes 

A German Soldier Surrenders . 

A Mounted Cossack . 

Soviet Assault Gun, 1943 . 

Wreckage.Strewn Path of German Breakout, Chcrkassy . 

Soviet Rocket Fire Near Dzhurzhentsy . 

Searching for Mines Outside Tsarskoye Selo Palace 

Civilians in Leningrad After the Siege 

Narva 

Soviet Ski Troops 

Soviet Cavalry in Action 

Typical Terrain Along the Dnepr 

Bridge on the Dncstr 

Sevastopol Harbor 

Soviet Troops on Sapun Heights 

A Partisan in Action. 

Russian Peasant Family 

Soviet Motorcycle Troops . 

A Russian Woman Attacks a German Prisoner. 

Soviet Machine Glin Crew 

German Prisoners of War in Moscow . 

Immobilized German Tank 

Soviet Submachinc Gunner Attacking. 

Soviet Tanks . 

Tito \'Vith Partisan Leaders 

Yugoslav Partisans 

German Out post in Finland 

German Troops With Reindeer and Sleds 

Soviet Troops in American-Built Trucks. 

Soviet Planes on a Mission 

Soviet Infantrymen Approach a Disabled German Tank. 

Soviet and U.S. Troops, Torgau . 

German Troops Clogging a Road 

The Reiehstag . 

The Chancellory . 

German Prisoner of War Camp . 

Gencraloberst Alfred Jodi Arriving at Reims 

Generalfeldmarschall Keitel Signing the Surrender Terms 

XII 

Pag. 

173 

175 

178 

182 

183 

185 

194 

201 

202 

229 

236 

237 

254 

255 

260 

263 

266 

283 

290 

294 

295 

305 

306 

320 

322 

327 

330 

338 

354 

357 

368 

376 

393 

397 

408 

417 

443 

482 

486 

489 

494 

495 

497 

499 
ST ALINGRAD TO BERLIN: 

THE GERMAN DEFEAT IN THE EAST 

CHAPTER I 

Invasion! 

As the war passed into its fourth year in 

early September '942, Adolf Hitler, the 

German Fuehrer, Commander in Chief of 

the German Armed Forces and Commander 

in Chief of the German Army. was totally 

absorbed in his second summer campaign 

against the Soviet Union. 1 For the last 

month and a half he had directed operations on the southern flank of the German 

Eastern Front from a Fuehrer headquarters, 

the \VERWOLF, ~ct lip in a small forest half 

a dozen miles northeast of Vinnit~a in the 

Ukraine. With him, in the closely guarded 

headquarters community he rarely left, one 

of plcasantlv laid out prefabs and concrete 

structures, he had his personal staff, through 

which he exercised the political executive 

authority in Germany and the occupied territories; the chief of the Armed Forcc5 

Hi p:h Command (Obnkom1ll"ndo de,. 

lV"hrmachl ( OKW )) . Gencralfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel; and a field detachment of the Armed Forces Operations StafT 

( IV,·/mn{[chl/ne/mmgsstab ( WFSt )) under its chief, Gencraloberst Alfred JodI. In 

Vinnitsa, a hot, dusty provin cial taWil , the 

Arnw High Command (Oberkomm{[ndo 

des Il eaes (OKH )) , had established its 

headq uarters under the Chief of Staff, 

OKH, Generaloberst Franz Halder.' 

Through it Hitler commanded the army 

1 As the Fuehrer, Hiller exercised the combined 

fun ctions of President, Chancellor. and head of Ihe 

National Socialist Party. 

~ Helmuth Greiner. Die oberste Wehrma chtfueh,.-

/In .I!.19.19 '943 (Wcishadcn. 1951 ), P·197· 

groups and armies in the Soviet Union. 

During the summer German Army 

g rou ps A and B had made spectacular 

advances to the Volga at.Stalingrad and 

into the western Caucasus. In August 

mountain troops had planted the German 

lIag at the top of Mount Elbrus, the highcst peak in the Caucasus. But before the 

month ended, the offensive had begun to 

show signs of becoming engulfed in the 

yast arid expanses of southern USSR withoul attaining any of its strategic objectives; 

namely, the final Soviet defeat, the capture 

of the Caucasus and Caspian oil fields, and 

the opening of a route of debouehment 

across the Caucasus into the Middle East. 

Hitler had become peevish :-tnd depressed. 

At the situation conferences his specific 

objections to how the offensive was being 

conducted almost invariably led on to 

angry questioning of the ability of the generals and their understanding of the fundamentals of military operations.:: 

On the afternoon of 9 September, after 

it particularly \'ituperativc outburst the day 

before against Generalfeldmarsehall Wilhelm List. whom he had repeatedly accused 

m'el' the past weeks of not following orders 

and of not properly deploving his troops, 

Hitler sent Keitel to Vinnitsa to tell Halder 

that Li!'t should submit his resignation as 

3 Franz Halder, Kriegstagebllch des Ceneraloberstw Franz Halder ( hereafter cited as Halder 

Diary ), \'01. VII, 23 Jul, 22, 29, 30 Aug, 8 Sep 

4- 2. trans!. OCMH files. 
4 

Commanding General, Army Group A. 

Hitler intended to take command of the 

Army group in person. To Halder, Keitel 

" hinted" that changes in other high posts 

were in the offing, including Halder's own:' 

[n fact, Hitler had already decided to dismiss Halder, who. he claimed, was "no 

longer equal to the psychic demands of his 

position." He also considered getting rid of 

his closest military adviser, Jodi, who had 

made the mistake of supporting List.' 

Germany in August '94 2 was at the peak 

of its World War II military expansion. It 

held Europe from the Pyrenees to the Caucasus, from Crete to the North Cape, and 

Panzer Army Africa h ad pu shed into 

Egypt. During the summer's fighting in 

soulhern USSR mistakes-for which Hitler 

was trying to give the generals all the blame 

- had been maclc, but these mistakes alone 

were not enough to account for the massive 

frustration that was being fclt. Il was rooted 

in a morc fundamental miscalculation. 

In the dirccti\"c for th e 1 ~)42 offensive 

Hitl er had e>tablished as the paramount objective, " ... the final destruction of the Soviet Union's remaining human defensive 

strength." 6 He had assumed that the Soviet 

Union would !'acrifi cc it~ la ~t manpower 

re::crvcs to defend the oil fields and, losing 

both , would be brought to its knees. Thal 

had not happened. In late August the Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, had undertaken to assess the Soviet ;;;ituation as it 

would exist at the close o f the German 

ofTen, i,·e. It had concluded that lhe Soviet 

objec th"C!" were LO limit the loss of territory 

a~ much <1<'; pos.<;; ible during the summer, at 

, I bid .. 9 SCI' 42. 

~ Greiner. Die oberst e Wehrma chtfuehfllllg. 

19 '~ 3. p. 409· 

' Der Fu ehrer fwd Oberste Befehlshaber der 

Wehrmacht. OKW, WFSt Nr. 556 , 6/ 42, Weisung 

4' .54 .42 . OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the same time preserving enough manpower 

and materiel to stage a second winter offensive. It had assumed that the Soviet 

command had resigned itself before the 

start of the German offensive to losing the 

North Caucasus and Stalingrad, possibly 

also Leningrad and Moscow and that consequently the territorial losses sustained, 

though severe, had not been unexpectedly 

so. Moreover, the Soviet casualties had 

fallen considerably below what might have 

been anticipated on the basis of the German 

' 94 ' offensive. In sum, the Eastern Intelligence Branch had judged that the Soviet 

losses were "on an order leaving combat 

worthy forces available for the future" and 

that the German losses were "not insignificant."7 

The German Command 

On 24 September '942 General der 

[nfanterie Kurt Ze-itzicr replaced Halder as 

Chief of Staff, OKH. In his farewell remarks to Halder, delivered in private after 

that day's situation conference, Hitler said 

that Halder's nerves were worn out and 

that his own wcre no longer fresh; therefore, they ought to part. He added that it 

was now necessary to educate the General 

Staff in "fanatical faith in the Idea" and 

that he was determined to enforce his will 

"also" on the Army, implying thereby -

and bv his lights no doubt with some justification - that under Halders stewardship 

the Armv had clung too stubbornly to the 

... hrcds of its independence from politics and 

to its traditional command principles.s 

Zeitzler's appointment surprised everyone, 

fO KH , GenStdH, Fremde Heere Ost (I) Nr. 

2492 / 42 , Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der 

Feindlage im Herbst lind Wi,ller, 29.8-42, H 3/ 190 

file . 

• l-la lder Diary. vnl. V1J . 24 Sep 4'2 . 
INVASION! 

including himself" He was a competent, 

but not supremely outstanding, staff officer. 

As Chief of Staff, Army Group D, defending the Low Countries and the Channel 

coast, his energy and his rotund figure had 

earned him the nickname uGeneral Fireball. " In one of the long evening monologues that have been recorded as table 

talk, Hitler, in June 1942, had remarked 

that Holland would be a " tough nut" for 

the enemy because Zeitzler "buzzes back 

and forth there like a hornet and so prevents 

the troops from falling asleep from lack of 

contact with the enemy." 10 Apparently, 

Hitler had decided that he preferred a high 

level of physical activity in the Chief of 

Staff to the, as he saw it, barren intellectualism of Halder and his like among the 

generals. 

The Ei'o/ll/lOn 0/ the Command 

The dismissa l of Halder and Zeitzler's 

appointment as Chief of Staff, OKH, 

marked another stage in an enforced evolution that Hitler had imposed on the German command structure since early I 9Jl8. 

At that time, also to an accompaniment of 

dismissals in the highest ranks, he had abolished the War Ministry and personally 

assumed the title and fun ctions of Commander in Chief of the German Armed 

Forces. To take care of routine affairs and 

to provide himself with a personal staff as 

Commander in Chief, he had created the 

Armed Forces High Command and placed 

Keitel at its head with the title Chief, 

OK'V. As the country moved toward and 

into the war 1 th e Armed orce~ OperaU Kriegsfngebuch des Obelkommandos der Wehrmacht (li'ehrmachtfuehrung.sstab), Balld lIt. Andreas Hillgrubcr, cd., p. 707. 

10 Henry Pickert, cd., Hitlers T ischgespraeche 

( Bonn. 1951), p. 166. 

5 

tions Staff, one of the sections within the 

OKW, under its capable chief, Jodi, would 

assume staff and planning functions paralleling and often competing with those of 

the service staffs. Seeking a more pliant top 

leadership in the Army High Command, 

Hitler had at the same time appointed Gener aloberst (later Generalfc1dmarsehaU ) 

Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander in 

Chief, Army, and Halder, Chief of Staff, 

OKH. As Chief of Staff, OKH, Halder 

also headed the most exclusive and influential group within the Army, the Arrny 

General Staff. 

Very early in the war Hitler had revealed 

that he was going to take an active part in 

directing military operations. His formal 

instrument for exercising control was the 

Fuehrer directive, which laid down the 

strateg), and set objectives for a given operation or a major part of a continuing 

operation, At least in the early years, it 

usually embodied the thinking of the staffs 

as approved or amended bv Hitler. The 

Fuehrer directives were isslied through the 

Operations Staff, OKW, which gave that 

organ ization a voice in all crucial, highlevel ec ~io s even though it did not bear 

direct eornmand responsibility. 

The invasion of Norway and Denmark 

in April J 040 had introduced new planning 

and command procedures and had set preccdents that wcre to be followed on a larger 

scale in the future. The Operations Staff. 

OK\\" uncler Hitler, had th en assumed 

direct planning and operational control, 

and the service commands had only supplied troops, equipment, and support. That 

change in the long run affected the Armv 

most becau~e land operations cou ld be more 

easily parceled out among the commands 

and because neither Hitler nor Jodi and 

th e Operations Staff, OKW, were com pe-
6 

tent to handle the technical aspects of air 

or naval operations and were therefore in· 

clined to leave them to the appropriate 

service staffs. By the summer of J 94 J the 

OKW commanded-usually through theater commanders- in Norway, the "",'est 

(France and the Low Countries), the Balkans, and North Africa. The OKH bore 

command responsibility for the Eastern 

Front ( USSR ) only and not for the forces 

in northern Finland or for liaison with the 

Finnish Army, both of the latter being included within the OKW's Northern Theater. 11 

TIU' Plan/or In ll(Jsion 

By the time the campaign against the 

Soviet Union came under consideration in 

the late summer of 1 Q40, Hitler and the 

German Army had three brilliant victories 

behind them-Poland, Norway and Denmark, and France. The German Army appeared in\'incibk, and even to the skeptics 

Hitler had begun to look like an authentic 

military genius. In that atmosphere there 

prohably was morc fundamental unanimity 

in the upper rcaches of the German command than at any other tirnc, either before 

or later. 

The main problems associated with an 

operation in the Soviet Union appeared to 

he geographical, and they were obvious, if 

not neressarily simple, of solution. One such 

was the climate, which was markedly continental with short, hot summers, long, extremely cold winters, and an astonishing 

uniformity from north to south , considering thc country 's great expanse. The climatc, unless thc Germans wanted to risk a 

" Fritz Freibe rr von Sic~lcr , Die H oeherell Dienststellrll fler Dellt ~c hell Wrhrmncht. 1933- 1945 ( Munich. 1951). p . 10, 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

long, drawn-out war or a winter campaign 

for which the vVehrmacht was not trained 

or equipped, imposed on them a req uirement for finishing off the Soviet Union in 

a si ngle summer offensive of not more than 

five months' duration. Consequently, in the 

\'cry earliest planning stage, at the end of 

July ")40, Hitler had put ofT the invasion 

until the following summer. l

:! The ras/JItlils), (literally, traflic stoppages) brought 

on hy the spring thaw and the fall rains, 

which turned the Soviet roads into impassable quagmires for periods of several weeks, 

imposed additional limitations on the timlIlg, 

The paramount problem was the one 

which had also confronted earlier invaders, 

how to accomplish a military victory in the 

\'astncss of the Rus!'; ian spacc. Apart from 

lhe Pripyat Ma"hes and ,everal of the 

large rivcrs, the terrain in European USSR 

did not offer notable impediments to the 

movement of modern military forces. But 

maintaining concentration of forces and 

supplyin g armies in the depths of the country presented staggering, potentially C\'en 

crippling, clifTi culties. The whole of the 

Soviet Union had only!} I ,000 miles of railroads, all broader gauged than those in 

German~' and eastern Europe. Of a theQI'ctical 8.'10,000 miles of roads, 700,000 

were no morc than cart tracks; 1:'0,000 

mile", were allegedly all-weather roads, but 

only 40,000 miles of those were hard surf aced. 13 

Hitler and the generals agreed that the 

"-olution wac.; to trap and destroy the main 

Soviet forces ncar the fromin. rn Decemher J Q40, howc"cr, when thc strategic plan 

was heing cast into the form of a Fuehrer 

1~ Halder Diary. \'01. IV, :)1 Jul 40. 

13 Georges J orre. The Souiet Ul1io'l (London. 

196[ ). pp. [1\:1-114. [92. 
INVASION! 7 

A RUSSIAN HIGHWAY 

directive, the generals disagreed with Hitlrr 

on how to go from that to the next stage, 

the final Soviet defeat. Halder and Brauchitsch proposed to concentrate on the ad-

\"anec toward Moscow. In that direction the 

roads were the best, and they believed the 

Soviet Union could be forced to commit its 

last strength to defend the capital, which 

was also the most important industrial complex and hub of the country's road and 

railroad networks. Hitler, however, was not 

convinced that the war could be decided at 

Mo!')cow, and he had his way. Fuehrer Directive 2 I for Operation BARBAROSSA, the 

invasion of the Soviet Union, when it was 

issued on ,8 December '940, provided for 

si multaneous advances toward Leningrad, 

?\1oscow, and Kiev and for a possible halt 

and diversion of forces from the Moscow 

thrust to aid the advance toward Leningrad. For the moment, the difference of 

opinion on strategy cast only the slightest 

shadow on the prevailing mood of optimism. Staff studies showed that the Soviet 

Union would be defeated in eight weeks, 

tcn weeks at most. 14 

The Army operation order for BARBAROSSA was issued in early February '94' , 

and the build-up on the eastern frontier began shortly thereafter, gradually at first. 

(Map I ) The OKH assigned '49 diyisians, including 19 panzer (armored ) divisions, to the operation. The total strength 

11 DA Pamphlet 20-'26Ia, The German Campaign in Russia Planning and Operations. 1940-

1942 ( Washington, 1955 ), pp. 17-25. 
/ \ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

MAP I 

o 

2 ] 

THE 1941 CAMPAIGN AND THE 

SOVIET WINTER OFFENSIVE 

o GEII~.N ,1.1.'0 FINN.S ... CONCUIHI4TtOHS 

UIoIIT OF GERMAN ,o\OYUICE,19., 

GROUtiO REGAINED, RlISSjA~ AOYANCE, 

WINTER IH'-".i! 
INVASION! 

was 3,05°,000 men. Army of Norway was 

to deploy another 4 divisions, 67,000 troops, 

in northern Finland. The Finnish Army 

eventually added another 500,000 mcn in 

14 divisions and 3 brigades, and Rumania 

furnished 14 infantry divisions and 3 brigades, all of them understrength, about 

150,000 men. The BARBARossA force initially had 3,350 tanks, 7, I 84 artillery 

pieces, 600,000 motor vehicles, and 

62 5,000 horses. Hs 

The most significant assets of the German 

Army on the eve of the Russian campaign 

were its skill and experience in conducting 

mobile warf arc. The panzer corps, employed with great success in the French 

campaign of '940, had been succeeded by 

a larger mobile unit, the panzer group. 

Four of these werc to spearhead the advance into the Soviet Union. The panzer 

groups were in fact powerful armored 

armies, but until latc 1941, conservatism 

among some senior generals prevented them 

from getting the status of full-fledged 

armies. 

Seven conventional armies and four panzer groups were assigned to three army 

groups, each responsible for operations in 

one of the main strategic directions. Army 

Group North, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm von Lceb, was to attack 

out of East Prussia, through the Baltic 

States toward Leningrad. Army Group 

Center, under Generalfeldmarschall Fedor 

von Bock, assembled on the frontier east of 

vVarsaw for a thrust via Minsk and Smol~ Throughout the war, the German and Soviet 

forces used horses extensively for moving supplies 

and artillery and, on the Soviet side , in cavalry 

units. The horses were a means of conserving 

gasoline and rubber, did not require complicated 

and expensive maintenance, and under the Soviet 

road conditions were frequently morc reliable than 

mntor vehicles. 

9 

lensk toward Moscow. Army Group South, 

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt 

commanding, was responsible for the sector 

between the Pripyat Marshes and the Black 

Sea and was to attack toward Kiev and the 

line of the Dnepr River. The Finnish Army, 

operating independently under its own 

Commander in Chief, Marshal Carl Mannerheim, was to attack south on both sides 

of Lake Ladoga to increase the pressure on 

the Soviet forces defending Leningrad and 

so facilitate Army Group North's advance. 

An Army of Norway force of two German 

and one Finnish corps, under OK'''' control, was given the mission of attacking out 

of northern Finland toward Murmansk and 

the Murmansk (Kirov ) Railroad. The 

Rumanian forces, Third and Fourth 

Armies, attached to Army Group South, 

had the very limited initial mission of assisting in the conquest of Bessarabia. 

The German Air Force High Command 

(ObeTkommando deT Luftwaffe (OKL)), 

assigned to BARBAROSSA ~omc 2,770 aircraft out of a total Air Force first-line 

strength of 4,300. Planes for the inva,ion of 

the Soviet Union were nearly 700 fewer 

than the number used in the much smaller 

French campaign; and the Air Force was, 

in the first five months of '94', almost 

totally committed against Great Britain and 

would have to continue so on a reduced 

scale after BARBARossA began. Because of 

the strain the fighting in two widely separated theaters would impose on his resources and organization, the Commander 

in Chief, Air Force, Reichsmarschall Herman Goering, had strongly opposed the 

operation against the Soviet Union. The 

campaign in the Balkans in the spring of 

'94 I added a further complication, as it 

also did for some of the ground forces. 

Because of the danger of giving the op-
10 

eration away by a sudden drop in the intensity of the attacks against Great Britain, 

the flying units could not be shifted cast 

until the latest possible moment and then 

only after an elaborate radio deception had 

been arranged to give the impression that 

they were being redeployed for an invasion 

of England. In spite of that and the other 

problems, however, the German Air Force 

looked forward to the campaign with confidence. It had the advantage of first-rate 

equipment, combat experience, and SUfpn~e . 

The air units deployed on the eastern 

frontier, between the Baltic and the Black 

Sea, were organized as First Air Force, supporting Army Group North ; Second Air 

Force, supporting Army Group Center; and 

Fourth Air Force, supporting Army Group 

South.

IG Fifth Air Force, its main mission 

the air defense of Norway, was to give modest support to the Army of Norway and 

Finnish Army forces operating out of Finland. In accordance with standard German 

practice, the relationship between the air 

forces and the army groups was strictly 

limited to co-operation and co-ordination. 

The German Navy's first concern in BARBAROS SA was to be maintaining control of 

the Baltic Sea. It had additional limited 

missions in the Arctic Ocean and the Black 

Sea, both of which the Navy High Command, (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine 

(OKM ) ), believed could not be executed 

until after the air and land operations had 

eliminated the Soviet naval su periority.17 

The Navy was also heavil y engaged in operations against Great Britain, and the 

18 Air Ministry (British ) Pamphlet 248, The Rise 

and Fall of the German Air Force (London, 1948 ), 

pp. 162-66. 

17 Earl F. Ziemke, The Germa1! Northern Theater 

of Operation s, DA Pamphlet 20- 271 (Washington. 

1959 ), p. '131. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Commander in Chief Navy, Grossadmiral 

Erich Raeder, like Goering, would rather 

have avoided further commitments. 

Barbarossa 

When Operation BARBARossA began on 

22 June 1941, the military and political 

centers of gravity in Germany moved from 

Berlin to the forests of East Prussia. There, 

beside the railroad running cast from Rastenburg, an elaborate Fuehrer headquarters, the WOLFSSCHANZE (Wolf's Lair), of 

painstakingly camouflaged concrete bunkers 

protected by rings of steel fences, palisades, 

and earthworks, had been constructed. In 

one closely guarded compound Hitler lived 

and worked with his intimate military and 

political advisers; another a short distance 

away housed the Operations Staff, OKW, 

and the communications center. The OKH 

was located just outside Rastenburg, a half 

hour away by rail. The railroad was closed 

to all traffic cast of Rastenburg except that 

between the OKH headquarters and the 

\VOLF SSC HANZF. and the courier trains that 

shuttled back and forth to Berlin. " 

From the outset Hitler demonstrated that 

he did not mean to let the conduct of operations rest entirely in the hands of the professionals. During the first weeks his interferen ce took the form mostly of nervous 

meddling and random attempts to impose 

on the battlefield tactical conceptions that 

occurred to him in his remote position. 

Halder, possibly with morc trenchant insight than he realized, characterized Hitler's behavior as symptomatic of a lack of 

confiden ce in the executi\'e commands and 

18 Percy ErnSl Schramm, cd., Kriegstagebu ch de s 

Oberkommandos der Wehrma cht ( Wehrm achtfuehrlln!!,utab) ( Frankfurt a. M .. 1961 ), Band IV". 

1752-53. 
INVASION! 11 

HITLER CONFERRING WITH K EITEL AND VON BRAUCHITSCH near Fuehrer Headquarters, Eastern Front. 

a failure to grasp the essential feature of 

the German command system- its reliance 

on training in a common body of doctrine 

to make each command level capable of 

performing its functions with a minimum of 

interference from above. HI Unfortunately 

for the German Army, Brauchitsch was no 

longer, if indeed he ever had been, the man 

to defend this principle. Conscious that he 

was both used and despised by Hitler, he 

vacillated futilely between complete subservience to the Fuehrer and the urgings of 

his professional conscience and most often 

ended by trying to suppress the latter with 

the excuse that he could not oppose his 

commander in chief. 

In the field the invasion forged ahead 

lJ Halder Diary, vol. VI, 3 Jul41. 

more rapidly even than the staff and command post exercises had forecast. Before the 

end of the second week it appeared that the 

first-phase objective, destruction of the 

Soviet Army main force close to the western 

frontier, had been accomplished. In twin 

pockets at Bialystok and Minsk, Army 

Group Center estimated that it had taken 

over 3 00,000 prisoners. After a comparatively slow start by Army Group South, all 

three German army groups were advancing 

at high speed. By mid-July, Army Groups 

North and Center reached and crossed the 

Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, the easternmost 

lines on which, according to German calculations, the Russians could defend their 

chief industrial areas. Army Group Center 

was completing another vast encirclement 

near Smalcnsk, and Army Group South 
12 

had begun a gigantic enveloping operation 

in the Ukraine west of the Dnepr. 

Halder even looked forward hope! ully to 

the time when the front would become so 

fluid that the battles would outrun Hitler's 

capability as a tactician. That was not going to happen. In fact, Hitler had arrived 

at the stage where he was prepared to free 

himself entirely from professional tutelage. 

On 19 July 1941 he completed a directive 

about which the OKH had not been consulted at all and which, although it was 

initialed by Jodi and Keitel, apparently did 

not reflect any significant consultation with 

the Operations Staff, OKW. In it Hitler 

reaffirmed his conviction that Moscow was 

not the primary strategic objective. He directed that in the next phase Army Group 

Center, the strongest of the three army 

groups in the Soviet Union, was to continue 

toward Moscow with its infantry alone and 

was to divert its armor to help Army Group 

North toward Leningrad and Army Group 

South in the conquest of the Ukraine." 

In effect the advance on Moscow was to 

be stopped. He had revealed that intention 

in the original BARBAROSSA directive, but 

the generals had assumed that the logic of 

events, particularly- after the invasion began- the indications that the Russians were 

massing their main forces in front of Moscow, would force him to change his mind. 

In the ensuing month Halder and Brauchitsch marshaled all the arguments they 

could and enlisted backing from Jodi and 

two of the army group commanders to help 

oppose the strategic change. Hitler from 

time to time showed signs of attempting to 

form a decision based on the realities of the 

~ituat on and at one point revised hi~ di-

:J'I Der Fuehrer und Oberste Be/ehlshaber der 

Wehrmach t, WFSt. Abt. L (J Op .) Nr. 441730 / 

41. WeisuTZJ;!' Nr. 33. 7.'].7.41. OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

rective. But in the directive as issued on 

2 I August, he stated, "The proposals of the 

OKH for the continuance of the operation 

in the East do not conform with my intentions," and ordered that Moscow was not 

to be considered the principal objective but 

was to be ranked after the Crimea and the 

Ukrainian coal fields in the south and Leningrad in the north. 

Two small incidents revealed how far the 

OKH had lost ground. Hitler, also on 21 

August, accused Brauchitsch of having 

failed all along to conduct the offensive on 

the lines he, the Fuehrer, desired. Three 

days later Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, 

who would have to execute the maneuver 

and who claimed that turning the armor 

south from Army Group Center was impossible, was called in to make a last-ditch 

attempt to dissuade Hitler. In the Fuehrer's 

presence he reversed himself completely, 

later lamely explained that confronted with 

the Fuehrer's resolve he had had lito make 

the impossible possible."21 

By 6 September Hitler, concluding that 

the army groups on the flanks had been 

helped enough, decided to renew the Army 

Group Center advance toward Moscow. 

Army Group North in the meantime had 

closed up to Leningrad on th e south but 

had yet to complete the encirclement on 

the east by joining hands with the Finns. 

Hitler had decided literally to starve the 

city out of existence. Army Group South, 

reinforced by Guderian's tanks, was completing an enormous encirclement east of 

Kiev but still had long distances to go to 

take the Doncts Basin and the Crimea . Hitler ordered both army groups to complete 

the operations with their own resources and 

~I Halder Diary. \'01. VI. 23-:P Jul 41 ; v01. VII , 

1 24 AlI~. 41 . 
INVASION! 

return the units they had received from 

Army Group Center." 

Army Group Center jumped off on 2 

October and within a week had broken 

open the Soviet front west of Moscow and 

formed two massive encirclements. The victory then appeared so near that the OKW 

canceled the expeditions out of northern 

Finland aimed at cutting the Murmansk 

Railroad, the supply line for outside aid to 

the Soviet Union." Then, at the end of the 

first week in October, in the Army Group 

Center and Army Group North areas, it 

began to rain. Relentlessly, through the rest 

of the month and into early November, 

rain, snow, and alternate freezing and 

thawing turned the roads into oozing ribbons of mud. Betwee_n 2 and 10 October 

Army Group Center's armies gained 30 

miles a day. In the next twenty days their 

advance fell off to 2 to 5 miles a day; in the 

first two weeks of November they remained 

practically at a standstill on the line KalininTula, 54 miles west of Moscow. 

In mid-November, after several cold, 

bright days, Army Group Center began to 

roll again. From the first it was apparent 

that the army group was not the fighting 

machine it had been. After five months' 

combat the troops were tired, and, if not 

discouraged, the troops and command both 

were becoming uneasy over the offensive 

that dragged on without a satisfactory end 

in sight. The equipment was showing wear 

and supplies and parts now had to come 

over long and unreliable lines. Losses in the 

campaign were approaching three-quarters 

of a million, no more than half of them 

replaced. Infantry companies were down to 

2! Der Fuehrer und Oberste Be/ehlshaber deT 

WehTmacht . OKW, WFSt, Abt. L (lOp.) NT. 

441492 / 41, Weisung NT. 35, G.9.4I, OCMH files. 

~ Ibid" NT. 441 696/41 . We;slwg Nr. 37. 10. 

10-4' , OCMH files. 

13 

25 and 30 percent of authorized strengths; 

first lieutenants were commanding battalions.24 

At the beginning of the fourth week of 

the month Army Group Center had put its 

every man and weapon into the attack. The 

best hope was that the Russians had done 

the same." That they had not, began to 

become apparent at the end of the month 

when Soviet forces launched heavy counterattacks against Army Group South that 

forced the Germans to give up Rosto\" the 

gateway to the Caucasus. 

On 5 December Army Group Center, 

which had a spearhead on the north within 

sight of Moscow, reported that it was at the 

end of its strength ; it could go no farther.'" 

The next morning, in snow and fog and 

forty below zero temperature, the Russians 

counterattacked. 

Hitler in Command 

The month of December 1941 ended the 

three-and-one-q uarter years' string of German victories with a jolt that shook the 

German Army to its boot soles. Hardest hit 

in the long run was the Army command. 

Brauchitsch, who had had a heart attack 

in November, decided in early December to 

ask for retirement. By then he had been 

reduced to nothing more than a "messenger boy"; on important matters Hitler communicated directly with the army groups." 

On 19 December Hitler assumed the post 

of Commander in Chief, OKH, himself, 

and thereby wiped out the Army's last 

vestige of service independence. 

Ignoring his advisers, Hitler ordered the 

21DA Pamphlet 20- 26Ia, p. BS. 

~ Halder Diary, vol. VII , 18-22 Nov 41. 

:G lbid·.5 Dec 4 1• 

lbid .. 7 Dec 41. 
14 

field commands to stand fast and called for 

fanatical resistance by the troops. In fact, 

they had no other choice. No positions existed in the rear, and none could be built 

in ground frozen so hard that impacting 

heavy artillery shells chipped out craters 

only inches deep. No one had given thought 

to fighting in the Russian winter. Weapons 

not conditioned for severe cold jammed; 

and lack of winter clothing, antifreeze, and 

low-temperature lubricants immobilized 

both men and vehicles. Commanders who 

lacked the stamina or the stomach for fanatical resistance as Hitler conceived it were removed. Von Rundstedt, the senior field 

marshal, had been dismissed as Commanding General, Army Group South, in Hitler's first pique over the retreat from Rostov. In mid-December, von Bock relinquished command of Army Group Center, 

pleading illness. Later, von Lecb, whose 

Army Group North had been stopped and 

turned back at Tikhvin in an attempt to 

join hands with the Finns and then was 

caught up in the Soviet counteroffensive, 

asked to be relieved. Making examples of 

generals who ordered retreats, Hitler dismissed Guderian and Generaloberst Erich 

Hoeppner and deprived the latter of his 

rank and privileges, including the right to 

wear the uniform. 

Hitler's determination and repeated appeals to the troops for fanati cal resistance 

were not enough to prevent the expanding 

Soviet offensive from chopping deep into 

the front at numerous places in the Army 

Group Center and Army Group North seclOrs. At the turn of the year a breakthrough 

on the Army Group Center north flank and 

a deepening dent on its south flank brought 

the Germans to the astonished, horrified 

realization that the Russians were trying 

nothing e~" than to encircle the whole 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Army Group Center. On 15 January 1942, 

Hitler for the first time in the war ordered 

a major withdrawal. He authorized Army 

Group Center to take its front opposite 

Moscow back to a north-south line eightyfive miles west of the capital. That was not 

enough to escape the threatening encirclement; it only shortened the Army Group 

Center front somewhat and thus freed some 

troops for the flanks. The orders to stand 

and fight remained in full effect. 

From mid-January until well into February the crisis at the front deepened. Although Army Group Center regained some 

control on its south flank, it was for weeks 

nearly helpless against the thrust on the 

north and barely managed to keep open its 

lifeline, the road and railroad running east 

from Smolensk. Astride the Army Group 

North- Army Group Center boundarv the 

front was torn open on a 16o-mile stretch 

between Rzhev and Lake limen. At Demyansk, south of the lake, two German corps, 

100,000 men, were completely encircled 

and had to be supplied by air. 

After mid-February the Soviet offensive 

began to lose momentum and appeared no 

longer to have any other objective than to 

gain some additional ground and inflict 

random drunagc on the Germans. In the 

first week of the month Army Group Center had managed to anchor its north Aank 

around Rzhev, and in the second and third 

weeks fresh divisions from Germany began 

moving in from the west to narrow the gap 

to Army Group North. In March the gradual German recovery continued until the 

spring mud and floods brought operations 

on both sides to a temporary halt.:!8 

The winter crisis of 1941-41 gave Hitler a personal triumph: he had ordered his 

armies to stand, and they had stood. His 

:18 DA Pamphlet 20- 26Ia, pp. 101 - 07. 
INVASION! 

decision not to pc. mit a general retreat, 

some suggest, was made less on military 

grounds than out of a desperate necessity 

to protect his image dS an infallible leader; 

nevertheless, even his harshest critics later 

had to concede that the German armies, 

caught as they were without prepared positions to fall back on or even adequate winter equipment and clothing, might well 

have disintegrated if the command had 

conceded a necessity to rctreat. 29 Hitler not 

only did not lose but probably gained 

stature in the eyes of, at least, the rank and 

fil e. His confidence in his own military 

judgment was strengthened- this at a time 

when the terms on which the war was being fought were undergoing a drastic alteration. As a consequence, the German conduct of the rest of the war was dominated 

by a conflict between th e militarv professionals' principles, fl exibility and mobility, 

and Hitler's rigidity- between command 

initiative and blind execution of the Fuehrer's will. 

O peration Blau 

A Promise, Doubts, and a Plan 

On 15 March 1942 Hitler delivered a 

Memori al Day (H eldengedenklag ) address 

in Berlin . He promised that "Bolshevism" 

would be destroyed in the coming summer 

and th at " the Bolshevik Colossus" would 

not thereafter "again touch the sacred soil 

of Europe,"" Privately he and his confidants did not look to the future with assurance quite that strong, The Propaganda 

Minister, Joseph Goebbels, and Goering had 

:III Kurt von Tippelskirch, G~schi te des Zweiten 

Weltkrieges ( Bonn, 1956 ), pp. 20g. !l 15-

30 Max Domarus, ed., Hitler Reden und Proclamationen, 1932- 1945 (Neustadt a. d. Aisch, 1963), 

II, 1850. 

15 

nagging qualms, chiefly on the score of Soviet capabilities, Hitler talked to Goebbels 

about the coming campaign and declared 

that he intended only to take the Caucasus, 

Leningrad, and Moscow - one after the 

other and not simultaneously, He was determined whatever the circumstances, he 

said, to go into winter quarters in time. He 

blamed Brauchitsch, whom he described as 

"a nincompoop and a coward," for overextending in 1941 ,31 

On 26 April Hitler undertook to present 

an accounting to the Reichstag, Grandly, 

he cl aimed that in the days of crisis during 

the winter he had felt compelled to place 

his "own person at the forefront in meeting 

whatever Fate had in store," He thanked 

the soldiers, noncommissioned offi cers, and 

offi cers "up to those generals who, recognizing the danger, risked their own lives to 

urge the soldiers onward." The only oth er 

reference to the generals was that Hin a few 

individual cases, where nerves gave way, 

discipline broke down or insufficient sense 

of duty was displayed" he had found it necessary to intervene severely, He asked and 

was automatically granted sweeping authority to dismiss or demote any civil servant or offi cer as it suited him. That in effect 

swept away the remnants of administrative 

independence in th e German Government 

and the armed forces, Ominous as th is 

strengthening of the di ctatorship was, however, it attracted less attention than the 

almost offhand remark: "N ext winter, no 

matter where it fin ds us, will find us better 

prepared." 32 

The directive for the 1942 summer campaign, Operation BLA u, provided for a full, 

n Joseph Goebbels, T he Goebb els Diaries, edited 

and translated by Louis P. Lochner (New Yorl. , 

1948, pp. 129, 137. 142. 

!I:I Domarus, ed., Hit/et' Reden und Proclama. 

tionen. 1932- 45, II, 187 1- 74. 
r 

.=.. 

SllTUlilM C_" 

, 

j 

THE SITUATION I May and Ie November 1942 

MAP2 

FItG!!T LIII(,'''.Y 

Fila .. , LINt . I .... OV 

',0 ?>"'LU 

~ IbO _I\.O"E ![lIS 

A 

" A L .-><u' 

• "~IT ;1 •• L.._--, 

" " 

, .. ~ F A 

51 .. 

j

''' .. " 

... n" 
INVASION! 

scale offensive only on the south flank of 

the Eastern Front, toward the Don River, 

Stalin grad, and the Caucasus oil fields. 

(Map 2) Hitler was in complete command. Halder and his staff assistants had 

drafted the directive in accordance with 

Hitler's detailed instructions, and Hitler 

had then dictated the final version, revising and expanding as he went along. 

The advance into the Caucasus had the 

characteristics of an expedition, albeit a 

massive one. In fact it had been regarded 

as such when it was first considered in the 

late fall of 1941. In the directive for BLAU 

Hitler elevated it to the level of a strategic, 

decision-seeking, offensive.:"!:1 It wa~ to be 

executed in two stages. First, several sue· 

cessive enveloping thrustt.;, beginning on the 

north along the Kursk-Voronezh axis, were 

to smash the Soviet south flank and carry 

the front out to the Don River. After that 

the advance would proceed to Stalingrad 

and across the lower Don into the Caucasus. For the operation, Army Group South 

was to be split to form two army groups 

designated as A and B. Army Group B, to 

be under von Bock, who now found himself well enough to command, would open 

the attack on the north. Army Group A, 

under List, would start somewhat later and 

be primarily responsible for the thrust 

across the lower Don and into the Caucasus. 

In the regroupment Army Group B took 

command of Second, Fourth Panzer, and 

Sixth Armies, the first two detached from 

Army Group Center. Army Group A was 

assigned First Panzer, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Armies. For the first time in the 

East, the German aJlies, Italy, Hungary, 

33 Der Fuehrer und Oberste Be/ehlshabe r der 

Wehrmach t. OKW, WFSt NT. 55616142. WeisulIg 

41.5442, OCMH files. 

17 

and Rumania, took to the field in earnest, 

each providing an army. All three of the 

allied armies were deficient in equipment 

and training; and the Rumanians and 

Hungarians would much rather have 

fought each other than the Russians. But 

then, the allied armies were expected only 

to lend substance to Hitl er's claim that he 

wa.;; conducting a selfless "crusade against 

Bolshevism" and occasionally to provide 

cover on the German fl anks. 

Hitler's decision to limit the 194 2 campaign was not a free choice. After the strains 

and drains of the 1941 offensive and the 

winter battles just ended, even Operation 

BLAU as planned bore discernible marks of 

austerity. Of the liS to 67 divisions that 

were to participate in the ofl'ensi\'e, fulh' 

two-thirds had to be rebuilt and rehabilitated while committed at the front and only 

one-third were new or rebuilt behind the 

front. As of 1 May 1942 the infantry divisions were at r,o percent of their authorized strengths. They were brough t up to 

100 percent by the time the offensive started, but, as a consequence, the divisions of 

Army Groups Center and North would not 

attain more than 55 percent of authorized 

strengths before August 1942. The panzer 

divisions in the offensive would have three 

tank battalions apiece, but those of the 

other army groups only one. The spearhead divisions in BLAU would have 85 percent o f their organic motor veh icle allowances, but the other divisions would have 

far less. ArtiJlery, antitank, and antiaircraft 

weapons could be brought to authorized 

levels for the units in the offensive - in 

some instances only by reaching into stocks 

of captured eq uipment- but an ammunition drought had set in during the winter 

and was expected to continue through the 

autumn of 1942. 
18 

Only in the air did the German strength 

fully equal that of the '94' campaign. 

During the winter, the transfer of Second 

Air Force to the Mediterranean to participate in the attempted reduction of Malta 

and to support operations in North Africa 

had reduced air strength on the Eastern 

Front to ' ,700 planes. The necessity for 

flying supply missions to numerous cut-orr 

and encircled forces had further reduced 

the flying units' combat effectiveness. In 

the spring, in anticipation of the summer 

offensive, the air strength in the East had 

been raised to a total of 2,750 aircraft. 

Fourth Air Force on the southern sector of 

the front received by far the largest share 

- 1,500 plancs,:H 

The Campaign, 19J 2 

At dawn on 28 June Second Army and 

Fourth Panzer Army opened the offensive. 

They smashed through the Soviet front east 

of Kursk and pushed cast toward Voronezh, reaching the outskirts of the city in 

four days and taking it on 6 July. Fourth 

Panzer Army then turned southeast alonp; 

the Don to meet Sixth Army, whi ch had 

moved out east of Kharkov on ~o June. 

The German armies again held the upper 

hand; but the first two thrusts, to Voronezh and cast of Kharkov, which had been 

planned as great encirclements on the 1 !)4 I 

pattern, brought in less than 100,000 prisoners. Disappointcd, Hitler on ~ July replaced von Bock as Commanding General, 

Army Group B, with Generalfcldmarschall 

Maximilian von 'Veichs. 

Hitler had originally intended to execute 

a third encirclement inside the D on bend 

~I Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet 24fL RiSi' ond 

Foll n/ the Germol! Air Force. p. l iR. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

that would have cleared the entire line of 

the DOll before the offensive was carried 

toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. On 

l July he changed his mind and ordered 

Army Group A , to which he attached 

Fourth Panzer Army, to turn south, cross 

thc lower D on, and force the Russians into 

a pocket around Rostov. Rostov fell on 2:1 

July, without bringing in the expected large 

hag of prisoners. 

On that day Hitler issued the order that 

set the final stamp of failure on the summer offensive. He put the two army groups 

on courses that took them away from each 

other at a right angle, Army Group B going east toward Stalingrad, Army Group A 

going south past Rostov to the Caucasus. 

At the same time, he ordered Army Group 

A to give up the eadquarter~, all of the 

artill ery, and about half the divisions of 

Eleventh Arm y, which was then getting 

ready to join the army group main force 

after taking Se\"aslopol. Eleventh Arm y was 

to go north for an attempt to take Lenin-

~rad and thereby pave the way for a later 

German - Finnish thrust to cut the M urmansk Railroad. As he had at the same 

stage of the ID4 I offensive, Hitler was dispersing the German effort. 

Army Group A was on the thr" hold of 

the Caucasus, but the distances were tremendous, 200 miles to the .Maikop oil 

fields, nearly 400 to those at Grozny. To 

reach Baku and TiOis the mountains themselves had to be cro&sed. On 2() Julv the 

army group cut the last Soviet rail line 

into th e Caucasus. Two days later Hitler 

issued another directive. The Russians, he 

reasoned, could do nothing more about defending th e Caucasus, but they could be 

forced to expend their last reserves defending; Stalingrad and their lifeline, the Volp;a. 

He ordered Fourth Panzer Army to make 
INVASION! 19 

STREET SCENE IN VORONEZH 

a 1800 turn and advance on the city from 

the south. 

Through August and September the offensive continued-without attaining any of 

the major objectives. Army Croup A took 

Maikop but found the oil fields destroyed. 

Two panzer corps headed for Crazny but 

were slowed and finally stopped for several 

weeks by gasoline shortages. The trucks 

making the long trip from RostO\, were 

burning nearly as much gasoline as they 

cou ld haul. Spearheads pushed into the 

Caucasus, but the Russians continued to 

hold all the passes. Sixth Army and Fourth 

Panzer Army closed in on Stalingrad from 

Lhe west and south but had to spread their 

forces thin to cover their flanks and so 

lost momentum. 

The M nnpowet Squeeze 

On 8 September 1942 the Organizational Branch, OKH, reported, "All planning 

must take into account the unalterable fact 

that the predicted strength of the Army 

field forces as of 1 November 1942 will be 

800,000, or 18 percent, below estaLlished 

strength r approximately 3,200,000 land 

that it is no longer possible to reduce those 

numbers. 11 3:' 

~ As of the first week in September 1942 the 

German strength on the Eastern Front totaled 

2,490,000 men in 163 divisions, not including the 

Twentieth Mountain Army in northern Finland 

which had 6 divisions. The attached forces of Germany's allies, Ital y, Rumania, and Hungary totaled 

48 divisions (including one Spanish and ~ne 510· 

vakian division ) and 648,000 men. The Finnish 

.'\rmy, which operated independently, had some 17 
20 

It had already predicted that the best 

to be expected was that the available manpower reserves would cover the next winter's losses and prevent a further decline 

before the spring of 194 3."" " False impressions will result," the report continued, 

"if units continue to be carried as before 

with this great loss of strength ." The Organizational Branch proposed reducing better than half the divisions on the Eastern 

Front from three regiments to twO.

37 

The larger and far more diflieult problem was finding actual relief from the manpower squeeze. Since May 1942, General 

clef Infantcric Walter von Unruh, armed 

with the authority to order irrevocable 

transfers to the Eastern Front, had been 

combing the rear areas as Hitler's personal 

representative. Unruh, whose visits generally met with dismay if not terror and who 

earned the nickname "General Hcldcnklau" ( hero sn a tcher )) had succeeded in 

pa ring down some of the rear echelon 

staffs; but after three or four months it 

had become apparent th at the results, 

though worthwhile, would not be decisive." The Organizational Branch, OKH, 

in the fall of ,,)42 proposed to release some 

I Hu,ooo men from the rear echelons by 

lI in ~ Hilfswillige (army auxiliaries) recruited among the Rus~ ian prisoners of wa r 

to take over service and suppl y jobs behind 

the lin es and thought it might gain another 

d ivisions a nd hrigades, slightl y less th a n 4 00,000 

men. OKH , CenStdH . (III ) Nr. 4 20743; O KW . 

WFSI . Op. (H ). 2"9.42; OKH . G,nSldH . Op. 

Abt. (Ill) Pru ef N r. 75940, Z ahlen maessige Uebersicht ueber die V uteilun g d u Diuisionen, Stand 

11 .942 , H '2 '2 /235 fil e. 

a OKH , GenStdfl . Org. Abe. Kriegstagebuch . 

BrultJ IV . 10 Aug 4'2 , ]-11 /2 14 fil e. 

• 1r OKH , GellStdH. Org. Abt. Kriegstagebuch N r. 

922 / 42. O rga nisatorische Plallun ge n . 8.942 . H 22/ 

21.') fil e. 

· OKH, GenStdH . Org. AbL Kriegstagebu ch , 

Band IV . '21 - 1 ' Aug. 4'2, H 1/ '2 14 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

80,000-90,000 by tightening the tables of 

organization.:.m 

A potential source of relief for the Army's 

manpower problem was the Air Force, 

whIch had a sizable surplus. Tn September 

1942 Hitl er agreed to tap th at surplus, but 

a t Goering's insistence decided not to use 

the men as Army repl acements but to form 

Air Force field divisions manned and oflicered exclusivel y by Air Force personnel. 

In September and O ctober Hitler ordered 

twenty such divisions created with a combined !'itrength of about 200,000 men. 

From the Army point of view a more un-

!'iatisfactory arrangement would have been 

difficult to devise. The Air Force troops 

had no training- in land warfare and , becaU!'ie Goering restricted the Army's influence on them to the absolute minimum on 

th e g-round that the " reactiona ry" a ttitudes 

of the Army would impa ir his troops' 

National Socialist indoctrina tion, were not 

likel y to be given enough to make them 

anywhere near suitahl e for employment on 

the a~ rn Front. Worse yet, the Army 

had to scrape together enough new equipmenl to outfit th e twenty divisions, and the 

diversion of vehicles alone forced postponement of pl ~ to bring four or fi ve panzer 

d ivisions up to strength. 40 

One other promising palliative was the 

employment of larger numbers of heavy 

and automatic weapons. The Operations 

Branch, OKH, proposed to suppl y the 

front-line units with new and more efficient weapon!" as they became ava ilable 

\vith ollt withdrawing the older weapons 

and so wind lip with both more and better 

firepowcr.·

11 German y's newest and most 

.,11 Ib id .. 1- 10 Oct 4 ::'! . 

<u I bid .. 1- 10, '2 5 Oct 4'2. 

. , O KfI. Ge nS tdl-l . O p. Abt. (Ill) Nr. 34149 / 42. 

Pl nun~ fu er Ausbau d er H eerestruppen im Wint er 

1942 143.3.9-42 . H '2'2 / 235 file . 
INVASION! 

promising weapon, however, the Tiger 

tank, was slow getting into production. 

Tests of two prototypes in July 1942 had 

revealed that the tanks would not be battleworthy before the end of the ycar..J:.! 

A Command Shake-up 

Hitler could hardly have expected to 

solve or greatly mitigate any of his immediate problems by changing chiefs of staff 

in September 1942. The tighter personal 

hold he got on the command apparatus of 

the Army by the shift from Halder to 

Zeitzler was also not very significant and 

took the form mainly of a symbolic downgrading of a very senior post by the appointment to it of a very junior general. 

Nevertheless, by the change, Hitler proposed morc than merely to give vent to his 

personal animosity against Halder. ',Vhat 

he had in view-probably motivated by 

even deeper seated animosities-----was nothing less than a recasting-to his mind rejuvenation- of the whole German officer 

corps, the General Staff and general officer ranks in particular. To enable himself 

to do this- and to get close control of all 

officer appointments as well-he assumed 

personal supervision of the Heerespersonalami. Army omcer personnel office. and 

placed it under his Chief Adjutant. Generalmajor Rudolf Schmundt. To Schmundt 

he outlined a policy of rapid promotion, 

particularly of younger, battle-tested officcr~, to the highest ranks. Zeitzlcr. forty-

~C 'e n ~'ean; old and a general officer less 

than a year at the time of his appointment, 

\\'a" an example. He also proposed to break 

the General Staff's hold on the higher apt~ General der Schnellen Truppen beim Ob.d.H. 

Nr. 459/ 42. Panurkampf1l.:agen "Tiger." 6.7.42. 

H 22/235 file . 

21 

pointments by training good line officers to 

qualify for advancement to the top positions and by requiring General Staff officers to acquire experience as troop commanders. He talked about eventually abolishing (he General Staff's distinctive red 

trouser stripes and silver collar tabs. 43 

As Chief of Staff, OKH, Zeitzler quickly 

demonstrated that he did not intend to be 

merely a yes-man, and during his first days 

in the post he secured a major victory in the 

intramural cold war that was a part of the 

functioning of the German command. The 

Army had long regarded as unfortunate, 

if not baneful, the influence of the Operations Staff, OKW- Jodi-on the drafting 

of Fuehrer directives, many of which although ostensibly strategic were primarily 

concerned with tactical operations on the 

Eastern Front. The irritation had increased 

after Hitler became Commander in Chief, 

Army, and thereby converted the Army 

staff into a second personal staff. It had 

been sharpened by the freewheeling criticism Keitel and Jodi had indulged in from 

their techni cally loftier positions on the 

command chain. Taking advantage of 

Jodi's having fallen into disfavor, Zeitzler, 

immediately upon his appointment, demanded and secured the OKW's exclusion 

from the drafting of Fuehrer directives applying solelv to the Eastern Front. Henceforth such directives were to be issued as 

"operations orders" through the OKH. He 

also succeeded in having the reporting proctdurc at the dail y situation conferences 

changed. Instead of JodI's reporting on all 

tneaters, the Chief of Staff, OKH, opened 

the conference with a report on the East 

and then Jodi followed with a report on 

U Taeti gkeitsberich t des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts. 5 Oct 42 , H 4/ 12 fi le. 
22 

the other theaters.'·' Subsequently, on the 

ground that the "need to know" no longer 

existed, Zeitzler managed, further, to cut 

off the OKW Operations Staff's access to 

detailed information concerning Eastern 

Front operations. In the long run, he 

achieved another effect in no way less important for its being inadvertent, namely, 

the hardening of the concept of OKH and 

OKW theaters that made the Eastern 

Front the OKH's exclusive and only operational concern and bred competition and 

rivalry with the OKW theaters, the West, 

the Balkans, Italy, and northern Europe, 

where earnest co-ordination would doubtless have served the German cause better. 

Operations Order J 

On t 4 October 194" Hitler issued Operations Order 1 in which he announced, 

"This year's summer and fall campaign, 

excepting the operations under way and 

several local offensives still contemplated, 

has been coneluded." The order was purportedly aimed at initiating a shift to the 

defensive hcforc winter set in; its effect 

w"' the opposite. Hitler ordered Army 

Group North, Army Group Center, and 

Army Group B to get ready for winter in 

the lines thcy held; but Sixth Army was to 

continue the attack at Stalingrad and Army 

U Hillgrubcr, cd., Kriegs/agebu ch des OberkommandOJ der Wehrma cht. B(md lIJ• p. ' :1. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Group A was to stand by for further 

orders, which meant that in the two sectors 

where German forces were still in motion 

he was going to continue the offensive. 

In Operations Order I and a supplement issued some days later, Hitler elevated 

to the level of doctrine the fanatical resistance formula he had employed during the 

Soviet 1941-42 winter offensive. He ordered that: the winter positions were to be 

held under all circumstances; there would 

be no evasive maneuvers or withdrawals; 

breakthroughs were to be localized and any 

intact part of the front was "absolutely" 

to be held; cut-off and encireled elements 

were to defend themselves where they 

stood until relieved. He made every commander responsible to him personally for 

the "unconditional execution" of those 

orders.·'" In the supplement he extended 

the orders down to the lowest leadership 

level. "Every leader," the supplement rcad, 

<cdown to squad leader must be convinced 

of his sacred dllly.to stand fast come what 

may even if the enemy olltnanks him on 

the right and left, even if his part of the 

line is cut ofT, encircled, overrun by tanks, 

enveloped in smoke or ga~.sed." That order 

was to be repeatedly "hammered into all 

officers and noncommissioned officers." 411 

~ D er Fu ehrer. OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (/j 

Nr. 420817 /42, Operationsbefehl Nr. I. 14 .1042. 

AOK 6 ~O 5:'/49 file. 

06 OKH. Chef des Generalstabes des Heere s, Abt. 

(lj Nr. 428858/ 42. I. ErgaellzulIg zum Opcraliollsbefehi Nr. 1.23.10.42, AOK 6 ~01~)5/49 fil(' . 
CHAPTER II 

Retreat 

If tension ran high in the German headquarters at the end of summer 1942, it was 

scarcely less in the Soviet command. On 30 

August the Germans broke through the 

intermediate Stalingrad defense ring forcing the defenders back toward the inner 

ring on the outskirts of the city itself.' Two 

days later, General Polkovnik Andrei I. 

Yercmcnko, commanding at Stalingrad, 

and his commissar, General Ley tenant 

Nikita S. Khrushchev, appealed to the 

troops to stand and defend the city. On 3 

September the Soviet Supreme Commander, Joseph V. Stalin, declared that Stalingrad "could be taken today or tomorrow" 

if the forces between the Don and the Volga 

north of the city did not counterattack 

immediately.' In haste the Soviet command committed three reserve armies of 

untrained replacements in a counterattack 

on 5 September.' Halder observed several days later that the German Sixth 

Army, attacking toward Stal ingrad, \vas 

making good progress and had had a " defensive success" on its north nank:~ 

The Russians did not know what sacrifices the current campaign might yet entail, 

I Institut Marksizma·Lcninizma, Istoriya Veliko)' 

Otechestuul1Ioy V O)ony Sovetskogo So),uza , 194'-

1945 (Moscow, 1961) (hereafter cited as I VQV 

( R )), II, 438. 

~ A. 1. Ycrcmcnko, Stalingrad (Moscow, 1961 ), 

pp. 159- 63. 

' /VOV(R ), II, 5 ' ). 

• Halder Diary, vol. VII, 10 Sep 42. 

and the cost of war was already truly colossal. To certainly 6,000,000, possibly as 

many as 8,000,000, military losses in killed 

and captured were added millions of civilian 

casualties, a million or more dead of starvation alone in Leningrad during the winter 

of '94'-42. The Soviet Union had lost 

47 percent of its inhabited places, territory 

in which 80,000,000 persons had resided. 

That territory had produced 7' percent of 

the Soviet pig iron, 58 percent of its steel, 

63 percent of its mined coal, and 42 percent 

of its electricity.' By the end of their '94' 

offensive the Germans had occupied areas 

th at had produced 38 percent of the grain 

and cattle and 84 percent of the Soviet 

sugar.

G 

The Soviet Command 

The price was not more than the Soviet 

regime was will ing to pay. Stalin was in a 

duel to the death and knew it, and he had 

never counted the cost of sacrifices that 

furthered the ends of the Communist system or susta ined his power. The capacity 

to sacrifice lives and territory was in fact 

the historic Russian strategic asset. But the 

issue of survival in a war with a technically 

and militarily proficient enemy ultimately 

had to be decided on other terms. T hat 

these \.,.ould be far more stringent than any-

' /VOV (R ), III, ). 

6 Ibid., II, 166 . 
24 

one had supposed had been full y brollg'ht 

home only under the shock of in vasion. 

Sinrc th en the Soviet leadership had worked 

feverishly to make good the ucfiricncics. 

In the waning days of slimme r 1942, when 

it aga in appeared that the German a nni('s 

could ma rch wherever lhey pleased in the 

hea rt of the Communist homeland, the 

hurning question was whether those labo rs 

would become eng ulfed in a general collapse of the nati onal will to resist. M orale 

of the troops and the people showed sig ns 

o f breaking. The burdl:11 of suITering, of 

defeats, and of mistakes weighed mor(' 

heavily than at any time in the war. The 

confidence and hope the winter's successes 

had raised were dissipated. The Soviet 

command, it appeared, might have taken 

its peo ple rlose to the edge of disaster too 

many time.;. 

() n 'h" liI'r o[ W (IT 

From the outbreak of World W ar II in 

September ' 939 until mid-1941 Soviet 

policy was compounded of It nice mi xture 

of ambition and apprehension. Alternatel y 

aggressive and timoro lls, the Soviet Unioll 

cultivated an ofTensive military posture hut 

a t the same time ~edu ou~ y maneuvered to 

avoid a genuine military confrontation. The 

Nazi-Soviet pact signed in Au~ust ' !J39 a nd 

the senet protocols added in September of 

that yea r Rave the Soviet Union substanti al 

new territory in th e west, a fre t' hand in 

the adjacent areas of eastern Europe and, 

on paper, immunity from direct German 

aggression. The '939-40 'Vinter "Val' with 

Finland b rough t a victory of sorts. SO Illl' 

territorial gains, an unwholesome inte rn ational reputation, and a loss of mili ta ry 

prestige. The Ge rman victorie~ of ' 940 in 

France and the Low Countries raised 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

d oubts o n both sides concerning the profitability o f the pact. J oseph Stalin almo't 

certainl y was not pleased sudden ly to fll1 e1 

himself alone on the Continent with Hitle r. 

"-1'0 th e Gennans, the Sov iet moves into the 

Baltic Sta tes and es~a abia and the renewed threats against Finland appeared as 

blackmail, which in fart they were. After 

mid-1 9 40 both parties fclt increasingly resti ve in the partnership, bu t on ly one] German )" was ready to do somct hing abo ut 

it. 1n November, Soviet ForciRIl l\1inistt'r 

Vyachesla\· :M, M olotov went to Berlin to 

negotiate an in crease in his cou ntry's sha re 

and received a barely veiled warnin,~ tha t 

Germany would not tolerate any fllrthlT 

Soviet expa nsion on its western borders 

the warning was heed ed . 1 n April I !)4 I 

th e Soviet Union ood by while Germany 

pocketed th e Balkans. th e trad itional Ru.'isian sphere of interest. Throughou t, a nd 

up to the day before the invasion, the Sll\·ict 

Union ad hered scrupulously to the sc hedule of economic exc hange on which German y by then had fallen slIbstanti<lll y 

behind. 

In late April ' 94', at thl' l'nd of tit l' 

Balkan campaign, the German Ambassad or 

to the Sovie t Union told Hitler th a t Stalin 

was " prepared to make even further concessions to us."; On (i M "y, Stalin, wil o 

until then had preferred to exerc ise pOWl'l' 

from bchind th e SCl:ncs, for tht' first time 

as.o;,;umcd an cxec ut i\'C post in the gO\'lTIlment, becoming, as Cha irman of thl' COllllt·il of People's Co mmis~ars, the o fli cia l chid 

of the Soviet state. The mmT, prompted 

by awarenc~s of a growi ng dang-cr, was, as 

the German Ambassad or inLLrprded it. 

primarily designed to gi n ; Stalin a stronger 

~ Raymond j 31llt'S Sllnt3~ and j 3IlH'S Stuart 

[!eddie, eds.. N(I::i-Srit';ct Relatio1lJ. 1.9.19- 194' 

Wa.~hillg"!(ln. t94B ) . p. :CI2. 
RETREAT 

and more open posItion from which to 

direct his efforts at staying on good terms 

with Germany.s 

On the eve of the war both dictators 

plunged determinedly onward toward disaster. Hitler, who had not yet completely 

overawed his advisers, brushed aside all 

arguments against his impending Russian 

adventure. Stalin's men were hardly likely 

to tell him things he did not wish to hear; 

nevertheless, for him too, holding the course 

he had set required a deliberate exercise 

of will. The German deployment to the 

cast, which went into full swing in early 

1941 , could he ignored or misinterpreted, 

but it could not have escaped the notice of 

an intelligence apparatus as highly developed as that of the Soviet Union. That 

it had not, could be inferred from the 10 

April alert, which ordered an increased 

state of readiness for the military districts 

on the western frontier. 9 The German Ambassador, however, told Hitler that the 

Soviet activity on the frontier was nothing 

more than an automatic reaction prompted 

by the "well-known Russian urge for 300 

percent security." 10 That same urge for 

security, had the German deployment been 

properly interpreted at the highest level, 

would beyond doubt have set in motion 

mobilization measures on an altogether different order of magnitude from those which 

were actually undertaken. But Stalin held 

the lid on tight, coldly ignoring official 

warnings from Britain and the United 

States and apparently oblivious to the 

impending military showdown between 

Germany and the Soviet Union, rumors of 

~ Ib id., p. 336. 

~ John Erickson. The So<'iet High Command 

( New York, 1962 ), p. Si4. 

10 Sontag and Beddic. cds., Nazi·Soviet Relations. 

p. 331. 

25 

which, the German Ambassador observed, 

were being brought along with facts to confirm them by "every traveler" from Germany to Moscow. ll On 14 June 1941, 

Tass, the official Soviet news agency, published a communique which stated that 

according to Soviet Government information, Germany was observing the nonaggression pact as strictly as the Soviet Union 

was and no grounds existed for thinking 

that Germany meant to break the pact." 

Preparedness and Doctrine 

The Soviet Union was neither devoted to 

peace- in the last half of the decade of the 

1930's it had fought in Spain, in the Far 

East, and against Finland-nor was it unprepared for war in the same sense that 

Great Britain and the United States, for 

instance, were not ready. It was badly 

prepared owing chiefly to adminislrative 

malfunctions that, despite substantial effort 

and some remarkable achievements, prevented attainment of readiness for war on 

the plane to which the Germans had by the 

early 1940's raised the military art. 

The great and persistent Soviet weakness 

was lack of initiative at all levels, which 

resulted in dogmatism, slavish dependence 

on orders from the top, and preference for 

the fixed and approved formula even when 

it was contradicted by reason or experience." That weakness had been made 

much worse by the great purges of the 

1 930's, which had removed the most experienced and independent commanders 

and had made conformity a near-absolute 

prerequisite for survival. The immediate 

11 Erickson. S oviet High Command, p. Si4 ; Sontag and Beddic , cds. , Nazi-Soviet Relations. p. 334. 

" IVOV (R ), II, ' 0. 

II Ibid .. I , 439. 
26 

and aggravating influence was the so-called 

personality cult associated with Stalin, but 

it may be doubted whether under the 

Soviet system, in any case, a complete cure 

would have been possible or desired. 

Although the Soviet command had direct combat experience and the examples 

of the early World War II campaigns in 

western Europe to learn from, the most 

important lessons had in some instances 

been misinterpreted and in others unsuccessfully applied. From the Spanish Civil 

War it had drawn the conclusions that 

large armored units were not worthwhile 

and that aircraft would only be useful for 

operations over the battlefield. Consequently, the mechanized corps in the Army 

had been abolished,..and aircraft production 

had concentrated on fighter and close 

ground support types.'·' From 1939 until 

shortly before the invasion, the largest Soviet armored unit was the tank brigade. 

Soviet doctrine in that period regarded the 

tank as primarily an infantry support 

weapon. After mid-1940, apparently under 

the influence of the German example in 

France, the mechanized corps and tank 

divisions were reinstituted, bUl then in the 

haste to get a large number fast few were 

fully equipped." 

For the Soviet command the war with 

Finland had been a traumatic experience. 

It had disclosed deep-seated weaknesses in 

the military structure. Finnish Iarshal 

Carl Mannerheim aptly compared the Soviet performance to one by a badly conducted orchestra in which the players could 

not keep time. u; By the Russians' own 

later admission , many of the officers t'had 

!I Ibid. , I, 439. 

1:; Ibid. , I, 457 . 

~ Carl Manncrhcim. ErinneruTlgelZ (Zuerich , 

195 2 ), p. 3 74· 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

no clear conception of modern war" and 

could not plan or command a co-ordinated 

operation." The damage to the Soviet 

military reputation abroad was enormous, 

greater, perhaps, than it should have been 

in the light of the recent and successful 

Soviet actions against the Japanese at 

Khassan Lake and on the Khalkhin Gol in 

the Far East. 

The experience in Finland may have 

been in considerable part responsible for 

Stalin's determination to avoid a clash with 

Germany at any cost. Quickly thereafter 

the Soviet Union had displayed an intense 

desire to avoid becoming militarily embroiled with either side in the big war. 

When the Germans invaded Norway in 

April 1940, allegedly to forestall the British 

and French who had talked about sending 

troops through Norway to aid the Finns, 

thev thought they would have to make explanations to the Soviet Union and were 

surprised when the invasion elicited a figurative "big sigh of relief" e,·en though the 

SQ\'iet-Finnish war was by then over. 1S 

How fundamental were the defects 

which the Finnish war had revealed was 

demonstrated by the reforms undertaken 

in the Soviet military system. In April 

1940, as soon as the war had ended, the 

Army abolished the old, formula-ridden , 

oversimplified training instructions and 

undertook to establish combat-oriented officer training courses. In May general and 

admiral ranks were reinstituted in the 

armed forces and other egalitarian holdovers from the Revolution were abandoned. 

In August the commissar system was abolished. A conference held in December 

1940, however, revealed that most officers 

" IVOV (R ), I, 462. 

18 Sontag and Bcddic , cds., Nazi·S oviet Relatiolls. p. 140. 
RETREAT 27 

SOVIET T34 TANK IN STALINGRAD 

were still receiving stereotyped training and 

that only small progress was being made 

toward achieving individual initiative and 

flexibility. " 

In weapons the Soviet Union had made 

some remarkable advances. It had developed multiple rocket projectors, the 

famous Katyushas; the T34 medium tank, 

which was diesel-propelled, faster, and 

more heavily armed and armored than any 

of the German tanks; and the-for that 

lime-superheavy KV (Klimenti Voroshilov ) models of tanks that ranged in weight 

to upwards of sixty tons. But the tanks 

and rocket projectors as well as new aircraft types had not been put into full-scale 

production by the time of the invasion. 

Armament production had been high and 

steadily increasing throughout the period 

of the Five Year Plans but without emphasis on or appreciation of new weapons. 

The Commisariat of Defense had, for instance, classified submachine guns as police 

weapons and therefore had not included 

them in the military production plans." 

From the German victories in western 

Europe the Soviet command had apparently also failed to draw pertinent conclusions. 

It saw as the chief causes for the Polish 

and French defeats the lack of will to 

resist and the fifth column." That reasoning, projected into the Soviet period of 

great defeats, was to occasion vast, point-

:lO Ibid., I, 415- 16, 453. 

~1 bjd., I, 441. 
28 

less, and at times paralyzing suspicion and 

terror. The Soviet command, moreover, 

had no clear conception of what would 

happen when war began. It assumed that 

initially both sides would be engaged in 

mobilization and strategic deployment and 

therefore not ready to launch major operations for several weeks. Hence, it assumed 

further that the frontier military districts 

would be capable of holding the enemy 

until mobilization was completed and the 

Soviet forces could take the offensive." 

In June 1941 the defense of the Soviet 

western frontier was assigned to the Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, 

Kievan Special, and Odessa Military Districts.

23 If war broke out they were to 

become front (army group ) headquarters 

commanding initially twelve armies, three 

on the Finnish border and nine on the 

frontier between the Baltic and Black 

Seas ~1 \Vhile it is difficult to accept that 

the western frontier military districts were 

in as austere a condition as the Soviet postStalin accounts would have them appear, 

they were undoubtedly not prepared for 

the test to which they were about to be 

,ubjected. They were established along a 

line that had over nearly all of its length 

~" bid .. I. 441 , 471 . 

:1.'1 The sector boundaries were as follows: Le1lingrad Military District- the Finnish border from 

the Arctic coast to the Isthmus of Karelia ; Baltic 

S puial M ilitary D istrict- the East Prussian border: 

We stern Special M ilitary District-from the southern border of the Lithuanian SSR to the northern 

border {"If the Ukrainian SSR, Kie l'on Special M ilitar}! District-from the northern border of the 

Ukrainian SSR to the Rumanian border: Odessa 

Military District-the Rumanian border to the 

mouth of the Danube. (To help the reader distinguish between opposing forces, all Soviet military organizations appear in ita li cs throughout this 

\·olume.) 

2< S. P. Platonov, ed., Vt oraya M irol.'aya Vo}'no. 

1939-1945 (Moscow, 1958 ), p. 178. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

less than two years before, in places less 

than a year before, been deep in foreign 

territory. The border defenses and the 

communications lines were still mostly 

under construction. The much more highly developed Stalin Line behind the old 

border had lately been neglected and, in 

any event, was not included in the war 

plan." 

Most serious, the Soviet Army was then 

a rigid instrument, uncertain in its responses under the best conditions, with a 

"ery low probability of successful reaction 

to surprise. 1t was to face as near total 

surprise as any army has encountered in 

modern times. The directive placing the 

frontier military districts on a war footing 

was issued from Moscow at 0030 on 22 

June. Three hours later, before any warning had reached the forward units, the 

Germans crossed the border. 2G 

Because of the Soviet reluctance to release hard statistics, nearly all Soviet 

strength figures must remain estimates (as 

must to a much greater degree all Soviet 

casualty figures ). The best available Soviet figure on troop strength gives a total 

of 4 ,207,000 men in the Soviet armed 

forces " by 194 1."" If th e German estimate which places roughly 70 percent of 

the Soviet strength in divisions on the western frontier is accepted, and if allowances 

are made for naval and air force personnel 

and a possible strength increase during 

194 I , the actual combat-ready Soviet 

strength in the western military districts 

amounted to about 3,000,000 men. Undoubtedly, the war plan envisaged a very 

rapid increase in the days immediately after 

the outbreak of hostilities, and yerv likely 

~ IVOV (R ), I , 4 73. 

z(I lb id .. II, II. 

~ IVOV(R ), I, 460. 
RETREAT 

such an increase was partially accomplished 

even under the conditions tJ'tat accompanied 

the German attack. 

In military equipment and weapons the 

Soviet forces had some striking numerical 

superiorities and qualitative deficiencies. 

Of 6,000 combat aircraft at 5lations in 

Europe (8,000 planes estimated in the 

whole Soviet Air Force ), for example, only 

I, I 00 were recent models. 28 According to 

German intelligence estimates the Soviet 

Army had 10,000 tanks (out of a total of 

15,000 ) in armored units on or near the 

western frontier. 29 The (ar greater part of 

those were older types but the western military districts had 1,475 KV and T34 tanks, 

both of which were superior to any of the 

German tanks.30 Production of the newest 

models of weapons and tanks was rising 

rapidly. In the first five and one-half 

months of 1941, 1,500 KV and T34 tanks 

had been built against less than 400 in the 

previous year. 

On balance, the Soviet Union was not at 

a positive disadvantage initially except in 

the air, and, even in the short term, it had 

the potential to achieve superiority in tfOOpS 

and possibly also in war production. 

In vasion and Retreat 

Under the shock of InVaSIOn the Soviet 

Government responded predictably with a 

series of decisions aimed at centralizing 

military and political controls and strengthening the influence of the Communist 

Party. On 23 Jun e it created the Stavka 

(Staff) of the High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces under the Commissar of 

2li DA Pamphlet 20- 2.6 1 a, p. 42. 

:!Sl Halder Diary, vol. VI, 2 Ju141. 

'" IVOV (R ), T, 475 . 

29 

Defense Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Semen 

K. Timoshenko." That same day the military commissars were reinstituted in the 

armed forces and given equal command 

responsibility with the military commanders. A week later all the powers of government, including the ultimate authority over 

the armed forces, were concentrated in a 

5-man State Defense Committee under 

Stalin. An important member of the State 

Defense Committee was Lavrenti P. Beria, 

the police chief, whose NKVD (secret 

police ) units were setting up blocking 

detachments behind the front to catch 

stragglers and prevent unauthorized retreats." On the first day of the war the 

five military districts on the western frontier became Leningrad} Northwest} West, 

SouthweJt, and South FrontJ. 

On the frontier, surprise soon turned to 

confusion and in not a few instances panic. 

To hold with the first echelon until a counterattack could be prepared, although now 

clearly an impossibility, remained the 

whole basis of Soviet strategy. A reserve 

Iront of four armies created on the third day 

in the most endangered sector due west of 

Moscow was first ordered to be ready to 

counterattack and then, on 1 July, combined with the shattered West Fronl.:.J:t 

Still trying to halt the retreat, Stalin had 

the Commanding General, WeJt Front, 

and his staff shot and some days later applied the same Draconian remedy to the 

NorthweJt Front." Henceforth an officer 

who permitted a retreat forfeited his life. 

The pistol shot in the back of the neck 

became a very common occupational 

31 Ibid., II, 2I. 

:t:l Ib id .. T, :H: Eri ckson, S oviet High Command, 

p. 598. 

~ IVOV (R ), II , 35. 

~I Eri ckson, S orriet High Command. p. 626. 
30 

hazard for all ranks in the Soviet Army. 

In the first two weeks of July the Soviet 

Command, stripped by the force of events 

of its earlier illusions, set about organizing 

for a desperate, bitter, and costly struggle. 

On the 3d, Stalin, who had not made any 

public statement until then, in a nationwide radio address called for a "patriotic," 

nationalistic effort against the foreign invader, for a scorched-earth policy in the 

threatened areas, and (or partisan warfare 

in the occupied territory.3:> The creation of 

the Stauka of the Supreme Command (supplanting the High Command Stauka ) with 

Stalin at its head continued the centralization that had been begun at the start of the 

war and that was completed when Stalin 

assumed the posts of Defense Commissar 

( 19 July 1941 ) and Commander in Chief 

of the Soviet Armed Forces (7 August 

1941 ) . 

The Stauka of the Supreme Command 

remained the highest Soviet military planning and executive group throughout the 

war. The Stauka was, under the State 

Defense Committee, a strategic planning 

council rather than a general staff, but it 

could issue orders through the Army General Staff, the administrations and commands of the service arms, or directly to 

the field commands. Its dozen or so members included the Army Chief of Staff, the 

Chief of the Na\'al Staff, high-ranking representatives of the combat arms, and top 

experts from the technical sen·ices. 

~I re genuinely urgent than the reorganization of the top level command, which 

after all sen "cd mainly to strengthen Stalin's 

position, \\!as the necessity for dey ising a 

workable system of rommand in the field. 

~ S. Golikow, Dit! SOlejt!tarmee im GrosJt! n Vat er· 

laendjschen Krit!g ( Berlin, 1954 ), pp. 11-14. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Three of the five original front commands 

had proved unequal to their missions,36 

The degree of incompetence in the lesser 

commands was as high or higher. The 

purges had removed too many experienced 

officers and had brought many others too 

rapid advancement, especially in the higher 

ranks. The only solution was to bring the 

unit organizations more nearly within the 

range of command capabilities. In midJuly the rifle corps and mechanized corps 

were abolished and the armies were reduced 

to at most five or six divisions. The rifle divisions, which had had actual peacetime 

strengths of about 12 ,000 men, were for 

the most part already being reduced bv 

attrition and drastic organizational shortcuts to 6,000 to 9,000 men. The tank 

divisions were broken up into smaller independent units which were assigned directly to the armics. Tn essence, the armor 

was again reduced to an infantry support 

role. 

The one shift away both from the trend 

toward centralization and from the reduction in the sizes of commands was the creation on 10 J ul\· of three high commands 

for the so-called strategic directions, Northwest, West, and Southwest . They were expecled to co-ordinate the operations on 

broad sectors comparable to those of the 

German army groups and eliminate the 

time lag in the transmission of orders and 

decisions from ~[OSCOW. 3; They were turned 

O\"er to \Iarshals Klimenti I. Voroshilo\' 

(.I\'ort hwest ), Timoshenko ( rv est ), and 

Semen M. Budenm' (Southwest ), men 

whose military experience had been acquired in the civil war and whose exalted 

ranks renected political rather than profesIVOV ), II. 29. 

37 Ibid .. II. 62. 
RETREAT 

sional competence. The commands for the 

strategic directions, as far as can be determined, never assumed their full functions 

and were, except for the Southwest Command) which survived into early 1942, soon 

quietly abolished. 

In mid-July, wh en German Army Group 

Center pushed into the gap between the 

Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, the strategic gateway to Moscow, and formed several large 

encirclements north and south of Smolensk, 

the Stavka deployed a second reserve front 

of six armies east of Smolensk." The Soviet command was doing exactly what the 

Germans had hoped it would ; it was standing and fighting and not voluntaril y retreating into the jnterior. It had, moreover, made the decision that Halder and 

Brauchitsch had predicted, namely, to put 

its main effort in the center, in front of 

MoSCOW. 39 

While Army Group Center stood by in 

August and September awaiting th e return 

of its big armored formations, the Soviet 

build-up continued. At the end of September, two days before Army Group Center 

went back into motion, the fronts on the 

Moscow approaches had more than 40 

percent of the Soviet Army personnel and 

artillery and 35 percent of the aircraft and 

tanks." The strategy was still the same: 

meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, 

stop him, and then counterattack. Again it 

failed. In a week the Germans trapped 

the greater part of six armies in pockets at 

Bryansk and Vyaz'ma. On 10 October the 

Army Chief of Staff, General Armii Georgi 

K. Zhukov, took command of the West 

Front into which the reserve front had been 

merged and therewith assumed responsibili-

:II Ibid., II, 69. 

- Ibid., II, 61. 

to Ibid., 11 , 234. 

31 

ty for the defense of Moscow." 

October was a black month for the Soviet Union, th e darkest of the entire war. 

Leningrad was under tight siege; Moscow 

was threatened ; Kharkov fell ; and German 

armies closed in on the Donets Basin industrial area. The human cost was appalling. 

The Germans claimed 3,000,000 prisoners 

ne.~~ 

On the other hand, the Germans, in action continuously for four months, had to 

contend with the added strains that the fall 

rains and mud inflicted on men and equipment. 'The margin of German superiority 

was narrowmg. In th e second half of October the Soviet command created three 

new reserve armies. In the first two weeks 

of November, it deployed six additional 

reserve armies to backstop the wh"le front 

on the line Lake Onega-Gorki-StalingradAstrakhan. By the end of November five 

reserve armies, two of them new, were 

deployed in and around Moscow." 

The First Wint er 0 fIensive 

The German weakness showed first on 

the nanks. In November Army Group 

North was stopped at Tikhvin ; Army 

Group South was stopped at Rostov and 

then, before the end of th e month, had to 

fall back to the Mius River. At the end 

of November the Stavka released three reserve armies plus better than a dozen divisions to the W est Front. On th e morning 

6 December Zhuko\' counterattacked. H It 

was in fact the moment the Russians had 

been waiting for since J UHC, but the Stavka 

U Ib id., II, 241 . 

42 As of I December '941. DA Pamphlet 20-

261a, p. 88. 

n IVQV(R ), lJ , 27 1. 

u lbid .. II, 274. 
32 

moved cautiously, glvmg the West Front 

and the Kalinin Front (created on 17 O ctober ) on its right only enough strength 

from the reserves initially to achieve a 

1.5: I superiority in troops, tanks, and artillery and 2 : I in aircraft,"" 

In December, while West, J(alinil1, and 

Southwest Fronts fought to eliminate the 

German threat to Moscow, the Stavka extended the counteroffen sive north and 

wu th along the length of the front from 

Tikhvin to the Kerch' Peninsula. By the 

turn of the year it had worked out plans 

and deployed the reserves for a general 

offensive that wo uld have as its objectives 

th e destruction of Army Group Center, the 

liberation of Leningrad, and th e reconquest 

of the Doncts Basin and the Crimea. On 

7 January 1942 the Stavka gave Kalinin 

and W est Fronts, assisted by the fronts on 

their flanks, the mission of " not only encircling, but also splitting and destroying 

piecemeal," the main force of Army Group 

Center.'IG 

Tn deciding to go to the general offen sive 

the Sta vka overreached itself. On 10 J anliar), it called attention to serious and elementary tactical errors that had been made 

during the period of the December counteroffensive, among them failure to concentrate at the points of main effort, dispersal 

of armor and artillery, and poor co-o rdination of the combat arms.'l; For the Staz,ka 

to recognize the weaknesses was one thing: 

for the field commands to correct them was 

quite another. In the general offensive the 

fronts and armies frittered away the rcservcs and, despite frequent admonitions, 

fail ed to observe the principles of concentration and mass in employing their troops, 

~"Ibid. , II, 277 . 

46 I bid., n , 320. 

t1 Ib id. , II. 317 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

artillery, and tanks. On I February, trying to save part of the offensive, the Stauka 

gave Zhukov full command of the operation 

against Army Group Center, but it was 

too late. By then the reserves were all 

committed. After mid month the power of 

the offensive began to decline eve rywh ere.'" 

Although the 1941-42 winter offensive 

fail ed to accomplish a clea r-cut victory, it 

dealt the enemy a damaging blow. M ost 

important, it destroyed the myth of German invincibility and raised immeasu rably 

SoviCl milita ry prestige abroad and political 

prestige at home. It imbued the Russian 

peopl e with confidence and gave the regime 

a renewed hold on the population on both 

sides of the front. It gave the Army a 

fund of experience to exploit in developing 

viable offensive doctrine. The opportunity 

was not wasted. Special detachments in 

the General Staff, th e sta ffs of the service 

arms, staff and command schools, fronts. 

and armies set about collecting and evaluating information and produci ng instructional materi als . ..j~ 

1942, R etreat and R eco very 

Encouraged by the winter's successes, the 

Stavka planned to keep the initiative and, 

after the spring thaw) attack at Leningrad . 

Demyansk, Orel, Kharkov, in the Donets 

Basin, and on the Crimea, to forestall the 

Germans and create conditions for another 

Soviet general offensive. 50 Defensively it 

built up the central sector of the front, 

expecting the German main effort again to 

be directed toward Moscow. The German 

4SIb id. , II, 327- 28. 

4 9 I bid .. II, 359, 612 . 

!iO Platonov, ed., Vtora)'a Miro va)'a Voyna, '939-

45 . p. 288. 
RETREAT 

attack on the south nank was considered a 

likel y possibility, but it was expected to 

bear north toward M oscow, not south toward the Caucasus and Stalingrad. C:011-

~cqu cn ll )', instead of going to Southwesl 

and South Fronts, the greater part of the 

Soviet reinforcemen ts went to the central 

sector, and to /3r)'flllsk Frollt, which was 

expected to cover Moscow and Tub from 

the sou th.')\ By those false estimates the 

Stnvk" placed itself in an onl y slightly Jess 

dangerous strategic position than that of 

the previous year. 

On 12 May 1942, at Kharkov, the Soltthwest Frollt open en the first of the projected 

preliminary offensives. The plan was to 

envelop the city from the north and south, 

the main thrust being made from the south 

out of a bridgehead that had been created 

on the Doncts arollnd Izyum durin .~ the 

winter fighting. The operation had been 

conceived with total di!'regard for the condition of the enemy and for the complicalions that could result from an attempt to 

execute an unsupported thrust out of an 

unstable bridgehead position. Perhaps for 

those two reasons more than any others, the 

attack out of the western enel of the bridgehead achieved some surprise and ga ined 

g-round in the first fOllr days; hut the Tzyum 

hridg-ehcad had been on Army Group 

South's own sc hedule of preliminaries to the 

summer offcnsi\'c. On the 17th a German 

armored force cul into the bridgehead from 

the south and in a week converted it into a 

pocket and a trap for 240, 000 So\'iet 

troops. '- The Soviet summer offensive 

evaporated in the Kharkov debacle, and th e 

SOlithwl'sl Front was weakened beyond re-

" IVOV ( R ), II. 404. 

~~ Walter Goerlit7., Paulus mId Stalillgrad (r\C\\ 

York , 1963 ) p , 183 , 

33 

pair in the time that was left before the 

German offensive began,t,:t 

The Soviet command at least did not 

enter the second summer campaign with all 

the self-imposed handicaps of the first. In 

July the Slfl vka gave the orders in time to 

save Southwesl Front and Soulh Frollt from 

encirclements. Between 28 June and 24 

July, Br)'mlSh-. Southwest, and Soutit Fronts 

feJl back 80 to 120 miles and gave up the 

important Donets Basin. The retreat severely damaged morale throughout the 

country, and the forces it saved were seriously weakened , hut it did deny the Germans a victory of the kind they wanted and 

needed,rd 

fn the continuing- absence of a clear 

Soviet expla nation, the strategy of the 1942 

surnmer campaign seems to have been 

rooted in a misreading of the German intentions which, costl y as the consequences 

were, may inadvertently have forestalled 

greater disasters. With the same stubborn 

consistency it had displayed the year before, 

the Soviet Command kept it') main forceg in 

the cen ter. At th e end of June 1942 it had 

28 armies between Leningrad and Tula and 

18 armies bl':t ween Tula and the Caucasus, 

the latter including I3ryansk Front's 5 armies 

which h ad as their main mission the defense 

of 1\'foscow on the south. Southwest Frolll 

and South Front had between them 10 

armies, 3 of them not much more than 

cadres left from the Kharkov battlc. K ali-

"in Front and West Front. on the direct 

a pproaches to ~1oscow, had a total of T 5 

armies. That deplo\'mellt pre"ailed through 

the summer. The reinforcement of the 

south nank, when it took place, came out of 

newly formed reser\'es, not, as the Germans 

/VOV ). IL 411 - 17. 

I I bid., IL 422 . 
34 

had expected, out of the substance of the 

forces at the front. 

The essential aspect of the 1942 summer 

campaign was that, while both sides fought 

it on false premises, the permanently damaging consequences fell entirely on the Germans. In August and September the Soviet armies on the south flank retreated 

another 80 to 360 miles, but the German 

armies became overextended and began to 

outrun their supplies. In the meantime, 

Soviet reserves had begun to move in along 

the lower Volga and in the Caucasus." 

By the fall of 1942 the combin ation of 

sheer space, Soviet resistance, and the German failure to attain a balance between 

means and objectives had brought the German armies for a second time to a state of 

dangerous overextension. Russia was engulfing the German forces as it had those 

of Napoleon and Charles XII; but to 

smother an invasion by exploiting space 

had not, in fact, been a deliberate element 

in Soviet strategy. In the late prewar 

period Soviet strategic doctrine, as far as it 

was formulated, had emphasized the attack 

and the destruction of the enemy Han his 

own territory." 50 Although, in the postwar Stalinist era, the so-called strategic 

retreat was elevated after the fact to the 

status of doctrine) it was not a consciously 

applied doctrine in either of the first two 

;ummer campaigns. Nevertheless, both in 

' 94' and in '942 it served better than any 

other strategy the Soviet command was able 

to devise. 

During the summer, in the midst of the 

second great retreat, the Soviet Union finally passed its crisis as a military power. In 

spite of a decline in basic industrial capacity 

occasioned by the loss of the Donets Basin 

r.:; Ibid., II, 43IJ-.-.44, 462. 

~ IVOV (R ), I, 440. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

and the disruption of oil production, direct 

output of military items rose. Aircraft production increased 60 percent above that of 

'941, to 25,000 planes by the end of the 

year, according to Soviet figures - which 

appear high. Tank output nearly quadrupled. The Russians officially claimed a 

total production of belter than 24,000 tanks 

in 1942, 66 percent of them T34'S. Over 

3,000 multiple rocket projectors were produced in '942 as against a few hundred the 

year before." In the Army, tank corps 

wc.re reintroduced, and, following the German example, tank armies were created. 

In troop strength the Soviet Union held a 

clear superiority. As of 20 September, according to German estimates, the Soviet 

forces opposing the German armies numbered 4,255,840 men, 3,0 '3,370 of them at 

the front and ' ,242,470 in reserve. German Army Groups North and Center were 

outnumbered at the front and, with the 

Soviet reserves counted in, all of the army 

groups faced potentially superior forces." 

For the future a further shift was in pros-

&7 Ib id. , II, 504- 15. 

M The Eastern lntelligence Branch, OKH , comparative force estimates were as follows: 

German and Allied Forces 

Army Grollp Nonh . 

Army Groul' Center 

Army Group IJ 

Army GroUI) A 

Total. 3,388,700* 

708,400 

1.011,500 

I.2H-,(XX) 

4H,BOO 

Soviet Forcu Ol)posite the German Army Groups 

In the Front Reserves Total 

Toul. 3,013,370 1,2H ,4 70 4,255,840 

Arm y Group North . 91 6,700 8-1 ,910 1.001,6 10 

Arm y Group Center. 1,0 12,070 H4 ,270 1.356,340 

Ar"'y Group H. 818,250 56 1,050 1,379,300 

"rmy Group A . 266,350 25Z,U O 5 18,590 

• The German figures are rallon strengths whIch 111 thI S 

in lan~ were some 250,()(X) men higher than the a<: tu al com· 

bat Jtrengths 

OKH, GenStdH , Fremde Hare O st, Nr, 26691 

42. Gegenu. eberstellung der uerbu.endeten und der 

sowjetrll55ischell Kraefte , Stand 20.9,42 , H 221235 

fi le, 
RETREAT 35 

SOVIET POW'S AFTER THE BATTLE OF KHARKOV, MAY 1942 

pect: the Soviet recruit class of 1925 numbered 1,400,000 men while that of the Germans would yield only slightly more than 

one-third as many. 

In the midst of the second German offensive, the Soviet military reforms begun 

in 1940-41 and reversed after the invasion 

were finally carried through. In the late 

summer, at the height of the retreat, officers 

and commissars were authorized, in fact encouraged, to carry out summary executions 

of "cowards and traitors." This gesture of 

desperation soon had to be modified. 

Equally desperate, from the doctrinaire 

Party point of view, but more to the point, 

was the simultaneous realization that the 

traditional military principles, feudal and 

reactionary as they might be considered, 

gave armies staying power in the field. 

Suddenly the Soviet Army began to assume 

all the old, long-despised trappings of military authority: sharp and rigid rank differentiation as the basis for discipline, strict 

observance of military etiquette, class status 

for officers, including special privileges and 

distinctive uniforms and insignia, the recognition of a Russian, as opposed to the 

revolutionary, military tradition, and the 

awarding of medals and decorations. At 

the same time, such men as Voroshilov and 
36 

Budenny, who had achieved high ranks 

chiefly through political channels, were 

quietly moved into the background. A 

most important step toward the professionalization of the Army was the re:ntroduction on 9 October 1942 of the principle of 

the single commander. The commissars, 

who until then had been at least the coequals of the military commanders, were 

reduced to deputies responsible primarily 

for political indoctrination and morale." 

In the higher reaches of the Soviet command the war experience was being rapidl y 

assimilated. In the. 1942 retreats the Soviet 

front and army commands showed some of 

the flexibility that had becn completely absent before. A year of war had produced 

a core of seasoned, capablc officers in the 

higher commands. Two of the best, Zhukov and General Polkovnik Aleksander M. 

r.o Alexander Werth, Ruuia at War (New York, 

1964 ) , pp. 4 14- 28. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Vasilevskiy, were with the fronts on the 

south flank during the summer campaign 

as representatives of the Stavka . . The practice of assigning representatives, begun during the summer of 1941 and further developed throughout the war, gave the Stavka 

a means of exercising effective control in 

crucial areas and provided an echelon of 

command capable of translating strategic 

guidance from the Stavka into operations. 

At the end of August 1942 German intelligence concluded that the Soviet higher 

commands had mastered the tactical principles of modern warfare and would be capable of applying them fully as ably as the 

Germans themselves were it :lot for the 

continuing inferiority of the lower and intermediate staffs. GO 

011 OKH, GenStdH, Frtmd e Hu rt Os! (I) Nr. 

2492 / 42 , Cedankim :;ur Weiterentw;cklung der 

Feindlage im Herbst und Winte" 29.8.42. H 3/ 190 

fi le. 
CHAPTER III 

Stalingrad, the Encirclement 

Stalin!;rad- Tsaritsyn before the Revolution, Volgograd after the de-Stalinization 

of the mid- 1950's-stands on the high 

west bank of the Volga 560 miles from 

1\1 05COW, 1,400 miles from Berlin. Around 

the city the flat, treeless steppe stretches 

away in all directions, hot, dry, and dusty 

in summer, cold, sometimes bitterly cold 

in winter. For half a year, under the 

burning August sun and in the fri gid J anuary ca lm, armies of a million and a half 

or more men fought in th e city and arollnd 

it. On the 60.ooo-squarc-milc battl efi eld 

the two sides committed, according to Soviet estimates. 2,000 tanks, 25,000 artille ry 

pieces, and 2,300 aircraft. 1 

Possessing some strategic attributes in its 

own right, Stalingrad became, in part by 

accident in part by design, the focal point 

of one of the decisive battles of World War 

II. The cit),'s half-million population, 

large tractor plants converted tu tank production) a gun fa ctory, metallurgical and 

chemical works, railroads, and o il tank 

farms made it an important war asset. 

Equally important wa'S Stalingrad's com -

manding position on the lower Volga 

River, the Soviet Union's chief waterway 

and the main route for shipment of oil 

from the Caucasus.:.! By the late summer 

' IVOV ( R ), II, 4'4. ~ Boris S. Telpuchowski, Die sowje lische GCIchichte des Grosserl Vaeterlae1ldische11 Krieges. 

1941 -1945 ( Frankfurt a. M .. 1961). p. 129. 

of 1942 the Germans had accomplished 

successes more sweeping than capture of 

Stalingrad could be- without putting victory within their g rasp. 

Strategically Stalingrad was no Moscow j nevertheless, as a symbol it acquired 

commanding proportions. The name alone 

implied a personal contest hetween the Soviet dictator and his German counterpart. 

Hitler had made Stalingrad the end objectiye of th e summer offensive and could 

not claim a full success without it. Conversely, holding the city gave the Soviet 

command its last chance to demonstrate to 

the world that the Germans had not C0111 -

pletely regained th e upper hand. 

What was to happen at Stalingrad had 

occurred at lvIoscow the year before. In 

the midst o f the engagement th e relative 

strengths of th e offense and the defense 

began to shift and the resu lt of the battle 

carne to hinge on how far that shift went 

and how fast. 

The Advance on Staiingrad 

Soviet historians set the starting date of 

the Stalin grad battle (the battle on the 

Volga in post-Stalin SO\·iet usage ) as 17 

Julv 1942, the day on which Sia/il/grad 

Frollt. which had replaced Southu'est Frollt 

(disbanded on 12 Julv ), committed two 

newly crea ted armies, the Sixt)'-seco1ld and 

Sixty-Iollrlit Armies, in the Don bend. their 

forw<lrd clements on the Chir and Tsimla 
38 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

\ xxxx 

Sf~~D 

FORTIETH 

! xxxx 'TTTTJ't-, SECONct @~GARIAN j SixTH 

VORONEZH 

~ __ --,"'XXXXX----

____ .-':;\~~ STALINGRAO 

I----XXXX j 

I""", ~ SOXTY·TH'.O 

XX)(X J ~ 

EIGHI~~LlA '1)ofO).::t. 

afllr5AIIO ""m'n-

~ \ 

~ '\ 

/ XXXX ~ -, ~ ~ •••••••••• .: ••• """ •••• TWENTY · FIRST 

-t'-t-t1J ~I~~ 17Jul } <' .... '--:;;'x-..... tr") ! ., :t ... , .$;-~..p-. ~ THIRO~RUMANIAN ••• • ::~J_ ........... ~ ,~ oll ..... I"Oe' .. • •• :\,...... 

I ~~~ ... 1 STALINGRAO 

. SOCT.l::'-SECONO ~I~~ ~J \ --~xxxx __ zs'P .-:; ..... __ ....... SOUTHEAST •• t> ""\ ? r-_ XXXl( 

F(~}t 17 Jill SIXTY-FOURTH 

)(XXX ./ ... :: t>t\ 

:.e]," F~~~Pt \_ -"\ 

: 'SOp n I 

-9 

r'::::,'J .J l!f(NT~ THIRTY.oSEVENTt:!... 

1fAA. ~ TWELFTH 

F~~rB Pt 17JUI 

:j ./'~ I • < I 

\ 

i J ("'....,.-r." \ j NINTH 

, ~,/ ,.: ---- \ .... ~ ..... ~.= .. ========~---

) EIGHTEENTH 

\ :: ............ . ........... : 

I FifTY-SIXTH 

... ..... .. ... : .......... 

MAP3 

Rivers 100 miles west of Stalingrad. (Mal) 

3) The date corresponds closely with the recasting of the German offcnsi\'c which. 

/ , 

/ 

THE ADVANCE TO STAUNGRAD 17 July -18 November 1942 

l1'TI'TTTT TTTTTTT GERM ... FII(lNT LINE. I? JUt. 

GUM ... F_t UN(,2'JUl 

GER".N '_T LINE,II."" 

GlRI"'N'~ LINE, t $(" 

'L'·rl .. rlh,~'~,_I.-r, -1,r--'--..J¥ "1LlS 

'0 0 ~ KILOMOEn 

togelher with Ihe appearance of the fresh 

Soviet armies, set the stage for the coming 

battle. Four days before, Hitler had 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

ordered the attack toward Rostov and had 

turned Fourth Panzer Army south, leaving 

Sixth Army to carry the advance toward 

Stalin grad alone. 

For the next several weeks Hitler tinkered 

with the machinery, trying to find the precise minimum of power th at would bring 

Stalin grad into his hands. T o meet the 

Soviet forces behind the Chir and Tsimla, 

General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Paulus, commanding Sixth Army, initially had 

one infantry corps approaching the Chir, 

two others farther back and coming up 

slowly. On the 18th Hitler took an infantry corps and XIV Panzer Corps out of 

the concentration north of R ostov, where 

units were beginning to pile up anyway, 

gave them to Paulus, and ordered him to 

strike fast for Stalingrad before the Soviet 

resistance had a chance to harden.' In 

two days XIV Panzer Corps reached the 

Chir, and on the 2 1St took a bridgehead, 

but then it ran out of gasoline and had to 

stop." On 23 July, in the directive that 

sent Army Group A south into the Caucasus, Hitler gayc Paulus another corps, 

XXIV Panzer Corps, from Fourth Panzer 

Army and, for the first time, a definite 

order to take Stalingrad.

5 

By the 25 th, Sixth Army had cleared the 

Don bend except for two strongly held Soviet bridgeheads fl anking the direct approach route to Stalingrad and a th ird, 

smaller bridgehead upstream around Serafimovich. Then the army stopped, ha" ing 

~ MS # P I 14C. Die Opera/julien dn deulsellen 

H eerl!sgruppen an de, 05t{ronl 1941 bj{ 1945. 

Suedliches Gebiet (Gene ral der Artillcric a. D . 

Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck), Teil /II , p. 84. 

'AO K 6. llehrllllg ableilu.n.~ Kriegs!ageburh 

Nr. 13.21 j ul 42, AOK 6 23948/ 1 file. 

~ Der Fuehrer, OK W. WFSt , Op. Nr. 551288 / 42 . 

Weisung Nr. 45 . 23.7.42. in OKM. Weisungell 

OKW (Fuehrer) , OCMH files. 

39 

run Iowan gasoline and nearly out of ammunition. Hitler desired that the "emphasis" be put on the Army Group A 

operations. Consequently, the OKH quartermaster had to divert half of Army Group 

B's motor transport to Army Group A, leaving less th an enough to sustain Sixth Army 

as it moved farther into the steppe away 

from the railheads.' Lack of gasoline also 

slowed the redeployment for the attack 

toward Stalingrad. The Hungarian Second Army had taken over a sector on the 

Don below Voronezh, but Paulus still had 

strung out along the middle Don the belter 

part of two corps that he could not bring 

cast until the Italian Eighth Army arrived 

to repl ace them. 

On the last day of the month Hitler, still 

tinkering, ordered Generaloberst Hermann 

Hath's Fourth Panzer Armv to do an 

aboutfaee at Tsymlyanskaya and strike toward Stalingrad from the south along the 

east bank of th e Don. For his mission, 

Hath was to have only XXXXVIII Panzer 

Corps, whi ch had already co"ered 4 00 

miles in the summer campaign, an infantry corps, and a Rumani an corps. The 

distance from Tsymlyanskaya to Stalingrad was 120 miles. 

Tn the meantime the Stavka had comm itted the newly formed First and FOllrth 

T ank Armies against Sixth Army.' The 

Italian Eighth Army was beginning to reIi eye the Sixth Army divisions upstream on 

the Don, but Paulus reported that at the 

rate he was getting gasoli ne anti ammunition, 200 tons a day, he would not have 

enough to start operations against the two 

large Soviet bridgeheads until 8 August. 

H itl er demanded that he start a day earlier 

G MS # P - 114C (Hauck ), T eil Ill . p. 103. 

' I VOV (R l. II . 429. 
40 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

GERMANS ADVANCING OVER THE STEPPE TOWARD STALINGRAD 

to prevent the Russians from escaping across 

the river.8 

Sixth Army attacked the strongest of the 

bridgeheads, the one west of Kalach, on 7 

August, and before the day ended had encircled the forward elements of Sixty-second 

Army and First Tank Army. In the next four 

days it mopped up the pocket, taking 50,000 

prisoners, and then turned against the less 

strongly held bridgehead north of Kalach, 

where the Russians fought stubbornly but 

did not repeat the mistake of standing and 

letting themselves be encircled.' 

The defeats on the west bank of the Don 

sent a nervous tremor through the Soviet 

• AOK 6, FuehTUngsabteilung Kriegstagebuch 

N,. 13.31 Jul- 5 Aug 42, AOK 6 23948/1 file. 

~ Ib id., 7-16 Aug 42. 

command. On 5 August, to reduce the 

span of control, the Stauka had created the 

Southeast Front out of the southern half of 

Sta/ingrad Front. On the 10th it reversed 

itself and made Headquart ers, Stalingrad 

Front subordinate to H eadquarters, Southeast Front. Two days later it sent Vasilevskiy to co-ordinate, and on the 13th it put 

Yeremenko in command of both fronts, 

with Khrushchev as member of the Military 

Council (political commissar) and the front 

commanders as deputies. to 

By 18 August Sixth Army had bridgeheads across the Don, but the fighting in 

the river bend had been exhausting and 

costly, and the army, particularly the in-

" IVOV(R) , II, 431. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

fantry, was not in condition to make th e 

35-mile thrust to Stalingrad. On the 21St, 

XIV Panzer Corps broke out and in three 

days drove a slender spearhead through 

to the Volga north of Stalingrad. To keep 

its toehold on the river, from which it 

brought the shipping under artillery fire, 

the corps had to break contact with the 

army and form a hedgehog. 

On the 24th the Soviet Twenty-first, 

Sixty-third, and First Guards Armies attacked Sixth Army's deep left flank out of 

the small bridgeheads they held at Serafimovich and Kremenskaya. Paulus reluctantly decided that he could not spare 

enough infantry to open a corridor to XIV 

Panzer Corps, at least not until Fourth Panzer Army freed his right flank." At the 

moment that prospect did not look good. 

Like Paulus, Hath was having to hold his 

attack to a narrow front. He was making 

his thrust along the chain of salt lakes due 

south of Stalingrad. This drive threatened 

the Soviet Sixty-second and Sixty-fourth 

Armies with an encirclement west of Stalingrad but left a 40-mile gap between his and 

Paulus' flanks. 

After fighting off a strong, well co-ordinated counterattack on 26 August, XIV 

Panzer Corps reported that it probably 

could not resist a second such attempt, but 

during the following two days the crisis suddenly evaporated. The counterattacks 

against XIV Panzer Corps weakened, and 

Russian morale appeared to be breaking. 

Sixth Army reported a marked increase in 

Russian deserters, including- and this was 

unusual- tank crews with their tanks. I :! 

Fourth Panzer Army, which had regrouped 

II I bid., II, 436 ; AOK 6, FuehTUngsabteilung 

Kriegstagebuch Nr. '3, 2 1- 25 Aug 43, AOK 6 

23948/ I file. 

12 Ibid., 26-28 Aug ~Z. 

41 

and shifted its panzer corps west to make 

contact with Sixth Army soonef, experienced a similar slackening in the Soviet 

resistance. 

When Hath observed that the Russians 

were falling back toward Stalingrad, he 

turned east on the 30th, and in three days 

pushed his armored points through to 

Pitomnik and nearly to Voroponovo Station due west of Stalingrad. On 2 September at noon Sixth Army attacked 

toward Stalingrad, opening a secure corridor to XIV Panzer Corps that day and 

making contact with Fourth Pauzer Army 

near Pitomnik the next. 13 

The Siege 

The Stauka had declared a stage of siege 

in Stalingrad on 25 August and had begun 

a total civilian evacuation. A few of the 

shops and plants were kept running to repair military equipment. The city, a typically unprepossessing Russian mixture of 

stone and concrete government buildings, 

sprawling factories, and drab, unpainted 

wooden dwellings lying in a tight 2 Yo -mile 

by 12-mile band along the cliffs of the 

river's edge, was about to entcr history. 

During the night of 2 September the 

Soviet Sixty-second and Sixty-follrth Armies 

withdrew to the inner Stalingrad defense 

ring. Sixth Army's lead corps a imed toward the 300-foot-high Mamai Hill, the 

city's central and dominant topographical 

feature. Fou rth Panzer Army closed in on 

the southern outskirts. 

Responding to Stalin's 3 September call 

for a counterattack, Stalingrad Front , 

which as the battlc developed had been 

pushed away from the city to Sixth Army's 

13 MS # P - 114C ( Hauck ), T eil Ill. p. 217. 
42 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

BRIDGING AN ARM OF THE DON 

north flank, hastily deployed the First 

Guards. Twenty-fourth, and Sixty-sixth 

Armies on a short front due west of the 

Volga and on the 5th attacked south. Thc 

counterattack, although it was conducted 

by incompletely trained armies and practically without preparation, carried enough 

weight to keep Sixth Army preoccupied for 

several days." In three days, 8 to 10 September, Fourth Panzer Army, spearheaded 

by a motorized battalion, drove a wedge 

through to the Volga on the southern edge 

of the city." Although the battalion was 

forced to fall back a half mile or so and 

took another five days to fasten its hold on 

the river, Sixty-second Army, General Lcy-

"IVOV(R), 11 , 438. 

I~ MS # P - 114C ( Hauck). Teil Ill , p. ~n9. 

tenant Vasili I. Chuikov commanding, was 

then in effect isolated in the Stalingrad 

bridgehead. " 

On 13 September Sixth Army attacked 

into the center of the city past t-Iamai Hill 

and to Railroad Station I , a third of a mile 

from the river. From then on the battle 

assumed the character it was to retain for 

the next two months: a bloody, relentless 

struggle in which single blocks and buildings became major military objectives and 

in which the opponents often occllpied parts 

of the same building, sometimes different 

floors. In the succeeding days the fighting 

at "t\1amai Hill and the railroad station became so heav), that it was all but impossible 

Hl l .R. 71 (mot.), lao Gcfechtsbericht des /11/71 

l'Otll 11.942 ,20.942, Pz. AOK 4 2818:1/5, file. 
STALINGRAD. THE ENCIRCLEMENT 43 

STALINGRAD IN FLAMES 

to tell who was attacking and who defending, and the Sixth Army troops needed a 

week to push Irom the station through to 

the ri\·cr.11 In the meantime the OKH had 

gi\'en Paulus command 01 XXXXVII [ 

Panzer Corps to help in cleaning out the 

southern hall 01 the city. After the breakthrough to the ri\'cr was made, that mission 

was accomplished in another fh'c days; and 

on the 26th Paulus reported that the army 

had raised the Swastika o\,er the go\'ernment building in the Red Square." 

By the turn 01 the month the Stalingrad 

bridgehead had been reduced to a breadth 

I' Vasili I. Chllikov. The Battle for Stalingrad 

(:\cw York. 1964 ). p. [20. 

1~ AOK 6, Fuehrun gsab teilllng Kriegstagebudz 

NT. 13.2 1- 26 Scp 4'2. AOK 6 23948/, file . 

01 six miles and a depth of nine. Neither 

side had space ~o maneuver. The situation 

fa"ored the defender, as long as he was 

willing to pay the price in blood, and this 

the StavJ.a was obviously willing to do. 

Between mid-September and the first days 

of October Sixty-second Army received reinforcements amounting to nine rille divisions, two tank brigades, and a rifle brigade. 

The command was reorganized and tightened. General Ley tenant Konstantin K. 

Rokossovskiy assumed command of Stalingrad Front J which was renamed Don Front. 

Yeremenko took command of Southeast 

Front , renamed Stalingrad Front. 1tl 

Toward the end of September, Paulus 

" IVOV ( R ), II, pp. 442- 44. 
44 

began shifting his full weight east when the 

Rumanian Third Army moved up to take 

over Sixth Army's front west of the Don. 

The Rumanians were neither trained nor 

equipped for fighting on the Eastern Front. 

In the last three days of the month, in the 

Fourth Panzer Army zone, the Germans 

were given a demonstration of their capabilities th at was a dark omen of events to 

come. On the 28 th the Rumanian divisions on the army's right flank along th e 

range of hills south of Stalingrad gave way 

before a halfhearted Soviet allack and fell 

into a retreat that could not be stopped 

until two days later, after a German panzer 

division had been committed. H a th reported, "German commands which have 

Rumanian troops serving under them must 

reconcile themselves to the fact that moderately heavy fire, even \",ithout an enemy 

attack, will be enough to cause these troops 

to fall back and that th e reports they submit concerning their own situation arc 

worthless since they nc\·cr know where their 

own units are and 'their estimates of enemy 

strength are vastly exaggerated."!:!o H e 

recommended that the Rumanians be assigned very narrow sectors a:1d that every 

fou r Rumanian di\'i ~ be backstopped by 

one German di\'i ~io n a~ a " corset sta y." I 

The Germans still had the initiati\·c. but 

to exerc ~c it thc~ ' were forced to accept 

battle on the enemy's crm~ in the bloody 

housc-to-hollse fi ghting in idc Stalingrad. 

There, nothing could prc\'ail but clelllcntal 

force capable of mastering l11en , concrete. 

stone, and steel. Four times between 20 

September and 4 October Paulus reported 

that his infantry strength in the city was 

fadin g more rapidl y than he could find 

~' i: . AOK 4 . I a. K l'iegslagebflch Nr. 5. Ill. 

r eil. 10 Sep 42, P7. AOK 4 28[81/ 1 filt' . 

21 I hid .. ] Oct 42 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

troops to replenish it. He predicted that 

unless the decline was reversell the battle 

would stretch out indefinitely. " 

Strategically Sixth Army had accomplished its mission by the end of September. 

The Volga was closed. Half of Stalin grad 

was in German hands and all the rest could 

be brought under fire . Prudence would have 

recommended that Sixth Army stop, consolidate its front, and wcar down the Russians gradually. Hitler himself had always 

been against wasting troops in street fighting. Paulus may have been about to make 

such a recommendation. On 4 O ctober he 

warned that he had no reserves and the 

Russians, if they counterattacked, might 

break through." But Hitler's frustration at 

that stage of the campaign had overcome 

reason. On 28 September he opened the 

drivefor the Winter Relief at the Sparlpalml 

in Berlin with a speech in whieh he ridiculed 

the publicity he had lately been receiving in 

th e world news media. Pinpricks like the 

Dieppe raid of mid-August, he complained, 

werc touted as brilliant Allied victories 

whilc his own march from the Donets to 

the Volga and the Caucasus was "nothing." 

To carry his point home he added, "''''hen 

we take Stalingrad-and you can depend 

on that- that is nothing. OJ As a clin cher, 

he vowed a second time to take Stalingrad 

and assured the audien ce, "You can be certain no one will get us away from there." Z I 

On 6 O ctober P au lu s temporaril y 

' topped the attack in Stalingrad. His infantry strength was too low. .Tn one division 

the infantry ba ttalions were down to averaRe strengths of 3 officers, I T noncommis-

"" AO'" 6, Fll chnmg.rabtcilllllg KriegJ tagebuch 

Ny. 13. 20 Sep-4 Oct 42, AOK 6 23948/ , file . 

:!., I bid .. 4 Oct 42. 

I Domartls, ed .,H itler Reden tlnd Proclamation· 

('11,19.12- 45 . II. ]9'4. 
THE SWASTIKA OVER RED SQUARE., STALlNGKAD 
46 

sioned officers, and 62 men. Ammunition 

also was beginning to run short. In September alone the army had fired 25 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 

better than half a million antitank rounds. 

and three-quarters of a million artillery 

rounds. The army's losses since crossing the 

Don in August numbered 7,700 killed, 

30,200 wounded, and 1, 100 missing.:!;; 

After receiving fh·c special pioneer battalions from the OKH, taking an infantrv 

division from his flank, and getting a panzer 

division from Fourth Panzer Army, Paulus 

renewed the attack in Stalingrad on 14 October. Soviet historians have described the 

next two weeks ac. the period of the bitterest 

fighting of the ,,·hole battle. The second 

day, the Germans took the tractor factory 

in the northern qua rter and reached the 

Volga, splitting the bridgehead in two." 

From the left bank of the Volga massed 

SO\'iet artillery laid down fire on the German lines now everywhere within reach. 

With characteristic suddenness, the season was changing. Several days of cold 

were foll owed on the 18th by heavy rain 

that next day turned to wet snow. On 

Ihe steppe, mud engulfed the German suppl y con\'oys. Nc\'crtheless, in the city, 

without managing to repeat their first two 

days' success, lhe Germans for a \vhile 

maintained more momentum than in their 

earl ier attempts. On an especially successful day, 23 October, they took half the 

"Red October" metallurgical works, several blocks of houses, and the greater pa rt of 

the ruin that formerly had housed the municipal bakery. A week later, howc\'cr, the 

army had to report th at its ammunition 

:; AOK 6, Fuehrungsab t eilung Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 14 , 6- 17 Oct 42. AOK 6332 24 /2 fiIe. 

~ IVOV (R ), 11 , 444- 45. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

was running short and it, therefore, could 

not sustain the attack at its former intensity. ~1 

In early November a hard freeze set in, 

creating a condition that compiicated the 

Soviet defense in Stalingrad. Most Russian rivers freeze solid from bank to bank 

in a few days. The lower Volga does not. 

It first forms slush, then ice floes, which 

combine into large masses of ice that drift 

downstream with the current. In the latter 

stage crossing the river becomes slow ann 

hazardous for even the strongest boats. At 

the latitude of Stalingrad the river takes 

weeks, sometimes months, to freeze over, 

and Sixt),-second Arm)' depended entirely 

on supplies and replacements coming across 

from the other side. 

By the time the freeze began Chuikov's 

hold at Stalingrad was reduced to two 

bridgeheads, one six miles wide and at most 

a mile and a half deep in the city, the other 

in the northern suburbs less than half th at 

size. On I I November the Germans broke 

through to the river near the northern end 

of the larger bridgehead and cut off one 

divi n. ~s On 17 N ovember, in an order to 

Sixth Army, Hitler stated, "The difficulties 

of the battle around Stalingrad and the 

decline in combat streng th are known to 

me . But for the present the Russians' difficulties occasioned by the drift icc on the 

Volga are even greater. If we exploit this 

time interval we will save ourselves much 

blood later. " He called for "one more all 

out attempt." ~9 

~~ AOK 6. Fu ehrungsab l eiiuTig Kriegslagebuch 

Nr. 14 .23, 3 1 Oct 4 2, AOK 6 33224/2 file. 

28Chuikov, Battle for Stalingrad , p. 206; IVOV 

(R ), II, 448. 

~., AOK 6. Filehrungsabteiiung Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 14, 17 Nov 42 , AOK 6 3322412 file . 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 47 

GERMANS AMID THE RUINS OF STALINGRAD 

German Expectations 

When the Eastern Intelligence Branch, 

OKH, concluded at the end of August 1942 

that in the coming fall and winter the Russians would rctain a considerable offensive 

potential, it undertook also to predict where 

they would attack. The Army Group B 

and Army Group Center zones seemed, 

from the Soviet point of view, to offer the 

best prospects. In the Army Group Barca 

the relatively weak German front and easy 

terrain favored a Soviet bid to recapture 

Stalingrad and raised the prospect of a 

thrust across the Don west of Stalingrad to 

Rostov, which, if successful, would collapse 

the greater part of the Army Group B front 

and the entire Army Group A front. But 

the Eastern Intelligence Branch believed 

that the Russians would be more eager to 

remove the threat to Moscow posed by the 

forward clements of Army Group Center 

and would therefore most likely exploit the 

salients at Toropets and Sukhinichi for converging attacks on Smolensk, with the objective of destroying the Ninth, Third 

Panzer, and Fourth Armies. It assumed 

that the Russians were not yet capable of 

directing and sustaining offensives toward 

remote objectives, for instance Rostov or 

the Baltic coast, and so would attack where 

the configuration of the front offered greatest prospects of success without overtaxing 

their tactical capabilities." 

30 OKH, CenSldH. Fremde Hurt OJt (/J NT. 

2492 142. Gedanken zur Weiterentwicklung der 

Feindlage im Herbst und Winter, 29.842, H 3/ 190 

file. 
48 

Crosscurrents 

The trend of the following two months 

appeared to the Eastern Intelligence Branch 

to confirm its August forecast. Having 

maintained through the slimmer a relatively stronger deployment against Army Group 

Center than against the two southern German army groups, the Russians in September began, on Army Group Center's north 

flank around Toropets, an offensive buildup that had progressed so far by the second 

week of October that Hitler wanted to 

attempt a spoiling attack." The Germans 

believed the offensive would start immediately after the fall rains, which began on 16 

OClOber and were expected to last two to 

three weeks. Shortly before the middle of 

that month the beginnings of a build-up 

were also detected opposite Army Group B, 

but they did not appear to be on a scale 

that would indicate an offensive in the 

ncar future . On 15 October the Eastern 

Intelligence Branch concluded that the Russians would eventually attempt an offensive 

in the Army Group B zone, but the main 

significance of the deployment there for 

the present was that to make the necessary 

forces available they would have to give up 

wh atever thoughts they might have had of 

enlarging the forthcoming operation against 

Army Group Center." 

In the last two weeks of the month intelligence reports indicated that the build-up 

opposite Army Group B was limited to the 

Serafimovich bridgehead opposite Rumanian Third Army. On 3 I October the 

~1 Cell, Kdo. LIX A. K .. la Kriegstagebuch Nr. 

4, '4 Oct 42, LJX A.K. 30 145/1 file. . 

3: OKH, GenStdH. Fremde Hure Osl , Kuru 

Beurteilung der Fei ndlage l.'o m 13.1042; KUTze 

Beurtei/ung der Feindlage VO In 15.10.42. Both in 

H 3/199 file. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

Eastern Intelligence Branch reported that 

the level of activity in the bridgehead did 

not presage a major attack but rather appeared more and more to indicate that only 

local attacks were to be expected. 33 At the 

same time, in the Army Group Center 

zone, Ninth Army recorded that the offensive against it could begin any day, and as of 

30 October the army anticipated at best no 

more than a week's respite in which to complete its regrouping. " 

Hitler's interpretation of the enemy activity in Army Group B's zone was less sanguine than that of the Eastern Intelligence 

Branch. As early as mid-August he had 

begun to worry that Stalin mjght attempt, 

as he put it, the Russian "standard attack" 

-a thrust toward Rostov directed acroSs the 

Don in the vicinity of Serafimovich- which 

the Bolsheviks had executed with devastating success in 1920 against the White Russian army of General Peter Nikolayevich 

Wrangel. On 26 October he reiterated his 

anxiety over a major offensive against the 

allied armies ranged along the Don and 

ordered Air Force field divisions moved in 

to stiffen the Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian fronts on the Don. 3

:; 

On 2 November, when aerial photographs revealed that the Russians had 

thrown several new bridges across the Don 

to the Serafimovich bridgehead, Hitler once 

marc predicted a major offensive toward 

Rostov. Realizing the Air Force field divi-

&1 OKH, GenStdH, Fremde Hure Ost, Kuru 

Beurteiiung der Feindlage t'om 26.10. , 27.10 ., 

28.10. und 31.10.42, H 3/199 file. 

!I< AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch, Fu ehrullgsabteilulIg, 

Berichtszeit 1.7-31.1242 , Band II, 30 Oct 4'2 , 

AOK 9 31624/2 file. 

!\; MS # C - o65a. Au/zeichnungw ueber die 

l.agevortraege und Besprechu ngen im Fuehrerhauptquartier vom 12. August 1942 bis zum 17 . 

Maerz ' 943 (Helmuth Creiner ), pp. 84- 85. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

sions would be small belp in a real crisis, he 

canceled the order concerning them and on 

4 November bad the 6th Panzer Division 

and two infantry divisions transferred from 

the English Channel coast to Army Group 

B, where they were to be employed as a 

ready reserve behind the Italian Eighth and 

Rumanian Third Armies. Since those divisions required a certain amount of refitting and could not have reached the Eastern Front in less than four to five weeks, it 

appears that Hitler did not expect the offensive to begin before December.JI: 

During the first two weeks of November 

new clues came in almost daily. By the 4tb 

it was clear that a build-up was also under 

way soutb of Stalingrad for an attack on 

Fourth Panzer Army, and on the 8th a 

division of the Soviet Fifth Tank Army, still 

believed to be in the Orel-Sukhinichi area, 

was identified opposite Rumanian Third 

Army. Two days later another division of 

Fifth Tank Army was identified and the 

appearance of a new headquarters, Southwest Front, was detected- an important 

sign, since it could be assumed that as long 

as only one front headquarters, Don Front, 

commanded all the Soviet forces against 

Army Group B north of Stalingrad, the span 

of control there would be too great for the 

Russians to attempt a major oH'cnsive .

3 7 

Despite these ominous portents the Eastern 

Intelligence Branch, as late as 6 November, 

was certain that the main effort would be 

against Army Group Center and that the 

offensive on the Don would come later.:!S 

:JII Ibid., p. 93 . 

~: OKH, GenStdH, Fremde Heere Ost, Kuru 

Beurteilung deT Feindlage vom 4 .11. , 8.11. , und 

10.11.42, H 3/ 199 file . 

:!Ii OKH . GenStdH, Fremde Heere Ost (I) , 

Beurteilung der Feindlage vor Heeresgruppe Mitte , 

6.11.42 , H 3 / 185 file . 

49 

On 12 November it described the picture 

as too obscure to warrant a definitive prediction but hedged only to the extent of 

stating, "However, an attack in the near 

future against Rumanian Third Army with 

the objective of cutting the railroad to Stalingrad and thereby threatening the German forces farther east and forcing a withdrawal from Stalingrad must be taken into 

consideration." 3D 

Army Groul) B's DispositiOlIS 

Although the Eastern Intelligence 

Branch possibly was right in assuming that 

the Russians intended to direct a heavy 

blow, possibly even the winter's main effort, 

against Army Group Center, it was clear to 

Army Group B by the second week of November that there would be an offensive 

against Rumanian Third Army and probably also Fourth Panzer Army; and against 

the Rumanian troops even a secondary offensive was cause for utmost concern. On 9 

November Weichs, commanding Army 

Group B, considered taking the 29th Motorized Infantry Division from Fourth Panzer 

Army and stationing it behind Rumanian 

Third Army but dropped the idea because 

Fourth Panzer Army was also expecting an 

attack. Instead, on 16 November, he decided to shift the 22d Panzer Division from 

Italian Eighth Army to Rumanian Third 

Army where, together with the Rumanian 

1st Armored Division, it would become part 

of a reserve corps under the command of 

Headquarters, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, 

transferred from Fourth Panzer Army,40 

3D OKH, GenStdH, Fremde Heere Ost, Kuru 

Beurteilung der Feindlage uom 12 . /1-42 . H . 3 / 199 

file. 

i Q Pz. AOK 4, la , Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5, Teil 

J/I, 8, 9 Nov 42, Pz. AOK 4 28183/t file. 
50 

On paper XXXXVlII Panzer Corps constituted a fairly strong reserve; in fact it 

was nothing of the sort. The 22d Panzer 

Division, hardly more than a regiment, had 

46 tanks, 38 of them in working order, on 

19 November; and Rumanian 1St Armored 

Division, which had not yet seen action, 

had 122 tanks, 2 I of them old German 

Panzer Ill's armed with 50-mm. guns, the 

rest captured Czech tanks mounting 37-

mm. guns.

41 

Soviet Intentions 

The Build-u/l 

On 4 October Zhukov and Vasilevskiy, 

representing the Stavka, headed a conference that ini.tiated planning for a Soviet 

counteroffensive at Stalingrad. (Map 4 ) 

During the remainder of October and the 

first two weeks of November, while German 

Sixth Army strained to end the battle in 

the city, the Russians carried through a 

build-up on the army's flanks. On 28 October, Headquarters, Southwest Front, 

under General Ley tenant N. F. Vatutin, 

moved in to take command of Sixth, First 

Guards, Sixty-third, Fifth Tank, and Twenty-first Armies on the Don upstream from 

Kletskaya. Don Front, its sector reduced 

by better than half, kept Sixty-fifth, Twenty-fourth, and Sixty-sixth Armies on the 

front between Kletskaya and the Volga; 

and Headquarters, Stalingrad Front, remained in command of Sixty-second, 

Sixty-fourth, Fifty-sev enth, and Fiftyfirst Armies in Stalingrad and opposite 

Fourth Panzer Army. The strongest of the 

4L OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. Ill, Pruef NT. 

88455, Lage H. Gr. B, Stand '9.11. Abends, H. Cr. 

B Lagekarten file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

reinforcements, Fifth Tank Army, consisting of six rifle divisions, two ta)lk corps, a 

guards tank brigade, a cavalry corps, artillery, antiaircraft, and mortar regiments, 

began moving into the line opposite Rumanian Third Army in the latter half of October, completing the redeployment on 

about 6 November." Except for Fifth 

Tank Army the reinforcement was accomplished with units of less than army size." 

The infantry strengths were increased, and 

the armies in the main attack were given 

mobile forces in the form of tank, mechanized, and cavalry corps.H 

By the time the deployment was completed Soviet armored strength around Stalingrad stood at 4 tank and 3 mechanized 

corps, 14 independent tank brigades, and 3 

tank regiments- all together goo tanks, 60 

percent of all the Soviet tanks at the front. 

The Stavka had also moved in one-third of 

the Soviet Army's rocket launchers, 1 15 

battalions, and had significantly reinforced 

the other types of artillery and the air 

forces.~!i The number of Soviet troops in 

the offensive zone was slightly over one 

million. 

Soviet estimates make the two sides about 

d Soviet rifle divisions were authorized about 

10,000 men each; tank corps (comparable to U.S. 

Army armored divisions), 10,500 men and 18g 

medium and heavy tanks; cavalry corps, Ig,ooo 

men and approximately 100 armored vehicles. 

43 [General Staff of the Red Army], Sborllik 

Materia lou po lzucheniyu Opyta Voyny, Nomer 6, 

Apr- May 43 . 

U Soviet mechanized r.orps were authorized 

strengths of 16,000 men and 186 tanks. Some of 

the lank and mechanized corps could have come 

from the First and Fourth Tank Armies. Fourth 

Tank Army no longer appeared in the order of 

battle in the Stalingrad area after September. 

First Tank Army disappeared after the encirclement west of Kalach where it was badly mauled 

if not, as the Germans claimed, destroyed. 

~ IVOV {R ), III, 20. 
/ 

)'J; 

y 

/ 

STALINGRAD 

~ 

xxxx r-~ 

ARM EEGRUPPE I HOTH I (F~ TH !.,}' 

November- December 1942 

G(~ ..... nlc"".g NOV 

GE" ..... fllO .. T, 12 O(C 

rrrrmTTTm 

~ 

GEIIM ... fliGHT, 2. DEC 

Russ!.'" .ov."c£ , 19-28 NOV 

'0 0 ,0 to 30 .0 " 'LES 

, ;1 : I , , I ' , ' 

'0 0 '0 ro 30 .0 "'LO"U[ltS 

MAP4 

xxxx 

~~T L_:1 ~ (Rumanian) , 

, 

, 

I 

I 
52 

equal in numbers of troops and the Soviet 

advantages in tanks, artillery, and aircraft 

slight- about 1.3:1, 1.3:1, and I. I: [ respectively." The actual ratios could not 

have been anywhere near that close. The 

Soviet I ,OOo,Doo-man strength approximates the total strength of Army Group B, 

of which not much more than half was 

deployed around Stalingrad. Assuming the 

figure for the Soviet strength to be accurate, 

the Soviet over-all superiority was probably 

in the neighborhood of 2: [ , much higher 

in the crucial sectors and, considering the 

quality of the troops the Germans had committed on Sixth Army's fl anks, relatively 

overwhelming. The same was, no doubt, 

also true of the other ratios. The armored 

strength of Army Group B, all told, could 

not have amounted to more than 500 tanks, 

at least a third of them outmoded Czech 

models and Panzer II's and Ill's. The aircraft ratio appears to have been secured by 

figuring in the entire German air strength 

on the Eastern Front. 

The Plan and Tactics 

The Soviet plan was to tie down Sixth 

Army on the front between the Don and 

the Volga and in Stalingrad, smash the 

Rumanians on its left, and thrust behind 

the army to cut it& lines of communications 

across the Don. The main effort was to be 

in the Fifth Tank Army sector where, after 

6 rifle divisions, 4 in the first wave and 2 in 

the second, opened a gap in the Rumanian 

Third Army's front, 2 tank corps would 

break through aiming for Kalach on th e 

Don due west of Stalingrad. Following behind the tank corps, the cavalry corps and 

3 rifle divisions of Sixty-third Army would 

4e Ibid., p. 26. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

fan out to the right to cover the outer flank 

by establishing a line on the Chir River. 

Inside the arc of the tank corps, advance 

clements of Twenty-first Army and Sixtyfifth Army were to break through on either 

side of Kletskaya and encircle the four 

Sixth Army divisions west of the Don. T hey 

would get help from Twenty-fourth Army, 

which was to prevent the divisions from 

joining the Sixth Army main force by taking the Don crossings at Pan'shirskiy and 

Vertyachiy. To complete the encirclement, 

Fifty-seventh and Fifty-first Armies were to 

cut through Fourth Panzer Army south of 

Stalingrad and strike northwestward to 

meet Fifth Tank Army at Kalach:" 

The Stalingrad offensive ushered in a 

new stage in the Soviet conduct of operations, a stage in which the Russians demonstrated a command of offensive tactics 

equal to that of the Germans in conception 

and sufficiently effective in execution to prevail against an opponent who had pa'lScd 

the peak of his strength. Most significant 

was the use of infantry massed on a narrow 

front to open a gap that was then exploited 

by strong, independent armored forces for 

a breakthrough deep into the enemy rear. 

Formerly the Russians had almost always 

employed mixed armor and infantry in 

frontal attacks, which, though less effective 

and more costly, were easier to command. 

The new tactics showed that the Soviet 

higher commands had achieved a level of 

competence that enabled them to take the 

risks and reach for the greater rewards of 

mobile warfare. An increased sophistication was evident in all phases of operations. 

The deployment for the Stalingrad offensive, for instance, was executed rapidly, 

smoothly, and unobtrusively without the 

H Sbornik Nomer 6. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

heavy-handed probing for weak spots and 

lengthy artillery duels with which the Soviet 

commanders in their earlier offensives had 

often frittered away the element of surprisc.'u 

Sixth Army Encircled 

Breakthrough 

After waiting for the Allied landings in 

North Africa to tie down the Germans in 

the West-and for the ground to freeze 

hard enough to carry tanks-the Russians 

opened the offensive at Stalingrad on 19 

November 1942. At midnight it had begun to snow, so heavily that visibility was 

reduced to zero. The temperature was 

200 F. At 0850, in the wake of an artillery barrage that lasted about an hour and 

a half, Fifth Tank Army and the Twentyfirst Army launched their infantry against 

Rumanian Third Army. 

By early afternoon the Rumanian line 

was breached, and at 1400 the two tank 

corps and one cavalry corps of Fifth Tank 

Army began to move through. An hour 

later a tank corps and a cavalry corps were 

committed to exploit the breakthrough in 

the Twenty-first Army sector. Rumanian 

Third Army had collapsed under the first 

assault, and the Soviet tanks, against which 

the Rumanians had no antitank weapons 

heavier than 47-mm., completed their demoralization. Sixty-fifth Jlrmy also began 

its attack on the morning of the 19th, but 

it faced the German divisions on the left 

flank of Sixth Army and made practically 

no progress except against the Rumanian 

411 See also Obkdo. d. H. Gr. B, la Nr. 4316142 , 

Erfahrungen ueber Feindverhallen beim russ. GrossangriO am '9.11.42 , :;;.1142, H. Gr. Don 39694/ 

36 file. 

53 

cavalry division on its right Rank and there 

advanced only about 3 miles as opposed to 

13 - 14 miles gained by the other two 

arrn.ies.'u 

The next day Fifty-seventh and Fittyfirst Armies broke through the front of Rumanian VI Corps south of the Beketovka 

bridgehead. Fourth Panzer Army recorded that the Rumanian corps disintegrated so rapidly that all measures to stop 

the Reeing troops became useless before 

they could be put into execution . At nightfall the army concluded that by morning 

Rumanian VI Corps would have no combat value worth mentioning. Hoth reported that what had taken weeks to 

achieve had been ruined in a day; in many 

places the Rumanians had offered no resistance- they had fallen victim to "an 

"indescribable tank panic." 50 He wanted 

to pull back Rumanian VII Corps, which 

was holding the army right Rank south of 

VI Corps; but Army Group B refused permission on the grounds that once the Rumanians began to retreat they would not stop. 

Shortly before midnight on 19 November Army Group B ordered Paulus to stop 

operations against the Soviet bridgeheads 

in Stalingrad and take three panzer divisions and an infantry division out of the 

city to meet the attack on his left Rank. 

The next day the divisions, under the command of Headquarters, XIV Panzer Corps, 

shifted to the west bank of the Don where, 

together with the three divisions already 

there, they prevented the Twenty-first and 

Sixty-fifth Armies from forming a secondary pocket west of the river; but confronted 

by superior forces and unable to achieve 

full mobility because of gasoline shortages, 

4D Sbornik Noma 6. 

roO PZ. AOK 4. la, Kril!g5tagl!buch Nr. 5, /II. Teil, 

'20 Nov 4'2, Pz. AOK 4 '28183/1 file. 
54 

they were not able to operate against the 

more important outer arm of the envelopment. The only obstacles in the path of 

the Fifth Tank Army advance were the 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and remnants of 

Rumanian Third Army. The Rumanians 

hardly counted any longer, although some, 

notably elements of one division under the 

Rumanian General Mihail Lascar, fought 

valiantly. XXXXVilI Panzer Corps, on 

which Hitler at first pinned all his hopes, 

could not establish contact between its two 

divisions and in the cnd barely managed 

to escape to the west bank of the Chir 

River." At most, all the German and 

Rumanian troops accomplished was to set 

the Fifth Tank Army timetable back about 

twenty-four hours-and this was less their 

doing than a consequence of the tank 

army's allowing itself to be drawn into local 

engagements contrary to its original orders. 

Subsequently, the army's two tank corps 

continued on toward Kalach and Chir 

Station while the cavalry corps, aided by 

several infantry divisions, cleared the line 

of the Chir River, east of which the Germans and Rumanians had no hope of holding out in any case. 52 

On the south Jlank Fourth Panzer Army 

61 On 26 November XXXXVII I Panzer Corps 

crossed to the west bank of the Chir with 6,000 of 

General Lascar's troops which it had rescued from 

an encirclement. H itler, who persisted in believing 

that the corps was strong enough to have stopped 

Fifth Tank Army, ordered the commanding general, Gcneralleutnant Ferdinand Heim, back to 

Germany, where he was stripped of his rank and 

jailed without trial. Released in August 1943, 

still without having been tried, he was restored to 

rank a year later and appointed to command the 

Boulognc Fortress. 

~2 AOK 6, la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 14. 19 Nov 

4'2, AOK 6 33'2'24/'2 file ; AOK 6, la, Angaben 

ueber Vorgaenge seit dem 20.1142, in Unterlagen 

Festung Stalingrad, 21.11.-21.1242, AOK 6 

75107/ 6 file; Sbornik Nomer 6. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

was no better off. The offensive had split 

the army in two, trapping IV Corps and 

the 29th Motorized Infantry Division inside 

the pocket forming around Stalingrad and 

leaving Hoth the Headquarters, Rumanian 

Fourth Army, Rumanian VI and VII 

Corps, and the 16th Motorized Infantry 

Division as all that remained of his army." 

The 16th Motorized Infantry Division, 

protecting the Army's outer flank, was cut 

off at Khalkuta on the first day of the offensive and had to fight its way west to 

Jashkul. In that condition, Fourth Panzer 

Army not only could not stem the advance 

of the Russian units encircling Stalingrad 

from the south, but it had no real hope of 

preventing the Russians from also advancing southwest along the left bank of 

the Don. 

In fact, though it was not known at the 

time, the army was saved more by the 

Russians' tactical shortcomings than by any 

efforts of its own. After the breakthrough 

Fifty-seventh Army had the rclatively 

limited mission of turning in on the Jlank 

of Sixth Army while Fifty-first Army had 

the dual mission of sending its strongest 

force, a paired tank corps and cavalry 

corps, in a wide sweep northwestward to 

complete the encirclement in the vicinity of 

Kalach and simultaneously directing its 

infantry divisions southwestward toward 

Kotelnikovo to cover the flank. Considering the shattered state of Fourth Panzer 

Armv, this splitting of forces should not 

have caused trouble; but the H eadquarteTS, 

Fifty-first Army, was not equal to the task 

of controlling forces moving in divergent 

directions; and, as a result, the advance 

c.:J In late October, Headquarters, Rumanian 

Fourth Army, bringing with it the VII Corps and 

three divisions, had arrived to take command on 

the Fourth Panzer right flank. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

toward Kalach and that toward Kotelnikovo were both conducted more slowly 

and hesitantly than was necessary. Toward 

Kotelnikovo, in particular, the Russians, 

after their initial success, advanced cautiously. Even so, Fourth Panzer Army was 

in near mortal danger. On 22 November 

Hoth described Rumanian VI Corps as 

presenting "a fantastic picture of fleeing 

remnants." 5" 

M anstein, Paulus, Hitler 

A sudden encirclement of a modem army 

is a cataclysmic event, comparable in its 

way to an earthquake or other natural 

disaster. On the map it often takes on a 

surgically precise appearance. On the battlefield it is a rending, tearing operation that 

leaves the victim to struggle in a state of 

shock with the least favorable military 

situation: his lines of communications cut, 

headquarters separated from troops, support elements shattered, and front open to 

attack from all directions. The moment 

the ring closes every single individual in 

the pocket is a prisoner. Death is in front 

of him and behind him; home is a distant 

dream. Fear and panic hang in the air. 

Escape is the first thought in the minds of 

commanders and men alike, but escape 

is no simple matter. With the enemy on 

all sides, with rivers to cross, turning 

around an army that numbers in the hundreds of thousands with all its men, weapons, vehicles, supplies, and equipment and 

marching it 10, 20, 30, or morc miles is a 

cumbersome and perilous undertaking. 

The first effect of the impending encircle-

~ Pz. AOK, la, Kriegstagebu ch NT. 5, III. Teil . 

21, 22 Nov 42, Pz. AOK 4 28183/1 file ; Sbornik 

Nomer 6. 

55 

ment is vastly to intensify the normal confusion of battle because the attack is carried 

into the areas most difficult to defend and 

because as the advance continues the victim progressively loses the points of refercnce, the means, and the ability to orient 

himself for a coherent response. That was 

what was happening to Sixth Army in the 

first days of the offensive. It was 70 miles 

from the Serafimovich bridgehead to the 

bridge at Kalach, a few miles farther to the 

Sixth Army's railhead at Chir Station. Tn 

between, in the angle of the Chir and the 

Don, lay army and corps staffs, ammunition and supply dumps, motor pools, hospitals, workshops- in short,the nerve center 

and practically the entire inner workings of 

the army. All of these merged into one 

southward rolling wave of men, horses, and 

trucks trying to escape the Soviet tanks. 

The Don was frozen and probably could 

have been crossed even by trucks, but those 

who would retreat east as long as they had 

any other choice were few. Not many 

had ever seen a Soviet tank or wanted to 

and, in fact, not many would, but rumor 

had the Russians everywhere." Disbelief 

added to the confusion; the Russians had 

never yet executed a completely successful 

breakthrough in depth . 

Tn the Fuehrer headquarters the events 

were not clear, but their probable conseq uences were obvious. Short of a miracle, 

Sixth Army would either have to be permitted to withdraw from Stalingradwhich from Hitler's point of view was unthinkable-or a relief would have to be 

organized. On 20 November Hitler created 

a new army group, Army Group Don, 

M A graphic, semifictionalized account is given 

in Heinrich Gerlach, Die Verratene Armee (Munich, 1959 ). 
56 

which would be composed of Sixth Army, 

Rumanian Third Army, Fourth Panzer 

Army, and Rumanian Fourth Army, and 

gave Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich von 

Manstein command. Manstein was commanding Eleventh Army on the left flank 

of Army Group Center and would need 

about a week to transfer his headquarters. 

Manstein's appointment completed the 

Stalingrad triumvirate, Hitler, Manstein, 

Paulus-a fateful combination of personalities. 

Hitler could not stand to see an animal 

injured or to view the human consequences 

of battles, but in his headquarters remote 

from the battlefield, where he and his staffs 

dealt with unit symbols on maps and those 

mostly in the abstract as "blocks," he could 

coldbloodedly give orders that were certain 

to cost thousands of men their lives. Governed by emotions and inclined to rely on 

intuition rather than reason, he was incapable of objective or dispassionate thought 

on any matter that affected his own image 

of himself and he could, therefore, not 

tolerate defeat. At Stalingrad he had publicly staked his personal prestige. In the 

previous winter he had discovered - and 

successfully employed - the one reaction to 

military adversity that suited his personality, the rigid defense. 

Manstein in his professional sphere, and 

without Hitler's irrationality, was nearly as 

much of an egoist as Hitler. In the, 930's he 

had held the two top posts under the Chief of 

Staff, OKH, in the Army General Staff and 

had, before the '938 shake-up brought in 

Brauchitsch and Halder, been the leading 

candidate for the next appointment as 

Chief of Staff, OKH." Relegated to an 

t4 Fritz Erich von Manstein, Aus EirJem Soldatenleben (Bonn, 1958 ), p. 31B. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

assignment as army group chief of staff, he 

had proposed changes in the plan for the 

French campaign of '940 that were received without enthusiasm in the OKH 

but which caught Hitler's imagination and 

ultimately contributed to the swift German 

victory. No favorite in the OKH- Brauchitsch described him as too ambitious and 

too conscious of his own achievements-he 

was first given a panzer corps to command 

in the Russian campaign. But Hitler held 

him in high regard, gave him command of 

Eleventh Army in September '94', and in 

July '942, after the conquest of the Crimea 

that culminated in the brilliantly executed 

capture of Sevastopol, promoted him to 

field marshal. Manstein, when he took 

command of Army Group Don, had a 

reputation to uphold, and possibly enlarge, 

as an engineer of victories and as an inspired, even daring, commander and tactician. He had Hitler's confidence. Had the 

Fuehrer decided to appoint another Commander in Chief, Army, he would have been 

one of the likeliest candidates. In his own 

mind Manstein seems to have begun to 

envision at least an appointment as Chief 

of Staff, OKH, with enough added authoritv to make him Hitler's Ludendorff. 

Paulus was the ideal staff officer, 

thoroughly trained, conscientious, capable, 

hard-working, and reserved. Nearly all of 

his military career had been spent as a staff 

offi cer, culminating in an appointment in 

'940 as Oberquartiermeister T, the plans 

chief in the OKH. Sixth Army was his 

first combat command and the 1942 summer offensive his first campaign in the 

field. He lacked the ability to inspire the 

personal loyalty enjoyed by some of the 

other army commanders, but he had fought 

the campaign well by professional stand-
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

ards. Like Manstein's his career was also 

on the rise." Reportedly, Hitler planned 

to bring him back to Fuehrer headquarters 

after Stalingrad to replace JodI, who was 

in lingering disfavor. 58 

On 2 I November Hitler ordered Sixth 

Army to stand where it was " regardless of 

the danger of a temporary encirclement." " 

At the same time, he promised M'anstein 

reinforcements totaling 6 infantry divisions, 

4 panzer divisions, an Air Force field division, and an antiaircraft artillery division, 

but of those only 2 infantry divisions were 

available immediately, the others not to be 

expected until the first week of December.'" 

The order reached Paulus at Nizhne 

Chirskaya behind the Chir River and outside the developing encirclement, where the 

Sixth Army's winter headquarters had been 

built. He had stayed at his forward command post at Golubinskaya, on the bank 

of the Don ten miles north of Kalach , until 

nearly noon , when Soviet tanks headed toward Kalach came into sight on the steppe 

to the west. The XIV Panzer Corps staff 

moved into the headquarters at Golubinskaya and from there, with parts of the 14th 

and 16th Panzer Divisions, tried to lure the 

Russian spearhead into a stationary battle. 

Wherever they could, the Russian tanks 

ignored the Germans and roared on past. 

IV Tank Corps lost a little speed. Its 

neighbor on the west, XXVI Tank Corps, 

was not affected at all. In a daring raid 

before dawn on the morning of 22 Novem-

~r Sec Goerlitz, Paulu s and Stalingradj Heinz 

Schroeter, Stalingrad (New York, 1958 ). 

r.8 Hillgrubcr, cd., Kriegstagebu ch des Oberkom· 

morldos der Wehrmach t . Band Ill , p. 12. 

:;0 H. Cr. B. la , an AOK 6, Fuehrerenhcheid. 

2/.11.42 , AOK 6 75107 / 6 file. 

• OKH, GenSldH, Op. Abl. (l S IB) N,. 4'0947 

/ 4:J , a11 H . Gr. B, 22.11.42 , H. Gr. D on 39694/ 3b 

file. 

57 

ber, a battalion from XXVI Tank Corps 

captured the Don bridge at Kalach and 

formed a hedgehog around it. 

That morning, Paulus flew into the 

pocket. From the Gumrak airfield, he informed Hitler by radio that the Russians 

had taken Kalach and that Sixth Army 

was encircled. In the strictest sense, the 

report was not correct. The Germans in 

Kalach held out until the next day; it was 

late on that day, the 23rd, that, after an 

exchange of green recognition ftares, I V 

Tank Corps, which had crossed the Don 

and covered the intervening ten miles, met 

IV Cavalry Corps at Sovetskiy, and closed 

the ring,G! 

In the message to Hitler on 22 November, Paulus also stated that he did not have 

any kind of a front on the south rim of the 

pocket, between Kalach and Karpovka; 

therefore, he would have to call XIV 

Panzer Corps back and use its divisions to 

close the gap. If enough supplies could be 

fl own in and the gap could be closed-the 

latter doubtful because of shortages of 

motor fuel- he intended to form a perimeter around Stalingrad. If a front could not 

be established in the south, the anI v solution, as he saw it, was to evacuate Stalingrad, give up the north front, pull the army 

together, and break out to the southwest 

toward Fourth Panzer Army. He requested discretionary authority to give such 

orders if they became necessary. 62 

H aving waited in vain throughout the 

day on the 23rd for a decision from Hitler 

and by then aware that the Russians had 

plugged the last gap, completing the cor01 Schroe ler, Sinlif/grad. p. 80. IVOV( R ), 111. 

40-49· «! AOK 6, la . KR-Funbprll ch an H. Cr. B. :12 . 11. 

42. 1901 Uh,. in Unterlagen Festung Stalillgrad. 

~· v 4'2, AOK 6 7510713 file. 
58 

don, Paulus that night radioed a second appeal to the OKH in whieh he stated 

that the German front still open in the 

south would expose the army to destruction 

"in the very shortest time" if the breakout were not attempted. As the first step 

he would have to strip the northern front 

and deploy the troops south for the escape 

effort. He again asked for freedom of 

decision, buttressing his request with the 

statement that his fi ve corps commanders 

concurred in his estimate.

G3 In a separate 

message Weichs seconded Paulus' request; 

and during the night General der Artillerie 

Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Commanding General, LI Corps, concluding that a 

breakout was inevitable and ' th at Hitler 

would have to be presented with a fait 

accompli, began pulling back several of his 

divisions on the northeastern tip of the 

pocket- which brought a prompt and 

angry protest from Hitler.'" Seydlitz, for 

whom destiny was preparing a unique place 

among the Stalingrad generals, was in personality the antithesis of Paulus, impulsive, 

temperamental, and enterprising. 

Manstein, who also submitted an esti-

~ Paulus. Fu nkspruch art OKH, Nachrichtlich 

H . Cr. B, 23.11.42. 2130 Uhr. AOK 6 75107 / 6 

file. 

G10 n '24 November Hitle r demanded a report 

on the LI Corps' withdrawal and forbade any 

further measures cont rary to Operations Order t. 

Wcichs attempted to gloss over the malter by explaining that the troops had been taken hack to 

prepared positions in order to gain a division for 

other employment ; bu t Hitler was not convinced 

and, suspicious of Paulus, gave Seydlitz, of whose 

ac tion he apparently was not aware, command of 

the entire north front, making him personally 

responsible for holding that side of the pocket. 

O KH , GenStdH , Op. Abt. (l SIB) Nr. 4209641 

42, an 6 Armee , H. Gr. B, H . Gr. DOT!. 24. 11.42; 

OKH. G,,,SldH, Op. Abl. ( I S I B) N,. 134142; 

H . Gr. B. AOK 6, 24.11.42 (all in AOK 6 

75107/6 file ); H . Gr. B. l a, Nr. 4242 142; H . Gr. 

D on. 24.11.42. H. Gr. Don 39694 /3b file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

mate to the OKH, was less positive th an 

Paulus and Weichs. He agreed that the 

breakout was the safest course and that an 

attempt to hold out was extremely dangerOUSj but he did not support an immediate 

attempt. He believed a relief operation 

could start in early December if the promised reinforcements were made available. 

At the same time, he warned that the breakout could still become necessary if the 

relief forces could not be assembled." 

That Hitler was not being influenced by 

any of these communications soon became 

clear. On 24 November he ordered Sixth 

Army to draw the northwest and southwest fronts inward slightly and then hold 

the pocket. He promised to su ppl y th e 

army by air."" Over Zeitzler's strenuously 

expressed doubts, Goering had assured 

him that the Air Force would be able to 

transport 600 tons of supplies per day into 

the pocket." Hitler also ordered Fourth 

Panzer Army to stop the Russians north of 

Kotelnikovo and get ready to counterattack 

north to re-establish contact with the Sixth 

Army, CoS 

Two days later Hitler set out the details 

of his intentions in a message to Manstein. 

To evacuate Stalingrad would mean giving 

(1.-. Ob . Kdo. H . Gr. D on, l ao Nr. 4580 142. an 

OKH. Op. Abt .. 24.11.42, H. Gr. Don 39694 /3 h 

file. 

()lJ OKH. GenStdH . an AOK 6. 24 .11.42, in 

Unterlagen FeJtu ng Stalingrad, Nov 42, AOK 6 

i.5 I0713 file. 

At the same time Hitler declared Stalingrad a 

fortress, a designation of no particular military 

significance under the circumstances other than 

as emphasizing his determination to stay there at 

all costs. 

0; MS # T ~ 9, D er Feldzug in RUHland eill 

operath'er Ueberblick (Generaloberst a. D . C otthard Heinrici), ch. X. "Stalingrad," pp. 81 H2. 

M OKH. GellStdH , Op. Abt. (l SIB) Nr. 420961 

/42, an H . G r. B, 24 .11.42. H . Gr. Don 39694/3b 

file. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

up the Hmost substantial achicvemene' of 

the 1942 summer campaign; therefore, the 

city would have to be held regardless of 

the cost, especially since to retake it in 1943 

would require even greater sacrifices. 

Fourth Panzer Army was to "extend a 

hand" to Sixth Army from the Kotelnikovo 

area and hold a bridgehead around the 

confluence of the Don and Chir Rivers to 

facilitate a secondary advance to Stalingrad from the west. When contact with 

Sixth Army was re-established supplies 

would be moved in, the city would be held, 

and Army Group Don could begin to prepare for a northward advance to clear out 

the area of the breakthrough between the 

Don and the Chir." 

After he had made his decision Hitler 

was confident. That feeling was not shared 

at the front." On receiving the Hitler 

order of 24 November, Seydlitz told Paulus 

there could be no question of holding; the 

army had either to break out or succumb 

within a short time. He believed supplies, 

which had already been running short before the Russian offensive began, would 

decide the issue; and to base any hopes 

on air supply was to grasp at a straw since 

only thirty lU-52's were at hand (on 23 

November), and even if hundreds more 

could be assembled, a feat which was doubtful, the army's full requirements would 

still not be met." Paulus commented 

sharply that Seydlitz was interfering in affairs which were no concern of his but 

nonetheless agreed in substance and on 26 

· OKH , GenStdH . Op. Abt. (I S IB) N" 420964 / 

42 , all Hum Clm eral/eldmarschall von Mun steiTl . 

26.11.42, H . Gr. D on 39694/ 3b file . 

':n MS # C--{)65a (Greiner ). p. I 16. 

~l Der K ommandierende General des L/ A.K .. 

Nr. 603 / 42 , an den Hum Oberbefehhhaber der 6 

Armee. 25 .11.42 , AOK 6 75107 / 3 file. 

59 

November in a personal letter to Manstein 

again asked permission to act at his own 

discretion if necessary, pointing out that the 

first three days of air supply had brought 

only a fraction of the promised 600 tons 

and 300 lU-52's per day. " Manstein, who 

assumed command of Army Group Don on 

27 November, knew Hitler's plans and did 

not reply. 

The Russians Neglect the Flanks 

As bad as the situation at Stalingrad 

was, it could have been far worse. Once the 

Russians had completed the encirclement, 

they devoted their main strength to fastening the hold on Sixth Army and virtually 

discontinued the offensive in the Chir 

River and Fourth Panzer Army sectors. 

By 28 November they had concentrated 94 

brigades and divisions against Sixth Army 

and about 49 opposing lhe remnants of 

Rumanian Third Army and Fourth Panzer 

Army, no more than 20 of those in the line. 

On the German side, the line of the Chir 

was held in the north by XVII Corps and. 

wuth to the confluence of the Chir and 

Don, b), Rumanian Third Army. XVII 

Corps had two German divisions and most 

of the remaining Rumanian troops. Rumanian Third Army existed in name only; its 

headquarters was manned by German staff 

officers and its front held by a scratch 

force of smaller German units." In the 

~~ D .n. der ADK 6, an General/eldmaru halJ von 

Manslein, 26.11.42 , AOK 6 75107 / 3 file . 

]n the German Army among all ranks disgust 

at lhe conduct of the Rumanian units was widespread ; and until well into 1943 Hiller and the 

Army Group commands had to intervene periodi cally with orders forbidding open expressions of 

contempt. Observers who retained some objectivity concluded that the individual Rumanian was 

not a bad soldier, but that he was poorly trained. 
60 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

WElCHS, PAULUS, AND SEYOLITZ AT LI ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS 

Fourth Panzer Army sector the remnants of 

Fourth Panzer Army and Rumanian VI 

and VII Corps werc redesignated Armecbadly lcd, and miserably equipped. The Rumanians argued that they had made no secret of their 

capabilities. One point on which most Germans 

and, at least, the rank and file of the Rumanians 

agreed was that the Rumanian officer corps, with 

\'cry few exceptions, was thoroughly incompetent, 

corrupt, and divided by political quarrels. Army 

Croup B reported that in the early siages of the 

offensive, division and corps staffs took to th eir 

heels with out bothering abollt their troops. VO , 

PKW, WPr. zum 3. rum. AOK, Bericht ueber dell 

ZU Ja mmclIbruch der 3. Ruma enischen Arme e, 

13.143, OW 39 file; Der Oberbefehlshaber der H. 

Cr. B, /0 Nr. 4200/ 42, an dUl Fuehrer und Ober· 

befellishober des Hures, 26.11.42, H. Gr. Don 

39694/3b file. 

gruppe Hoth." Under Hoth, Headquarters, Rumanian Fourth Army, took command of the two Rumanian corps. With the 

Rumanians and a scattering of German 

rcar area troops, Hoth attempted to stop 

the Russians north of Kotclnikovo; but, he 

reported on 24 November, if they made 

anything approaching a serious effort they 

could not help but have the "greatest" success. By 27 November Kotelnikovo was 

within Russian artillery range, but Slalingrad Front and Fift)'-jirst Army were rnov-

'Th e change had been planned before the 

Russian attack as a means of keeping closer can· 

trol of the Rumanian units after Headquarters, 

Rumanian Fourth Army, assumed cOJIW13nd. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

ing cautiously; and in the last four days of 

the month the first transports of German 

troops for the counterattack began to 

arrive. 75 

Wintergewitter 

Hitler's decision to hold Sixth Army at 

Stalingrad had embodied two assumptions: 

sufficient forces to conduct a successful relief operation could be assembled; and Sixth 

Army could be maintained as a viable 

fighti!lg force by air supply until that was 

accomplished. The air supply problem 

appeared to be one of simple arithmetic, of 

matching the number of planes to tonnages. 

Such was not the case, but even if it had 

been, the problem would still have been beyond solution. In late November 1942, 

the German Air Force was undergoing its 

greatest strain since the start of the war. 

At Stalin grad and in North Africa, it was 

fighting a two-front war in earnest. By 

the end of November 400 combat aircraft 

had gone out of the VSSR to North Africa, 

reducing the total strength by one-sixth and 

the effective strength by nearly one-third. 

Of 2,000 planes left in the cast, the OKW 

estimated I, I 20 were operational on 29 

November.7G 

Generalobcrst Wolf ram von Richthofen, 

commanding Fourth Air Force, reported on 

25 November that he had 298 trimotor 

JV-52 transports; to supply Stalingrad he 

needed 500. He recommended that Sixth 

Army be allowed to break out, a suggestion 

which Hitler "rejected out of hand." 71 The 

':$ Pt.. AOK 4. la, Kriegstagebuch ' NT . 5 , Teil 

1II, 21 -30 N ov. 42, Pz. AOK 4 28183/ 1 file. 

:11 Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet 248, Rise and 

Fall of the German Air Force, p. 182 ; MS #C- 06sa 

(Greiner ), pp. 124- 25 . 

";'7 Ibid., p. 117. 

61 

subsequent employment of HE-I I I twinengine bombers as transports further reduced the number of aircraft available for 

combat missions without decisively improving the air supply. As it was, even the 

number of aircraft at hand could not be 

organized into an effective airlift across 

enemy-held territory, through contested air 

space, in uncertain weather, and without 

adequate ground support. On 29 November, 38 JV-52's (load I ton per plane ) 

and 2 I HE-I I I'S ( maximum load 1,000 

pounds) took off. Of those, 12 JV-52's 

and 13 HE-I I I 's landed inside the pocket. 

The following day 30 JV-52's and 36 HEI I I'S landed out of 39 and 38 committed." 

If Sixth Army was to be saved, it would 

have to be done soon. 

On I December Army Group Don 

began preparations for Operation WINTERGEWITTER, the relief of Sixth Army, assigning the main effort to Fourth Panzer 

Army's LVII Panzer Corps which with two 

fresh panzer divisions (6th and 23d ) then 

on the way would advance northeastward 

from the vicinity of Kotelnikovo toward 

Stalingrad. Rumanian VI and VII Corps 

were to protect the flanks. For the secondary effort Fourth Panzer Army was given 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to strike toward 

Kalach out of the small German bridgehead astride the conft uence of the Don and 

Chir Rivers. Headquarters, XXXXVIII 

Panzer Corps, left its two original divisions, 

the nd Panzer Division and the 1st Rumanian Armored Division, on the Chir front 

and assumed command in the bridgehead 

of three divisions then arriving, the I I th 

8 OKH, CenStdH, Cen Qu. , Abt. ~ Qu. I Nr. 

/ / 8807/ 42 an H Cr. Don , 26.11.42 ; H. Cr. D on, 

Einsatz Luftwaffe 29.11.42; H . Cr. Don, Einsatz 

der Flugzuege zur Versorgung der 6. Armee am 

30.11.42. Both in H. Gr. Don 39694/ 3b file. 
62 

Panzer Division, 336th Infantry Division, 

and 7th Air Force Field Division. Paulus 

was to concentrate all of his armor on the 

southwest rim of the pocket and be ready 

to strike toward LVII Panzer Corps if 

ordered. He was also to be prepared to 

break out toward Kalach, but was at the 

same time to hold the fronts on the north 

and in Stalingrad. Manstein wanted to be 

ready to start any time after daybreak on 

8 December." 

Doubts and Delays 

The outlook for VVINTERGEWITTER was 

not auspicious from the first and grew less 

promising with each passing day. Sixth 

Army moved two motorized divisions and 

one panzer division with 80 tanks to its 

southwest front for the breakthrough, but 

beginning on 2 December the Don and 

Stalingrad Fronts for a week staged a fuIlfledged effort to liquidate the pocket and 

tied down th e three divisions in defensive 

fighting." On 3 December the Russians 

also became active along the Chir in the 

Rumanian Third Army sector, forcing 

~1an tein to commit there the divisions for 

XXXXVIIT Pan zer Corps and making it 

extremely unlikely that th e corps would be 

able to participate in the advance toward 

Stalingrad. Further, the divisions for LVI I 

Pan zer Corps were slow in arriving, and 

the OKH instructed the army group to 

usc the Air Force field divisions, Doe with 

XXX XVI I I Panzer Corps and one with 

~ Ob. Kdo. d. H . Cr. D on, l a Nr. 0343 / 42. 

Weisung Nr. 1 fuer Operation "Win tergewitter," 

1.1242, H. Gr. Don 39694/ 3b file. 

80 AOK 6, la , Nolizell zur Beurleiiung der Loge 

6. Armee 7. 12.42 Vormittags, H . Gr. Don 39694 / 

4 file; Platonov, Vt oTa}'a M irovaya V oyna , 1939-

45 , p. 39 1 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Fourth Panzer Army, for defensive missions only. 

By 9 December WINTERGEWITTER had 

dwindled to a two-division operation. 

Nevertheless, the next day Manstein decided to go ahead, and he set the time for 

the morning of 12 December, having to 

delay that much because freezing weather 

had just begun to set in after several days' 

rain and thaw had made the roads impassable. A further postponement, he believed, 

could not be tolerated because supplies 

were running short in the pocket and because Soviet armor had been detected moving in opposite Fourth Panzer Army." 

Sixth Army reported that an average of 

only 70 tons of supplies per day had been 

flown in and that ammunition stocks were 

declining dangerously and rations, except 

for odds and ends, would run out by 19 

December.s:! 

Hitler was optimistic. On 3 December, 

answering a gloomy Army Group Don 

report, he cautioned Manstcin to bear in 

mind that the Soviet divisions were always 

smaller and weaker than they first appeared to be and that th e Soviet Command 

was probably thrown off balance by its 

own success. S3 A week later his confidence 

had grown, and, concluding that the first 

phase of the Soviet winter offensive could 

be considered ended without having 

achieved a decisive success, he returned to 

the idea of retaking the line on the Don. By 

10 December his thinking had progressed 

to the point where he planned to mo,'e the 

7th and 17th Panzer Divisions to the Army 

SlOb . Kdo. H. Gr. D on, l a Nr. 0356/ 42. all 

OKH, Chef d. GenStdH, 10.1242, H. Gr. Don 

39694/ 4 file. 

fol! AOK 6. 10. NT. 4727/ 42 , an H. Gr. D on. 

11.1242 , H. Gr. Don 39694/ 4 file. 

"" AT/ nn 785/ , Bezug : H . Gr. D on , l a Nr. 034Ii 

42, H. Gr. Don 39694/3b file. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

Group Don left flank and use them to 

spearhead an advance from the Chir to 

the Don." The next day he ordered Manstein to station the 17th Panzer Division in 

the XVII Corps sector, thereby, for the 

time being, ending the possibility of its being used to support Fourth Panzer Army's 

attack toward Stalingrad." 

Wint ergewitter Begins 

Jumping off on time on the morning of 

12 December- the German forces being 

probably about equal to those opposing 

them- LVII Panzer Corps made good, 

though not spectacular, progress. During 

the afternoon situation conference at 

Fuehrer headquarters, Zeitzlcr tried to persuade Hitler to release the 17th Panzer 

Division for WINTERGEWITTER; but Hitler 

refused because a Russian threat appeared 

to be building up on the Army Group Don 

left fl ank where it joined the right fl ank of 

the Italian Eighth Army. In the conference he restated his position on Stalingrad, 

saying, "I have reached one conclusion, 

Zeitzler. We cannot under any circumstances give that [pointing to StalingradJ 

up. We will not retake it. We know what 

that means . . . if we give up that we sacrifi ce the whole sense of this campaign. To 

imagine that I will get there again next 

time is insanity." se 

On the second day of WINTERGEWITTER, 

LVI! Panzer Corps reached the Aksay 

River and captured the bridge at Zalivskiy; 

but, on the Chir and at the Don-Chir bridgehead XXXXVIII Panzer Corps barely held 

61 MS # C- 06s a (Greiner), p. 140. 

&'I OKH" GenStdH, Op. Abt . NT. 1014/ 42 , an 

H. Cr. D on, 11.12 .42 , H. Cr. Don 39694/ 4 fil e. 

,. St~nogT. D ienst im F. H . Quo, Lagebesprechung 

vorn 2.12 .42, OCMH files. 

63 

its own against the Fifth Tank and Fifth 

Shock Armies, which were attempting to 

fasten the Soviet hold on Sixth Army by 

enlarging the buffer zone on the west." 

Before noon Manstei n reported to Hitler 

that the trouble on the Chir had eliminated any chance of XXXXVIII Panzer 

Corps' releasing forces for a thrust out of 

the bridgehead and that without such 

help LVII Panzer Corps, east of the Don. 

could not restore contact with Sixth Army. 

He wanted the 17th Panzer Division to 

take over the attack from the bridgehead 

and the 16th Motorized Infantry Division 

- then stationed between the Army Group 

Don and Army Group A fl anks- to support the LVrr Panzer Corps ofTensive. 

Concerning Hitler's plan for an advance to 

the Don north of Stalingrad, he stated that 

it could not start before 10 January 1943 

if at all, and, in the meantime, the success 

of WINTERGEWlTIER had to be assured by 

all possible means." Hitler released the 

17th Panzer Division but not the 16th 

Motorized Infantry Division . The decision 

regarding the 17th Panzer was made somewhat easier by a growing impression thai 

the Russians were merely simulating the 

ofTensive build-up opposite the Army Group 

Don left fl ank." 

The Outcome 

During the next four days WINTERGEWITIER went ahead but without gaining 

51 PL. AOK 4, l a Kriegstagebuch NT. 5. Teil Ill , 

16.9-31.1242, 13 Dec 43, Pz, AOK 4 28183/ 1 

fi le; [General Staff of the Red Army] , Sb or"ik 

Materialall po Izucheniiu Opyta Voyny, N omer 8, 

Aug- Oct 43. 

88 O .B. d. H. Gr. Don, 10 NT. 259/ 42, an Chef 

des Generalstabes, OKH , 13.1242, H. Gr . D on 

39694/ 4 file. 

~ MS # C- 065a (Greiner ), p. 144. 
64 

enough momentum to ensure an early success. On 14 December that part of the 

Don-ChiI' bridgehead east of the Don had 

to be evacuated. The attack out of the 

bridgehead would have been abandoned in 

any case since the onc-division reinforcement Hitler had a pproved was by then 

needed in the LVII Panzer Corps sector. 

On the 17th and 18th, LVI r Panzer Corps, 

increased to three divisions by the arrival 

of the 17th Panzer Division, became tied 

down in fighting around Kumsky, half way 

between the Aksay and l\lishkova Rivers. 

On the I gth LVII Panzer Corps suddenly shook itself loose and pushed to the 

Mishkova, thirty-five miles from the pocket. 

Manstein, however, informed Hitler that 

LVII Panzer Corps probably could not 

achi c,"c contact with Sixth Anny and certainly could not open a permanent corridor 

into the pocket. He believed the only 

answer was to order the army to break out, 

gradually pulling back its fronts on the 

north and in Stalingrad as it moved toward 

LVII Panzer Corps. That, he maintained, 

would, at least, sayc most of the troops and 

whatever equipment could still be moved.!)O 

T o Sixth Army he sent advance notice of 

the breakout order. The army's mission, 

he stated, would have to include an initial 

breakout to the ~1ishkova where, after contact with LVII Panzer Corps was established, truck convoys which were moving 

up 3,000 tons or supplies behind the corp' 

would be sluiced through to thc pockct. 

Subsequently Sixth Arm)', taking along 

what equipment it could, would evacuate 

the pocket and withdraw southwestward. 

IIG Der Oberbe/chlshaber der I-I eeresgruppe D Oli. 

/ a Nr. 0368/ 4'1 , (HI Chef des Gelleralslabes des 

Henes zur s%rfigen Vorlage beim Fuehre r. 19.12 . 

42. H. Gr . Don 19694/ 5 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

The army was to get ready but not start 

until ordered.::n 

Hitler, encouraged by LVII Panzer 

Corps' recent success, refused to approve. 

r nstead, he ordered the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking transferred from 

Army Group A to Fourth Panzer Army. 

Sixth Army, be insisted, was to hold out 

until a firm contact was established and a 

complete, orderly withdrawal could be accomplished. In the meantime, enough supplies were to be Aown in, particularly gasoline, to give the army thirty miles' mobility; 

Hitler had heard that the army's vehicles 

had fuel for no more than eighteen miles." 

On 2 I December, after LVlI Panzer 

Corps had failed to get beyond the Mishkova in two days' fighting, Generalmajor 

Friedrich Schulz, Chief of Staff, Army 

Group Don, conferred with Gencralmajor 

Arthur Schmidt, Chief of Staff, Sixth 

Army, O\'er a newly installed decimeter 

wave telecommunications system. After 

Schmidt, replying to a questi on forwarded from OKH, declared that the 

army's fuel on hand was only enougb for 

twelve miles, Schulz turned to the question 

of a breakout. Permission for the breakout 

and evacuation, he stated, had not been 

received; but because of the unlikelihood of 

LVII Panzer Corps' getting any farther 

north, ~1an tein wanted to go ahead as soon 

as possible. Schmidt replied that the breakout could begin on 24 December, but he 

did not believe the army could continue 

to hold the pocket therea fter if hcavy losses 

were incurred; if Stalingrad was to be held 

it would be belter to fl v in supplies and 

replacements) in which case the army could 

" Ob . Kdo. H . Gr. D on. / a Nr. 0369/42. an 6, 

Armee. 19.1242. H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file . 

~ MS # C- 06sa (Greiner ). p. 148. 
STALINGRAD, THE ENCIRCLEMENT 

hold out indefinitely. He and Paulus 

thought the chances for success would be 

better if the evacuation followed immediately upon the breakout, but they regarded the 

evacuation as an act of desperation to be 

avoided until it became absolutely necessary.!l3 The conference ended on that indeterminate note. 

Manstein transmitted the results of the 

conference to OKH. He could give no asOJ FS-Gespraech Gen. Schmidt-Gen. Schulz, 21. 

1242, AOK 6 75107/2 file. 

65 

surance, he added, that if the army were 

to hold out contact could be re-established. 

Further substantial gains by LVII Panzer 

Corps were not to be expected. In effect, 

WINTERGEWlTTER had failed." Later that 

day Hitler conferred at length with the 

Chiefs of Staff, OKH and OKL, but to 

those present "the Fuehrer seemed no 

longer capable of making a decision." 95 

Ill. O.B. d. H . Gr. D Oli, Ia NT. 0372 142, zu 

Fernspru ch OKH, Op. Abt. NT, 521021 / 43. 21.12. 

42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file. 

oc; MS # C- 06sa (Greiner ), p. 93. 
CHAPTER IV 

Stalingrad, the Turning Point 

Sixth Army Isolated 

By the end of the 1942 summer campaign the southern flank of the Eastern 

Front was split in two. Army Groups A 

and B stood almost back to back nearly 

fOllr hundred miles apart, the one facing 

south along the high ridge of the Caucasus, 

the other northeast along the west bank of 

the Don. The whole Army Group B front 

on the Don had one fun ction- to protect 

the forces to the south, at first Sixth Army 

and Army Group A, later also Army Group 

Don. That mission, not crucial as long as 

the offensi\'e kept rolling, had fallen chiefly 

to the allied armies. In mid-December 

Hunga rian Second Army and Italian 

Eighth Arm\ still held the 200-mile front 

on the Don sout h of Voronezh. Their 

future performance was predictable: of the 

three allied armies the Rumanians had been 

considered the best. 

A glance at the map rcycals how n .ilncrable Army Groups Don and A wcrCj they 

dangled like puppets on strings at the ends 

of the few railroads that reached into the 

steppe cast of the Don and Donets. ( AI (II) 

5) The critical points on th ose lines lVere 

the river crossings. E\'crything- cast of the 

Dnepr Bend depended on th e bridges at 

Dnepropetro\'sk and Zaporozhye. The distance frorn Dncpropctrovsk to the RlI s~ian 

line at Novaya Kalitva in the rcnter of the 

Italian Eighth Army sector was 2.10 miles. 

while from Dnepropetrovsk to the Army 

Group Don front on the Chir River the 

distance was 330 miles and to the left flank 

of Army Group A, 580 miles. But the Rus-

~ia s did not need to strike that far west. 

On the left flank of Army Group Don they 

were within 80 miles of the thrce Donets 

crossings: VoroshilO\'grad, Kamensk, and 

Belokalit\'enskaya. A 150-mile march from 

the left flank of Army Group Don would 

take them to Rosto\,. Both Army Group A 

and Fourth Panzer Army were entirely 

dependent on the railroad through Rosto\". 

The Army Group A left flank was 350 

miles and the Fou rth Panzer Army right 

flank 220 miles from Rosto\'. Although 

the Slmlka was not yet so ~e lf· con fid nt as 

to sct about tryi ng to bag two army groups 

in a single swcep, geography, thc state of 

the German forces, and Hitler's gencralship 

wcre cncouraging slich an attempt. 

Southwest Front Renews 

th e Offensive 

I n late NO\'cmbcr, when it could be secn 

that the Germans would attempt to rclie,'c 

Stalingrad, lh e Sttn'ka gaye Southwest 

Front the mission of creating a massi,'C 

di,·cr:.;ion b~ att acking- sOllthwcs.t and wc~t 

against the Italian Eighth and Rumanian 

Third Arm y fronts from Noyaya Kalil" " 

,ollt h to the mOllth of the Chir. Zhukm' 

planned <l nd co-ordinated th e operation 3R 
. ' 

8 

8 

MAP 5 

'lcxxx ,---, 

SEVENT£ENTH 

'-----' 

'Y' 

I 

A DOUBLE 942-19Jonuary 1943 

16 December I [ ,s,,",c .... 

--- GI . ... . '.O,Il ~~. 'IIOI'e"4' 

THRUST AT ROSTOV 

--- GI .... ~ '.000, . "'"oJ 

~ 

••••••• GI" ... ~ ,.""', ,,", ~' • .,. .. .. Gt:."u,.o,,, ""[. "" ..... .. 

.., 't ' .... ,,' I i .'0 '.J, .:. • ..." .... 1 •• 

. .. : .. 

. 

. . 

/ 

~ FiRST PANZER ••• 

" ''''''''"'" ~\ ,,, .... . 

~ --.. ....... ""-: ......... ....... '" 
68 

representative of the Stavka, leaving Stalingrad to Vasilevskiy.' The offensive was to 

go deep- to the lower Kalitva, the Donets, 

and the Derku!. When the planning began 

Southwest Front had the First Guards and 

Fifth Tank Armies. Subsequently First 

Guards Army was enlarged, then split- its 

right flank becoming Third Guards Army 

- and Voronezh Front's Sixth Army was 

attached. 

In December, when the Iront around 

the Stalin grad pocket had stabilized, the 

Russians began to get nervous. The almost 

simultaneous lailure of the Fifth Tank 

Army-Fifth Siwek Army offensive on the 

lower Chir and the beginning of WINTERGEWITTER south of Stalingrad increased the 

nervousness, briefly at least) to a near case 

of jitters. Southwest Front's offensive, conceived as an embellishment, began to look 

like a salvage operation. Under orders, 

Vatutin changed the main direction from 

southwest to southeast and reduced the 

projected depth of the advance by hal£.' 

On 16 December the Russians began to 

move again. Soviet Sixth Army broke 

through the Italian line east of Novaya 

Kalitva, sweeping an Italian corps out of 

its path. In the succeeding days Vatutin 

committed the First and Third Guards 

Armies to extend the breakthrough downstream along the Don. On the 20th the 

1 The Soviet official history, which plays down 

Zhukov's role throughout but makes a particular 

effort to do so in connection with Stalingrad, slates 

that Stalin on '27 November instructed Vasilcvskiy 

to devote his full attention to Stalingrad and, 

as to the Sou thwest Fr01It's offensive, said, "Let 

Vatutin and Kuznetsov [General Ley tenant V. I. 

Kuznetsov, Commanding General, First Guards 

Arm)l] handle it alone." (IVOV(R), III. 43. ) 

It is inconceivable that Stalin at this stage would 

have casually entrusted so important an operation 

to a front and an army commander. 

'Sbornik Nomer 8. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Celere and Sforzesca Divisions on the Italian Eighth Army right flank collapsed, 

carrying with them two Rumanian divisions 

on the left flank of Army Group Don. In 

four days the Russians had ripped open it 

I Do-mile hole and were driving south behind Army Group Don toward Millcrovo 

and the Donets crossings.' 

For the Germans, the first problem was 

somehow to screen the deep northern flank 

of Army Group Don. The OKH transferred a corps headquarters, commanded by 

General der Artillerie Maximilian FretterPieo, from Army Group North to take 

over the right flank of Army Group B as 

the Armeeabteilung Fretter-Pico.' It gave 

the Armeeabteilung one fresh infantry division, the headquarters and elements of 

the 3d Mountain Division, and remnants 

of a weak German corps that had attempted 

to backstop the Italians. Fretter-Pico's 

mission was to protect the Donets bridges 

cast of Voroshilovgrad and at Kamensk, 

establish a line away from the river, and 

tie in with Army Group Don. 

On 23 December Manstein informed 

Hitler that the breakthrough on the army 

group left flank required an immediate 

shift of at least onc division, perhaps two, 

Irom LVII Panzer Corps. That would 

mean relinquishing the idea of relieving 

Sixth Army soon and necessitate long-term 

air supply for the army. The army needed 

3 Kriegstagebu eh des deutschen Gerurals beim 

ital. AOK 8 v. 11.7.42-3 1.1.43 , '5-20 Dec. 4'1 , 

AOK 836188/ 1 file; H . Gr. D on, l a Lage H . Gr. 

Don , 19.- 21.12.42> H . Gr. D on 39694/16 file ; H . 

Gr. D on, l e/AO Nr. 276/ 42, an OKH, Fr. Heere 

Ost, 22.12.42 , H. Gr. D on 39694/5 file . 

tIn the German practice an A rmeeabteilung. 

literally an army detachment, was a temporary 

command controlling two or more corps without 

the full staff and appurtenances of an army headquarters. 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 

550 tons of supplies a day; but von Richthofen, commanding Fourth Air Force, be· 

lieved 200 tons a day was the most that 

could be delivered. If, as it appeared, air 

supply could not be guaranteed, Manstein 

saw a breakout as the only solution despite 

the risk. He pointed out that the appearance of Soviet reinforcements along the 

Mishkova meant the Russians would soon 

also be able to go over to the offensive there, 

a situation which was extremely dangerous 

since Fourth Panzer Army was relying on 

Rumanian troops to cover its fl anks.iS 

Hitler's decision, in fact no decision at 

all, came in the early hours of the following 

morning. He authorized the transfer of 

"elements" of LVII Panzer Corps to the 

army group left fl ank to protect at Morozovsk and Tatsinskaya the air bases which 

were essential for Sixth Army's air supply. 

But the LVII Panzer Corps main force 

was to stay on the Mishkova until the advance toward Stalingrad could be resumed. 

As if it would make all the difference, he 

informed Manstein that one battalion of 

Tiger tanks being sent by railroad to the 

army group would that day cross into Russia near Brest-Litovsk.

6 

The Last Chance for Sixth Army 

A month is a long time to an encircled 

army. Its moral and physical sustenance 

reduced to the thinnest streams, it begins 

to wither. The entire organism is affected, 

most dramatically and dismayingly the men 

themselves. In 194 I the Germans had 

noticed and then forgotten that large num-

~ O .B. d. H . Gr, D on, Ia NT. 0374/ 42 , an Chef 

des GenSldH, 22. 12.42, H . Gr. Don 39694 /5 file. 

• OKH, GenS,dH, Op. Ab,. ( 1 SIB) N,. 421026 

/ 42 , an Generalfeldmarschall von M anstein, 23. 12 . 

42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file . 

69 

bers of Russians captured in the great encirclements died suddenly without detectable symptoms. In December, the same 

sort of deaths began to be reported in the 

Stalin grad pocket. A pathologist fl own in 

to perform autopsies in secret discovered 

that undernourishment, exhaustion, and 

exposure had caused the complete loss of 

fatty tissue, changes in the internal organs 

and th e bone marrow and, as the apparent 

cause of death, a shrinking of the heart 

except for the right ventricle, which was 

greatly enlarged. Such heart damage, in 

normal medical practice, had been regarded 

as a condition that chiefly affected the 

aged; among the soldiers of Sixth Army at 

Stalingrad, as the days passed, it was observed to be common in both the dead and 

the living.' In the Stalingrad pocket death 

was no novelty. Sixth Army lost 28,000 

men between 22 November and 23 December. 

On 18 December the army reported a 

ration strength of 246,000, including 13,000 

Rumanians, 19,300 Russian auxiliaries, and 

6,000 wounded ; but that was far from representing its effective combat strength. Already in mid-October the army had reported that it was reduced to a front-line 

infantry strength of 56,500. Service troops 

were converted to infantry, but experience 

showed that even under the exceptional 

conditions of an encirclement, such con-

\·ersions were neither easy to accomplish nor 

especially worthwhile in terms of combat 

effectiveness.s 

At the end of the first month, the hard 

1 Hans Dibold, Arzt in Stalingrad (Salzburg, 

1949), p. 18. 

N Helmut Arntz, Die W ende des Krieges in Sta-

[ingrad. manuscript apparently written late in the 

war from offi cial German records. Schroete r, Sta· 

lillgrad, p. 208. 
70 

winter had not yet set in. The temperature 

lingered close to freezing- some da),s 

above, some below. Cold days were apt 

to be clear and only occasionally snowy or 

windy. Warmer days brought clouds, fog, 

light rain, snow, and, always when there 

were two or three such days in succession, 

mud. Not as extreme as it might have 

been, the weather, nevertheless, was not 

easily borne by soldiers who were inadequately sheltered and clothed and were living on slender rations of bread, soup, and 

occasional horse mcat.9 The instability of 

the weather also seriously affected the air 

supply. In the early winter, particularly, 

continental and maritime air masses met 

over the region of the lower Don and Volga, 

producing not only frequent and rapid 

changes in the weather but great variations 

within relatively short distances. Consequently, when the skies over the air bases 

at Tatsinskaya and Morozovsk were clear 

the Stalingrad pocket was sometimes buried 

in fog. 

The relief attempt had failed. That another could be made or that the army could 

survive until then were both daily becoming 

more doubtful. On the afternoon of 23 

December, Manstein called for a teletype 

conference with Paulus. He asked Paulus 

to consider whether, if no other course remained open, the breakout (which by then 

was assumed automatically to include the 

evacuation ) could be executed provided 

limited quantities of motor fuel and ration ~ 

were Aown in during the next few days. 

Paulus replied that the breakout had become more difficult because the Russians 

had strengthened their line, hut if it had to 

be, it was better done right away than later. 

Then he asked, "Do you empower me to 

OMS # P- 114C (Hauck), TeillV. Tab el/e Xn . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

begin the preparations? Once begun they 

cannot be reversed." 

Manstein replied, "That authority I 

cannot give today. I am hoping for a decision tomorrow. The essential point is do 

you consider the army capable of forcing its 

way through to Hoth if supplies for a longer 

period cannot be assured?" Paulus answered, "I n that case, there is nothing else 

to be done." He thought the army would 

need six days to get ready and an added 

300,000 gallons of motor fuel plus 500 tons 

of rations. 10 

Within the hour Manstein dispatched a 

situation estimate to Hitler in which he 

outlined three po ibilities: ( I) leave the 

army where it was and assure a daily air 

supply of at least .'jOO tons; ( 2) order 

Paulus to break out, taking the risk that 

the army might not get through; (3) transfer immediately the 16th Motorized Infantry Division and two panzer division ~ from 

First Panzer Army (Arm)' Group A ) to 

enable Fourth Panzer Army to resume the 

advance towa rd Stali ngrad." Again Hitler 

could not make up his mind and, in lieu of 

a decision, the next day countered with a 

series of questions. \Vas a breakout actually possible, and would it succeed? When 

could it start? How long could Paulus stay 

in the pocket, given the current level or 

supplies or, perhaps "somewhat" increased 

air supply? When could the relief operation be resumed ir lan stei n were given 

both the SS Panzer Grenadier Division 

Wiking and the 7th Panzer Division? Did 

Manstein think the Russians would ~oon be 

10 FS-Ge rpral.ch, Gell. Feldmarsc/zall 1'011 kflll/-

stein an Gen. Obst. 1'071 Pauilu. 23.12 4'2. AOK 6 

75 107 /5 file. 

H Mansttin. an Chtf Gell. Slab. A lit wort aul 

heutige An/ragt. 23.1'24'2 . H . Gr. D on 39694/5 

file. 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 

stopped by supply and fuel shortages' 

Would Manstein "welcome" being given 

command of Army Group A as well as Don 

in light of the fact "that the further developments could lead to momentous decisions?"" (Hitler had relinquished personal command of Army Group A on 22 November and turned over command to 

Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist. ) 

Mainstein answered that the breakout 

could begin, as reported, in six days. As to 

success, nobody could predict that with 

certainty; and, if even a moderate degree 

of assurance were desired, it would be necessary to transfer two more divisions from 

First Panzer Army. The SS Wi king Division and the 7th Panzer Division would be 

needed on the army group left flank when 

they arrived. There were no reasons for 

thinking the Russians would run out of supplies. As far as his also taking command 

of Army Group A was concerned, nobody 

would "welcome" it in the existing circumstances, but it was unavoidable. Even 

so, it appeared that for Sixth Army, and 

Army Groups Don and A as well, the announced "momentous decisions" would 

come too late. Manstein concluded, "I ask 

that it be considered how the battle would 

develop if we commanded on the other 

side." 13 

Operations Order 2 

On 24 December Vatutin pushed a 

spearhead through to Tatsinskaya and came 

within artillery range of Morozovsk. That 

same day Second Guards Army, rushed to 

the Mishkova by Stalingrad Front, threw 

120KH, GcnStdH, Op. Abt. NT. 421030/ 42, an 

H. Gr. Don, 24.1:142, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file. 

l!l O.B. d. H . Gr. Don, l a NT. 0376/42, in Chef 

des GenStdH. './4.1242, H. Gr. Don 39694/6 file. 

71 

LVII Panzer Corps back to the Aksay 

River. To hold the air supply base for 

Sixth Army at Morozovsk and recapture 

the one at Tatsinskaya, Manstein had to 

take the I I th Panzer Division from the 

hard-pressed Fourth Panzer Army. He 

created the Headquarters, Armeeabteilung 

Hollidt, under General der Infanterie Karl 

Hollidt, and gave it command of the north 

flank. The Headquarters, Rumanian 

Third Army, he sent behind the Donets to 

reorganize the Rumanian stragglers and 

start building defenses downstream from 

Kamensk. H 

To gain a respite north of TatsinskayaMorozovsk, Manstein had been forced to 

reduce Fourth Panzer Army's effective 

strength by a third; nevertheless, Hitler 

still hoped to bring up the 7th Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Grenadier Division 

Wiking in time to renew the advance toward Stalingrad. 1l1 Manstein's situation 

report of 25 December demonstrated how 

slight that hope was. In a day or two, he 

said, the Fifty-first and the Second Guards 

Armies would attempt to encircle Fourth 

Panzer Army on the Aksay River. Nothing 

could be expected of Rumanian VI and 

VII Corps, and the two divisions of LVII 

Panzer Corps could muster no more than 

nineteen tanks between them. If Sixth 

Army was not to be left entirely in the 

lurch at Stalingrad, a panzer corps (two 

divisions ) and an infantry division would 

have to be shifted from Army Group A to 

Fourth Panzer Army and at least one inH H. Gr. Don , la , Lage H. Gr. DOTl, 22.-27.12. 

42, H. Gr. Don 39694/16 file ; H. Gr. Don, fa Nr. 

415142. Heeresgruppenbe/ehl fuer Neugliederung 

der Befehlsverhaeltnisse, 26.12-42, H . Gr. Don 

39694/6 file. 

150KH, CenStdH, Op. Abl. 421030/42, an H . 

Cr. Don, 24.12-42, H. Gr. Don 39694/6 file. 
72 

fan try division to the Army Group Don 

left flank." 

The next two days proved that Manstein was by no means painting too dark a 

picture. On the 26th Paulus reported that 

casualties, cold- the temperature that day 

was -15 0 F.- and hunger had so sapped 

his army's strength that it could not execute 

the breakout and evacuation unless a supply corridor into the pocket was opened 

first." The next day Rumanian VII Corps, 

holding the LVII Panzer Corps flank on 

the cast, collapsed and fell into a disorganized retreat, leaving the German corps 

stranded. Hoth hoped to get the panzer 

corps back to Kotelnikovo where it might 

make another temporary stand. I S 

On the 27th Hitler, looking for a cheap 

way out, ordered Army Groups Don and A 

to hold where they were while Army Group 

B, to protect the rear of Don, rctook the 

line of the Rossosh' -Millerovo railroad. 

Army Group A, he told Manstein, could 

not spare any divisions, and Army Group 

Don would have to make do with the SS 

Wiking, the 7th Panzer Division, and the 

battalion of Tiger tanks. The only hint of 

flexibility was an order to Army Group A to 

begin evacuating its wounded and scout a 

bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula." Manstein protested that Fourth Panzer Army's 

2 panzer divisions and the 16th Motorized 

Infantry Division faced a total of 43 enemy 

1~ O.B. d. H. Cr, D on, It I Nr, 378142, an Chef 

d . CenStdH, 25 .12-42 , H. Gr . Don 39694 / 6 file . 

n AOK 6, fa N,. 6010142 , an O .B. H . Gr. 

Don, 26.1243. H. Gr. Don, 39694/ 6 file. 

" Pz. AOK 4 . la Kriegstagebu ch Nr, 5 . Teil 

Til, 27 Dec 42 , Pz. AOK 4 28183/ 1 file . 

"OKH, G,nStdH, Op. Abt. II S IB) Nr. 

421033/42 , 0'1 den O .B. d. H. Gr. D on, 27. 12-42j 

OKH, GenStdH, 01'. Abt. Nr. 321034/ 42 , Weisung fuer die weitere KampDuehrung, 27.12 .42 . 

Both in H. Gr. Don 39694/ 6 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

units (brigades and divisions, tank, cavalry, 

and mechanized corps) while First Panzer 

Army in a well-constructed line was opposed only by an equal number, and Seventeenth Army had to deal with no more than 

24 Soviet units. He was convinced, he 

wrote, that events would compel a shift of 

forces from A to Don. The sooner the decision to do so was made the cheaper it 

would be in the long run." 

Hitler countered with Operations Order 

2. Army Group A, holding its line on the 

Black Sea coast and in the Caucasus, 

would swing its right Aank back by stages 

to Salsk, where it would be able to take 

over its own flank defense. Fourth Panzer 

Army, if forced to, could fall back to the 

line Tsymlyanskaya-Salsk. To co-ordinate 

those movements Manstein would assume 

command of Army Group A at a time to 

be decided by Manste'n himself." Hitler 

passed over in silence Manstein's earlier contention that his taking command of both 

army groups would be worthwhile only if 

it included full operational freedom." 

The last days of the year brought another crisis. On the afternoon of 28 December Fourth Panzer Army had to rescue 

LVII Panzer Corps by permitting it to 

withdraw from Kotelnikovo to the Sal 

River. That opened up the south bank of 

the Don to Rostov and exposed the deep 

right flank of Armeeabteilung Hollidt. The 

next day the Russians pushed out of a small 

bridgehead they held around Potemkinskaya, and Hollidt had to shift the 11th 

~ O .D. d . H . Gr. D on, la Nr. 0384 142, an Ch ef 

des GenStdH., 27.12 .42 , H. Gr. Don 39694 / 6 file. 

l OKH, CenStdH, Op . Abt. Nr. 421042 / 42 , 

Operatio nsbefehl Nr. 2 , 28.12.42 , H. Gr. D on 

39694/ 6 file . 

'22 0 .B. d. H . Gr. D on, la , Nr. 0376142 , an Ch ef 

des Cen eralstabes des Ceneralstabes zu Fernspruch 

uom 24 .12-42 , H. Gr. Don 39694/ 6 file . 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 

Panzer Division to Tsymlyanskaya, seventy 

miles downstream, to brake their advance. 

Because of the growing danger, Hitler 

ordered the 7th Panzer Division held at 

Rostov for a possible last-ditch defense of 

the city." 

On the 28th Manstein reported to Hitler 

that Fourth Panzer Army was no longer 

capable of holding a broad front south of 

the Don and that the Armeeabteilung 

Hollidt line could be penetrated from the 

north or south at any time. He intended 

to turn Fourth Panzer Army east south of 

the Sal River to protect the rear of Army 

Group A, taking the chance that the Russians might cut through to Rostov between 

the Sal and the Don. Armeeabteilung 

Hollidt would have to be pulled back, possibly, to a line slightly forward of the 

Donets, more likely to the river itself." 

On New Year's Eve Manstein told 

Paulus that the army group's first objective 

was to liberate Sixth Army, but the army 

would have to hold out in the pocket a while 

longer. Hitler, he said, had ordered Goering to increase the air supply to at least 300 

tons a day." Whether he knew it or not, 

Manstein had said farewell to Sixth Army. 

Army Group Don would henceforth be 

fighting for its own life. Southwest Front's 

armies, having reached their original end 

objectives, were surging past Millerovo on 

the east and west toward the Donets be13 Pz. AOK 4. l a, Kriegstagebuch NT. 5, Teil 

111, 28- 31 Dec 42, Pz. AOK 4 28 183/ 1 file ; 

H . Cr. Don, la, Lage H . Gr. D on, 28.- 31.12.4-2, 

H. Gr. Don 39694/ .6 file ; OKH, GenStdH, Op. 

Abt. (/ SIB) NT. 1959142, Einzelanordnungen des 

Fuehrers NT. 79, 30.12 .42, H. Gr. Don 39694/ 6 

file. 

:N O.B. d. H . G r. Don, la NT. 0394/ 42 , an 

OKH, Chef des Genualstabes, 31./2.42 , H. Gr. 

Don 39694/6 file. 

r. a.B. H . Cr. Don, fa Nr. 0396142, an AOK 

6 , 31.12.42 , H. Gr. D on 39694/6 file. 

73 

tween Voroshilovgrad and Belokalitvenskaya. Stalingrad Front, after transfer of 

its three armies on the south face of the 

Stalingrad pocket to Don Front, was renamed South Front on I January and given 

the mission of attacking toward Rostov on 

both sides of the Don with the Fifth Shock, 

Second Guards, and Fifty-first Armies." 

Ignoring Manstein's report of the 28th, 

Hitler, on New Year's Day, announced in 

a supplement to Operations Order 2 that 

he was going to send the Grossdeutschland Division and the SS Divisions Adolf 

Hitler, Das Reich, and 7th SS to relieve 

Stalingrad. Army Groups B and Don were 

to hold the most favorable positions for the 

jump-off. All the provisions of Operations 

Order No.2 remained in effect. In it he had 

given permission for Hollidt to withdraw 

no farther than the line Morozovsk-Tsymlyanskaya." 

Even Hitler did not expect the divisions 

for the relief to be deployed before midFebruary. To imagine that Fate and the 

Russians would allow that much time was 

the merest self-deception. 

At the turn of the year, very little had 

been accomplished. The withdrawals Hitler 

approved were piecemeal; he still talked in 

terms of "definitive" lines and was beginning to lose himself in nebulous plans for a 

counteroffensive. The decision to bend 

back the left flank of Army Group A was 

a significant step, but after he had issued 

the order he showed no desire to see it executed quickly and, on the contrary, seemed 

to welcome delays. 

On 2 January, in a dispatch to Zeitzler, 

'" Platonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , '939-45 , 

p. 397· 

1'1' OKH, GenStdH, OfJ. Abt. (1 SIB) Nr. 421052 

142, Ergaenzung zum Operationsbefehl Nr. 2, 

1.1.43, H. Gr. D on 39694/6 file. 
74 

Manstein no longer attem pted to conceal 

his irritation. He pointed out angrily that 

although it could have been seen as soon as 

Sixth Army was encircled that the Russians 

were developing a major offensive on the 

southern flank of the Eastern Front and 

might strike into the rear of Armv Group 

A, nothing had been done until the last 

few days about evacuating the wounded 

and the heavy equipment from the Caucasus. The consequences of that neglect 

,yould be either to slow the movements of 

Army Group A or to force a sacrifice of 

large quantities of equipment. Because 

the OKH (Hitler) was controlling all th e 

substantial shifts of Army Group A forces 

no purpose would be served by Army 

Group Dan's taking over A. Since the 

OKH had ordered the divisions intended 

for Fourth Panzer Army, the 7th and 11th 

Panzer Divisions, sent elsewhere, all Army 

Group Don could do was to instruct Hath 

to hold as long as he could keep his flanks 

free. Army Group A would have to speed 

up its withdrawal and transfer a corps to 

Salsk." Unlike some that had gone before, 

this communication had at least one effect: 

Hitler did not again mention Manstcin's 

taking command of Army Group A. 

Retreat to Ihe Manich and Ih e 

Donets 

In the first week of the new year Armccabteilung HolJidt began a hectic 90-

mile retreat to the Donets. On 3 Jan uary 

Armeeabteilung Fretter-Pico reported that 

the 304th Infantry Division, which had 

been assigned the mission of keeping touch 

:18 O.B. d. H . Gr. Don, fa Nr. 0399/ 42, all Chef 

des Generalstabts des Hures, 2.1.43, H. Gr. D on 

39694/6 file . 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

with Hollidt's left flank, could not be depended on. It lacked training and combat 

experience; panic was breaking out in the 

ranks." East of the Fretter-Pico-Hollidt 

boundary the Russians had massed two tank 

corps for an attack toward the Donets crossing at Belokalit,"enskaya, and Hitler, on 4 

January, had to release the 4th Panzer Division to prevent a breakthrough. On the 

5th, having retreated forty miles in six days, 

Hollidt gave up l\[orozovsk, the air base 

closest to Stalingrad. The next day Hitler 

tried to call a halt " for the sake of morale 

and to conserve the strength of the troops"; 

but with the Russians probing across the 

Don in the south and threatening to advance down the Donets from the north 

Hollidt had not a chance of holding any 

line east of the Donets more than a few 

days. 30 

On the other side of the Don, Fourth 

Panzer Army ranged its two panzer divisions and the \Viking Division along the 

Kuberle River, which flowed into the Sal 

from the south. In the gap between the 

Don and the Sal the II I Guards Tank 

Corps pushed downstream along the south 

bank of the Don and at the end of th e first 

week of January sent reconnaissance patrols 

to within twenty mil es of Rostov. Hitler 

urged ~1anstcin to commit the Tiger tanks, 

which he predicted would be able to destroy 

a Soviet tank corps; but when the Tigers 

went into action for th e first time they failed 

to live up to that expectation. They claimed 

to have destroyed eighteen enemy tanks, but 

of the twenty Tigers half were damaged. 

Hath reported that the tank crews needed 

29 A. Abt. Fretter-Pico. l a, Kriegstagebuch, /8. 

12.42- 2.2-43.3 Jan 43 , A. Abt. Fretter-Pico 31783 

/ 1 file. 

:I(l OKH. GenStdH, Op. Abt. NT. 171 /43, an H . 

Gr. Do'l. 6.1.43. H. Gr. Don 3969417 file . 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 

morc training and experience. 3 1 

When a motorized corps and guards rifle 

corps began making their way around 

Fourth Panzer Army's north flank, Hitler, 

on 6 January, had to permit Manstein to 

withdraw the 16th Motorized Infantry 

Division from Elista.

32 Manstein warned 

that the division could do no more than 

stabilize the Fourth Panzer Army line temporarily. He again asked for a panzer 

corps from Army Group A and complained 

bitterly that everything was expected of 

Don while nothing was possible for A." 

In the second week of January, even 

though the crisis deepened, the fronts of the 

two southern army groups began to assume 

some coherence. Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 

shifting its panzer divisions back and forth 

to counter threats from the north and 

south, continued its march to the Donets. 

Hitler permitted Fourth Panzer Army to 

swing back to a line facing north along the 

Manich Canal." First Panzer Army, 

though slowed by its heavy equipment and 

by what Manstein, at least, considered 

exaggerated worries about what the Russians might do, gradually narrowed the gap 

between the army groups. 

Between 15 and 19 January the stage 

was set for ncw decisions which, in fact, 

wefe already overdue. Armceabteilung 

Fretter-Pico, after successfully extricating 

some 14,000 troops from an encirclement 

at Millerovo, went into a line behind the 

3IOKH, GenStdH, Dp . Abt. NT. 233/43, an 

O.B. d. H. Gr. D on, 6.1.43; Pt. AOK 4 , la, 

Erfolgsmeldung Tiger-Panzer, 7.1.43. Both in H. 

Gr. Don 39694/ 7 file . 

32 OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. NT. 249/ 43, an H. 

Cr. Don , 6.1.43, H. Cr. Don file . 

3J O.B. d . H. Gr. D on, la Nr. 0402 / 43, an Chef 

GenStdH, 7.1.43, H. Gr. Don 39694/ 7 fi:c . 

• OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (I S IB) Nr. 

430028/ 43, an H. Gr. Don, 10 .1.43, H. Gr. Don 

39694/ 7 file . 

75 

Donets." Hollidt's units likewise gained 

the slight protection of the frozen river. On 

the Manich Canal between the Don and 

Prolyetarskaya Fourth Panzer Army set up 

a strongpoint defense, and First Panzer 

Army extended its left flank north to tie in 

east of Salsk." 

Sixth Army Destroyed 

By the beginning of the year Sixth Army 

was dying a lingering death from starvation 

and exhaustion. The supplies trickling in 

were sufficient to prolong but not to mitigate the agony. Between I and 23 December the amounts airlifted into the pocket 

had averaged 90 tons a day. In the first 

three weeks of January they came to 120 

tons a day; but on only one day, 7 December, had the air supply reached 300 tons, 

the daily tonnage promised and about half 

the army's daily requirement. 3

' 

Nevertheless, the army was not yet completely at the Russians' mercy. The original 

success at Stalingrad had been the work of 

the Soviet armor, not the infantry; and 

when Fifth Tank Army and other armored 

elements had pulled out after the pocket 

was formed, the infantry had showed itself 

to be distinctly inferior. By January the 

weather, hunger, and fatigue had also 

taken their toll of the Russians. In fact, 

Sixth Army possessed some small advantages. The chief one was that the pocket 

enclosed nearly all of the built-up areas in 

and around Stalingrad; consequently, the 

German troops had some shelter and could 

:I:i A. Abt. FreUH-Pica, la, Kriegstagebuch, lB. 

1242- 2.2-43, 14- 18 Jan 43, A. Abt. Fretter-Pico 

31783/ 1 file . 

311 H. Gr. Don, la, Lage H. Gr. D on, 15.- 19.1.43, 

H. Gr. Don 39694/ 17 file . 

31 Tageseinsatz der Luftloue 4, 1.- 23.12-42, H. 

G .. Don 39694/ 3b- 5 file. 
76 

obtain wood for fu el from the demolished 

buildings, while the Russians had none. 

Secondly, the terrain, nat and treeless, but 

cut by deep balkas (gullies) , somewhat 

favored the defense. Lastly, the Germans 

had field fortifications of their own nd 

some thc Russians had built to defend the 

city. 

After the Russians resumed the offensive 

west of Stalingrad the task of reducing the 

pocket was left to Don Front. General 

Polkovnik Nikolai N. Voronov was assigned as Stavka representative. JS D Oll 

Front in early January had a strength , 

according to Soviet figures, of 28 1,000 men 

and 250 tanks." The fin al push, originally scheduled to begin on 6 January apd 

take seven days, started on 10 January 

after Sixth Army had rejected surrender 

ultimatums on the two preceding days.'" 

The attack, it appeared, could hardly 

fail, since it was directed mainly against the 

pockee s west and south fronts, which were 

weak, having been improvised after the 

encirclement. Late on to January Paulus 

reported that after that day's fighting there 

was no longer any prospect of holding out 

until mid-February; relief would have to 

come much ea rlier; the promis(:d quantity 

38 Don F' Oll t commanded TWt'lt)'-{iTst , T wentyfourth, Fi/t),-sel'enth, Sixty-second , Six ty-fourth, 

Sixty-fifth, and Sixt),-si: .. th Armies. 

3OSbonlik Nomer 6 states that in January '943 

Sixth Army had a numeri ca l superiori ty in arti llery 

(6,'200 guns to 3,770), machine guns ( ' 3,700 to 

7.300), lanks ( 1,800 to 250 ) , and motor \'chicles 

( 18,000 10 9,400 ). It admits tha t these figures 

include pieces of equipment possibly knocked out 

long before the final battles and some the Germans 

might nol have been able to use f:::; lack of fue l or 

ammunition. Sixt h Army in earl y D ecember reported a strength of about 100 tanks; probably by 

Januar)' many, if not most of these, were dam~ged, 

destroyed, or unserviceable for lack of paris and 

fue l. 

10 Sbonlik Nomer 6 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

of supplics would have to be delivered; 

and replacement baualions would have to 

be fl own in immediatel y.'" 

On 12 J anuary the army lost Pitomnik, 

the better of its two airstrips. Six of the 

fourteen fighters based there took off under 

fire. Five attempted to land on the strip 

at Gumrak and crashed. The pilot of the 

sixth fl ew out to the west, thus ending the 

fi ghter defense over the pocket." In the 

northwest and south fronts the Russians 

had torn gaps which could not be closed 

because the army did not have enough 

troops or the gasoline to move them. 

Paulus reported on the 13th that there the 

artillery ammunition would run out by the 

end of the day and the guns were being 

abandoned where they stood." 

Nevertheless, from the Soviet point of 

view, the first phase of the fin al attack was 

a disappointment. It did not have the 

crushing effect initially expected, and after 

the first few days it lost momentum. The 

Soviet account blames an intelligence error 

which led to too Iow an estimate of the 

German strength." Most likely, Don Front 

was in almost the condition Sixth Army 

had been in during th e previous September 

and October. Five of Rokossovskil" seven 

armies had been in combat since midsummer. If the SO\·iet strength fig ures arc 

accurate, the armies were at least 150,000 

men understrcngth . Stalingrad was not 

coming chea p to the Russians either. 

On IS Janua ry Hitler, after repeated 

picas from Paulus, appoi nted GeneralfeldI I AOK 6. l a, an H. Gr. D on O.B .. 10. 1.43 , H . 

Gr. D on 39694/7 fi le. 

<2 Schroeter , Stalingrad. p. 166. 

t:! Ob . Kdo. H . Gr. D on. In Nr. 412/ 43. an 

O KH . Chef des Generalstabe$. 13.1.13. H. Gr. 

D on 39694/8 file . 

.. Sb ornik N omer 6 . 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 77 

DEVASTATION ALONG THE RAILROAD SOUTHEAST OF STALINGRAD 

marschall Erhard Milch to direct the air 

supply for Sixth Army, giving him authority to issue orders to all branches of the 

Wehrmacht." Hitler's order for the first 

time established a command powerful 

enough to override all other claims on 

planes, fuel, and ground crews and organize 

the air supply on the scale which had been 

promised for Stalingrad; but it was too 

late. Daylight landings in the pocket were 

becoming too dangerous. On the 17th, 

after a pilot reported German troops falling 

back toward Staiingrad on either side of 

the airstrip, Fourth Air Force for a time 

4l> Dcr Fuehrer, OKW, WFSt, NT. 00284/ 43, 

15.143, H. Gr. Don 39694/ 8 file. 

suspended landings at Gumrak." Two 

days later the Russians took Tatsinskaya, 

forcing the planes to shift to bases at Rostov 

and Novocherkassk, over 200 miles from 

the pocket. 

As the Russians moved in for the kill, 

Paulus reported on 20 January that the 

"fortress" could not hold out more than a 

few days longer. In some sectors the defenders had all been wiped out and the 

Russians could march through the front at 

will.'" During the next night Gumrak was 

III Fernsprll ch von Luftflotte 4, la, 17.1.43, H . 

Gr. D on 39694/ 8 file. 

(10KH, GenStdH, Chef des GenStdH, NT. 38/ 

43, an D.B. d. H. Gr. D on, 20.1.43, H. Gr. Don 

39694 / 8 file. 
78 

lost, leaving airdrops the army's only means 

of supply. 

The day of 22 January marked the beginning of Sixth Army's death agony. The 

Russians,.pressing in from the southwest on 

a 3-mile-wide front along the railroad, 

broke through the outer ring of the Stalingrad city defenses at Voroponovo Station 

and marched cast into the city with battle 

flags unfurled. To close the gap was impossible. Ammunition had run out on 

that stretcb of the front and neither troops 

nor ammunition could be brought in from 

other sectors. 

That night Paulus radioed Hitler via the 

OKH: 

Rations exhausted. Over 12,000 unattended wounded in the pocket. What orders 

should I give to troops, who have no more 

ammunition and are subjected to mass attacks supported by heavy artilIelY fire? The 

quickest decision is necessary since disintegration is already starting in some places. Confidence in the leadership still exists, however.'S 

Hitler answered: 

Surrender is out of the question. 

The troops will defend themselves to the 

last. If possible the size of the fortress is to 

be reduced so that it can be held by the 

troops still capable of fighting. 

The courage and endurance of the fortress 

have made it possible to establish a new front 

and begin preparing a counteroperation. 

Thereby Sixth Army has made an historic 

contribution to Germany's greatest struggle.

49 

As the front fell back from the west, the 

inner city, which after months of bombard48 D.B. ADK 6, an Gen. Zeitzler zur Weitergabe 

an den Fuehrer und H . Gr. Don , 22.1.43, H. Gr. 

Don 39694 /9 file. 

n H. Gr. D on, la, Abschrift von Funksp ruch an 

6. Armee. Zur Vorlage an Herrn Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein , 22 .1.43, H. Gr. Don 39694 

/9 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ment had the appearance of a landscape in 

Hell, became a scene of fantastic horror. 

Sixth Army reported 20,000 uncared-for 

wounded and an equal number of starving, 

freezing, unarmed stragglers. As many as 

could took shelter in the basements of the 

ruins where the tons of rubble overhead 

provided protection against the constant 

rain of artillery shells. There, in darkness 

and cold, the sick, the mad, the dead, and 

the dying crowded together, those who 

could move not daring to for fear of losing 

their places. 5o Over the tallest of the ruins 

in the center of the city Sixtb Army ran 

out the Reich battle nag "in order to fight 

the last battle under this symbol." " 

On 26 January Sixty-second Army captured Mamai Hill, and tanks of Twentyfirst Army linked up from the west to split 

the pocket in two. XI Corps formed a 

perimeter anchored on the tractor works 

on the northern edge of Stalingrad while 

Sixth Army headquarters, and LI, VIII, 

and XIV Panzer Corps dug in around and 

northwest of Railroad Station I. IV 

Panzer Corps, which had been holding the 

south front, was destroyed on that day by 

a Russian push across the Zaritsa River 

from the south." A day earlier Sixth Army 

had asked the Air Force to drop only food, 

ammunition was not needed- there were 

too few guns.53 

The end was clearly at hand. On 28 

January Sixth Army stopped issuing rations 

to the wounded in order to preserve the 

strength of the fighting troops. That day 

00 H. Gr. D on, la, Tagesmeldung, 24.1.43, H. 

Gr. Don 39694/9 file. 

~I H. Gr. Don, la , M orgenmeldung, 25.1.43, H. 

Gr. Don 39694/9 file. 

:;l! ADK 6, la , an H. Gr. D on ueber DKH, 26.1.43, 

H. Gr. Don 39694/9 file. 

r.:! ADK 6. Chef, an H. Cr. Don , 25.1.43, H. 

Gr. Don 39694/9 file. 
STALINGRAD, THE TURNING POINT 

the main theme of the midnight situation 

conference at the Fuehrer headquarters 

was Hitler's desire to have Sixth Army reconstituted quickly, using as many survivors of the original army as could be 

found." 

By 29 January the south pocket was 

split, leaving army headquarters in a small 

enclave in the south and the remnants of 

LI and VIII Corps in the north. XIV 

Panzer Corps ceased to exist on that day. 

During the night ten small groups departed in a forl orn attempt to make their 

way west across almost 200 miles of enemy 

territory. By the following night, LI and 

VII Corps had been pushed into a small 

area around the engineer barracks, where 

they surrendered the following morning. 

The headquarters staff, Sixth Army, and 

survivors of the 194th Grenadier Regiment 

still held a 300-yard perimeter around the 

Red Square." 

At 06 I 5 on the morning of 3 I January 

the radio operator at army headquarters 

in the basement of the Univermag on Red 

Square sent the following message: "Russians arc at the door. We are preparing to 

destroy [the radio equ ipment]." An hour 

later the last transmission from Sixth Army 

came through: " We arc destroying [the 

equipment]." " Paulus, failing to appreciate all the implications of his promotion to 

generalfeldmarschall the day before, became 

the first German officer of that rank ever 

to be taken prisoner. Hitler's comment: 

lOt AOK 6, l a, an H . Cr. D on ueber OKH . 

28.1.43, and AOK 6, l a, an H . Gr. D on, 30.1.43 . 

H. Gr. Don 39694/10 file ; Greiner, Die oberste 

Wehrma cht/uehnwg, 1939- 45 , p. 69· 

loA AOK 6, l a , atl fl . Gr. D on. 29.1-43; AOK G. 

an H . Cr. D on 30 .1-43. Both in H . Cr. Don 39694/ 

9 file . 

r.. AOK 6, l ao an H. Cr. Don, 31.1.43, 0615 . 

AOK 6, la , an H. Gr. Don, 31.143, 0714. Both 

in H. Cr. Don 39694/ 10 file . 

79 

"Paulus did an aboutface on the threshold 

of immortality." :17 

In the north pocket around the tractor 

works, the 33,000 men of XI Corps, under 

General der Infanterie Karl Strecker, held 

out another forty-eight hours. On I February Hitler called on the corps to fight to 

the last man, saying "Every day, every 

hour that is won benefits the rest of the 

front decisively." " At 0840 the next day 

Army Group Don received the last message from the north pocket: 

XI Corps, with its six divisions, has done 

iI, duty to the last. 

Long live the Fuehrer! 

Long live Germany! 

---Strecker :19 

In the Stalingrad pocket the Germans 

lost somewhat over 200,000 men. The 

exact total was apparently never determined. During the fighting 30,000 wounded 

were fl own out. The latest Soviet figures, 

which are substantially lower than those 

originally given but still apparently high, 

set the German casualties at 147,200 killed 

and wounded and over 9 1,000 captured, 

the latter including 24 generals and 2,500 

officers of lesser rank.t;O The Soviel Union 

has not made public its own losses. If the 

casualties of the VllI Cavalry Corps and 

III Cavalry Corps, 36 percent and 4.') percent in the period 19 lovember to 2 December 1942, a re representative, the Soviet 

losses must also have been substantial. An 

impression of what the final conquest of the 

pocket cost can be deduced from Don 

~: Arntz, Die W eT/de des Krieges iTI StaiiTlgrad. 

rA OKH , GenStdH, Op. Abt. (/ S I B) Nr. 14331 

43. art Gen. Kdo. Xl A.K ., 1.2-43, H. Gr. Don 

39694/ 10 fil e. 

roo Xl A .K .. an H. Gr. Don, l a, 2.2-43, 0840 , 

AOK 6 75107/ 1 file. 

00 lVOV ( R ), III, 62. 
80 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

WRECKED GERMAN EQUIPMENT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF STALINGRAD 

Front's ammUnition expenditure between 

'0 January and 2 February '943 : 9" ,000 

artillery rounds of all calibers up to '52-

mm., 990,000 mortar shells, and 24,000,-

000 machine gun and rifle rounds,G' 

As Hitler frequently stated, Sixth Army 

performed a valuable service by tying down 

several hundred thousand Russian troops; 

on the other hand, it is possible to imagine 

81 [General Staff of the Red Army], Sbornik 

Materialou po lzucheniyu Opyta Voyny, Nomer 9, 

1944· 

a much less catastrophic development of the 

'942-43 winter battles on the German 

southern Rank in Russia had the army been 

permitted to withdraw its twenty divisions 

from Stalingrad in time. Nor was the 

magnitude of the defeat in any way lessened 

by the fact that it resulted more from 

Hitler's errors than from Soviet military 

skill. Historically, Stalingrad, along with 

Guadalcanal and the North African invasion1 marks the start of the Axis' recessIOn 

on all fronts in World War II. 
CHAPTER V 

The Countermarch 

The Fight for Survival 

At Stalingrad Germany lost both an 

army and a campaign. What Hitler had 

sacrifi ced Sixth Army to keep- the fruits 

of the summer's victories- slipped from his 

grasp along with the dying army. The 

banks of the Don as well as the Volga became a graveyard of German ambitions. 

Since mid-December Weichs, the Army 

Group B commander, had helplessly 

watched the Russians massing against his 

two left flank armies on the Don, north of 

the bend at Novaya Kalitva. In early 

January his worst fears had been confirmed when Third Tank Army, formerly 

in the Bryansk area, appeared south of 

Novaya Kalitva. On the morning of '3 

January the Russians reached up the Don 

a third time- to hit Hungarian Second 

Army. The first assault, by Fortieth Army 

of the Voronezh Front, carried away the left 

flank of Hungarian Second Army. To the 

north, the German Second Army hastily 

screened its flank to protect Voronezh . On 

the south between Lisk i and Novaya Kalitva Hungarian VII Corps and Italian AIpini Corps, backstopped by a German provisional corps, were not touched for a day 

or two; but as Third Tank Army pushed 

behind their line from the south, their front 

disintegrated. 

By the end of the third week in January, 

Army Group B front was torn open on a 

200-mile stretch between Voronezh and 

Voroshilovgrad. Weichs reported to Hitler 

that he saw no way of stopping the Russians 

and was worried about the German Second 

Army which, with an open flank in the 

south and a front that bent back sharply 

in the north, was exposed to a double envelopment.' Second Army would have its 

turn before the month was out. 

The South Flank Threatened 

While the Russians were opening the way 

for a cut deep to the southwest, Army 

Group Don stayed tied down on the Donets 

and east of Rostov protecting the rear of 

Army Group A. (Map 6) Although Hitler 

had indicated at the end of December that 

he intended to withdraw Army Group A to 

a bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula, he 

had only allowed the army group to bend 

back its left flank to tic in with Don. On 

'3 January Kleist asked for a decision on 

what to do next. He wanted to evacuate 

most of his troops through Rostav and hold 

a small Taman bridgehead. Zeitzler replied that despite all efforts, it was very 

difficult "at the present time" to get decisions from Hitler, who claimed to be occupied with other problems and considered 

that decisions such as that pertaining to 

'OKW, Stelluertretende Chef deJ Wehrmachtfut!hrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.1 - 31.3.43 . 

21 Jan 43. IMT Doc 1786--PS. 
82 

< £ A 

, r 

A • 0 

ARMY GROUP A 

19 January -1 8 February 1943 

,......,,....,,......, GERMAN fllOforON 19 J." .. 3 

GItANGU TO ]0 JAN 43 

TTTTTTTTT'!'TT GU .. AN FRONTOM 18 Fn 43 

" , ' I I " , , 

.~ KILO .. HERS 

MAP 6 

. . 

..... 

. • 

... 

• -. -. 

Army Group A still had time. Zeitzler 

added that he believed it was too late for 

the army group to escape through Rostov, 

and on his own responsibiEty admonished 

Kleist to get into the GOTENKOPF, the 

Taman bridgehead, fast. Without expressly confirming it, Hitler let Zeitzlcr's instruction stand, except for an attempt on 2 I 

January to get the GOTENKOPF extended to 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

........ FIFTY-

..., ""f '\ 

; 

" a 

1 

] 

J 

J 

] 

1 

\ 

] 

) 

J 

] FORTYJ FOURTH 

1 

] tl'~~fH 

J 

FORTYSIXTH 

l 

\ ) NINTH 

TRANSCAUCASUS 

..... ./ 

THIRTYSEVENTH 

include the Maikop oil fields. ' 

Manstein, having just rescued his army 

group from one threatened envelopment, 

found himself about to be caught in another. ( Mal) 7 ) On 19 January his left 

flank north of the Donets was still protected 

by a thin line of Army Group Band Ar-

: H. Gr. A, la , Kriegstagcbuch, Band 2, Teil I, 

13-21 Jan 43, H. Gr. A 75126/6 file. 
ARMY GROUPS B AND DON 

(after 13 Feb ARMY GROUP SOUTH) 

t 

\ 30 January 1943-18 February 1943 

GflllolAI<I FROH f NE ,3QJAN 

• 

[iliA OF AZOV 

MAP 7 
84 

meeabteilung Fretter-Pico troops on the 

Derkul River, but Fretter-Pico was being 

forced back to the Donets north and west 

of Voroshilovgrad, and the Army Group B 

remnants were beginning to fall back to the 

Aydar River, forty miles to the west. Manstein gave Hitler two choices: either stop 

the Soviet advance in the gap between 

Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad far enough 

east to prevcnt Second Army at Voronezh 

and Army Group Don on the Donets from 

being completely outflanked, or assemble 

a strong offensive force north of the gap 

and another on the south to strike the 

enemy flanks. For the first, the SS divisions coming in might be used provided 

they arrived in time. Were the second 

course to be chosen, Army Group Don 

would have to pull back to avoid being cut 

off before the offensive forces were assembled. 3 Two days later Manstein warned 

that in another four or five days he would 

have to take two divisions away from 

Fourth Panzer Army (which Hitler had 

ordered to hold open the railroad south of 

Rostov until supplies for the GOTENKOPF 

were hauled through) and shift them to his 

north flank to keep the Russians from crossing the Donets west of Voroshilovgrad.' 

While Manstein showered the Fuehrer 

headquarters with situation reports, most of 

which went unanswered, the Russians stayed 

on the move. South of the Don they forced 

their way across the Manich, threatening 

Rostov and the rear of Fourth Panzer 

Army. The I I th Panzer Division had to 

be transferred from the Armeeabteilung 

Hollidt to push the line back to the Manich . 

Off the left flank of Army Group Don on 

J O.B. d. H. Cr. Don, Ia Nr. 0424/ 43. an Chef 

GenStdH, 19.1.43. H. Gr. Don 39694/8 file. 

'O.B. d. H . Cr. Don, fa Nr. 0428/43. an OKH, 

Chef GenStdH, 21.1.43. H. Cr. Don 29694/8 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

23 January, First Guards Army spearheads 

drove across the Aydar River, crossed the 

Donets west o( Voroshilovgrad, and headed 

toward Lisichansk farther upstream. East 

of Voroshilovgrad three Soviet armies, 

throwing in all the manpower they could 

scrape together, including supply troops 

and armed civilians, launched strong probing attacks across the Donets, some of 

which were beaten off only in the nick of 

time.:> 

As the winter deepened, the rivers lost 

their defensive value and the vagaries of 

the Russian weather added to the Germans' troubles. On 24 January the temperature rose above (reezing, and puddles 

of water lay on the roads. That night it 

sank to below zero. The next day the 

roads were sheeted with slick icc. On the 

27th a snow storm blew down from the 

north and in three days blanketed the land 

in deep drifts.' 

On 25 January the Russians extended 

their offensive north to the left flank o( 

Army Group B, where the Second Army 

front was precariously anchored on the 

Don west o( Voronezh. Hitler had authorized the army to withdraw to the line o( 

the Tim River, but he had insisted that it 

be done by stages, without sacrifi cing any 

supplies or equipment. On the 25th, having just taken the last troops out of the 

Voronezh bridgehead, the Second Army 

was beginning to take the first step back 

from the Don when Fortieth Army attacked 

and broke through the lightly screened 

south flank. The next morning Brya71sk 

Front struck in the north due south of 

Livny. Vasilevskiy was co-ordinating the 

II H . Cr. Don, la , Lage H. Cr. Don, :11.- 26.1.43. 

H. Gr. Don 39694/1 7 file . 

II AOK 6. Vom Tschir zum MiIH. Juni 194 .1. 

AOK 6 32929/1-2 file. 
THE COUNTERMARCH 

operation for the Stauka. With the snow 

drifted too deep for trucks, the Russians 

brought gasoline to their leading tanks by 

air, using single-engine U-2 biplanes that 

landed on the snow at night in the light of 

bonfires. In a couple of days two of Second Army's three corps were encircled. 

The third, tying in with Army Group Center on the north, was badly shaken. While 

the trapped corps struggled to break out, 

the army had only one weak panzer division with which to block the Soviet westward advance. 7 

The Main Effort Against 

Army Group Don 

As the month drew to a close, the Soviet 

winter offensive was in full swing. The 

main effort was against Army Group Don. 

Vatutin's Southwest Front struck for the 

crossings in the middle reaches of the 

Donets, and South Front, under General 

Armii Radian I. Malinovskiy, applied pressure from the east. Zhukov co-ordinated 

operations of these two fronts. Against 

Army Group B, Bryansk Front, under General Ley tenant M . A. Reuter, and Voronezh Front, under General Ley tenant F. 1. 

Golikov, bore west and southwest toward 

Kursk and Kharkov.' 

Unpleasant decisions were again being 

forced on Hitler. Once more, he tried to 

make half measures do. On 27 January, 

at the last minute, he ordered Headquarters, First Panzer Army, two corps headquarters, one panzer clivi,sian, onc infantry 

division, and two security divisions trans7 AOK 2 , la , Chefgespraeche, 24.1- 30.1'43, 24-

27 Jan 43, AOK '2 40937 file. 

' IVOV(R), III, 106- 07. Platonov, Vtoraya 

Mirol'fl)'tl Vnyna . '9.19- 45. p. 425 . 

85 

ferred via Rostov to Army Group Don.' 

Kleist, worried about getting his supplies 

across Kerch' Strait, asked that the entire 

army group be taken out through Rostov; 

but it was too late for that. Badly as troops 

were needed in the north, Kleist had to take 

400,000 men into the GOTENKOPF, where 

the most they could accomplish would be to 

maintain the fiction of a threat to the 

Caucasus. 10 

That the German Command could still 

make relatively deliberate decisions respecting Army Group A resulted mainly from 

the Soviet failure to mount more than a 

token offensive against the army group 

itself. The Stauka plan apparently envisioned a gigantic encirclement of Army 

Group A that would be completed from the 

south and east by Transcaucasus Front; 

but organizational and transportation 

troubles and the cautious leadership of General Armii I. V. Tiulcnev had prevented 

the front from taking the initiative anywhere on a scale sufficient to cause the Germans genuine trouble. 

Several days earlier Manstein had asked 

what was going to be done to relieve the 

pressure on his left flank, since the units he 

might have used there had been ordered to 

stay south of the Don to hold open Rost')v. 

Hitler, on 27 January, promised an offensive from the vicinity of Kharkov by the SS 

Divisions Das Reich and Adolf Hitler, to 

begin on 12 February. Manstein replied 

that he doubted whether the offensive 

would do any good because the two diviD The German security divisions were not in. 

tended for front-line combat. They were composed mostly of older men and usually lacked the 

artillery and heavy weapons of the regular infantry divisions. 

10 H. Gr. A, In , Kriegslagebuch, Band 2 , Teil I , 

27 and 28 Jan 43, H. Gr. A 75126/6 file. 
86 

sions would probably be forced to the 

defensive and, in any case, would be too (ar 

away and not strong enough to affect his 

flank,l1 

At the end of the month Manstein's 

northern front reached the breaking point 

as he was forced almost daily to stretch it 

westward to keep up with the Russians. 

Southwest Front had bridgeheads on the 

south bank of the Donets west of Voroshilovgrad and between Voroshilovgrad and 

Kamensk. On the Krasnaya River one 

Army Group B division still attempted to 

shield the left Aank of Army Group Don 

north of Lisichansk. On I February that 

division's line collapsed and the newly 

created Popov Group (under General Leytenant Markian M. Popov ), with fou r tank 

corps and a riAe corps, moved into the 40-

mile ga p, crossed the Donets near Lisichansk, and headed west toward Slavyansk. 

Bet ween Voroshilovgrad and Kamensk the 

Soviet bridgehead expanded like a giant 

inverted balloon, which might burst any 

tim '~ 

General der Kavallerie Eberhard von 

Mackensen was bringing his first Panzer 

Army headquarters up from the south to 

take over the old Armeeabteilung FretterPico zone and the new front to the west, 

but his main reinforcements, the 3d and 

I I th Panzer Divisions, were stalled north 

of Rostov by snowdrifts." North of the 

Donets Army Group B turned over the 

scattered units on the southern half of its 

II O.B. d . H. Gr. D on, 10 Nr. 293/43. an Chef 

GenStdH, 25.'-43; OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (I 

SIB) Nr. uH9/ 43 , an H . Gr. Don, 27.1.43; O.B. 

d . H. Gr. Don, 10 NT. 0435/43. Beurteilung der 

Lage , 28. 143. All in H . Gr. D on 39694/ 9 file. 

1~ H. Gr. Don, l a , Lage H . Cr. Don, 1.-3 .243, 

H. Cr. Don 39694/ 18 file. 

13pz. AOK I , Ia. Kriegstagebuch NT. 10, 1- 4 

Feb 4'3. Pz. AOK I 3 1555 / 1 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

front to the Headquarters, Armeeabteilung 

Lanz, under General der Gebirgstru ppe 

Hubert Lanz, giving it the all but impossible mission of protecting Kharkov and the 

northern Rank of Army Group Don." 

Hitler was intent on a counteroffensive. 

On 3 February he issued Operations Order 

3. A recently activated headquarters, the 

SS Panzer Corps, would advance with 

the SS Division Das Reich and elements of 

Division Adolf Hitler out of the area south 

of Kharkov to Kupyansk and then strike 

south in the rear of the Russians crossing 

the Donets behind Army Grou p Don. 

Over-all control would be assigned to Army 

Group Don." 

Manstein, who placed no confidence in a 

counteroffensive by onc division, dismissed 

the order with a reply that Army Group 

Don could not take control until after the 

enemy west of Kupyansk was wiped out. 

Turning to more immediate problems, he 

stated that Southwest Front had strong 

forces ready to attack on the middle Donets 

east of Voroshilovgrad and between Slavyansk and Lisichansk; therefore, he would 

have to transfer Fourth Panzer Army's last 

panzer and motorized divisions north, leaving Hath without enough strength to hold 

his line on the lower Don. He asked permission to pull the Armeeabteilung Hollidt 

front back to the line Kamensk-Novocherkassk and, if necessary, to take the entire 

eastern front of the army group back fort)'-

five miles to the Mius River. IG 

II Obkdo. d. fl . Gr. B, l a Nr. 49 r143. It'eisutlg 

fuer die Kampffuehrung im Bereich der Huresgruppe B his tum GegenangriU. 31.1.43 . Ital. AOK 

8 :1'2 166/ 2 file. 

13 OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (1 SI B) Nr. 4300g8 

/ 43 , Operationsbejehl NT. 3. 3 .243. H. Gr. D on 

39694/ I 0 file. 

" O .B. d. H . Gr. Don. l a Nr. Q439/ 43, an OKH . 

Op . Abt. , 3.343. H . Gr. D on 39694/ 10 file. 
THE COUNTERMARCH 

On 5 February the Russians took Izyum, 

the last German strongpoint off the deep 

left flank of Army Group Don. Manstein 

reported that he was being outflanked to 

the west, and neither he nor \'Veichs had 

the means to prevent it. By advancing 

about seventy miles more Vatutin's forces 

could cut both railroads into the Army 

Group Don sector. Manstein called for 

emergency measures : transfer of the 7th Air 

Division to Stalino to protect the Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino rail line; a large-scale 

air supply capability for Army Group Don; 

an increase of rail traffic through Kharkov 

to Army Group Don at the expense of 

Army Group B (the Italians and Hungarians, he thought, could be left to live off 

the land ) ; and two divisions to be transported b y air fr om Army Group A to 

Dnepropetrovsk. ' , 

Retreat to the Mius 

With the surrender at Stalingrad still 

painfully alive in his memory, the prospect 

of another encirclement was too much for 

Hitler. On 6 February he sent a fast 

Condor transport to fly Manstein to the 

Fuehrer headquarters at Rastenburg. When 

the two met, Hitler, with no preliminaries, 

declared that he accepted sole responsibility 

for the debacle at Stalingrad. Manstein 

had come intending to propose that Hitler 

lay down the active command and appoint 

a qualified professional (Manstein?). He 

was so taken aback by Hitler's assumption 

of responsibility for Stalin grad, his professed 

refusal to find fault with any of the others 

who had participated, and by the general 

amiability of the reception, that he only 

suggested that Hitler consider appointing 

11 O.B. d. H. Gr. Don, la Nr. 044' /43. an OKH, 

Chef des GenStdH .5.:J.43 , H.Gr. Don 39694/ 10 file . 

87 

KHRUSHCHEV (LEFT) AND MALINOVSKIY 

a military deputy with somewhat morc 

authority than the Chief of Staff, OKH, 

then had. Hitler led the conversation 

away into a discussion of the "disillusionment" he had experienced with von Brauchitsch and others and then to the situation 

at the front.18 

When the discussion turned to the front 

Hitler again became evasive. After Manstein demonstrated in detail that it was 

necessary to get behind the Mius River 

without losing another day, Hitler took 

refuge in a variety of tangential arguments: 

shortening the front released as many Russian as German troops; if the Russians 

were forced to fight for every foot of ground 

they would soon be worn out ; Germany 

could not afford to lose the Donots coal 

(Manstein had learned before going to the 

18 Fritz Erich von Manstein, Verlorl!nl! Sil!gl! 

(Bonn, 1955 ). p. 438 ; GOl!bbds Diaril!s, p. 265 ; 

Domarus, Hitler Rl!dl!n und Proclamationl!n , P. 1986. 
88 STALlNGRAD TO BERLIN 

MOUNT ED S OVIET TROOPS PASS WRECKED GERMAN AIRCRAFT 

Fuehrer headquarters that the coal mined 

east of the Mius could not be used either 

for coking or as locomotive fu el), After a 

4-hour debate, Hitler reluctantly ga\'e 

Manstein permission to withdraw to the 

Mills, and then asked him to consider 

whether it could not, at least, be postponed 

for a while. HI 

On 8 February Armeeabteilung Hollidl 

look lhe first backward slep to the 1Ilius, 

Thereafter, together with Fourth Panzer 

Army, it covered the I Do-mile distance in 

nine days. Demolition crews gave the retreat a thunderous accompaniment as they 

dynamited the mines and factories. Malinovskiy kept his armies close on the GerI' Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 439- 44. 

man's heels all the way. In the coal fields 

the Russians sent detachments down into 

th e pits, probing for footholds behind the 

German fronl. Behind the German line 

several hundred lhousand civil ians migrated west : refugees from th e Caucasus. 

specialists and men fit for military service 

whom the Germans evacuated from the 

cities, and personnel of the German economic offices. On 18 February Armeeabteilung Holl idt and Fou rth Panzer Army 

crossed lhe ~[ius and occupied the positions which had been built by Arm)' Group 

South the ,ear before. Whether lhe line 

would hold or not was in doubt for several 

days. On the night of the 18th, II I Guards 

M echanized Corps crossed the Mius and 

roUed 18 miles west. Only a sudden thaw 
THE COUNTERMARCH 89 

GERJ.1ANS ATTACKlNG SOUTH NEAR THE MIUS LINE 

gave .the Germans time to push the corps 

out and close the line before the Russians 

could bring in rcinforcemcnts. 20 

Kharkov Falls 

Off the north flank of Army Group Don 

Armeeabteilung Lanz struggled to stem the 

Soviet thrust toward Kharkov. Early in 

February Hitler had declared Kharkov a 

fortress, to which Lanz had objected on the 

grounds that the city was not fortified and 

that he had no troops with which to hold it. 

On 6 February Hitler called Lanz to 

Fuehrer headquarters where he personally 

:.J AOK 6, Yom Tschir zum Mius, funi 1943. 

AOK 6 32929/1-2 file ; IVOV (R), III, 116. 

gave the general two miSSIons: to hold 

Kharkov; and to counterattack with two 

di,·isions of SS Panzer Corps to the southwest toward ~1an tein's north Aank. 

By then SS Panzer Corps, under unrelenting enemy pressure, had for several days been trying in vain to muster 

enough strength for a counterattack. On 

7 February the "rmy group warned that no 

morc excuses would be accepted; Weichs 

had given his word to Hitler; but the next 

day SS Panzer Corps had to evacuate BeIgorod, northeast of Kharkov, and go behind 

the Donets along the rest of the line. On 

the loth Lanz ordered the counterattack 

to begin the following day, but he told 

Weichs that he had only three divisions 

- Adolf Hitler, Das Reich, and Gross-
90 

deutschland- fit for combat and so could 

not be expected to hold off four Soviet 

armies, defend Kharkov, and counterattack. If the attack were started, he warned, 

the risk of losing Kharkov would have to 

be accepted. 

As was soon to be shown, Lanz also had 

other troubles. Headquarters, SS Panzer 

Corps, was new and afflicted with both 

inexperience and overconfidence. The SSmen often regarded their subordination to 

the Army as an unnecessary formality and 

used their private channels to Fuehrer 

headquarters for optimistic reporting on 

their own capabilities and to make certain 

that their setbacks were blamed on the 

Army. 

On 11 February, starting from Mercfa, 

SS Panzer Corps attacked south. In three 

days it gained about thirty miles, but without really managing to come to grips with 

the enemy. Snow forced the German tanks 

to stay on the roads. The Russians, mostly 

cavalry with sleds, took to the woods. 

On the 13th the north flank of SS Panzer 

Corps was forced back to the outskirts of 

Kharkov. Hitler next morning ordered the 

front around Kharkov absolutely to be held, 

even if the counterattack in the south had 

to be stopped temporarily. 

That day Headquarters, Army Group 

Don, assumed command of Armeeabteilung 

Lanz. Hitler took Headquarters, Army 

Group B, out of the front, giving its northern force, Second Army, to Army Group 

Center. Army Group Don he then renamed Army Group South. Manstein's 

first step was to order the SS Panzer Corps' 

correspondence with "higher" headquarters 

stopped. He suspected the SS-men .had 

been responsible in the first place for giving Hitler the idea that Kharkov could be 

held. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

In Kharkov, on 14 February, an uprising broke out, and in the night, disregarding a direct order from Lanz, the 

Commanding General, SS Panzer Corps, 

Obergruppenfuehrer ( Lt. Gen. ) Paul 

Hausser, decided to evacuate Kharkov. 

Before midnight, reminded of Hitler's 

order, Hausser changed his mind and reported that he was determined "to hold 

Kharkov to the last man." The next 

morning Hitler set holding Kharkov as 

Lanz's sole mission, but it was too late. By 

afternoon the corridor out of the city to the 

southwest had shrunk to a width of a little 

more than a mile, and elements of the SS 

Division das Reich, against orders, had 

pulled out of the northern suburbs. Lanz 

found himself forced to approve an SS 

Panzer Corps' decision to withdraw to the 

Uda River. In another twenty-four hours 

the SS troops were pushed entirely out of 

the city toward the southwest and south. 

Losing Kharkov which, like Stalingrad, had 

become a symbol was a blow to Hitler's 

prestige and a scapegoat had to be found. 

On 20 February he relieved Lanz and replaced him with General der Panzertruppen Werner Kempf." 

The Last German Victory 

Of the successive Russian right hooks 

against the southern flank of the German 

Eastern Front, the last was potentially the 

most dangerous. By the time First Panzer 

Army, Armeeabteilung Hollidt, and Fourth 

Panzer Army had drawn their front back 

into the angle of the Donets and Mius 

Rivers, strong Soviet tank and cavalry forces 

had moved in across their rearward lines 

JI AOK 8, la. Kriegstagebuch Nr. I, 5-20 Feb 

43, AOK 8 36188/8 file. 
THE COUNTERMARCH 

of communications. On 13 February the 

Popov Group took Krasnoarmeyskoye and 

cut the Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino railroad. 

By the 19th tanks of First Guards Army, 

after crossing the Samara River and taking 

Novo-Moskovsk and Pavlograd, were converging on Sinel'nikovo, the railroad junction twenty miles cast of Dnepropetrovsk. 

Manstein Castles to the Left 

The Soviet tide was at the flood. But, 

though momentum might still carry it 

far, new influences were coming into play. 

Army Group Don, now South, had conducted its retreat without excessive loss of 

strength or decline in morale. It had 

shortened its line and had freed itself of the 

responsibility for defending Army Group 

A's northern flank. In SS Panzer Corps it 

had a fresh, powerful- though somewhat 

erratic - striking force . The Russians, on 

the other hand, although they had carved 

out vast stretches of territory, had still not 

attained their primary objective, the destruction of the German armies in the 

south. In recent weeks, as glowing opportunities for cheap successes beckoned them 

at every turn, they had shown an increasing 

tendency to follow the line of least resistance. 

In Operations Order 4 of 10 February 

1943, Hitler had taken another step toward 

stopping the offensive. He had told Army 

Group South to establish a firm front on 

the Mius-Donets line and close the gap between Armeeabteilung Lanz and First 

Panzer Army. Harking back to one of the 

proposals Manstein made in January, he 

talked about creating two new "attack 

armies," onc behind the Army Group 

South in the vicinity of Pavlograd and the 

other on the Army Group Center south 

91 

flank. The plan was, to say the least, 

Utopian. It ignored the fact that the Russians were still rolling at full tilt and that 

the question was not simply one of closing 

gaps in the front and then going over to the 

offensive with two widely spaced armies. 

But, in ordering seven fresh divisions 

from the West transferred to Army Group 

South by the end of the first week in March, 

Hitler did provide Manstein with the means 

to brake the Soviet advance and possibly, 

given a little luck and a great deal of skill, 

to seize the initiative. 22 

On the afternoon of 17 February, Hitler, 

with JodI, Zeitzler, and a retinue that included the Fuehrer's personal cook, arrived 

at Army Group South headquarters in 

Zaporozhye. Hitler's visits to the front, 

even as distant as an army group headquarters, were rare. In this instance the 

reasons that brought him there were also 

unusual. On the one hand, he longed to 

put an end to the winter's string of defeats; 

on the other, he had learned the full import 

of Manstein's 6 February proposal concerning the supreme command and he had 

all but made up his mind to hand Manstein 

h is dismissal." 

If he had any doubts, Hitler discovered 

that the situation of Army Group South 

was truly, as one general described it, "hair 

raising." On 18 February Soviet tanks 

were thirty-six miles east of Zaporozhye, 

and there were no German troops in between. From the Armeeabteilung Kempf 

right flank to the left flank of First Panzer 

Army a 110-mile gap afforded the First 

Guards Army and Sixth Army open road, 

to the south and west. They had cut the 

railroad east of Dnepropetrovsk, and First 

~ OKH, GenStdH, op. Abt. (I) NT. 430129/43, 

Operationsbefehl NT. 4. 12.12.42, H 22/223 file. 

~, Goebbels Diaries, p. 265_ 
92 

Guards Army's tanks, those east of Zaporozhye, were, for a day or so, in a position 

to bag the top German command. On the 

east, Soviet Third Tank Army and Filth 

Shock Army had broken through the Mius 

line at separate places. 

The time was obviously not appropriate 

for getting rid of a field marshal, and 

Hitler quickly became absorbed in planning. Moreover, he wanted and needed a 

big success that would attract worldwide 

attention and no doubt sensed that Manstein was the man who could get it for him. 

Manstein, however, insisted on first closing 

the gap between Armeeabteilung Kempf 

and First Panzer Army. Kharkov, he 

argued, could wait but the army group 

could not survive if the gap remained, particularly since the spring thaw, which 

might start any time, would for several 

weeks rule out any attempt to close it.~ ' 

Hitler refused to give in, and in the end an 

accident decided the argument. On 18 

February the SS Totenkopf Division reported that its vehicles were stuck in mud 

east of Kiev, and Manstein persuaded 

Hitler that if SS Panzer Corps had not 

been able to hold Kharkov with two of its 

divisions, it would certainly not be able to 

retake it without the third. 

During the night of 18 February the 

train carrying Headquarters, Fourth Panzer 

Army, arrived in Zaporozhye. Hoth had 

turned his front on the Mius over to Armeeabteilung Hollidt the day before, after 

being ordered to transfer to Dnepropetrovsk. At the Army Group South headquarters Manstein outlined the army's mission orally to Hoth. He told him he intended to crcatc a new Fourth Panzer 

Army in the gap between Armeeabteilung 

~, Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 455. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Kempf and First Panzer Army. Hoth's 

first assignment would be to stop the First 

Guards and Sixth A rmies cast of Dnepropetrovsk and throw them back across the 

Samara River. Von Mackensen would 

stretch his left flank west and northwest 

to narrow the gap. Fourth Panzer Army 

would be given two panzer corps headquarters, two panzer divisions, and two 

infantry divisions from Armeeabteilung 

Hollidt and First Panzer Army; and it 

would take over from Armeeabteilung 

Kempf the Headquarters, SS Panzer Corps, 

with the SS Divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf. Manstein intended to provide three 

or four more infantry divisions later.:!5 

Before he left Zaporozhye, Hitler, on 19 

February, called in Kleist and directed him 

to evacuate as many Army Group A troops 

as possible from the Taman bridgehead and 

transfer them to Army Group South. In 

the next eight days 50,000 men were airlifted out of the bridgehead, and by 6 

March the number had risen to t 00,000. 

But the gain for Army Group South was 

less than it appeared because the planes 

could carry only troops, not weapons and 

equipment. 2G 

Even though Hitler's decision to rectify 

the mistake of sending nearly a half million 

men into isolation on the Taman Peninsula came too late, Army Group South was 

able to extract at least one important dividend from th·e disasters of the previous 

months. Since December 1942 the OKL 

had supplied reinforcements to Richtofen's 

:z Pz. AOK 4. la , Kriegjtagebuch, 1.2- 25.343 , 

I Feb 43. Pz. AOK 4 34888/ r file . O.B. d. H. Cr. 

Sued,la Nr. 684/43, Heeresgruppenbefehl, 19.243, 

Pz. AOK 4 34888/5 file. 

28 H . Gr. A, la , Kriegstagebuch . Band 2, Teil 2, 

Ig, 28 Feb 43, H. Gr. A 75126/8 file; H. Cr. A, 

l a, Kriegstagebuch , Band 2 , Teil 3, 6 Mar 43, H . 

Gr. A 75 126/g file. 
THE COUNTERMARCH 93 

MANSTEIN (CENTER) AND HITLER PLAN TilE DEFENSE OF Z APOROZHYE 

Fourth Air Force, in the Army Group 

South (Don ) zone. By early February 

Fourth Air Force controlled 950 planes, 53 

percent of the 1,800 first-line aircraft then 

on the Eastern Front. The percentage was 

even more impressive if reckoned in terms 

of the best and most efficient aircraft types. 

During the first months of the Soviet winter 

offensive the performance of Fourth Air 

Foree had not been commensurate with its 

' trength for a variety of reasons: bad 

weather, dispersion of effort, and loss of its 

forward bases. By mid-February Richthofen 

had reorganized and regrouped. Keeping most of the long-range bombers under 

the control of his own headquarters at 

Zaporozhye, he had divided his close-support clements into three main forces, stationing one west of Poltava behind Armeeabteilung Kempf, another at Dnepropetrovsk in back of Fourth Panzer Army, 

and the third at Stalino in the First Panzer 

Army sector. In the period 20 February 

to 15 March, he maintained a daily average of I ,aDO sorties, a tremendous improvement over the January average of 350 

sorties per day. For the last time in Russia 

the German Air Force managed to provide 
94 

offensive support in the style of the old 

blitzkrieg days of '940 and '941. " 

The Panzer Armies Attack 

By the time Fourth Panzer Army established its headquarters at Dnepropctrovsk 

the counteroffensive had begun. After assembling at Krasnograd, on the right flank 

of Armeeabteilung Kempf, SS Division 

Das Reich had started a rapid march due 

south behind the points of Sixth and First 

Guards Armies east of Dnepropetrovsk. 

(Map 8) On 20 February the division took 

Novo-Moskovsk, and the next day, turning 

east, it pushed into Pavlograd. By those 

swift blows it eliminated the threat to the 

Dnepr crossings and trapped a sizable force 

south of the Samara, where the Soviet commands had spread out their advance units, 

and in the next two days the division easil y 

destroyed some of them and drove the rest 

north across the Samara Rivcr.:!s 

On 23 February elements of SS Totenkopf Division began advancing cast north 

of the Samara on a line extending to the 

Ore! River. East of Pavlograd the 6th 

and 17th Panzer Divisions moved in to 

form the right flank of Fourth Panzer Army 

and began to push north. Manstein then 

ordered the First and Fourth Panzer Armies 

to smash the Popov Group south of the line 

Pavlograd-Lozovaya-Barvenkovo." H oth , 

in his orders to Fourth Panzer Army, emphasized that for the time being the main 

objective was not to gain ground but to 

destroy the estimated six tank corps and one 

~ Air Ministry ( British ) Pamphlet 248, Rise and 

Fall of the German Air Force, pp. 223-32. 

2!1 Pz. AOK 4. l a, Kriegstagebu ch, 1.2- 25 .343. 

'9- 23 Feb 43, Pz. AOK 4 34888/ , file . 

:!gO.B. d. H. Cr. Sued, 1a Nr. 731 / 43. aTl Pl . 

AOK 4. '3·'-43, Pz. AOK 4 34888/5 file . 

STALINGR AD TO BERLIN 

guards rifle brigade of Popov Group and so 

open the way to the north. 3D 

On the eastern edge of the gap von 

Mackensen had thrown First Panzer Army 

into the offensive with speed and vigor 

that took the Russians completely by surprise. After evacuating Slavyansk to free 

a panzer division, von Mackenscn committed SS Wiking Division against the Russians on the railroad at Krasnoarmeyskoye 

and dispatched two panzer divisions in 

wide sweeps from the east and west to 

create a large pocket north of the town. 

For several days, Popov's staff misjudged 

its situation. On 22 February it reported , 

in a rad io message which the Germans intercepted, that it intended to block th e 

German "retreat." To von Mackensen no 

decision co uld have been more welcome. 

His greatest worry had been that the Soviet 

mobile units would slip out of the enci rclement. By the next day Popov Groul' realized that it was in trouble. It reported 

that most of its communications were cul 

and that in one unit panic was having to 

be suppressed "by the harshest measures." 

On the 24th, as the Russians maneuvered 

desperately to escape, the pocket disintegrated into several small encirclements. 

Popov Group had taken a severe beating, 

but succeeded in extricating enough of it~ 

tanks and troops to make anoth er stand 

farther north in the vicinity of Barvenkovo . .'.! l 

Khorkov Retaken 

The opening phase of the counteroffensive had succeeded beyond all expectations. 

~ Pt. AOK 4. l ao KriegJtagebuch. 1.2- 25 .343. 

25 Feb 43 , Pz. AOK 4 348881 I file . 

3L Pt . AOK I, l ao Kriegstagebuch Nr. 10. 15-24 

Feb 43 , Pl. AOK I 3155S/t file . 
xxx xx XXXX ../ J f7E~E";1 rsECONDl '" THE ARMY GROUP SOUTH 

COUNTEROFFENSIVE i~L_...J~ 19 February -18 March 1943 

A SIKJY~) J SEVENTIEHI ' 1)0 'I"M'fI' TTT ":i SECOND FIFTH 

;f TANK ~ THIRTEENTH 

++++~ ••••••• 

GtRM.lN FRONT LINE,'9FE8 

GERMAN FRONT L INt , n FEB 

GERMAN FRONT LINE, ' MAR 

GE""'''N FRONT LIN£,18Io1AI! 

r 

xxxx ,---, 

L

SECOND 

- -' 

" 

'~, r) 

1

" f~~i:: :--

... - , 

, 

," 

ORONEZH , - I 

/ .: IJ \ 

THtRTY- ,~ XTIETH!Ja ) 

• /) EIGHTH 

~ ?V FOfHV20 ~ 20 40 'OMllfS 

"'·""'",.+t---.",-"'-,T',---r,L'-----" 20 0 60KIlOlolElEIIS 

FORTIETH 

""' -/.\I .~'''"," 

: '¥c 1 SIXTY-

, . -'" 5IXTYFOURTH VORONEZH '"C-______ ~~XX XXX --

THIRD SOUTHWEST 

TANK 

FIRST 

, GUARDS 

[,......,,...... 

r~ ........... -. . 

~( XXXX n-,., ~ 

xxxx F1R,ST .J t!..A~E!!J 1· 

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THIRD 

GUARDS 

FIFTH J TANK 

] SDUH-IWEST 

l

_XXXXXSOUn • 

/ 

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FIftH 

SHOCK 

SECOND 

GUARDS 

TWENTYEIGHTH 

MAP 8 
96 

The two panzer armies had scored shattering successes against Southwest Front. 

West of Kharkov Armeeabteilung Kempf 

was still retreating, but nothing could be 

done about that for the present and it might 

in the further course of events evcn prove 

an advantage. On 25 February l\lanstein 

issued orders to clear the way for a thrust 

into the south flank of the Voronezh Front 

west of Kharkov. First Panzer Army was 

to take Petrovskoyc and Izyum to close the 

Doncts crossings. Fourth Panzer Army was 

to go northeast until it had passed Lozovaya and then be rcady to swing its main 

force north for a thrust along the railroad 

toward Kharkov." 

On 26 February the point of Fourth 

Panzer Army reached Lozovaya. To the 

east the First Panzer Army's left flank drew 

abreast. In two more days Hoth took 

Petrovskoyc on the Donets, and von J\lackcnsen began swinging north on the lin e 

Lozovaya-Pctrovskoye.:!3 Around Barvcnkavo, in the First Panzer Army sector, the 

Russians still resisted desperately; the Popov 

Groul) had run out of gas and had no 

choice but to fight to the end where it was. 

Farther east, First Panzer Army spearheads 

were rapidly approaching Slavyansk from 

the south and cast. ~ 

On 28 February ]\[anstei n ordered Hoth 

to begin the attack toward Kharkov and 

von Mackcnscn to push to the Donets in 

the area cast of Pctrovskoyc.

l

:' Time W3!' 

running short. For several days the daytime tempcratures had risen abO\'c freczing. 

32 O.B. d. fl . Gr. Sued, la Nr. 771 / 43. Heere.rgruppenbeleltl, 25.243. Pz. AOK 4 34888/ 5 file. 

3.1 H . Cr. Don, la , Lage H . Cr. D on, 26.- 28.243. 

H. Gr. D on 39694/ 18 file. 

31 Pt. AOK I, la , Kriegstageb uch Nr. 10 . '26- 28 

Feb 431 Pz. AOK 1 31555/1 file. 

~ O .B. d. H . Cr. Sued, Ia Nr. 826/ 4.1. an Pt. 

AOK 4. ,8·1-43. P7.. AOK 4 34888/5 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Forced to slog through mud and standing 

water, the troops were beginning to tire. 

Soon the roads would become completely 

impassable. 

In spite of the thaw, both armies made 

astonishingly rapid progress. Fourth 

Panzer Army, starting on I March, covered 

50 miles in five days, reaching the Mosh 

River, 10 miles south of Kharkov, on the 

5th. Off the front of Armeeabteilung 

Kempf cast of Krasnograd it trapped and 

destroyed three rifle divisions and three tank 

brigades of Third Tank Army. Over most 

of the distance it was opposed only by 

First Guards Army elements, which had 

been badly mauled and cut off from their 

rearward communications in the fighting for 

Lozovaya and Petro\'skoye. 3G First Panzer 

Army, by 5 lI[arch, had reached the line of 

the Donets in all of its corps sectors. [n 

some of the sharp bcnds of the river, such 

as that sOllth of lzyum, the Russians still 

held bridgeheads, but because of the thaw, 

the army decided to call a halt and leave 

the bridgeheads to be eliminated when 

bcttcr weather set in. :17 

For Fourth Panzer Army the question 

was whether or not to continue toward 

Kharkav at the risk of being stopped any 

day by the thaw. The prospect was tempting, particularly since it appeared that thc 

Russians were not preparcd to put up a 

fight north of the ]\[osh Ri,·er and, after 7 

~lar h, the wcather turned colder again. 

~[anstein and Hoth decided to go ahead, 

but, in order not to risk losing contact with 

.\rmeeabteilung Kempf, to strike west of 

the city instead of sweeping to the cast. 

They planned to cut the Russians' lines 

:I(IO.B. d. P=. AOK 4. Armee-Tagesbelehl, 20.3. 

43. Jlz. AOK 4 :14888/5 file. 

~; Po:. AOI{ J. Ia . Kriegstagebuch NT. 10, 1-5 

Mar 4:i. Jlz. AOK 1 31555/1 file. 
THE COUNTERMARCH 

through Kharkov on the west and then 

encircle the cily by dropping down on it 

from the north. 38 

Again the advance went amazingly well. 

SS Panzer Corps broke away from the Mash 

R iver on a broad front. On 9 1\1arch, as 

the corps right flank drew level with the 

western outskirts of Kharkov, the SS general, Hausser, reported that he had decided 

to take the city the next day in a surprise 

raid; but Hath warned against tying down 

troops in street fighting and ordered him 

to stick to the plan. On the I I th, against 

a direct order to stay out of the city, Hausser, impatient for victory, sent one division 

into Kharkov from the west and another 

from the north. In three days of heavy 

fighting the SS divisions retook the city. 

Meanwhile, they also opened a road around 

the northern suburbs, which enabled them 

to execute the envelopment in the east 

about as quickly as had been planned-at 

least, so Hath said when he declined to 

bring charges against Hausser." 

After Kharkov fell , the resistance west of 

the Donets collapsed. Voronezh Front, obviously afraid the Germans might attack 

across the river, began hastily building 

defenses on the east bank. 

The Soviet winter offensive was over. It 

had made massive gains, but the Stavka 

had meant to reach for a great deal morc. 

In the latter half of February it had deployed Central Frollt (the former Don 

:16 PZ. AOK ~ la , Kriegstagebu ch. 1.2- 25.343. 

5- 8 Mar 43. Pz. AOK 4 34888/ 1 file. 

30 P:;. AOK 4 , la, Kriegstagebu ch. 1.2- 25.3-43. 

9-14 Mar 43, Pz. AOK 4 3488811 file . 

97 

Frollt ) northwest of Kursk for an attack 

toward Bryansk. Voronezh Front had been 

given orders to go past Kharkov to Poltava 

and the Dnepr between Kiev and Kremen chug. Southwest Front's final mission 

had been to strike for Melitopol and Mariupol and clear the Donets Basin.-lO 

On the morning of 18 March SS Panzer 

Corps, advancing along the railroad running north out of Kharkov, covered the 

thirty miles to Belgorod and captured the 

city in four hours. On the 21St Manstein 

proposed crossing the Donets to get a line 

that did not have to follow the zigzag bends 

of the river south of Kharkov, but Hath 

ref used on the grounds that the troops were 

worn out and that the defensive advantages of the river outweighed those of a 

shorter line in the open steppe." 

Manstein declared the operation completed as of 17 March. South of Belgorod, 

Army Group South stood along approximately the same line the German armies 

had held before the 1942 summer offensive 

began. North of the city the Russians occupied a large bulge wcst of Kursk, but 

there, too, the front was being stabilized. 

After its long retreat, Second Army, once 

the Army Group South counteroffensive 

had begun taking effect, had been able to 

slow the Soviet advance, and in the first 

weeks of "Nfarch had even regamed some 

ground on its flanks." 

40 PlatonovJ Vtoraya Mirova ya Voyna , pp. 4'29-

30. 

n Pz. AOK 4, la, Kriegstagebuch . 1.:1.- :15.3.43, 

17- 21 Mar 43, Pz. AOK 4 34888/1 file . 

.~ AOK 2. Kriegstagebu ch Russland , Teil 10, 8-

20 Mar 41, AOK 2 37418/1 file. 
CHAPTER VI 

The Center and the North 

At the End of Summer 1942 

Army Group Center 

Army Group Center had borne the main 

weight of the Soviet 1941-42 winter offensive. On both sides of the Army Group 

North-Army Group Center boundary the 

Russians had broken through to depths of 

150 miles and more and for a time had 

nearly encircled Ninth and Third Panzer 

Armies. In fighting that lasted well into 

the summer, the army group, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge commanding, had destroyed or pushed back the most 

advanced Russian elements and had set up 

a front anchored on Velikiye Luki, Velizh, 

Bely, and Rzhev. That left the Russians in 

possession of a gigantic bulge around Toropets, about one-third (Demyansk-Kholm) 

in the Army Group North zone and twothirds in the Army Group Center zone. 

(Map 9) 

The western rim of the bulge from the 

army group boundary to a point several 

miles east of Demidov was held by LIX 

Corps, renamed in October 1942 Gruppe 

(Group) von der Chevallerie (Generalleutnant Kurt von der Chevallerie) . With five 

divisions and more tl).an 100 miles of front 

it could not establish a continuous line and, 

instead, had to depend on a strongpoint 

system that thinned out dangerously on the 

left flank. During the summer the swampy, wooded terrain and poor roads made 

a Soviet breakthrough attempt unlikely, but 

in the winter conditions would favor another thrust deep between the two army 

groupS.1 

On the eastern rim of the bulge, Ninth 

Army held the Rzhev salient. On Ninth 

Army's right, Third Panzer Army, in a narrow sector, straddled the Warsaw-Moscow 

highway eighty miles west of Moscow. On 

Third Panzer Army's right the Fourth 

Army - Second Panzer Army line extended 

south to the army group boundary below 

Orel. On the boundary between the latter 

two armies the Russians held a deep salient 

east of Sukhinichi, not as large as the bulge 

in the north, but enough to pose an obvious 

threat of thrusts from the north and southeast to cut off the Ninth, Third Panzer, 

and Fourth Armies east of Smolensk. In 

the summer the Russians had launched 

strong attacks against Ninth Army, Third 

Panzer Army, and Second Panzer Army. 

When those failed to gain ground they 

were broken off in the Third Panzer and 

Second Panzer Army zones early in September but continued with unabated violence against the Ninth Army line at and 

south of Rzhev until 7 October. 

By the time the Rzhev fighting had 

ended it was apparent that the Russians 

were getting ready for a new offensive after 

1 Gen. Kdo. LIX A.K., la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 , 

30 Sep, 14 Oct 42, LIX A.K. 30145/1 file. 
~ 

I 

1 

\ 

.,~ I THIRTYFOURTH 

FIFTY-THIRD 

THIRTYNINTH 

TWENTYSECOND ..... -~"" 

\ *r '*+ ++. 

FOURTH SHoe K)( I ~~OR~/ FI~~~ ~ -~ ~ 

L rF~~111- ~ 

""" !VoN DERl 

C~VALLERIE 

-~ / /' 

SOVIET OF AGAINST ARJ"fNSIVE 

CENTER AND GROUPS 

November-D NORTH 'TTTT'TmTITT" ecember 1942 

F~ON' L'~£ ~O~OV.I'.2 

" 2'0 'i .,0 W'LES 

.O~ILo"n[~S 

MAP 9 

)' ' 

THIRTIETH 

~ 

FIFTH 

xxxx 
100 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET GUN EMPLACEMENT NEAR RZHEV 

the fall rains. One strong force was assembling in the area west of Sukhinichi and a 

second in the Toropets bulge on the north 

flank.:! The concentration around Toropets was obviously the more dangerous. On 

5 October Kluge promised von der Chevallerie a panzer division from Army Group 

North and three Air Force field divisions, 

which would have to bc provided with 

training cadres since they were newly 

formed and had no training in ground 

warfare. On 14 October Hitler ordered 

von der Chevallerie to begin planning for a 

pre-emptive attack east from Velikiye Luki 

~ AOK 9. K,iegstagebuch , Fuehrungsabteilung, 

Berichtszeit 1.7.-3 1.12.42, Band II, 5 Oct 42 , AOK 

93162412 file; Pz. AOK 3, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 5, 

28 Oct 42, Pz. AOK 3 29195/ 1 file . 

to Toropets. At the end of the month threc 

additional divisions were moved into the 

Gruppe von der Chevallerie zone and the 

Headquarters, Eleventh Army, was transferred from the sector around Leningrad 

to plan and command the operation.

3 

Army Group North 

The Army Group North front was a not 

very satisfactory legacy of the unfinished 

1941 operations and the subsequent Soviet 

winter offensive. On the left flank thc 

Eighteenth Army front formed an arc 

around Oranienbaum on the Gulf of Fin-

~ Cerl. Kdo. LIX A.K., l a, Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 4. 

5, 14,30 Oct 42 LIX AX. 301 45/ ( file . 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

land and bent eastward south of Leningrad, 

anchoring on Lake Ladoga at Schluesselburg. East of Schluesselburg the anm· 

held six miles of the Ladoga shore; then its 

line dropped ofT sharply south eastward to 

the VolkhQ\· RiYer and followed th e ri,·cr 

south to the northern tip of Lake limen. 

South of Lake limen , Sixteenth Army held 

a scalloped line; its main feature , projecting from the front like a misplaced thumb, 

was the Dem ya nsk poc ket. South of 

Demyansk the line cun"cd west anchoring 

on Kholm. Frorn Kholm to the army 

grou p bOlln dary. north of Vclikiyc Luki, 

the front was a loose chain of strongpoi nts. 

Tn J uh· ' 942 Hitler ordered Generalfeldmarschall Georg \"on Kuechler, comrnanding Army Group 1\Torth, to prepare an 

operation again::.t Leningrad. He wanted 

the city taken by early fall in order to free 

Finnish forces for an operation againH the 

~furJ11an <; k Railroad. I In Aug ust Hitler 

lOok th e Leningrad operation out of 

Kuechler's hands and ga\'c it to }.llanstcin. 

who had conductcd a irnilar operation 

against Sevastopol. ~Ian~tcin , bringing 

with him the Headquarters, Ele\'cnth 

Arrny. two corps hcadquartcrs. and four 

infantry di\'isions, assumed command of 

the front fa cing Leningrad and \\'as made 

directh· subordinate to OKH. Before the 

preparations could be completed, the Rus-

~ian~ opened an offcnsi\'c on the line facing 

cast just ,ou th of Lake Ladoga and quickly 

scored a breakthrough that threatened the 

German hold on Leningrad. On 4 September ~lanstein took command in the 

breakthrough area, and thereafter his first 

co;-}cern \\'as to restore the front, which, in 

• Der Fu ehrer. GKW WFSt. Gp. Nr. 551288/ 42. 

Weisung Nr. 45 fun die FOJtsetzuflg der Gperatio1Z 

"BrlZlHHdZl{'eig:' 23.7.42. OKWhg[ file. 

101 

thc face of stubborn Russian resistance, was 

not accomplished until '5 October. By 

that time all hope that the Finns would 

exec ute their projected operation that year 

had ,·anished , and it had been decided that 

the attack on Leningrad could not begin 

before freezing weather set in. On 20 O ctober the OKH announced that the Leningrad offensive was postponed indefinitely. 

] n the meantime, the heavy siege artillery, 

which had also been brought up from 

Sevastopol, was to be used to smash the 

city's defenses and inch the line forward 

gradually. Postponement of the offensive 

freed Headquarters, Ele\'enth Army, for 

the shift to the Vc1ikiye Luki area." 

In the Sixteenth Army zone the Demyansk pockct was a source of constant 

concern. On '4 September Kuechler in a 

personal letter attempted to persuade the 

OKH that to continue to hold the pocket 

was usc1es~. II Corps, in the pocket, he 

wrote, had been fighting under adverse 

conditions since the last winter, and with 

the known upcriorit~ , of the Russians in 

winter warfare serious developments could 

be expected in the coming month s. Operationally, the pocket performed two se rv~ 

ices: it kept Rl1 ~sian troops tied down; and 

it might be used as one arm of an encir~ 

cling operation against the Toropets bulge, 

but the question was whether anything of 

the sort was intended or could be executed. 

If not, Kuechler maintained, the pocket's 

\'aluc was practically nil. 

r. fl. Gr. J\'ord. la Nr. 13000/ 43. Der Feldzug 

gegen die S owjet-Union tier Heere sgruppe Nord 

Kriegsjahr 1942. 10-5 .. 13. H. Gr. ;\ord 75884/ 1 

file; H. Gr. Nord. la. Kriegstagebuclz. I. 4 Sep 

42 , H. Gr. Nord 75[28114 file; H. Gr. N ord. la . 

Kriegstagebllclz. 1. 20 Oct 42 , H. Cr. Nord 

75128/ 15 file ; H. Gr. Nord. la. Kriegstagebll ch, 

6 ov 42, H . Gr. Nord 75128/16 file. 
102 

A week later Halder answered that he 

was not convinced that the reported endurance of the Russians in winter was as great 

as had been claimed, and, in any case, the 

II Corps would not be the only unit having 

to endure hardships. To pull the corps 

back would gain Army Group North 12 

divisions but would also free 26 divisions 

and 7 tank brigades for the Russians; anyway, Hitler completely rejected the idea of 

withdrawing the corps. Subsequently, in 

October and early November, Army Group 

North executed two small operations, which 

were only moderately successful, to widen 

the corridor leading into the pocket and 

braced itself for the expected Soviet winter 

offensivc,G 

Finland- Twentieth Mountain 

Army 

On the extreme left flank of the Eastern 

Front, Twentieth Mountain Army and the 

Finnish Army held the line they had occupied at the end of the 194' campaign. 

In the Far North, forty:two miles northwest of Murmansk, XIX Mountain Corps 

faced the Soviet Fourteenth Army across 

the Litsa River. The corps' primary mission was to protect the Kolosyoki nickel 

mmes. The idea of an overland advance 

to Murmansk had not been revived during 

the year; and while a thrust into the Rybatchiy Peninsula remained vaguely under consideration, the likelihood of its being attempted was slight because of the difficulty 

of assembling and maintaining sufficient 

forces. 

e H . Gr. Nord, la , NT. 3000/43, Der Feldzug 

gegen die Sowjet·Unioll de, Heere5gruppe Nord, 

Kriegsjahr J94~. 10.$.43, H. Gr. Nord 75884/1 

file; H. Cr. Nord, la, Kriegstagebuch, 14, 23 Sep 

42, H. Gr. Nord 75 128/ 14 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

In the roadless Arctic forests between the 

Litsa River and the Salla-Kandalaksha rail 

line no front existed- neither side bothered 

with more than scattered patrols. Astride 

the railroad XXXVI Mountain Corps held 

a line it had taken a year earlier a few 

miles cast of the 1939 Finnish border and 

forty-five miles west of Kandalaksha. On 

the Twentieth Mountain Army right flank 

XVIll Mountain Corps occupied a short 

front straddling the Kesten'ga-Loukhi spur 

line about twenty miles west of the Murmansk railroad. 

The Finnish Army, which had assumed 

responsibilit y for all operations out of Finland south of the line Oulu-Belomorsk, held 

three fronts: one (the Maasclkii Front ) 

running north from the northern tip of 

Lake Onega; the second (the Aunus Front) 

between Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga 

along the general line of the Svir River; 

and the third (the Isthmus Front ) across 

the Isthmus of Karelia north of Leningrad, 

approximately following the 1939 Finnish 

border. 

In the Finnish Army and Twentieth 

Mountain Army zones there had been no 

combat activity worthy of note since the 

spring; and although the German and Finnish forces enjoyed an almost 2: I superiority over their Soviet opponents, the chances 

of resuming the offensive in the foreseeable 

future were slim. For nearly a year the 

Finns had displayed extreme reluctance to 

assume any new military commitments and 

had insisted on the capture of Leningrad 

as an absolute prerequisite to new offensive 

operations. In August 1942 the Finns 

had agreed to take part in a two-pronged 

attack to th e Murmansk railroad by Finnish 

forces (to Belomorsk ) and XXXVI Mountain Corps (to Kandalaksha ), but in Oc-
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

tober the OKW was forced to cancel the 

plans when the preliminary Army Group 

North operation to capt me Leningrad was 

abandoned.? 

Partisan Warfare 

Communist tradition and the experiences 

of the civil war made it a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union would attempt 

to exploit to the ulmost all forms of irregular and clandestine warfare for both military and political reasons. However, although the Russians had created partisan 

units in large numbers immediately after 

the war started, the partisan movement in 

' 94 ' had remained ineffectual and by the 

late fall of that year was, if anything, on 

the downgrade. The impact of the rapid 

German advance and the apparent helplessness of the Soviet regime had made it difficult to kindle, even artificially, a spirit 

of resistance. Those partisan units that 

did appear were small, ineffective, usually 

isolated, and in constant uanger of disintegrating. Communist Party and NKVD 

(secret police ) attempts to leave behind a 

network of Party and partisan groups had 

failed because of lack of time and because 

the local Party authorities, on whom the 

burden of the work fell, either had no clear 

conception of what was required or lacked 

enthusiasm for underground activity. It 

was clear that, contrary to propaganda 

claims, neither the masses nor the Party 

elite would voluntarily spring to the defense 

of the Soviet system in a time of crisis. 

' OKW, WFSI , Op. (H ) N,. 55'796/ 42, an 

(Geb .) AOK 20, ~9.10.42 , in Weisungen OKW, 

Fuehrer, 12 .242-27.344, Band 3. OCMH files. 

For additional information concerning German and 

Finnish operations out of Finland, see Ziemke, Ger· 

man Northern Theater of Operations, 1940- 45. 

The Rise of the Soviet Partisan 

Movement 

103 

The Soviet '94'-42 winter offensive 

prepared the ground for a new, more purposeful approach to partisan warfare. In 

a few weeks victories restored the prestige 

of the Soviet Government. In the occupied 

territories the heightened awareness that the 

former regime was still to be reckoned with, 

aroused a nice mixture of fear and patriotism. Moreover, the population by then had 

been exposed to German rule long enough 

to know that it had nothing to look forward to from that quarter. While this 

psychological shift was not sufficient in 

itself to bring about active resistance, it 

could be exploited by the Soviet regime 

which, in any event, no longer toyed with 

the illusion of a spontaneous partisan movement. 

Taking advantage of the great ga ps torn 

in the German line, particularl y in the 

zones of the Army Groups North and Center, and the virtual disappearance of security forces in the enemy rear, the Russians set 

about systematically organizing partisan 

forces. Soviet-trained o rganizers and 

cadres roamed the CouJltryside recruiting 

men by the authority of the Soviet draft 

law. Air supply was stepped up ; military 

organization was introduced in the partisan 

detachments; and regular army officers 

appeared as instructors, advisers, and members of the partisan command staffs. The 

surviving 1941 units and the new units 

were brought under direct Soviet control by 

radio and air and by the creation of army 

and front partisan control staffs. Partisa~ 

detachments that had averaged less than 

100 men in November 1941 more than 

doubled in strength by February ' 942, and 

in the spring and summer of that year the 
104 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

PARTISANS IN THE BRYANSK FOREST 

"brigade" of 1,000 men or morc, became 

the standard unit. 

By the late summer of '942 the partisan 

movement was solidly established. The 

organizational work had been completed, 

and the lines of control were firmly in Soviet hands. The total partisan forces numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 men. 

The partisan movement had become a 

major prop of home front morale, and in 

August '942 its more prominent leaders 

were called to Moscow, many of them 

flown in from behind the German lines, 

in order to be shown off at a conference. 

Attempts by Soviet authorities to stir up 

partisan activity in all German-occupied 

areas, brought mixed success. Nearly ninetenths of the partisan forces were located 

in the rear areas of Army Groups North 

and Center with the greatest concentrations 

behind Army Group Center, particularly in 

the Bryansk Forest north and south of 

Bryansk and behind the great Soviet salient 

west of Toropets. There vast stretches of 

forest and swamp provided cover for the 

partisan units. In the Ukraine and south· 

ern Russian the movement hardly gained a 

foothold before the late summer of ' 943,' 

8 Sec also Earl Ziemke, The Soviet Partisan 

Movement in 1941 (Research Study 6, vol. 2), 

Earl Ziemke, Composition and Morale of the 

Partisan Movement (Research Study 6, vol. 5), 

and Earl Ziemke and Ralph Mavrogordato, History 

of the First Belorussian Partisan Brigade (Technical Research Report 24, vol. 3 ), Ajr Research 

and Deve lopment Command, Human Resources 

Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

Fuehrer Directive 46 

On ,8 August ' 94', Hitler, confirming 

that the pa rtisan movement had become 

much morc than a local nuisance, issued a 

drastic order, Fuehrer Directive No. 46. 

The directive opened with the statement: 

"The bandit monstrosity in the East has 

assumed a no longer tolerable scope and 

threatens to become a serious danger to 

front supply and exploitation of the land." 

Hitler wanted the partisans rooted out before winter "to avoid important disadvantages in the Wehrmacht's conduct of winter 

operations." He made the ReichsfuehrerSS, Heinrich Himmler, responsible for collecting and evaluating information on antipartisan warfare and gave him sole responsibility for antipartisan operations in the 

territories under civil administration. He 

charged the Chief of Staff, OKH, with the 

conduct of anti partisan warfare in the zone 

of operations and ordered clements of the 

Replacement Army transferred east to be 

used as anti pa rtisan forces while completing their training.9 

Conceding that the partisan movement 

could not be mastered by military means 

alone, Hitler recognized for the first time 

that a successful anti partisan campaign 

would have to take into account the attitude of the population in the affected areas. 

It would, on the one hand, have to offer 

them at least a subsistence standard of living to prevent their going over to the partisans and, on the other, make active collaboration against the partisans attractive 

by the promise of substanti al rewards. 

Abo for the first time, he approved recruit-

. _--

11 D er Fu ehrer. OK W . WFSt. Op. NT. 002821 / 

42 . Weisung Nr. 46 Richtlinien fuer die verstaeTkt e 

Bekaempfung des Bandenu',wesens im Osten, I B.B. 

42. OKW/29 1 file. 

105 

ment of indigenous military units from 

among prisoners of war for employment 

against the partisans. 

The Army regarded the directive as a 

significant advance in Hiller's concept of 

anti partisan warfare, particularly because 

it permitted efforts to win over the population and the usc of indigenous troops. The 

Organizational Branch, OKH, had long 

maintained that Germany did not have the 

manpower to stage an effective anti partisan 

campaign with its own forces.

10 But, regardless of the directive, Hitler did not 

abandon his plans to reduce the Russians 

to servitude and subject them to the most 

ruthless exploitation ; consequently, he refused to offer suffi cient inducements to stimulate genuine popula r support for the German cause. Furthermore, as the year drew 

to a close, the Russian people grew in rea~­

ingly aware that the chances of a German 

victory were fading. 

A Com/Janion Piece to Stalingrad 

Up to '9 November the Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, had predicted that 

the main Soviet winter offensive would be 

directed against Army Group Center. 

Later it defended the prediction by pointing 

ou t that the great success at Stalingrad obviously came as a surprise to the Russians 

and that they were at first clearly not prepared to exploit it by continuing the advance west of Stal ingrad, where the road to 

even greater victories lay open." The Eastern r ntclligence Branch was, perhaps, not 

as far wrong as might appear. Certainly, 

'O OKH. Ge1lStdH, Org. Abt., K riegstagebluh . 

Band IV. 11 - '20 Aug 4'2 , H 1/2 14 file. 

II OKIf . Gell StdH . Fremde Hure O st . ATilage I 

zur kurzen Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 10.12 . 

42. H 3/ 199 fil e. 
106 

the Stavka could not have fully anticipated 

the speed of the Rumanian collapse nor 

could it have counted in advance on Hitler's 

offering up a whole German army. 

On the other hand, an element of selfdeception in the German thinking was to 

have baneful and lingering effects. The 

conviction that the moment when the Soviet Union would have dredged up its last 

reserves must soon be reached was slow in 

melting away and kept alive the notion 

that the Soviet capability to stage a second 

winter offensive would have to fall within 

predictable limits. After Stalingrad the 

idea took hold that, because the Russians 

had attacked in the south, they could not 

do the same in the center. On 2 I November, Ninth Army recorded, "Numerous 

signs indicate that major Soviet offensives 

in two separate sectors of the front are no 

longer possible."" Actually, the Stavka 

was able to launch, almost simultaneously, 

two offensives of approximately equal 

scope, and later greatly expand one of 

them. 

The R zhev Salient 

In the Army Group Center sector, as at 

Stalingrad, the front's configuration presented a ready-made opportunity for a large 

encirclement, yet one which would not require too high a level of tactical proficiency. 

On a 2o-mile front due south of Rzhev the 

West Front deployed the heavily reinforced 

Thirty-first and Twentieth Armies- some 

45 divisions and brigades, 2 tank corps. 

and 2 guards corps. On the eastern face 

of the Rzhev salient, Kalinin Front stationed Forty-first and Twenty-second Army 

12 AOK 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, K,iegstagebu ch, 

Band 3, 21 Nov 42 , AOK 9 31624/ 3 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

-about 25 divisions and brigades plus 2 

motorized-mechanized corps and the cHtc 

V I Stalin Corps, for attacks on either side 

of Bcly. On the north, at the apex of the 

salient, Thirt y-ninth Army concentrated a 

half dozen or so divisions for a thrust due 

south. 

The offensive began on the morning of 

25 November, repeating the pattern of Stalingrad in its initial phase. But the German 

position there was different than it had 

been on the Don. Ninth Army was a firstclass force which, having weathered the 

summer battles successfully, was not to be 

overawed by numerical and materiel superiority. After a month 's respite and with 

three panzer divisions in reserve, the army 

faced the attack with confidence, particularly since the Soviet main effort came 

exactly where it had been expected, south 

of Rzhev." After Twentieth Army, conducting the main effort, made the mistake 

of committing its armor in piecemeal breakthrough attempts that cost the Soviet units 

better than half their tanks, one panzer 

corps handled the defense with ease." 

On the west the defense was, at first , less 

successful; the Russians broke through on 

both sides of Bely, penetrating to within 

twenty miles of the town on the south and 

about ten miles along the valley of the 

Luchesa River in the north. But in ten 

days of fighting they failed to exploit their 

initial success,' and on 7 December the Germans executed a surprise counterattack 

that turned the breakthrough south of Bely 

into a pocket. In another ten days the 

Germans cleaned out the pocket and regained their original front at a cost to Kali13 Ibid., 25-30 Nov 42. 

II Sb ornik Noma g. 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 107 

SOVIET TANKS APPROACH V ELIKIYE LUKI 

nin Front of 15,000 men killed and 5,000 

captured,15 

On 1 1 December West Front launched 

a final attempt south of Rzhev which, in 

terms of sheer weight, surpassed anything 

Ninth Army had yet encountered. In the 

first two days of what the army described 

as the greatest defensive victory of the war 

thus far, the Russians lost 295 tanks without making any notable gains. During the 

next two days the offensive slackened rapidly, ending on 16 December, the day on 

which Ninth Army also finished mopping 

up the pocket south of Bell" Thereafter the 

last tangible remnant of the offensive was 

~ AOK 9. FuehTungsabtcilung, KriegJtagebu ch, 

Band 3, 1- 7 Dec 42, AOK 9 31624 / 3 file . 

the penetration in the Luchesa River valley, where later, in fighting extending into 

the new year, Ninth Army also regained 

its original front. "General Winter" had 

for once failed the Russians: the Germans 

were better equipped than at the same time 

a year earlier, and the weather was milder 

- the lowest temperature reached by midDecember being about 15 ° F.1 G 

Veliki}'e Luki 

On the Ninth Army left flank, beginning 

on 25 November, Gruppe von clef Chevallerie, holding the strongpoint line along the 

western rim of the Toropels bulge, also 

10 Ibid ., 11-16 Dec 42. 
108 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

MANNER HElM (right) with GeneralieulrwlIl Erwin Engelbrecht, dun"ng the German occupation of Finland. 

came under attack by Kalinin Front. ]11 

that area of forests, lakes, and swamps 

Vclikiye Luki constituted a kind o( island 

base (or the Germans. It anchored the 

center of the front in that sector; it was an 

important junction on the lateral railroad 

line closest to the (ront; and it straddled 

se\'eral east-west roads. In the two weeks 

before 25 November Kalinin Front had 

built up Third Slwck Army to an absolute 

su periority in armor and belter than 5: I 

su periority in infantry and artillery . 

Bothered most by the (orests and the 

swamps, which had not yet frozen solid. 

Third Shock Arm)' in two days pushed 

through, encircled Vclikiye Luki, and 

trapped 7,DOO German troops in the town. li 

On the 27th, with Novosokol'niki, fifteen 

miles west, similarly threatened. von del' 

\0 Sb omik Nomer 9. 

Che\'allerie reported that if the troops In 

Velikiye Luki were to be saved they would 

have to break out immediately. Three 

days later Hitler countered with an order 

stating that to evacuate Vclikiye Luki was 

out of the question. The garrison would 

have to hold out until contact was restored 

and the former front line retaken.' '! 

In the third week o( December, when the 

pressure abated slightly, von der Chevallcrie began a relief operation; but his troops 

were worn out, and the attempt had to be 

ahandoned after the ~ccond day. On 4 

January 1943 a second attempt heg-an. In 

the interval the garrison in Vclikiyc Luki 

had heen spli t in two: a small group held 

out in the old kremlin (citadel ) on the 

western edge of the town; the main body 

l' Gen. Kd o. L/X A .K .. la , Kriegstagebu ch NT. 

4. '25-::;0 Nov 42, LIX A.K 30145/ 1 file. 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

had been driven back to the eastern suburbs. The relief column, it was clear, 

could hope to do no more than rescue the 

garrison. To open a permanent corridor 

into the lown was impossible. 

For ten days the relief force inched its 

way eastward, being halted, finally, within 

a few hundred yards of the kremlin. On 

15 January, when troops in the kremlin 

and east pocket were ordered to break out, 

the garrison commander, who was in the 

east pocket, radioed that this was not possible, and thereafter all contact was lost. 

The next morning T 76 survivors broke 

through from the kremlin, and the relief 

column began to fall back. " 

The Quiet Front 

In the northern reaches of the Soviet 

Union, the Twentieth Mountain Army 

zone stayed quiet throughout the winter. 

In the Arctic Ocean, British and American 

convoys shuttled back and forth to Murmansk during the dark months carrying 

supplies to support the Soviet winter offensive . The Allied landing in North 

Africa in November 1942 had drawn off 

nearly all of the torpedo planes formerly 

employed against the convoys, and, in December, an unsuccessful sortie by the 

cruisers HiIJ/JeT and Luel::ow brought 

Hitler's wrath down on the Navy. As a 

consequence Racdcr resigned and was re~ 

placed as Commander in Chief, Na\'Y, by 

Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz, the submarine 

specialist. Hitler threatened to scrap all 

Gcrman heavy ships. 

In southern Finland the Finnish Army 

19 Ibid. } '4 Dec 42- ,6 Jan 43. 

109 

fronts were also quiet. The Finns were 

less interested in their own than in the 

main sectors of the Eastern Front, and they 

watched the Soviet progress with mounting 

dismay. In January 1943, as Army Group 

North's hold on Leningrad began to slip, 

the Finnish Commander in Chief, Mannerheim, asked Twentieth Mountain Army 

to give back all Finnish troops still under 

its command. On 3 February, the day 

after the last German units surrendered at 

Stalingrad, Mannerheim, the Finnish President, Risto Ryti, and members of the 

Cabinet met and decided that the war had 

reached a decisive turning point and that 

it would be necessary for Finland to get out 

at the first opportunity. Six days later 

they informed a secret session of the Parliament that Germany could not win and 

Finland would have to accustom itself to 

thinking in terms of another Treaty of 

Mocow, the treaty which ended the Winter 

War of 1939-40. A month later a new 

Foreign Minister, Dr. Henrik Ramsay, appointed because he was reputed to have 

contacts in Great Britain and the United 

States, made the first move toward negotiating a separate peace. 

To the Germans it was obvious that, for 

the time being, only fear of the Russians 

would keep Finland in the war. Fresh 

German victories in the coming summer 

might yet restore the Finns' morale, but 

the war had changed since 1941. It required resources, train ing, and masses of 

men which the Finns did not ha\'c, By 

the early months of 1943, the Twentieth 

1Iountain Army staff had concluded that 

future offensive support was hardly to be 

expected of the Finnish Army and that the 

Finns probably could not withstand a fullscale Soviet attack, 
, . 

PlPIiS 

MAP 10 

• \ 

~ 

\ 

'Xxxx r-"" EIGHTEENTH I.--~ 

j 

xxxX' ,-, 

SIXTEENTH 

L_~ 

" 

FfFTYSECOND 

TWENTYSECONO 

xxxxx 

IKAUNINI 

VOLKHOV 

~ 

"----" 

ARMY GROUP NORTH 

Winfer 1942-43 

to 40 "'l~5 , ! , 20 40 M'LO"En~s 

I 

, 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

On the Defensive 

Leningrad and the Demyansk Pocket 

In Leningrad the second winter of the 

siege was not as bad as the first. While 

Lake Ladoga was open, boats had brought 

in supplies for th.e troops and civilians and 

had evacuated close to half a million persons. A German attempt to use the Siebel 

ferries-catamarans driven by airplane engines and mounting a light antiaircraft gun 

- to interdict the lake traffic had failed . 

In the fall of '942 the Russians had laid an 

electric cable and a gasoline pipeline in the 

lake. When the lake froze, they built an 

ice road and set up high tension lines. In 

the city the people had enough food at 

least to survive and sufficient electricity to 

operate some industrial plants. But the 

five or six thousand tons of supplies trucks 

could haul across the ice per day could 

barely sustain the city and the front; and 

Leningrad, normally the second largest industrial center in the country, was capable 

of a far greater contribution to the Soviet 

war effort than it was now making- by 

operating plants within sight of the front 

for propaganda as much as for production. 

Consequently, after their first attempt to 

overcome the siege failed in October '942 , 

the Leningrad and Volkho v Fronts had 

promptly begun the build-up for another 

try. When the winter darkness set in, reinforcements from the cast crossed the lake 

and moved into the line. 

Army Group North watched anxiously. 

Occupying a relatively inactive front, it 

had been neglected during most of '942, 

had not fully replaced its losses of the previous winter, and was committed to a static 

defense that might be attacked at any of a 

number of critical points. Around Lenin111 

grad, particularly at the "bottleneck"-

the narrow tie-in to Lake Ladoga- Army 

Group North functioned as the main support of German strategy in northern Europe. (Map 10 ) If the hold on Leningrad 

were broken, Germany would, in the long 

run, lose control of the Baltic Sea. Fin-

'land would then be isolated; the iron ore 

shipping from Sweden would be in danger; 

and the all-important submarine training 

program would be seriously handicapped. 

In the ,6 months they had held the 

"bottleneck" the Germans had built a 

tight network of defenses in the swampy 

terrain and had converted Schluesselburg, 

several small settlements, and scattered 

patches of woods into fortified strongpoints. But, with only six to eight miles 

between fronts, one facing west and the 

other east, the defenders had little room to 

maneuver. The Russians had found highly 

instructive their experience in the summer, 

and in the intervening months had rehearsed every tactic and maneuver for 

taking each individual German position. 

This method the Germans themselves had 

used in '940 to train for the assaults on the 

Belgian forts. 

The attack on the "bottleneck" began on 

12 January. S;xly-se venlh Army, its troops 

wearing spiked shoes to help them climb 

the frozen river bank, struck across the ice 

on the Neva River while Second Shock 

Army, on the east, threw five divisions 

against a 4-mile stretch of the German line. 

Methodically, the Russians chopped their 

way through, and by the end of the first 

week had taken Schluesselburg and opened 

a corridor to Leningrad along the lake 

shore. Thereafter, in fighting that lasted 

until the first week of April, the twO Soviet 

fronts made little headway. When the 
112 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

G ERMAN COMM UNICATIONS M EN CII ECKI NG A T ELEPH ONE LINE, N O RT H ERN FRONT 

fi ghting ended, they held a strip 6 miles 

wide, aU of it within range of German artillery. When the battle ended, Army 

Group North claimed a defensive victory, 

but its hold on the second city of the Soviet 

Union was not a tight as before.

20 

On the Army Group North right flank 

the Demyansk pocket had been under continuous attack since the end of November 

' 942. By mid-January the fighting in the 

pocket had drained off the last army group 

reserves. On ' 9 January, Zeitzler told 

Kuechler that he intended to take up with 

Hitler the question of evacuating the Dcmyansk pocket. He and Kuechler agreed 

that the principal reason for the setback the 

~ H. Gr. Nord, fa NT. 13000/44 . Der Feldzug 

gegul die S owjet- Union der Heeresgruppe Nord, 

K riegsjahr 1943. 24.12.44, H . Gr. Nord 75884/1 

file. 

army group had just suffered south of Lake 

Ladoga was the shortage of troops and that 

the onl y way to avoid similar mishaps was 

to create reserves by giving up the pocket." 

That Hitler would bitterly resist any such 

proposal went without saying ; and Kuechler, who had been sharply rebuffed in the 

fall of ' 942 when he suggested abandonment, refused to take the initiative in reopening the question." 

On the night of 3 ' J anuary, after a 

week-long debate, Hitler finall y gave way 

to Zeitzlc r's arguments. The Operations 

Section, OKH, informed Kuechler that the 

struggle to get the decision had bcen unprecedentedly difficult and asked him to 

get the troops out fast in order not to give 

:11 H . Gr. Nord, l a. KTiegslagebuch, 19 Jan 43, 

H. Cr. Nord 75 128/ 18 fil e. 

:!:= I bid., 26 Jan 43. 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

Hitler a chance to change his mind." 

Kuechler, however, refused to risk losing 

the vast quantity of equipment and supplies poured into the pocket during the 

past thirteen months. He began pulling 

back the line on 20 February, after three 

weeks preparation, and then collapsed the 

pocket by stages, completing the last on 18 

March.'·' 

Army Group Cenler- Anliparlisan 

War/are 

Through the winter Army Group Center 

stood as the bulwark of the Eastern Front, 

but its underpinnings were weak. Its 

front, projecting eastward- once a giant 

spearhead aimed at Moscow- was, under 

the influence of the second Soviet winter 

offensive, becoming badly eroded and an 

invitation to disaster. (Map II ) On the 

north flank, around the bulge west of Toropets, the army group had not had a secure 

line since December 194 I . After midJanuary '943, the Soviet armies gouged 

deeply into the south Aank, forcing it back 

west of Kursk. 

On 20 January, to shore up what was 

then the weakest spot in his front, Kluge 

moved Headquarters, Third Panzer Army, 

into the sector on the western rim of the 

Toropets bulge. The attempt to relieve 

Velikiye Luki had failed five days earlier. 

After his first look at the front, the Commanding General, Third Panzer Army, 

Generaloberst Hans Reinhardt, reported 

2:1 H. Gr. Nord, la, Ftrng~spraech des Chefs des 

Ceneralstabts deT f'leeresgruppe mit Ge11eralmajor 

Heusinger, 31.1.43 . H. Gr. Nord 75129/52 file. 

at H. Gr. Nord, la NT. 13000/44, deT FeldzuR 

gcgen die Sowjet·Unioll deT Heeresgruppe Nord. 

Kriegsjahr 1943, 24.12.44 . H. Gr. Nord 75884/1 

file. 

113 

that the sector was in "appalling condition." Gruppe von der Chevallerie had 

thrown every unit it could lay hands on 

into the thrust toward Velikiye Luki. In 

the army rear area an estimated 20,000 

partisans roamed the countryside at will. 

The army's first task would be to gain 

enough troops to establish some sort of 

defensible line by pulling back and sorting 

out the jumbled units west of Vclikiye 

Luki." 

In the first week of February, having set 

up a line of strongpoints, Third Panzer 

Army turned to the partisan menace. 

Throughout the zones of Army Groups 

North and Center, partisan activity had 

flared up dangerously since the beginning 

of winter. As in the previous year, the 

Soviet commands employed the partisans 

as an adjunct to the winter offensive. 

Again the conditions were favorable. Hardpressed to man the front, the Germans 

could only commit second- and third-rate 

troops in the rear arcas. The Soviet victories raised the partisans' morale and made 

the civilians in the occupied territory amenable to Soviet and partisan inAuences. 

Hitler, as he had since the start of the 

war, called for the utmost severity. In January 1943 he decreed that soldiers could 

not be brought to trial for atrocities committed while fighting partisans. The Geneva Convention and the rules of chivalry, 

he declared, had no place in anti partisan 

warfare. The generals, on the other hand, 

were fully aware that they lacked the 

strength to master the partisan movement 

by Draconian methods and would, if they 

tried, only succeed in totally alienating the 

civilian population. Consequently, most 

lI:I Pz. AOK 3. la, Kril!gstagl!buch Nr. 6. 20- 23 

Jan 43, Pz. AOK :l 35568/ I file. 
fill~ ARMY GROUP CENTER j...) 

(./ 

~~~'------ ~, ") 

NORTH 

L_J Winter 1942 - 43 

--~ G ElI ..... N FRONT lI NE. 2 ! "~1I.3 

---- C H_ NG ESI'R'OIlTO Z' ''A'' .l '0 0 , 0 lO 30 .. ,LES 

MAP /I 

) /--- u! ."?,"H! ~i!.! ll-"...J'" -"r"-_..J' 10 0 In zo 'lO En 5 

\) THIRD -.... ..........- (, - ~\ 

) SHOCK )/ r \ 

FOURTH / .... SHOCK ~ _ 

~ ~-i... Ope,ot,on ,-- Operotion "'\. FORTY-"",Jor '" BUEFFEL , 

KUGEL8UTZ ) I'l THIRD ,/~~~ fMor I Jen-Feb 43 ........." .....,...... /' / ' \ 

~ ......, -- ./1 THIRTY- THIRTIETH \. '\ ~~X " """'; NINTH I THIRD Pi ( "'\ ~-... ~ THIRTY- ./ 

. l"\,-,......, FIRST ~ 

~ "\ FIFTH ) 

~~~ .) ( 

"if!:!!!:, '" THIRTY - \ ) THIRO ) 

\ FORTY- ./ 

""'" NINTH ..,.-

"''''-,,/ FIFTIETH 

/J TENTH 

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) 

" 

, 

, 

xxx xx r-, 

CENTER L_-' 

"\,...,,,, "XTH / 

~~ ,,......,~,...,,,, ~~+~'V 

\ 

\'"" r~~ 

L • J 

I 

I 

"j..i-1- ........, ~ ++",~ 

( "'",\ /~'v~ 

.....J I ~\ THIRO 

\ 

/ 

• !eORTV. 

......--'.....-l~ ..... ~v EIGHTH 

..,J THIRTEENTH J SEVENTIETH 

j SIXTY-FIFTH 

...---. SECOND TANK 

1.:1 .. 1-1- '->" CENTRAL ____ }_xxxxxXXXX 

S{~~D 

1 VORONEZH 

? SIXTIETH 

J THIRTY- J EIGHTH 

'\ ' 

\ FORTIETH T~,~~~Y-

""""",,-,-,.-:/"') 

\ 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

of them attempted, for humanitarian and 

practical reasons, to a,·oid interpreting 

Hitler's decree literally. The Commanding 

General, Second Panzer Army, General del' 

Panzertruppen Rudolf Schmidt, for instance, directed that it would apply onl y to 

acts committed in the hea t of battle and 

would, under no circumstances, be considered a license to kill and plunder wantonly." 

In late February Third Panzer Army 

condu cted an operation ( KUGELBLITZ ) 

against the partisan center in the Surazh 

Rayon northeast of Vitebsk. Although it 

had little effect on the course of the war, 

the operation is worth examining for two 

reasons: it is representati\'c of dozens of 

similar anti partisan operations the Germans conducted in the years '942-44, and 

it gives an unusually clear-cut picture of 

partisan and antipartisan warfare. The 

area concerned, the Surazh Rayon, lay directly behind the Third Panzer Army front. 

It had been partisan-infested for more than 

a year and had won acclaim on the Soviet 

side for the so-called Vitebsk Corridor, 

where in the late winter of '94'-42 the 

partisans and the Red Army had maintained truck and horse-drawn supply traffi c through the large ga ps in the German 

line. By February '943 the front had not 

greatly changed. The sector north of 

Surazh, a thin line of strongpoints spaced 

two to three miles apart, was held by German Air Force field di,·isions. In the gaps 

and in the extensive forests and swamps 

behind the front the Germans had been 

forced bv lack of troops to permit the partisans virtually free rein. The partisans, 

numbering an estimated four to fisc thou-

~ Pz. AOK 2 , l a. KTiegJ tagebu ch NT . .1. Band I , 

3 Jan 43, Pz. AOK 2 37075/ II file . 

IH- 7 n 0-68-9 

liS 

sa nd, \,'ere organized into brigades. They 

had built permanent, fortified encampments, and operated their own airfields. 

T o execu te the antipartisan operation, 

Reinhardt detailed two security divisions. 

The first step, completed on 2' February, 

was to draw a skirmish line around the partisan area, \"hich encompassed most of the 

Surazh Ramn. When that had been done, 

the troops began to advance inward, drawing the ring tighter and dri,·ing the partisans 

ahead of them toward th e cen ter. Contact 

was difficu lt to maintain, and the troops, 

pushing across rough terrain and through 

forests deep in snow, soon tired. The partisans, for their part, e,·aded pitched battles 

and, whenever they could, hid or slipped 

through the encirclement. When the operation ended, on 8 March, the arm~· claimed 

3,700 partisans killed, but it had no way of 

telling with certainty how many of the 

casualties were actually partisans and how 

many noncombatant civilians. As soon as 

the German units withdrew, the partisans 

reorganized and \"ithin a few months they 

had nearly regained their former strength." 

o peTalio/! Blleffel 

Although the Arm,· Group Center zone 

was quiet in the early winter of 1942-43 

except for partisan activity, its front in the 

long run, clearly was untenable. The army 

group had no reserves. Its left Oank was 

weak and , after the collapse of Second 

Army, its right flank was left dangling in a 

void. When Arm" Group North sec ured 

permiSSIOn to evacuate the Demyansk 

pocket, the great eastward projection of 

~ Pz. AOK 3, la , k"riegJtagebuch NT . 6, 3 Feb8 Ma r 4:-1. Pz. AOK 3 35568/ , file. See also 

Ziemke and Mawogordato, History of the First 

Belorussian Partisan Brigade. 
116 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

RUSSIAN EVACUEES ON THE ROAD, 1943 

Army Group Center ceased to serve any, 

even remotely, useful purpose. To pinch 

off the Toropets salient was no longer possible, and no one was thinking seriously 

any more of an advance to Ivfoscow. On 

26 J anuary Kluge recommended to Hitler 

a large-scale withdrawal that would shorten 

the front and eliminate the danger of the 

Ninth and Fourth Armies' being encircled. 

As was to be expected, Hitler resisted bitterly, but finaliy, on 6 February, he yielded 

lO Zeitzler's and Kluge's arguments.

28 

During the rest of the month _the army 

group readied itself for the withdrawal, 

which was given the code name B UEFFEL. 

:8 AOK 4. l a, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 15, 26 Jan 

and 6 Feb 43. AOK 4 34579/' file. 

The chief task was to build a fortified line 

in the rear between Velizh and Kirov. At 

mid month the armies began combing the 

towns and the countryside for able-bodied 

men and others who might be useful to the 

Russians if left behind. Long columns of 

evacuees, whom one army commander described as presenting pictures of absolute 

misery, were marched off to the west 

through the dead, late winter cold. Fourth 

Army alone reported evacuating 45,000 

persons. 

On I March Ninth Army began drawing 

back its front north and west of Rzhev. 

J n twenty-three days Operation BUEFFEL 

was completed." The units that originaliy 

bid., 17 Feb-IS Mar 43. 
THE CENTER AND THE NORTH 

stood farthest east had covered a distance 

of go miles. The length of the front in 

the BliEFFEL area was reduced from 340 

miles to I 10 miles. 

On his south flank, after 14 February, 

Kluge faced the problem of finding enough 

troops to halt Second Army's retrc?( and 

to man the lengthening line of Second 

Panzer Army, its neighbor on the north. As 

the Russians advanced west past Kursk, the 

arm\' group front began to bulge dangerous117 

Iy cast of Ore!' On 20 February Kluge proposed pulling back the Panzer and Second 

Armies to the line of the Desna Ri\'er, but 

Hitler was through retreating.:!') H e was already at work on other plans, and before 

many months had passed, the names of two 

pfO\·i ncial Russian towns, Kursk and Orel, 

\vauld gain renown on the Eastern From. 

!II! AOK 2, l a, Kriegstage bu. ch Ru.Hland, Teil 10, 

20-23 Feb 43, .'\OK 2 374 181 I file. 
CHAPTER VII 

Operation Zitadelle 

The Lull in the Storm 

Tn the years past, the arrival of spring had 

always heralded new German triumphs. 

Even the black winter of '94' -42 had been 

followed by a surge of fresh strength and 

confidence. But '943 was different. The 

day of the whirlwind offensive was gone 

and with it the grandiose plans that less 

than a year earlier had included a gigantic 

pincers movement through the Caucasus 

and Egypt into the Middle East. During 

the winter Hitler had been forced to usc 

the slogan "defense of the Homeland" in 

rallying the armies on the southern flank ~ 

of the Eastern Front. Although the front 

was still deep in the Soviet Union, several 

hundred miles from the German border, 

that appeal was beginning to have a literal 

significance that was not lost on the troops. 

The victory on the Donets, which ended 

the long winter retreat of Army Group 

South, and the successful withdrawals by 

the other army groups, restored morale at 

the front, but no one deluded himself into 

believing the next summer would see the 

swastika replanted on Mt. Elbrus or German outposts again looking east into Asia 

from the high bank of the Volga. Henceforth the war would be fought on other 

terms. The crucial question was to what 

extent, if at all, Germany would still be able 

to set those terms. For a time, the front 

settled down to an ominous quiet, waiting. 

A Dark Spring 

After the first week of April, when the 

Russians gave up their second attempt to 

liberate Leningrad, both sides paused to 

rest and regroup. The Russian spring with 

its mud and swollen rivers could be depended on to enforce at least a few weeks' 

truce. Only Army Group A had a tactical 

mission still to be executed. Hitler had 

ordered it to eliminate a beachhead the 

Russians had established early in February 

south of Novorossisk in the Kuban. He 

wanted to anchor the GOTENKOP firmly 

at Novorossisk so as to deny the enemy the 

port that had formerly been an important 

base for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. 

After several false starts and delays 

caused by bad weather, the attack began 

on ,8 April. When five days of fighting, 

which Seventeenth Army described as the 

heaviest it had experienced since the battle 

for Sevastopol in ' 942, failed to dent the 

Soviet line, the attack had to be given up as 

too costly in men and materiel. Seventeenth Army charged much of the blame 

for its failure to a condition then widespread among the armies in the east: its 

divisions, after nearly a year of uninterrupted combat, were simply not as effective 

as they once had been. The divisions 

needed rest and time to train their replacements, who in the past months had been 

thrown directly into combat from the basic 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

training camps in Germany,l 

Since June 1941 German attention had 

centered on the Eastern Front. Now, quite 

suddenly, the situation changed. Dangers 

that might have been disposed of handily 

had the campaign against the Soviet Union 

gone according to schedule loomed ominously all around. In January U.S. Army 

Air Forces flying fortresses staged the first 

daylight bombing attack on Germany, a 

massive strike at ""ilhelmshaven. Two 

month, later the British Royal Air Force 

(RAF ) resumed night bombing, using 4-

engine bombers instead of the 2-enginc 

planes that had carried out most of the 

ea rlier raids. ~ In the cities, particularly in 

the Ruhr, bomb damage increased alarmingly; and in one of the ironic twists of the 

war the army groups in the East began 

keeping tabs on home front morale. 

As their air forces struck at the center 

of the so-called Fortress Europe, the British 

and American ground forces deployed to 

storm the outer defenses. A second Stalingrad had long been in the making in 

North Africa. After British Eighth Army 

broke the Mareth Line in the last week of 

March defeat became inevitable, and on 12 

and 13 May the last clements of Fifth 

Panzer Army and Italian First Army surrendered in Tunisia. That the Western 

Allies would follow up their victory in 

North Africa with an invasion of southern 

Europe, either in Italy or in the Balkans, 

seemed certain. If they were committed, 

as it appeared, to Winston S. Churchill's 

strategy of attacking on the periphe,,", 

landings in Norway wefe ,also possible. 

There, growing hostility in Sweden added 

I H . Gr. A. l a, Kriegstagebuch, Band 2, Teil 4. 

1-24 Apr 43. H. Gr. A 75126/ 11 file. 

: Air Ministry (British ) Pamphlet 248, The Riu 

and Fall of the Germa n Air Force, p. 275· 

119 

to the danger. In the west the Channel 

coast would probably not be threatened in 

1943, but it would be foolhardy to count 

on more than a year's respite before the 

decisive battle that was to be expected 

there. [n short, the keystone of Hitler's 

strategy was crumbling; he had failed to 

make good the boast that he would deal 

with his enemies one by one; Germany was 

confronted with a 2-front war, that old 

specter that had haunted the General Staff 

since the latter years of the nineteenth 

century. 

Since 1939 Hitler had been fighting the 

"poor man's war," trying to compensate 

for inferior resources of manpower and personnel by relying on surprise, relentless exercise of the initiative, and his opponents' 

lack of preparedness. Now his enemies 

were on the ascendant, and the indications 

were that he would be hard put to meet 

them on their terms. 

Paradoxically, of the major belligerents, 

Germany had been the slowest in fully 

mobilizing its national resources. Dazzled 

by cheap successes and confident that victory was just around the corner, Hitler had 

for the first two and a half years of the war 

been content to live off the lead he had 

gained before 1939. Early in 1942, in one 

of his most fortunate choices, he had appointed Dr. Albert Speer Minister for 

Armament and Munitions. Under Speer 

German war production 'rose sharply and 

continued to rise until 1945, but the production gap remained. 

In the earl)' months of 1943, influenced 

by a second disastrous winter, Hitler again 

undertook to intensify the German war 

effort. [n Januarv he appointed the Committee of Three, composed of the Chief, 

OKW, Keitel, the Chief of the Party Chan-
120 

cellory, Martin Bormann, and the Chief of 

the Reichs Chancellory, Hans Lammers. 

The committee was to procure 800,000 

men for the armed forces, and it was given 

broad powers to make the men available 

by eliminating nonessential industries and 

occupations." They expected 10 filllhe 800,-

ooo-man draft by placing the civilian economy on what was called a "total war" 

footing. Consequently, subsequent drafts 

would bring the armed forces and the war 

industries into direct competition for men, 

and the OK\V estimated that between October ' 943 and April ' 944 the armed 

services would need another 973,000 men. 

Since the new class of eighteen-year-olds 

would number no morc than 460,000, most 

of the remainder would have to come from 

the deferred groups, a move which would 

cut deep into the labor force of the armament industry_ I 

Among the service arms, th e German 

armored forces had long shown serious 

symptoms of neglect. In the winter battles 

of '942-43 in the USSR the German tanks 

were outnumbered and, to a large extent, 

outclassed. The most powerful tank in 

quantity production , the Panzer IV, was 

a pre\-var model known sin ce 1941 to be no 

match for the Soviet T34. The winter 

disasters forced Hitler to call back the 

Army's outstanding tank expert, Guderian, 

whom he had summaril y dismissed in December ' 94'. He appointed Guderian 

Inspector General for Armor, gave him 

control of tank development and allocation 

and authorized him to devise improvements 

~ OKW. Stelluertretende Chef des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes. Kriegstagebuch L'om 1.1.-3 1.848. 

16, 22 Jan 43, IMT D oc 1786- PS. 

• Der Chef des Heeresstllbes beim Chef OKW, 

Vortragsnotiz ueber die persollelle Lage. 15.8-43. 

H 1/527 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

in tank tactics and the employment of 

panzer units.!> 

New tank models were on the way. The 

Tiger, which so far had fallen somewhat 

short of expectations, was in full production. 

The Panther, lighter and more mobile than 

the Tiger, was scheduled to start coming 

off the assembly lines in the late spring. 

Through the combined efforts of Speer and 

Guderian German tank output rose rapidly 

in th e early months of '943, reaching 62' 

units in April and 988, including 300 of 

the new Panthers, in May. In June and 

Jul y it fell off slightly to 775 and 8" , 

largely beca use of production difficulties 

with the Panthers.'; Impressive as they 

were, the figures probably fell well below 

the current monthly output of the Soviet 

Union alone and certainly far less than the 

combined American, British, and Soviet 

produc tion. Furthermore, the gain in 

strength was less than appeared at first 

glance because th e new models were being 

rushed to the fran t before they had been 

thoroughly tested and without fully trained 

crews. 

In at least one phase of weapons development, however, the Germans were still far 

ahead of their enemies. In April '943 

they completed firing the first test series of 

seventeen A-4 (V-2 ) rockets. By July 

they had fired another thirteen missiles in 

guidance and accuracy tests, and in August 

they put in production the first series of 

missiles. [n February ' 943 component development was begun for the C-2, Wasserfa ll, a large antiaircraft rocket. It was 

~ Heinz Guderian. Erinllerungen eines Soldaten 

(Heidelberg, 1951), p. 258. 

"Ceneralillspekteur tier Panzertruppen. Besprechullgspurlkte anlaesslich der FuehreTuortraege am 3. 

117ld 4. Mai 1943.5.5-43. H 16/ 159a fill'. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

expected to reach the testing stage by the 

end of the year' 

Germany's Allies 

The strongest reaction to the Germans' 

waning fortunes came from their allies. 

Late in March the recen tly appointed Finnish Foreign lVlinistcr, Ramsay, fl ew to 

Berlin for a conference with Reichsministcr 

Joachim von Ribbentrop. On 20 March the 

U.S. State Department had olTered its good 

ofTices in cstabli~hing contact between ' Finland and the Soviet Union for the purpose 

of bringing an end to hostilities between 

the two. Ramsay, new to diplomacy and 

apparentl y not well acquainted with the 

hara tcr of the German Foreign ~1inistcr, 

IIlformcd Ribbcntrop of the American note 

and, while denying that Finland intended 

to make peace behind the Germans' back, 

indicated that Finnish " private circles" 

'vere comin g to favor a change on the part 

of Finland to something like armed neutrality. Ribbentrop promptly undertook to 

dispel Ramsay's illusion of opening the way 

out of the war by a friendly agreement with 

Germany. The German people, he said, 

who were also fi ghting the war for Finland, 

would not appreciate havin ~ the Finns 

"cast come-hither looks" at the Russians. 

T o dri\'c the point home, he presented two 

demands: the United States' offer must be 

promptly and firmly rejected ; and the Finnish Government must declare its intention 

not to conclude a se lI'ate peace without 

ClTll1an ('onsent. " The s('cond came a<.; a 

'; OKII . Cli . H. RueJt. 1l.BdE. A':::72//1 IVa Pru e/ 

I.I II~P J...·dr .. Br. Nr. 8/ 4.1. Stand der A- 4 -

I~/Itlf' /('k lun~ und Nebenelltwid..lulIgeTl. 12 .7.43. H 

1/",.1.7 file . , Wipert \'on BllIcchcr. Ge.Hlndler z.wirchell Dik· 

/a/llr II/HI Dl'l/I vJ..T(ltie ( Wi cshadcn r 9.'1 [ ), pp. 

:1.1 0 -1 1 . 

121 

considerable blow to the Finns, since to 

meet it meant giving up the independent 

status Finland claimed as a cobelligerent, 

not a formal ally, of Germany. Actually, 

the problem of Finland was not yet acute. 

Even if the Finns evaded a binding deelaralion of loyalty to Germany, it could be 

safel y assumed that for the present they had 

no place to go. They were completely 

dependent on German economic and military assistance, and eager as they might be 

to leave the war, they were undoubtedly 

not ready to trust themselves to Soviet 

mercy. 

For the ncar future Italy was a more 

pressing problem. That Mussolini's regime, shaken by the dcleat in North Africa , would survive an invasion of the [talian 

mainl and was highly doubtfu l, and to 

imagine that in such a case the Axis could 

be preserved was completely fatuou s. Mussolini was worried. In December 1942 and 

again in March '943 he proposed negotiatmg a peace with the Russians to avoid the 

trap .of a 2-front war. "On tht' day the 

RUSSian campaign is liquidated" he wrote 

". we " can hOlst the nag. Victory is ours!" 

s an alternative, he thought of creating an 

East Wall," a permanent, fortified front 

in the East that would free enough troops 

to meet the expected I3ritish-Ameri can offensives in western and southern Europe.:! 

In the second week of April Hitler and 

Ribbentrop received M:ussolini and his acting foreign minister at Schloss Klcssheim 

". S til/nidI. A 1I{::I 'idlnllll .~ !Ieba die U IItnrrdlt7!J! 

,::w!Jl'he1/ dem Fuehrer lwd dem Gra/en Ciano in 

A.'lll:e.relll!eit de$ Ueich.rmarshallr. de$ RAM. deJ 

"'ldl/lf!" dllllf~ Keitel. de r ('cllcl'ld.r Judi. und deJ 

MarJ/wUs C(/lJallero i1ll Fll ehrer !1auptqllartier am 

18 D e:: 1 [)1.2 .. Drie/. der Duce dC$ FaschiJmuJ und 

Ur.~i ~/lll .~rc he{ aI/ den Fu ehrer. 26 Maerz '943 . 

Bl!th 111 U.S . Dcpt of State. Cermall Forc iH"n Ministry Docs. 
122 

near Berchtesgaden. Hitler had already 

rejected the id ea of negotiating with the 

Russians on the ground th at Stalin could 

not be trusted a nd " if given a half-year's 

peace" would use it to prepa re his revenge, 

but it was necessary to try to revive the 

Italia ns' confidence and set at least some 

of th eir fea rs to rest. Ribbentrop told the 

Duce that in a war of ideologies such as 

th at between Germany and the Soviet 

Union compromise was out of the question ; 

the Soviet U nion was three-fourths defealed ; a nd the Germa n a rmies woul d ta ke 

the offensive aga in in the coming summer. 

At th e same time, he indicated tha t Germany would not stage a nother all-out offensive in the style of the previous two years. 

Instead, the strategy would be to wea r 

down the Soviet U Ilion gradually." 

The idea of an " East \Vall," as proposed 

by M ussolini, had also begun to appeal to 

some of the German genera ls. After the 

winter battles ended, Zeitzlcr suggested 

building a fortified line to backstop th e 

Easlern Front, but Hitler would have none 

of it. H e claimed it would undermine the 

troops' will to fight. H e still envisioned an 

eventual decline in Soviet strength to the 

point where th e Germa n a rmies could advance eastward again, perhaps to th e line 

of the Don River, a nd then establish a 

sort of Limes Gerl1um iclts beyond which the 

Russians, reduced to military impotence, 

could be left to their own devices.

ll 

After ~1 usso lin i ca rne a procession of 

10 S chmidt. A u/zeichmwg ueber die U II terredu llg 

zwiJchen dem R A M WId d em S taatnekretaer Btlsfitw;"i im A1!l('eul/heit de r Botse/wlter l'on M arkeT/Jell !I u d Alfieri i1ll SeMon K lt'Js heim. 8 Apr 43, 

U.S. Dept of State, German Foreign M inislry Don. 

II M S # P--049, Die S tra tegie der deutJC hell 

oberstetl Fuehru.ng im tweiten Viertelja hr 1943 

(Genera l de l' Artill cric a. D. Walte r Wa rlimon t ), 

p. 4· 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

leaders of the lesser allies, first Marshal 

Antonescu, the Rumanian head of state, 

then Admiral Miklos H orthy, Regent of 

Hungary, a nd later M sgr. J oseph Tisa, th e 

Slovakian head of state, and Ante Pa vciic, 

the Poglavnik of Croatia. Antonescu, like 

Mussolini, worried a bout the consequences 

of a 2-front war, but he recommended making peace with the Western Allies in order 

to gain a free h and against the Soviet 

Union. 1 2 The Rumani ans, with a long 

frontier bordering on the Soviet Union, 

had no choice but stay in the wa r. The 

Hungarians, all along morc interested in 

their quarrels with their immediate neighbors than in the campaign against th e 

Soviet Union, henceforth kept their Army, 

except for a few token divisions, a t home. I:: 

I'lasov 

On e p o t enti a l a ll y man y G e rm a ns 

thought might still be able to turn the tide 

against the Soviet Union was the Russia n 

people. The popula tion of the Germa noccupied territories in the Soviet U nion 

plus the millions of Russia n prisoners of 

wa r constituted a potentia l reservoir of 

economic a nd milita ry power second only 

to that of Germany itself. Given some independen ce and a reason ably a ttracti ve 

government, it appeared those peopl e Inight 

yet prove willing to forget th e years of 

hardship and oppression under the Germans 

and turn aga inst their former masters in 

the Kremlin, from wh ose return they expected to profit little. Al though the chances 

were not as good as in former years, it also 

a ppeared possible that the example of a 

non-Communisl Russian state would scri1: Paul Schmid l, S tatiJI allf d iplom atiuher u.~hue. 1923-45 ( Bonn, 1949 ), p. 555. 

U MS # P-049 ( Warl imont), p. 35. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

Dusly undermine Stalin's authority In the 

rest of the Soviet Union, 

Late in '942 th e sentiment in German 

military circles for an alliance with the 

Russian people produced the first tentative 

step toward a positive program. The propaganda section of th e OKW and the Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, tried to set 

up the captured Soviet general, Andrei I. 

Vlasov, as the leader of an anti-Communist 

Russian national movement. He was 

named head of a shadow government, the 

Russian National Committee, and given 

nominal command of the Russian Army of 

Liberation, a miscellaneous coll ecti on of 

collaborator units recruited by th e Germans. The Wehrmacht propaganda offi cers prepared a '3-point p rogram promising the Russians private property, peasant 

ownership of the land , and-vaguely- national independence. When that program, 

published over Vlasov's signature as the 

so-called Smolensk Manifesto, was given 

limited publi cit y durin g the winter o f 

1942-43, the popular response appeared 

encouraging but also quickl y revealed that, 

to have any lasting effect, it would have to 

be implemented by concrete measu res, and 

Hitler refused to go that fa r. He held to 

the dictum he had established when he 

began the campa ign in the USSR- that he 

was not fighting the war and sacrificing 

German men for the sake of the Russians. 

Early in 1943, when it became clear that 

anything th at promised to contribute toward restoring the German fortunes was 

worth a try, Hitler's stubborn hard line on 

the Soviet Union aroused dismay even 

among some who rarely allowed th emselves 

to doubt the Fuehrer's judgment. Propaganda Minister Goebbels tried to persuade 

him at least to offer the Ru&sian peasants 

123 

land and freedom of worship , but without 

success.14 In May, Kluge, Commanding 

General, Army Group Center, having failed 

a month earlier to persu ade Goebbels to 

approach Hitler again concerning a more 

liberal policy for the cast, forwarded a long 

memorandum to the Chief of Starr, OKH, 

in which he set down his and his army 

commanders' beliefs regarding the future 

of German relations with the Russian people. In blunllanguage, Kluge, who, when it 

came to expressing opinions that might 

come to Hitler's notice was not the most 

outspoken of the generals, outlined the following reasons for a change in poli cy: 

The development of the total situ ation is 

forcing, with growi ng insistence, the establishment of clear objectives with respect to the 

Russian people whose collabora tion including 

military collaboration must be won because 

it will have a decisive influence on the war. 

The methods employed so fa r have fa iled : 

force is not enough. The Russian people 

must be \von by other means and be per~ 

suaded to fight for our cause because they 

also see it as theirs. 

Economic concessions- which would have 

the most reliable effect- arc not a t our di ~ 

poso!. The only possibility is to grant the 

Russian p(:oplc a share in the administration 

of their country immediately in order to 

dl'monslrate that the German waf aims arc 

not limited to the worn out slogan "the 

crusade against Bolshevism."! "' 

Kluge added that the Smolensk Manifesto 

and a recent Vlasov visit in the army grou p 

zone had aroused a favorable popular rc~ 

sponse, but he warned that it was high time 

to follow this up with deeds, ot herwise the 

propaganda itself would become dangerolls 

and have to be abandoned. He ecom~ 

II G oebbeil Diariel. p. 2B4. 

Ir. O .B. d. H . Cr. Mille. f a Nr. 5440 / 43. (HI dell 

Chef des Gen. Stnbe t des H eereJ, 22 .543. Pz. AOK 

2 36468/1 fil e. 
124 

mended creating a Russian national committee in the Army Group Center zone 

that would be given a gradually increasing 

role in the civil administration of the occupied territory. "We will have to accept 

the fact," Kluge concluded, "that the last 

stage will be full self-government under 

the occupying power." 16 

That Kluge's memorandum had no 

chance of influencing Hitler was a foregone conclusion. To have accepted it 

would, as far as Hitler was concerned, have 

made nonsense out of the whole war in the 

Soviet Union. A month earlier, at a conference of the economic administrators for 

the occupied territories, Goering had laid 

down the policy to be followed. Maximum 

exploitation of the Eastern territories to 

meet German needs was to be the watchword. Even the subsistence requirements 

of the people were to be disregarded "because the Russian people cannot be won 

over to the German cause in any case." ). 

A Limited 0 If etlsive 

By early March 1943 it was evident that 

Germany would be able to salvage two significant assets from the wreckage of the 

winter. Manstein's advance to the Donets 

would throw the Russians temporarily ofT 

balance in the zone of their main effort, 

and as a dividend of Operation BUEFFEL 

and the retreat in southern USSR, a fairl y 

strong operational reserve would be created. 

These were enough to afford Hitler, at least 

to a limited degree, a free hand in planning. 

~ Ibid. 

11 Wi Stab OSl, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.4- 30 .6 .43. 

Stab Abe . 1, Wirtschaftliche Lage im April 1943 , 

Wi/ID 2.338 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Strategic Plans- O perations Order 5 

On 13 March the plan was ready, embodied in Operations Order 5. After the 

end of the winter and the spring muddy 

season, it stated, the Russians would 

return to the offensive. The German armies 

would have to strike first in several places 

and, as Army Group South was currentl y 

doing, definitely se ize the initiative in at 

least one. The spot Hitler chose was the 

Kursk bulge. By mid-April Army Group 

South was to assemble a strong panzer 

army for an attack north toward Kursk 

from the Kharkov area. (Map 12 ) On the 

northern rim of the bulge Army Group 

Center was to create an offensive force in 

the Second Panzer Army zone, using divisions released by BUEFFEL. The offensive 

would begin as soon as the muddy season 

ended and before the Russians had a chance 

to launch an attack of their own. Army 

Group A would reduce the size of the 

GOTENKOPF, and its primary mission would 

be to release troops for transfer to Army 

Group South. " 

Although the Kursk offensive, given the 

code name ZITAOELLE, subsequently acquired the character of a desperate and 

tragic gamble, it was conceived as part of a 

coherent and not unpromising strategy that 

envisioned a series of limited offensives to 

consolidate the German defenses. A victory in the Kursk bulge would straighten 

the German front and could be expected to 

keep the Russians off balance a while 

longer. In his order H itler instructed 

Army Group North to be ready to follow 

up ZITADELLE with an operation against 

Leningrad." By taking Leningrad he in18 0KH , CenStdH , Op . Abt. Nr. 430163/ 43 , 

Operationsbefehl Nr. 5, '3.3.43, OCMH files. III Ibid. 
XXlCXX r-, 

CENTER 

L_J 

MAP 12 

., 

xxxx 

SE§~9PZ 

xxx xx r-, 

SOUTH 

L_J 

PROPOSED OPERATIONS 

HABICHT, PANTHER, ZITADELLE 

March -April 1943 

" , , i',i',1 " , 

GER'"'' ~RONT, 51 .... " 45 

PROJECTED '"01'11$ "T rH[ 

CON CLUSION Dr D~[IUtIONS 

ZO 4 0 10 " 'LES 

i ! I I' ! 

20 40 10 Kl l0MU[1I5 

..... __ F 

;'"' 

/ 

-

\ 
126 

tended to tighten his hold on the Baltic 

Sea and northern Europe, where growing 

hostility on the part o[ Sweden and war 

weariness in Finland were adding to his 

long-standing concern over the vulnerable 

Norwegian coast. 

During the winter he had several times 

talked about strengthening the forces in 

Norway, and in February the Army o[ 

Norway had begun work on a defense plan 

which included the occupation o[ Sweden. 

On 13 March, the day Operations Order 5 

was issued, he told JodI that he intended to 

shift a mountain division plus six battalions 

to Norway and planned to equip the panzer 

division then forming in Norway "with 

the heaviest assault weapons, ones against 

which Sweden possesses no means of defense." :!o 

The timing was crucial. If ZITADELLE 

succeeded in the spring, the operation 

against Lening rad , using troo ps fr om 

ZITADE LLE, could start in early summer; 

and once Leningrad was safely in hand, 

Finnish interest in the war could be expected to revive, Sweden could be dealt 

with at will, and Norway would become a 

much less attractive target [or the Western 

Allies. If ZITADELLE were completed 

promptly, there would also be time and 

troops enough to strengthen the Mediterranean front. On the other hand, th e cost 

of failure would run high. The two armies 

intended for ZITADELLE comprised the 

entire German strategic reserve . They were 

working capital which, lost or tied down in 

a fruitless enterprise, could not be quickly 

replaced. 

At the time Hitler issued Operations 

!!() OKW, Stelluertretende Chef des Wehrmachtfuelzrungsstabes. K riegstagebuch von! 1. 1.-3 1.343. 

13 Mar 43 , IMT Doc 1786- PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Order 5, the [rant in the Army Group 

Center and South zones was still fluid. As 

so often happened, Hitler's planning was 

based in important particulars on conditions which did not yet exist and which 

might not come into being exactly as he anticipated. Army Group Center was in the 

midst o[ Operation BUEFFEL. Second Army 

and Second Panzer Army were struggling 

to stop the Russians in the bulge west and 

northwest of Kursk. The striking force o[ 

Army Group South, Fourth Panzer Army, 

was adding the finishing touches to its victory at Kharkov, but it had been on the 

move without pause for nearly a month, 

and its troops were nearly exhausted. Both 

army groups needed time to rest and refit 

before embarking on an offensive. Army 

Group South was already feeling th e effects 

of the spring thaw. Farther north, in the 

Arm y Group Center zone, the thaw wou ld 

set in during the next few weeks and last 

through April. To get ready [or ZITADELLE by mid-April would be difficult, maybe impossible. 

J-l abicht and Panther 

After Fourth Panzer Army, in the third 

week o[ March, cleared the right bank of 

the Donets north to Belgorod, Hitler temporarily left ZITADELLE in abeyance and 

turned his attention to the Donets line 

southeast o[ Kharkov. There, it appeared, 

the opportunity for a quick, relatively easy 

victory was beckoning. Frantic enemy 

activity east of the river showed the Russians were worried. From the German 

point of view a thrust across the Donets 

had ta cti ca l advantages. It would 

stra ighten and shorten the [rant southeast 

of Kh arkov and, by pushing it farther east, 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

might discourage the Russians from again 

attempting to cut off the Army Group 

South right flank by striking at Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. It would also 

facilitate the execution of ZITADELLE by 

eliminating the danger of a counterthrust 

from the south into the rear of the ZITADELLE advance. 

On 22 March Hitler issued an order for 

Operation HABICHT, an offensive thrust 

across the Donets, to be undertaken as soon 

as the river receded enough to permit a 

crossing. He assigned responsibility for 

HABICHT to First Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf. Armeeabteilung 

Kempf was to put one assault force across 

the Donets in the vicinity of Chuguyev and 

strike southward behind the Russian line 

on the river. A second (orce was to cross 

farther north and advance east to Kupyansk. First Panzer Army was to tic down 

the Russians around Izyum and send a 

force north along the west bank of the 

Oskol River to Kupyansk." 

Two days later Hitler directed Army 

Group South also to begin planning a 

more ambitious operation, code-named 

PANTHER, to be executed by the First and 

Fourth Panzer Armies, which would force 

the Russians away from the Donets and 

back to the line Volehansk-Kupyansk-Svatovo-Krasnaya River." Neither of the 

new operations aroused enthusiasm at the 

headquarters of the armies concerned. The 

First Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung 

Kempf chiefs of staff worried that Hitler 

would fall into his old habit of driving 

the armies on from victory to victory with2IO.B. d. H. Gr. Sued, fa NT. 0469/43, an 1. 

Pz. Armu, an A. Abt. Ktmp/, 23-3.43, AOK 8 

36188/20 file. 

a Pz. AOK I, la , Zusaetze zum K.T.B., '2 4 Mar 

43. Pz. AOK I 44652/ 20. file. 

127 

out rest until, as in previous years, they 

again became hopelessly overextended." 

At the end of the month, with three 

operations in planning, Hitler faced the 

problem- which to execute and when. 

HABICHT was comparatively minor and 

would hardly be worthwhile unless it could 

be a prelude to ZITADELLE . PANTHER, 

larger and tactically more profitable, would 

require much more time and would necessitate an indefinite postponement of ZITADELLE. One thing was certain, every week's 

delay reduced the chances of success no 

matter what the choice. The advantages 

on the German side were slight enough as 

it was. On the Armeeabteilung Kempf 

front alone the Russians had an estimated 

1,000-1,500 tanks, more than twice the 

number Army Group South could muster 

in its entire zonc. Z4 To achieve genuine 

surprise with any of the three proposed 

operations was already out of the question. 

Everything hinged on being ready to exploit the first onset of good weather in the 

hope of catching the enemy momentarily 

off guard and not solidly dug in. 

On 2 April Hitler issued his "decision." 

HABICHT would be made ready so that it 

could begin on four days' notice any time 

after 13 April. By placing HABICHT first 

on the list he had virtuall y eliminated it. 

The Donets was expected to reach the flood 

stage in the second half of April, and Manstein had said that Army Group South 

could not be ready to resume the offensive 

by mid-April because the panzer units 

would have to be allowed to complete their 

rest and refitting Hat least to a certain 

,., Ibid . 

2 1 AOK 8, Krieg.stagebuch NT. I , 30 Mar 43, 

AOK 8 36,88/ 8 file. 
128 

degree." Z~ Aware of those difficulties, 

Hitler ordered that if HABICHT could not 

start by I7 April, it would be superseded 

by PANTHER, which would then have to be 

ready by I May; if neither HABICHT nor 

PANTHER could be executed, he added, 

Army Groups Center and South would go 

over to ZITADELLE." Three days later Manstein told his subordinate commanders the 

final choice would probably be ZIT ADELLE.27 

Operations Order 6-Zitadelle 

Postponed 

On 15 April, Hitler announced his "definitive decision." ZITADELLE, he directed 

in Operations Order 6, would be ready to 

start on six days' notice after 28 April. 

PANTHER would follow, taking advantage 

of the confusion ZITADELLE was expected 

to create on the Soviet side. The special 

instructions for ZlTADELLE reveal why 

Hitler had taken so long making up his 

mind. He was fully aware that the operation was an extremely touchy undertaking. 

He warned, first, that it would have to be 

done fast because troops were needed for 

other missions. Secondly, he ordered Army 

Groups Center and South to be on guard 

against Soviet attacks in the exposed sectors on either side of the Kursk bulge. " 

Operation ZITADELLE, as he was painfully 

aware, would be launched not out of a 

::; Ibid. , 4 Apr 43; A. Abt. Kempf, Niederschrift 

ueber Besprechung Ceneralfeldm. v. M anstein mit 

O.B. und Chef Gen Stab Armeeabteilung am 28·3· 

43. AOK 8 36188/20 file. 

lie O.B. d. H . Gr. Sued, 0479/43, an A. Abt. 

Kempf, 24.43, AOK 8 36188/20 file . 

:l7 Pz. AOK 4, la, Kriegstagebu ch, 25 .3-3 1.743. 

5 Apr 43, P,. AOK 4 34888/2 file. 

WI OKW, Stelluertrete1!de Chef des Wehrma chtfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch vom , 1 - 3' .843, 

5 Jul 43, tMT Doc T792-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

solid front but rather out of the tips of two 

far from stable salients, the outer faces of 

which invited Soviet attention as much as 

the Kursk bulge did German. The danger 

was greater northwest of Orel but not 

much less south of Kharkov, where the 

Soviet line projected westward into the 

bend of the Donets below the city. 

ZITADELLE could become a case of a herring intent on gulping a sardine swimming 

into the jaws of a shark. That had raised 

the question whether ZITADELLE could not 

more sa fely be conducted as a "backhand 

stroke" (aus der Nachhand schlagen ) 

that would leave the first move to the Russians. Nevertheless, Hitler had suppressed 

his doubts and had decided to go ahead 

with ZlTADELLE as he originally conceived 

it. The reason why is also to be found in 

Operations Order 6. "The victory at 

Kursk," he stated, "must have the effect of 

a beacon seen around the world.":!9 He 

needed a victory in the old style, a gigantic 

encirclement to bring in hundreds of thousands of prisoners and thousands of tons of 

booty. Only ZITADELLE could provide 

those. 

No sooner did Operations Order 6 

reach the front commands, than new obstacles appeared. Ninth Army, which was 

to command the offensive in the Army 

Group Center zone, protested that its deployment could not be completed by 3 

May. The OKH proposed granting postponements on a day-ta-day basis, but Ninth 

Army insisted that either its mission be 

reduced or ZITADELLE be put off at least 

to 15 May. 30 

On 18 April air reconnaissance reported 

long truck columns moving out of loscow 

:?\J Ibid .. 5 Jul 43. 

:JO AOK 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebu ch 

Nr. 8, 16, 20 Apr 43, AOK 9 34739/2 file . 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

toward Kursk and out of Stalingrad toward 

Valuyki, due east of Kharkov." This sign 

that the Russians were on the alert was 

scarcely needed: Army Group South estimated that from reserves already at hand 

the Russians could throw 8 tank, 5 mechanized, and 5 cavalry corps against its 

main force, Fourth Panzer Army, in the 

first six days of the offensive." 

On the morning of 30 April, having 

agreed four days earlier to postpone Z,TADELLE for two days, the OKH granted four 

more days' delay because of heavy rains. 

That afternoon it ordered all directives setting a time for ZITADELLE canceled and 

destroyed. A new date would not be set until 

after Hitler had conferred with the commanding generals.:

u 

On 3 May Hitl er called Manstein , 

Kluge, and the Commanding General, 

Ninth Army, Generaloberst Walter Model, 

to a conference to be held the next day in 

Muni ch. The others to be present were 

Zeitzler, Guderian, Speer, and the Chief 

of Staff, OKL, Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek. 

The discussion centered on Model's report describing the problems he expected 

Ninth Army to encounter in breaking 

through the well-fortified Russian front. 

In particular, Model believed the Mark IV 

tanks, the heaviest he had except for a few 

Tigers, would not be able to stand up to 

the new Soviet antitank weapons. Hitler, 

who apparently had begun to have qualms 

3tAOK 8, l a, Kriegstagebuch NT. I . 18 Apr 43, 

AOK 8 36,88/ 8 file . 

»Ob. Kdo. d . H. Gr. Sued, 10 N r. 0505/ 43, 

Operationsbe/ehl luer "Zitadelle" NT. I . 20.443 . 

AOK 8 36 , 88/.0 file. 

:13 AOK 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstageb uch 

Nr. 8, 30 Apr 43, AOK 9 34739/. file ; AOK 8. 

l a, Kriegstagebuch N,. " 30 Apr 43, AOK 8 

36,88/8 file . 

129 

on his own account, was impressed. He 

proposed letting ZITADELLE wait until 

June; by then he expected to have the 

newer model tanks available in quantity. 

Manstein , Kluge, and Zeitzler objected, 

maintaining that the delay would benefit 

the Russians more than the Germans by 

giving them time to recover from the winter battles and that their tank output, which 

was known to be higher than that of the 

Germans, would cancel any gains anticipated from waiting for the new tanks. 

Manstei n sa id he believed Z,TADELLE 

could succeed if it were executed in May. 

He considered a longer wait dangerous for 

the reasons he, Kluge, and Zeitzler had 

given and because the collapse of German 

and Italian resistance in Tunisia, expected 

any day, would probably be followed within 

a matter of weeks by a British-American 

landing in the Mediterranean, which would 

create more complications. Kluge, perhaps chiefly out of annoyance at seeing 

one of his subordinates given direct access 

to Hitler, declared that Ninth Army was 

not as badly off as Model thought. Jeschonnek added that a delay would not 

benefit the Air Force." The others present, Guderian and Speer, objected to Z,TADELLE'S being executed at all, because, successful or not, it would occasion heavy tank 

losses and thus upset their plans for increasing German armored strength .'" Hitler 

closed the conference without giving a 

decision. but he indicated privately to 

Model that there would be a postponement. JG 

3 1 Manstc in, Verlorene Siege, pp. 390-91. 

:J:; Guderian, Eri,merungen eines S oldaten. p. 

277· 

.36 Manstc in, Verlorene Siege, p. 492 ; AOK 9 , 

Fuehrun gJabteilung, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 8, 4 May 

43, AOK 9 34739/ . fil e. 
130 

On 6 Ma\' the OKH announced that 

ZrrADELLE was postponed to 12 June. The 

lIext day in a telephone conference with 

Zeitzlcr, Kempf protested that the delay 

was "undesirable" frorn both the psychological and operational points of view. He 

believed it would benefit the defender more 

than the attacker. Zeitzler agreed and saiel 

he was glad to have such an uobservation 

from the front" to lay before Hitler at th e 

next opportunity,:;' Bul further argument 

proved useless ; Hitler was determined to 

wait for the new tanks, especially the Ferdinands, ninety of which he would have in 

June. He expected them to increase the 

penetrating power of the attack." The 

Ferdinand mounted a long-barreled 88-

mm. gun on a Tiger chassis. Guderian 

considered it a mediocre weapon because 

of its low speed, fixed turret, and lack of 

machine guns for usc in close combat ; but 

its heavy armor and powerful gun had 

impressed Hitler. 3!l He succumbed once 

morc to his weakness for new weapons and 

the visions of easy victories they aroused in 

his imagination. 

~I ay was a troubled month. A week 

after the Munich conference Guderian 

asked Hitler why he wanted to start an 

offensive in the East at all in 1943. Hitler 

replied that he had doubts himselfthe very thought of the offensive gave 

him Hbutterflies in his stomach." 10 On the 

13th the last German and Italian units in 

Tunisia su rrendered. The defeat had been 

inevitable for hvo months or more, but, as 

n A. Abt. Kempf, Niederschrift ueber Funges· 

praech O.B./C/zef GenStdH am 7.5-43, AOK a 

16 188/20 file . 

311 A. Abt. Kempf. Besprechung Chefs Ge1L St. 

d . Ann et'l be; Heeresgruppc . 6-5.43, AOK 34739/2 

file. 

~ Guderian, Erinneru:tgul eiTles Soldaten. p. 27' . 10 Ib id., p. 280. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

in the case of Stalingrad, Hitler, to the 

last, had only half-believed it could actually 

happen. Confronted in earnest with the 

necessity for strengthening Italy and the 

Balkans, his doubts about ZITADELLE grew. 

On the 14th Kluge told one of his army 

commanders that it was completely uncer· 

tain when ZITAOELLE would begin:

1I 'ren 

days later Goebbels believed that Hitler had 

adopted an "After you, my dear Alphonse" 

attitude and intended to let the Russians 

make the first move. 

Probably the most illuminating insight 

into Hitler's state of mind occurred early in 

May at a meeting of high Nazi Party offi cials. He drew a detailed comparison 

between the year 1932, when the partyafter victories at the polls-appeared to be 

going down to defeat at the hands of Papen 

and Hindenburg, and the current situation. "In 1932," he said, "we attained 

victory only by stubbornness that sometimes looked like mad ness, so too shall we 

achieve it today." I:': This was a theme 

which, over th e years, he had come to regard as the first principle of his military and 

political leadership. It expressed his deepseated belief, shared by many Germans, that 

his primary claim 10 greatness was his abili· 

ty to achieve victory against impossible 

odds, sometimes almost by will power alol1(,. 

As had happened several times in the past. 

the apparent doubts and uncertainty \vere 

a phase in the period of incubation from 

which he invariably emerged determined to 

follow the most radical course. 

Silberstrei! 

As Operation ZITADELLE receded farth er 

II AOK 2. la, Kriegstagebuch Russland. Teil II , 

'4 May 43, AOK 2 374, 8/2 file. 

<i2 GoebbeJs Diaries, pp. 3~,2, 391. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

into the future, an unnatural quiet settled 

over the Eastern Front. The Russians, 

who for two months had appeared to be 

l acing desperately to get in the first blow, 

seemed to have decided instead on a courteous "After you, my dear Gaston." During 

the pause Army Group Center diverted a 

number of line divisions, rarely available 

for such tasks, to anti partisan operations. 

Front activity, except for random local 

skirmishing, was restricted to Operation 

SILBERSTREIF, the most ambitious German 

propaganda campaign of the war. 

SILBERSTREIF was a byproduct of the 

Army's desire to draw the Russian people 

into an alliance against the Soviet regime. 

I n April the OKH had established in Basic 

Order No. 13, a policy of preferred treatment for Russian deserters. They were to 

be segregated from the other prisoners of 

war and housed in better quarters. When 

they crossed into the German line they 

were to be given a "generous" issue of rations and transported to the rear aboard 

trucks, not marched back on foot. Officers 

were to be assigned orderlies. Prisoners of 

war who had volunteered for German service \,"cre to be formed into units, one offi cer 

and twenty-four men for each German divISion. These units would conduct loudspeaker propaganda at the front and act 

as \velea rning committees for th e incoming 

deserters. -43 

SILBERSTREIF. conducted in May, June, 

and Jul y, was an attempt to advertise Basic 

Order No. 13 to the Russian soldier. Its 

results were disappointing. Army Group 

North reported distributing forty-nine mil-

~3 OKH, GenStdH, Gen. Qu., Abt. Kriegsverw. 

Nr. I1/ 2310 / 43 , Grundlegender Belehl Nr. 13, 

20.4.43; OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt. Nr. I1/ 12024/ 

43, Au/stellung russ. BetreuungsstaDeln. 20-4·43· 

Both in H 3/473 file. 

2H-713 0-68-10 

131 

lion propaganda leafl ets in Mal' and June. 

During the same period a total of 622 

deserters came in, less than haIf of them 

directl y attributable to SILBERSTREIF." 

The propaganda officers believed that SILBERSTREIF would have been more successful had it been conducted in conjunction 

with ZITADELLE, as was original1y intended, 

I ather th an at a time when the front was 

stable and desertion, consequently, more 

difficult." 

H itler Decides for Z itadelle 

As summer approached, tension increased on both sides of the front. Late in 

May Ninth Army reported th at the Russians had strong reserves echeloned in depth 

behind the front, ready to meet any threat." 

In the first weeks of June the forces for 

ZITADELLE reached their peak strength. 

The troops were rested, and they had received goo tanks and over 300 seIf-propelled assault guns since March:" Still, 

as far as anyone knew, ZITADELLE was no 

nearer execution. A conference at the 

OKH on 10 June again considered the tactic of the "backhand stroke. " 4S 

On 18 June the Operations Staff, OKW, 

entered the picture and recommended to 

Hitler that ZITADELLE be abandoned. They 

characterized the coming summer as a 

period of uncertainty and proposed pulling 

U Political and police pressures made the desertion rate of the Soviet Army somewhat higher than 

that of most other armies. 

U Db. Kdo. d. H. Gr. Nord, St. O. Prop., Propaganda Lage im Bereich der H eeresgruppe Nord, 

10-7-43, H. Gr. Nord 75 131 / 107 file . 

~e ADK 9, Fuehru7lgsa bteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

NT. 8, 25 May 43, AOK 9 347 39/2 file . 

H OKH, Org. Abl. (III), Beitraege zum K .T .B. 

1941-43.22.6.43, HI / 167 file. 

I AOK 9, Fu ehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 8, 10 J un 43, AOK 9 34739/2 file. 
132 

together all the troops that could be spared 

into two strong strategic reserves, one in 

Germany and the other, comprising the 

two armies for ZITADELLE, behind the Eastern Front but close to railroads so that it 

could be moved to Italy or the Balkans in 

case of ncecl. 49 On the same day, Hitler 

replied that although he fully appreciated 

the Operations StalT's point of view, he had 

definitely decided to go ahead with ZITADELLE. 50 Two days later he announced his 

decision to the army groups and armies, but 

another five days passed before he set the 

time-5 July." 

In the three months after Operations 

Order NO.5 appeared the situation at the 

front had so changed that ZITADELLE 

would have to be fought under conditions 

exactly opposite those originally anticipated. The time for exploiting the enemy's 

temporary weakness was long past. The 

chances of a quick thrust were slight; the 

armies would have to grind through a 

fortified front miles deep and backed by 

waves of reserves. A Ninth Army report 

described the coming offensive as "a colli· 

sian between armies at the peak of readiness on both sides" in which the skill of the 

GenTIan soldiers and the superiority of their 

leaders would have to be enough to tip the 

balance." On 26 June Fourth Panzer Army 

warned that the prospects of success were 

declining daily." On the other hand, from 

4nMS # P-049 (Warlimont), p. ,61. 

,~, OKW. Stellue rtrete11de Chef des Wehrma chtfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.7.-31.843, 

5 Jul 43, IMT Doc I 792-PS. 

~I Ibid ., 5 Jul 43; AOK 9. Fuelirungsabteiiung, 

KTiegslagebu ch Nr. 8, 20 Jun 43, AOK 9 34739/2 

file. 

1'4 Ib id., 12 Jun 43. 

r.:J Pz. AOK 4, Ia . Kriegslagebuch , 25.3-31.743, 

26 Jun 43, Pz; AOK 4 34888/2 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the OKH point of view, to cancel the 

offensive could prove worse than to go 

ahead and risk a setback. If ZITADELLE 

were given up, Hitler was certain to accept 

the OKW proposal concerning reserves, 

with the result that the OKH would lose 

c.ontrol of Ninth Army and Fourth Panzer 

Army, which would probably be taken 

away from the Eastern Front altogether and 

shifted to the OKW theaters in Italy and 

the Balkans." 

As if the picture was not gloomy enough, 

ZITADELLE, coming when it did, automatically invited comparison with the German 

summer offensives of 1941 and 1942. In 

order to disguise the fact that this time 

Germany could only mount a limited offensive and as a hedge against the possibility that even this might miscarry, Jodi 

instructed Wehrmacht Propaganda to depict ZITADELLE as a counteroffensive, thereby creating the impression of a strong defensive capability and establishing an alibi 

in advance in case ZITADELLE failed, 55 

On I July, in a special order for the German officers down to the rank of battalion 

commander, Hitler summarized the reasons for ZJTADELLE. It would not only 

strengthen the morale of the German people and make the rest of the world "take 

notice," it would also instill new confidence 

in the German soldiers. Germany's allies 

would gain faith in the final victory, and 

the neutrals would be admonished to behave with caution and restraint. The victory would snatch the initiative away from 

the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future 

~I See MS # P-049 (Warlimont), pp. 159, 161 , 

162. 

r.:; OKW, Stellverlretende Chef des Wehrma chlfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.7.-31.843, 

,) Jul 43, IMT Doc 1792- PS. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

and could have extensive, "if not dccish'c," 

effects on the morale of the Soviet soldicrs. jt' 

Z itadelle 

T actics and Forces 

The tactical plan for ZITADELL E had 

remained the same throughout the months 

of delay: Ninth Army was to strike due 

south along the line Orcl-Kursk, while 

Fourth Panzer Army, its Aank on the cast 

,creened offensively by Armceabteilung 

Kempf, advanced north from Belgorod to 

Kursk. ( M ap 13) The plan was logical to 

a fault; it had not the slightest chance of 

achieving surprise. 

Recognizing that weakness, H itler in 

April had thought of combining the offensive forces of Army Groups Center and 

South in a single thrust east from the vicinity of Rylsk to Kursk, but he had quickly 

given up the idea because of the tremendous difficulties involved in transferring and 

regrouping the units." T oward the end of 

June, Manstein had considered shifting the 

line of advance east toward Staraya Oskol 

to bypass the heavy Soviet fortifications 

astride the direct route to Ku rsk, but the 

drawbacks- greater distances and the need 

to reshuffl e the forces at the last minuteoutweighed the probable advantages of the 

change." In the end, the best hope was 

that, having expected a German offensive 

!>CI AuDrischungntab Charkow. I a NT. 209/ 43. 

2.7.43, PZ. AOK 4 34888/ 6 file. G1 O KW , Stellvertretende Chef des W ehrmachtfueh rungsstabes, K riegstagebuch vom ' I·7-3 1.8·43. 

5 Jul 43, IMT D oc 1792-PSj ~S # 06 , ~as 

Ringen urn die grossen EnlScheldu ngen 1m z,wetten 

lVeltkriege (Ccneraloberst a. D . Kurt ZCHzler ), 

pt. II, pp. 63-65. 

68 AOK 8, Kriegstagebuch NT. I , 21 Jun 43, 

AOK 8 36188/ 8 file. 

133 

against Kursk for months, the Russians 

might have become distracted and so might 

,·et be caught slightly ofT guard." 

Although the risks were obvious, ZITADELLE was not absolutely foredoomed to 

failure. The strengths of the three assault 

arm ies could be considered about adequate 

for the missions. Their divisions were in 

excellent shape, and they had received 

large numbers of new tanks, including the 

latest models. The Air Force, owing largely to the production genius of Armaments 

~1 ni r Speer, had about 2,500 first-line 

combat planes on the Eastern Front, only 

a few hundred less th an the peak strengths 

of previous years. Of those it was prepared 

to commit about half in direct support of 

Z ITAD£LLE. D uring the last two weeks of 

J une long-range bombers had struck nightly at the most important Soviet industrial 

centers within their reach, the Gor'kiy tank 

works, the rubber pl ants at Yaroslavl' and 

the oil refineries at Saratov and Astrakhan. 

Simultaneously, low-l evel bombers had attacked th e railroads and airfields in the 

Kursk area,GO 

The Soviet commands in th e Kursk 

bulge were, on the north , Cenhal Front 

under Rokossovskiy and, in the south, Voronezh Front under Vatutin. Both fronts 

had concentrated about two-thirds of their 

artiller), and tanks in the sectors where the 

German attacks were expected. In the 

main line of resistance, 2 to 3 mi les deep, 

the armies had dug thtee to fi ve trench 

lines and built weapons emplacements and 

dugouts. At depths of 6 and 18 miles, they 

had constructed similar secondary lines. 

Behind th ose, the first about 25 miles back, 

roo AO K 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, K riegstageb uch 

Nr. 8. " j un 43. AOK 9 34739/2 file. . 

eo Ai r Ministry (British ) Pamphlet 248, R ISe and 

Fall 0/ the Ge rman Air Force, pp. 233-34. 
MAP 13 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

lay another three lines that constituted the 

/rolll defense zone. The Celliral Fronl 

alone, using troops and local civilians, had 

dug over 3,000 miles of trenches. Every 

village and every hill in the steppe had been 

fortified, and in the fields, that summer 

mostly overgrown with grass ami thistles, 

the engineers had set 400,000 mines. Across 

the open eastern end of the bulge, General 

Armii Ivan S. Konev's Sleppe Fronl had 

established three armies in a screening line 

to prevent the Germans from carrying the 

offensive east if the Soviet defense in the 

bulge failed. As additional insurance, an 

army and two tank armies were held in 

reserve northeast of Ore! and an army and 

a tank army stood by east of KharkovBelgorod." The representatives of the Supreme Command were Vasilevskiy and 

Zhukov, the proved Stalingrad offensivedefensive team. 

Th e Offensive Begins 

On the morning of 5 July, with Fourth 

and Sixth Air Forces' Stukas blasting paths 

through the enemy line, Army Groups Center and South launched ZITADELLE. Ninth 

Army, its main force the heavily armored 

XXXVII Panzer Corps in the center, 

XXXI and XXXXVI Panzer Corps on the 

Ranks, and XXIII Corps in reserve, attacked south on a 35-mile front. By the 

end of the first day it had broken Rokossovskiy's fir:.;t line and had penetrated the 

second in the zone of the main effort immediately west of the Orel-Kursk railroad.' ;~ In the Fourth Panzer Army zone, 

xxxxvrrr Panzer Corps and II SS 

6I JVOV(R), ITI, 249-51. 

~2 AOK 9, FuehrungsabteilulIg. Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 8,5 Jul 43 , AOK 9 34739/2 file. 

135 

Panzer Corps (so designated after the SS 

bcgan organizing another panzer corps in 

the spring of 1943 ) struck northward out 

of a 30-mile front anchored on the right at 

Belgorod. The two corps got off to a flying start, cutting through Vatutin's first 

line in two hours. 

But the day brought several unpleasant 

surprIses. No sooner had II SS Panzer 

Corps passed through the first line than 

the Russians brought it under heavy artillery fire that forced the tanks to take cover. 

At the same time a sudden, brief but violent 

thunderstorm swept the Fourth Panzer 

Army zone, flooding the numerous, normally dry, gullies that cut the landscape. One 

of these stopped XXXXVIII Panzer Corps 

dead, and it was near nightfall before the 

last tanks were gotten across. At midmorning, after Stukas had silenced the artillery, II SS Panzer Corps moved out 

again, expecting to reach the second line 

before the end of the day; but in a few 

hours it was stopped, this time by a mine 

field cleverly laid in tall grass. Meanwhile Vatutin had pulled his divisions back 

into the second line without heavy losses.G~ 

South of Belgorod III Panzer Corps and 

Provisional Corps Raus of Armeeabteilung 

Kempf, after crossing the Donets, ran into 

a 3-mile-deep belt of fortifications between 

the river and the railroad. Without air 

support of their own and harried incessantly 

by S0\·iet planes, they inched along while 

their casualties mounted alarmingly,t:1 

The faltering start of the Armeeabteilung 

Kempf pointed up a troublesome weakness 

which was to continue to plague ZlTADELLE. 

Although the Luftwaffe maintained a rate 

11..1 Pz. AOK 4. l a. Kriegstagebuch, 25.3.-31.7-4.1. 

5 Jul 43, P,. AOK 4 34888/2 file . 

01 AOK 8. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2. 5 luI 43, AOK 

844 70]/1 file. 
136 

of 3,000 sorties per day during the offensive, it did not have air superiority over 

the battlefield. Because of the more pressing need for close ground support of the 

front-line units, it could not seriously challenge the Russi3:.ns in the air. Even so, it 

was unable to provide simultaneous support 

for all of th ground units. Those slighted 

were usually slowed down and often had to 

stop. To maintain the advance at a fairl y 

uniform pace, the air units had to shift 

their points of main effort from day to 

day." 

On the second and third days the battle 

appeared to be developing well enough. By 

nightfall on 6 July Ninth Army had gained 

about thirteen miles except on its right 

flank, where XXXVI Panzer Corps was 

hanging back. In the south the lead elements of II SS Panzer Corps had advanced 

nearly twenty-five miles. On the 7th the 

rate of gain declined somewhat; fierce tank 

battles erupted on both sides of the bulge. 

The Russians werc committing their reserves. Rokossovskiy had put in two reserve 

tank corps and a guards rifle corps. Vatutin was getting two tank corps from the 

Stavka's reserves to beef up First Tank 

Army with which he was trying to hold the 

second line. 

The Germans were mildly surprised to 

find the Russians reacting so fast; on the 

other hand, in terms of strength and performance, they were pleased to discover 

that the reserves appea ring thus far were 

about what their intelligence had led them 

to expect. The two most troublesome developments were Armccabtcilung Kempf's 

failure to keep pace with Fourth Panzer 

Arm y, which forced the latter to divert an 

co Air Ministry ( British) Pamphlet 248, Rise and 

Fall 0/ tht! German Air Force, p. '235. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SS division to screen its flank on the east, 

and the rapid decline of tank strength in 

some of the divisions. The Grossdeutschland Division, for instance, had only 80 of 

its 300 tanks still fit for combat. Most of 

the disabled tanks were new models laid 

up in the shops by mechanical troubles." 

Thrust and Co""terthTllst 

On 8 Jul y the first clear-cut crisis 

developed. The center corps of Ninth 

Army, straining to shake off Rokossovskiy's tank reserves and strike out into 

the open, ran into a heavily fortified ridge 

southwest of Ol'khovatka. Denied air support because of bad weather, the corps was 

forced to stop, and that night Model reluctantly decided to wait a day and regroup 

for an assault on the ridge. Dismayed at 

finding so strong an obstacle far behind 

th e original front, '''[odel predicted that 

even after the ridge was taken there would 

be no quick breakthrough to Kursk. He 

characterized the probable future course 

of the offensive as a "rolling battle of 

attrition." After two well-prepared attempts, on )0 and) I July, failed to carry 

across the ridge, Headquarters, Arm y 

Group Center, promised an additional in -

fantry division and a panzer division to 

help break the deadlock. 

On the morning of th e 12 July, by then 

confident that the German reserves were 

tied down in the Kursk battic, IlT}'llnsk 

Front, under Popov, and the left fl ank 

armies of General Polkovnik Vasil i D. Sokolovskiy's West Fr o1l t opened a three1M Pz. AOK 4, l a, Kriegstagebuch . 25.3-:1 1.7. 43. 

6. 7 lui 43. Pz. AOK 4 34888/'2 file ; AOK 8. 

Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2. 6, 7 lui 43, AOK 8 44701/ 1 

file ; AOK 9, Fu ehrungsab teilung. Kriegstageblu h 

N,. B, 6, 7 lui 43. AOK 934739/'2 file. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

pronged offensive against the north face of 

the Orel salient." Second Panzer Army, 

holding a 170-mile front with 14 divisions, 

could not prevent quick, deep penetrations. Before noon Kluge was forced to 

divert the 2 divisions intended for Ninth 

Army to Second Panzer Army, and in the 

afternoon and evening he had to call on 

Ninth Army to give up 2 panzer divisions, 

half of its Ferdinand tanks, and substantial 

quantities of artillery and rocket projectors,08 

Meanwhile, Army Group South's fortunes were improving. By I I July II SS 

Panzer Corps had a bridgehead north of 

the Psel River. Although the Russians 

were still hanging on obstinately south of 

the Psel in the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps 

sector, Fourth Panzer Army considered the 

enemy situation there hopeless. Hath reported that he expected the going to be 

easier north of the rivcr.69 

Vatutin, it appeared, had about reached 

the cnd of his ready reserves. TO Manstein, 

on the other hand, had a trump left. He 

had begun moving XXIV Panzer Corps 

(23d Panzer Division and the SS Wiking 

Division ) out of reserve behind First Panzer 

Army and into the Belgorod arca, where it 

would be at hand when the time came to 

give weight to the final drive to Kursk." 

East of the Donets Armeeabteilung 

Kempf had made painfully slow progress 

in the first six days, but on I I July in an 

almost desperate effort III Panzer Corps 

broke out to the north. The next day 

~ IVOV(R ), III, 276. 

III AOK 9, Fu ehrungsab teilung, K riegstagebuch 

N,. 8, 8-12 Jul 43, AOK 9 34739/2 file. 

811 Pz. AOK 4. l a, Kriegstagebuch, 25.3.-3 1.7-43, 

II Jul 43. Pz. AOK 4 34888h file . 

70 Manste in, Verlorene Siege, p. 50 1. 

TI AOK 8, Kriegstagebuch NT, :1, 9. 12 Ju1 43. 

AOK 84470 1/ 1 file . 

137 

Vatutin threw Fifth Guards and Fifth 

Guards T ank Armies, the latter from the 

reserve, the former frorn Steppe Front, into 

a counterattack; but III Panzer Corps 

stayed on the move and by nightfall on the 

13th had trapped a sizable Soviet force between its fl ank and the right flank of II 

SS Panzer Corps." 

Hitler Cancels Zitadelle 

On 13 July Hitler called Manstein and 

Kluge to Fuehrer headquarters. He had 

decided to stop ZITADELLE. The Orc! 

salient was in danger, anrl Soviet buildups opposite First Panzer Army and Sixth 

Army (formerly Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 

renamed in March 1943) had aroused his 

concern for defense of the Donets basin . 

But his greatest worry was Sicily, where the 

Americans and British had landed on 10 

July. The Italians, he said, were not fighting, and it was becoming necessary to 

create new armies to defend Italy and the 

Balkans. Troops would have to be taken 

from the Eastern Front. 

Manstein protested that ZITADELLE was 

just reaching its turning point. In the 

Army Group South zone, he insisted, the 

Russians could be considered defeated, and 

if Ninth Army resumed its offensive within 

the next few weeks, victory might yet be 

secured. But he was alone; Kluge declared 

that inth Army could not advance again 

and in a few days would have to withdraw 

to its line of departure. At the close of the 

conference Hitler reaffirmed his decision to 

stop ZITADELLE, but agreed to give Army 

Grou p South enough time to deal the Russians at least a parti al defeat and so cut 

" I bid. , 11 - 13 Jul 43 ; Platonov, Vt ara ya MiroVQ)'a V ayna, 1939-45 , p. 460. 
138 

down the chances of their staging a counteroffensive 500n,13 

To Fourth Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf, convinced that victory lay 

in their grasp, the order to stop ZITADELLE 

came as a shock. Manstein and the commanding generals of the armies at first still 

hoped to be able to mop up south of the 

Psel River, but even that satisfaction was 

denied them. On 17 July Hitler ordered 

II SS Panzer Corps out of the front. He 

planned to transfer the corps to Italy as 

soon as the threats to First Panzer and Sixth 

Armies were eliminated. 7-1 

On the morning of 17 July the Southwest and South Fronts opened the offensive 

Hitler expected on the Army Group South 

right flank. The Germans had for nearly 

a week been watching feverish activity on 

the other side; and on the 14th, in what 

at the time seemed to the army command 

an excess of caution, Hitler had ordered 

XXIV Panzer Corps shifted back behind 

First Panzer Army. In the first twentyfour hours' fighting two points of main 

effoft emerged, one in the First Panzer 

Army zone near Izyum and the other north 

of Golodayevka on Sixth Army's lIIius 

River line. 

The Russians quickly scored sizable 

breakthroughs which they fought stubboTllII' to expand, and th e Germans concluclerl 

with some astonishment that the ofTcnsi\'c 

was actually intended to recapture the 

Donets basin, not merely to draw o fT 

reserves from ZITADELLE t as had been 

73 AOK 8, Kriegstagebuch NT. 2. 15 Jul 43. 

AOK 8 44701 / 1 file j Manstein, VerlorcTle Siege. 

p. 50 '2 . 

H AOK 8, KTiegstagebuch NT. 2. 15- 17 Jul 43, 

AOK 8 4470il l file; Pt. AOK 4. l ao KTiegstagcbuch, 25.3.-31. 743, 15- 17 Jul 43, Pz. AOK 4 

34888/. file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

expected. During the next two weeks, 

although the Russians never came close to 

making good their bid for a decisive penetration, the battle seesawed violently and 

at times dangerously. 

By the end of the month the ofTensive 

had lost its momentum, and the Germans 

moved in quickly to restore their front. 

Those were small battles, like so man v 

others quickly lost in the rush of greater 

events, but, nevertheless, enormously costly 

ior both sides. Sixth Army, for instance, 

between 17 July and 6 August captured 

17 ,000 Russians. Its own casualties totaled 

23,855·" 

In the Army Group Center zone the 

ZITADELLE offensi\·e, already stalled, ended 

on 12 July. The next day, after th e conference at Fuehrer ead qu rt ~, Hitler 

gave Model command of both Ninth Arm\" 

and Second Panzer Army, ord ering him to 

close the breakthroughs and retake the 

original £ront.;!; ~lodel\s appo intment 

signalized the emergence of a new type of 

German higher commander- the Rpccia li t 

in stubborn defense. Hitler had once 

called on men like l\I anstein to engineer 

victories. After the summer of 1943 he 

came more and more to rely on ~rodcl and 

a few others because they seldom disputed 

his orders and because they appeared to 

have a kn ack for staving off catastrophe. 

~[ ocl cl was the best and most Sllccc&,ful of 

the type. Aside from being a convinced 

Nazi whose faith in Hitler outl asted that 

of most other officers of his rank, he was a 

first-rate tactician. Tn combat he spared 

~~ Pi;. AO/{ I, KTiegstagebuch NT. II. 11 - 29 Jul 

43, Pz. AOK 1 44652/ 1 file ; AOK 6. K, iegstagebuch. Band 5. '7 Jul-g Aug 41. AOK 6 3552 1/ 1 

file . 

,Q AOK 9. Fll ehrrmgsabteihmg. KTiegstagcbulh 

Nr. 8. 13 Jul 43, AOK 9 347 39/2 file. 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

neither himself nor his subordinates. 

By the time Model took command in the 

Orel salient the Second Panzer Army front 

had been punctured in three places. Two 

of the penetrations, one due east of Orcl 

and another south of Sukhinichi, were 

growing wider and deeper by the hour. On 

15 July the offensive expanded into the 

Ninth Army sector. 

A day later, as a precaution, the army 

group and the armies began work on the 

HAGEN position, a line of field fortifications 

across the base of the Orel salient, For once, 

Hitler, distracted by events in the Mediterranean and in the Army Group South zone, 

did not insist on a rigid linear defense. He 

had quickly amended his original order to 

call only for a continuous front, and on 22 

July he agreed to let Model conduct an 

"elastic defense." 11 

In the meantime, on the 18th and 19th, 

relieved of the threat of ZITADELLE, the 

Stavka had committed powerful forces from 

its reserves. Popov received Third Guards 

Tank Army to lend weight to the thrust 

toward Orel, and Sokolovskiy was given 

the Fourth Tank and Eleventh Armies to 

widen the gap on the north face of the 

salient. 1s However, heavy rains, which set 

in at the beginning of the third week in 

July, and superior German tactics, which 

if they could not stop the Soviet onslaughts 

managed most of the time to rob them of 

their full effects, began to take some of the 

power out of the offensive. 

In the last week of the month Hitler's 

fears concerning Italy were confirmed. On 

the 25th the King dismissed Mussolini, who 

was placed under arrest as he left the palace. The Badoglio government said it 

H Ibid. , '4-25 Ju1 43-

~ IVQV (R ), III, ,S .. 

139 

MODEL AND HOLLIDT 

intended to continue the war, but no one 

at Fuehrer headquarters, least of all Hitler, 

believed that. Hitler set off an avalanche 

of planning to rescue Mussolini and to 

strengthen the German hold on Italy. 

From the Eastern Front he called in th" 

Commanding General, Army Group Center. When Kluge arrived at noon on 

26 July Hitl er explained that he was going 

to transfer II SS Panzer Corps from Army 

Group South to Italy. The politically 

trained SS divisions, he thought, would 

form a nucleus around which ~ the fascist 

clements in the Italian Army could rally. 

The SS Adolf Hitler Division alreadv had 

orders to entrain at Stalino. Army Group 

Center would have to provide replacements 

for the SS divisions and would in the near 
140 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET ANTlAIRCRAFT GUN FIRING NEAR OREL 

future be expected to release other divisions, approximately two dozen in all, for 

transfer to Italy and the West. The only 

way they could-be obtained was by giving 

up the Orel salient. The Second Panzer 

and Ninth Armies would have to begin 

moving into the HAGEN position at once. 

To Kluge's protests that he could not take 

the armies back into a line which was far 

from finished, Hitler replied that there was 

nothing else to be done. Army Group 

Center would have to start releasing divisions, and soon. Above all, he had to have 

II SS Panzer Corps, which he described 

as the equivalent of twenty Italian divisions. fD 

rt Stenogr. Dienst im F. H. Qu. , Fragment NT. 

17. Besprechung mit Gen. Feldmarschall Kluge 

vam :/6.7.43, OCMH files. 

In three days Model had his armies ready 

to move, but he had to postpone their 

start until I August because of the poor 

state of the roads. A week and a half of 

heavy rains had turned even the main 

roads into quagmires. In some places they 

had become broad bands of ruts, as much 

as a hundred yards wide, where the vehicles had wandered off to the sides searching 

for firm ground. Overhead the Soviet 

Air Force had practically undisputed com· 

mand of the sky. 

Throughout it all, the armies had to 

move their heavy equipment and supplies. 

Ninth Army had hundreds of tons of supplies and ammunition originally earmarked 

for ZITADELLE stored in dumps around 

Kromy, south of Ore!' The rear area 

commands set about destroying the rye 
OPERATION ZITADELLE 

harvest, which was just ready to be brought 

in, and began herding some 250,000 civil~ 

ians and their cattlc, carts, and personal 

possessions down the side roads. [n Orel 

demolition crews set charges in all buildings 

and installations which might be of usc to 

the Russians. 

The withdrawal began on time on the 

night of 1 August. By then the Russians 

were fully aware of what was going on, and 

unlike the BUEFFEL operation earlier, 

being already geared for an offensive, they 

could react quickly. On the nights of 3 

and 4 August partisan activity Rared up in 

the entire Army Group Center rear area. 

On the 4th the army group rear area command counted a total of 4, I 10 partisanlaid demolitions on the railroads. A day 

later waves of Soviet fighters and bombers 

swept over the front and across the clogged 

roads in the rear. All over the salient telephones were out for hours at a time.so 

On 6 August, certain the Second Panzer 

and Ninth Armies wcrc on the run, the 

Stavka extended the offensive north into 

the Fourth Army zone. Voronov, co-ordinating for the Sta vka, put seven armies on 

W est Front's left Aank into an attack toward Spas-Demensk and Yel'nya. Its end 

objective was to take Roslavl and lift the 

HAGEN position off its hingcs.~ 1 During the 

following days the air and partisan raids 

multiplied, blacking out telephone communications over much of the Army Group 

Center zone and tying up th e rail lines. 

As the second week of the withdrawal 

began, the battle reached its climax. Model 

predicted that the Russians would try to 

overrun the HAGEN position- if they did 

not succeed in pushing through on its 

flO AOK 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebucil 

Nr. 8, .6 Jul-6 Aug 43, AOK 9 34739/ ' file. 

"IVOV(R) , III, 363. 

141 

flanks before then. The Fourth Army 

front was strained to the breaking point. 

The quality of the Soviet troops was low 

but they came on in massive, seemingly 

endless, waves of infantry and tanks. One 

of the Fourth Army corps commanders 

reported that the enemy losses were five 

times his own but that the Russians still 

had the advantage because they had begun 

the battle with a 10: I superiority.s:! On 

13 August W est Front's armjes lOok SpasDemensk, and Varonov put two armies of 

J(alinin Front into an attack at the Third 

Panzer - Fourth Army boundary." That 

day Ninth Army took over the Second 

Panzer Army sector and began throwing up 

a switch position behind the HAGE N position. 

On the '4th the first units moved into 

the HAGEN position. For three days the 

army kept as many of the divisions as it 

could east of the line, while the engineers, 

llsing Russia n civilian laborers of both 

sexes, rushed ahead with the work on the 

.,till far from finished line. On the night 

of the 17th the last troops moved into the 

HAGEN position ..... 1 The withdrawal was a 

major tactical achievement, but how long 

the line would hold was anybody's guess. 

~1odcl's retreat to the HAGE N position 

brought to an end the chain of events directly associated with ZITADELLE. Hitler 

had intended once more to make the world 

sit up and take notice. Instead, he had 

touched off a gigantic convulsion of the 

Eastern Front that weakened the armies in 

the East and left the Soviet Union in full 

possession of the initiative. By the time the 

8: AOK 4. Kriegstagebllch Nr. 16, 3 - 11 Aug 43 , 

AOK 4 41556 file. 

~ IVOV( R ). III, 365. 

81 AOK 9. Fu ehrurlgsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 8. 7- 18 Aug 43, AOK 9 34739/2 file . 
142 

divisions of Army Group Center moved 

into the HAGEN position, the Soviet armies 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

in the south were on the march again. 

The summer campaign was far from over. 
CHAPTER VIII 

The First Soviet Summer Offensive 

Troops and Tactics 

As the war in the Soviet Union en tered 

its third year the world watched, expecting 

summer to bring answers to two crucial 

questions. Could the German armies 

again shake off the effects of the win tel' 

battles and make a strong bid for victory? 

If not, could the Soviet Army prove itself 

master of the field without its old ally, 

"General Winter?" ZITADELLE provided 

an explicit answer to the first question. 

After ZlTADELLE, in two and one-half 

months the Soviet Army erased the last 

lingering doubt inherent in the second. 

The Main Effort ;11 the South 

In the spring of 1943 Soviet planning for 

the coming summer no doubt concentrated 

on two possibilities : a German offensive in 

the style of the previous two summers and, 

if that failed to materialize or could be 

stopped, a Soviet offensive similar in scale 

and conception to that of the last winter. 

Although they would have been the last 

to admit it, the Russians were already benefiting mightily from the Allied operations 

in the Mediterranean and the threats of 

invasions there and on the Atlantic coast. 

Had Hitler been able to count on another 

year's respite in the south and west he might 

have made far more ambitious plans for 

the coming summer in the USSR. As it 

was, the chances were that the Germans 

would not be able again to seize the complete initiative and prevent the Soviet forces 

from getting in substantial blows of their 

own before the summer ended. 

The most vulnerable sector of the German front was still the southern flank. 

Below Kharkov the Army Group South 

front stretched east 150 miles along the 

Donets and then dropped off south along 

the Mius River to the Gulf of Taganrog. 

Soviet troops held several small bridgeheads on the south bank of the Donets, the 

most significant one in the sharp bend of 

the river south of Izyum. To defend more 

than 250 miles of front, Army Group South 

had two armies, First Panzer Army on the 

Donets and, in the Mius line, Sixth Army 

-the upgraded Armeeabteilung Hollidt, 

which resembled its powerful predecessor 

in name only. A Soviet advance of a little 

more than 100 miles along the line Kharkov-Dnepropetrovsk could cut off both 

armies, break open the southern flank of the 

German front, and isolate Army Group A 

in the Kuban and the Crimea. The past 

winter's experience had shown that German skill and Soviet lack of finesse often 

combined to prevent such maneuvers from 

achieving their full effect, but it had also 

demonstrated that even so the dividends 

could be substantial for the Russians. 

Knowing that those considerations could 

not have escaped the Soviet Command, the 

Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, predicted in May 1943 that the main effort of 
144 

the SO\'iet Slimmer ofTcnsi\'c would he on 

the sou thern flank, either at Kharkov or 

ogoinst Sixth Army, ond that it would be 

preceded or accornpanicd by a secondary 

attack in the Army Group Center zone to 

tic down troops and eliminate the Orcl 

salient as a threat to the flank of the 

offensive in the south.! 

Even if the tactical advantages had been 

less obvious, the Sta vka would still probably have given first priority to the southern 

flank in the summer of ' 943. Of the 

hortagcs created by the German invasion, 

those still being most acutely felt were in 

coal, ferrous metals, and foodst uffs, particularly grain and animal products. All 

could be most quickly alleviated by recapturing the Ukraine. Between Stalino and 

the Mius lay the belter half of the Donets 

Basin cool fields. Inside the great bend of 

the Dn cpr were the Krivoi Rag iron mines, 

which before the war had su pplied 40 percent of Soviet iron are. And, in spite of 

efforts in the past two years to open up new 

lands cast of the Urals, the black-earth 

region of the Ukraine was needed if the 

food shortage was to be overcome any time 

soon. 

Comparative Strellgths 

By the summer of '943 the Germans had 

succeeded, for the time being at least, in 

stopping the Eastern Front's decline in 

strength which had aroused so much concern during the previous fall and winter. 

On 20 July the total troop strength in the 

East exclusive of the allies and the Twentieth Mountain Army stood at 3,064,000 

10KH, GenStdH, FHO (lla) Nr. 1126/43. 

Zu sammelllassende Beltrtei/«ng der Feindabsichten 

vor der deutschen OSllront im grossen, :2 / -543, H 

31,85 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

men.' This was only about a quartermillion men less than the peak strength of 

'94' and 574,000 more than that of , 

September '942. Italian Eighth Army 

had been recalled in the spring, but Rumania and Hungary still had between '50,-

000 and 200,000 men in the East. South 

of Leningrad the Spanish 250th "Blue" 

Division held a sector of the Army Group 

North front. 

In considerable part the restoration of 

strength on the Eastern Front had been accomplished by shifting troops from the Air 

Force, the Waffen-SS, and the OKW theaters. Also, the three months' quiet at the 

front had meant that for the first time in 

more than a year the number of men returning to duty from the hospitals exceeded 

the casualty rate. The '943 class of 

eighteen-rear-olds and the screening of 

deferred workers had produced enough 

men to cover the winter's losses and leave 

a few hundred thousand to spare.' 

On 20 July '943 the Soviet strength, 

according to German estimates, had reached 

5,755,000 men, a gain of a million and a 

half over September 1942 and about three 

times the German increase in the same 

period. The Russians had at the front an 

estimated 7,855 tanks and 21 ,050 antitank 

guns, the Germans 2,088 tanks and 8,063 

antitank guns. 4 Ordinarily, superiorities of 

20KH, GenStdH, Org. Abt. Nr. lloSl 43 j 

Kraeltegegenueberstellung , Stand 20.4.43, H 1/ 5'27 

file. 

~ OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt., Anlagehelt tum 

Band VI, 2. Teil des K.T.B. , v. Seite 389-445, 9 

Sep 43, OCMH files. 

4 The German estimates could have been somewhat low. l\ccording to Soviet postwar figures, the 

Soviet tank strength at the front, for instance, was 

8,500 tanks, and the Stauka was holding another 

400 in reserve. OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt. Nr. 

1105/ 43 . Kraeltegegenueberstellung, Stand 20.743. 

H 7/577 file ; IVOV(R), III, 714. 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 145 

2 : 1 in troops, nearly 4 : I in tanks, and 

better than 2: 1 in antitank guns could in 

themselves be regarded as enough to justify an offensive. O n the German-Soviet 

front that was not necessarily the casco The 

Germans had been operating against preponderant Soviet forces since the start of 

the war. It would take something more 

than weight of numbers and equipment i[ 

th e Russians were to beat the Germans at 

their own game, the summer offensive. 

The State of Soviet Military Art 

On e co nsid er a tion whi ch must have 

weighed heavily in the Stavka's decision to 

undertake a summer offensive was the 

knowledge that the Soviet Army had passed 

beyond its apprentice.hip. Tn two years 

Stalin's generals had learned much and, 

not content to be blind imitators, had 

adapted the German methods to suit their 

own capabilities and limitations. While 

they had not attained the [acility o[ the 

Germans, they had, at least at the upper 

command levels, acquired the fl exibility so 

conspicuously lacking earlier and had improved their large-scale offensive tactics. 

T he latter they had successfull y tested and 

refin ed during the 1942- 43 winter offensive. 

The German technique o[ blitzkrieg had 

been 10 deliver the decisive stroke with 

precision, speed, and economy of effort. 

Its distinguishing characteristics had been 

penetration and avoidance of broad [rontal 

engagements. T o th e German sta ffs 

Schwer/JUnktbildung, concentration o[ force 

at the most advantageous point, was the 

very COf C of military art. The Russians, on 

the other hand, favored a broader lateral 

scope and morc conservative execution. 

They adopted the breakthrough and penetration as basic tactical maneuvers but preferred to achieve the decisive effect by a 

a few deep thrusts. They also accepted the 

brcadt h of the front rather than by one or 

a few deep thrusts. They also accepted the 

principle of the Schwerpunkt, but usuall y 

their concentration in the zone of the main 

effort was less pronoun ced than in the 

German practice, and almost always the 

main effort was built up gradually by successive thrusts. 

Acco rd ingly, a lthough th e Russians 

claimed that Stalingrad had suppl anted 

Cannae as the classic encirclement battle, 

they did not employ the double envelopment as frequentl y as did the Germans. 

More often they were content with a single 

thrust or multiple thrusts, the objective being not so much to achieve a deep penetration along one line of advance as to force 

the opponent back on a broad front. Those 

tactics were particularl y suited to southern 

USSR where th e successive, roughly parralle! rivers afforded natlIral defense lines. 

Thrusts from one river line to the next 

could be depended on to bring back long 

. tretches of the German front with them. 

The first objective of German offensives. 

in theory at least, had been to annihilate the 

enemy main force quickly. The purpose 

was not to gain ground or merely alter the 

respective positions of the opposing forces 

but to produce a decision. The Russians, 

for their part, cared less [or speed or the 

fatal stroke; they were content to wear the 

enemy down blow by blow. Contrary to 

the general conception th at the Russians 

were relatively indifferent to geographical 

space, they were inclined to reckon their 

victories as much in terms of ground regained as in terms o[ damage to the enemy 
146 

or other tactical advantage. Their ultimate 

objective was to annihilate the enemy, but 

by the cumulative effect of repeated offensives, not by the single battle- by weight 

rather than by the skillful blow. 

Probably no better historical example exists of offensive tactics successfully tailored 

to the shortcomings of an army than that 

afforded by the Soviet Army in World War 

II. Despite the smoke screen of high-flown 

theorizing which the Russians have thrown 

around the two basic elements, the single, 

or "salient," thrust and the broad front 

offensive, both can be most simply and, it 

appears, most logically explained in terms 

of Soviet shortcomings. As the most cursory 

reading of Stalin's speeches and orders of 

the day will show, the Russians regarded 

the encirclement as the most expeditious 

means of destroying large enemy forces; on 

the other hand, as a practical matter, they 

apparently regarded the double envelopment as an unreliable maneuver and adjusted their planning to the concept of the 

single thrust. To complete a double envelopment required co-ordination and a 

high degree of skill at all le"els in the leadership. It required, in particular, troop 

commanders at the middle and lower levels 

who possessed the initiative and ability to 

meet and master unforeseen developments 

without disrupting the over-all plan. Those 

the Russians did not have, at least not in 

sufficient numbers. Further, the double envelopment required troops of a uniform 

high quality. Those they did not have 

either. 

On the basis of conclusions drawn from 

the 1 94' disasters, the Soviet Army had 

concentrated on developing its artillery and 

armor. In both arms the emphasis was on 

increased output of weapons and machines 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

and on their organization for mass employment. 

By mid- 1 943 the Soviet artillery was 

vastly expanded, equipped with reliable 

weapons, and, while not always accurate 

against pinpoint targets, was capablc of 

laying down preparator), fires of an intensit)' comparable to those fired in the great 

battles of World War I. Eleventh Guards 

Army in the Orel offensive of July 1943, 

for example, had 3,000 guns and heav), 

mortars, almost double the standard issue 

to the armies in the Stalingrad operation 

and three times the complement of the 

armies m the 1941 counteroffensive at 

Moscow. At the end of 1942 the Soviet 

Army had 17 rocket launcher brigades and 

had begun organizing an initial increment 

of 30 self-propelled artillery regiments. In 

the spring of 1943 it began forming artillery brigades and antitank artillery regiments and in the s.:cond half of the ),ear 

created 26 artillery divisions.' 

The armored forces were well trained 

and to a large extent equipped with the 

Soviet-designed-and-built T34 tank. American and British lend-lease models were still 

used but were regarded as too light. The 

earlier practice of scaltering the armor 

piecemeal among the infantry had been 

abandoned, and the brigades and corps 

had become the standard armored unit organizations. The tank armies, of which 

there were five by the end of summer 1943, 

each had two tank and one mechanized 

corps and were fully capable of executing 

independent tactical missions,G 

By early summer 1943 the Russians had 

at least a 2.5: I advantage over the Germans in the air. The Soviet air arm re6 IVOV (R), III, 211 - 14 , 277. 

- Ibid., p. 2 15. 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 147 

mained subordinate to the Army and concentrated almost exclusively on close ground 

support, air defense, and tactical bombing. 

At the end of 1942 each front had been 

assigned an air army for support. 7 

In 1943 the infantry, particularly the 

guards units, received increased numbers of 

antitank weapons and began getting the 

Sudayev submachine gun and the new 

Goryunov machine gun to replace the 1910 

Maxim.' But the massive effort to develop 

the technical arms had resulted in persistent neglect of the infantry, which received the lowest grade recruits, least 

competent officers, and very little training. 

In 1943 the Germans observed that the 

quality of the Soviet infantry was lower 

than in 194 I and that the decline was continuing.' In mass attacks the infantry could 

be crushingly effective, but it was not an 

instrument that could be maneuvered with 

tactical precision. On its own the infantry 

lacked staying power; without heavy tank 

and artillery support it lost momentum and 

its progress was often erratic . 

The deficiencies which made the double 

envelopment unreliable also limited the 

effect of the single thrust. Aware of their 

own weaknesses and those of their troops, 

the Soviet commanders almost always displayed an excessive flank sensitivity. After 

the breakthrough-which could be guaranteed by the artillery and tanks- they 

were reluctant to concentrate on the forward advance and often began to strike out 

on all sides in an attempt to keep their 

flanks open, with the result that forward 

~lbid. . 217. 

S Ibid., p. 211. 

o OKH, GenStdH, FHO (la) Nr. 80, Bisherige 

Entwicklung des deutJchsowjetru;sischen Kraeftev erhaeitnisses sci! Kriegsbeginn und seine moegliche 

Weiterentwicklung bis Ende 1943, 17.10.43, H 

3/ ,85 file. 

momentum dropped off. Even when the 

tanks were ablc to keep lip a rapid pacc, 

the infantry frequently fell behind; consequently, the deep thrusts took the form of 

tank raids which often ended in near disaster, as in the case of the Popov Group in 

February 1943. 

The depth of the single thrust was further 

limited by considerations of control and 

supply. Since the offensive by nature made 

it difficult to plan for in detail beyond the 

first few days of fighting, morc and more 

unforeseeable factors came into playas the 

advance proceeded, with the result that the 

burdens on the initiative and judgment of 

the field commander, and on the troops 

themselves, increased. Therefore, given the 

weaknesses of the Soviet Army, the chances 

of a single thrust's succeeding declined as 

the distance from the point of breakthrough 

to the objective increased. 

Finally, the Soviet supply system, while 

it could on occasion perform near miracles 

of improvisation, was not equipped or 01'-

ganized to handle in a routine fashion the 

logistics of rapid advances over long distances. The Soviet soldier, who subsisted 

almost exclusively on what he could carry 

in the sack he customarily slung over his 

shoulder or tied to his belt, who preferred 

German boots, hand weapons, and other 

items of equipment to his own, and who 

was- out of necessity as much as by inclination-an expert scroung~r, was one of 

the least demanding in the world. The 

armies were expected to forage and collect 

booty with utmost diligence. An example 

of what could be achieved along those lines 

was that of an army which in the winter of 

1942, passing through an area the Germans had subjected to scorched-earth 

treatment, collected the following percent-
148 

ages of its mon thl y requirements of staples: 

fl our, 54 percent; vegetables, 9 7 percent ; 

meat, 10 8 percent; hay, 140 percent; and 

oats, 68 percent. IO But modern armies 

could not live entirely off the land and rely 

exclusively on booty; Soviet armies were 

therefore generally- but not invariablyadequately provisioned and supplied with 

ammunition and motor [uel in advance of 

offensives, the rule of thumb being that 

each army should have stocks on hand for 

a lo-day operation and an advance of up 

to sixty or seventy miles. Beyond this 

range, and not too infrequentl y even short 

of it, inadequacies of transport and a lingering cavalier attitude toward the problems of 

supply in general placed checks on Soviet 

mobile operations. Before the July ' 943 

offensive in the arc! bulge, for instance, the 

infantry had been neglected in the supply 

build-up, and later, infantry ammunition 

had had to be fl own in to keep th e offensive 

going. That led to the following admonition- apparently not considered axiomatic 

- to the Soviet commands, "Experience . .. 

shows that it is necessary to arrange for supplies and ammunition for the infantry as 

well as for the artillery."" Often enough, 

mobile forces also had supply trouble., as is 

evinced by the following warning, "Dis_ 

regard of the necessary supply planning for 

the mobile group may lead to its extinction 

or, in the most favorable case, failure to 

achieve success." I:! 

As the single thrust afforded an escape 

from the more onerous requirements of the 

double envelopment, so the concept of multiple thrusts on a broad front avoided the 

ultimate problems of the single thrust. The 

10 Sbom ik Nome r 9. 

11 Ibid. 

12 lbid . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

broad front possessed the great advan tage 

of extend ing the offensive laterally, which 

enabled th e Stavka to bring strength to 

bear on a number of points and elim inate 

the risks inherent in attempting to pursue 

one clearly defin ed line of advance. The 

offensive was relatively easy to control since 

success did not depend on maneuvering one 

or a few bodies of troops in motion but 

could be attained instead by a series of 

thrusts launched more or less at will from 

convenient lines of departure. The supply 

problems, if not eliminated, were significan tly eased : the assembly could be carried 

out over a number of rail lines, and none 

of the thrusts needed to go so deep as to 

outrun its supplies. Of course, Soviet protests to the contrary notwithstanding, th e 

broad front offensive was at best a modified 

linear method of warfare. It required 

massed troops, repeated frontal encounters, 

and an enemy willing- as Hitler was- to 

respond with a linear defense. 

The Psychological Warfare Victory 

In one sphere, psychological warfare, 

Operation ZITADELLE brought the Soviet 

Union a clear-cut and final victory. German psychological warfare and propaganda, always hobbled by Hitler's racial 

theories and his extreme war aims, had 

declined steadily in effectiveness since the 

winter of 194'- 42, but as late as the spring 

of 1943 the Smolensk Manifesto had given 

the Soviet authorities some cause for worry 

and the S I LBERSTR EIF propaganda had 

shown latent promise even though it failed 

to achieve much in th e way of practica l 

results. After ZITADE LLE German psychological warfare was completely on the defensive. The Soviet propagandists held the 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 149 

initiative. They co uld exploit two years of 

accumulated German injustices and atrocities and an almost painful desire on the 

part of the Russian people to believe that 

things would be better once the Soviet 

Army returned. Above all, they could 

promise an early end to the war. 

ZITADELLE and its aftermath also placed 

the Soviet propaganda directed to the Germans on a new and morc substantial fooling. Tn the late summer the Russians 

created the National Free Germany Committee and its subsidiary, the League of 

German Offi ce rs. The Free Germany 

Committee was composed mostly of emigre 

Communists, but the League of German 

Officers was allegedly voluntary, noncommunist, and devoted exclusively to overthrowing Hitler and restoring the traditional soc ial order in Germany. The 

league, headed by General Seydlitz, had an 

original membership of three other Stalingrad generals and 100 officers of lower 

ranks. It issued a newspaper which was 

dropped behind the German line, and 

Seydlitz from time to time addressed personal letters to army and army group commanders calling on them to join the Free 

Germany Movement. l:! 

The Fourth Battle of Kharko v 

Northwest of Belgorod on the right Aank 

of Fourth Panzer Army, its own right tying 

in with the left Aank of Armeeabteilung 

Kempf, stood the 167th Infantry Division. 

It was a good division, "good" meaning it 

was not greatly understrength and was battleworthy by the then current standards 

I~ OKH, GenStdH. HPA , Taetigkeitsbericht des 

Chefs des HeerespeTJon.alamts, 14.9.43, H 4/ 1'2 

file. 

on the Eastern Front. On the morning 

of 3 August 1943 the massed artillery of 

Sixth Guards Army laid down a several 

hours' barrage on the division sector. ''''hen 

the artillery lifted its fire, 200 tanks roared 

into the German line, followed by waves 

of closely packed infantry. Before nightfall, the 167th Division had shrunk to a 

scattering of odds and ends. Its infantry 

regiments were completely smashed, and 

the survivors were dazed and shaken. 

N car the center of the Fourth Panzer 

Army front a secondary attack hit the 332d 

Infantry Division, and by the end of the 

day its front too had begun to crumble. On 

the 4th two Soviet tank corps pushed south, 

elbowing aside the shattered 167th Infantry Division and the 6th Panzer Division, 

whi ch had moved up in a vain attempt to 

close the breach. During the day the tanks 

opened a 7-mile gap between Fourth 

Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf 

and dragged the German line on the east 

back to the outskirts of Bclgorod. H 

Tactical Surprise 

An attack on the north flank of Army 

Group South aimed at recapturing Kharkov and breaking through to the Dnepr had 

been considered one of the most likely possibilities in all of the German forecasts for 

the summer of 1943. (Map 14 ) On 21 

July Manstein had asked the OKH for a 

decision either to hold the Donets line, 

which would require more troops, or to 

prepare for a grad ual withdrawal to ;he 

Dnepr in order to gain enough troops to 

prevent a breakthrough on his north Aank. 

None was made. '" At the end of the month 

II Pz. AOK 4, l a. Kriegstagebu ch, nand I , 3 

and 4 Aug 43, Pz. AOK 441631/1 file. 

I~ Manstein, Vcrloren.e Siege, p. 512. 
I 

\ 

I 

/ / 

MAP 14 

\ 

FORrY~ 

SEVENTH 

THE FOURTH BATTLE OF KHARKOV 

3 Aug-27 Aug 1943 

~ 

r-'I"""" GERMAN FRONT liNE. 2 AUG 43 

GERMAN FR'ONT LINE, ~ AUG 43 

TTTTTTTTm'IT GERMAN FRONT LINE, 14 Aua 43 

•••••• GERIolAN FRONT LINE . 20 AUG" 3 

GERMAN FRONT liNE, 21 AUG 43 

10 0 10 20 3D 401ollLE5 

" .,1111 I t I " I I I 

10 0 10 20 3D 40 ~ILOIoiETER5 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 151 

Army Group South had a total of 822,000 

troops opposing an estimated 1,7 I 3,000 

Russians. The army group had I, I 6 I 

tanks, about half of them operational, and 

the Russians had 2,872 tanks." 

Against Fourth Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf, the Stavka had committed Voronezh Front and Steppe Front, 

both reinforced with armies held in reserve 

during ZITADELLE. In the last two weeks 

of July, Konev's Steppe Front had taken 

over Vatutin's left flank east and south of 

Belgorod, assuming command of the two 

armies there and bringing with it two 

armies from the reserve. The plan envisioned a kind of flying wedge of four 

armies- Fifth and Sixth Guards, Fifth 

Guards Tank and First Tank Armiesaimed southwest between Akhtyrka and 

Kharkov toward Poltava. While Vatutin 

thus split apart Fourth Panzer Army and 

Armeeabteilung Kempf, forcing Fourth 

Panzer Army away toward Akhtyrka, 

Konev was to bear down on Kharkov from 

the north. Fifty-seventh Army, Southwest 

Front's right flank army, was to close in on 

Kharkov from the east." 

On I August Manstein informed the 

OKH that he was expecting an attack on 

Kharkov as the inevitable next item on the 

Soviet agenda; nevertheless, when two days 

later an attack did come it achieved a 

degree of surprise and caught Fourth 

Panzer Army and Armeabteilung Kempf 

standing forward of their pre-ZITADELLE 

front. After ZITADELLE Manstein had concluded that the Army Group South offensive had upset the Soviet dispositions 

enough to force a several week's delay in 

I' OKH, GtmStdH. Org. Abt. NT. J 105143. 

Krae/tegegenueberstelLung, Stalld ~o.7.43 , H 1/ 

5'27 file. 

"IVOV(R ), III, ,86. 

their plans for a counteroffensive; and on 

2 August, believing there was still time, he 

had decided "to wait for more definite 

signs of an impending offensive" before 

pulling back to the original line." 

Breakthrough 

On 5 August the Russians marched into 

Belgorod. That same day, in the Army 

Group Center zone, Bryansk Front captured Ore!' To celebrate the twin victories 

Stalin ordered an artillery salute of twelve 

volleys from 120 guns. It was the first 

time in the war that such a salute had been 

fired, and in Moscow some of the citizens, 

thinking it was an air raid, took to their 

cellars. In the coming months the booming of victory cannon would become commonplace in the Soviet capital. As an 

added honor, the first divisions into Belgorod and Orel were authorized to include 

the names of the cities in their unit designations. In his order of the day Stalin stated, 

"In this way the legend of the Germans 

that Soviet troops are allegedly unable to 

wage a successful offensive in the summer 

has been dispelled."" In that cry of relief 

and jubilation Stalin revealed that the Soviet Government had reached an optimistic 

assessment of its military prospects and had 

decided to commit itself publicly to a fullscale summer offensive. 

With a total of fifteen divisions between 

them, only three of them panzer divisions, 

the Fourth Panzer Army and Armeeabteilung Kempf faced two Soviet fronts and 

part of a third. Together, the three fronts 

brought cleven armies to bear against the 

two German armies. Even taking into ac18 Pz. AOK 4, la, Kriegsiagebuch, Band 1, '2 

Aug 43, Pz. AOK 4 41631 / 1 file. 

I. New York Times, August 6, 1943. 
152 

count that Soviet units were generally 

smaller than German units of the same 

type, these were tremendous odds. 

One of Hitler's first moves after the offensive began had been to order the Grossdeutschland Division back from Army 

Group Center and to return the 7th Panzer 

Division which was being held as the OKH 

reserve. On the second day he also decided 

to leave the SS Das Reich and Totenkopf 

Divisions in the Army Group South zone. 

Since the Headquarters, II SS Panzer 

Corps, and the Adolf Hitler Division had 

already been transferred to Italy, Manstein 

placed the two SS panzer divisions under 

the Headquarters, III Corps, together with 

the 3d Panzer Division. These and the SS 

Wi king Division he ordered into the Armeeabteilung Kempf zone. 

In the first six days of the fighting Army 

Group A sent one and Army Group Center 

three infantry divisions, but on 7 August 

Kluge reported to OKH that the battle 

of the Orel bulge was clearly approaching 

its climax and insisted that no morc divisions could be withdrawn from Army 

Group Center without impairing the defense of the HAGEN position." Several days 

later Model submitted a similar report. 

The result was th at in the critical early days 

of the battle Army Group South received 

only driblets of assistance from Army Group 

Center while the combined Second Panzer 

and Ninth Armies, the one great potential 

reservoir of reserves on the Eastern Front, 

fought a secondary battle in the Orel bulge 

with forty-five divisions. 

In the breakthrough area the most Army 

Group South could do during the first day; 

:10 MS # P- 114b, Der Feldzug gegen die SowjetuII;on im Mittelabscll1litt der Ost/ront (General 

der Infanteric a. D. Rudolf Hofmann ), Flltll/ter 

T eil, pp. 4'8-49. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

was to throw some obstacles in the way of 

the Soviet flood. To gain room to maneuver, Fourth Panzer Army stretched its boundary north, taking 40 miles of front and 

four weak divisions from Second Army. 

While three divisions, cut off in the first 

onslaught, fought their way out to the west, 

Hoth moved the newly arrived Grossdeutschland Division into a bridgehead east 

of Akhtyrka as an anchor for his right Aank 

and to prevent the Russians' rolling up his 

line farther to the north and west. But 

he could do nothing about the gap to the 

Armeeabteilung Kempf flank, which by 8 

August had opened to a width of 35 miles 

and, except for one infantry division ranged 

northwest of Po Ita va, gave the Russians a 

clear road to the Dnepr 100 miles to the 

southwest. :!1 

On the right side of the gap Kempf 

struggled to avoid being encircled as Steppe 

Front forced his northern front down on 

Kharkov and, on the west, Voronezh 

Front's First Tank Army attempted to push 

south past the city. The SS divisions coming from the Army Group South right ftank 

had to he thrown in to screen the Armeeahteilung rear west of Kharkov. l\1anstein 

had intended using them in a cOllnterattack 

to close the gap, but they were tied down 

singly as soon as they reached the front. 

The most they could do was carry the line 

out parallel to the Merlya River on either 

side of Mcrcfa , which only narrowed the 

gap slightly but did deAect the Russian advance southwestwa rd and away frorrt Kharkov." 

On I 2 August Kempf, worried by his declining infantry strength, proposed to eva2IOKH . GenStdH . Op. Abt. [lI b PTu ef Nr. 

38663. Lage OSI, Stand 8.8.43 abds. 

2Z AOK 8, lao Kriegstagebll ch NT. 2, Bmld 2, 

7- 1 I Aug 43, AOK 844701/2 file . 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 153 

SOV1ET TROOPS NEARING OREL 

cuate Kharkov the next day and retreat to 

a shorter line south of the city. Manstein 

did not object, but Hitler promptly countered with an order that Kharkov be held 

under all circumstances, and demanded 

"the most severe measures" against any 

units that failed to execute their assigned 

mISSIons. Kempf, who expected a breakthrough on the east at any moment (Fiftyseventh Army had already crossed the river 

and taken Chugu)'ev ), predicted that the 

order to hold Kharkov would produce another Stalingrad. On the 14th Manstein 

relieved Kempf and appointed General der 

Infanterie Otto Woehler in his place. A 

few days later the Armecabtcilung was redesignated Eighth Army." 

:I Ibid., 12- 14, 16 Aug 43. 

Meanwhile, Manstein and the Chief of 

Staff, OKH, had tried again to persuade 

Hitler to adopt a coherent plan. On 8 

August Zeitzler visited the Headquarters, 

Army Group South, where Manstein told 

him that the existence of the entire army 

group was at stake. The alternatives, he 

said, were either to give up the Donets front 

immediately, and so gain troops for the 

north Aank, or provide twenty fresh divisions for the army group, ten for Fourth 

Army and the others to backstop the rest 

of the army group front." 

Hitler Decides To Build an East Wall 

As he had on other occasions when con-

,. Manstein, Verlorene Siege. p. 519-
154 

fronted with unpleasant choices, Hitler 

avoided the decision by taking an altogether different tack. He suddenly resurrected the idea of an East Wall which he 

had categorically rejected earlier in the 

year. On 12 August he ordered work 

started at once on the wall which was to 

begin in the south on the Kerch' Peninsula, 

continue on the mainland at Melitopol, run 

in an almost straight line to the Dnepr near 

Zaporozhye, swing eastward around Zaporozhye in a large bridgehead and follow the 

Dnepr northwest to Kiev with bridgeheads east of the major cities. North of 

Kiev it was to follow the Desna River to 

Chernigov and then run almost due north 

along a line somewhat east of the cities of 

Gomel, Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, and Pskov to 

the southern tip of Pskov Lake. From there 

it would continue north along the western 

shore of the lake and the N arva River to 

the Gulf of Finland." Since the term 

"East Wall," applied to a line which in its 

southern half might have to be occupied 

even before work on it could be begun, 

could prove psychologically dangerous, the 

OKH later in the month adopted two more 

innocuous code names: "VOTAN position in 

the Army Groups South and A zones and 

PANTHER position in the Army Groups 

North and Center zones. 

While, at first glance, it would appear 

that in the East Wall order Hitler accepted 

a general retreat on the Eastern Front as 

inevitable, the decisions which followed 

indicate that he actually wanted to establish an absolute barrier beyond which the 

armies could not retreat and, since no work 

of any kind had yet been done on the socalled East Wall, give himself an excuse 

~ OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. Nr. 430513/ 43 , 

Fli threrbe/t!hl Nr. 10, 12 .8.43, H 1/ 527 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

for not retreating in the meantime. The 

one major withdrawal he tentatively approved after issuing the East Wall order, 

evacuation of the GOTENKOPF, he postponed on 14 August, claiming it would 

have unfavorable repercussions among Germany's allies and in neutral Turkey.::!G 

[(harkov Evacuated 

While Hitler was attempting a diversion 

in the running dispute with his generals, 

the battle on the north Rank of Army Group 

South raged on, acquiring toward the end 

of the second week of August a somewhat 

amorphous character, largely as a result of 

the Russians' indecisive operating methods. 

(Map IS ) The way to Poltava remained 

open, but Vatutin hesitated to push through 

while the Germans Ranking the gap held 

firm. Instead, he turned his left Aank 

armies, the Fifth Guards and Fifth Guards 

Tank Armies, against the west front of 

Eighth Army (formerly Armeeabteilung 

Kempf) where the SS divisions fought to 

keep the front angled southwestward away 

from Kharkov. On the weaker Eighth 

Army east front Fifty-seventh Army cleared 

the right bank of the Donets between Chuguyev and Zmiyev, but the army command 

somehow could not quite bring itself to 

try for a full-scale breakthrough. 

Manstein, although forced by Hitler's 

order to undertake the dangerous and, in 

the long run, futile exercise of holding 

Kharkov, concentrated his effort on the tac~ 

tically decisive point, the gap between 

Fourth Panzer Army and Eighth Army. 

After the SS divisions became tied down on 

:m OKW, Sttllv ertretellde Chef des Wehrma chtfueh-ungsstabes. K riegstagebuch vom 1.7- 30.9.43 . 

'4 Aug 43. IMT Doc 1792- PS . 
/ 

I 

I 

~~, 

MAP 15 

I 

xxxxx r-,-l 

L_ J 

THE SOVIET ADVANCE 

TO THE DNEPR 

18 Augusl-2 Octoberl944 

GERMAN FftOHT,'eAUO 

GER MAN FRQNT,' '' SEP 

GU .... N FRONT.! OC T 

I ~ [ 

( 

~I 

I 

\ , 

, 

I 
156 

the Eighth Army west front, Manstein 

transferred responsibility for the counterattack to Fourth Panzer Army. On 18 

August the Grossdeutschland Division and 

the 7th Panzer Division broke out of the 

Akhtyrka bridgehead. In two days they 

sliced across the gap and established contact 

with the SS Totenkopf Division, which 

succeeded in extending its left flank across 

the Merlya River. The counterattack eliminated the direct threat to Poltava, but, in 

the meantime, the Fourth Panzer Army 

front had broken open farther north. 

On 18 August Vatutin, repeating the 

tactics he had employed in opening the offensive, brought the 57th Infantry Division, holding a sector midway between 

Akhtyrka and Sumy, under concentrated 

artillery, mortar, and tank fire . By midafternoon the division had lost all its lieutenants and most of its senior NCO's. It 

reported that the battalion commanders 

had yelled themselves hoarse but could not 

keep the troops from retreating. In the 

next two days the Russians tore open ten 

miles of the front, shouldering aside what 

was left of the 57th Division, which was 

redesignated a kampfgruppe, a term then 

beginning to be applied to units so drastically reduced in strength that to continue 

carrying them as divisions would be misleading if not downright ridiculous.

21 

On 20 August, the day the Grossdeutschland and Totenkopf Divisions joined hands 

to close the gap west of Kharkov, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, Woehler, 

asked permission to evacuate the city that 

night. After the first few days in his new 

command, Woehler was no more optimistic 

rt Pz. AOK 4, la, KTiegstagebu h, Band 1 , '3-

20 Aug 43. Pz. AOK 4 41631/ file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

than Kempf had been. XI Corps, holding 

the front on the northern outSkirts of Kharkov, had a strength of 4,000 infantrymen, 

one man for each ten yards of front. The 

artillery, which, as the infantry strength 

ebbed away, had been forced to carry the 

main burden of the fighting, was running 

out of ammunition. The army's supply 

depots in Kharkov had five trainloads of 

spare tank tracks left over from ZITADELLE 

but very little else. The high consumption 

of ammunition in the last month and a 

half had cut into supplies put aside for the 

last half of August and the first two weeks 

of September; until the turn of the month 

the army would have to get along with 50 

percent of its average daily requirements 

in artillery and tank ammunition. 

Grudgingly, Hitler gave Manstein permission to evacuate Kharkov hut asked that 

the city be held if at all possible. He claimed 

the loss would damage German prestige, 

particularly in Turkey. In the spring the 

Turkish commander in chief had inspected 

the "impregnable" defenses of the city as a 

guest of Armeeabteilung Kempf. 

On the 20th Manstein still thought he 

might be able to hold Kharkov and ordered 

the SS Das Reich Division shifted north 

to support XI Corps. The next day he 

changed his mind and gave Woehler permission to pull back "if necessary." The 

following morning the SS Das Reich Division launched a counterattack in the XI 

Corps zone, but Woehler informed Manstein that he intended to give up the city 

anyway. His artillery situation was catastrophic. The artillerymen, after firing 

their last rounds, were abandoning their 

guns to fight as infantry. Manstein replied 

that twenty-four trainloads of ammunition 

were on the way from Germany but had to 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 157 

agree that they would hardly come in time. 

In the afternoon Hitler, characteristically, 

requested that if the counterattack by the 

Das Reich Division improved things "some· 

what" Kharkov not be given up. Woehler 

and Manstein agreed that this was no 

longer possible. During the night the city 

changed hands for the fourth and final 

time.:!8 

While Eighth Army withdrew south of 

Kharkov, massive Soviet efforts to expand 

the breakthrough in the Fourth Panzer 

Army zone and reopen the route to Poltava forced Hoth to fall back south of 

Akhtyrka on either side of the Vorskla 

River. By 25 August he had regained sufficient equilibrium to be able to spare two 

divisions for a counterattack into the gap. 

It was successful, and by the 27th the Fourth 

Panzer and Eighth Armies held a continuous line on a rough arc bending southwestward between Sumy and Zmiyev." 

The Front in Fla". " 

By re-establishing a continuous front on 

the Army Group South left flank the Fourth 

Panzer and Eighth Armies had for the 

moment blunted a deadly thrust, but to the 

north and south fresh blows had already 

been dealt or were in the making. Employing the peculiar rippling effect that 

marked their offensives, the Russians, 

thwarted in one place, had shifted to 

others, adding weight to the offensive laterally. For the first time in the war they 

had the full strategic initiative, and 

they grasped it jealously without regard for 

• AOK 8, la , Kriegstagebuch N,. 2, Band 2, 8, 

18-22 Aug 43, AOK 8 44701 / 2 file . 

211 Pz. AOK 4, la, Kriegstagebuch, Band I . '22 -

'28 Aug 43. Pz. AOK 4 4163 1/ I file . 

economy of effort, tactical sophistication, 

or the danger of overreaching themselves. 

The Stavka, apparently worried that the 

Germans would try for a stalemate, aimed 

at keeping the enemy off balance and not 

letting him establish a stable front anywhere 

in the Army Group Center and Army 

Group South sectors." Vasilevskiy co-ordinated the fronts on the south flank and 

Zhukov those opposite the Army Group 

Center right flank and the left flank of 

Army Group South. 

Only the outer flanks of the Eastern 

Front remained quiet. In the zone of Army 

Group North, on 23 August, the Leningrad 

and Volkhov Fronts finally abandoned a 

costly and unpromising drive they had begun four weeks earlier against the Mga 

bottleneck south of Lake Ladoga. The 

Germans never were much worried since 

the offensive was a fairly ramshackle affair 

from the start. They guessed that its main 

purpose was to prevent the shifting of reserves to the south. In the last two weeks 

it had degenerated into a series of random 

assaults by units of divisional size or 

smaller." In the south, the greatest concern of Army Group A was to secure a decisic:... tr) get out of the GOTENKOPF before 

thl,.. {ad rains set in. Hitler insisted on first 

talking it over with Antonescu. At the end 

of August Zeitzler on his own responsibility 

told Army Group A to go ahead and get 

ready to evacuate, sinr • such a decision 

was inevitable. 3

::! 

~ IVOV (R ), III, 307. 

31 H . Cr. Nord3 1a Nr. ' 3000/44, Du Feldzug 

gegen die Sowjet-Union der Heere sgruppe Nord, 

Kriegsjahr '943. 24.12.44. H. Gr. Nord 75884/1 

file . H . Cr. Nord, la, K riegstagebuch, 1.8-31.843, 

3 Aug 4 3. H. Gr. Nord 15128/ 25 file. 

:1::1 H . Cr. A, la, Kriegstagehuch, Band 2, Teil 8, 

16, 23,30 Aug 43, H. Cr. A 75126/ 14 file . 
158 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET TROOPS STORM A BURNING TOWN 

Army Group Center 

Beginning on 20 August, the pressure on 

Army Group Center subsided for a week. 

The Bryansk and Central Fronts closed to 

the HAGEN position, and the Stavka had 

directed Voronov to abandon the Roslavl 

thrust and regroup for an attack via Yel'nya 

toward Smolensk." The OKH took advantage of the pause to transfer five more 

divisions from Ninth Army to Army Group 

South. 

When the last of those divisions left on 

23 August, Kluge informed the OKH that 

he could no longer guarantee prevention of 

a breakthrough on his front. He offered as 

» IVOV (R) , III, 365. 

alternatives either giving the army group a 

large contingent of replacements and quantities of new materiel or allowing it to draw 

back forty-five miles to the SDB position, a 

recently surveyed but not yet constructed 

line roughly following the courses of the 

Seym, Desna, and Bolva Rivers. He had 

reason for concern. All the signs indicated 

that the Russians would shift the weight of 

their effort away from Ninth Army to the 

armies on its flanks. Fourth Army, on the 

left, had just barely been able to hold its 

line earlier in the month, and Second Army, 

on the right, although its front had been 

quiet thus far, was the victim of considerable neglect. It had been thoroughly 

mauled during the winter battles and later 

slighted because its front on the western 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 159 

rim of the Kursk bulge was expected to be 

eliminated by ZITADELLE. Second Army's 

strength was 7 divisions and 2 kampfgruppen, that of Fourth Army, II divisions and 

7 kampfgruppen. Ninth Army still had 

some 26 divisions, 6 kampfgruppen, and 

miscellaneous smaller units, but Kluge 

could 'not count on drawing on them to 

bolster the other two armies. As one of 

Hitler's favorites, Model could operate with 

much more independence than the average 

army commander, and he was known to be 

something less than generous in weakening 

his own front for the sake of other sectors. 

That tendency, it may be said, had not disturbed Kluge earlier when the question was 

one of giving up divisions to Army Group 

South.3 • 

On 26 August Central Front resumed the 

offensive against Army Group Center, striking at the Ninth Army right Rank east of 

Karachev and near Second Army's center 

at Sevsk and east of Klintsy. During the 

day it took Sevsk and scored a deep penetration east of Klintsy. Army Group Center 

and Second Army, assuming that Rokossovskiy was going to turn north and strike 

in the rear of Ninth Army, decided to deal 

first with the threat at Sevsk. That decision was no doubt correct, even though it 

helped raise an equal danger elsewhere. At 

that time Rokossovskiy had two tank armies 

standing in reserve behind his right Rank, 

and he probably intended to commit them 

at Sevsk." Kluge had shifted one panzer 

and two infantry divisions south from Ninth 

Army several days earlier. Those he put 

into a counterattack northwest of Sevsk on 

29 August. 

:lI MS # P-1 14b (Hofmann ), Teil V , pp. 69-

70. 

z IVOV (R ), III, map 12. 

Although only a moderate success, the 

counterattack, together with a sudden jump 

Sixtieth Army made that day to Yesman' 

on his left Rank, was enough to persuade 

Rokossovskiy to change his plan. He began 

regrouping Second Tank and Thirteenth 

Armies from the right to the left Rank. " 

No matter which direction the Russians 

took, Second Army was in trouble. At 

Yesman' Sixtieth Army was twenty-five 

miles behind Second Army's south flank, 

and there a counterattack was out of the 

question. 

Kluge allowed the army to bend XIIl 

Corps back southwest of Yesman' and 

warned the OKH that Second Army would 

soon have to retreat farther and thereby 

also affect the north flank of Army Group 

South. Enough reinforcements to regain 

control were not to be had. The most 

Kluge could do was transfer two more divisions from Ninth Army, which was having 

troubles of its own. On 28 August two of 

West Front's armies, West Front's Tenth 

Guards and Twt1!ty-jirst, had attacked at 

the Ninth Army-Fourth Army boundary. 

In two days they drove a 20-mile-deep 

wedge through to Yel'nya, forcing the German armies to bend their Ranks back to 

keep contact. 37 

On 29 August Kluge asked to take the 

Ninth and Second Armies into the SDB 

pOSItIon. Second Army was split in two, 

and it seemed at the moment that with 

a little determination West Front would 

quickly push past Yel'nya to Smolensk, the 

eastern gateway to the Dvina-Dnepr gap." 

311 Ibid., p. 308. 

S7 MS # Ph 14b (Hofmann ), Teil V, pp. 70-74. 

-Ibid., p. 75; AOK 4, la , Kriegstagebuch, Nr. 

lB. 30 Aug 43, AOK 4 5°315 fil e; AOK :1, Krieg· 

stagebuch RUHland, Teil 13 , 29 Aug 43 , AOK 2 

48318/ 1 file. 
160 

Kalinin Front had failed to break open the 

Third Panzer and Fourth Armies' flanks, 

but it was building up to another attempt. 

Hitler countered by asking for an opinion 

on another stand-and-fight order similar to 

the one which had been issued in the winter 

of 1941-42. Kluge replied that such an 

order would be futile : the troops would not 

carry it out, and the Soviet capabilities were 

much greater than they had been then." 

Finally, Hitler agreed to a half measure 

allowing Army Groups Center and South 

to swing their adjacent flanks baek as far 

west as Krolevets. 

Two days later, on 2 September, after 

Model had reported that Ninth Army could 

not establish a permanent front east of the 

Desna, Kluge issued preliminary instructions for a general withdrawal to the SDB 

pOSItIon. In the Second Army zone it was 

already too late. XIII Corps, told to fall 

back to the west and maintain conlact with 

Army Group South, allowed itself instead 

to be pushed south across the Seym River 

into the Fourth Panzer Army sector, thereby 

opening a 20-mile gap between the flanks 

of the army groups." Ignoring this fresh 

crisis, Hitler canceled the Army Group 

Center withdrawal orders." On 3 September, in a mood of near desperation, 

Kluge and Manstein went to Fuehrer 

headquarters to argue with Hitler in 

person. 

First Panzer Army and Sixth Army 

During the last week of August, in spite 

of a momentary improvement on the north 

a9 MS # P-114b (Hofmann ), Teil V, p. 7S, 

and Anhang 34. 

~o MS # P-114b (Hofmann), Teii V. pp. 76-77. 

u AOK 9, Fuehrungsab teilung, Krie gstagebuch 

Nr, 9,2 Sep 43, AOK 9 5253511 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

flank, the situation of Army Group South 

had also taken an alarming turn. On 13 

and 18 August Southwest and South Fronts 

extended the offensive into the zones of the 

First Panzer and Sixth Armies and struck 

south of Izyum and east of Golodayevka, 

exactly the same spots where their breakthrough attempts had failed in July. 

For the second time, the First Panzer 

Army line held, even though the artillery 

and mortar fire, described as the heaviest yet 

seen in the war, produced so many casualties that the army was forced to call for replacements after the first lorty-eight hours. 

Sixth Army had worse luck. Instead of 

following the usual Soviet practice of bringing up fresh divisions before an offensive 

General Polkovnik F. r. Tolbukhin, commanding South Front, had fleshed out the 

units in the line; consequently, the German 

intelligence officers, watching for what they 

regarded as an infallible sign of coming 

trouble, were misled by the absence of 

changes in the Second Guards and Fifth 

Shock Armies' orders of battle. When the 

attack came on 18 August it repeated the 

pattern of overwhelming concentration, 

particularly of artillery, on a narrow front. 

Before the end of the day Fifth Shock Army 

spearheads had penetrated three and a half 

miles behind the front through a mile-anda-half-wide gap. During the night, in the 

light of a full moon, they spread out north 

and south behind the German front. 

Hollidt, commanding Sixth Army, decided against attempting to seal off the 

breakthrough and to try instead to close the 

gap in the front. That was the sort of bold 

decision which formerly had brought handsome rewards for comparatively EttIe effort, 

but under present circumstances it had 

more the character of an all-or-nothing 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 161 

GERMAN SELF-PROPELLED ASSAULT GUN 

gamble. The army could spare very little 

infantr)", and it had not a single tanl,- On 

20 August the attack began from both sides 

of the gap. It made fair progress and b)" 

nightfall the two forces had almost joined 

hands, but during the night the IV Guards 

Mechanized Corps realized what was happening and, turning around, attacked from 

the west the next morning. The Soviet 

superiority was too great. By nightfall the 

gap had reopened to a width of nearly five 

miles. 

By 20 August, Manstein had secured the 

13th Panzer Division from Army Group A, 

but when it arrived at Sixth Army it was 

found to consist of only one regiment plus 

three companies. Moreover, Soviet espionage was working so well that the Russians 

knew about the division almost as soon as 

Sixth Army did. On 23 August, 13th 

Panzer Division attacked from the north 

side of the gap, which by then had widened 

to seven miles. For it to have closed the 

gap would have been a miracle. As it 

was, the three miles the division gained 

before being stopped by two mechanized 

corps constituted a startling success. Meanwhile, Tolbukhin, even though he operated 

cautiously, worried by the threat in his rear, 

had expanded the breakthrough to the 
162 

point where Sixth Army could no longer 

muster the resources for an attempt to contain it.42 

By 23 August First Panzer Army was also 

in trouble. It reported that the corps south 

of Izyu m was reduced to a combat 

strength of 5,800 men, not enough to maintain a continuous line.

43 All Manstein 

could do was issue an unconvincing prediction that the battle was approaching its 

climax, and the victory would go to him 

whose strength lasts "one minute longer 

than his opponent's," 44 

On 25 August the operations officers of 

First Panzer Army and Sixth Army flew to 

army group headquarters with a joint proposal for a withdrawal. There they learned 

that Manstein had told Hitler that if five 

fresh divisions, at least two of them panzer, 

could not be supplied, a retreat and, eventually, evacuation of the Donets Basin 

would be necessary. Manstein did not believe Hitler would accept that estimate, but 

gave the armies permission to start getting 

ready to go back to the general line of the 

Kalmius River, just east of Stalino. 45 

Two days later, at Hitler's headquarters 

near Vinnitsa, Manstein presented the alternatives again, this time asking for twelve 

divisions. Hitler promised "all the divisions 

that could possibly be spared" by Army 

Groups North and Center. Both army 

groups promptly protested that they could 

not give up as much as a single division. 4 6 

u AOK 6, la, Kriegstagebuch , Band 6, 18-23 

Aug 43, AOK 6 38986/ I file. 

':! Pz. AOK I , la, Kriegstage buch Nr. II , 23 

Aug 43, Pz. AOK I 446S!2/ 1 file. 

u AOK 6, la, KTiegstagebuch. Band 6, 23 Aug 

43, AOK 6 38986/, file. 

&:; Pz. AOK I , la, KTiegstagebuch NT. 11 , !25 

Aug 43, Pz. AOK I 44652/ I file. 

• , Manstein, VerloTene Siege, pp. 522-!23. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

While Hitler was at Vinnitsa on 27 

August more trouble developed for Sixth 

Army. II Guards M echanized Corps turn ed 

south out of the breakthrough area and 

began a dash to the coast behind the 

XXIX Corps on the army right flank. Sixth 

Army was virtually helpless. It had 35,-

000 front-line troops and 7 tanks against 

130,000 Russians with 160 to '70 tanks. 

Reluctantly, Manstein gave Hollidt two 

weak divisions, one infantry and one 

panzer, recently arrived from Army Group 

Center, and a panzer division, also weak, 

from First Panzer Army. Those, organized 

into a corps, Hollidt used to draw some of 

the pressure off XXIX Corps. On 29 

August the Russians reached the coast west 

of Taganrog, driving XXIX Corps back 

into a pocket at the mouth of the Mius 

River. 

The next day, coming from the west, 

13th Panzer Division opened a narrow gap 

in the Russian line while XXIX Corps 

assembled its 9,000 troops in three columns 

headed by its few undamaged self-propelled assault guns. The Russians were 

misled by the heavy cloud of dust the German assembly raised. Believing that a 

strong tank attack was in the making, they 

gave way after the assault guns fired their 

first rounds, and, during the night, the German columns marched out to the west with 

hardly any losses. 

On 3 I August M anstein authorized 

Sixth Army and First Panzer Army to fall 

back to the Kalmius River." That night 

Hitler approved "if the withdrawal was 

absolutely necessary and no other course 

was open. n 48 

61 AOK 6, l a, KTiegstagebuch, Band 6, 27- 3' 

Aug 43, AOK 6 38986" file. 

4& Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 5!22 . 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 163 

M anslein and Kluge C onfronl 

Hitler 

When Manstein and Kluge presented 

themselves at Fuehrer headquarters on 3 

September they believed the time had come 

for radical measures. They wanted to convince Hitler that the situation demanded 

nothing less than a major overhaul of German strategy and a unified, militarily competent, command at the top level. During 

August, Manstein had several times called 

for the creation of a strategic main effort. 

He had proposed stripping the OKW theaters- the West, Italy, and the Balkansand throwing the full weight of the German 

Army against the Russians. 

The OKW had given some thousands of 

men to the Eastern Front in the form of replacement battalions, but it resisted giving 

up whole divisions, insisting that its theaters 

were underdefended as it was. In late 

August, perhaps influenced by Stalin's incessant demands for a second front, the 

Operations Branch, OKW, professed to see 

a danger of an Allied invasion on the Atlantic coast in the coming fall. On 2 September the Deputy Chief, Operations 

Branch, OKW, prepared a memorandum 

in which he main tained that attacks were 

to be expected on the Atlantic coast, in 

Italy, and in the Balkans. In contrast to 

the East, he pointed out, where there was 

still ample room for maneuver, these attacks 

would directly threaten th e borders of the 

Reich. He concluded, therefore, that the 

O KW theaters could not spare any more 

troops for the East. The Chief, Operation, 

Branch, OKW, Jodi, at first did not concur 

entirely, but in the next few days he worked 

out estimates of his own in which he reached 

essentially the same conclusion.<49 

j' OKW, S tellvertretende Chef des WehrmachtIn the conference on 3 September, Manstein and Kluge asked Hitler to abolish the 

dualism between the OKH and OKW theaters and make the Chief of Staff, OKH, 

responsible for all theaters." Kluge had 

reported to Hitler several days before that 

he saw as the main source of the present 

troubles the lack of a single military adviser 

responsible to the supreme commander 

( Hitler) for all theaters." 

The idea of a single chief of staff was 

militarily unexceptionable. Unfortunately, 

as the two field marshals must have known, 

it could not be presented in any form Hitler 

would accept. In the first place, conducting operations in all theaters through the 

OKH would automatically enhance the 

power of the Chief of Staff, OKH. At the 

same time, it would weaken Hitler's personal control by nullifying the claim that he 

alone could form a complete strategic picture and by depriving him of the device, 

which he had used often, of playing the 

OKW and OKH off against each other. 

Finally, it could result in his losing his grip 

on the Eastern Front. A more powerful 

Chief of Staff, O KH, might bring actual 

over-all control in the East into the hands 

of the Army General Staff and end the 

compartmentalization Hitler used to maintain himself as supreme arbiter over the 

four army groups and the OKH. That 

Hitler would reject any such abridgments 

of his personal authority was a foregone 

conclusion. In the end, he chose to consider the problem a purely technical one of 

co-ordinating troop transfers between the 

fuehrungsstllbes, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.7-30.9.43 . 

~, 8, I' Sep 43, IMT Doc 1792-PS. 

~.o Manste in, Verlorene Siege, p. :;24. 

n MS # P-1 14b ( Hofmann ), T ei[ V . Anhan.~ 

34-
164 

OKH and OKW theaters and ordered that 

henceforth all decisions by the OKH or the 

OKW affecting each other's strengths 

would be communicated to him personally 

in the presence of both the Chief, OKW, 

and the Chid of Staff, OKH." 

Having demonstrated that, whatever the 

state of the war, he was and would remain 

the master in Germany, Hitler turned to 

the situation at the front. To Manstein 

he conceded nothing, rejecting his pleas for 

large-scale reinforcement of Army Group 

South from other theaters." He gave 

Kluge permission to take Second Army and 

the right flank of Ninth Army behind the 

Desna River." On the afternoon of 3 

September, after conferring with Antonescu, he ordered Army Group A to start 

evacuating the GOTEN KOPF. All civilians 

were to be evacuated to the Crimea, and 

the Russians were to be left "an uninhabitable desert." iS5 

Hitler Approves a Withdrawal 

U In Principle" 

After 3 September the offensive against 

Army Group Center subsided briefly. West 

of Yel'nya the Ninth and Fourth Armies 

re-established a continuous front. On the 

southern flank, Rokossovskiy shifted his attack to the left flank of Fourth Panzer 

Army, and, as a consequence, Second 

Army's withdrawal to the Desna proved 

fairl y easy. Fourth Panzer Army took 

over XIII Corps and, after replacing the 

&: OKW, Stellvertretende Chef des W ehrmach tfu.ehruTignlabes, Kriegstagebu ch vorn 1-7.-30.9-43. 

I I Sep 43 , Doc 1792- PS. 

M Manstein, VerloTene Siege, p. 525-

C,J MS # P- 114b (Hofmann). Teil V, p. 78. 

r,/; H . Gr. A , A, la, Krie gstagebuch, Band 2. Teil 

9a, 3, 5 Sep 43, H. Gr. A 751'26/15 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

commanding general, used it to screen its 

lengthening north flank. 

The drive against Army Group Center 

had obviously gone somewhat awry, although it had perhaps accomplished as 

much as was needed for the time being. 

The Stavka had probably realized that 

though substantial, its superiority was not 

enough equally to sustain simultaneous advances into Belorussia and the Ukraine. 

On 4 September it committed itself definitely to a main effort in the Ukraine against 

the Army Group South left flank. On that 

day Voronezh Front, reinforced by Third 

Guards Tank Army (transferred from the 

Central Front ), Fifty-second Army, and 

se .... eral tank and mechanized corps, 

launched a powerful attack on a broad 

front between the Pse! and Vorskla Rivers 

that threatened to break open the Fourth 

Panzer Army right flank and leave the army 

with both flanks hanging in the air.'" 

Oil the night of 4 September Sixth Army 

and First Panzer Army went into the Kalmius line, and the Sixth Army commander, 

Hollidt, declared there would be no more 

withdrawals, the front would absolutely be 

held. He could not have been more wrong. 

As long as it had the protection of the 

Donets River along nearly all of its front, 

First Panzer Army presented at least an 

appearance of strength, but after it had 

bent its right corps back from the river 

even that was lost. The army, severely 

strained by battles of attrition since July, 

had asked for nine or ten days to move into 

its new line but was given only three. Southwest Front, after following close on its heels 

all the way, opened a slashing attack on the 

morning of 6 September. In a few hours 

MIVOV (R ). III, :112: Pt. AOK 4, fa Krie gJtagebuch. Band 1. 4 Sep 43 , Pz . AOK 4 41631/ 1 

file. 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 165 

I Guards Mechanized Corps and nine rifle 

divisions rammed through north of the 

First Panzer Army-Sixth Army boundary. 

That night von Mackensen told the army 

group chief of staff that all that was left 

to do was to retreat to the Dnepr, since 

neither his army nor Sixth Army had 

strength enough to restore the front. The 

next day XXIII Tank Corps slipped 

through the gap and joined I Guards M echanized Corps. Leaving the infantry behind, 

the two armored corps broke away to the 

west. By 8 September their reconnaissance 

detachments were approaching Pavlograd 

and Sinel'nikovo, a hundred miles behind 

the front and about thirty miles east of the 

Dnepr.!>1 

Early on the morning of the 8th Hitler's 

plane carrying him and Zeitzler landed at 

Zaporozhye, Manstein's headquarters. 

Some sort of reasonably thoroughgoing decision could no longer be avoided. During 

the day's conferences Manstein argued that 

Army Group Center should be pulled back 

to the PANTHER position to shorten its front 

by about one-third and free a commensurate number of divisions for Army Group 

South. Hitler objected that such a withdrawal would take too long. Instead, he 

ordered Kleist, who was present, to speed 

up evacuation of the GOTENKOPF, a move 

expected to yield three divisions. 

As far as the right flank of Army Group 

South was concerned, to patch the line on 

the Kalmius River was clearly out of the 

question; therefore, Hitler approved Hin 

principle" the withdrawal of First Panzer 

and Sixth Armies to the WOTAN position 

between Melitopol and the Dncpr north of 

Zaporozhye. For the north flank of the 

11 Pz. AOK I . la, Kriegstagtbuch Nr. 12 , 6-8 

Sep 43. Pz. AOK I 45393 / 1 file. 

army group he promised reinforcements, 

four infantry divisions for the Dnepr crossings and a corps headquarters with two infantry and two panzer divisions from Army 

Group Center to close the gap between the 

Second Army and Fourth Panzer Army 

flanks. Manstein immediately told the First 

Panzer and Sixth Armies to go over to "a 

mobile defense." With that the retreat to 

the Dnepr was on.!>8 

To the Dnepr 

As usual, Hitler's main concern in the 

conferences on 8 September had been to 

avoid any decision that was not already inevitable. Finding himself forced to give up 

the Donets Basin, he was doubly reluctant 

to concede the necessity for a similar decision with respect to the Fourth Panzer and 

Eighth Armies. Instead, he took refuge in 

dubious promises, one of which evaporated 

the next day when he learned that of the 

four divisions designated for the Dnepr 

crossings only one would be available and it 

would have to come all the way from Army 

Group North. The other he gave somewhat more substance before leaving Zaporozhye by issuing specific orders to Army 

Group Center concerning transfer of the 

corps headquarters and four divisions that 

were to come under Army Group South 

control as soon as they crossed the Dcsna. 5 9 

But three of the divisions were to come from 

Second Army, which in its weakened state 

could hardly spare the divisions on 8 September, and on the 9th, after Rokossovskiy's 

troops crossed the Desna south of Novgorod-Severskiy and at Otsekin, could not 

~ Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 526- 27 ; H . 

Gr. A, la, Kriegstagebu ch, Band , Teil 90, 8 Sep 

43, H . Gr. A 75126/ 15 file . 

r.. H. Cr. Sued, la, Nr. 0676143, an Pz. AOK 4 , 

8·9·43. Pz. AOK 4 4163 t 19 file. 
166 

spare them at all. The 8th Panzer Division, 

the one division Second Army did release, 

it used to protect its own flank south of 

the Desna. 

First Panzer Army and Sixth Army 

Retreat 

In the south the First Panzer and Sixth 

Armies lost no time starting their march to 

the Dnepr. In two da),s their inner flanks 

covered seventy miles, about half the distance, and on 12 September panzer units of 

First Panzer Army pushing south re-established contact with the left fl ank of Sixth 

Army. As the gap between the armies narrowed, I Guards Mechanized Corps and 

XXlII Tank Cor/)s, operating toward Pavlograd and Sinel'nikovo, slowed down. On 

the night of the 12th the H eadquarters, 

Southwest Front, ordered the two corps to 

turn back and escape to the east. During 

the next two days First Panzer Army beat 

off several breakout attempts. On the 

night of 14 September remnants of the 

corps slipped through an accidental gap in 

the Sixth Army line." 

The experience of I Guards Mechanized 

Corps demonstrated once more the Russians' difficulties in fully exploiting their 

armor. After the breakthrough at Golodayevka, Tolbukhin had been criticized for 

usi ng his tank units too cautiously and dissipating their strength in numerous small 

skirmishes.'" Malinovski)" app~rentl)' determined not to make the same mistake, had 

unleashed I Guards Mechanized Cor/)s and 

XXIlI Tank Corps. Their dash toward 

to Pt. AOK I , Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12 ,8-14 Sep 

43. Pz. AOK I 45393/1 file . • 1 Pavel A. Zhilin, ed., Vazhnt)'.shiye Operallij 

Vdikoy Otechestve1lnoy Voyny (Moscow, 1956 ) 

(hereafter cit ed as Vazh neyshi),t 0 puats;; DlechestutmTloy Voyny), p. 2 4 0. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Dnepr, though spectacular, had been 

tactically unproductive. It had pointed up 

the already obvious weakness of the two 

German armies, but this could probably 

have been done with greater effect by keeping the corps in contact with the front. As 

soon as their supply lines were cut, the corps 

had lost momentum, and when the front 

closed behind them they had had to fall 

back precipitously, taking a thorough drubbing on the way. 

After 12 September First Panzer Arm)' 

and Sixth Army set a more deliberate pace. 

Behind Sixth Army, which, to protect the 

land routes into the Crimea, would have to 

hold a line whose only natural advantage 

was the small Molochna),a River, Arm" 

Group A began mov ing in troops and artillery. Worried that Manstein might later be 

tempted to siphon these off to other sectors 

of Army Group South, Kleist asked for 

command of Sixth Army when it rC'achcd 

the WOTA N position. At mid month Hitler 

agreed that Army Group A would take over 

Headquarters, Sixth Army, and its two 

southern corps, the third corps going to 

First Panzer Army.G:! 

Fourth Panzer Army and 

Eighth Army Weaken 

On its north flank the Army Group South 

front was becoming tauter and more brittle 

by the hour. Eighth Arm)' reported shortl,· 

after the turn of the month that it could no 

longer hold a continuous line. It had established a system of strongpoints with connecting trenches for patrols. Its rear echelon 

troops consisted exclusively of "sole surviving sons" and Hfathers of large families," 

81 H . Gr. A, K riegstagebuch, Band 2 , Tei{ 9a, 

13-17 Sep 43, Pz. AOK 2 75 126/ 15 file. 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 167 

two categories that were still, by Hitler's 

order, exempt from front-line duty, aU the 

rest having been sent to the front. Even so, 

one infantry division was reduced to a 

strength of six officers and 300 men. Exhaustion and apathy had set in, and the 

"most severe mea u~es " no longer helped to 

stiff en the troops' resistance. 03 

Fourth Panzer Army was in worse straits. 

On the 30-mile stretch of front between the 

Vorskla and the Psel, its front sagged under 

the weight of six tank and mechanized corps 

and an estimated nineteen rine divisions. 

I n the gap off its left fl ank the most it could 

do was to try to create an island of resistance around Nezhin, the last obstacle in 

Central Front's way on the road to Kiev." 

T here the slow arrival of the promised divisions from Army Group Center so exasperated Hoth that, fin aUy, on 12 September, he claimed command of aU units south 

of the Desna, in accordance with Hitler's 

order, and took the 8th Panzer Division off 

the Second Army flank. 

Kluge Begins the R etreat to the 

Panther Position 

Kluge made a conscientious, though 

hardly heroic, effort to get the four divisions 

promised Army Group South. On 10 September, when he asked the Commanding 

General, Second Army, General der Infantefie Walter ,"" eiss, to reconsider whether 

he could not somehow spare two more divisions, Weiss replied that his army was 

down to an average combat strength of 

1,000 men per division. The next day, 

after Weiss reported that the Russians had 

M AOK 8, l a. Kriegstagebuch N r. 2 , Band 3, 

2 Sep 43, AOK 8 4470' / 3 file. ~ OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. Ill b P,ue/-N,. 

443:13, Lage Osl, Stand 9.9.43, abds. 

increased the number of their bridgeheads 

across the Desna to six, Kluge decided to 

take the two divisions from Fourth Army 

instead. At the same time he told the 

OKH, "The door to Smolensk now stands 

open." 

On the 12th he informed the OKH that 

the army group could not supply a fourth 

division. The pause in the offensive against 

Army Group Center had ended. The Russians were expanding their bridgeheads on 

the Desna; a cavalry corps, attacking south 

of Kirov, had sliced through behind the 

center of Ninth Army; and an offensive toward Smolensk was to be expected any day 

against Fourth Army. 

By the 12th, Army Group Center, in fa ct, 

was in seriolls trouble; the Stauka was 

obviously determined not to let the army 

group come to rest. T he cavalry corps that 

had penetrated the Ninth Army left flank, 

thrusting deep to the southwest, took Zhukovka on the Bryansk-Roslavl' railroad. 

Model set about closing his front, but the 

effort merely emphasized the futility of 

Ninth Army's continuing to hold a rigid 

Jine when it was obvious that th e armies on 

its flanks would give way before the next 

onslaught. The build-up opposite Fourth 

Army had gone so far that the army would 

not dare meet the impending attack headon. Second Army's front on the Desna was 

riddled with bridgeheads, and to man its 

lengthening right fl ank it had committed 

two security divisions and a H ungarian 

division, none of them equipped or trained 

for front-line fighting. 

On 13 September Kluge issued the warning order for a withdrawal to the PANTHER 

position. In a meeting at army group headquarters, the chief of staff gave the officers 

present an idea of the magnitude of such an 
168 

operation. It would mean, he stated, relinquishing half, qualitatively the better 

half, of the territory the army group still 

held in the Soviet Union. Work on the 

PANTHER position would require 400,000 

civilian laborers. Between 2.5 and 3 million persons would have to be evacuated to 

the west- this as compared to some 190,000 

evacuated from the Orel bulge. Six hundred thousand cattle would have to be 

herded to the rear, and the army group 

would have to shift all of its rear area installations. For instance, new hospital 

facilities for 36,000 beds would have to be 

built. 

The next morning West Front renewed 

the thrust toward Smolensk. In the afternoon the Chief of Operations, OKH, called 

the army group headquarters to inform 

Kluge that Manstein intended ordering 

Fourth Panzer Army to withdraw behind 

the Dnepr. The Chief of Operations believed the time had come for Army Group 

Center to start its pullback to the PANTHER 

position. 

He wanted to know whether Kluge considered that he, Kluge, had the authority to 

issue such an order. Kluge replied that he 

did not: an order would have to come from 

Hitler through the OKH. Certain that the 

order would come within a matter of hours, 

Kluge that night directed Model to start 

taking the center of the Ninth Army line 

behind the Desna and gave Weiss permission to begin falling back west of the 

Desna. 65 

Hitler and Kluge Go Slow 

In the Army Group South zone on 14 

• H. Cr. Mitte , la, Kriegstagebuch, 1.-30.9.43, 

10--14 Sep 43. OeMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

September, Fourth Panzer Army wavered 

on the brink of collapse. On its left Central 

Front troops were pushing into Nezhin, and 

in the center Voronezh Front had broken 

through, splitting the army into three parts. 

Hoth reported that the Russians could 

march to Kiev unhindered. The situation, 

he stated, was similar to that the army had 

faced south of Rostov during the winter, 

the difference being that then it had some 

battleworthy units with which to maneuver. 

The greatest danger was that the army 

would be pushed south parallel to the 

Dnepr and leave a long stretch of the river 

on either side of Kiev completely exposed. 

Manstein instructed Hoth to break contact with Eighth Army and swing his right 

flank west, orienting his front on a northsouth axis to cover Kiev. He ordered 

Woehler to take Eighth Army back as 

quickly as he could without impairing the 

troops' fitness for comba"t and so release 

enough troops to screen the gap that would 

open between the two armies. In his report 

to Hitler, Manstein stated that on 15 September he was going to order Fourth 

Panzer Army to retreat behind the Dnepr, 

otherwise the army would soon be destroyed. Since he would have to take divisions from the Eighth and First Panzer 

Armies for Fourth Panzer Army, he saw no 

chance of holding any ground forward of 

the river. On the night of the 14th Hitler 

told Manstein and Kluge to report in person 

the next day." 

Meanwhile, the loss of Nezhin early on 

the 1 sth touched off a near panic at 

Fuehrer headquarters. The OKH urged 

86 Pz. AOK 4. la, Kriegseagebuch, Band 1 , 14 

Sep 43. Pz. AOK 4 4163 1/ 1 file; AOK 8, la , 

Kriegstagebuch NT. 2, Band 3. 14 Sep 43, AOK 

844701 / 3 file ; OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Krieg!-

tagebuch, 14 Sep 43· 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 169 

Army Group Center to speed up the withdrawals already under way in order to free 

units for Army Group South. After Manstein and Kluge arrived, Hitler told Kluge 

to transfer four divisions to Army Group 

South and agreed to a general retreat to the 

WOTAN (Dnepr) and PANTHER positions. 

By the end of the day, however, he began to 

have second thoughts, and before Kluge 

left Fuehrer headquarters he instructed him 

to execute the Army Group Center withdrawal by phases, avoiding "excessive 

speed." He was not interested, he said, in 

executing the operation quickly. Every 

major step back would require his prior 

concurrence. 61 

For Army Group South the decision to 

go behind the Dnepr, welcome though it 

was, posed problems that would test the skill 

and stamina of the leadership and troops as 

severely as anything they had yet undertaken. The first of these was to disengage 

the scattered pieces of Fourth Panzer Army, 

a move accomplished on the nights of ,6 

and '7 September in what Hoth described 

as "two great leaps backward"- through 

which the army regained some freedom of 

maneuver and restored contact between its 

units. 68 Next came the more difficult and 

dangerous task of getting the Fourth 

Panzer, Eighth, and First Panzer Armies 

across the river. The three armies, occupying a front nearly 400 miles in breadth, had 

at their disposal only five crossings- Kiev, 

Kanev, Cherkassy, Kremenchug, and Dnepropetrovsk- which meant splitting their 

forces, establishing bridgeheads that could 

be held until the troops were funneled 

across, and then fanning out behind the 

87 H. Gr. Mitte , la, K,iegstagebuch, 1.-30.9.43. 

15 Sep 43. OCMH files. 

• Pz. AOK 4 . la Kriegstagebuch Band " 15-17 

Sep 43. Pz. AOK 4 41631 / I file. 

river before the Russians could get bridgeheads of their own in the undefended areas 

on the west bank. 

Very little had been done to improve the 

crossings. Regarding Cherkassy, swiftly being congested with evacuated cattle and 

piles of goods, Headquarters, Army Group 

South, and Eighth Army argued over who 

would furnish engineers and bridging 

equipment." At the last minute Hitler 

added another complication by insisting 

that First Panzer Army strengthen the 

bridgehead east of Zaporozhye to protect 

the nearby Nikopol manganese mines. 70 

Hitler's tendency to place economic objectives above tactics was once morc to have 

baneful effects, for in following orders 

Manstein had to shift nearly all of the few 

units he could spare, and would otherwise 

have used to shore up the army group's 

weak left Rank, to the tactically worthless 

Zaporozhyc bridgehead. 

At the '5 September conference, Manstein had insisted that Army Group Center 

transfer the newly promised four divisions 

to Army Group South at top speed. Before 

the end of the day marching orders came 

through for two of the divisions; but by the 

time Kluge left Fuehrer headquarters Hitler 

had given him two mutually contradictory 

missions: to release the divisions for Army 

Group South quickly- but to conduct the 

withdrawal to the PANTHER position at a 

deliberate pace. The latter coincided with 

Kluge's own thinking; consequently, he was 

in no hurry to get the general withdrawal 

under way and waited three days before 

issuing a basic order. In that order he emphasized that the armies would stay for-

• AOK 8. la, Kril!gstagl!buch Nr. 2 , Band 3, 15 

Sep 43, AOK 84470'/3 file. 

'fO Pz. AOK I , Kril!gstagl!buch Nr. 12 , 19 Sep 

43, Pz. AOK 1 4.5393/1 file. 
170 

ward of the PANTHER position at least until 

10 October.T1 As a result, the army 

group remained tied down in heavy fighting 

at the front, and the transfer of two of the 

four divisions promised Army Group South 

was first postponed and finally canceled. 

Tactically, Kluge's decision to go slow 

gave the Stavka an opportunity to continue 

developing its two currently most dangerous 

offensive thrusts, the one toward Smolensk 

and the other toward the Dnepr between 

the lIanks of Army Groups Center and 

South. While W est Front forced the 

Fourth Army right lIank back southeast of 

Smolensk, Kalinin Front J under Yeremenko, bore down north of the city on both 

sides of the Third Panzer-Fourth Army 

boundary. South of the Desna, off the 

Second Army right lIank, on 16 and 18 

September Central Front moved in a fresh 

guards mechanized corps; during the next 

two days, without slackening the advance 

toward the Dnepr, it aimed a two-pronged 

thrust northward across the Desna on either 

side of Chernigov. The Second Army 

lIank collapsed under the first wave of the 

attack. The army group recorded that on 

19 September the Hungarian division stationed east of Chernigov "dissolved completely." 

Between 20 and 23 September disastrous 

developments on both lIanks forced Kluge 

to ahandon his plan for a leisurely withdrawal. North of Smolensk, Kalinin Front 

broke through the Third Panzer Armv right 

lIank, taking Demidov and threatening the 

PANTHER position. Southeast of Smolensk, 

the Fourth Army line was beginning to 

crack. In the Second Army zone, east of 

Chernigov, Central Front carried its adn H. Gr. MiUe, lao Kriegstagebuch. 1.-30.9-43 . 

• 8 Sep 43, OCMH file •. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

vance north behind the army lIank toward 

Gomel, the most important road and railroad junction on the southern half of the 

Army Group Center front. " 

Army Group South Goes Behind 

the River 

During the last week of the month the 

Army Group South's retreat degenerated 

into a race with the Russians for possession 

of the right bank of the Dnepr. At the conlIuence of the Pripyat and the Dnepr some 

of Rokossovskiy's troops had crossed as 

early as 19 September, and before the end 

of the month they had a bridgehead reaching 15 miles west along both sides of the 

Pripyat to Chernobyl. 

Anxious to keep the Germans from digging in on the Dnepr and thereby possibly 

effecting a stalemate, the Stavka had directed the fronts and armies to cross the 

river on the run. To the officers and 

soldiers who distinguished themselves in 

river crossings, it offered the highest Soviet 

military decoration, Hero of the Soviet 

Union, which meant a life pension and 

public recognition- a life-sized bust of the 

recipient was to be displayed in his home 

town. The technique of the crossings was 

the same everywhere, crude, but conducted 

on so large a scale and with such great persistence that it was overwhelmingly eff ective. For instance, near Bukrin, forty-eight 

miles southeast of Kiev, four soldiers of a 

guards submachine gun company crossed 

the Dnepr in a rowboat after dark on 22 

September. They waded ashore, climbed the 

bank, at this point steep and several hundred feet high, and from the gullies near the 

top drew fire from the German outposts. 

'OS I bid., 16-23 Sep 43 . 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 171 

Other small parties followed. By daylight 

the whole company had crossed and taken 

a foothold at the top of the bank. Then, in 

an antlike processiun, the whole Third 

Guards Tank Army began to cross, the infantry using anything that would Aoattimbers, gasoline drums, wooden doors, 

even straw wrapped in ponchos-while the 

engineers built causeways for the heavy 

equipment, and other troops set up artillery 

on the east bank to deliver covering fire. 

The four sub machine gunners became 

Heroes of the Soviet Union. Up and down 

the river, the Stavka J to keep the armies 

moving and as if intent on paving the crossings with medals, awarded 2,000 Hero of 

the Soviet Union decorations and ten thousand lesser ones. 73 

On the 26th, Voronezh Front took a 

bridgehead in the bend of the Dnepr below 

Pereyaslav, and Steppe Front made three 

smaller crossings between Kremenchug and 

Dnepropetrovsk. These it expanded in the 

next few days to form a single bridgehead 

thirty miles wide and at one point ten miles 

deep." Lying, as they did, almost exactly 

midway between the Germans' own crossing points, the bridgeheads were each established in places the Germans would have 

trouble reaching. 

Hitler worried most about the bridgehead 

at the mouth of the Pripyat. On 25 September he ordered Army Groups Center 

and South to eliminate it immediately, but 

that was not easily done. While the two 

army groups sent the few, nearly exhausted, 

divisions they could spare probing into the 

swamps that fringed the rivers, the Rus-

" IVOV (R ), III, 327-33. 

7' AOK 8, Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 2, Band 3, 25-'28 

Sep 43, AOK 8 4470J/3 file; Pz. AOK 1, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12,26 Sep 43. Pz. AOK 1 45393/1 

file. 

sians, determined not to be dislodged, 

moved in fresh well-rested troops." 

By the end of the month Army Group 

South had taken the last of its troops across 

the river and was struggling to establish a 

front. Sixth Army, having gone into the 

WOTAN position below Zaporozhye on 20 

September, was already straining to beat 

off an armored offensive at the center of its 

front- a certain sign that the Sta vka would 

not relax the pressure, at least as long as the 

good weather lasted. On 2 October the 

last units of Army Group Center moved 

into the PANTHER position, which followed 

the general line of the Sozh and Pronya 

Rivers about thirty miles east of the Dnepr. 

In the south Army Group A completed its 

withdrawal from the GOTENKOPF on 29 

September. It still held a small bridgehead 

on the Taman Peninsula but evacuated it 

during the next ten days. 

In two and one-half months Army 

Groups Center and South had been forced 

back an average distance of 150 miles on a 

front 650 miles long. Economicall y, the 

Germans lost the most valuable territory 

they had taken in the Soviet Union. In an 

effort at least to deny the Soviet Union the 

fruits of these rich areas Hitler had initiated 

a scorched-earth policy, but, in the end, 

even that satisfaction was denied him. At 

the end of September Army Group Center 

reported that it had succeeded in evacuating no more than 20 to 30 percent of the 

economic goods in its rear area.;(; 

In the Army Group South zone the failure was, if anything, greater. The economic 

staffs did not have the personnel to accomplish total destruction, and they lacked the 

';$ H . GT. Mitte , la, KTiegslagebuch, 1.-30.9-43, 

25, 26 Sep 43, OCMH files. 

~8 H. GT. Mille . l a, KTiegstagebuch, 1.-30.9.43 , 

27 Sep 43 , OCMH files. 
172 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET TROOPS BOARDING A RAFT ON A BRANCH OF THE D NEPR 

equipment to remove more than a part of 

the useable goods. Large numbers of factories, power plants, railroads, and bridges 

were in fact destroyed, but many of them 

had never been fully restored after the 

Soviet retreat in 1941. The people, influenceel by Soviet propaganda promising that 

there would be no reprisals, sabotaged the 

evacuation to save their own possessions and 

to establish alibis that would be useful after 

the Germans departed. The only willing 

evacuees were the outright collaborators, 

those from some of the districts along the 

Donets who had had a taste of a Soviet 

"liberation" during the last winter, and 

those who resided in the few areas completely laid waste. The armies and economic 

staffs organized caravans of civilians numbering all together about 600,000 persons, 

or one-tenth of the population. They estimated later that about 280,000 of these 

eventually reached and crossed the Dnepr. 

In addition to 268,000 tons of grain and 

488,000 cattle and horses taken across the 

river, the Germans destroyed 94 I ,000 tons 

of grain and 13,000 cattle; but they left 

behind 1,656,233 tons of grain, much of it 

standing in the fields ready to be harvested, 

and 2,987,699 cattle and horses. 

The Russians lost no time in exploiting 

the fruit, of victory. As they pursued the 

right flank of Army Group South across the 

southern Ukraine they drew on the local 

population for replacements. Sixth Army 

estimated that about 80,000 men were 

drafted in the reoccupied towns and cities, 
THE FIRST SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 173 

UKRAINIAN EVACUEES AT A RIVER CROSSING 

given a uniform jacket or pants and a rifle, 

and thrown into the front line.n 

On reaching the Dnepr River the Soviet 

Army attained the original objectives of its 

summer offensive. The shortening of the 

German front, the defensive advantages of 

the river, the lengthening Soviet lines of 

communications, and the attrition of Soviet 

forces should have brought the two sides 

into balance temporarily. In early October 

the Germans still believed they had a 

chance of achieving some sort of a balance, 

n AOK 6, Kriegstagebuch, Band 6, Int. XXIII, 

AOK 6 38986/ 1 file ; Wi In ~('ued, NT. 434 / 43, 

Die wirtschaftliche Raeumung des Donez-Gebietes, 

5 Nov ':.3, Wi lID 2.104 file. 

but their own mistakes and the Soviet 

numerical superiority were working against 

them. By trying to hold out east of the 

Dnepr, Hitler had sacrificed too much of 

the strength of Army Groups South and 

Center; consequently, the so-called East 

Wall could not be properly manned or fortified and in the end was breached in 

several places while the front was still in 

motion. The Russians' manpower advantage, on the other hand, had enabled them 

to rest and refit their units in shifts. As a 

result, they reached the Dnepr with their 

offensive capability largely intact, and before the last German troops crossed the river 

the battle for the Dnepr line had begun. 
CHAPTER IX 

The Battle for the Dnepr Line 

Army Group South 

The Dnepr, the second largest Russian 

river, affords the strongest natural defense 

line in western Russia, especially when the 

battle is moving from east to west. At the 

conAuence of the Pripyat the Dnepr 

broadens to about a half mile, and downstream the meandering main channel varies 

in width from a third of a mile to morc than 

a mile. Below Kiev the river valley is 

twenty to twenty-five miles wide and the 

cast bank is swampy and laced with secondary channels. At Kiev the west bank 

rises nearly 300 feet to form a fringe of 

steep cliffs. Below the city the wcst bank 

continues high, averaging between 150 and 

300 feet along most of the lower course. 

The east bank is flat and treeless, and the 

bare steppe stretches away beyond the far 

horizon. 

Fortified and adequately manned, the 

Dnepr line would have been almost ideally 

defensible; but the condition of Army 

Group South in the fall of ' 943 was such 

that the river provided at most a modest 

degree of natural protection and a tenuous 

handhold. (M ap 16 ) The troops, influenced by talk of an "East Wall," were dismayed to find on crossing that nothing had 

been built and that much of the proposed 

front had not even been surveyed. Later, 

one of the army chiefs of staff was to warn 

that troop morale could not again withstand 

such a shock.' 

In the first week of October, Army 

Group South had 37 divisions with an average front-line infantry strength of ',000 

men each, or about 80 men per mile of 

front.' This highly unfavorable ratio of 

troop strength to frontage was the price the 

army group had to pay for the protection of 

the river. Whether it was worth paying 

was doubtful from the first. Below Kiev 

the Dnepr angles southeastward for 250 

miles; at Zaporozhye it doubles back to the 

southwest another ' 50 miles before reaching the Black Sea below Kherson. In making this great bend it travels nearly twice 

the straight-line distance between Kiev and 

the coast. The front of Army Group South 

and the Sixth Army, dropping off south of 

Zaporozhye to Melitopol, did not follow th e 

lower angle of the river, but even so it was 

over a third longer than, for instance, a line 

Kiev-Nikolaev would have been. Tactically the Dnepr confronted Army Group 

South with the problem that had dogged 

its steps since Stalingrad- defending a front 

angled away to the east. 

The Zaporozh}'e Bridgehead Lost 

On , October Southwest Front launched 

a strong attack against the Zaporozhye 

I Pz. AOK I. la o Kriegstagebu. ch Nr. 12. 26 :"1ov 

43. Pz. AOK 1 45393/3 file . 

: Manstein, V erlorene Siege, p. 542. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 175 

THE DNEPR BELOW KIEV 

bridgehead, making a small penetration 

that First Panzer Army eliminated before 

the end of the day. But in reporting the 

success to the army group von Mackensen 

asked permission to give up the bridgehead 

anyway, stating that to attempt a stand 

there would consume too many troops. 

The next day the Russians, realizing that 

they had reached the line the Germans 

meant to hold, broke off the offensive along 

the entire Eastern Front for a week while 

they regrouped and brought up fresh units. 

To underscore the victories so far, and to 

mark the entry into a new phase of the war, 

the Stavka began renaming the fro')t commands. Opposite Army Group South and 

Sixth Army the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwest, and South Fronts became the First, 

Second, Third, and Fourth Ukrainian 

Fronts. 

After a conference at the Fuehrer headquarters on 8 October the Chief of Staff, 

Army Group South, informed von Mackensen that Hitler had denied the request to 

evacuate the Zaporozhye bridgehead, because to do so would expose the left flank 

of Sixth Army.' Hitler's thinking coincided 

exactly with that of the Stavka, which considered the bridgehead the key to cleaning 

out the cast bank of the lower Dnepr and 

gave the mission of eliminating it to Third 

U kranian Front.' 

3 Pz. AOK I, la , Kriegstagebuch NT. 12 . 8 Oct 

43, Pz. AOK I 453931, file. 

• IVOV(R ), Ill, 345. 
\ 

1 

MAP 16 

KIEV 

,. ...... . .'0....-: ... . 

THIRfA~,6.RDS 

TWENTY· 

SEVENTH 

FOR THE DNEPR LINE THE BATTLE -!IDIU.,tHo." .. , 

r 

• 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

On the morning of 10 October the 

Eighth Guards and Third Guards Armies 

renewed the offensive against the, by then, 

solidly dug-in Germans in the bridgehead. 

The attack began with an extraordinarily 

powerful artillery preparation. This and 

the other battles then developing along the 

front demonstrated that the Russians had 

reached a new stage in their employment 

of artillery. Artillery divisions made their 

first appearance, and the duration and 

weight of the barrages indicated that the 

Soviet Army now had enough guns and 

ammunition to employ them lavishly to 

level the defenses and make the way easier 

for tanks and infantry. The bridgehead 

line held, but on the second day von 

Mackcnsen indicated that his losses were 

so heavy that he could not hold out more 

than a few days longer. The next day he 

reported that gaps had appeared in the line 

and could not be closed and that by holding 

the bridgehead he was risking not having 

enough troops left to establish a front behind the rivcr. r> 

When Manstein informed the OKH that 

he intended to give up the bridgehead on 

14 October, Hitler called in the Commanding General, Army Group A. Kleist was 

worried about his north Rank, and both he 

and Hitler suspected that Manstcin was 

merely trying to slough off a mission he had 

not wanted in the first place. Hitler 

ordered Kleist to investigate- without informing NIanstcin- whcthcr Army Group 

A could take over the bridgehead. On the 

13th Kleist reported that to hold the bridgehead he would need onc or two more diVISIOns. Since the fighting on the Sixth 

G p z . AOK I , la , KTiegstagebuch NT. 12. 10- 12 

Oct 43 , Pz . AOK I 45:l93/'2 file . 

177 

Army front was imposing a heavy drain on 

the army group's reserve strength, he would, 

if he had to supply the divisions from his 

own resow ces, have to evacuate the 

Crimea." That prospect was completely 

unpalatable to Hitler; he therefore reverted 

to his habitual device of simply refusing to 

approve a withdrawal. 

XXIII Tank Corps and I Guards Ma"-

anized Corps, rested and recovered from the 

beating they had taken in September, settled the issue. In a daring tank attack on 

the night of the 13th they cut through the 

northeast corner of the bridgehead, pushed 

to the outskirts of Zaporozhye, and forced 

First Panzer Army back into a shallow arc 

around the city! The next day the army 

rear guard crossed to the west bank after 

holding around the bridges and the dam 

south of the city long enough to assure their 

being blown up.' 

Sixth Army-Breakthrough 

and Retreat 

Kleist had cause for concern over his left 

flank. After the week's respite, which it 

had used to muster a lopsided superiority of 

troops and materiel, Fourth Ukrainian 

Front on 9 October had resllmed the 

offensive against Sixth Army. Against 13 

German divisions- the total Army Group 

A strength in German units, except for 

three divisions on the Crimea-and 2 

Rumanian divisions, Tolbukhin massed 4:; 

rifle divisions, 3 lank corps, 2 guards mcch· 

anized corps, 2 guards c:avalry corps, and 

ftH. Gr. A. la, Kriegstagebuch. Band 3. Teil I. 

['2,1 :1 Oct 41, H. Gr. A 75126 / 17 lile . 

' IVOV (R ), 1lI, 346- 47 . 

"Pz. AOK I. lao Kriegstagebuch NT. 12. 3~15 

Oct 43, Pz. AOK [ 45393/2 file . 
178 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET ARTILLERY NEAR KIEv 

400 batteries of artillery. He had 800 

tanks against the Germans' 83 tanks and 

98 self-propelled assault guns. 

Tactically the Nogay Steppe, one of the 

least hospitable regions of southern USSR, 

presented all kinds of difficulties for the 

defense. The Sixth Army front spanned 

the open end of the V formed by the Dnepr 

River on the north and the Sea of Azov and 

the Black Sea on the south. The army's 

communications lines were three singletracked railroads that crossed the Dnepr at 

Nikopol, Berislav, and Kherson. The barren steppe afforded neither cover nor 

natural defenses. On the roads, the deep 

dust slowed traffic and billowed above 

moving columns, choking men and horses 

and sifting into motors. Sixth Army's 

single advantage was a fairly well-fortified 

front; because the line above Melitopol was 

naturally weak more work had been put 

into it than on the rest of the WOTAN 

position. 

The attack began on a 20-mile front 

straddling Melitopol. The artillery preparation was devastating. In an hour two 

German divisions each counted 15,000 

shell bursts in their sectors. The German 

batteries replied in kind as far as they were 

able. On both sides the artillery wasted no 

time on counterbattery fires but brought 

down its full weight on the infantry. 

Tolbukhin's objective, obviously, was to 

dislodge Sixth Army from Melitopol, the 

southern anchor of its front, and force it 

north away from the Isthmus of Perekop, 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

the entrance to the Crimea. By 12 October 

Fift y-first Army had pushed into the city 

from the south, but it took another twelve 

days of bitter street fighting to break the 

German grip. 

On 23 October Melitopol fell; this was 

the signal for the thrust by the main forces, 

which so far had been holding back. Two 

days later T wenty-eight h and Fifty-first 

Armies drove southwest and south of the 

city, splitting Sixth Army in two. South of 

the breakthrough the army had two German and two Rumanian divisions. Since 

these could hardly be expected to establish 

a line that would protect the Isthmus of 

Perekop-the Rumanians were already beginning to panic-the army decided to try 

closing the gap from the north. On the 

27th the 13th Panzer Division struck south 

into the gap, but it did not have enough 

power to go all the way. Meanwhile, the 

army moved its heavy weapons into position for another attempt several days later. 

Before that attack could be launched Fiftyfirst and T wenty-eighth Armies, on the 

30th, smashed the weak Sixth Army south 

fl ank and began swift thrusts to the Isthmus 

of Perekop and to Kherson at the mouth of 

the Dnepr. During the next two days the 

remnants of the south flank, abandoning all 

their heavy equipment and most of their 

vehicles, retreated behind the Dnepr. The 

stronger north fl an k fell back to a large 

bridgehead south of Nikopol, which Hitler 

then ordered held to protect the city and as 

a springboard for a counterattack to reopen 

the Crimea.!) 

~ AOK 6, l a, Gesamtuehersicht ueber die Abwehrkaempfe der 6, Armee in der "Wolan-Stellu11g'} 

und in der Nogaischen S teppe vom 26.9. his 3.1 I. 

43, AOK 6 38986/ . file . 

179 

The Crimea Cut 0 If 

After the middle of October Army Group 

A had grown increasingly concerned over 

the future of Seventeenth Army in the 

Crimea. On the 18th, when it appeared 

that the Russians might penetrate the Army 

Group South right flank and strike for the 

coast west of the Dnepr, Kleist had warned 

the OKH that the time had come to start 

evacuating the peninsula. The battle on 

the Sixth Army front, he reported, was 

siphoning off the strength of Seventeenth 

Army; sooner or later it would become too 

weak to defend itself. 

The next day and again five days later 

Kleist asked the Chief of Staff, OKH, to get 

a decision. Zeitzler replied that Hitler 

would not allow the word Crimea to be 

mentioned in his presence. On 26 October, 

when the Sixth Army front broke in two, 

Kleist declared that he was having to trans· 

fer another division from Seventeenth Army 

to Sixth Army, and that with one German 

and seven unreliabl e Rumanian divisions 

Seventeen th Army could not defend the 

Crimea. He added that he therefore intended to begin the withdrawal by evacuating the Kerch' Peninsula that night. Hitl er 

promptly forbade any withdrawals.'" 

Two days later Antonescu, worried about 

the effect the loss of another seven divisions 

would have in his co untry, appealed to 

Hitler to give up the Crimea. In reply 

Hitler undertook to justify his decision. His 

most substantial arguments were that the 

Soviet U nion could use the Crimea as an 

air base for attacks on the Rumanian oil 

fields and as a staging area for landings on 

the Rumanian and Bulgarian coasts and 

IO H. Cr. A. l ao Kriegstagebuch Band 3, Teil I . 

18- 26 Oc t 43. H. Gr. A 75126/ 17 file. 
180 

that it was too late to evacuate the peninsula anyway. 11 

On the night of 28 October the Commanding General, Seventeenth Army, General der Pioniere Erwin J aenecke, declaring 

that he refused to take the responsibility for 

another Stalingrad, informed Kleist that he 

proposed to execute the command to evacuate which the army group had issued on 

the 26th and Hitler had canceled. Kleist 

countered '" ith an order to hold the Crimea 

no matter how the battle went. He offered 

the explanation that Hitler had said things 

would look better in two weeks and then 

the Crimea could be reopened with fresh 

forces. J aenecke ref used to accept that 

order. Kleist then put through a personal 

phone call to J aenecke. 

Since much has been written about the 

blind obedience of the German generals, it 

may be worthwhile to recount the ensuing 

conversation as an example of what an 

attempt to disobey an order involved. 

After stating that Jaenecke's intention had 

possibly been misinterpreted and receiving 

his assurance that it had not, Kleist went 

on: 

Kleist: You are to defend the Crimea. 

Jaenecke: I cannot execute that order. 

No one else will execute it either; the corps 

commanders believe the same as I do. 

Kleist: So, collusion, conspiracy to disobey an order! If you cannot, someone else 

will command the army. 

J aenecke: I report again that in the light 

of my responsibility for the army I cannot 

execute the order. 

Kleist: As a soldier I have often had to 

struggle with myself in similar situations. 

You will not save a single man. What is to 

11 OKW, Stellvertutende Chef des Wehrma chtfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.10.-3'.J 2. 

43, '28, '29 Oct 43, IMT Doc I 79O-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

come will come one way or another. This 

attitude only undermines the confidence of 

the troops. If I get one more division [for 

you] everything will be all right. 

Jaenecke: That is building castles in the 

air. One must deal with realities here. 

Kleist: To retreat under pressure of the 

enemy is well and good; to retreat this way is 

something else. 

J aeneckc: I cannot wait until Army 

Group South has gone that far. [Jaenecke was 

referring here to the threatening breakthrough to the coast on the Army Group 

South right flank. See below.] 

Kleist: The army has not yet been 

attacked. A little reinforcement on the isthmus and everything will be in order. The 

enemy will prefer to strike west and then 

north into the fl ank of First Panzer Anny 

rather than into the Perekop narrows. 

Jaenecke: The Crimea must be defended 

on its entire perimeter. If the Russians 

attack the catastrophe is at hand. I must recall once more the example of Generalfeldmarschall Paulus at Stalingrad. 

Kleist: The details of events there are 

not known. The accounts of what happened 

vary. Do you believe that the Fuehrer will 

let himself be influenced by you? He has 

already said once that he will not allow any 

general to subject him to blackmail. If the 

Commanding General, Seventeenth Atmy. 

does not execute the order he will break every 

rule of soldierly deportment. Will )'OU ('X('· 

cute the order or not? 

When Jaenecke asked for time to consult 

his chief of staff, the exchange broke off. 

Afterward, the Chief of Staff, Army 

Group A, called the Chief of Staff and the 

Operations Officer, Seventeenth Army, and 

admonished them to give their commanding 

general "proper" advice. The question, he 

said, was purely one of obedience. If 

Jaenecke refused, a new commanding general would be sent who would be less well 

acquainted with local conditions and the 

conscquences would fall entirely on the 

troops. An hour later Jaenecke capitulated 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

and recalled his order. In relaying an 

account of the incident to Zeitzler, Kleist 

said that he did not want to court-martial 

Jaenecke but could not keep him as an 

army commander. I Z J acnecke stayed on, 

however, possibly because Zeitzler and 

Kleist, on second thought, decided it would 

be better not to bring a further example of 

a general's alleged unreliability to Hitler's 

attention. 

Probably, no amount of argument would 

have persuaded Hitler to give up the 

Crimea. As always, he expected his luck 

to change and had vague plans to recoup 

his losses. On their side, the generals, 

optimism and determination being among 

the most highly regarded virtues of their 

profession, were for the most part unwilling to proclaim a cause lost as long as a 

glimmer of hope, no matter how remote, 

remained. 

In th is instance, Hitler at the end of the 

month found support in another quarter. 

Manslcin, who was getting five fresh 

panzer divisions from Italy and the West 

to clean up the breakthrough in his own 

sector, proposed to attach them to First 

Panzer Army for a quick counterattack and 

then, as soon as the Russians were stopped, 

shift them south to the Dnepr Bend to 

attack into the flank of the thrust against 

Sixth Army. Manstein's plan was reminiscent of the Kharkov offensive earlier in the 

year, and Hitler, seeing in it not only 

a chance to keep th e Crimea open but the 

prospect of a full-scale victory as well, 

approved immediately. I:! For Manstcin, 

too, the plan must have had an extraordinary attraction, as an exercise in virtuosity 

12 H. Gr. A, la , Kriegstagebuch Band 3, Teil I. 

28, ~9 Oct 43. H . Gr. A 751'26/17 file . 

U Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 551. 

181 

and as another opportunity to demonstrate 

the tactics he had long advocated of using 

the retreat to trap and waylay the enemy. 

Konev Drives Toward Kriooi Rog 

Before Manstein could execute his plan 

he first had to stop a thrust west of the 

Dnepr that was threatening to cut ofT the 

First Panzer Army and Army Group A as 

well. Second Ukrainian Front had massed 

four armies, including Fifth Guards Tank 

Army, behind its bridgeheads below Kremenchug and at midmonth was hringing 

Fifth Guards Army down from the bridgehead above the city. On the morning of 

15 October a dozen rifle divisions attacked 

out of the larger of the bridgeheads, and 

that afternoon Konev committed Fifth 

Guards Tank Army. The next day he had 

three armies across the river.14 That night 

Manstein and von Mackensen agreed that 

the best decision would be to give up the 

Dncpr Bend and take First Panzer Army 

and Army Group A back to the Bug River 

above Nikolaev, but Manstein added that 

such a decision was hardly to be expected. 

During the next few days Konev poured 

divisions across the river and tore open the 

First Panzer Army left flank. On 18 October his troops took Pyatikhatka, thirty-five 

miles south of the Dnepr, and cut the main 

railroads to Dnepropetrovsk and Krivoi 

Rog. For a time von Mackensen thought 

the Russians had gone as far inland as they 

had planned and would henceforth concentrate on rolling up the army's front from the 

north. He decided to wait until he could 

assemble a force- two panzer divisions the 

army group was transferring from Eighth 

Army and two others ( 14th and 24th Panzer 

"/VOV(R ), til, 348. 
182 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ARMY COMMANDER REPORTS TO KONEV AND ZHUKOV on preparations for Dnepr 

crossing, September 1943. 

Divisions) coming from the West and Italy 

- for a concerted counterattack. By the 

20th he had changed his mind: the Russians were obviously ready to go for bigger 

prizes- Krivoi Rog, where they would cut 

the army's lines of communications, or 

maybe even Kherson or Nikolaev. Krivoi 

Rog had to be held. It controlled all the 

rail lines running east to the army front and 

was the site of large ammunition and supply dumps which would take weeks to 

evacuate. Von Mackensen decided to 

counterattack with the divisions coming 

from the Eighth Army and not wait for the 

others, which would be another eight to 

twelve days in transit. Hi 

l$ PZ. AOK 1 , la, Kriegstagehuch NT. 12, 15-21 

Oct 43, Pz. AOK I 45393/2 file . 

For once, though somewhat belatedly, 

the OKH could offer effective help. 

Earlier in the month the Operations 

Branch, OKW, had decided that the danger of an invasion in the West had passed 

for the time being and that the Eastern 

Front had to be reinforced even if it meant 

taking risks in other theaters. Subsequently 

the OKW had released the 14th and 24th 

Panzer Divisions. On 20 October it also 

offered the 1st and 25th Panzer Divisions, 

the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, and the 

384th Infantry Division. " The five panzer 

divisions (the Adolf Hitler Division was the 

1St SS Panzer Division ) constituted a 

HIOKW, Stellvertrttende Chef des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes, K riegstagebuch von! [ .10 .-3 ' . 12 . 

43_. 4.5 Oct 43. IMT Doc 179O--PS. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 183 

SOVIET TROOPS CROSSING THE DNEPR, 1943 

powerful mobile reserve, but the question 

was whether they would get to Russia in 

time. 

On 21 October, as the Russians pushed 

toward Krivoi Rog, von Mackensen had to 

give up his plan to counterattack with the 

divisions from Eighth Army- the 11th 

Panzer and SS Totenkopf- and had to put 

them in the line separately to do what they 

could toward braking the Russian momentum. He informed Manstein that the 

Russians, if they wanted to, could also turn 

east into the Dnepr Bend and strike in the 

rear of the army's line on the river. He 

proposed giving up the eastern half of the 

river bend and drawing back to a line 

anchored on the river and the left flank of 

Army Group A near Nikopol. Manstein 

agreed, but, after relaying the proposal to 

the OKH, called at midnight and said that 

H iller insisted on keeping the Dnepr front 

where it was. 

Two days later Eighth Guards Army 

battered its way out of a small bridgehead 

around Voyskovoye in the Third Ukrainian 

Front sector halfway between Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. At the same 

time Forty-sixth Army bore down from the 

north. Von Mackensen then barely had 

time to get his troops out of Dnepropetrovsk 

and away from the river on what was left 

of his front upstream,17 

The alarm had finally gone through, but 

would the firemen come in time to save the 

11 Pz. AOK 1 , fa KTiegslagebuch NT. l:J, 21-23 

O ct 43, AOK , 45393/' file ; IVOV(R ), III, 349. 
184 

building? On 24 October Manstein transferred XXX X Panzer Corps to Eighth 

Army on the northern flank of Konev's 

thrust toward Krivoi Rog. He ordered the 

corps to counterattack southeast across the 

Russian spearhead, using the 14th and 24th 

Panzer Divisions and the SS Totenkopf 

Division. The other three divisions being 

furnished by the OKW were still on the 

way." While XXXX Panzer Corps deployed, Kanev's lead elements, on 25 

October, entered the outskirts of Krivoi 

Rog. Starting a day early because of the 

threats to that city, XXXX Panzer Corps 

attacked on 27 October and in three days 

destroyed the better part of two mechanized 

corps and nine rifle divisions and forced 

Kanev's armor out the city and back about 

twenty miles. 

Having accomplished that much, Manstein wanted to shift XXXX Panzer Corps 

and two of its divisions to the Sixth Army 

bridgehead below Nikopol for the attack 

into the Nogay Steppe. On 2 November 

von Mackensen protested that he had 

thought the objectives were to hold Krivoi 

Rog and Nikopol. If XXXX Panzer 

Corps were transferred, he was convinced 

the Russians would start up again, take 

Krivoi Rag, and sooner or later take Nikopol as well. Manstein answered that if 

contact with the Crimea could not be reestablished the whole line of the lower 

Dnepr would have to be held and there 

were not enough troops for that. 19 

Two days later Manstein changed his 

mind. He told the OKH that his plan had 

been based on an assumption that Sixth 

Army would keep strong forces forward of 

18 AOK 8. la, Kriegstagebuch NT. 2, 24 Oct 43, 

AOK B 44701/4 file . 

111 Pz. AOK I, Kriegstagebuch NT. 12, 2 Nov 43, 

Pz. AOK I 45393/ 3 file. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

the Dnepr. As it was, he had no confidence in a XXXX Panzer Corps counterattack and proposed instead that two divisions of the corps be held as a ready reserve for the Nikopol bridgehead and the 

Krivoi Rag. 20 Before another twenty-four 

hours passed, Manstein's attention was 

completely diverted to the army group left 

flank, where another storm was breaking. 

Kie v and Ihe Crimea 

For a month Fourth Panzer Army had 

kept an uneasy balance along its front on 

both sides of Kiev. On its Ranks the Russians held two large bridgeheads, around 

the mouth of the Pripyat and below Kiev 

at Bukrin. In the first week of October 

they had taken two smaller bridgeheads, 

one at Lutczh, twelve miles north of Kiev, 

and the other around Yasnogorodka, 

twenty-five miles north of the city. 

The Slavka had first instructed Vatutin 

to take Kiev by a wide sweep west and 

north out of the Bukrin bridgehead. From 

12 to 15 and from 2 I to 23 October three 

armies had tried to break out of the bridgehead. Because the Russians lacked the 

bridging material to get the heavy artillery 

across, and because the fields of observation 

on that stretch of the river were too limited 

to permit accurate fire from the left bank, 

the attempts failed." In the meantime the 

two bridgeheads north of Kiev had been 

expanded, the one at Lutezh having been 

extended south to within easy artillery 

range of Kiev. After the second attempt to 

break out at Bukrin failed, the Stavka had 

ordered Vatutin to move Third Guards 

l!O OKH , GeuStdH, Op. Abt., Kriegstagebu ch. 

9.1°-43- 12.1.44,4 Nov 43· 

~I Platollov, Vtora),a Mirovaya VOJ'fla. 1939- 45. 

P·452 . 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 185 

KIEV CASUALTY 

Tank Army and the artillery north to the 

Lutezh bridgehead and try from there." 

On 3 November, after several days of 

intense activity behind the front, in the 

bridgehead, and east of the river, the Russians began to roll. In the wake of a massive artillery preparation, six rifle divisions 

and a tank corps, elements of Third euards 

Tank Army and Thirty-eighth Army, hit 

the center of the German line around the 

Lutezh bridgehead and broke through. At 

the same time, Sixtieth Army broke out of 

the bridgehead at Yasnogorodka. In two 

days the Fourth Panzer Army front around 

Lutezh had collapsed. During the night of 

5 November the battle swept through the 

streets of Kiev, and the next morning the 

H IVOV(R ), III, 335- 36. 

last Germans retreated south. 

Lacking reserves of any kind, Fourth 

Panzer Army was helpless. At first Hoth 

had thought Vatutin might content himself 

with Kiev, but by the 5th both he and Manstein concluded that the Russians would 

swing wide to the southwest and, if they 

could, outflank the entire Dnepr front. 

The first objective, then, would be Fastov, 

forty miles southwest of Kiev, the railroad 

junction which controlled the important 

double-track line feeding the center of the 

Army Group South front. On 6 November 

Manstein ordered the 25th Panzer Division, 

arriving from the west, to deploy to hold 

Fastov.:!3 

:1:1 Pz. AOK 4. la , Kriegstagebuch, Band 2, 1-30 

Oct, 1- 6 Nov 43, Pz. AOK 4 41631/2 file . 
186 

At Fuehrer headquarters the next day, 

Manstcin learned how much of a mistake 

had been his plan (or a counterattack in the 

Nogay Steppe. Manstein argued , as he 

had since the beginning o( the year, that th e 

Army Group South main effort had to be 

on the north flank j he wanted to shift 2 

of XXXX Panzer Corps' divisions and the 

3 panzer divisions, including the 25th, coming from the "Vcst, to the Kiev area. But 

Hitler would not be deprived o( his dream 

-a big success south o( the Dnepr Bend to 

generate fresh confidence in the troops and 

enable him to retain Nikopol and the 

Crimea. He agreed to let Manstein divert 

the 3 new panzer divisions to Fourth Panzer 

Army but insisted on leaving the XXXX 

Panzer Corps divisions with First Panzer 

Army. To make up th e difference, he 

promised the 2d Parachute Division, th e 

SS Brigade Nordland, and the 4th Panzer 

D ivision- promised before from Army 

Group Center and never delivered." That 

Ma nstcin accepted those terms aroused 

considerable irritation in the O KH. Aft er 

the conference, in a telephone conversa tion 

with Kluge at Army Group Center, the 

O KH operations chief sa id that :--lanstein 

could ha,"c had the 5 panzer divisions he 

origi nally asked for if he had not, by prematurely agreeing to take less, undercut 

Ze itzlcr, who was ready to give him unqualified support.'" 

For a time n1 anstein considered going 

ahead at once with the attack 10 reopen the 

Crimea since it appeared th at Seventeenth 

Army could not hold out the three or four 

weeks he expected th e battlc around Kiev to 

:1 Manstcin. Verlorene Siege, pp. 554ff; O KH . 

GenStdH . Op. Abt .. Kriegslogebuch, 9.1043-12.1. 

44 . 7 Nov 43· 

~ H . Gr. M itte, l a. Kriegstogebll ch. 1.-30. J 1.43. 

10 Nov 43. OCMH files 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

last- the Russians had landed on both 

sides o( Kerch' and on the south shore o( 

the Sivash near the base o( the Isthmus o( 

Perekop. An encouraging sign was a small 

successful attack the 24th Panzer Division 

had made out o( the Nikopol bridgehead 

several days before; but on 8 November 

Manstein decided that First Panzer Army 

did not have enough strength to handle th e 

breakthrough in its own front and attack 

to the south. The next day he instructed 

\"on Mackensen to plan an attack that 

would be carried out when more units became available. In the succeeding weeks, 

when the Russians showed no haste in retaking the Crimea, Manstein, amply occ upied on his own (ront, let the plan (or an 

operation south o( the Dnepr slip into abeyance. ZG 

A Lesson ;n M alleuver 

In the second week o( November, while 

the 1st and 25th Panzer Divisions and the 

Adolf Hitler Division struggled with the 

(ormidable task o( assembling and reloading their elements that had already unloaded at First Panzer Army and o( rerouting to Fourth Panzer Army troops still 

aboard trains com ing from Germany, First 

Ukrainia n Front continued its advance 

~o uthwe tw rd past Kiev against spotty 

German resistance. Fourth Panzer Arm y 

was split into three isolated parts that were 

moving away from each other as if along 

the spokes o( a whee!. Its left fl ank corps, 

LIX Corps, was being pushed northwestward toward KorQsten. The two corps in 

:.'it Pz. AOK 1. l a, KriegJtagebuch NT . 12 , 7-9 

No\' 43 . PZ. AOK I 45393/3 file; OKIV. Siellt'erIrelende Chef des W ehrmachtfuehrungulabes. 

KriegJlagebllch t'om 1.10·-31. 12·43. I , 3, 6, II 

~O\· 43. IMT Doc I 790-PS. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

the center, VII and XIII Corps, fell back 

due westward toward Zhitomir. On the 

south XXIV Panzer Corps, still holding 

part of the river line, had swung its left 

nank back to block the Russians due south 

of Kiev. On its left the Headquarters, 

XXXXVllI Panzer Corps, transferred 

from First Panzer Army, tried to bring the 

advance elements of the divisions coming 

from the south into position to establish a 

line fl anking Fastov. 

On the morning of 7 November, when 

the Commanding General, 25th Panzer 

Division, moved up with as much of hi ~ 

di\'ision as he could muster to execute his 

assigned mission of defending Fastov, he 

discovered that Third Guards Tank Army's 

mobile units had arrived there before him. 

For the next three days, in wet snow and 

rain, the di\'jsion, not trained for fighting 

on the Eastern Front and lacking much of 

its equipment, tried futil ely to retake the 

town. 

In the meantime, the Russian adyance 

past Fastoy to the wcst gathered momentum. Manstein decided he had better leave 

Fastov :ilone and relic\'c the pressure on 

V II and XIII Corps. On 12 November 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps committed its 

three divisions, all of them still lacking vital 

components, in an attack northwestward 

from the vicinity of Fastov into the [car of 

Thirty-eighth Army's spearhead, then pushing into Zhitomir ninety miles west of Kic\·. 

The attack made little progress. In the 

north Sixtieth Army was forcing LIX 

Corps back rapidly toward Korosten and 

threatening to snap its contact with the 

Army Group Center right flank. 

As had happened before, the Russians 

themseh·es afforded Fourth Pamer Armv 

its best chance for recovery. Vatutin han 

187 

split his effort and was attempting to go in 

two directions, southwest and \vest. Manstein decided to concentrate first on Zhitomir and then turn cast behind Fasto,·. 

Bcginning on 14 November XXXXVI II 

Panzer Corps tried again, the veteran 7th 

Panzer Didsion from XXIV Panzer Corps 

taking the place of th e 25th Panzer Divi-

,ion. This time it had bctter luck. After 

the first day the Russians, touchy about 

their flanks and rear, began to hesitate and 

slow down. Even so, it appeared that the 

counterattack had come too late to save 

LIX Corps. The corps, fighting alonc, was 

nearly surrounded in Korosten and had to 

be supplied by airdrops. The commander 

wantcd to pull back farther west while he 

still could, but on 16 Kovember Hitler 

ordered Korosten held at all costs. 

On 19 Nm·ember Xill Corps and 

XXXXVIII Pa nzer Corps recaptured 

Zhitomir, and the next day the Adolf Hitler 

Division turned cast, reaching Brusilov, 

north and slightly west of Fastov, on the 

23d, but b,· then se,·cral days of rain had 

turned the roads to mud. In the north LIX 

Corps, after being pushed out of Korosten 

in spite of Hitler's order, was able at the last 

minute to take advantage of the Russians' 

growing uncertainty and retake the town on 

the 24th. Thc next day Manstein called a 

temporary halt because of the weather.:!' 

"He Who Holds His Positions a 

Alil1ute Longer . .. . n 

The last two weeks of Nm·ember ,ealed 

the fate of the Dnepr line. What time was 

left could be credited partly to the lessons in 

concentration and maneU\'er IVIanstein had 

21 Pz. AOK 4 , la , Kriegstagebuch, Band 2. 7- '25 

Nov 43, Pz. AOK 41631 / 2 file . 
188 

given Vatutin east of Zhitomir; however, 

the main rcason was that Vatu tin, wailing 

for more settled weather, held back a 

stronger punch. Had the two panzer divisions Hitler insisted on keeping on the army 

group right Aank been at hand, Fourth 

Panzer Army might have been able to deal 

the three Soviet armies a fullAedged defeat." As it was, Hoth and Manstein decided late in the month that it was useless 

even to talk about getting back to the 

Dnepr at Kiev." 

While Fourth Panzer Army was occupied west of Kiev the situation in the rest of 

the Army Group South zone had continued 

to deteriorate relentlessly. Alter gaining 

small bridgeheads on both sides of Cherkassyon 13 November, Second Ukrainian 

Front had quickly expanded the one on the 

north until it threatened to engulf the city 

and tear open the Eighth Army front.'" 

North and east of Krivoi Rog and against 

the Nikopol bridgehead, which First Panzer 

Army had taken over from Sixth Army, the 

Russians kept up constant pressure. On 20 

November Generaloberst Hans Hube, who 

had replaced von Mackensen in command 

of First Panzer Army, reported to the army 

group that his infantry strength had sunk 

to the lowest tolerable level. The front 

could not be completely manned, and on 

days of heavy fighting casualties were running at the rate of one battalion per division 

under attack. ''''ithout an extraordinary 

supply of replacements by air he did not 

believe further defense of the Dnepr line 

was possible. 3 1 

• Of the three substitute divisions Hitl er had 

promised, only the 2d Parachute Division arrived, 

and that at the cnd of November. 

2t Pz. AOK 4. la , Kriegstagebuch, Band 2 , 28 

Nov 43, Pz. AOK 4 4163 1/'2 file. 

"., AOK 8, la, Kriegstagebuch NT. 2 , Band 5 , 

13-20 Nov 43, AOK 844701/5 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

That same day, Manstein, looking 

ahead, advised the OKH that besides their 

reserves-an estimated 44 riAe divisions 

and an unknown but large number of tank 

brigades set up in 1943-the Russians had 

33 rifle divisions and I I tank and mechanized corps resting behind the front. With 

these they would be able to mount a fullscale winter offensive, and Army Group 

South, completely tied down at the front, 

would be tactically at their mercy. The 

army group, he wrotc, needed "sufficient 

and powerful reserves" which, if they could 

not be sent from other theaters, would have 

to be acquired by shortening the southern 

flank of the Eastern Front and taking 

Seventeenth Army out of the Crimea." 

Glum as Manstein's analysis was, it was 

more optimistic as far as the near future 

was concerned than those of his army commands. Eighth Army had gaps in its front 

around the Cherkassy bridgehead and north 

of Krivoi Rog. On 24 November the Chief 

of Staff, Eighth Army, asked whether " large 

operational decisions" (a general withdrawal ) could be expected when freezing 

weather set in,33 Manstein could only reply with the lame aphorism: "He who 

holds his positions a minute longer will have 

won," 3-1 Two days later Hube warnecllhal 

the decision to give up the Nikopol bridgehead and the Dnepr Bend would have to 

come soon or the army would have to get 

substantial replacements. The next day, 

the 27th, he told Manstein the army had 

exhausted all its means of self-help and 

31 Pz. AOK I, la, Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 12, 20 

Nov 43, Pz . AOK I 45393/3 file. 

U Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 558ff. 

S:I AOK 8, l a, Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 2 , Band 5 , 

24 Nov 43 , AOK 8 44701 /5 file. 

!H AOK 8, la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 2, Band 5, 

24 N ov 43, AOK 44701 /5 file. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

needed to know how much longer it would 

have to hold the Nikopol bridgehead. The 

Russians were filling up their units with 

men from the recently reoccupied territory; 

as soldiers they did not amount to much, 

but their number alone was creating an 

ammunition shortage on the German side. 

Manstein replied that he agreed but could 

not get Hitler to change his earlier orders. 35 

At the end of November Hitler wanted to 

take units away from Fourth Panzer Army 

and First Panzer Army to strengthen the 

front around Cherkassy, but Manstein insisted that if the Russians broke loose again 

on either the army group's north or its south 

flank, holding Cherkassy would be a waste 

of time anyway. 36 

In the first week of December the 

weather turned cold, and in a few days the 

roads had frozen solid enough for the 

panzer divisions to move again. Manstein 

ordered XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to shift 

north of Zhitomir, push east to the line 

Radomyshl' -Malin, and then turn northeast into the flank of Sixtieth Army operating against LIX Corps at Korosten." 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps began attacking north of Zhitomir on 6 December. For 

two days the corps made good progress 

against gradually stiffening resistance; but 

by the loth the resistance had become 

strong ; and Hath, taking no chances, told 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to restore contact between XIII Corps and LIX Corps 

as its first order of business after taking 

Radomyshl'. On the 19th XXXXVIII 

Panzer Corps was ready to execute the sec-

~ Pz. AOK I J la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 12, 26, 

'27 Nov 43, Pz. AOK I 45393 / 3 file. 

38 OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Kriegstagebu ch 

9.10 .-12.1.44 , 29 Nov 43· 

S7 Pz. AOK 4. la, Kriegstagebu ch, Band 3, 3 

Dec 43, Pz. AOK 4 41631/3 file. 

189 

ond part of its original mission, the turn into 

the flank of Sixtieth Army. But in the next 

three days the panzer corps made almost no 

gain; it was meeting forces massed for another advance toward Zhitomir. On 21 

December Fourth Panzer Army ordered it 

to go over to the defensive,3s 

In the Eighth Army and First Panzer 

Army zones through November and during 

the first three weeks of December the Russians were content to fight a battle of attrition, which they could afford but the Germans could not. The two armies managed to keep their fronts fairly stable until 

the second week of the month, when the 

northwest side of the line around the 

bridgehead above Krivoi Rag gave way. 

Before a new front could be established 

Second Ukrainian Front had cleared the 

Dnepr north to Cherkassy. After midmonth all Army Group South held of the 

original WOTAN position was a 50-mile 

stretch of the Dnepr between Kiev and 

Cherkassy. 

The Dnepr Bridgehead, 

Army Group Center 

In the Army Group Center zone the 

most prominent feature of the PAN THER 

position was the bridgehead located east of 

the Dnepr from Loyev on the south to east 

of Orsha and 190 miles long and 30 to 40 

miles deep. (Map 17 ) The PANTHER 

protected a great switch position on the line 

N evel-Vitebsk-Orsha-the Dnepr. At the 

end of September the army group began 

building up that line, which was potentially 

stronger than the PANTHER position itself 

but which was also the last natural defense 

:I!I Pz. AOK 3, la, Kriegstagebuch , Band 3, 3-

21 Dec 43, Pz. AOK 41631/3 file. 
.. K 

~ xxxx 

~, ~OURTHl ,\ ~-.J 

MA P 17 

\ 

\ 

THIRTE ENTH 

\ 

\ 

THE DNEPR BRIDGEHEAD I OCTober -26 Oecemb er 1'3 4 3 

•••••••••• Dupu. UTIO H ~O-UOEC 

"""""'1"!'I"I"m' ~O l LI Nf • n 0[( 

10 10 ' 0 ti 

i ! i II , 

I" 00 . 0 " I.O " UlO. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

line of any consequence forward of the 

Polish border. 

Although Army Group Center had 

sharply declined in strength during the 

summer through transfers and losses, it was 

still stronger than either o( its neighbors. 

Its total complement on I October was 42 

infantry divisions, 8 panzer and panzer 

grenadier divisions, and 4 Air Force field 

divisions. Of those 1 '2 infantry and 4 

panzer divisions were kampfgruppcn, aclUally no morc than rcgimcnts.:'l'I Opposite 

the army group stood (our Soviet fronl.!. 

none of them showing any marked decline 

in offensive capability. OfT th e south flank 

o( the army grou p the Stauka. in the first 

week of October, combined the zones of the 

Uryo1lsk and Central Fronts under Rokos-

~o vskiy's headquarters, which was rcdc-

!-ignalcd lJeiOTltSsian F1'O llL 

Rokosso,'skiy J-Jolds Ihe Prill)'fll 

Uridgehead 

Even though it cou ld hc afcly a~~lImcd 

that the Slavka would keep its main efTort 

against Army Group South ( best evidence 

\\ as the combining of the UrY(l71sk and Central Frollts under a single command, si nce 

the Russians never undertook anything really ambitious with one froll! in so broad a 

~c(· tor , Army Group Cen ter was con< erned 

o\'er its south nank. Second Army was 

wcak, it had its bark to the Pripyat 

Marshes, and it was ndnerahle on hOlh 

f1anb. In th" Ilorth it had to hold a hridgehead cast I)f the Sozh RinT to protect the 

\'aluahle railhead at Comci, and in the 

."outh the Ru:"sians had driven a wedge betwecn it and the left flank of Army Group 

191 

South along the lower reaches o( the Pripyat River. 

At the end o( September Kluge had directed ''''eiss to shift three panzer divisions 

to his right Oank and join Fourth Panzer 

Army in a counterattack to wipe out thc 

bridgehead and restorc contact betwecn 

the two groups on the Dnepr. But the 

Russians brought reinforcements across the 

Dllcpr from the east faster than the German 

panzer divisions could assemble and mancuver on the marshy west bank, and for 

the first few days the Germans were forced 

to the defensive and in some places lost 

ground. When Second Army finally got 

i~s tanks into motion on 3 October, the Russians n>untered with punishing air strikes. 

On 4 October units of Fourth Panzer Army 

took Chernobyl, but in two more days' 

fighting the Second Army force made 110 

headway. 

On thc 6th ''''ciss reported that to go on 

was useless. He proposed to take his front 

back La a shorter lint, liSt' the troops gained 

thereby to throw a screening-line artlllnd the 

western edge of the bridgehead, a nd so 

restore contact with Army Group South. 

Kluge approved, and on I I October Second Arm)1 put a division across the Pripyat 

where it made contact with Fourth Pan zer 

Army northwest of ehernob}'!' First Ukra initl1/ Front remained in undisputed ("ontrol 

of a bridgehead rlftc.:CIl miles (ltep and 

thirty mil es wide. 111 

Gomel-Rel chilsfl 

On the SC{"()I1d Ann) left nank /Jclono-

~itllI Frolll held two hridg'l'hcads \\l'st of tilt" 

." II. (~', . Atitle. [ a. Kril!~ t{/ gl!blldl. f .'{o.(}-4.', . 

. !lI '\0 St·p 4 '\. I 3f /0 .. 1:1. I liOn 4 '\. {)C~I II 

lill's : S # 1'- 1141 , ( 11 "flllann ). Tr/l VI . pp. 17-

• \fS # P I qh ( lI "flllanli 1. T nt 1'1 . p_ I) :w 
192 

Sozh flanking Gomel, one ten miles north 

of the city across the river from Vetka on 

the boundary with Ninth Army, and the 

other fifteen miles south of the city. In 

the first week of October it expanded the 

one on the south, thereby threatening 

Gomel and Second Army's own bridgehead 

east of the river. On 9 October Kluge 

reported that an orderly evacuation of the 

Second Army bridgehead was already in 

doubt. Hitler agreed to give up the bridgehead "if there is a danger of the troops 

being destroyed." The next day, as the 

troops came out they were shifted south of 

the city where their presence was promptly 

effective, and the Russians advance slowed 

down.oIl 

By that time more trouble was brewing 

farther south. While Second Army was 

occupied on its flanks, Rokossovskiy had 

built a strong concentration south of Loyev, 

just bclow the confluence of the Dnepr and 

the Sozh. There a thrust across the DneF 

toward Reehitsa could outflank both the 

PANTHER position and the Dncpr switch 

position and confront Second Army with 

the unhappy task of trying to create a front 

in the partisan-infested woods and swamps 

west of the Dnepr. 

On 15 October the attack began on 20-

mile-wide front south of Loye\". It gained 

ground fast, partly because Kluge, still 

morc worried about keeping contact with 

Army Group South, hesitated for two days 

before letting one of the panzer di\'i ion s 

be taken off the Second Army right flank. 

By the 20th the Russians had carved out a 

bridgehead sixty miles wide and len miles 

deep on both sides of the Dnepr. Then, for 

two days. they attempted to thrust north-

.1 H. Gr. Mitte . la, Kriegstagebu ch. 1.~3f.10-43. 

9, 10 Oct 43, OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

east toward Retchitsa on the railroad west 

of Gomel. 

On 22 October Kluge called Zeitzler to 

ask for replacements. Second Army, he said, 

was exhausted and could not stand up 

against the continuing attack. The army 

group could give no guarantees with respect 

to future developments, and unless help 

were given it might become necessary to 

pull the whole front back." On the same 

day, having failed to achieve a breakout, 

Rokossovskiy stopped his offensive in the 

Loyev bridgehead. 

In the last week of the month Rokossovskiy shifted his attack to the Ninth Army's 

flanks, denting the PANTHER position in 

several places and posing a threat of multi pIe breakthroughs. On 27 October Kl uge 

and Model discussed taking Ninth Army 

and Second Army back to the Dnepr below 

Mogilev. The next day Rokossovskiy 

added to their concern by resuming the offensive in the Loyev bridgehead; but at the 

end of the month, satisfied for the time 

being with local gains, he called another 

halt. 

The end of October saw a change of the 

Army Group Center command. On 28 

October, Kluge, who had commanded the 

army group since December 194 I , was 

severely in jured in an automobile accident. 

and to replace him Hitler the next day 

appointed Generalfeldmarschall Ernst 

Busch. As Commanding General, Sixteenth Army, Busch had been on the Eastcrn Front sin ce the start of the campaign. 

He was a highly regarded army commander, but most of his experience had 

been gained on a static front. He had not 

had a chance really to prove himself as a 

tactician; consequently, in his rclations with 

42 Ibid ., 22 Oct 43. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

Hitler he was more compliant than some 

of the other commanding generals and 

tended to welcome the Fuehrer's guidance. 

In the first week of November Vatutin's 

offensive at Kiev renewed Army Group 

Center's concern for its south flank. When 

the offensive started, Busch told Weiss to 

use the two panzer divisions he still had in 

that area (two had been shifted to the 

Loyev bridgehead ) to hold Chernobyl and, 

if necessary, stretch Second Army's flank 

south to keep contact with Fourth Panzer 

Army. By 7 November the Russians were 

moving so fast that Busch became alarmed 

and asked for permission to take his flank 

back from Chernobyl, but Hitler, who was 

never willing to give wayan the flanks of 

a breakthrough, refused. 

On the loth Rokossovskiy tried for the 

third time to break out of the Loyev bridgehead. The German line held the first day 

but broke on the second. At the same time, 

the right flank army of First Ukrainian 

Front began pushing north forty miles west 

of Chernobyl into the undefended Second 

Army flank. On 12 November Weiss asked 

permission to take troops off his south flank 

to meet the greater danger in the center, 

but the OKH again ordered him to hold 

Chernobyl. The next day, when Belorussian Front's thrust carried to west of Rctchitsa, he proposed giving up Gamel and 

taking the army north flank back to the 

Dnepr to gain troops. This Hitler forbade . 

By the t 4th Rokossovskiy had spearheads 

turning east toward the Dnepr from northwest of Retchitsa. 

After the gap in the Second Army center 

had opened to eight miles, Hitler told 

Model to supply one division and Weiss 

another for a counterattack to close it. Adding a third division, onc of the two panzer 

divisions from his south flank, Weiss opened 

193 

the counterattack on 18 November, but 

when the divisions failed to make headway 

in two days, the attack had to be canceled. 

Vatutin's forces in the meantime had taken 

Chernobyl and Rokossovskiy's had turned 

west behind Retchitsa toward Kalinkovichi, 

the railroad junction controlling all of the 

Second Army supply lines. 

On 20 November Weiss shifted two of 

the divisions that had taken part in the 

counterattack west, to screen Kalinkovichi, 

and transferred control of his sector north 

of the Bercsina and cast of the Dnepr, including Gamel, to Ninth Army. Thereafter 

Second Army's paramount concern was to 

establish a defensible front forward of the 

Pripyat Marshes. As almost always happened in such situations, the first problem 

was to get an agreement on tactics. Weiss, 

Busch, and Zeitzler wanted to seck a balance by maneuver. Hitler, on the other 

hand, stood by his old formula of holding 

the remnants of the orig inal front as "corner posts" and counterattacking to patch 

the gaps. On the night of the Igth he 

commanded Weiss to keep the part of his 

front that had not been broken through 

where it was until further orders. That 

left the army in the peculiar, though by 

then no longer unu:\ual, position of having 

its main force tied down forty miles forward 

of the cruc ial zone of the battlc. 

The next morning, with Busch's permission, \Veiss ca lled Zeitzler. Soviet tanks 

and cavalry with strong infantry support, 

he reported, were within nineteen rniles of 

Kalinkovichi. If they took the taWil , the 

army would be out of motor fuel in two 

days and out of ammunition in four. Actually, he added, the same effect could be 

accomplished simply by cutting the two 

railroad,. That could be done by the 

{'avalry alone, which in the wooded and 
194 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

PANJE WAGON IN THE PRJPYAT MARSHES 

swampy terrain was far more maneuverable 

than the defending German armor. Even 

if the two panzer divisions managed to stop 

the advance on Kalinkovichi, it would only 

be a matter of time until the Russians, 

bypassing the town to the north, forced 

them to extend until the whole line was 

hopelessly weakened. Therefore, the entire 

front had to be taken back, and the decision 

had to come soon because if the withdrawal 

was executed in haste most of the heavy 

vehicles would be left stuck in the swamps. 

Zeitzler replied that he had tried the night 

before to talk Hitler into giving Second 

Army freedom of movement and failed. He 

would try again but at the moment could 

promise nothing. Shortly before midnight 

the OKH operations chief called the Army 

Group Center headquarters to report that 

Hitler had again refused to permit any withdrawal."'J 

The next day the Russians tore through 

Second Army north of Udalevka and 

started a sweep to the southwest that 

threatened to envelop the army's right 

flank. On the afternoon of 22 November 

Hitler finally accepted the inevitable and 

allowed Weiss to take his front back- but 

no farther than a line he had plotted in 

U MS # 114b (Hofmann ). Teil VI, pp. 26- 34, 

Anhang 7. 
THE BATTLE FOR THE DNEPR LINE 

detail, running east of Kalinkovichi and 

the railroad north of the town. The army 

diary noted that had the order been given 

a week earl ier it could have been executed 

smoothly and would have prevented sizabl e 

losses. That night Weiss reported to army 

grou p that th e line Hitler had laid out 

would be difficult "to reach, occupy, or 

hold ." ft traversed a swampy forest with 

thi ck undergrowth, an old and established 

partisan hau nt. He asked for freedom 

within the limits of his miss ion to establish a front cast of the Pripyat M:arshcsto operate with out reference to a spec ific 

line. 

In the me antime R o kossovski y had 

readied an unpleasant surprise. Early on 

22 November, after a quick regrouping 

undetected by the Germans, he launched a 

thrust into th e Ninth Army center south of 

Propoysk. [t dealt Ninth Army a sudden, 

staggering blow. The next day he pushed 

a strong spearhead into the gap between 

the Second and Ninth Armies south of 

the Bcrcsin a and ( ut the railroad that ran 

north frorn Kalinkovichi . 

The Ninth Army front around Gome! 

had by then become a great, sagging, t:1 (-

li all~ ' useless bulge. As a railhead the city 

had lost its value len days before when thl' 

Russians ( uL the railroad wcst of Retchitsa. 

On 23 November Hitler allowed ;\10del to 

begin taking out troops, but he hesitated 

anot her twenty-four hours before signing 

the evacuation order because he was worried 

about th e "ccho" the loss of Gamel would 

create. II Reluctant as he was to give 

ground under any circumstances, he had 

lately become even more reluctant when the 

loss of territor), also involved th e loss of a 

H II. Gr. Mitte, /(1, Krie.~$ lagebll h, '.-.1 1.1'43. 

'24 Nov 43, OCMH fil es. 

195 

cit)' large enough to be noticed in the world 

press and set ofT a celebration in Moscow. 

Nikolaus 

On 25 November Busch ordered Ninth 

Army to seal ofT the bridgehead at Propoysk and th e Ninth and Second Armies to 

co unterattack into the gap between their 

f1ank ~, close it, and regain control of the 

railroad. The first order could not be 

executed for lack of troops. The Russians 

had already torn open a 50-mile stretch of 

the PA NTI·n:R position and gone twent y 

miles west. The most Ninth Army could 

do was try to exert a slight braking action. 

The armies intended to execute the second 

order on 30 November, but in the next few 

days th e Russians advanced to the northwest so rapidl y and in such strength that 

neither army could spare troops for the 

eounterattaek. The OKH promised the 

t 6th Panzer Division from Ital y, and) since 

that one division would not be enough, 

Busc h proposed taking the Ninth Arm)' 

center back to the Dnepr to gain two marc 

divisions. Hitler resisted until the 30th. B)' 

then Rokossovskiy's troops were on the 

Dnepr west of Propoysk and had smashed 

the last remnants of the PA NTHER position 

farther south. 

At the end of th e month Second Army 

had set up a new front east of Kali nkovichi, 

albeit some miles west of the line Hitler had 

demanded. During the night of 'I December Ni nth Arm)' compl eted its withdrawal. 

Having improved their positions somewhat, 

the armies could prepare th e counterattack to dose the ga p. On 6 December 

they issued the orders for the coun terattack, 

code-named NIKOLA US , and, allowing timl' 

for th e t 6 th Panzer Division to arrive, set 

16 December as the starting dale. After 
196 

the 8th heavy attacks on the north flank of 

Second Army tied down all that army's 

reserves; and on the I1lth a flareup in the 

angle of the Bcresina and the Dnepr forced 

Ninth Army to ask for a delay to 20 December. 

That the counterattack began on time 

on the 20th was itself something of a surprise; and its initial success surpassed all 

expectations. On the second day the Ninth 

Army and Second Army spearheads met at 

Kobyl'shchina . The army group ordered 

the divisions to regroup fast and turn east 

to clear the railroad. Until then neither 

the army group nor the army commands 

had expected to do more than close the 

gap, and they had not been very confident 

of accomplishing that. 

On the 22d the attack continued, gaining ground to the east against stiffening 

resistance as the Russians poured in troops 

from the flanks. In three more days the 

Germans reached the railroad in the north, 

but in the south were stalled by a strong 

line on the I pa River. On the 26th, Busch, 

worried about his north flank, took out the 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

I6th Panzer Division for transfer to Third 

Panzer Army and told Model and Weiss to 

stop the counterattack and find a favorable 

defense line. 

After nearly three months the Ninth and 

Second Armies once morc held a continuous front. They had eluded a succession 

of dangerous thrusts, often just in the nick 

of time. The price was high. Half of 

the Dnepr bridgehead was lost and with 

it a loa-mile stretch of the river. In the 

south a 60-mile gap yawned between the 

flanks of Army Groups Center and South:" 

Nevertheless, the distinguishing aspect of 

the Belorussian Fronl's three-months' fall 

campaign was its drab pointlessness. It had 

operational, even strategic, possibilities, but 

the indications are that the Stavka could 

not have exploited these and, in fact, had 

not wanted to do so. The battles, expensive 

to both sides, were fought only because the 

Soviet Union, having the initiative, fcared 

either to lose it or to be trapped into a 

stalemate. 4 !; 

'5 MS # P_ I 14b (Hofmann ), l'eil VI , pp. 35- 45 . 

'8 See IVOV (R), III, 37 1- 82. 
CHAPTER X 

The Rising Tide 

Breakthrough at Ne vel 

Army Group North 

In the summer of '943 the Army Group 

North zone, by comparison with the other 

army group zones, was quiet. In a battle 

that flared up toward the end of July 

around Mga, L eningrad Front's performance fell far below that of the commands 

operating against Army Groups Center and 

South. The front-line strengths of the opposing forces in the Army Group North 

zone were almost equal. The army group 

had 7' 0 ,000 men. Leningrad, V olkhov, 

Northwest, and Kalinin Fronts, the latter 

straddling the Army Group North-Army 

Group Center boundary, had 734,000 men. 

For the future, however, Army Group 

North also had to reckon with some half a 

million rcscrves echeloned in dcpth behind 

the northern fr onts. In artillery the two 

sides were about equal, but again the Russians were known to have substantial reserves. In mid-July Army Group North 

had 49 tanks, 40 fit for combat. The Russians had 209 tanks at the front and an 

estimated 843 in reserve. By, 5 September 

Army Group North had 7 tanks still serviceable.' Tn the last six months of ' 943, First 

Air Force, which was responsible for air 

lOKH , GenStdH, Org. Abt., NT. 11 05/43, 

Krae/tegegenueberstellung, Stand 20.7.43. H I/Y27 

file. 

operations in the army group zone, flew 

just half as many sorties as its Russian oppon ents.:! 

During August air reconnaissance detected increasing enemy activity ofT both 

Army Group North flanks. A rise in the 

number of boals making the short but extremely hazardous trip in th e Gulf of Finland between Leningrad and the Oranienbaum pocket indicated that the Russians 

might soon attempt to break out and unite 

the pocket with the front around Lcningrad. In the south Kalinin Front. under 

Yeremenko, bega n a build-up opposite the 

Army Group North- Army Group Centcr 

boundary. T o meet those and other possible threats, the army group created a rcady 

reserve by drawing fi ve infantry divisions 

out of the front. In the first and second 

weeks of September the OKH ordered two 

of the reserve divisions transferred to Army 

Group South. 

On 19 September, in conjunction with 

the Army Group Center withdrawal to the 

PANTHER position, Army Group North 

took ovcr XXXX I II Corps, the northernmost corps of Army Group Center. That 

transfer brought the army grou p three divisions, forty-eight morc miles of front , and 

responsibility for defending two important 

~ MS # P 114a. Der Feldzug gegen die S owjetulIion illl Nordabschnitt der O stfrOTll (Generalielltnant rl . D. Friedrich Sixt), Dritter Teil . Anhang C 19. 
198 

BREAKTHROUGH AT NEVEL 6 OC l ober 1943-18 Jonuory 19 44 

Gu .. u r~OIIf ., .......... ,., .. 

.. . '0 10 ... .o .... u , ,II I , " I' " , 

.. . 

t 

\ 

i 

\ 

/ 

IOOUI 

r---, 

SIXTEENTH 

'----' 

KIOOt 

r:LTH~~ _--1 

MAP 18 

railroad and road centers, Nevel and Novosokol'niki. (Map 18 ) By late September no 

one doubted that the Russians were preparing for an offensive in the vicinity of the 

North-Center boundary. That area of 

forests, lakes, and swamps, and of poor 

roads even by Russians standards, heavily 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SIKTH 

GUAROS 

infested by strong partisan bands, had long 

been one of the weakest links in the Eastern Front. During the 1941 winter offensive the Russians had there carved out the 

giant T oropets salient, and in the '942-43 

winter campaign they had encircled and 

captured Velikiye Luki and nearly taken 
THE RISING TIDE 

Novosokol'niki. Compared with the losses 

elsewhere, parti cularly after Stalingrad, 

these were mere pinpricks; but there always 

was a chance that the Stavka might one day 

try the big solution, a thrust between the 

flanks of the two army groups to the Gulf 

of Riga. 

S UY prise-Re percussions-PaT tisans 

At the end of September and during the 

first few days of October the Germans lost 

track of K alinin Fronfs troop movements. 

Bad weather prevf'nted aerial reconnaissance, and the Russians first changed their 

radio traffic patterns and then maintained 

radio silence. 

Early on 6 October four riAe divisions 

and two tank brigades of Third Shock 

Army attacked the od Air Force Field Division, the left flank division of Third Panzer 

Army, and ripped through. Probably 

somewhat startled by their success, for the 

2d Air Force Field Division had not merely 

given way but had fallen apart lInder the 

first assault, the Russians hastily loaded a 

guards infantry division on trucks and tanks 

and dispatched it northwestward behind 

the Army Group North flank toward Nevel. 

Before the Germans could form a clear 

picture of what had happened at the front 

the Russians were in Nevel. The surprised 

garrison, after putting up scattered resistance, retreated out of the town early in the 

afternoon. 

The Germans' first impression was that 

they had fumbled badly but not irrevocably. 

Kuechler ordered the three Arm,' Group 

N()rth reserve divisions into the breakthrough area; and Hitler, reverting to his 

sove rei gn remedy for such calamities, 

ordered the "corner posts" held at all costs. 

Late on the 6th a regiment of one of the 

199 

reserve divisions arrived north of Nevel, 

and Kuechler told the whole division to 

counterattack the next day. 

The next two days brought a rash of 

troubles. The division that was to counterattack could not bring its artillery up on 

time and had to wait another twenty-four 

hours. When it did get going on the 8th, it 

ran into a superior force attacking out of 

Nevel and was thrown back. At the end 

of the day the gap between the flanks of the 

army groups had opened to fifteen miles. 

Meanwhile, the partisans had so thoroughly disrupted the railroads that the other 

two reserve divisions had to be routed to 

Pskov, 130 miles north of Nevel, and there 

loaded in trucks, not enough of which were 

available. On 9 October Kuechler decided 

to wait until the reinforcements were assembled before trying again to close the 

gap.' 

Besides creating tactical difficulties, the 

loss of Nevel brought down on Army 

Groups North and Center verbal thunderbolts from Fuehrer headqua rters. In 

Fuehrer Order 10 Hitler condescendingly 

pointed out that the Russians had a habit 

of trying to break through at the unit boundarie~ and that such breakthroughs always 

took excessively long to clean up because 

each of the affected units attempted to 

saddle the other with most of the responsibility. He "demanded" that the armies 

and army groups "consider it a point of 

honor" to maintain contact with each 

other.'" 

Not satisfied with that indirect rebuke, 

he demanded explanations for the breakthrough and the loss of Nevel. Kluge replied that under heavy artillery and rocket 

3 Ibid .. pp. 4'25-30. 

• H. Cr. Nord. la. Kriegstagebuch , 1.- 31.10-43. 

7 Oct 43, H. Cr. Nord 751'28/27 file . 
200 

fire for the first time, the 2d Air Force 

Field Division had lost its nerve, and the 

tank attack had thrown it into a panic. 

"Vhat was needed, in Kluge's opinion, was 

awareness that the armies in the USSR 

were increasingly being forced to operate 

with troops who could not or would not 

withstand a determined attack. Army 

Group Center, he added, had recently recci\'cd replacement battalions, one-third 

composed of V olksdeuische (racial Germans from outside the original territory of 

the Reich) who said openly that they did 

not intend to fight for Germany.' The 

Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army, when he 

was asked why a well-fortified town like 

Nevel was lost so quickly, replied, "What 

good are the best positions when you have 

no troops to hold them?" (j 

On 10 October Hitler took another tack 

in giving vent to his annoyance. Army 

Group Center had asked to merge the 

remnants of the 2d Air Force Ficld Division with an Army division. Hitler refused, 

stating that he did not want to water down 

good Air Force troops with bad Army 

troops.1 

To the army group commands Fuehrer 

Order 10 was offensive, particularly because it implied that the generals had to be 

instructed on one of the oldest and by then 

best known Russians tactical tricks. During the past year, in nearly every instance, 

the initial blows of Soviet offensives had 

come at unit boundaries. Possessing a vast 

and active intelligence network of partisans 

and agents, the Russians never had trouble 

G H. Gr. Mitte , la , Kriegstagebuch, 1-.11.10.43. 

7 Oct 43, OCMH files. 

e H . Gr. Nord, la, Kriegstagebucl,. , 1.-31.10.43, 

6 OCl 43, H. Gr. Nord 75128h27 file. 

r H. Gr. Mitte , la, Kriegstagebuch, 1.-3' ./0 .43 . 

10 Oct 43, OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

locating the boundaries. From the point 

of view of the German commands, that such 

a crude and unimaginative tactical device 

often proved frustratingly effective was irksome enough. Nor could they find comfort in the knowledge that the reason why 

was to be found in the condition of the 

German forces, not in the Russians' skill. 

With the front undermanned and stretched 

taut in all sectors, it was almost inevitable 

that when an attack hit a boundary the 

units involved would wait to see which way 

the main effort would go, with each perhaps hoping its sector would be the least 

aflected. Even when both were willing to 

act they usually had trouble making forces 

available at the same time, and almost 

always the first concern of each was not to 

close up but to prevent further damage in 

its own sector. In short, much as they 

might resent Hitler's reminding them of 

"points of honor," the army groups, armies, 

and lesser commands, burdened by defeats, 

lack of reserves, and chronic shortages of 

equipment and personnel replacements, had 

in fact fallen prey to the philosophy of 

every man for himself. 

But in warfare combatants can occasionally have more good luck than convenient 

to handle, and apparently something of that 

sort befell Kalinin Front in the attack on 

Nevel. For a highly skilled, flexible leadership such an occurrence could be a pleasant 

challenge; for a Soviet front command, 

even in late 1943, it raised many distressing 

uncertainties. On 9 October, the day 

Kuechler postponed his counterattack, Yercmenko suddenly reined in on the offensive. During the several days' pause that 

followed, Army Groups North and Center 

threw a line arollnd the western limits of 

the breakthrough and each moved in a 
THE RISING TIDE 201 

A GERMA"'i SOLDIER SURPENDER~ 

corps headquarters to command in the 

battle area. To take further advantage of 

the respite the two army groups planned a 

counterattack by three divisions, two from 

Army Group North and onc from Center, 

timed for midmonth; but at the last minute, on J 4 October, Hitler forbade it because he believed the force was not strong 

enough. 

On the J 5th the Russians became active 

again. However, their main effort was on 

the northeastern rim of the breakthroughwhich indicated that Y cremcnko, not yet 

ready to resume the offensive, was suffering a seizure of the old Russian malady, 

flank sensitivity. Army Group North had 

in the meantime become worried by the 

signs of a build-up east of Novosokol'niki 

and the possibility of another breakthrough 

there. When Army Group Center, on the 

Igth, proposed a joint effort to close the 

gap, Kuechler declared that he could not 

make troops available because of the danger 

at Novosokol'niki. Convinced that Yeremcnko would soon be able to resume the 

offensive in earnest, Army Group Center 

wanted to go ahead alone, but, for the 

second lime, Hitler intervened to cancel 

the army group plans. After 26 October, 

when Army Group Center was forced to 

transfer to Ninth Army the panzer division 

it had been holding in reserve for a counterattack, neither army group was able to 

mount an offensive around Nevel.s 

8MS # P-114a (Sixt), Teil Ill, pp. 430-34 ; 

MS # P-114b (Hofmann ), Teil V I , pp. 88-93. 
202 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

A MOUNTED COSSACK 

At the end of the month the Russians 

still had the initiative and showed they intended to exploit it soon. Since the middle 

of the month rail traffic through Toropets 

and Velikiye Luki from the cast had been 

growing steadily. A sure sign of something 

big in the making was the appearance of the 

former Headquarters, Bryansk Front, which 

as Headquarters, Second Baltic Front, 

Popov commanding, took over the northern 

half of Kalinin Front (renamed First Baltic 

Front ). In the Nevel bulge Fourth Shock 

Army moved in on the left of Third Shock 

Army. 

In the light of those ominous portents, it 

was high time the Germans did something 

at least to reduce the partisan menace at 

their backs. The area due west of Nevel 

was probably the most thoroughly partisan 

infested on the whole Eastern Front. In a 

2,000-square-mile rectangle of forests and 

swamps Army Group North had identified 

nineteen partisan brigades totaling some 

25,000 men. At the approximate center 

of the rectangle, in the Rossono Rayon 

(fifty miles west of Nevel), the partisans 

had completely re-established Soviet rule, 

wefe operating collective farms, and even 

had occasional mail service to and from the 

unoccupied Soviet territory. To the north, 

west, and south partisans were scattered 

behind the fronts of Army Groups North 

and Center, some as roving bands and 

others in stationary concentrations like that 

around Rossano. 

In the past neither army group had been 
THE RISING TIDE 

able to mount a thoroughgoing anti partisan 

campaign; and by the fall of '943 there 

was no chance at all of their being able to 

do so. In October the larger part of Army 

Group North's anti partisan force, twelve 

battalions of Osttruppen (former Russian 

prisoners of war, mostly Cossacks, who had 

volunteered to fight on the German side) 

were transferred to Germany and France 

at Kuechler's request. They had become 

unreliable, and whole units were deserting 

to the partisans with their weapons and 

equipment. On 14 October Hitler ordered 

SS-Obergruppenfuehrer (Lt. Gen.) Erich 

von clem Bach-Zelewski, who was responsible for anti partisan warfare in the area of 

Belorussia under civil administration, to 

stage an operation against the Rossano partisans. During the next two weeks von 

clem Bach moved in nineteen mixed battalions of poljce, Latvian volunteers, and 

security troops, and on I November he 

launched Operation HEINRICH, employing 

two approximately division-sized units in a 

converging attack toward Rossano from 

the north and south.' 

Attack and Counterattack 

In an early morning fog on 2 November 

the Third and Fourth Shock Armies penetrated the Third Panzer Army left flank 

sou thwest of Nevel. They had paved the 

way during the five previous days with 

heavy attacks that drove a deep dent in the 

Third Panzer Army line. After the breake H . Gr. Nord, la , Kriegstagebuch, 1.-31. 10 .43. 

19 Oct 43, H. Cr. Nord 75128127 file. H . Cr. 

Mille . l a, Kriegsta gebuch, 1.-31.10-43, 14.10.43. 

OCMH files; H. Gr. Nord. 10 Nr. 13000/44, Der 

Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion der Heeresgruppe 

Nord, Kriegsjahr 1943, ~4.12-44 , H. Cr. Nord 

75884/ 1 file. 

203 

through, which opened a lo-mile-wide gap, 

Third Shock Army turned north behind 

Sixteenth Army's flank, and Fourth Shock 

Army turned southwest behind Third 

Panzer Army. 

Army Group Center shifted a panzer 

division north from Ninth Army. With 

that division it was able to strengthen the 

Third Panzer Army flank below the breakthrough and deflect Fourth Shock Army 

southwestward away from the panzer 

army's rear. Army Group North was less 

fortunate. Third Shock Army's more aggressive mode of operating indicated that it 

had been assigned the main effort in the 

renewed offensive. Kuechler transferred 

six infantry battalions from Eighteenth 

Army, and with these Sixteenth Army managed to bend its right flank around to the 

northwest. Both the army group and army 

expected the Russians to continue pressing 

around that flank . 

On 4 November Hitler called Kuechler 

and Busch to Fuehrer headquarters. After 

characterizing the October Nevel battle as 

a Schweinerei (filthy mess) and blaming 

the subsequent failure to recoup the loss on 

the chief of staff of Army Group North's 

right flank corps, an officer whom he described as a defeatist to whom everything 

was impossible, Hitler declared that he intended to eliminate the new gap at once. 

Busch, whose headquarters had already 

proposed a joint counterattack by the two 

army grou ps, agreed. Kuechler objected. 

He did not want to risk a counterattack 

while his flank was exposed, and, as he 

revealed indirectly, he did not fully share 

Hitler's and Busch's feeling of urgency 

about the army groups' flanks. He was 

more worried by the signs of a build-up for 

an attempt to liberate Leningrad, and he 
204 

warned Hitler that since the temperature 

there had been well below freezing for the 

past several days, that offensive could come 

at any time. For those reasons Kuechler 

was reluctant to weaken the north by taking 

out troops for the flank. To try to gain 

troops by shortening the front, he maintained, would be particularly dangerous 

since it might set ofT a chain reaction. 

Brushing aside Kuechler's doubts, Hitler at 

the close of the conference ordered the two 

army groups to be ready on 8 November 

to counterattack from the north and south, 

close the gap, and cut off the two shock 

armics. 10 

At the end of the first week in November 

the Germans were still holding fast on the 

Oanks of the breakthrough, but Fourth 

Shock Army had sent parts of two divis.ions probing as far west as Drctun, thirty 

miles behind the Third Panzer Army flank. 

T o place at least token limits on the Russians' westward advance, the Germans 

stopped Operation HEINRICH before it was 

completed and turned von clem Bach's 

antipartisan units east to form a screening 

line behind the armv groups' flanks. 

Kuechler ordered four infantry divisions, 

two from Eighteenth Army and two from 

Sixteenth Army, to his right Rank, but they 

had to be taken out of static positions and, 

in somc instan ccs, moved sC\'c ral hundred 

milcs by truck and rail, which took time. 

On 7 November Third Slwck Arm)' ga ined 

more ground behind Army Group North. 

Yeremenko was pouring troops of the Sixth 

and Eleventh Guards Armies through the 

gap and by a process of rapid erosion carving 

out a pocket, elongated on its north-south 

IO ff. Gr. Nord . l a. Kriegstagebuch, 1.-30. 1'-43. 

4 ~ov 43, H . Gr. Nord 75128/28 fil e; H. Gr. 

M ille. l ao Kriegstagebucll. 1.-30. 11.43. 4 Nov 43 . 

OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

axis, behind both army groups. He appeared 

still to be concentrating on the northern 

rim of the pocket. So far he had not shown 

much interest in directing his weight west, 

which was fortunate for the Germans since 

the army group commands had obsen·ed 

that the SS generals were conducting operations in their sector "in broad impressionistic strokes." 

On 8 November two Third Panzer Army 

divisions, one infantry and one panzer, 

attacked north into the breakthrough area. 

Before the end of th e day they gained nearly fi,·e miles. Army Group North was 

scheduled to attack from its side on the 

morning of the gth, but Kuechler protested 

that all of his units were tied down. Army 

Group Center accused Army Group North 

of refusing to attack simply "because it did 

not want to." Hitler, apparently irked by 

Kuechler's lukewarmness at the conference 

four days earlier, refused to "accept any 

further excuses" and ordered Army Group 

North Has a matter of honor" to begin the 

counterattack in its sector no later than 10 

Novembcr. ll The next day, while the 

Army Group Center force waited for Army 

Group North to make the next move. 

Kuechler hastily assembled a scratch forc(, 

of seven battalions. \ Vhcn these units at· 

tacked as ordered on the loth, they ran 

into heavy artillery fire and then were 

thrown back to their line of departure by a 

counterattark. 

Meanwhile, the Russians had continued 

on the move behind the flanks of the armv 

groups, extending the pocket to a length of 

fiftY' miles. In the south they were at the 

level of Polotsk and Gorodok, and in th e 

north! south of Pustoshka , less than ten 

11 H. Gr. Nord. la , Kriegstagebuch. 1.-30.11.4.1. 

8 ~O\" 43, H. Cr. Nord 75 128/28 file. 
THE RISING TIDE 

miles from the railroad running west out of 

Novosokol'niki. Once again, this time with 

greater strength than before, they began 

turning east behind the right flank corps 

of Army Group North. 

For a week Hitler and Kuechler debated 

the next move. Hitler demanded a counterattack and instructed Kuechler to strip 

Eighteenth Army if he had to. Kuechler 

insisted on getting rid of the threat to his 

fl ank first. Finally, on 18 November, after 

a trip to Fuehrer headquarters, Kuechler 

secured an order giving the army group th e 

missions of first eliminating the bulge behind its flank and then mounting an attack 

into the gap south of Nevel. The next day 

Kuechler transferred another division from 

Eighteenth Army. On 2 I November, the 

weight of nearly the whole Eleventh Guards 

Army forced Army Group Center to take 

its two divisions which had advanced into 

the gap back to their line of departure. 

H ow greatly that reduced the chances of 

closing the fron t was demonstrated by the 

increase in the number of Soviet units moving into the pocket; but Hitler insisted that 

Army Group North go ahead with both of 

its assigned missions. 

After mid-November, following several 

weeks of below-freezing weather, th e temperature began to rise, an un usual phenomenon for that time of the yea r in northern 

Russia and a disastrous one for the German plans. Since the temperature hovered 

just above freezing, the grou nd began to 

thaw. At the beginning of the last week in 

the month the roads were stretches of mud 

two feet deep. Su pplies could onl y be 

moved to the front on tracked vehicles, and 

in some places Army Group North had to 

resort to airdrops. 

The counterattack, set for 24 November, 

could not begin until I December, and 

205 

then in rain and mud. The weather ruled 

out air support entirely. On the first day 

the two divisions, attacking due west across 

the northern quarter of the pocket, gained 

less than three miles before they were 

stopped. The self-propelled assault guns 

coming up behind stalled on the bank of a 

small river and stayed bogged down there 

for the next five days. On the 6th Kuechler reported that he inten ded to go ahead. 

He had another division coming from 

Eighteenth Army, and he believed the 

weather was g iving the Russians trouble 

with their supplies; but Hitler, who was 

intent on closing the Nevel gap, refused to 

allow any morc divisions to be committed 

on the west. On 8 December he called 

Kuechler to Fuehrer headquarters and 

ordered him to launch an attack into the 

gap before the end of the month. 

Vitebsk 

The warm weather had also imposed a 

drag on the Russians' movements. In the 

third week of November Fourth Shock 

Army. which until then had been working 

its way south and west without giving any 

clear indication of its actual objective, hau 

tu rned cast behind Third Panzer Army 

toward Gorodok and Vitebsk. By 23 November it had pushed to within three miles 

of Gorodok, th e road and rail center controlling the communications lines to the 

Third Panzer Army north fl ank, and had 

tank and cavalry spearheads standing ten 

mil es northwest of Vitebsk. That confronted Third Panzer Army with a choice 

of either pulling back its flank, in which 

case it would be able to defend Vitebsk 

handily, or running the risks of having the 

flank smashed and losing Vitebsk as well. 

The Commanding General, Third Panzer 
206 

Army, Reinhardt, urged taking back the 

flank, but Busch refused, citing two of 

Hitler's favorite tactical princip1cs which, 

valid as they were under the proper circumstances, had lately produced more than 

onc disaster or ncar-disaster: shorlening 

the front freed more Soviet than German 

troops, and Rank insensitivity on the German side reduced the force of Soviet offensives. During the thaw FOllrth Shock 

Army failed to carry its advance any farther 

toward Gorodok and was forced to draw 

back slightly northwest of Vitebsk. 

After Army Group North's attempt to 

pinch ofT the north end of the bulge failed, 

the Russians had a free hand, in fact their 

opportunities exceeded their resources. 

They had paved the way for a deep, possibly evcn strategic, thrust to the west 

between Army Groups North and Center. 

but with its main forces committed in the 

south and a winter campaign in the offing 

the Stm ,ka was not inclined to attempt anything of that magnitude. Large as they 

were, its reserves were not inexhaustible; 

during the fall the Stavka had frequently 

thrown green conscripts from the recently 

reoccupied territories into the assault wave!' 

to spare trained troops. On the south, Vitcbsk aITorded a lesser but tactically u~cful 

and propagandistically valuable prospect. 

Aside from being an important road and 

rail center, Vitebsk, togcther with Orsha, 

guarded the 50-mile-wide land bridge between the Dvina and the Dnepr, the historic gateway to the Russian heartland. 

Between October and the first week of December West Front had tried four times to 

take Orsha and had been beaten ofT in 

furious baltles bv Fourth Army. 

On '3 December Eleventh Guards Army 

attacked the nort hern tip of the Thinl 

Panzer Army flank from the northeast. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

northwest, and southwest. Tn two days it 

cut in deeply and was clearly on tile way 

toward forming two encirclements and 

trapping a German division in each. A 

request to take his front back brought 

Reinhardt a blunt refusal from Busch and 

a further admonition from the OKH that 

Hitler wanted the flank held under all circumstances because he was determined to 

close the gap from the north. In another 

day Reinhardt's northernmost division was 

encircled and the division southwest of it 

cut off from the road and railroad. Reinhardt then had no choice but to order the 

encircled division to break out, which it did 

on 16 December at a cost of 2,000 of its 

7,000 troops, and all of its artiller)" heavy 

weapons, and vehicles. 

On the ,6th Hitler at last conceded that 

to close the Nevel gap was no longer possible. But, as always, reluctant to permit 

any changes in the front, he told the army 

groups to deny the enemy any further successes. Between '7 and 23 Decem ber Rein -

hardt, harassed all the way by reminders 

from Hitler that withdrawals were not permitted except under overwhelming pressure, took his army's flank back to a irregular arc twenty miles nonh of Vitebsk. 

The still unanswered question was what 

the Russian~ would do ncxt. On the 

chance that they might turn west, Reinhardt strengthened his line on thl' west, 

and the OKH transferred two division!' 

from Army Group North to the Army 

Group Center left flank cast of Polotsk. On 

23 December Yeremenko gave the answer. 

Fourth Shock. Eleventh Gllards, Thirt yni71th. and Forty-third Armies attacked 

around the Vitebsk perimeter. r n the fir.>t 

two days they pushed the German line 

back several miles. Northwest and southeast of the (,ity tanb and infant!'\' dron.' 
THE RISING TIDE 

deep wedges into the Third Panzer Army 

front, cutting the Vitebsk-Polotsk rail line 

and threatening the Vitebsk-Orsha line. T o 

prevent an encirclement Army Group Center moved in the two divisions recently received from Army Group North and on the 

28th transferred a division each from the 

Ninth and Second Armies. Thereafter the 

front held even though Yeremenko kept 

punching away with rigid determination 

for another six weeks. 

After Third Panzer Army retreated to 

the Vitebsk perimeter, the flank of Army 

Group North projecting toward Nevel became a useless appendage. Late on the 

night of 27 December Hitler decided to let 

Kuechler straighten his line and so gain 

enough troops to strengthen the west face 

of the Nevel bulge, which was still manned 

only by miscellaneous SS and security 

troops. After 29 December Sixteenth 

Army in six days drew back to an almost 

straight line south of Novosokol'niki." 

At the situation conference on the night 

of 27 December, Hitler blamed the Nevel 

breakthrough and the subsequent German 

setbacks entirely on the " petty egoism" of 

the two army group commanders.ll Although in so doing he conveniently overlooked occasions when he had intervened 

to stop projected counteroperations, his 

criticism had merit. Both army groups 

had been reluctant to do more than they 

conceived to be their fair share. Army 

Group North, in particular, had been unwilling to weaken its otherwise quiet front. 

Kuechler eventually did transfer six divisions to the breakthrough area- but too 

11 MS # P- 114a (Sixt), Tl!il 1/1, pp. 435- 65; 

MS # P-1 14b (Hofmann), Teil VI, pp. 94-119. 

nStenogr. Dienst im F.H .Qu., Besprechung d es 

FUl!hrtrs mit Generaloberst ZeitzleT. 27.17-43. 

OCMH files. 

207 

late for them to affect the outcome. On the 

other hand, as became fully evident later, 

Army Group North , weakened by the defensive battles around Leningrad and Nevel 

and by transfers to the other army groups, 

was in fact rapidly drifting into dangerous 

straits. 

Looking at the Nevel battles in retrospect, Hitler was somewhat encouraged. 

H e saw in the Stavka's failure to grasp the 

strategic opportunity a sign of weakness. 

It proved, he said, coining an inaccurate 

simile, that the Russians were not like "the 

giants of Antiqu ity who gained strength 

every time they fell down." 14 Going on, 

he reiterated his old theory th at the Soviet 

Union was approaching the limit of its 

strength and, therefore, a little more determination on the German side would be 

enough to turn the tables. The point he 

missed, of course, was that the Soviet weakness, as far as it existed, was psychological 

rather than actual, that the Stavka had not 

intended to reach for a strategic objective, 

but in the Nevel breakthrough and its companion piece, the fall offensive against the 

Army Group Center south fl ank, had 

adopted elaborate, strenuous, and probabl~ 

in the long run superfluous, means of reassuring itself and preserving an initiative 

that it stood in no great danger of losing. 

The German Allies 

The winter battles of 1942-43 had ended 

Germany's prospects- never very great- of 

profiting militarily from the coalition of 

small nations that had joined in the war 

against the Soviet Union. At the same 

time, the governments of those countries 

had discovered that they stood in grave 

It Ibid. 
208 

danger of riding the German coattails 

straight into the jaws of di.aster. In September t943, when Italy dropped out of 

the war, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania 

would gladly have followed had they been 

able. Only Bulgaria, until then a noncombatant, was struck by a sudden , apparently irrational, fit of martial spirit a nd 

offered the Germans a corps for employment in the Southeastern Theater. The 

puppet government of Slovakia, on the 

other hand, had decided several months 

earlier that henceforth its two divisions 

were not to be employed by the Germans 

without approval of the Slovak Minister 

of War." 

Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain, 

no ally but an old if unreliable friend , dealt 

a particularly rude blow, which was the 

morc painful because it was militarily not 

very Rignificant and so could be taken as a 

gratuitous commentary on the German 

condition. He recalled the '50th Blue 

Division, which, as Spain's one tangible 

contribution to the Axis calise, had fought 

well on the Eastern Front, mostly in the 

vicinity of Leningrad. Later, to soothe the 

German feelings, he relented to the extent 

of allowing a thousand-man replacement 

battalion recently sent to the division to 

stay as a " Spanish Legion.'!}!: 

H,mgary-0IJeralion M argarelhe 

In the fall the Operations StafT, OKW, 

worked on the problem of dealing with 

Hungary and Rumania if either or both 

should attempt to defect. Hungary, which 

In OKW, Stelluertretende Chef del Wehrma ch tjuehrllngutabu, K rieg$tagebuch vom 1.10.- 31.12. 

43. 25 Sept and 7 Nov 43, IMT D oc 1790- PS . 

. 1 H . Gr. Nord . In , K rieg$tage buch, '.-3' .10.43. 

5- 18 Oct 43 , H . Gr. Nord 75128127 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

III the past months had dissociated itself 

almost entirely from the Axis war effort. 

appeared the mostly likely candidate; and at 

the end of September the Operations Staff 

completed a preliminary plan for Operation MARGARETHE. the military oct'upat ion of Hungary. In November the 

transfer to the Eastern Front of the divisions allocated for MARGARETHE and 

intelligence reports that the Rumanians and 

Hungarians had secretly ironed out their 

difTerences and might try to desert the Axis 

in conjunction with an American-British 

invasion of the Balkans, complicated the 

problem. After reviewing its plans, the 

Operations StafT concluded that by midDecember it would again have enough 

forces to occupy Hungary but not Ruma nia 

as weIl. n 

F;nland- Fttehrer D;recl;ve 50 

Most worrisome was the question of Finland. A resort to force there, as was contemplated in the cases of Hungary and Rumania, was impo~!' ible. On the other hand. 

although the Finns for a yea r and a half 

had limited themselves to a passive defense. 

they could not simply be written ofT as 

excess baggage. The Finnish Army tied 

down an estimated t 80,000 Soviet tro ~ 

and, more important, protected the southern flank of Twentieth MOllntain Army 

and iLC) rearward lines through the Finnish 

Baltic ports. Finland's quitting the war 

would deal a serious, if not fatal. blow to 

Twentieth Mountain Army and , possibl y. 

to the entire German position in the Balti c 

and Scandinavian areas. The one potent 

trump left in the German han d was the 

l~ OKW. Slell vertretende Chef del Wehrmachlfuehrun gutabe$, Krieg$tagebuch vom 1.'0.-3 ' .'2. 

43,7 :"J"ov 43, IMT Doc 1790- PS. 
THE RISING TIDE 

Finns' longstanding (ear of the Soviet 

Union . 

During the spring and early summer o( 

1943 Hitler had taken some tentative steps 

toward shoring up the northern bastion of 

his Fortress Europe. On his orders Army 

Group North had drafted a plan (or the 

capture of Leningrad, which would have 

established overland contact between Germany and Finland and would have given 

the Finns security in their most vulnerable 

area, the Isthmus o( Karelia. Army o( 

Norway at that time had devised a defense 

plan for Norway which envisioned a possible occupation o( Sweden. Between 

March and mid-July the OKW, under 

Hitler's constant prodding, had moved the 

equivalent of three infantry divisions to 

Norway and had converted the 25th Panzer 

Division, which would have been the main 

striking force in an attack on Sweden, into 

a strong armored force- by Scandinavian 

standards though not, as was later demonstrated, by the standards o( the Eastern 

Front. 

Had ZITAOELLE succeeded, Hitler would 

very likely havc set about tightening his 

p;rip on northern Europe. When ZITADELLE failed, the reverberations spread 

north like a shock wave. The ambitious defense plan (or Norway had to be dismantled 

and the reserves recalled to the Continent. 

Swcden, long leaning away (rom the benevolent neutrality forced on it early in the 

war, abrogated the transit agreements that 

had put the Swedish railroads at German 

disposal for movement of most kinds of 

'su pplies and military equipment to Nonvay. 

In July Finland had "unoHicially" rcceived an oral offer to discuss peace 

through the Soviet lep;ation in Stockholm." 

18 Mannerheim, ETinnerungen, pp. 497-98. 

209 

The next month three members o( the 

Finnish Parliament had delivered to Ryti, 

the President, a petition signed by thirtythree prominent men and calling on him to 

take steps toward restoring good relations 

with the United States and toward getting 

Finland out of the war.19 When the contents o( the petition were published in a 

Swedish newspaper they touched off a 

press and public discussion in Finland 

which heavily (avored a separate peace. 

In that disturbed atmosphere Army 

Group North, in August, began work on 

the PANTHER position along the Narva 

River-Lake Peipus line 125 miles southwest 

o( Leningrad. When, after the end o( the 

month, it appeared that the army group 

might have to be taken back to the 

PANTHER position to release troops (or the 

south, Twentieth Mountain Army replied 

to an OKW request for an opinion that 

Army Group North should not be pulled 

back under any circumstances. The Finns, 

the army memorandum stated, already (elt 

betrayed because the capture of Leningrad 

had been repeatedly promised and never 

carried out, even in times when, in their 

opinion, it had been possible. If Army 

Group North went back to the PANT HER 

position the Finnish Aunus and Maaselkii 

Fronts would project into Soviet territory 

like spearheads and would have to be pulled 

back under circumstances which made establishment of a tenable line to the rear 

highly doubtful. Morc than likely, the 

army predicted, a government oriented toward the Soviet Union would be brought 

to power. If the Soviet Union then offered 

anywhere ncar bearable peace terms Fin19 Auswaertiges Amt. NT. Pol. VI 1091. an das 

Oberkommalldo der Wehrmacht , 30.8-43, OKW/ 

f o~o file. 
210 

land would leave the war, and Twentieth 

Mountain Army would have to leave Finland, an undertaking which in winter, over 

the roads of northern Finland and Norway, 

would be exceedingly hazardous. ,. A week 

later the Finnish Government warned, 

both through the German Minister in Helsinki and its own Minister in Berlin, that a 

withdrawal south and west of Leningrad 

would have the most serious consequences 

for Finland. 21 

On 28 September, in Fuehrer Directive 

50, Hitler told Twentieth Mountain Army 

to prepare for the worst. The Army 

Group North front was "completely stabilized," he said, and the danger point on the 

Army North-Army Group Center boundary 

(Nevel ) was being reinforced, but for insurance the army group was fortifying the 

Narva River-Lake Peipus line. If Army 

Group North was forced to retreat to the 

PANTHER position, and as a result, """ inland 

left the war, Twentieth Mountain Army's 

mission would be to swing its two right 

flank corps back to a line across northern 

Finland south of Ivalo and defend the 

Pechenga nickel-mining region as long as 

might be necessary. When the time came, 

the army would be given two additional 

divisions from Army of Norway. Construction and supply stockpiling were to 

begin in secret immediately. zz 

In the second week of October, after 

the breakthrough at Nevel, the Finnish 

command er in chief, Mannerheim, requested clearance to begin building a line 

:JD (Ceb.) AOK 20. l a Nr. 12/43. an OKW. 

WFSt, z. Hd . Gen. d . Art. Jodi, 14.943. AOK 20 

43871/ 10 file. 

:1 Auswaertiges Amt, Pol. VI 9259. an das Oberkommalldo der Wehrmacht, 22.943, OKW/1040 

file . 

22 OKW WFSt. Op. Nr. 662375/ 43. Weisung 

Nr. 50 , 28.9.43. AOK 2043871 / 10 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

behind Twemieth Mountain Army for the 

event of a German withdrawal. That 

signal mark of failing confidence led the 

German representative at Finnish Army 

headquarters to ask the OKW to send a 

top-level representative to Finland immediately." On 14 October JodI flew to Helsinki and in two days of conferences with 

Mannerheim and the Finnish Minister of 

Defense gave them a picture of the war as 

the OKW professed to sec it. The Italian 

surrender, he explained, was not important 

because Ital y had never constituted an 

element of strength in the alliance. As far 

as an invasion of France was concerned, 

Germany would welcome it as an opportunity to deal Great Britain and the United 

States a resounding defeat, put an end to 

the second-front idea, and free troops for 

Ihe Eastern Front. At Leningrad, he admitted, th e balance was precarious, and a 

withdrawal on th e northern flank had been 

considered ; but, out of regard for Finland, 

Germany had abstain ed from taking that 

course. Germany, he let it be known, was 

aware of the Finnish efforts to get out of 

the war and took the attitude that no nation 

could ask another to risk destruction for its 

sake ; but) he pointed out, Finland's future 

in the clutches of Stalin would not be 

bright." 

To add bite to what J odI had to sa\", Hitler 

sent along a letter to the Finnish President 

which was an indirect but pointed reminder 

that Finland was economically and militarily dependent on Germany. He also 

took Ryti lOtask over the lack of discipline 

in Finnish internal policy and for the Fin-

~ OKW, Stellvertretellde Chef des Wehrmacht-

/uehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebu ch uom 1.10.- 31. 12 . 

43.15 Oct 43, IMT Doc 1 790- PS. 

:. Mannerheim, Erinllerungen. pp. 498- 99. 
THE RISING TIDE 

nish press's hostility toward Germany." A 

week later the Finnish Minister of Defense, 

in an interview with Generaloberst Eduard 

Dietl, the Commanding General, Twentieth Mountain Army, promised the "truest 

brotherhood in arms" and declared that the 

newspaper talk of a separate peace was 

groundless. Jodi, he said, had explained 

everything "openly and completely."" At 

the end of the month R yti replied to Hitler 

in a letter which, while it contained no 

specific commitments, was taken to be positive in tonc. 21 

As the year drew to a close, a measure 

of stability appeared to have been restored 

between Germany and Finland, and Hitler 

ordered that Fuehrer Directive 50 be held 

in abeyance for the time being. The balance was delicate, however. In late October Mannerheim renewed his request to 

layout a defense line behind the German 

front, and in November Finland resumed 

its contact with the Soviet Union." On 20 

November Kuechler proposed taking Sixteenth Army to the PANTHER position and 

using the divisions released to clean up the 

Nevel breakthrough." Hitler thought then 

that work on the PANTHER position had not 

progressed far enough, but a month later, 

when he needed troops for Army Group 

:III Gerda-Luise Dietl and Kurt Herrmann, Central Dietl (Munich, 1951 ), p. 261. 

:N (Geb.) AOK 20, la, Aktennotiz ueber die 

Besprechung mit dem finnishschen Verteidigungsminister, General der Infanterie Walden, 25.10-43, 

AOK 2043871/5 file . r! OKW. Stellvtlrtretende Chef des Wehrmacht-

/uehrungHtabes, K riegstagebuch vom 1.10.-3' .12. 

43,20 Nov 43, JMT Doc 1790-PS. 

28 Ibid" 25 Oct, 16 Dec 43: Mannerheim. Erin· 

nt!rungt!n, p. 500. 

N OKW. Stdlvertrdt!nde Chef des Wehrma cht· 

fut!hrungsstabt!s, Kriegstagebuch vom 1.10.-13.12. 

43, 20 Nov 43. 1 MT Doc I 79O-PS. 

211 

South, he returned to the idea. 30 At the 

turn of the year, the OKW had drafted a 

letter to Mannerheim telling him that Army 

Group North would have to go back, but 

Keitel then decided to hold the letter while 

Hitler mulled over the decision. 3t 

Leadership, Manpower, Strategy 

Command Changes 

Since 1939 Hitler had been fighting the 

war with a body of higher officers whom he 

mistrusted collectively and, for the most 

part, disliked individually. As victory 

drifted beyond his grasp, he convinced himself that the generals and the General Staff 

corps were at the root of his trouble. More 

and more he longed to rid himself of those 

cold-eyed technicians and surround himself 

instead with men like his old party stalwarts who, uncontaminated by intellectual 

doubts and unhampered by scruples, got 

things done by hook or by crook. 

In November 1943, after a disastrous 

year, he returned to the idea he had outlined 10 his Army personnel chief, 

Schmundt, in October 1942, of overhauling 

the higher command echelons of the Army. 

Declaring that many senior generals would 

soon have to be relieved "because of illness 

or for other reasons," he instructed 

Schmundt to work up a list of junior generals and staff officers who would form a 

reservoir of potential army commanders. 

The aim was for every commanding general 

of an army to have a successor ready and, 

80 Stenogr. Dienst im F. H. Qu., Fragment Nr. 

II, Besprechung mit Gen. Obust Zt!itzler vom 

29.12-43, OCMH files. 

31 OKW. Stellvertretende Chef des Wehrma ch tfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebu ch, vo-m 1.10 .-3 1.12. 

43, 31 Dec 43, IMT Doc 1790- PS. 
212 

as it were, waiting in the wings. The generals selected for advancement, Hitler specified, were to be those "who exude confidence" and WiiO "have positive inner 

convictions favoring the National Socialist 

WeltallschauulIg."" In the long run, that 

order would, in large part, be negated by 

the homogeneity of the German officer 

corps; however, it was useful to Hitler in 

that it lent an appearance of logic to his 

dismissal of officers in whom he had lost 

confidence but whom the Army and the 

public still held in high esteem. 

The first of the generals to go was the 

Commanding General, Fourth Panzer 

Army, Hoth. In the past year Hoth's army 

had played a crucial part in most of Army 

Group South's battles. When given the 

chance, Hoth had proved his mastery of the 

mobile defense, but Hitler did not want 

mobility on the defensive, he wanted generals who would hold without giving an 

inch. In November Hoth was scheduled 

for a long leave "to unwind"; in December, 

after the Russian breakthrough at Kiev, 

Hitler ordered that he was not to return to 

his army or be given any other command. 33 

Speaking to Zeitzler and JodI later in the 

month, Hitler described Hoth as "a bird of 

ill-omen" and "an instigator of defeatism of 

the worst sort." 3. 

At the same time as Hoth, Model was 

also given an extended leave, with the expectation that when he returned it would 

be to replace Manstein in command of 

Army Group South." Of all the generals, 

U Taetigkei!sbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts, II Nov 43, H 4/12 file. 

:I., Ibid. , 10 Dec 43. 

3' Stenogr. Dienst im F.H. Qu" Fragment Nr. 10, 

Besprechu.ng mit Gen . Oberst Jodi "nd Gen. Oberst 

Zeitzlu am 28.12-43, OCMH files. 

:\(; Taetigkeihbericht des Chefs des Heeresper-

$onalamts,4 Nov 43, H 4/ 12 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Manstein, who in the past year had several 

times suggested that it was high time he be 

given a chance to try to extricate Germany 

from its military quagmire, was probably 

the one Hitler could stomach least. Only 

Manstein's tremendous reputation and undeniable skill as a tactician had saved him 

thus far. 

The most important command shift in 

the second half of 1943 was the appointment in September of General der Flieger 

Guenther Korten as Chief of Staff, OKL. 

While the Air Force generals were somewhat farther removed from Hitler's scrutiny 

than their Army counterparts, when the 

time came to find a scapegoat the consequences were often more severe for the 

officer concerned because of Hitler's desire 

- not to mention Goering's- to protect 

Goering as Commander in Chief, OKL, 

and as Hitler's heir apparent. 

From February 1939 to August 1943 

Jcschonnek had been Chief of Staff, OKL. 

While Goering indulged his sybaritic inclinations and dabbled in a variety of interests 

outside the Air Force, Jeschonnek had developed the doctrine of close air support for 

the Army. Successful at first, that doctrine 

lost most of its effectiveness when the Army 

was forced to the defensive, and its last 

application, during ZITADELLE, was a complete failure. Concurrently, the fighter defense of Germany had been neglected; as a 

result, the Air Force's response to the big 

Allied bombing raids during the summer of 

1943 was dismayingly feeble. The failure 

was in large measure Jeschonnek's responsibility, but Jeschonnek could, and in an 

August 1943 memorandum to Hitler did, 

cite numerous mistakes Goering had made. 

After that, in a stormy telephone conversation Hitler told Jcschonnek that he was 
THE RISING TIDE 

being held completely responsible for the 

failure of the Air Force and concluded with, 

"You know what is left for you to do now." 

Jesehonnek shot himself. 

Korlen was a believer in strategic bombing. He was also associated with the body 

of opinion in the Air Force that favored 

fighter defense. For the armies in the East, 

Karlen's appointment was no gain. J n 

September he took six fighter squadrons off 

the Eastern Front to strengthen the Reich 

defenses; and in November, when bad 

weather began to hamper fl ying, he started 

withdrawing bombers and crews from close 

lIpporl Cor retraining in strategic bombing. 

He predicted that by careful target selection 

50 to 80 percent of Soviet tank and aircraft 

production could be climinated.:

w He 

promised Hitler 400 bombers for lon -ran ,~e 

missions by mid-February 1944, but the 

demands for troop support and air supply 

delayed the start of retraining until latc 

March. By then many of the targets were 

beyond the reach of most of the German 

bombers.:!' The net impact on the Eastern 

Front was a loss of six fighter squadrons, 

which were never replaced, and a substantial weakening of the close support bomber 

strength. 

ManlJower 

If Hitler's personnel troubles had been 

confined to the upper command echelons he 

could still have considered himself fortunate. By the fall of 1943 the manpower 

squeeze, which at midyear had been tem-

:III Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet No. 248, 

Hise and Fall of the German Air Force. pp. 236-

4°· 

~7 OKW. WFSt. K .T .B. Ausarbeitung, Cstfront. 

Zuluehnwg von Verbaenden luer den Osten , 1.1 .-

3 1.3.44, p. 16, OKW/ 1929 file. 

213 

porarily mitigated, was on again more 

strongly than ever. On 1 September, for 

the first time in the war, the Army strength 

on the Eastern Front (not including the Air 

Force field unit, and the Waffen-SS ) rell 

below two and one-half million men. 38 In 

the first three years of the war the total 

permanent losses on all fronts (dead, missing, and disabled ) had been 922,000, or 

14.3 percent of the total Army strength. In 

the thirteen months between 1 September 

1942 and 20 November 1943 that number 

rose to 2,077,000, or 30 percent of the 

Army strength. 3D Between I November 

1942 and 1 December 1943, an OKH su rvey revealed, the number of German units 

on the Eastern Front stayed constant even 

though the actual strength declined- in 

!'hort, the armies in the East were being 

gradually burned out." 

Furthermore, the Army was confronted 

with an almost complete drying up of its 

sources of new recruits. The 800,ooo-man 

draft ordered in January 1943 brought in 

about 580,000 men by September, when it 

was stopped. In July Hitler added a requirement for another 700,000 men but it 

ran into heavy resistance from industry and 

the civilian bureaucracy. In September, 

after 120,000 draft notices had been isslled. 

the Army recruitment chief reported that he 

would hardly get 50,000 men all together." 

The Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, 

reckoned that between 1 September 1943 

.. OKH ; CenStdH , Org. Abt. Nr. 1/ 1894 ' / 44 . 

Entwicklung der Iststae rke des Ostheeres, 7.9.44 , 

OKH/Misc file. 

"' OKH. GenStdll. Org. Abt. NT. 1/5854/43. 

Notiz. 31.12.43, OKH/Misc file . 

,o OKH. GenStdfl. Org. Abt ., Kriegstagebuch, 

25.6-43-3'.3-44, 12 Jan 44. H 1/204 fil e. 

u OKH. GenStdH, Org. Abt., Notiz Betr.: 

"800000 Mann Pia " ulId 700000 Mann Plan ." 

9 .9.43; OKH. GenStdH . Org. AbL, Persoenliche 

Ansicht General Olbrichr, 9.9.43, OKH/ Misc filc . 
214 

and 1 Jan uary 1944 the Soviet losses in 

killed, disabled, and prisoners of war 

amounted to 1,200,000 men. The German 

dead and missing for the same period were 

243,743. The Germans estimated the 

front-line and front-line reserve strength of 

the Soviet forces in Europe on 1 January 

1944 was 5·5 million men." (The estimate 

was apparently close: the Soviet official 

figures are 5,568,000 mcn in formations at 

the front and 419,000 in units in the Slavka 

reserves. ) f3 The encouragement to be 

found in the assumption that Soviet manpower was declining and Soviet losses were 

about five times their own was slight. The 

Eastern Intelligence Branch predicted that 

relatively the German strength would continue on the downgrade during the subsequent months for the following reasons: 

I. The Soviet numerical superiority was 

already great. 

2 . The annual classes of recruits were 

about three times larger than those of the 

Germans. 

3. The Soviet Union was gaining and 

Germany losing manpower from the reoccupied territories (some 500,000 to 

600,000 men between July and midOctober 1943 ). 

4. The Russians were more stringent 

and morc successful in screening their deferred men. 

The Eastern Intelligence Branch concluded 

that Germany was at a further disadvantage in that it had to divert at least 30 percent, and usually morc, of its total strength 

u OKW, WEST, K .T.B. Awarbeitung, Osl/ront, 

Zu/uehrung von Verbaenden lucr dim Osten, 1.1 .-

3'.3-44, p. 4a, OKW/'929 file; OKW, AWA , 

WVW (V) N,.. 54. Anlage zu HDA, Kurierst , Hb . 

NT. 390/45, H 17/207 file . 

~ IVOV (R ), IV, p. 20. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

to the OKW theaters while the Soviet 

Union diverted only 7 percent to its Far 

Eastern Theatcr.H 

In early November the OKW considered 

making women between the ages of eighteen and forty-five liable for military service 

and began contingency planning for a levy 

in mass (lelzles Aufgebot). The idea of 

drafting women had to be dropped because 

it conflicted with Hitler's philosophy concerning the roles of the sexes, and on 8 

November, with a disconcerting jolt, Hitler 

set the OKW planners off in another direction. Speaking to the Nazi Party leaders in 

Munich, he criticized the unfavorable ratio 

of front-line to rear area troops in terms 

which came close to implying that the German Armed Forces had become a refuge 

for slackers. 

During the next few weeks the OKW 

hastily initiated studies that culminated in 

Basic Order 22 of 5 December 1')43. The 

order set a requirement for one million combat troops to be wrung out of the rear echelons. Besides directing the services and 

their subordinate commands to reduce and 

simplify their staff and support overhead 

and to restrict the so-called "paper war," 

it laid down several specific regulations: No 

men under thirty years of age and no ablebodied men were to remain in rear area 

assignments. The standards of physical fitness were lowered, and men with chronic 

but not acute ear, stomach, and lung complaints were to be considered fit for front 

duty. All rear and command staffs were 

automatically to reduce their strengths by 

10 to 25 percent. To make certain that the 

"OKH, GenStdH, FHO Nr. 80 / 43. Bisherige 

Entwicklung des deutschsowj etrussischell KraefteverhaeUnisses seit Kriegsbeginn und seine moegliche 

Weiterentwicklung bis Ende 1943, 17.10.43, H 

3/,85 file. 
THE RISING TIDE 

order was executed, the OKW created 

Feldjaeger (courier) battalions which were 

to comb the rear areas, conducting their 

visitations by surprise and dispatching the 

men they found to central collecting points 

without delay." 

That more economical employment of 

the men already in the service could contribute toward alleviating the manpower 

squeezc was certain. The OKH estimated 

that its forces on the Eastern Front consisted of 47 percent combatants and 53 percent noncombatants.

4 G If individual armies, 

corps, and divisions were considered, the 

disproportion was often even greater. Frequently, for inst?nce, divisions reduced to 

combat strengths of a thousand men or less 

had three or four times as many men in 

their rear echelons. But to convert this apparently superflu ous manpower to combat 

cffcctivcs was no easy maller. The German 

Army was accustomed to operating with 

extensive supply and support services. It 

could not, as the Soviet Army frequently 

did, rely on poorly equipped and sca ntily 

provisioned masses of men; and one of its 

continuing advantages over the Russians 

was its superiority in logistics, communications, and transportation in the rear areas. 

For those reasons unit commanders, even 

when the men in the rear outnumbered the 

troops at the front, were unwilling to risk 

losing valuable equipment and trained specialists for the sake of a temporary gain in 

front strength. Added to the natural reluctance of commanders to dismantle their 

~ OKW. Stelluertrdende Chef des Wehrmacht· 

fuehnwgsstabes, K riegstagebuch vom 1.10.-31.12. 

43. 8, 1'2, 15, '22- 27 Nov, 5 Dec 43, IMT Doc 

I 790-PS ; OKH, GenSldHJ Org . Abt. Nr. 1/5500/ 

43. Grundlegender-Befehl Nr. :12 , 5.12.43, OKH / 

Mise file. 

"OKH, GenSldH, Org. Abt. (I) Nr. 5'70/ 43, 

Gliederung des Ostheeres, 1.10.43. file H 1/ 17'1 . 

215 

support elements was the resistance of the 

rear area bureaucracy, particularly its mem· 

bers who were themselves candidates for 

reassignment. By '943 the bureaucracy 

was firmly entrenched behind ramparts of 

paper and entanglements of red tape, and 

rear area personnel were past masters at 

avoiding assignments which by even the 

remotest mischance might bring them to a 

hero's grave; hence the Feldjaeger battalions. But whether even they would be 

completely successful was doubtful since 

General Unruh , the dreaded "hero 

snatchcr/' had been operating along similar 

lines for nearly two years with only middling success. 

Along with anxiety over dwindling numbers went growing concern in the higher 

German command circles over the multiplying signs of a deterioration in troop quality among the armies of the East. Kluge 

and others had reported that the German 

soldiers were no lonl:er as reliable as they 

had been. In the late summer and fall of 

'943 a new term, Krisenfestigkeit (ability 

to withstand crises), was brought into use 

in judging the caliber of individual divisions. The best divisions were described as 

Krisenfest (able to stand up under a crisis) 

and the others, on a descending scale, as 

either Krisenfest to a limited extent or unreliable in various degrees. Dismayingly 

few German divisions qualified as Krisenfest. The allied troops (excepting the 

Spanish and the Finns) and the Russian 

collaborators stood at the bottom of the 

scale. Before the end of the year all of the 

Russians organized into units were transferred away from the Eastern Front to prevent their defecting to the partisans. 

Hitler saw the apparent drop in the quality of the German troops as entirely a prob-
216 

lem of leadership. "The condition of the 

troops," he said, 'lis a reflection of the commander's disposition." Therefore, the 

solution, in his opinion, was simple-get 

better commanders. But he was forced to 

admit that at the battalion and regimental 

levels, where the officer losses ran high, that 

might not be easy." 

Guderian, in his capacity as Inspector 

General for Armor, proposed a different 

approach. He believed the time had come 

to rationalize the German defensive tactics. 

The infantry, he reported to Hitler on 20 

October '943, had lately lost some of its 

ability to withstand crises; on the other 

hand, the new model German tanks had 

just about overcome their breaking-in troubles and could be considered the best weapons of their kind in the world. What was 

needed was to create mobile tank reserves 

to backstop the infantry. Panzer divisions 

would have to be taken out of the front, 

rested, re-equipped , and then held back to 

form a powerful striking force for emergencies. The result, besides providing stiffening for the infantry, would, Guderian COI1-

tended, be to restore the panzer divisions to 

their proper role as mobile offensive units." s 

Guderian wanted to begin putting his 

proposal into effect with the five rebuilt 

panzer divisions he sent to Army Group 

South in October. The success at Krivoi 

Rag of the first two to arrive convinced him 

he was right. Subsequentlv he argued for 

employing all five of the divisions in the 

battle around Kiev, even if the Dnepr Bend 

and the Crimea were lost as a consc-

"Stenogr. Dienst im F. H . Qu. , Bes/Jrechung des 

Fuehrers mit Generaloberst Zeitzler vom 27.12.43, 

OCMH files. 

~8 Der Generalinspekteur der Panzertrllppen, NT. 

1301/43, FllehrervoTtrag 20.10.43, H 16/1592 

file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

quence.~ !} There his plan foundered, as 

others had before, when it encountered 

Hitler's unwillingness to sacrifice ground for 

the sake of creating a clear-cut main effort. 

The five divisions never did get into battle 

as a single force, and after the end of December, when the Soviet winter ofTensive 

started, all hope of reconstituting that 

strong a reserve vanished. 

Fuehrer Directive 51 

Ultimately, the conduct of the war on 

the Eastern Front was to be most greatly 

affected by a decision which Hitler elevated 

to the level of national strategy in Fuehrer 

Directive 5', issued 3 November '943· 

The two-and-one-half-year campaign 

against Bolshevism, he asserted, had required full commitment of the greater part 

of Germany's military strength and effort. 

That was consistent with the extent of the 

danger and the total situation, but, in the 

meantime, the latter had changed. The 

Soviet danger was still there, but a greater 

danger had arisen in the West- the AngloAmerican invasion. IIIn the most extreme 

instance" Germany could still sacrifice 

fairly extensive areas in the East without 

being fatally injured. Not so in the West. 

There, a breakthrough on a broad front 

would have "unforeseeable consequences in 

a short time." IIThercfore," Hitler concI uded, "I can no longer take the responsibiity for allowing the Western Front to be 

weakened for the benefit of other theaters 

of war." so 

,g Det Gelleralillspekteur der Panzer Truppen. 

Nr. 1830/43. Vortra gsno tiz, 9.1.43, H 16/ 159a file . 

5(1 D er Fuehrer, OKW. WFSt. Op. Nr. 662656/ 

43, Weisung Nr. 51, 3 November 1943, OCMH 

files. 
THE RISING TIDE 

In his directive Hitler completely took 

the side of the Operations Staff, OKv.', 

which had all along contended that it was 

necessary to keep strong forces in France, 

Scandinavia, and the Balkans. In so doing 

he rejected the OKH argument that it was 

wrong to risk losing a battle already in progress by holding back troops to meet future 

threats. While it was probably too late for 

Manstein's radical strategy, namely, strip217 

ping the other fronts bare for an attempt to 

defeat the Soviet Union first, Hitler in the 

directive went almost to the other extreme, 

putting the Army on notice that for the near 

future at least the Eastern Front would 

have to get along on its own resources, come 

what might. He implied that he might 

consider trading space for time, but events 

were soon to prove he was constitutionally 

incapable of that exchange. 
CHAPTER XI 

Offensives on Both Flanksthe South Flank 

The Battle Resumes W est of Kiev 

Manstein had gone forward on 24 December to celebrate Christmas Eve with onc 

of the reserve divisions. During the day 

he learned that First Ukrainian Front was 

attacking west on both sides of the Zhitomir-Kiev road.' (Map 19 ) Whether a fullscale offensive was in the making could not 

be determined for certain. That the Soviet 

units could have recovered so soon from th e 

beatings many of them had taken during 

the German counterattack appeared doubtful. Moreover, the weather had turned 

warm and rainy which, although the roads 

were still firm on the 24th, did not augur 

well for armored operations. But the 

Fourth .Panzer Army evening report, which 

i\1"anstcin rece ived after returning to his 

headquarters in Vinnitsa late that night, 

convinced him that a big offensive was 

imminent. 

Vatutin Attacks 

The next day brought confirmation. 

First Guards and First Tank Armies with 

fourteen riAe divisions and four tank and 

mechanized corps in the front , veered southwestward below the Zhitomir-Kiev road 

1 Manstcin, Verlorene Siege, p. 565. 

toward Berdichev and Kazatin. During 

the day Vatutin extended his offensive 

north into the XIII Corps zone east of 

Zhitomir, and on the Fourth Panzer Army 

left flank LIX Corps east of Korosten expected an attack at any hour. In the afternoon Manstein ordered Fourth Panzer 

Army to prevent an irruption to Berdichev 

and Kazatin by taking XXXXVI II Panzer 

Corps out between LIX and XIII Corps 

and bringing it down [or an attack into the 

Soviet flank. ' 

Manstcin was fully aware of the terms on 

which the winter battles would have to be 

fought. The long-standing strategic threat 

to the Army Group South left flank was 

stronger than ever. It could take the form 

of a deep envelopment carried west to the 

Carpathians or a shorter southward thrust 

bel ween the Dncpr and the Dnestr. In his 

order to Fourth Panzer Army Manstein 

chose to concentrate on defending against 

the southward thrust as the most immediately dangerous and the one on which 

Vatutin appeared to be concentrating. 

Additionally, since the front had moved 

back to the Dnepr a new menace had come 

to the fore . It was the threat to the army 

group's lifelines, the railroads. They were 

2 Pz. AOK 4, l a, Kriegstagebuch , Band 3. 25 

Dec 43 , Pz. AOK 4 41631 /3 file. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 219 

G~ern~ General 

THE BATTLE WEST OF KIEV 

24 December 1943-31 January 1944 '" 

, r ~; 

~--

I 

I 

~~~ 

""" ....",... 

13TH 

G£R M~N FRONT LINE, 24 DEC 

GERMAN FRONT LINE , 31 J~N 

NUMBERED ARMIES 

Fl~!!.fz \ AFTER 1 JAN 1944 

20 0 20 40 601lliLES \_v L' "it lr\iT1!"'If--"......l'-"--,,.L1 _ ---'I 

.f 

j , 20 0 2.0 40 60 KILOMETERS " ., 

MAP 19 

t\vo: on the north the line Lublin-Kave}'-

Shepetovka-Berdichev-Kazatin and about 

fifty miles farther south the roughly parallel 

line L'vov-Ternopol-Proskurov-Zhmerinka. 

If they were cut, all of the Army Groups 

South and A supplies would have to be rerouted over the Rumanian railroads, which 

were in dismal condition and were certain 

to become worse as the front drew closer to 

the Rumanian border. 

Turning to the OKH, Manstein, on 25 

December, reported that Fourth Panzer 

Army was not equal to the approaching 

test. The army would have to be given 
220 

five or six divisions. If Army Group South 

was to supply them it would need authority 

to shorten its right flank. Otherwise the 

OKH would have to provide the divisions. 

He requested a speedy decision.' On 26 

December the OKH instructed Army 

Group A to transfer one division to Army 

Group South, and Hitler authorized Manstein to take the easternmost projection of 

the First Panzer Army line back fift een 

miles behind Zaporozhye to gain another 

division, but the OKH indicated that a 

fundamental decision of the sort Manstein 

had requested was not being made. 

Meanwhile, Vatutin had expanded the 

offensive. Fortieth Army began pushing 

south below Fastov, and Third Guards 

Tank, First Guards, Thirt eenth, and Sixtieth Armies advanced west and northwest 

toward Zhitomir and Korosten. On 26 

December Manstein thought XXXXVIII 

Panzer Corps might still be able to attack 

into the flank of the thrust toward Berdichev and Kazatin, but the Commanding 

General, Fourth Panzer Army, General der 

Panzertruppen Erhard Raus, maintained 

that the assembly would take too long. 

The best the army could do, he argued, was 

to hem in the Russian spearheads, slow 

them down, and try to stop them forward 

of the two cities:' 

Hitler Fends 0 If a Decision 

On 27 December Manstein turned to 

Hitler and the OKH again. Half measure., 

to gain a division or two, he said, would do 

no good. He would have to shift his main 

effort from the right to the left fl ank, and to 

30KH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Kriegstagebuch. 

9.10-43- 12.1.44 , 25 Dec 43· 

• Pz. AOK 4. lao K riegstagebuch, Band 3. 26 

Dec 43, Pz. AOK 4 41631/3 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

do that First Panzer Army had to be taken 

back to the Kamenka River line in order 

to release at least five divisions.' At the 

situation conference that night Hitler rcfused. Manstein, he asserted, could propose anything he liked; he did not bear the 

final responsibility. If First Panzer Army 

withdrew and so touched off trouble on the 

Crimea that gave the Russians and the 

Western Powers the argument they needed 

to bring Turkey into the war against Germany, Manstein would not take the blame. 

He would merely say it was a political 

problem.' 

Early on 28 December thirty Soviet tanks 

with infantry aboard burst into Kazatin 

where they destroyed some hundreds of 

German trucks. By late afternoon the Germans had retaken about half of the city but 

had no real prospect of maintaining their 

grip on it more than a few hours. Manstein reported to Hitler that the Russians 

had so far thrown a total of forty-seven rifle 

divisions and nine tank and mechanized 

corps against Fou rth Panzer Army. Against 

that array the army would not be able to 

defend the railroads behind its front. As 

in his earlier dispatches, Manstein suggested 

that if he were allowed to shift the main 

effort to the left flank he could mount a 

strong counteroffensivc. 1 The day before, 

he had hinted that he might manage to repeat something like the March ' 943 victory 

at Kh arkov, which, he pointed out, had 

been possible because Rostov and the eastern half of the Donets Basin wcrc gi\'cn up 

in time. He again wanted to execute the 

50KH. GenStdH , op. Abt., Kriegstngebllch, 9. 

10.43-12. I 44, 27 D ec 43· 

o Sten og r. Dienst im F.H.Qu ., esprechun.~ des 

Fuehrers mit Generaloberst Zeitzler vom 27.12-43. 

OCMH files. 

70KH . GenStdH , Op. Abt .. Kriegstagebu ch . 

9.1043-12.1.44, '28 Dec 43. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 221 

"R ochade" (castling) that had been so 

successful there. 

At the Fuehrer headquarters the 1I1anstein telegram unleashed a storm. In a 

rage, Hitler declared th at ~1 in was 

only trying to make himself look good by 

his "pompous" talk o f counteropcrations. 

H e should give wh at he was doing its rea l 

name, "running away," M anstcin, Hitler 

went on, was losing his nerve, probably because his headquarters was too close to the 

fronl. H e should get out of V innitsa. 

Then Hitler broke off his tirade to discuss 

possible new locations for M anstcin's headqua rters and to demand that the headquarters at Vinnitsa, the former Fuehrer 

headqu arters for the southern nank of the 

Eastern Front, be completely destroyed so 

th at th e Russians would find nothing B to 

haul away and put on display in Moscow." 

After lh at Hitler shifted to the subject of 

retreals in general, shouting, "Everything 

back! Sometimes that becomes an outright mania." He could make himself sick 

with aggravation over "those retreats," he 

continued. He was sorry he ever gave permission for the first one ; it co uld no t have 

been worse if the armies had stayed wh ere 

they were. The conference ended with 

nothing more than a decision to move M anstein's headquarters to T ernopo1.s 

Behind the cloud of accusations and protests he had thrown up, H itler had, nevertheless, g rudg ingly come to realize that 

th oroughgoing measures were nrces~ary if 

the south nank of the Eastern F ront was to 

be saved. On 27 December he had talked 

brieny of aki ~ back Arm y Group North 

to the P A?'-JTHER position to ~ain a dozen 

8 Stenogr. Dierat im F. 1-I .Qu .. Besprechung mit 

Ge1zerll[oberst Jodi lind Genern/oberst Zeitzler am 

28. 12.43. OCMH fdes. 

divisions for the south. At the noon conferenc e on the 29th he told Zeitzler that 

after thinking it over during the night he 

had concluded that the southern flank had 

to be strengthened. In the north, as he saw 

it, the worst that could happen was that a 

greater burden would be thrown on the 

Finns, whereas in the south, Germany 

would lose the Crimea, Krivoi Rog, and 

Nikopol, which would be bad economically 

and could have dangerous political repercussions in Turkey and the Balkans. He 

indicated that he had decided to let Army 

Group North withdraw to the PANTHER 

position. 9 

The next day, however, when Kuechler 

came to Fuehrer headquarters, Hitler 

changed his mind. Kuechler described the 

Eighteenth Army front a round Oranicnbaum, below Leningrad, and along the 

Volkhov as strong ly fortified, and stated 

tha t the a rmy commander thought the army 

stood a good chance of beating off the 

offensive expected during the winter. 1U 

That was enough to arouse all of Hitler's 

old antipathy toward giving ground voluntaril y. Later he appa rently also had second 

thoughts regardin g th e Finns and the effect 

a withdrawal might have in the Baltic area. 

Firsl Panzer Army R edeployed 

While H itler procrastinated, the Fourth 

Panzer Army fron t was breaki ng apart. By 

30 December LIX Corps on the a rmy's 

north fl an k was in full retreat west of Koroo Stenogr. Dienst im F. fI .Qu .. BespruhulIg de, 

Fzuhrers mit Generalobent Zeitzler am 29.1243. 

OC MH files. 

10 Stenogr. Dienst im F.H .Qu .. BesprecJZlmg mit 

Gen. Feldmarsclwll Ku u hler l'o m 30.1243. OC MH 

files: H . Gr. Nord. In. J..·riegstagebZl ch. 1.1 -3 1.1.41. 

fi Jan 44, H . Cr. :'\ord 751'28/33 file . 
222 

sten. Between its right flank and the XIn 

Corps left north of Zhitomir, a 35-mile gap 

had opened. From Zhitomir to southwest 

of Kazatin the army main force, XIII 

Corps, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, and 

XXXXII Corps, tried to keep a solid front 

against the main weight of the offensive. A 

45-mile gap separated the XXXXII Corps 

right flank southwest of Kazatin and the 

left flank of VII Corps south of Belaya 

Tserkov'. On the army's right the VII 

Corps and XXIV Panzer Corps held a still 

stationary front running east to the Dnepr 

and tying in with Eighth Army at Kanev. 

The commanding general, Raus, told Manstein that the army could do nothing about 

the gaps and intended to concentrate on 

keeping the three "blocks" from disintegrating,l1 

Manstein had decided the day before to 

stretch his authority to the utmost and 

assume that the logic of events would force 

Hitler to approve. He ordered the Headquarters, First Panzer Army, to move to 

Uman on 1 January and take command of 

Fourth Panzer Army's two right corps, 

VII Corps and XXXXII Corps (XXIV 

Panzer Corps and XXXXTI Corps traded 

sectors on 1 January 1944 ). To give First 

Panzer Army a striking force he took the 

Headquarters, II [ Panzer Corps, and two 

panzer divisions from Eighth Army and 

added a panzer-grenadier division and a 

Iaeger (light infantry ) division being transferred from Army Group A. I If Panzer 

Corps was to assemble its four divisions east 

of Vinnitsa. To provide a similar force for 

Fourth Panzer Army, he gave it the Headquarters, XXXXVI Panzer CO!'PS, and a 

panzer division coming from Army Group 

1\ Pt. AOK 4, la . Kriegstagebuc h. Band 3. 30 

Dec 41, Pz. AOK 4 41631 /3 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Center, an infantry division being transferred from Army Group North, and a 

mountain division coming from Army 

Group A. Whether those two corps would 

be sufficient to stop the Russians and close 

the gaps was still extremely doubtful. 

On 31 December Hitler concurred but 

refused to approve the necessary next step, 

the withdrawal of the Army Group South 

right flank in the Dnepr Bend to the 

Kamenka position. All the signs indicated 

that the Russians \Vere preparing an offensive in the Dnepr Bend. Once it started, it 

would be too latc to take out divisions for 

the left flank." 

The Battle Expands 

Until the end of Decembet, Army Group 

South was fortunate in one respect, that 

Vatutin concentrated his forces against 

Fourth Panzer Army's three groups without attempting to exploit the gaps in the 

army front. After the turn of the year the 

battle began to develop much more dangerously. While maintaining strong frontal 

pressure that forced Fourth Panzer Army 

westward, the Russians began working their 

way around thc flanks and threatened to 

encircle the army main force, the XIII, 

XXXXVIII Panzer, and XXIV Panzer 

Corps. 

On the north LIX Corps, what was left 

of it, had by 3 January been pushed back 

to Gorodnitsa on the pre-1939 Polish 

border. East of Shepetovka the railroad to 

Berdichev was virtually undefended except 

for scattered XXXXVI Panzer Corps components trying to assemble there. From 

northwest of Berdichev to northeast of Vinnitsa the three corps of Fourth Panzer 

1~ Manstcin, Verlore1le Siege. pp. 567-69. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 223 

Army's main force held a continuous but 

extremely fragile line. On 4 January XIII 

Corps, holding at and northwest of Berdichev, reported that it was falling apart. 

The troops were exhausted; the divisions 

had front-line strengths of 150 to 300 men; 

and the whole corps had the infantry 

strength of one regiment. " The gap between the Fourth Panzer Army flank and 

what on 1 January became the First Panzer 

Army left had widened to nearly seventy 

miles. VII Corps on the east side of the 

gap had been pushed south and east of 

Belaya Tserkov' to where its front and that 

of XXXXII Corps on the Dnepr stood back 

to back and formed a pocket open on the 

south. III Panzer Corps was moving up 

from the south to plug the gap but a Soviet 

attack, which began on 3 January at 

Kirovograd in the Eighth Army zone, delayed the transfer of the two panzer divisions intended for III Panzer Corps." 

On 4 January Manstein went to Fuehrer 

headquarters and tried again to talk Hitler 

into giving up the Dnepr Bend. By then 

Manstein believed that the Kamenka River 

would be only the first phase line in a retreat that would probably have to go all the 

way to the lower Bug River before the 

balance of the front could be restored, but 

he knew any discussion of a larger withdrawal would be completely futile. Hitler, 

for his part, refused even to consider letting 

Army Group South go to the Kamenka, and 

added that he could not supply reinforcements from outside the army group zone. 

Divisions could not be given from the West, 

he insisted, before the expected British13 Pz. AOK 4, la , KTiegslagebu ch. Band I, 1- 4 

Jan 44. Pz. AOK 4 49417/ 1 file . 

H OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. 1J1b, Lage o.sl. 

Stand 3.1.44 abds; Manstein, Vtrlorene Siege. p. 

56g. 

American invasion had been beaten off; 

until then the Eastern Front would have to 

fight for time." 

During the coming months the invasion 

in the West was to be Hitler's standard excuse for avoiding decisions in the East. 

Characteristically, he ignored current crises 

and closed his mind to reality while he 

looked to the future for the opportunity that 

he imagined would restore his fortunes with 

one bold stroke. For the Eastern Front 

commands this meant a close approach to 

the ultimate in frustration by adding to the 

normal rigidity of Hitler's tactical concepts 

the drag of a massive indifference . 

When Manstein went to Fuehrer lieadquarters he still thought he would be able 

to patch the gaps on both sides of the 

Fourth Panzer Army main force with the 

two panzer corps then forming, but the 

events of the succeeding days compelled 

him to change his plans. After 4 January 

LIX Corps on the north Aank had to sideslip southwest to avoid being pushed into 

the Pripyat Marshes and to do what it 

could to cover Shepetovka and Rovno. 

That opened the breach between Army 

Groups Center and South to a width of 1 10 

miles. Neither army group had the slightest prospect of doing anything to restore 

contact, and the gap came to be referred to 

as the Wehrmachtsloch (armed forces 

hole ) which gave it virtually the status of a 

permanent feature of the Eastern Front. 

Manstein proposed moving in a who1e new 

army, but neither he nor anyone else knew 

where such an army might come from. In 

the second week of the month the gap 

opened even wider when Belorussian Front 

pushed Second Armv to the line of the Ipa 

U Manstein, Verlorene Siege , p. 57 1. 
224 

River. Nevertheless, the army groups could 

count themselves fortunat~ in two respects: 

the abnormally warm weather had kept the 

marshes from freezing, and the three armies 

operating against LIX Corps had resumed 

the offensive without being rested and resupplied after the fall battles, so that by 

mid-January they had lost much of their 

momentum. 16 

To narrow the open expanse off the right 

Aank of the LIX Corps, Manstein on 3 

January had ordered XXXXVIII Panzer 

Corps to shift west of Berdichev. Berdichev 

was lost before the end of the first week in 

January, but by extending its flank out to 

the Sluch River XXXXVIII Panzer Corps 

kept the Russians from getting behind the 

army.17 Between the inner flanks of the 

Fourth and First Panzer Armies, III Panzer 

Corps, still assembling, maneuvered elements of two divisions and attempted to 

establish a screening line. On 6 January 

Vatutin showed for the first time that he 

was fully aware of the opportunity there. 

The pressure against the Fourth Panzer 

Army main force declined sharply, and the 

First Tank and Fortieth Armies turned 

south into the gap. 

Manstein Concentrates on the 

Southward Thrust 

On that day Manstein, in a directive to 

Fourth and First Panzer Armies, predicted 

that Vatutin would either try to encircle the 

Fourth Panzer Army main force or attempt 

to strike deep toward Shepetovka and 

Ravno in the north and toward Zhmerinka 

in the south. The latter appeared to him 

I'MS # P-114c (Hauck ). Teil VI, p. 382-83. 

I. Pz. AOK 4 , In, Kriegstagebu ch, Band I , 3-7 

Jan 44, Pz. 49417/4 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the more likely. Having already told the 

armies that it would not be possible to deal 

with both thrusts at the same time, he instructed them to concentrate on stopping 

the southward advance of First Tank and 

Fortieth Armies. In the first phase of the 

counterattack First Panzer Army would deploy III Panzer Corps against Fortieth 

Army operating on the east side of the gap. 

To gain additional divisions the army 

would collapse the pocket formed by the 

VII and XXXXII Corps fronts and take 

them south to the Ross River. In the second phase, beginning on approximately X 

plus eight days, III Panzer Corps would 

turn west into the left flank of First Tank 

Army while XXXXVI Panzer Corps, 

which Fourth Panzer Army would have 

shifted south by then, attacked the right." 

The directive went out to the armies subject to Hitler's concurrence. On the afternoon of 7 January Hitler approved it in 

general but strictly prohibited the proposed 

withdrawal of the VII and XXXXII Corps 

to the Ross River, thus greatly diminishing 

the chances of the counterattack's achieving 

a complete success as well as perpetuating 

a danger which before the end of the month 

was to produce the Cherkassy pocket. First 

Panzer Army had warned two days earlier 

that to leave the two corps standing in a 

vulnerable open loop was to court disaster. 1f1 

In the second week of January the two 

Soviet armies continued probing southward. 

By the loth First Tank Army had opened 

a hole between the flanks of XXXXVI 

Panzer Corps and TIT Panzer Corps and 

had turned a guards tank and a guards 

18 H. Cr. Sued. III Nr. 0748144 .6.1.44. AOK 8 

582g8/ 15 file. 

Ii Pz. AOK 1. la, Kriegstagebuch Nr. I.1. 5- 7 

Jan 44, Pz. AOK I 58683/1 file. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 225 

mechanized corps due west toward Zhmerinka. It took the German armor two days' 

heavy fighting to eliminate the threat to 

Zhmerinka for the time being. On the east 

Fortieth Army opened a wider breach between the flank' of III Panzer Corps and 

VII Corps, and by the loth its spearheads 

had pushed nearly to the outskirts of U man. 

The two German corps struggled to prevent 

the Russians from breaking loose completely 

before the units for the counterattack, some 

of which were still in transit from the West, 

could be assembled. Manstein held to his 

original plan of dealing first with Fortieth 

ArmJI and then turning against First Tank 

Army. 

Between 10 and 15 January TIl Panzer 

Corps shifted the 17th Panzer Division 

from its left flank to the right flank north 

of Uman, leaving only the division's reconnaissance battalion to hold on the left. Behind the 17th Panzer Division the corps 

echeloned the main force of its other division, the 16th Panzer Division. (Two of 

the divisions intended for the corps were 

tied down in other sectors.) Minor clement, of the 16th Panzer Division were left 

in the corps front fa cing north. In effect, 

what the corps had to accomplish was to 

close the front by starting from a weak 

handhold in the center of the gap and drawing the dangling ends of the front inward 

toward it. By the time the two panzer divisions were in position VII Corps had helped 

by extending its nank south to within 

twenty-five miles of their line of departure. 

On 15 January the II [ Panzer Corps' 

tanks jumped off to the east, making good 

if not spectacular progress. That same day 

First Panzer Army took command of 

XXXXVI Panzer Corps and began shiftin g 

some of its strength east for the second 

phase of the counterattack. On the 17th 

III Panzer Corps came within a mile or 

two of making contact with the VII Corps 

flank and began turning north for an attack 

into the First Tank Army flank. 

Unseasonably high temperatures, in the 

daytime well above freezing, had persisted 

since the latter half of December. Rain 

and snow turned the roads into mud and 

when the temperature sank the roads became icy. On the 18th First Panzer Army 

complained that poor visibility and dilliculties in reconnaissance had made it lose 

track of the Russians' movements just as the 

army was getting ready to deal First Tank 

Army a decisive blow. 

During the next six days III Panzer 

Corps jockeyed itself into position while the 

army brought up the Adolf Hitler Division 

and the 18th Artillery Division to restore 

the striking power XXXXVI Panzer Corps 

had lost in extending its line. Early on 24 

January XXXXVI Panzer Corps, the 

Adolf Hitler Division in the lead, attacked 

out of the corps front west of Vinnitsa. 

The breakthrough was speedily accomplished, but before noon the operation was 

wavering on the edge of disaster. At a 

small stream an engineer sergeant had 

pulled out a bridging platoon when it came 

under fire. It was nearly nightfall before 

the platoon, which had subsequently gotten 

itself thoroughly lost, returned and laid 

bridges to get the tanks across. The next 

day III Panzer Corps attacked from the 

east and met strong resistance almost at 

once. Clearly the moment for catching 

First Tank Army by surprise and throwing 

it off balance was lost. 

Xl and XXXX[[ Corps En circled 

On 26 January the Stavka played its 

trump. A mechanized corps and a uard~ 
226 

tank corps penetrated the First Panzer 

Army right flank at the VII CorpsXXXXII Corps boundary. Fourth Guards 

Army had plunged into the Eighth Army 

front southwest of Cherkassy the day before, 

and a classic double envelopment was in the 

making. First Panzer Army was helpless. 

To stop the counterattack on the left flank 

while First Tank Army stayed intact would 

have restored the initiative there to the 

Russians and so would not have freed any 

units for transfer to the right. 

While the XXXXVI and the III Panzer 

Panzer Corps ground their way into the 

Aanks of First Tank Army, the Soviet armor 

on the First Panzer Army right flank took 

advantage of its free rein, pushed south at 

top speed, and on 28 January closed the 

ring around XXXXII Corps and XI 

Corps. Almost simultaneously the points 

of the XXXXVI and the ITT Panzer Corps 

made contact, trapping several Soviet divisions to the south. The army ordered the 

17th Panzer Division to begin pulling out 

and the two panzer corps to finish mopping 

up behind their new front, fast. By 3 1 

January all of III Panzer Corps was out 

and heading east. 

The operation against First Tank Army 

was a moderate success: it netted an estimated 70 I tanks and assault guns destroyed 

and 8,000 Russians killed and 5,436 captured. The responsibility for the catastrophe on its right flank, First Panzer Army 

justifiably believed, lay clsewhere. It had 

twice been forbidden to take the flank back. 

In the army war diary Hube remarked, 

"One can only obey, even in the deepest 

anxiety." 20 

2O PZ. AOK I. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 13. 8-:p Jan 

44. Pz. AOK I 58683/1 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

The Cherkassy Pocket 

(Korsun' Shevchenkovskiy) " 

At the turn of the year Eighth Army held 

a I aD-mile seclor from Kanev to twenty 

miles due east of Kirovograd. South of 

Kanev the army still held twenty miles of 

the original Dnepr front. From the river 

the front angled away to the southwest, its 

configuration determined by successive 

Soviet thrusts and by Hitler's insistence on 

defending every yard of ground that could 

possibly be held. In effect it was nothing 

more than the line where Hitler's will temporarily counterbalanced the Russians' pressure against the army. 

K irovograd 

On 5 January, three days after Eighth 

Army had cleaned up a breakthrough 

fifteen miles north of Kirovograd, Second 

Ukrainian Front threw a powerful blow 

directly at the Eighth Army- Sixth Army 

boundary. Expanding the attack northward rapidly, the Russians penetrated 

nearly to Kirovograd in a matter of hours 

and the next day swept north and south 

around the city, encircling XXXXVII 

Panzer Corps, which was attempting to 

make a stand beyond the eastern suburbs. 

The speed and strength of the attack indicated that Konev and Vatutin-actually, 

Zhukov, since he was co-ordinating th e two 

fronts' offensives- might be trying for an 

encirclement of the First Panzer and Eighth 

Armies east of the Bug. tin~ quickly , 

21 Although Cherkassy was npt in the pocket, the 

Ge rmans used the designation "Cherkassy pocket" 

or, more specifically, "the pocket ncar C herkassy." 

The Russian designation, "The Bat lle of Korsun' 

Shevchenkovskiy!' is pcrhaps more accuratc since 

that locality remaincd insidc thc porket throughout. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 227 

M anstein gave Eighth Army two panzer 

divisions a nd the left fl ank corps of Sixth 

Army. On 8 January XXXXVII Panzer 

Corps had to pull out to the west, giving 

up Kirovograd. Once that was accomplished, the army recovered its equilibrium 

and in a few days threw a screening line in 

a semicircle behind the city.:!:! 

If Zhukov and Konev had originally 

meant to go farth er, they weco probabl y 

dissuaded by th e fast German reaction and 

by the wealher, which was the worst imaginable. R ain and wet snow turned the 

ground into thin , watery mud. Temperatures hovering around the freezing mark 

coated guns and tanks with icc, which h ad 

to be knocked off before they could go into 

action. Clothes, soa ked in the daytime, 

froze stiff at night." 

On 10 J anuary the Commanding General, Eighth Army, Woehler, told the army 

group chief of staff that the bulge on the 

inner flanks of the First Panzer and Eighth 

Armies was becoming a source of deepest 

concern to the army. His comba t strength, 

he said, was very low, a nd he cited one infantry regiment which was reduced to two 

officers and fift), enlisted men." That same 

day First Panzer Army, which held the 

most exposed part of the bulge, urged that 

the line be taken b ack. The a rmy group 

concurred, but Hitler, as Manstein had predicted four days earlier, would not hear of 

it. 25 

Although Zhukov and Konev kept 

several anTIleS concentrated ncar KirovoS # P-1 14c (H auck), Teil VI, pp. 37 1, 

380- 8 !. 

:l3 New York Time s, J anuary 10, 1944. 

!U AOK 8, l a, Kriegstagebuch NT. 3, 10 Jan 44. 

AOK 8 58298/ I file . 

2:; Pz. AOK 1 , l a, Kriegstagebuch Nr. 13,6, 1 0 

J an 44, Pz. AOK I 58683/ I file. 

grad, they did not try to get the offensive 

there rolling again; even under th e best 

conditions the Soviet commanders generally 

shied away from too extensive enveloping 

maneuvers. '''hen the weather continued 

warm and rainy and First Pa nzer Army began to brake the southward advance past 

Vinnitsa, Zhukov waited at first and then 

shifted to other objectives, more modest but 

also more certain of attainment. An obvious one was to cu t off th e bulge in the 

German lin e, not at its base but farther cast 

where the distan ces were shorter and the 

l<t cti cal problems fewer. By mid-J anuary 

something of th e sort had, in fact, become 

necessa ry in order to shorten the front. 

First Ukrailliall Front had extended from 

a little more than 100 miles to over 250 

miles and could not keep on advancing 

\vest much longer without closing up from 

the cast. 1\{oreover, even though it is difficu lt to discover any basis for such fears, the 

Stavka apparently had become worried 

about th e fl anks of th e Firs! and Second 

Ukrainian Fron!s."; T actically the Russians had not had such an opportunity for 

a set piece double envelopment sin ce Stalin· 

grad. First P anzer Army and Eighth Army 

had their main forces committed and tied 

down on their outer fl anks, and their inner 

fl anks, projecting eastward, were depleted 

and exposed. 

T he Ell ve/olmzen! 

On 24 J anuary a Second Uk1'nillinn 

Front reconnaissa nce 111 forcf' aga inst 

Eighth Army about midway bet \ .... cen Cherkassy a nd Kirovograd hit a I 2-milc stretch 

on which the army had no more th an ant' 

::a Zhilin, ed., V azlt!!e)'sh i)'e Operatsii Otecltest. 

uellllOJ' V o)'!!)'. p. 286. 
228 

infantryman for e\·cry fifteen yards of front. 

By the end of the day the probing attack, 

had penetrated dcep in a number of placcs. 

The next morning Fourth Guards Arm)' 

opened a full-scale attack and b), the end 

of thc day had poured twelve rifle divisions 

into the breakthrough. Eighth Army again 

asked to eliminate the bulge, but the arm)' 

group could not get an answer from Hitl er. 

On 26 January two armored corps of 

Sixth Tal/k Arllly ripped through the First 

Panzer Army front bet"·cen the fl anks of 

VII Corps and XXXXII Corps. With a 

show of daring they had until then not often 

displayed, So\·iet armorcd commands 

headecl south at full till. While the two 

German armies pleaded vainly for a dec ision from higher headquarters, the Soviet 

thrusts gained speed on the 27th. On the 

afternoon of the 28th air reconnaissance 

showed that the spearheads had met at 

Shpola. The XI Corps and XXXX II 

Corps- ,,6.ooo troops, including several 

thousand Russian auxili al'ics- \\·cre encircled. When Hitler refused even then to let 

the corps mm·e, l\1anstein took the first 

steps toward restoring contact. Transferrin ~ XXXXII Corps to Eighth Arm\', he 

promised the army the 24th Panzer Division 

from Sixth Arnw and ordered First Panzer 

Army to close out its counteroffensive 

against First Tank Arm)' and st~rt shifling 

units cast. 

As Zhukm· no doubt knew before he 

started. the German reaction could not be 

,wift. Even if the First Panzer and Eighth 

Annic~ could release forces from their outer 

flanks, the regroupinl( would be delayed by 

the rands and weather. The Russians had 

another advantage: their tracked vehicles. 

tanks and assault gUlls- had broader 

treads than tho~c of th e Germans and thercfore pcdormed heller on soft ground and 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

in mud. 

On the other hand, and fortunately for 

the Germans, the latter advantage was a 

relative one. The quick advance to Shpola 

from the east and north had obviously 

placed a great strain on Soviet equipment, 

and Zhukov was not able to maintain the 

pace in establishing the aliter screening line 

around the encircl ement. He could not, as 

he had at Stalingrad, take advantage of the 

initial shock to throw thc main front back 

so far as to make a relief exceedingly diflicult Or impossible. 

The Relief 

On I Februar), Manslein ordered the relief. He told First Panzer Army to shift 

111 Panzer Corps to its extreme right fla nk 

and Eighth Army to put XXX XVII Panzer 

Corps on its extreme left. ( Map 20 ) On 

the 3d, the 4th at the latest, the two corps 

were to strike toward the pocket, converging on its eastern rim. The objective, ostensibly, was only to regain contact with the 

encircled corps; Hitler was as far as cver 

from consenting to a withdrawal. The 

armies thought at first that thev would be 

able to start on 3 February, but they had to 

ask for a 24-hour postponement on the 2d, 

when warm weather and heavy fog sct in. 

On the 3d the Chief of StafT, Arnw Group 

South, ad\'ised l\Ianstein that after the 

operation began the troops of the XXXX II 

and XI Corps would ha\·c to sland "with 

their packs on their backs" ready to break 

out at the fir!'t opportunity. To think of 

leaying the corps where they were ann 

merely restoring contact, he declared, wa s 

"Utopian." That information was passed 

on to the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, who 

agreed heartily. But later in the day, talking to Woehler. ;\fanstein indicated that he 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 229 

SOVlET ASSAULT GUN, 1943 

still proposed to reach the pocket and turn 

the tables on Zhukov by trapping a good 

part of his forces between the two relief 

columns and the southwest front of the 

pocket. He also relayed without comment 

an intention of "the highest leadership" 

(Hitler) to carry the thrust north toward 

lGev. 21 

The attack began on 4 February in bright 

sunshine and a temperature well above 

freezing. At the last minute Hitler released 

to III Panzer Corps a panzer division which 

he had detained at Vinnitsa; how much 

tir.te the division would waste moving 

through the mud was a question. In spite 

J7 AOK 8, la, Kriegstagebuch NT. 3. 1-3 Feb 

44, AOK 8 58.g8/. file. 

of a somewhat ragged start the attack in the 

First Panzer Army zone gained several miles 

before the end of the day. The army reported that ordinarily it would be certain of 

success, but the warm weather and mud 

were multiplying the difficulties. 

During the night fog closed in again, and 

the next day neither side could move. In 

the meantime the tanks had burned up 

phenomenal quantities of fuel churning 

through the mud, and rations and ammunition were running low at the front. Since 

trucks were useless, the army directed III 

Panzer Corps and VII Corps to mobilize 

the civilians in their areas as porters and to 

requisition all the horses and sledges that 

could be found. 

The Eighth Army effort was, if anything, 
MAP 20 

BREAKOUT FROM THE POCKET 

NEAR CHERKASSY 

----

4os=-...,.:.n;:z: 

1111'"'111 

16 February 1944 

AREA HELD BY UNITS SHOWN MORN,IS FEB 

GERMAN WITHDRAWAL, 16 FEB 

III PZ CORPS FR ON T, 16 FEB 

JW C. Br'Wf!Or,Ji-. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 231 

less promising. At the last minute Hitler 

ordered 24th Panzer Division returned to 

Sixth Army. He had transferred Sixth 

Army to Army Group A on I February, 

partly to reduce Manstcin's span of control 

but mostly to prevent his taking troops 

away from the south flank. The 24th 

Panzer Division had plowed its way through 

the mud to Eighth Army, when it received 

orders to tUrn around and head south again. 

The division \vas thus of no usc to either 

Sixth Army or Eighth Army. Realizing this 

and not wanting to deny Army Group 

South the division which might make all the 

difference in getting through to the pocket, 

Kleist offered to take an infantry division 

instead; but Hitler refused to change his 

order.2S 

Inside the pocket XI and XXXXII 

Corps had a combined strength of six divisions, two of them very weak. The strongest was the S5 Wiking Division, which had 

two armored infantry regiments, a tank 

regiment, and the Belgian Volunteer Brigade Wallonien. The safety of the Belgian 

Rexist leader, Leon Degrelle, serving in the 

latter, was a source of some concern to 

Hitler. The first orders to the two corps 

instructed them to hold where they were, 

but that was clearly impossible since both 

were already vastly overextended and now 

would have also to form a front on the 

south. 

On 29 January Eighth Army authorized 

the first withdrawals on the north and east, 

and thereafter the corps fell back gradually 

to a perimeter centering at and west of 

Korsun' . The movements benefited somewhat from planning and some preparations 

made for the withdrawal to the Ross River 

:l8 H . Gr. A, l a, KriegJtagebuch. Ban.d .1 . Teil 4 . 

4 Feb 44, H. Gr." 75126 / 24 file . 

proposed in the first week of January. The 

corps were favored in that they had collected all the food stocks in the hands of 

the German agricultural administrators and 

transported them sou th of the Ross River 

to the vicinity of Korsun'. Consequently, 

the troops could be kept on better than 

normal rations, and the air supply could be 

limited exclusively to ammunition and 

motor fuel.:!!l 

Air supply began on 29 January. Fog 

and snow kept the planes grounded much 

of the time, and rising temperatures in the 

first week of February so ftened the landin): 

strips. Tn the first five days forty-four 

planes were lost in accidents or shot down 

by Soviet fi ghters and antiaircraft fire. On 

5 February mud barred usc of th e two airstrips in the pocket, but by the 9th a new 

strip had been laid out on drier ground. 

During the next five days the planes were 

ablc to bring in between tOO and 185 tons 

of ammunition daily, about enough to meet 

day-to-day requirements. 

By 6 February Manstein and both of the 

army commanders were convinced that 

neither of the relief forces would be able to 

punch through all th e way to the pocket. 

XXXXVlT Panzer Corps, itself under 

heavy attack on its flanks, was getting nowhere at all. III Panzer Corps, with a 

shorter distance (about twenty miles) to go, 

was pushing ahead slowly but was having 

trouble bringing up gasoline and ammuniti on. The tank crcws ~verc carryi ng- gasoline to the front in buckets, and man)' of 

the infantrymen were slogging through the 

knee-deep mud barefooted, finding this bs 

exhausting than having to stop and retrievc 

their boots every few steps. At the sam{' 

:.oj DA Pamphlet 20- 234, Operatiom 0/ Encircled 

Forces ( Washington, 1952 ), pp. '5- 20. 
232 

time, air supply to the pocket had again 

stopped completely, which meant that the 

pocket might run out of ammunition in 

three to four days. On 5 February Eighth 

Army sent an officer courier to alert the 

two corps to the possibility that they might 

have to come part way to meet the relief 

forces. \OVhcn the army, on the same day, 

proposed awarding both commanding generals the Knight's Cro&, of the Iron Cross 

"to boost morale," Manstcin replied that 

it would be better to wait until an actual 

order for the breakout had been given "to 

avoid comparisons with January 1943." 

As always, Hitler's approval was slow in 

coming. He delayed authorizing a preparatory order for the breakout until late on 

the night of 6 February; the execution was 

still to depend on further developments. 

Act ually, once the preparations began. 

complete execution could not be delayed 

morc than a few days, since to mount an 

attack to the southwest the perimeter of the 

pocket would have to be drawn in so tightly that every part of the pocket would be 

exposed to enemy fire. Eighth Army transmitted the order as soon as it came in and 

directed General der Artillerie Wilhelm 

Stemmermann, the senior corps commander, to head both corps in the pocket. 30 

During the next four days, while Stemmermann positioned his units, III Panzer 

Corps inched forward through snow, mud, 

and fog in local attacks and attempted to 

bring up enough tanks for a final push on 

the I I tho On the night of 8 February 

planes dropped 100 tons of ammunition 

into the pocket, and on the loth they be-

:'0 ADK 8. lao Kriegstagebluh . Nr. 3. 5, 6 Feb 

44. -"OK B .,}82gB/2 file : Pz. AOK 1. la. KriegJ-

/a gebuch NT. 13.5.6 Feb 44. Pz . AOK I 58683/1 

file ; Dbkdo H . Gr. Sued. In NT. 0765144 an AD"" 

8.6.2.44 . AOK 8 582g8/15 file . 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

gan to land again, taking in another hundred tons of ammunition, several thousand 

gallons of gas, and evacuating 400 

wounded. On the loth rain softened the 

ground even more than before; but Manstein and Woehler decided the attempt 

would have to be made the next day because XI Corps, which had started with 

only one good division out of three, appeared on the verge of collapse. First 

Panzer Army ordered II I Panzer Corps to 

begin its final drive on the I ilh "no matter 

what," and without the tanks, if nccesfla ry.:u 

Spurred by a mood of near desperation, 

III Panzer Corps attacked carlyon the 

I I th and pushed its advance elements, 

hindered more by the mud than by the 

Russians, into the southern quarter of Lisyanka, nearly to the narrow but fairly deep 

Gniloy Tikich River. The army headquarters ordered the corps to cross the river 

and keep going north, taking advantage of 

the slight momentum it had. But before 

the end of the day the corps reported that 

this was impossible. It would have to stop 

for supplies; because of the weather the 

tanks were burning gasoline at three times 

the normal rate. 32 

The attack out of the pocket, started 

shortly before midnight on the II th, surprised the Russians and carried a mile or 

so to the villages of Khil'ki and Komarovka, 

ofT the southwestern rim.n But the next 

day Stemmermann's troops had all they 

could do to hold the Khil'ki-Komarovka 

.1 1 Pt. AOK I , fa , Kriegstagebuch NT. 13, 7- 10 

Feb 44. Pz. AOK 1 5868311 file; AOK 8, la . 

Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3 , 7- 10 Feb 44, AOK a 

58298/2 file. 

'" Pz. AOK I . la Kriegstagebuch Nr. 13 . II Feb 

44. P7 . AOK 1 58681 file. 

:L1 Gen . Kdo. XI A.K ., fa K,iegslagebuch , 28. 1 .-

I [ 4.44. [I Feb 44. XI AX. 48755 / 1 file . 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 233 

line against furious counterattacks. Despite 

a "now or never" warning from army 

headquarters, III Panzer Corps remained 

stalled south of the Gniloy Tikich throughout the day as rain and rising temperature 

slowed the efforts to bring up ammunition 

and refuel the tanks. 

On 13 February part of III Panzer Corps 

crossed the Gniloy Tikich and pushed to 

the northern outskirts of Lisyanka. Between Khil'ki and Komarovka the Germans 

and Russians were locked in an all-day 

battle in which neither side made any 

worthwhile gains. Yard by yard, III 

Panzer Corps gained ground the next day 

but was stopped before nightfall by counterattacks, heavy snow, and mud. The 1st 

Panzer Division and Heavy Panzer Regiment Backe were all that the corps could 

support north of the river. The heavy 

panzer regiment's Tiger tanks had run up 

a phenomenal score of 400 Russian tanks 

destroyed in three weeks, but was itself 

down to its last half dozen tanks." That 

night, after deciding that the day's events 

had shown that TIl Panzer Corps would 

not get through to the pocket in time. 

Woehler authorized Stcmmcrman to take 

his northeastern front behind the Ross 

River and instructed him to mas.r; all the 

troops he could for a thrust out of the line 

Khil'ki-Komarovka to Dzhurzhentsy, halfway between the pockct and Lisyanka." 

The 1St Panzer Division, with the hcav} 

lank regiment in the lead, ~a incd a little 

on 15 February but failed to reach 

either Dzhurzhent'y or Hill 239.0, which 

commanded a ridge line south of the town 

3IPZ. AOK 1, 10 Kriegstngebu ch NT. '3. 1:1. 14 

Feb 44. P ... AOK I .)8683/ 1 file. 

~ AOK 8, l a Io:riegstoRfbuch NT . 3. 14 Feb 44. 

AOK 858298/2 file. 

and was the highest elevation on the approach to the pocket. First Panzer Army 

reported that III Panzer Corps definitely 

did not have enough strength to get through 

to the pocket. Manstein had already 

reached the same conclusion. Until then 

he had thought a relief could be effected 

by the orthodox method of extending the 

two fronts toward each other until they 

met, but that had clearly become impossible. He told Woehler that Stemmermann 

would have to be given a directive to mass 

his forces for an all-or-nothing attempt. 

Woehler's order to Stcmmermann stated 

that he would have to reach Dzhurzhentsy 

or Hill 239.0 on his own power. It instructed him to assemble all the artillery 

he could to open a breach and to place 

Generalleutnant Theobald Lieb, Commanding General, XXXXTI Corps. in command of the assault force. Stemmcrmann 

replied that he would attack as ordered at 

2300 on 16 February. 

Breakout 

The 16th was a day to test everyone's 

nerves. During the past several days wet 

snow blanketing the familiar mud had piled 

to depths of three feet in gullies and low 

spots. To the troops in the pocket the 

snow at least brought some respite from air 

attacks and afforded concealment that 

otherwise was hard to find in the pocket. 

which had shrunk to a width of about six 

miles. Lieb noted in his diary that when 

the snow stopped he could see almost the 

whole pocket from his command pOSt. 36 

In the morning Manstein ordered the 

breakout to begin without artillery and 

the artillery to be positioned so th at it could 

311 DA Pamphlet 20- 234. p. ~5. 
234 

go into action when the first strong resist· 

ancc was met. In the afternoon the Russians retook Komarovka, the southern 

anchor of the breakout front. Stemmermann had to revise his plan to incorporate 

the changes. The loss of Komarovka endangered the south flank, pa rticularly of 

the units which would follow the first 

assault waves. 

During the day the 1St Panzer Division, 

with Heavy Panzer R egiment Backe still 

in the lead, tried aga in to reach Dzhurzhcntsy, but it could not push its front 

beyond the northern tip of Lispnka . The 

heavy panzer regiment, ranging ahead, 

managed once to get three tanks atop Hill 

239.0, but heavy fire from the flanks forced 

th em back 400 yards behind th e hill. By 

nightfall nothing more could be done. Fir.;t 

Panzer Army had brought hospital trains 

up to thc closest station bchind the front 

and had J U-S2 'S standing by to take on 

wou nded at th e U man airfield . J\[anstcin 

waited out the night aboard his command 

train in U man, where First Panzer Army 

had its headquarters,:!; 

O n the lin e of departure in the pockct 

Slcmmcrmann sta tioned Corps Detachment 

B (the I 12th Infantry D ivision and remnants of two other divisions) on the north 

in Khil'ki, the 7'2d Infantry Division in the 

center, and thc SS ' Viking Di\'ision in th e 

south .:!'> After KOl11 arovka was lost, the 

latter two divisions had to occupy th C' !<iCttor originally intended for one, which occasioned some last-mi nute confusion and 

~Pz. AOK 1. I n Krieg$tngebu ch Nr. 13. 14- 16 

Feb 44, Pl . AOK 1 .')8683/1 file : AOK 8. l a 

Kriegstagebu. ch Nr. 3. 14- 16 Feb 44. AOK R 

')8298/ 2 file; Manstein. V ('rlorene Siege. p. ,;8~-). 

3!1 The "corps detachments" were composed uf 

several d ivisions greatly reduced in strtne;th (I!>crating under a divisional staff. Tn sizc they wcre approximatcly equal to a standard infantry division 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

scrambling. Each division placed a regiment with artillery in the vanguard and 

echeloned two approximately rcgimelltsized units behind it. Stemmermann took 

personal command of the rea r gua rd , th e 

57th and 88th Divisions, which was to 

withdraw to three successive phase lines: 

the first was to be reached shortly before 

2300 on the 16th ; th e last was approxima tely th e line of departure of the assault 

divisions. The sixth division, the 389th 

Infantry Division, had gone out of existence 

a week ea rl ier wh en jts last 200 men were 

a ttached to the 57th Infantry Division. 

The total strength of the pocket, in cl uding 

Russian auxili aries, stood at about 45,000 

men, including 1,500 wounded who were 

to be left behin d." 

The a ttack bega n on time an hour before 

midnight on th e 16 February. Jumping ofT 

in silence and using onl y knives and bayonets, the th ree assa ult regiments cut through 

the outpost li ne and main screening line 

before the Russians knew wha t had happened. The regiment of Corps Detachment B met no marc Russians until it 

arrived at the Russian lin e between Dzhurzhentsy and Hill 239.0, which it pushed 

through easily. T hereafter it cd on 

white :;; ignal fl ares fired by th t.: 1St Panl.cr 

Divi!'ion and reached th c north ern tip (,f 

Lisya nka at osoo.1n 

The rc~i nt of the 72d Infantr\' Di\·i-

~io n had C\TTl hctter luck. On rcarhi n!.!" 

the road ru nn ing into hllr cnt~y from 

the sou th easl it encountered fOtlr Sm·irl 

ta nks and a column of trucks ll1ov n~ to-

:Ill Cruppl' StemmUlIllll/tI. III Nr. rl36 / 44. Be/I'M 

/1It'f (/("11 lJlIllhbT1/1h . f5 ·:} 44· P7 .. \OK J 5k6S'11 

21 fill' 

.~ f,.·orp I-Abtei/u"J! lJ l a Nr rlOO/44. (111 Dn 

(;I'IlP/U' M a/tf'lIJ../o/t. 24.2.44. Pz . .'\OK I ~)B6B :I/ 

fill' 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 235 

ward the town. When someone yelled, 

"Slo;'" (Halt! ) the tanks stopped and let 

the Germans cross the road. The Russians did not realize their mistake until the 

cannon company went across, and then it 

was too late. The regiment moved off into 

the darkness quickly, not paying any further 

attention to the tanks which had by then 

become embroiled with other German units 

coming up behind, and made its way to the 

1st Panzer Division front north of Lisyanka 

shortly after." 

The SS regiment was not so fortunate. 

Passing east of Dzhurzhentsy, it encountered heavy machine gun, antitank, and 

tank fire from the edge of the settlement. 

It diverted one battalion to throw the Russians back while the main force turned 

due south, apparently to avoid heavy tank 

fire from the direction of Hill 239.0. By 

turning south, the regiment extended the 

distance it had to go and placed itself east 

of the Gniloy Tikich. To reach Lisyanka, 

it had to cross the river. The only way to 

do that was to swim. All of the heavy 

equipment which had come that far stayed 

on the cast bank, and most of the SS men 

had to discard their riAes in the water. 

Even so, many of them drowned, the first 

of hundreds, perhaps thousands, who 

shared the same fate in the icy water that 

day. '" 

The second wave followed the first after 

a I a-minute interval. Then, at a slower 

pacr the heavy equipment began to move 

out. Stemmermann had ordered all vehicles destroyed except tanks, self-propelled assault guns, tracked prime movers, 

and enough horse-drawn wagons to carry 

n 72 I.D ., fa Nr. 158144. Gefechtsbericht, 23 .2 

44. Pl. AOK I 58683/!;! I file. 

I~ SS- pz Diu. Wiking. la N,., 158144 . Gt/echtsberiehl, Pz. AOK I 58683/ 21 fil e. 

men wounded during the breakout. That 

still left enough vehicles to create traffic 

jams behind the line of departure, particularly since some units disregarded the 

order and tried to take along ordinary 

trucks and heavily loaded wagons that 

promptly got stuck. The attempt to save 

the vehicles, tanks, and heavy equipment 

was almost exclusively a battle against the 

terrain. Many of the vehicles that left 

Khil'ki had to be abandoned in the bottom 

of a gully a mile and a half to the south. 

Those that found a way across or started 

farther south were all, excepting a few 

horse-drawn wagons, eventually trapped in 

the snow and mud. Many piled up against 

the ridges flanking Hill 239.0. Others 

turned south, and a few reached the Gniloy 

Tikich only to be lost in the swampy bottomland or in the river itself. 

During the night Stemmermann kept his 

command post in Khil'ki, most of the time 

out of touch with his subordinate commands. Tanks, troops, and Russian artillery fire had severed most of the telephone 

lines, and last-minute transfers of radio sets 

from trucks to horse-drawn pallje wagons 

had put nearly all the sets out of order. At 

0300, having deduced from the receding 

sound of the fighting that the breakout was 

succeeding, Stemmermann dispat ched 

orders by radio and by runner to the two 

rearguard divisions, instructing them to fall 

back to the second and third phase lines in 

the next three hours and then strike southwestward toward Lisyanka. An hour later 

he and his staff followed the last wave of 

Corps Detachment B out of Khil'ki, intending to set up a new comand post about 

half way to Dzhurzhentsy. South of Khi}'ki. 

in the confused mass of troops and vehicle" 

he became separated from the staff. Later 

a soldier reported he had taken the ,I!;eneral 
236 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

WRECKAGE-STREWN PATH OF GERMAN BREAKOUT NEAR CHERKASSY 

aboard his wagon shortly before it was 

blown to pieces by a Russian antitank 

shell." 

Lieb and the officers of his staff, all on 

horseback, moved out behind the last 

echelon of the 72d Infantry Division at 

0330. Half an hour later they crossed the 

gully south of Khil'ki, by then filled Witll 

smashed, half-buried vehicles which were 

being ground into unrecognizable junk by 

Russian tank and antitank gun fire from 

Komarovka. Dawn found them due west 

of Dzhurzhentsy. They could hear the 

noise of heavy fighting coming from the 

.a.3 AOK 8, Che/.la Nr. 1247/ 44. an H. Gr. Sued, 

Chef Gen . Stab. 21.2.44, Pz. AOK I 58683/21 file. 

town, Hill 239.0, and the woods to the 

south, but their own troops were still moving ahead rapidly toward Hill 239.0. By 

the time they and the troops drew up to 

the hill the Russians were pouring in artillery and rocket fire from the flanks and had 

tanks ranged along the woods. All that 

was left was to turn south. 

When Lieb's chief of staff reached the 

Gniloy Tikich in the midmorning he found 

several thousand troops there trying to 

swim across. Some left their weapons on 

the bank, others tried to throw them across 

the 50-foot wide river and in most cases 

failed. While he watched many drowned, 

and many more collapsed on the opposite 

shore. Late in the afternoon, after doing 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 237 

SOVIET ROCKET FIRE NEAR DZHURZHENTSY 

what they could to establish some order at 

the crossing, he and Lieb swam the river 

and joined the long lines of unarmed, often 

nearly naked, men trudging up the snowy 

slope away from the Gniloy Tikich toward 

Lisyanka,H 

Stemmermann's chief of staff, who came 

out with the divisions of the rear guard, 

observed that all semblance of order disappeared shortly after daylight. By then 

the Russians had a clear idea of what was 

going on, and brought the Germans under 

heavy machine gun, mortar, and artillery 

fire as soon as they passed west of Komarovka. To escape they took cover in ravines 

U Gen. Kdo. XXXXII A.K'J Chef des Generalstabes. Ia NT. 158/ 44. an Obkdo, d. 1. Pz. AOK 1. 

58683/' file. 

and gullies. Units became completely 

mixed, and no one thought of anything 

except to keep under cover and reach safety. 

Since the fire from the direction of Dzhurzhentsy and Hill 239.0 was the heaviest, except for occasional groups which broke 

through to northern Lisyanka during the 

day, almost the entire movement veered 

south to the bend of the Gniloy Tikich." 

In all, 30,000 troops escaped from the 

pocket. Manstein and the two army commanders were pleased and relieved to have 

gotten that many out. Even Hitler did no 

more than grumble briefly about the lost 

materiel. On the other hand, the psycho-

.~ Gen. Kdo. XI A.K'J Der Chef des General· 

stabes. fa Br. B. NT. 19/ 44. 23.2-44. XI A.K. 

48755/2 file. 
238 

logical state of the men who came out 

shocked the army group and army commands. The troops of the heavy tank 

regiment, in constant combat and without 

a full meal in weeks, were astonished at the 

good physical condition of the first units 

from the pocket to reach their line. They 

were more astonished when both officers 

and men refused to stay and help their 

lagging comrades." On 17 February Manstein decided he would have to send all the 

survivors back into Poland to rest and 

recuperate. First Panzer Army reported, 

HIt must . .. be recognized that these troops 

were encircled since 28 January and, consciously Or subconsciously, had the fate of 

Stalingrad before their eyes." It observed 

that the "inner substance" was still there, 

but added, "One must not fail to recognize 

that only the rew soldiers who possess inborn toughness (as opposed to that which 

might be instilled by military discipline ) 

would be able to withstand such strain 

morc than once." 47 

Nikopol and Krivoi Rog 

When Headquarters, Sixth Army, took 

control of the former First Panzer Army 

zone in the lower half of the Great Bend 

of the Dnepr, it assumed the mission of 

holding an indefensible front to protect an 

untenable position- that of Seventeenth 

Army in th e Crimea- and to keep in German hands economic assets which had by 

then become military liabilities- the iron 

~8S. P.z.-Regt. Baeke , Abt. } a, Bericht ueber die 

Verbindungsaufnahme deT westlich T scherkass), 

eingeschlosStlnen K orps am 17.:J44. Pz . AOK 1 

58683/ 2 I fil e. 

'7 Pz. AOK I , 1a Nr. 158/ 44, Stellungnahme zu 

den Gefechtsberichten der Gruppe Stemmernl(Hln 

und des HI Pz. K orps ueber die Kaempfe vom 16. 

bis 18 ~44, Pz. AOK I 58683/2 1 fil e. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

and manganese mines at Krivoi Rog and 

Nikopol. (Map 21 ) 

Schoerner in Command 

ot! Ihe Bridgehead 

To make certain that the most crucial 

sector of the Sixth Army front would be 

held no matter what, Hitler had called in 

General der Gebirgstruppe Ferdinand 

Schoerner at the end of October 1943 and 

given him command of the three corps in 

the loop inside the Dnepr Bend and on the 

bridgehead.4.S Schoerner was one of the 

"new" generals, a convinced Nazi whose 

military reputation thus far was founded 

on two qualities- energy and determination. He had a knack for cultivating comraderie with the troops, which to some ex· 

tent concealed a strong tendency toward 

ruthlessness and severity in his treatment of 

subordinates. His last command had been 

XIX Mountain Corps in northern Finland, 

where he had coined the slogan "The 

Arctic does not exist" (Arklis isl nichl ). 

By the turn of the year the chances of 

Schoerner's talents being brought into play 

in the manner Hitler had desired were 

small. North of Sixth Army the Russians 

had cut in so deeply west of the Dnepr 

that the army's front was bent in the middle 

to a right angle. Approximately half the 

front- that held by Schoerner's three 

corps- faced southeast. All that was left of 

the original Dnepr line, it possessed good 

field fortifications, but behind lay the broad 

flood plain of the Dnepr, marshy and crisscrossed by watercourses which during that 

winter hardly ever froze. The exits from 

the bridgehead were a temporary bridge at 

UTaetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heeresper· 

sonaiamts, 29 Oct 43, H 4/ 12 file . 
OFFENSIVES ON B01iH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 239 

l 

r 'r " 

.J 

n .. 

El~H 

• 

-

( 

FIFTYSEVENTK 

--_I 

E,GtfTH 

GUARDS 

.. ) 

\ 

f 

~ \ , ~X .. 

I {I~& , 

Y 

\ r ... 

~~~ 0' .' .,' 

SECO"4l 

GUARDS 

THE NIKOPOL BRIDGEHEAD 

AND KRIVOI ROG 

IOJonuory-29 February 1944 

G[R'UM 'ROtot llNt.1I JaN 

G(h'U 'RO'" llNl, "{I 

GUIIU" 'ROIIY liHt,le 'l' 

10 ~o 1<1 40 .. 'lU 

j " I' " , 

MAP 21 

\ 

the north end east of Nikopol and two 

single-lane ponton bridges at the extreme 

south end near Bol'shaya Lepatikha, The 

TWENTY -

EIGHTH 

FIFTH SHOCK 

) 

other half of the Sixth Army Front, fa cing 

north and slightly cast, was a tenuous line 

across the open steppe cut at right angles 
240 

by numerous gullies and the watercourses 

of five large rivers. It passed 18 miles 

north of Krivoi Rag and go miles north of 

Apostolovo Station, the railroad junction 

where the one railroad still serving the army 

branched northward and toward Nikopol. 

The only all-weather road in the army 

area was the so-called Through Road IV, 

which by then lay too close to the front to 

be of usc except locally around Krivoi Rag. 

The complete absence of any sort of gravel 

or suitable stone had prevented even an 

attempt to lay down hard surfaced roads 

over the deep, soft clay of the region. In 

wet weather, when the ground was not 

frozen-which was most of the time during 

the winter of I94g-44-the railroad and 

tracked vehicles were the only dependable 

means of transportation. The Russians thus 

merely had to advance the go miles to 

Apostolovo Station to effectively cut off 

Schoerner and his three corps. 

Vasilevskiy Stages a Two-Front Battle 

On the Soviet side the projecting Sixth 

Army front imposed a drag on the deep 

right flank of Third Ukrainian Front and 

kept Fourth Ukrainian Front from arranging a final reckoning with Seventeenth 

Army in the Crimea. On the other hand, 

it offered a first-class opportunity for a double envelopment, and Vasilevskiy was there 

to exploit it for the Stavka. 

When a cold wave in the first week of 

January firmed up the ground enough for 

the tanks to get moving, Third Ukrainian 

Front started the attack on 10 January. 

Behind a barrage laid down by 220 artillery pieces and as many rocket launchers, 

80 tanks pushed south on a four and onehalf mile front west of the Buzuluk River. 

Nine riRe divisions in two waves moved in 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

behind the tanks to exploit the breakthrough, but in one of those tactical fumbles which the Soviet commands still periodically perpetrated, the infantry failed to 

keep up with the tanks. Three miles behind the front two panzer divisions stopped 

the tanks and in a few hours destroyed twothirds of them. Before the end of the day, 

in spite of efforts by the artillery to blast an 

opening for the infantry, the Germans 

closed the front and regained all but a mile 

or so of the ground they had lost. 

During the next three days Malinovskiy 

committed such masses of infantry that 

their weight alone pushed the front back 

five miles. These were five miles Sixth 

Anny could not afford to lose, and the commanding general, Hollidt, decided to take 

the 24th Panzer Division from the bridgehead for a counterattack; but, before the 

division could be moved, Fourth Ukrainian 

Front attacked south of Nikopol at the narrowest point of the bridgehead. Hollidt 

found himself faced with a choice of sacrificing the five miles in the north or, possibly, 

losing ground on the bridgehead where a 

mile or two might be fatal. He decided to 

do the former, taking, as the army later put 

it, "the consequences of this two-front battle 

in which neither front can support the 

other." On the 16th, having failed to do 

more than dent the bridgehead, the Russians stopped both there and on the north. 

During the next week and a half Sixth 

Army's chances of withstanding another 

attack fell sharply. Warm weather turned 

the ground to ·soft, soupy mud, and Vasilevskiy took advantage of several days of 

heavy fog that began on 19 January to 

move a guards mechanized corps and two 

guards rifle corps from opposite the bridgehead to the Sixth Army north front, more 

than doubling the strength there. To dis-
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 241 

guise the movements Fourth Ukrainian 

Front feigned heavy traffic toward the 

Crimea and put dummy tanks in the assembly areas of the units that had pulled 

Gut. 

Hollidt, astonished that the Russians had 

not placed more weight there in the first 

place, was fully aware that next time the 

fate of the bridgehead would be decided on 

the north front. To give himself a strong 

mobile reserve, he decided to take his four 

panzer divisions out of the line and hold 

them as a panzer corps behind the north 

front. On 24 January that still seemed 

possible, but in the next four days he had 

to give up, first, an infantry division for the 

Crimea, then approximately two infantry 

divisions to Eighth Army, and finally, the 

24th Panzer Division, his strongest division, 

to Eighth Army. In the end, all he could 

spare for the reserve was the 9th Panzer 

Division, which was weak in infantry and 

artillery and down to thirteen tanks, about 

one-third of its normal complement. After 

losing the four divisions, Sixth Army had 

left 20 divisions with average front-line 

strengths of 2,500 men. Against this force 

the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts 

could throw 5 I rifle divisions, half of them 

in full fighting trim, 2 mechanized corps, 2 

tank corps, and half a dozen tank brigades. 

On the morning of 30 January, after 

laying down 30,000 artillery rounds on the 

German front in an hour, Third Ukrainian 

Front launched a massive infantry assault 

against a 4-mile stretch of the XXX Corps 

front west of the Buzuluk River. This time 

the tanks stayed behind, waiting for the infantry to open a gap, but the German artillery laid down a barrage of its own that hit 

the infantry before they could jump off 

and threw them so completely off balance 

that the attack dissolved into a series of 

uncoordinated skirmishes. 

The next day, leading off with heavier 

artillery fire than the day before, Malinovskiy tried again, giving the infantry 130 

tanks plus an estimated 300 aircraft in support. The thrust carried south two and 

one half miles on a 7-mile front, still without breaching the XXX Corps line. Hollidt 

took the 23d Panzer Division out of the 

front farther west. With it, the gth Panzer 

Division, and an infantry division from the 

bridgehead, he intended to counterattack; 

meanwhile, Fourth Ukrainiall Front had 

pushed a deep wedge into the south end of 

the bridgehead toward Bol'shaya Lepatikha. Once again, except for the two 

weak panzer divisions, all of his strength 

on both fronts was tied down. At the end 

of the day he informed Army Group South 

that if the Russians broke through in the 

north Sixth Army would be helpless. He 

applied for permission to evacuate the 

bridgehead and go back to the line of the 

Kamenka River. 

It was already almost too late. On I 

February Soviet tanks carrying infantry 

penetrated the XXX Corps line in several 

places where the defending German tanks 

and assault guns had fired their last ammUnItIOn. By nightfall the Russians had 

opened a 6-mile gap in the front west of 

the Buzuluk. In the mud, which was by 

then knee-deep, they had superior mobilit\". 

Wide tracks gave their tanks some buoyancy, and their powerful American-built 

trucks and half-tracks, though slowed 

down, could negotiate all but the worst 

stretches. On the other end of the technological spectrum, they had the small, 

high-riding, horse-drawn panje wagons. 

The Germans were handicapped in particular by their trucks, two-wheel drive commercial types that could not cope with the 
242 

mud. Their prime movers were good but 

LOO few. Most of the time their tanks kept 

moving, though just barely. The self-propelled assault guns performed better. 

On 2 February, while the 23d and 9th 

Panzer Divisions plowed through the murl 

in a futil e attempt at a !l ank attack, Eighth 

Guards A rm y too k Sholokhovo and a 

mechanized corps veered west and crossed 

the Kamenka. At day's end the Russians 

stood five miles north of the vital railroad 

to Nikopol, ten miles north of the Dnepr, 

and had a solid foothold in the proposed 

Kamenka line." At 1845 Zeitzler called 

Kleist at Army Group A and told him to 

take over Sixth Army immediately. Hitler 

had approved th, army's going back to the 

Kamenka. He wanted a small bridgehead 

held a round Bol'shaya Lepatikha, and he 

expected th at by shortening its line the army 

would be able to spare two divisions. One 

was to go to th e Crimea and th e other to 

the lower Dnepr. To make sure these divi-

,ions would go where he wanted them was 

the reason he had taken Sixth Army out of 

Manstein's command o 

R etreat From the Bridgehead 

Sixth Army ordered Schoerner to begin 

drawing in the bridgehead front on 4 February. Fortunately two divisions were already standing by east of Nikopol. O n the 

3d the army managed to get through a 

trainload of ammunition on the railroad. 

For two more days th e rolling stock could be 

shuttled to pick up the troops coming 

across the Dnepr and carry them out to the 

Buzuluk River, where th ey threw up a 

n AOK 6, 10 I<riegstagebu ch NT. 10. pp. lXXIV, AOK 6 47595/ 1 fi le. 

W Obkdo. H . Cr. A, l a Kriegslagtbuch. Band 3 , 

r eil 5 , !Z Feb 44, H . Gr. A 75 126/ 25 fi le. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

scree nin g line fa cin g west. Sch oe rn er 

made th e painful but unavoidable decision 

to destroy the heavy equipment, except 

horse-drawn artillery and tracked vehicles, 

where it stood. As a result, the troops were 

gotten out more quickly and in better condition than if they had wasted energy on 

an almost certainly fu tile effort to manhandle trucks and guns through the mud . 

West of the Dnepr ':X,xX Corps had lost 

all of its trucks and had broken up into 

small groups, some platoon size, most 

smaller. Nobody from the commanding 

general down had anything he could not 

wear or carry, and many of the soldiers 

had lost their boots in the mud. Off the 

corps' right fl ank, 9th Panzer Division 

made its way into Kamenka, which it held 

long enough to slow somewhat the Soviet 

thrust toward Apostolovo. 

On his side Malinovskiy, as his supply 

lines lengthened, was having trouble with 

the mud too, trouble he compounded by 

tactical extravagance. On the 4th th e forward units of Eight h Guards Army. reached 

Apostolovo. During the next few days 

Forty-sixth Army moved in and began to 

attempt a sweep west of Apostolovo to envelop Krivoi Rog from the south. At the 

same time, Eighth Guards Army, instead of 

goi ng the ten miles from Sholokhovo to the 

Dnepr, which would have cut off at least 

one of Schoerner's corps completely, struck 

out from the vicinity of Apostolovo toward 

the lower tip of th e bridgehead twenty-five 

miles to the south. 

By 4 February Schoerner had two divisions across the Dnepr and ready to block 

the Ru&sians south of Sholokhovo. Hollidt 

then faced the choice of merely funn eling 

the troops from the inside of th e Dnepr 

Bend and the northern half of the bridgehead th rough the corridor below Sholo-
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE SOUTH FLANK 243 

khovo or attempting to push northwestward from the foothold on the lower Kamenka River toward XXX Corps right 

flank, which was still on the Kamenka 

north of Apostolovo. The first, he concluded, would mean using up a considerable part of the strength of two panzer 

divisions, the 9th and 24th (ordered back 

to the army on the 4th ), to open an 

escape route in the south for Schoerner's 

units. Tactically it would accomplish 

nothing more. The second would get 

Schoerner's divisions out and offer a chance 

to regain the Kamenka River line. The 

plan became morc attractive during the 

next few days as Schoerner's movements 

went ahead smoothly and the Russian effort 

dispersed." 

By 5 February the 9th Panzer Division, 

after three days' heavy fighting at Kamenka 

and Apostolovo, was just about burned out. 

HoUidt reported that Schoerner could not 

make the breakout alone and proposed 

giving up the smaU bridgehead east of 

Bol'shaya Lepatikha to get three divisions 

for an attack from the south. Kleist forwarded the proposal to the OKH and was 

told that Hitler still wanted the smaU 

bridgehead held but gave the army group 

authority to decide whether or not the divisions should be taken out. The next 

morning Kleist told Hollidt to evacuate the 

Bol'shaya Lepatikha bridgehead." 

On 7 February the last German troops 

east of Nikopol crossed the Dnepr, blowing 

up the bridge behind them. The next day 

one of Schoerner's corps, IV Corps, attacked west while XXVII Corps, withdrawing out of the Dnepr Bend, screened its 

61 AOK 6, /a Kriegstagebuch Nr. 10, pp. XXIVXXIX, AOK 6 47595" 61e. 

D Obkdo. H. Gr. A, Ia Kriegstagebuch , Band 3, 

Teil S. 5- 6 Feb 44, H. Gr. A 75126/ 25 file . 

rear. For three days IV Corps gained 

ground. On the loth the 9th Panzer Division and part of the 24th Panzer Division 

pushed into the open space south of Apostolovo where they smashed a guards rifle 

corps. Meanwhile, two of the divisions 

from the Bol'shaya Lepatikha bridgehead 

had fanned out along the west bank of the 

Dnepr and the other was moving north 

into the area south of Apostolovo. 

But the mud and the Russians were too 

much. After IV Corps made no progress 

at aU on the I I th, the army caUed a halt, 

ordering the 9th and 24th Panzer Divisions 

to turn east and Schoefner to turn south, 

skirt the southern edge of the Russian advance, and so establish contact with each 

other. On the night of the 12th Kleist informed the OKH that Sixth Army could 

patch together a front for the time being but 

could not hold it. The Russians could strike 

south to the lower Dnepr and north past 

Krivoi Rog any time they chose. He proposed taking Army Group A and the right 

flank of Army Group South back to the 

line of the Ingul and lower Bug Rivers as, 

he implied, a first step toward getting both 

southern army groups back to the next 

defensible line, that of the Bug. 

Krivai Rag-The lngulets 

In the second half of February a peculiar 

sort of semiparalysis settled on the entire 

German southern flank. On the 18th 

Kleist, turning again to the OKH, advised 

letting Army Group A and most of Army 

Group South withdraw to the Bug River. 

To make the prospect "more appetizing" 

for Hitler, he suggested holding several 

large bridgeheads from which offensives 

could be launched later to retake some of 

the lost ground. The withdrawal to the 
244 

Bug was not new; Manstein had suggested 

it before and so had Kleist. Both ~lanstein and Zeitzler seconded the proposal. 

Zeitzler seemed to tJUnk the withdrawal 

was inevitable- but nothing happened. 

On the 19th, Sixth Army closed the lasI 

gap in its front southwest of Apostolovo. 

The day before, Schoerner had departed to 

take up a new assignment as Chief of Ihe 

National Socialist Leadership Corps, the 

organization for political indoctrination in 

the Army. Two days later, on the 21st, the 

Russians broke into the outer defenses of 

Krivoi Rog. As at Nikopol, the mines had 

been destroyed, the able-bodied population 

evacuated, and the movable goods, except 

for 100,000 tons of mined iron ore, hauled 

away_ To avoid a costly house-ta-house 

battle, Kleist made Sixth Army withdraw 

behind the city. Alter that, reluctant as 

always, Hitler agreed to let Sixth Army go 

behind the Ingulets River as far south as 

Arkhangelskoye, but he insisted that the 

anny stay on the Dnepr below Dudchino. 

The Dnepr afforded a better natural defense line than the meandering I ngulets; 

on the other hand, by keeping the army 

there, Hitler again created a large bulge to 

the east. 

In the meantime new trouble loomed on 

the left Rank, where the Sixth Army's left 

corps and Eighth Army's right corps held 

a shallow bulge between Kirovograd and 

Krivoi Rag. Konev had deployed strong 

forces off the Eighth Armv right Rank and 

appeared ready to strike to the southwest 

at any moment. Fully occupied on his left 

Rank, Manstein transferred the Eighth 

Army's right Rank corps to Army Group A. 

At the end of the month the attack had 

not started, Sixth Army was going back to 

the Ingulets by stages, and in the south the 

front was still on the Dnepr, where drifting 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ice kept the Russians from ferrying troops 

across and gave the Germans time to catch 

their breath." In Berchtesgaden Hitler 

conferred with Antonescu, and although 

the Rumanian leader argued that in spite 

of the political disadvantages the Crimea 

ought to be evacuated for military reasons, 

Hitler remained more than ever convinced 

the peninsula had to be beld." 

Dubno-Lu/sk-K ouel' 

Manstein's 6 January order to the First 

Panzer and Fourth Panzer Armies was concerned with two enemy thrusts, one to the 

south, toward Zhmerinka, between the 

Ranks of the two armies and the other 

against the Fourth Panzer Army north 

flank toward Rovno and Shepetovka. 

( Map 22 ) Since the first had made greater 

progress and was the more dangerous, he 

had told the annies to concentrate against it. 

On the north, he had instructed LIX Corps 

to continue covering the Fourth Panzer 

Army Rank, using its main force to hold 

the Russians away from Shepetovka and a 

smaller one to screen Ravno. ~:S 

LIX Corps, in the retreat from Korasten, 

had lost Novograd Volynskiy, giving the 

Russians access to two main roads, one 

running due west to Ravno, the other southwest to Shepetovka. In the heavily wooded, 

swampy terrain on the edge of the Prip"at 

Marshes roads were important. Since the 

distance to Shepetovka was shorter and the 

weight of the Soviet attack was being directed southwest rather than west, Fourth 

$:I Oblr:do. H. Cr . ..... , Ia Kriegstagebu.ch , Band 3. 

Teil 5 , 7-~9 Feb 44, H . Gr. A 75126/25 file. 

M OKW. WFSt, K.T.B. AusarbeilulIg, Ostfront, 

1.1.-31.3·44, pp. loA and 28A, OKW/ 1929 file. 

",. H. Gr. Sued. /a Nr. 0748/44. 6.1.44. AOK 8 

58'298/1 5 file. 
fO LU'LI~ 

--------- ---- ----

MAP 22 

~-

Portl,ons __ 

00' -- - Cavalry --

~ 

-- --- ~--

DUBNO - LUTSK -KOVEL' 

6 Jon\lory -I March 1944 

___ G(.w.'" '~ONl liNE, 'JAN 

"rTrT1"'I"'T G(~ .N f ftO Nt LINE, ' ''U 

10 0 10 10 'O""LU 

I ',',', Ii' i " , 10 0 !O to JQ.'LOWUUS 

THIRTEENTH 

~h:,,~ 

"'"" r 'E -, " L1X ., 

L _ -' .""" 

./ " '''''''''''''''''''-''''''' '){ ~~~ ~ 

CO"':' ( NCB_.,J, 
246 

Panzer Army had already ordered the 

corps to shift its headquarters there and 

concentrate on holding open the railroad. 

This left only Corps Detachment C (about 

the strength of an infantry division ) and 

the 454th Security Division between the 

Russians and Rovno, where the road and 

railroad forked northwestward to Kovel' 

and Lublin and southwestward to Duhno, 

Brody, and L'vov. The LIX Corps main 

force, (\'."0 infantry divisions, was isolated 

too, but in falling back to Shepetovka it 

drew closer to the center of the Fourth 

Panzer Army front. Against LIX Corps, 

Sixtieth Army was advancing toward Shepetovka and Thirteenth Army was turning 

west toward Rovno. 

Shepetovka and Rovno were the last 

German handholds on the main railroad 

running \ ... ·est of Kiev. If they were lost, the 

enemy would have complete control of a 

railroad into the exposed flank of Army 

Group South. Romo could be used as a 

staging area for operations north toward 

Lublin or, more profitably, southwest toward L'vov. From Ravno to L'vov and 

the main supply artery of Army Group 

South the distance was 1 10 miles, from 

Shepetovka to Ternopol it was 80 miles. 

Another 30 to 50 miles would take the Russians across the Dnestr and to the foothills 

of the Carpathians. 

~1anstein, as sensitive as ever to the danger on his left flank, could do nothing as 

long as Hitler insisted on keeping Arm~· 

Group A and the right flank of Army 

Group South echeloned east and exposed to 

simultaneous attacks in half a dozen places. 

On 14 January Manstein instructed Fourth 

Panzer Army to shift the Headquarters, 

XIII Corps, north to take command of 

Corps Detachment C and of the 454th 

Security Dh-ision, which were still trying to 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

hold a front on the Goryn River twenty 

miles east of Rovno. Farther north Soviet 

cavalry supported by partisan bands was 

already penetrating the outlying forests and 

swamps of the Pripyat Marshes in the direction of Kovel' and Lutsk. In the woods the 

Germans had found lukewarm allies in the 

Ukrainian nationalist partisans, who hated 

Russians more than they did Germans but 

whose value from the German point of 

view was greatly reduced by the lack of a 

unified command and a deplorable inclination to kill all Poles and Russians, including those in the German service. 

XIII Corps was given the missions of 

holding Rovno and keeping the Russians 

away from the roads and railroads west of 

the city, even though no one really believed 

that the corps could do either. On 21 

January the commanding general reported 

that he could not pre\·ent the Russians' infiltrating through the forests north of 

Rovno, and for his troops to push them 

back out was entirely out of the question. 

At the end of the month he predicted that 

Rovno would be lost in a matter of days. 

Two Soviet cavalry corps, which could only 

be tracked by air, were moving through the 

woods behind the city and would soon be in 

position to threaten Lutsk and Kovel'. On 

2 February the Russians took Rovno, and 

on the same day their cavalry drove the 

German garrison out of Lutsk forty miles to 

the west. 

During the next two weeks the Army 

Group South left flank came close to dissolving completely. To escape encirclement and protect L'vov, the main body of 

XIII Corps had to fall back to Dubno. In 

the north Soviet cavalry ranged at will west 

of Lutsk and almost to the outskirts of 

Kovel'. Dubno was half encircled while 

XIII Corps was still going back toward it, 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE SOUTH FLANK 247 

and Hitler demanded that the name of the 

officer entrusted with the defense of the city 

be reported directly to him. The officer 

who had been in command in Rovno he 

called to Fuehrer headquarters and ordered 

to face a court-martial. 

The army, the army group, and the 

OKH had recognized before the end of 

January that to evade a complete disaster 

they would have to commit several more 

divisions on the flank, but these divisions 

were at first nowhere to be found. In the 

first week of February all the army could 

supply was the 7th Panzer Division, a 

kampfgruppe. By 9 February a Soviet 

guards cavalry corps had pushed west of 

Dubno and appeared to be getting ready to 

attack the city from the rear. The next day 

Manstein, who had hoped to wait until the 

fighting around the Cherkassy pocket 

ended, decided he dared wait no longer 

and began shifting reinforcements to the 

flank . He gave XIII Corps the 340th 

Infantry Division (three infantry battalions 

and two of artillery ) and began assembling 

under the Headquarters, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, the 7th and 8th Panzer Divisions 

and two reinforced territorial regiments 

from Poland for an attack north and east 

toward the Styr River and Kovel'. 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was ready 

west of Dubno shortly after the middle of 

the month, but heavy, drifting snow kept it 

from going into action until 22 February. 

The attack went well, reaching Lutsk and 

the Styr River on both sides of the city by 

the 27th. From there the corps turned 

north, and by the end of the month it had 

established a line of strongpoints from 

Kove!' to the XIII Corps left flank west of 

Dubno. 

For the first time in months the gap on 

the extreme left flank of Army Group South 

was closed. The effort, however, had left 

Fourth Panzer Army without the strength 

to patch a 30-mile gap between the XIII 

and LIX Corps flanks. Since mid month 

the Russians had been building up their 

strength in the vicinity of Shepctovka, on 

LIX Corps' left, and on the 26th they began moving fresh troops into the trenches. 

On 2 March Manstein concluded that they 

would strike toward Ternopol before the 

spring thaw set in. 56 

at Pz. AOK 4 , fa Kriegstagebuch, 1.1.- :19.2-44. 

6 Jan - 29 Feb 44. Pz. AOK 4 49417/1 file; Pz. 

AOK 4. la, Chef·Notizen, 1.1.- 15.6·44, 20 Jan3 Mar 44. Pz. AOK 4 5149'2 / 32 file . 
CHAPTER XII 

Offensives on Both Flanksthe North Flank 

o peTation Blau 

During the two years after the first Soviet 

winter offensive, Armv Group North had 

b,· comparison with the other army groups 

occupied an almost stationary front. On 

the right Sixteenth _-\rmy had given up 

some ground but had kept its line anchored 

firmly on Lake Ilmen in the north. Below 

[he lake the old Russian towns, Staraya 

Russa and Kholm, had lain directlv in the 

front since the summer of 194 t. Even the 

breakthrough at Nevel in October '943 was 

more significant as a portent of a possible 

drive to outflank the army group in the 

south than for the loss of ground it involved. 

On the left Eighteenth Armv had fought 

three battles south of Lake Ladoga to keep 

Leningrad under siege and had held the 

Russians to a token gain of a few miles 

along tbe lake shore. From the Volkho'· 

River to the Gulf of Finland the front was 

reminiscent of World War I- a lacework 

of trenches and shell holes, the result of two 

and a half years' fighting in which the gains 

and losses on both sides could be measured 

in yards. Ranged along the coast west of 

the city, the heavy siege artillery transferred 

north in the summer of '942 after Sevastopol could still bring all of Leningrad except 

the northeastern suburbs under fire . 

For more than a year, however, the relati,·e stability of the front had not reflected 

the actual state of the army group. In 

September and October '943 Kuechler had 

had to give up three infant,,· divisions and 

the 25ath Spanish "Blue" Division, at tbe 

same time taking over some sixty miles of 

inadequately manned front from _-\rm,. 

Group Center. As replacements he had 

received three recently fonned 5S divisions 

with mostly non-German personnel and the 

Spanish Legion, the, ,000 men Franco had 

substituted for the Blue Di,-ision, many of 

them Loyalists who were looking for a 

chance to desert to the Russians. 

By December the line around the 

Oranienbaum pocket was being held bv two 

Air Force field di,-isians and two of the SS 

divisions, and, except for the critical sectors 

close to Leningrad and north of Nevel, the 

rest of the front was liberally sprinkled with 

Air Force field divisions and 55 units newh· 

recruited in the Baltic States. After the 

::-level breakthrough the armv group had 

weakened its left flank and center to 

strengthen the right. Tactically the army 

group's position had become very similar to 

that of Army Group South: it was forced 

to split its effort between the two extreme 

flanks, holding the one ( OranienbaumLeningrad ) mostly for political and prestige 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 249 

reasons and the other to stave off what 

could become a military disaster. 

In the second week of September '943 

Army Group North had begun work on the 

PANTHER position, its share of the East 

Wall. The north half of the PANTHER 

position was laid behind natural obstacles, 

the Narva River, Lake Peipus, and Lake 

Pskov. The south half was not so favorably situated. [t had to be stretched east 

somewhat to cover two major road and rail 

centers, Pskov and Ostrav, and the tie-in to 

Army Group Center had to be moved west 

after the Nevel breakthrough. Nevertheless, 

when it was occupied it would recluce the 

army group frontage by 25 percent, and, 

unlike most of the East Wall, it had by late 

'943 actually begun to take on the appearance of a fortified line. A 5o,000-man construction force had improved the communications lines back to Riga and Dvinsk and 

had built 6,000 bunkers, 800 of them concrete, laid '25 miles of barbed wire entanglements, and dug 25 miles each of 

trenches and tank traps. During November and December building material rolled 

in at a rate of over roa carloads a day.1 

In September the army group staff had 

begun detailed planning for Operation 

BLA U, the withdrawal to the PANTHER position. The staff estimated that the million 

tons of grain and potatoes, half a million 

cattle and sheep, and military supplies and 

other material, including telephone wire 

and railroad track to be moved behind the 

PANTHER line, would amount to 4 ,000 

trainloads. The withdrawal itself would be 

facilitated by the network of alternate posiI H . Cr. Nord, fa NT. 13000/ 44 . Der Feldzu g 

gegen die Sowjet-U1Iion der Heeresgrupp e Nord 

Kriegsjahr 1943, ~4.1244. H. Cr. Nord 75884/ 1 

fil e. 

tions that in the preceding two years had 

been built as far back as the Luga River. 

The 900,000 civilians living in the evacuation zone, particularly the men who could, 

if they were left behind, be drafted into the 

Soviet Army, raised problems. The first 

attempts, in early October, to march the 

civilians out in the customary treks produced so much confusion, misery, and hostility that Kuechler ordered the rear area 

commands to adopt less onerous methods. 

Thereafter they singled out the adults who 

would be useful to the Soviet Union as 

workers or soldiers and evacuated most of 

them by train. ' During the last three 

months of the year the shipments of goods 

and people went ahead while the armies 

worked at getting their artillery and heavy 

equipment, much of which was sited in permanent emplacements, ready to be moved. 

At the end of the year, having transported 

250,000 civilians into Latvia and Lithuania, the army group could not find quarters for any more and called a halt to that 

part of the evacuation. 3 

Standing By 

The army group staff believed that logically BLAU should begin in mid-January 

and be completed shortly before the spring 

thaw, in about the same fashion as Army 

Group Center had executed BUEFFEL the 

year before, but on 22 December the chief 

of staff told the armies that Hitler would 

probably not order BLAU unless another 

~ H. Cr. Nord, Ia NT. 093/43, Raeumung, 9.1:1. 

43. H. Cr. Nord, Ia Nr. 119/ 43, Besprechungspunkte filer den 15.9 .. 29.9.43; H. Gr. Nord. III 

NT. 138/ 43. Evakuierllng der Bevoelkerung. Both 

in H. Gr. Nord 75 129/ 64 file . 

:I H. Cr. Nord. Kriegslllgebuch 1.- 3£.1243. 28 

Dec 43, H. Gr. Nord 75128/ 29 fil e. 
250 

Soviet offensive forced him to. At the 

moment, Hitler's opinion was that the 

Russians had lost so many mcn in the fighting in the Ukraine that they might not try 

another big offensive anywhere before the 

spring of 1944.' 

Toward the end of the month it 

appeared, in fact, that Hitler might be 

right. The bulge on the Army Grou p 

North right flank was worrisome, but the 

Stauka had shifted the weight of the offensive to Vitebsk, for the time being at least. 

In the Oranienbaum pocket and around 

Leningrad the J.eninKrad and VolkhoIJ 

Fronts had been ready to attack since November, but with the trouble at Nevel out 

of the way the army group was less concerned than it had becn. Intclligence reports from Eighteenth Army indicated that 

the units in the Oranicnhaum pocket, in 

particular, had been strengthened; and 

boat traffi r between Leningrad and 

Oranienbaum had heen usually heavy during the fall, continuing: until some boats 

were trapped in icc. On the other hand, 

almost no new units had appeared, and 

J.f7linKrnd Front seemed to be depending 

for its reinforcements on the Leningrad 

population. While an offensive sometime 

in January appeared a ncar certainty, the 

longer Eighteenth Army's intelligence 

offic(,rs looked the closer they came to convincing themselves it would be cut in the 

modest pattern of the three earlier offensives 

around Leningrad. 1I 

On 29 Decem her the OKH ordered 

Kller hler to transfrr to Army Group South 

one of his best divisions, the 1St Infantry 

Division which Eightccntll Army was de-

'Ibid-:;'2 Dee 43. 

~ Ib id .. 1'2 , 15. 17 DcC' 43 ; AOK 18 , Fuehru'l/1j"· 

abtrilllllK Kri,.g t(/I[ bll la, 1',.il 41 . Textband 111 , 

3 1 OrC' 4:i, AOK 1844911 1'20 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

pending on to backstop some of its less reliable units in the Oranienbaum-Leningrad 

sector. When Kuechler called to protest, 

Zcitzler told him he would not need the 

division; Hitler intended to execute Operation BLAu after all and would tell him so 

personally the next day. During the noon 

conference in the Fuehrer headquarters on 

30 December, Kuechler, expecting to receive his orders, reported on the state of the 

PANTHF.R position and the time he would 

need to complete BLAU. In passi ng, he 

remarked that he had talked to Generaloherst Georg Lindemann, Commanding 

General, Eighteenth Army, who "naturally" had asked for his army to stay where it 

was even though he lost 1st Infantry Division. To a question from Hitler, Kuechler 

replied that the Eighteenth Army front was 

well fortified, almost too weB, in fact, since 

the army did not have enough troops to 

man it completely. Hitler then terminated 

the conference without mentioning Operation BLAU.n 

Kllerhler did not fully realize what had 

happened until th" next day, after an order 

had rome in to transfer another good division to Army Group South. Zeitzler told the 

army group chief of staff that Hitler had 

heg-un to falter in his decision as soon as 

Kuechler made the remark about Lindemann's wanting to keep his army where it 

was. He thought it would take at least a 

week to talk Hitler around again.' By 

day's end the chief of staff had a memorandum marshaling the arguments for 

BLAU ready for Kuechler to sil(n. but that 

was scarcely enough. Lindemann would 

ftStenogr. Die,ul im F.H. Qu .. Besprechulll[ mit 

Ge,1 Feldmarschall K1uchler 110 m 30 .12 .43. OeMH 

files. 

' H . Gr. N ord . Kriegstagebu cla 1.- 3' .lrI .43 . 3 1 

OIT 4 3, H . Cr. Nord 75 128129 file . 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 251 

have to be persuaded to reverse himself, 

since in such instances if in almost no others 

Hitler always took the word of the man on 

the spot. 

On 4 January- by then a third division 

was on its way to Army Group SouthKuechler went to Eighteenth Army headquarters and, citing the necessity to husband 

the army group's forces, almost pleaded 

with Lindemann to reconsider. Lindemann replied that his corps, division, and 

troop commanders in the most threatened 

sectors were confident they could weather 

the attack.' After that, none of the army 

group's arguments counted for much. 

Hitler told Zeitzler he was only doing what 

Kuechler wanted. Nor could Kuechler and 

his staff draw any comfort from the knowledge that Lindemann was probably motivated mainly by a desire to draw attention 

to himself-as a senior army commander 

he had never had so good an opportunity to 

show what he could do directly under the 

eyes of the Fuehrer. No less disquieting for 

the army group was the knowledge that it 

was committed to repeating an error which 

had already been made too often in the 

Ukraine. To the operations chief at OKH 

the chief of staff said the army group was 

marching to disaster with its eyes open, putting forces into positions which in the long 

run could not be held.' 

Leningrad Liberated 

On 14 January 1944 the operation began. 

(Map 23 ) Leningrad Front, General Pol-

' H. Cr. Nord, von Negulborn, Rittmeister, Ord. 

DOz. O.B. Nord, Bericht ueber die Besprechung bei 

deT 18. Armee am 4.1.44, H. Gr. Nord 75129/81 

file. 

• H. Cr. Nord, 10 Kriegstagebuch, 1.-31.1.44, I, 

2, 6 Jan 44. H . Cr. Nord 75128/33 file. 

kovnik L. A. Govorov 

mounted the main effort. 

commanding, 

Second Shock 

Army drove east out of the Oranienbaum 

pocket while Forty-second Army attempted 

to push west on the front below Leningrad." Against Forty-second Army, the 

stronger of the two, the corps artillery of 

L Corps reacted fast, laying down a wellplaced barrage that stopped the attack before it got started. Second Shock Army did 

better; the loth Air Force Field Division 

began to crumble the moment it was hit. 

Not a real surprise but, still; only half 

expected, were the strong thrusts that General Polkovnik KiriJl A. Meretskov's Volkhou Front launched the same day north 

and south of Novgorod on Eighteenth 

Army's right flank. Novgorod had been 

considered a danger point, but the army 

had not been convinced that the Leningrad 

and V olkhou Fronts would have the 

strength to attempt simultaneous offensives 

on a major scale. Lindemann, on 10 January, had rated the build-ups-in the 

Oranienbaum pocket, southwest of Leningrad, and east of Novgorod- as relatively 

modest, particularly in terms of reserves. 

He had predicted that without more reserves the thrusts could not go very deep 

and that the attacks in the OranienbaumLeningrad sector and at Novgorod would 

"very likely" be staggercd.ll In fact, the 

Leningrad and Volkhou Fronts had Eighteenth Army outnumbered by at least 3 : I 

in divisions (55 riAe divisions, 9 rifle brigades, and 8 tank brigades to 20 German 

divisions) , 3: I in artillery, an 6: I in tanks, 

self-propelled artillery, and aircraft." 

>0 IVOV (R), IV, 35. 

1\ AOK 18,10 K,.iegstagebucil, Teil 4g. Band 1 . 

10 Jan 44 , AOK 18 526 14/2 file. 

" IVOV (R ), IV, 34. 
N \. 

FIRST $HOCIC 

'" ~ ~ 

ARMY GROUP NORTH 14 Jonuary-31 MCHch 194 4 

GE~"~N FROMl LINE , ), ... R 

to 10 . 0 10 IIILts 

""'''TT+---.i-"i-r---iei----~i 10 10 _0 to 'lO [HII~ 

MAP 23 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 253 

The Soviet commands had chosen exactly the two places in which Eighteenth Army 

had the least room to maneuver. The loop 

of the front separating the Oranienbaum 

pocket from Leningrad was only twenty 

miles wide at its base. On the Eighteenth 

Army right flank an envelopment five to ten 

miles deep was enough to chop out Novgorod and break the tie-in to Lake limen . 

The danger was, as Zeitzler warned at the 

end of the day, tbat minor slip-ups could 

have consequences similar to the Nevel 

debacle. 

During the second and third days the 

battle seemed to be going about as the Germans hoped it would. Neither Govorov 

nor Meretskov put in any new units, which 

seemed to indicate that they were operating 

without much in the way of reserves, and it 

appeared that Leningrad Front did not intend to do more than open the Oranienbaum pocket. On ,6 January Kuechler 

told his army commanders that the Russians had committed all their forces, and 

Army Group North could win the battle 

by taking some risks in the quiet sectors. 

The next day his optimism started to 

fade. Lindemann had put in his entire reserve, the 61st Infantry Division, to stiffen 

the ,oth Air Force Field Division, but it 

was barely managing to stave off a complete rupture. Before noon the army group 

informed the OKH that the fighting 

around Leningrad was taking a turn for the 

worse. Eighteenth Army would have to 

begin dismantling the siege artillery during 

the night, and if the army group wanted to 

see the battle through it would have to 

withdraw below Lake Ladoga to the 

ROLLBAH N position along the LeningradChudovo road to shorten the front and 

gain two divisions. The army group had 

originally built the ROLLBAHN to provide 

just such insurance. In tbe afternoon the 

answer came from Hitler: he neither 

approved nor disapproved but thought it 

would be better to give up the hold on the 

Gulf of Finland and take back the front 

between Leningrad and Oranienbaum. 

Kuechler protested that to do that would 

give the Russians the victory and an opportunity to turn south with their strength 

intact. 

On the morning of the ,8th Lindemann 

reported that the fronts east of Oranienbaum and west of Leningrad were collapsing. The same was happening at Novgorod 

where the encirclement was nearly complete, and the few extra battalions the army 

bad been able to throw in would not even 

be enough to hold open an escape route 

much longer. After seeing for himself how 

near complete exhaustion the troops at the 

front were, Kuechler asked and was denied 

permission to withdraw to the ROLLBAHN. 

In the afternoon Forty-second Army's 

spearhead drove into Krasno)'e Sclo, the 

former summer residence of the Czars, and 

cut the two main roads to the north. After 

that, Kuechler decided he had no choice 

but to take back the two divisions on the 

coast before they were completely cut off. 

He informed the OKH that he intended to 

give the order at the end of the day whether 

he had received permission by then or not. 

At the midnight situation conference Hitler 

approved, after Zeitzler told him the order 

had already been given. 

Withdrawal to the Rollbahn 

On '9 January the first stage, which 

plainly was only the prelude to the battle, 

ended. The difficult task was to get Hitler 

to accept the consequences. Kuechler's 

order had come too late to save the divi-
254 STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

,sEARCHING FOR M1NES OUTSIDE DAMAGED TSARSKOYE SELO PALACE, PUSH KIN 

sians on the coast; some elements escaped, 

others were trapped and destroyed as the 

Russians swept in from the east and west. 

Second Shock and Forty-second Armies 

then joined forces, and the appearance of 

several fresh divisions demonstrated that 

they had more than adequate reserves. At 

Novgorod eight Soviet divisions encircled 

five German battalions. Their one hope 

for escape was to elude the Russians in the 

swamps west of the city. 

Shortly after nightfall, after Zeitzler had 

argued unsuccessfully for half an hour, 

Kuechler called Hitler and begged him to 

give the troops at Novgorod what would 

certainly be their last chance. Suddenly 

dropping the argument he had clung to 

stubbornly throughout the day, that Novgorod could not be given up because of its 

"extraordinary symbolic significance," Hitler agreed. On the subject of the ROLLBAHN, however, he merely read Kuechler a 

short lecture on the demoralizing effects of 

voluntary withdrawals. Fifteen minutes 

later he called back to give permission for 

that too. At midnight he changed his mind 

about the ROLLBAHN, but Zeitzler told him 

the orders had gone out to the divisions and 

could not be recalled." 

Hitler had also tried to extract from 

Zeitzler and Kuechler guarantees that the 

ROLLBAHN p~sition would be held. On the 

20th Kuechler, appraising the situation, de13 Ibid" 15 19 Jan 44. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-TH E NORT H FLANK 255 

CIVILIANS rN LENINGRAD AFTER THE SIEGE 

dared that the two recent tactical setbacks, 

at Novgorod and southwest of Leningrad, 

had resulted from lack of reserves and an 

overtaut front. The same conditions still 

existed. The withdrawal to the ROLLBAHN 

would free three divisions, two to go into 

the front below Leningrad, the other west 

of Novgorod. With that, the army group 

would have exhausted its resources for crcating reserves. The three divisions would 

be used up in a short time, and an operational breakthrough could then be expected. 

He recommended that the pullback to the 

ROLLBAHN be made the first step in a continuous withdrawal to the PANTHER position, pointing out that the army group was 

already so weakened that it would have just 

enough troops to man the front when it 

reached there. 14 

Less than a day passed before Kuechler's 

forecast began to come true. On 21 January Forty-second Army attacked toward 

Krasnogvardeysk, the junction of the main 

rail lines and roads coming from the south 

and west. L Corps had not had time to 

sort out its battered units and start setting 

up a front. 

That night Kuechler flew to Fuehrer 

headquarters where the next morning, 

shortly before his interview with Hitler, 

word reached him that Eighteenth Army 

could not hold Krasnogvardeysk unless it 

gave up Pushkin and Slutsk, also important junctions but farther north. Hitler 

was deaf to all his proposals. The Fuehrer 

brushed off everything said concerning 

U H. Cr. Nord, fa Nr. 15144. an Chtf GtnStdH , 

20.1.40, H 22hz26 file . 
256 

Pushkin and Slutsk, the PANTHER position, 

and possible new threats on the army group 

right flank with a statement that Army 

Group North was spoiled; it had not had a 

crisis for more than a year and, consequently, did not know what one was. "I am 

against all withdrawals," he went on. "We 

will have crises wherever we are. There is 

no guarantee we will not be broken through 

on the PANTHER. If we go back voluntarily 

he [the Russians 1 will not get there with 

only half his forces. He must bleed himself 

white on the way. The battle must be 

fought as far as possible from the German 

border." When Kuechler objected that the 

PANTHER position could not be held if the 

army group was too weak to fight when it 

got there, Hitler blamed all the gaps in the 

front on the egoism of the army groups and 

insisted that every square yard of ground 

be sold at the highest possible price in 

Russian blood. Finally, demanding that 

the ROLLBAHN be held, he dismissed the 

field marshal. Later Zeitzler said the time 

had been bad and Kuechler should try 

again in a few days; Hitler was worried 

about the landing that day by Allied troops 

at Anzio south of Rome and had not 

Ii~tcncd to what was said. 

Meanwhile, Eighteenth Army was beginning to disintegrate. Fighting in mud and 

water, the troops were exhausted. GOVOTOV 

and Meretskov, on the other hand, had 

managed, since the warm weather set in at 

midmonth, to give their divisions a day out 

of every three or four to rest and dry out. 

On the morning of 23 January, Lindemann 

gave the order to evacuate Pushkin and 

Slutsk and reported to the OKH that it 

could either accept his decision or send a 

general to replace him. During the day the 

army completed the withdrawal to the 

ROT.l .nAIIN, which th e Rus.~ians had already 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

penetrated in several places. 

Kuechler's Dilemma 

On the 24th at Eighteenth Army headquarters Kuechler accused Lindemann of 

having submitted false estimates of Soviet 

reserves at the end of December. Lindemann admitted "mistakes" had been made. 

The belated revisiol) of the army's past intelligence estimates was swiftly buried, however, under waves of bad news from the 

front. In the morning the Russians entered 

the outskirts of Krasnogvardeysk and 

rammed through to the bend of the Luga 

River southeast of Luga. The divisions in 

the ROLLBAHN position tried to patch the 

front by throwing in their rear echelon 

troops. At the end of the day Lindemann 

reported that his right flank had lost contact with Sixteenth Army and Krasnogvardeysk would fall within twenty-four hours. 

Because losing Krasnogvardeysk would 

badly weaken the supply lines of the corps 

farther east, the army group asked to go 

back at least to the Luga River. In the 

evening Zeitzler replied that Hitler's orders 

were to hold the corner posts and make the 

troops fight to the last. Since there was 

nothing else to do for the time being, he 

advised the army group command to be "a 

little ruthless" for awhile." 

On 27 January, Kuechler and the other 

army group and army commanders on the 

Eastern Front attended a National Socialist 

Leadership Conference at Koenigsberg. 

Hitler addressed the generals on the subject 

of faith as a guarantee of victory. He 

called for a strengthening of faith in himla H. Cr. Nord. In Kriegstngduch, / ,-31.1.44. 

gO- !:I5 Jan 44. H. Gr. Nord 751118/33 file . 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 257 

self, in the National Socialist philosophy, 

and in the ultimate victory and suggested 

that the generals' faith needed strengthening as much as anyone else's. If': During one 

of the interludes, in a private talk with 

Hitler, Kuechler repeated a situation estimate he had sent in the day before: the 

Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts were employing four strong attack forces to cut 

Eighteenth Army to pieces; they were going 

toward Narva from the east and toward 

Luga from the north and east; if the attack 

from the east carried through Luga it would 

cut the communications lines of six of 

Lindemann's eight corps. Hitler responded 

by prohibiting all voluntary withdrawals 

and reserving all decisions to withdraw to 

himself. When Kuechler remarked, probably with the subject of the day's meeting 

in mind, that Eighteenth Army had suffered 40,000 casualties and the troops had 

fought as hard as could be expected, Hitler 

replied that the latter statement was "not 

quite" true. He had heard the army group 

was not fighting everywhere with as much 

determination as it might. 17 

That interview destroyed Kuechler as an 

effective army group commander. When 

he returned to his headquarters he still 

seemed, as his chief of staff later put it, to 

realize that all he could do was retreat, but 

all he could talk about was showing more 

determination and attacking-with what, 

nobody knew. On the 28th the chief of 

staff, Generalleutnant Eberhard Kinzel, 

took matters into his own hands and told 

the Chief of Staff, Eighteenth Army, that 

Ie Manstein, Vtrlorene Siege, pp. 579f; Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts, 27 

Jan 44. H 4/ 1'2 file. 11 H . Gr. Nord, Ia Nr. 20144. Beutteilung det 

Lage, ~6.1.44 , H 2'212'26 file ; H. Gr. Nord, O.B., 

Aktennotiz, 29.144, H. Gr. Nord 751'29/ 81 file. 

the time had come. An order to retreat 

must be issued, but the army group was 

forbidden to do that. The army would, 

therefore, have to act as if it had been 

given, issuing its own implementing orders 

orally rather than in writing. He would see 

to it that the army was covered "in the 

General Staff channel." The next day 

Kinzel prevailed on Kuechler at least to 

submit a report pointing out to Hitler that 

Eighteenth Army was split into three parts 

and could not hold any kind of a front 

forward of the Luga River." 

On the 30th Kuechler went to Fuehrer 

headquarters where Hitler finally approved 

a retreat to the Luga River but directed 

that the front then be held, contact with 

Sixteenth Army regained, and all gaps in 

the front closed. When Kuechler passed 

this along to his operations officer the latter 

protested to the Operations Branch, OKH, 

that it was impossible to execute; one of the 

gaps was thirty miles wide, and at Staritza 

northwest of Luga the Russians were 

already across the Luga River. Later 

Zeitzler agreed to tell Hitler that the Luga 

line could not be held. In the meantime 

Kuechler had been told to report back to 

the Fuehrer headquarters on 3 [ January. 

Model Takes Command 

At the noon conference the next day 

Hitler informed Kuechler he was relieved 

of his command. Model, who had been 

waiting to replace Manstein, was given 

temporary command of the army group. 

Reacting quickly as always, Model telegraphed ahead, "Not a single step backward will be taken without my express permission. I am flying to Eighteenth Army 

18 H. Cr. Nord, fa Nr. :14/ 44 , an Chef GenStdH, 

'19.1 .44, H 22/226 file . 
258 

this afternoon. Tell General Lindemann 

that I beg his old trust in me. We have 

worked together before."19 

During the last days of January the 

Eighteenth Army's attntlon rate had 

spiraled steeply. On 27 January the army 

north front had lain about ten miles north 

of the line Narva-Chudovo over most of its 

length and forty miles northeast of Narva 

in its western quarter. By the 31st it had 

been pushed back nearly to the Narva River 

in the west and slightly below the NarvaChudovo line in the east, by itself not a surprising loss of ground; but in the interval 

the front had virtually dissolved. On the 

situation maps of the 27th it had still 

appeared as a distinguishable, continuous 

line, albeit with several large gaps. By the 

31st all that was left was a random scattering of dots where battalions and companies 

still held a mile or two of front. The only 

two divisions still worthy of the name were 

the 12th Panzer Division, which had come 

in during the last week in the month, and 

the 58th Infantry Division, moving in from 

the south by train. On 29 January the 

army group reported that as of the loth 

Eighteenth Army had had an infantry combat strength of 57,936 men; it had lost since 

then 35,000 wounded and 14,000 killed 

and now had, including new arrivals, an 

infantry strength of 17,000." 

Model had never had a greater opportunity to display his talent as an improvisor, 

and he took it with a flamboyant zest which, 

though it did not change the tactical situation, quickly dispelled the sense of hopelessness and frustration that had been hanging over the army group. He also had the 

li H. Cr. Nord, la Kri~gstag~buch. 1.-31.'-44, 

:28-31 Jan 44, H . Gr. Nord 751:28/33 file. 

10 Ibid., :29 Jan 44. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

advantage of Hitler's tendency to give new 

appointees, particularly when they were 

also his favorites, greater latitude, at 

least temporarily, than he had allowed their 

predecessors. 

Model's first moves were as much psychological as military. To dissipate what 

he called the PANTHER psychosis he forbade 

all references to the PANTHER position and 

abolished the designation. Past experience 

had shown that in times of adversity, named 

lines, particularly when the names suggested strength, had a powerful attraction 

for both troops and commands. On the 

other hand, the state of Eighteenth Army 

being what it was, Model could not attempt 

to enforce his original "no step backward" 

order. Instead, he introduced something 

new, the Schild und Schwert (shield and 

sword ) theory, the central idea of which 

was that withdrawals were tolerable if one 

intended later to strike back in the same or 

a different direction in a kind of parry and 

thrust sequence. The theory was apparen1ly Hitler's latest brain child, a remedy for-as he viewed it- the disease of 

falling back to gain troops to build a new 

defense line which in a short time would 

itself prove too weak to be held. That 

Model placed overly much faith in the 

theory may be doubted. He was enough 

of a realist to know that while the withdrawal was usually possible the counterthrust was not. On the other hand, he was 

also well enough acquainted with Hitler to 

know that it was always advantageous to 

make a retreat look like the first stage of an 

advance. 

Schild und Schwert 

Model applied the Schild und Schwert 

theory in his first directive to Eighteenth 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 259 

Army issued on I February. He ordered 

Lindemann to take his main force back to a 

short line north and east of Luga. After 

that was accomplished and the 12th Panzer 

Division had finished closing the gap to 

Sixteenth Army, as had been directed before the change in command, the 12th Panzer and the 58th Infantry Divisions plus as 

many more divisions as could be spared 

from the short line would be shifted west of 

Luga for a thrust along the Luga River to 

establish contact with the two corps on the 

Narva. The first part of the directive gave 

the army a chance to reduce its frontage by 

almost two-thirds, which was necessary, the 

second envisaged a gain of enough strength 

- which was highly doubtful- to open a 

counteroffensive and extend the front fifty 

miles to the west. 

To apply the Schild und Schwert theory 

on the Eighteenth Army left flank was impossible. LIV Corps and III SS Panzer 

Corps, both under the command of General der Infanterie Otto Sponheimer, the 

Commanding General, LIV Corps, had 

fallen back along the Baltic coast from the 

Oranienbaum pocket. After 28 January 

they had been thrown back to the Luga 

River and then to the N arva River, the 

northern terminus of the PANTHER position. 

They could go no farther without endangering the entire PANTHER line and the important shale oil refineries near the coast 

about twenty miles west of the river. 

On 2 February, when Model inspected 

Sponheimer's front, his divisions were crossing to the west bank of the river and pulling 

back into a small bridgehead around the 

city of Narva. South of Narva the Russians were probing across the river and 

before the end of the day had a small 

bridgehead of their own. Elements of the 

Panzer Grenadier Division Feldherrnhalle, 

coming from Army Group Center, and a 

regiment of the 58th Infantry Division were 

arriving to strengthen the front below 

Narva. 

Everywhere Model heard the same complaint: the troops were worn out; and 

everywhere he gave the same order: they 

would have to see the battle through. The 

help the army group could give was small 

enough: an infantry adviser for I II SS 

Panzer Corps; an artillery expert to match 

the skilled artillerists the Russians were 

using; requests to Himmler for some experienced SS replacements, to Doenitz for 

reinforcements for the coastal batteries, and 

to Goering for air force personnel to be 

used against the partisans. 

Nevertheless, the near collapse of Eighteenth Army at the end of January had had 

the effect of a temporary disentanglement, at 

least in places, as on the N arva River. 

Model's decision to close up the front 

around Luga gave the army a chance to 

maneuver and to catch its breath. The 

next move was still the Russians', but it 

would be met on a coherent front. For a 

few days at the beginning of February the 

points of greatest pressure were in the Sixteenth Army area where the Second Baltic 

Front pushed into the front south of 

Staraya Russa and west of Novosokol'niki, 

tying down German troops which might be 

shifted north and, as a bonus, creating entering wedges which might be exploited for 

deep thrusts later. 

By 4 February the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts had regrouped and were beginning to close in on Eighteenth Army again. 

Army Group North informed the OKH 

that Meretskov had massed one strong 

force and 200 tanks southwest of Novgorod. 

and Govorov was assembling another easl 

of Samro Lake thirty miles off the Eight-
260 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

NARVA. Two medievalfortresses, Hermannsburg (left) and lvangorod (righl),jlank Ihe 

Narva River. 

eenth Army left flank. They obviously 

would try for an encirclement around Luga. 

Model still intended to attack to the 

northwest, and he proposed a "large" and a 

"small" solution. The first would carry the 

front out to the length of the Luga River; 

the second would extend it diagonally to 

the northern tip of Lake Peipus. Kinzel, the 

chief of staff, remarked later to the Chief 

of Staff, Eighteenth Army, that it was gratifying just to be able to think about such 

bold strokes. Whether either would be 

carried out would depend on how the battle 

developed. In any event, nothing would 

be lost because the preliminary movements 

would be useful no matter what the army 

did next.::!1 

~l H. Gr. Nord. Ia Krieg5tagebuch, 1.- 29.2-44 , 

1- 6 Feb 44, H. Gr. Nord 75138/ 37 file. 

Hitler, usually delighted by talk of an 

offensive, displayed no enthusiasm. In a 

rare personal directive to Model he cited 

the Narva area as most vulnerable and 

ordered it reinforced without delay. In the 

sector between Lake Peipus and Lake limen 

he saw a danger of Eighteenth Army's being pushed east away from Lake Peipus and 

a threat of an encirclement, and he instructed Model to submit a request for a 

withdrawal to the PANTHER position as 

soon as either of those became imminent. 22 

Having appointed the kind of daring, 

iron-nerved general he wanted, Hitler himself became the advocate of caution. The 

change probably also resulted in part from 

Hiller's tendency to associate men with 

- OKH. GenStdH, op. Abt. liN N,. 44063 / 44, 

lin H. Cr. Nord, 6.244. 11 22/ 226 file. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 261 

events. Most likely, before dismissing 

Kuechler he had decided that a retreat to 

the PANTHER position was necessary, but he 

had not acted then because he could not 

bring himself to appear to mitigate what he 

considered to be Kuechler's responsibility 

for the defeat. 

On 6 February the 12th Panzer Division 

finished closing the gap to Sixteenth Army. 

Its next mission was to assemble in Pskov 

and attack east of Pskov Lake and Lake 

Peipus. The 58th Infantry Division was 

standing by farther east, and Eighteenth 

Army had called for a withdrawal on the 

front around Luga which would free three 

divisions in two days. In the pause, short 

as it was, the Army's strength had begun 

to rise as stragglers, men recalled from 

leave, and those released from the hospitals 

were returned to their divisions. In addition, Model had ordered 5 percent of the 

rear echelon troops transferred to line duty. 

At Headquarters, Eighteenth Army, 

Model on the 7th issued instructions for the 

first stage of the projected counteroffensive. 

By shifting divisions from the north and east 

the army would create a solid front between 

the southern tip of Lake Peipus and Luga. 

Having accomplished that, the army would 

apply the Schild und Schwert theory by employing two corps on the east defensively to 

stop the Russian advance from Samra Lake 

and one corps in the west in a thrust northward along the Lake Peipus shore. 

During the next two days Eighteenth 

Army tried to jockey its divisions into position. Roadblocks laid by the partisans delayed 12th Panzer Division's advance toward Pskov. The 58th Infantry Division established a short front on the Plyussa River 

at about the center of the proposed new 

line, but the Russians filtered past on both 

sides, and the other divisions would have to 

attack to close up the front. That would 

not be easy since the divisions only had four 

understrength battalions each and' the 

enemy strength was growing hourly as units 

moved in from the northwest. The swampy 

terrain also raised problems, but, on the 

other hand, it was probably the main reason 

why Leningrad Front could not bring its 

full force to bear more quickly. 

By 10 February the 58th Infantry Division was split in two and one of its regiments was encircled. The 24th Infantry 

Division, trying to close the gap on the 

right of the 58th Division, got nowhere and 

for most of the day had trouble holding 

open the Luga-Pskov railroad. Although 

Eighteenth Army would try again the next 

day to regain contact with the 58th Division and close the gap the prospects were 

worsening rapidly. Air reconnaissance had 

spotted convoys of 800 to goo trucks moving southeast from Samro Lake. 

The next afternoon Eighteenth Army reported that the battle had taken a dangerous turn. The 24th Infantry Division was 

stopped. Soviet tanks had appeared. Both 

regiments of the 58th Infantry Division 

were surrounded and would have to fight 

their way back. That they could save their 

heavy weapons was doubtful. After nightfall Lindemann told Model that the only 

way he could get enough troops to close the 

gaps on the left flank was to take the entire 

front back to the shortest line between the 

southern tip of Lake Peipus and Lake 

limen. Govorov had spread the right arm 

of the pincers out to the Peipus shore and 

was pushing south toward Pskov. He already had some units far enough south "to 

pinch the 12th Panzer Division in the backside." Reluctantly, Model agreed to let the 

army go back. 

The next day brought more bad news. 
262 

At Narva the Russians expanded their 

bridgehead and created another north of 

the city. Between Lakes Peipus and Pskov, 

Govorov poured in enough troops to 

threaten a crossing into the PANTHER position. If Model were to establish a front between Lake Peipus and Lake IImen he 

would have to fight for it. On the evening 

of the 12th Model informed the OKH that 

he still planned to take and hold that line 

and wanted to know whether Hitler 

approved. The OKH response indicated 

that nobody there, including Hitler, liked 

the idea. The opinion was- for onceunanimous that it was too late to set up a 

front between the lakes and that, in any 

event, it was more important to free one 

division for Narva and another for the 

Peipus-Pskov narrows. The operations 

chief in the OKH added that Hitler was 

repeating every day that he did not want to 

risk any encirclements forw'ard of the 

PANTHER position. An hour before midnight Sponheimer reported breakthroughs 

north and south of N arva. On the north 

III SS Panzer Corps had managed to close 

the front and even gain a little, but south of 

Narva the Feldherrnhalle Division did not 

have the strength even to offer effective 

resistance. 

To the Panther Position 

In the morning on the 13th Model sent 

a situation report to Hitler. He said he 

would fight the battle around N arva to 

its end. If worst came to worst he would 

shorten the front by giving up the bend of 

the Narva River. He still believed it would 

be best to hold between Lake Peipus and 

Lake IImen until more work had been done 

on the PA~THER position. Hitler's answer 

came four hours later. The Narva front 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

would be strengthened with greatest speed. 

The army group would submit a plan and 

timetable for a prompt withdrawal to the 

PANTHER position. 

For the moment it appeared that the decision to go back to the PANTHER position 

might have come too late to save the Narva 

front, for which, as a last resort, the army 

group that day released an Estonian brigade. The brigade was the product of a 

draft the SS, which was responsible for foreign recruitment, had been conducting in 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since early 

January. Because Hitler refused to offer 

the Baltic States even a promise of eventual 

autonomy, the draftees were dispirited and 

their only motivation was fear-of the Russians and the Germans. On the night of 

13 February, Sponheimer reported that the 

Estonians had arrived in complete disorder 

verging on panic. Some had tried to desert 

on the way. That left Model no choice but 

to take troops from Eighteenth Army. He 

ordered the 58th Infantry Division transferred north after a three-day rest. The 

division had lost a third of its personnel and 

all of its heavy equipment in the encirclements. 

On the morning of the 14th, after Sponheimer reported that he had no room to 

maneuver and no troops to close the gaps 

and was therefore helpless, Model asked to 

evacuate the small bridgehead still being 

held east of Narva, to gain three battalions. 

Zeitzler approved and offered in addition 

an infantry division (rom Norway. Then, 

shortly after daylight news came in that the 

Russians had staged a landing on the coast 

northwest of Narva. Later reports revealed 

that the landing force was not large, about 

500 naval troops, supported only by several 

gun boats from Lavansaari Island in the 

Gulf of Finland. In the report sent to the 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 263 

SOVIET SKl TROOPS ON THE NORTHERN FRONT 

OKH Model stated that, nevertheless, the 

scene around Narva was "not pretty" and 

he had ordered the bridgehead given up 

immediately. During the day the landing 

parties were wiped out without much damage having been done except by the German Stukas that bombed a German division 

headquarters and knocked out several Tiger 

tanks. 

More troublesome was the appearance 

of Soviet ski troops on the west shore of 

Lake Peipus north of the narrows. The 

security division responsible for the area rcported that its Estonian troops were "going 

home." After that, Model told the OKH 

that he would begin the withdrawal to the 

PANTHER position on '7 February and 

complete it early on I March. He would 

mop up the west shore of Lake Peipus in 

the next few days and use the first two divisions freed to cover the lake shore. He expected that as soon as Eighteenth Army began to move Govorov and Meretskov would 

try for an encirclement around the army's 

"shoulders." They had strong forces in 

position north of Pskov and on the west 

shore of Lake limen. 

In the two days before the withdrawal 

began, the Russians did not try again to 

cross the lakes, and on 17 February Model 

gave a corps headquarters command of the 

lake sector and began shifting the 12th 

Panzer Division into the area. On the 

Narva the battle began to degenerate into a 

vicious stalemate in which the two sides 

stood toe to toe, neither giving nor gaining 
264 

an inch. Sponheimer could not close the 

gaps in his front, but that Govorov was less 

than satisfied with his own progress was 

confirmed in repeated radio messages offering the decoration Hero of the Soviet 

Union to the first commander whose troops 

reached the road running west out of 

Narva. As the Sixteenth and Eighteenth 

Armies began to move, the Soviet armies 

followed close. Through their networks of 

agents and partisans they knew exactly 

what was taking place." 

On '9 February Army Group North became suddenly and acutely aware of an old 

danger that had been lurking in the background throughout the last month of crises. 

On that day, for the first time in two 

months, the attacks on the Third Panzer 

Army perimeter around Vitebsk stopped; 

and air reconnaissance detected truck convoys of 2,000 or 3,000 trucks moving out, 

most of them heading north and northwest. 

Army Group North intelligence estimated 

that two armies could be shifted to the Sixteenth Army right flank in a few days. 

Model foresaw two possibilities. The first, 

and most likely, was that after adding to 

its already strong concentration in the 

Nevel-Pustoshka area, Second Baltic Front 

would attempt to break into the PANTHER 

position below Pustoshka and roll it up to 

the north before the Sixteenth and Eightefnth Armies could establish themselves 

there. The second, the "big solution" as 

the Germans had come to call it, was a 

thrust straight through to Dvinsk and on to 

Riga to cut off Army Group North in the 

Baltic States." 

III H. Cr. Nord, Ia Kriegstagcbu ch, . - 29.2.44. 

6- 18 Feb 44. H. Gr. Nord 75138/ 37 file. 

"Obkdo. H. Cr. Nord, Ia N,., 34/ 44 . An den 

Fuehrer nls Oberbefehlshaber des Hurts. H 2'1 / 

226 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Model also speculated that the activity 

on the Sixteenth Army right flank might be 

a sign that the Stavka was becoming discouraged with the attempts to encircle 

Eighteenth Army. If that was so, it did 

not result in any lessening of pressure on 

Eighteenth Army. As predicted, the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts bore down 

heavily on the army's shoulders. 

Meretskov tried for a breakthrough at 

Shimsk west of Lake limen on '7 February. 

For three days, while the flank of Sixteenth 

Army came back from Staraya Russa, the 

battle to keep contact between the two 

armies swayed in the balance. On the 

20th, when both began pulling away from 

Lake limen, that crisis was passed. 

Govorov reacted morc slowly but more 

dangerously. Pskov, throughout the war 

the main communications center of Army 

Group North, was also the hinge on which 

the whole withdrawal to the PANTHER position turned. The army group could not 

afford to lose Pskov but scarcely had room 

around the city in which to maneuver. In 

the swamps and forests east of Pskov Lake, 

Leningrad Front had trouble bringing its 

forces to bear, but on 24 February it began 

laying on heavy pressure north of the city 

and launched probing attacks across thf 

lake. According to intelligence reports. 

Stalin had called in Govorov and personally ordered him to take Pskov. By 26 February the threats at Pskov and on the Sixteenth Army right flank had made Hitler 

so nervous that he asked Model to try to 

speed up the withdrawal. 

In the north, on the Narva front, the 

Germans toward the end of the month had 

gained only enough strength to tip the scalrs 

slightly in their favor. On 24 February 

General der Infanterie Johannes Friessner, 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 265 

who had proved himself in the fighting on 

the Sixteenth Army-Eighteenth Army 

boundary, took over Sponheimer's command which was then redesignated Armeeabteilung Narva. By then troops of the 

"4th Infantry Division were beginning to 

arrive. They still needed seasoning, but 

they could be used to relieve experienced 

troops from the quiet parts of the line. 

Going over to what he called "mosaic 

work," Friessner cut into the extreme tip of 

the bridgehead south of Narva and pushed 

the enemy there into two small pockets. 

Although the Russians ignored the punishing artillery and small arms fire and kept 

pouring in troops through the open ends of 

the pockets, the danger of their reaching the 

coast was averted.

2li 

On 1 March Army Group North took the 

last step back into the PANTHER position, 

and the Russians demonstrated that they 

were not going to let it come to rest there. 

North of Pustoshka two armies hit the VIII 

Corps front. South of the town two armies 

threw their weight against X Corps. Leningrad Front massed two armies south of 

Pskov and poured more troops across the 

Narva River, attacking out of the bridgehead to the north, northwest, and west. For 

a week the battle rippled up and down the 

whole army group front. Except for small 

local losses, the German line held. On 9 

March Second Baltic Front 'tepped up its 

pressure against the Sixteenth Army right 

flank and began straining heavily for a 

breakthrough. 

On the loth the army group was confronted with a politically unpleasant and 

militarily insignificant consequence of the 

disastrous winter. The commanding officer 

t:l H . Gr. Nord, 1a Kriegstagebuch , J. - 29.2.44. 

19 - 29 Feb 44, H. Gr. Nord 75138/ 37 file . 

of the Spanish Legion and the Spanish military attache visited Model to tell him the 

legion was being called home. Franco, they 

said, was not turning away from Germany; 

he wanted to gather all his "matadors" 

about him to resist an Anglo-American invasion. Since the legion had proved as 

troublesome in the rear areas as it had been 

ineffectual at the front, the loss to the army 

group was not a painful one. 

At midmonth Second Baltic Front was 

still batteri'ng the Sixteenth Army flank 

while Leningrad Front probed for openings 

around Pskov and Narva. But the weather 

had turned against the Russians. After a 

warm winter- for Russia- the spring thaw 

had set in early. A foot of water covered 

the icc on the lakes. Sixteenth Army reported that the Soviet tanks were sometimes 

sinking up to their turrets in mud. Against 

a weak front the Russians might have continued to advance, as they were doing in the 

Ukraine, but the PANTHER position, all that 

remained of the East Wall, was living up to 

German expectations. 

Model Departs 

On 28 March Hitler's chief adjutant, 

Schmundt, called on Model to tell him that 

in a few days Hitler would name him to 

replace Manstein as Commanding General, 

Army Group South. For Model the news 

came at an inconvenient moment. He had 

just completed a situation estimate in which 

he said that the army group "might" be 

able to give two divisions to Army Group 

South after the front settled down." 

Hastily he reworked the estimate and in the 

altered draft reached the conclusion that 

'" H. Cr. Nord, fa Kriegstagebuch, 1.- 31.3·44 . 

1- 28 Mar 44, H. Gr. Nord 75128/40 file. 
266 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET CAVALRY IN ACTION ON THE NORTHERN FRONT 

Army Group North could give up five divisions and a corps staff immediately, and the 

12th Panzer Division as soon as two selfpropelled assault gun brigades and a battalion of tanks could be sent to replace it." 

On the 29th he went to the Fuehrer 

headquarters. Still officially the Commanding General, Army Group North, he 

attempted to usc his authority to raid the 

army group for the benefit of his new command. In what Zeitzler later descrihed as 

"unimaginable goings on" Model first told 

Hitler that the army group could give up 

five divisions and then raised the number to 

SIX. In a telegram to Army Group North 

n Obkdo H. Gr. Nord, 1a NT. 51144, BeurteilulIg 

du Lage vom 27.3.44, H 22/226 file. 

headquarters he stated that the Fuehrer had 

ordered the six divisions transferred. By 

telephone he gave the chief of staff half an 

hour in which to report that the order was 

being carried out. Finally, Zeitzler was 

forced to intervene and instruct the army 

group not to act on any of Model's orders. 

On 31 March, with Model safely installed as Commanding General, Army 

Group South, Zeitzler persuaded Hitler to 

reduce the proposed transfers to one division and that only in the ncar future. The 

next day, after the air had a chance to 

clear, Hitler agreed. In the meantime, 

Lindemann, the senior army commander J 

had been appointed acting commanding 

general of the army group. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 267 

An "Echo" in Finland 

At the end of January 1944 the OKW 

took up the painful task of discussing the 

developments south of Leningrad with the 

Finns. Keitel wrote Mannerheim that 

Army Group North would hold the Luga 

River line and asked the Marshal to suggest how Germany might help strengthen 

the Finnish front to compensate for the 

increased Soviet threat. In reply, Mannerheim proposed that Twentieth Mountain 

Army extend its right flank south to take 

in the Ukhta sector, which would release 

one Finnish division." The Commanding 

General, Twentieth Mountain Army, Dietl, 

objected. He insisted that it was a waste 

of man power to tie down morc German 

troops on a secondary front in Finland and 

that Finland, "through greater efforts in the 

sense of total war," was capable of creating 

a reserve division out of its own resources 

"without laying claims on the German 

Army which is already carrying the entire 

burden." Irritated also by recent Finnish 

protests against even the smallest withdrawals of German troops from Finland, 

Dietl wanted to urge Mannerheim not to 

raise objections if Twentieth Mountain 

Army were to offer all the troops it could 

spare to Army Group North, "which is also 

fighting for Finland."" But the OKW, 

remembering the warnings that had come 

from Finland in the fall of 1943, considered 

Mannerheim's response comparatively 

moderate and ordered Dietl to take over 

the Ukhta sector. 

• OKW, WFSt. K.T.B. Ausarbeitu.ng, der noud. 

liche K,iegHchauplalz, 1.1 - 31.3·44 , p. 4. OKW/ 

2040 file . 

• (Geb.) AOK 20, Ia Nr. 5144. an OKW, 

WFSt. 3.2.44, AOK 20 58629110 file. 

At the Tehran Conference (2 7 November-2 December 1943 ), Roosevelt and 

Churchill had told Stalin that they wished 

to see Finland out of the war before the 

invasion of Western Europe planned for 

the spring of 1944 and that they desired a 

peace which would leave Finland its independence. Roosevelt, representing the 

only one of the three countries not at war 

with Finland, had offered to help persuade 

Finland to ask for an armistice. Stalin had 

stated that, in the course of the current 

Finnish peace feelers, the Soviet Union had 

declared it had no designs on Finland's 

independence. He had added, however, 

that the Soviet Union would demand restoration of the 1940 border plus Pechenga 

and heavy reparations. so 

During the night of 6 February 200 

Soviet planes bombed Helsinki. The next 

day the United States Department of State 

dispatched a note warning the Finnish 

Government that the longer Finland stayed 

in the war the more unfavorable the terms 

of peace would become. On the 8th, in a 

long editorial, Izvestia took up the subject of 

a Soviet drive to Helsinki, pointing out 

that the Soviet Union had more than 

enough forces to spare for it. On the loth 

the text of the United States note was released to the Finnish newspapers where it 

brought an almost unanimous editorial response in favor of investigating the possibilities of peace. That night 150 Russian 

bombers raided the Finnish port of Kotka.'" 

On the 12th the Finnish Government sent 

30 U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations 

of the United States," The Conferences at Cairo 

and Teheran, 1943 (Washington, 1961 ) pp. 590-

93· 

31 New York Timtls, February 6, 8, 10, 1944. 
268 

the former Prime Minister and last Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Dr. Juho K . 

Paasikivi, to Stockholm to receive the Russian terms from the Soviet Minister to 

Sweden , Madame Alexandra M . Kollontay. 

Tanne and Birke 

The negotiations going on in Stockholm 

and the continuing desperate condition of 

Army Group North prompted the Germans to consider how to preserve their COIltrol of the Baltic Sea. The retreat to Narva 

had already loosened their blockade of the 

Soviet Baltic Fleet somewhat. A FinnishSoviet armistice threatened to knock all of 

th e remai ning props out from under the 

German strategy in the Baltic. In neutral 

Finnish or Soviet hands Suursaari Island 

and Hanko would no longer serve as corks 

to keep the Soviet naval forces bottled up 

in the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, 

and the Aland Islands could be uscd to 

block the iron ore traffic from Lule?t. 

Once Soviet naval units were able to roam 

the Baltic at will, submarine training would 

have to cease and the fate of the submarinr 

fl ret would be sca led. 

On 16 February Hitler ordered that in 

the event of a Finnish change of course the 

Aland lslands and Suursaari were to be 

occupied. Under the code names TANNF. 

WEST (Aland Islands) and TANNE OST 

(Suursaari ) the OKW took over the planninl!:. (oSrr M,,/, 1. ) The 41Gth Infantry 

Division, in Denmark, and a parachute 

regiment were earmarked for TANNE 

\V EST, and the provision of troops for 

Sutlrsaari was made a responsibility of 

Army Group North. Finnish resistance 

was not expected. Control of the TANNr. 

operat on~ remained in the hands of the 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

OKW, which assigned the tactical direction to the OKM and OKL." 

Meanwhile, Twentieth Mountain Army 

had resurrected Fuehrer Directive 50 and 

worked out an implementing plan under 

the code name BIRKE. In executing the 

BIRKE plan, the army proposed to swing 

its right flank back to a line running roughly from Karesuando near the Swedish 

bordcr to the Arctic Ocean Highway south 

of I valo. The maneuver was to be completed in two phases. In the first phase 

XXXVI Mountain Corps and XVIII 

Mountain Corps would pull out of the 

Kandalaksha, Loukhi, and Ukhta sectors 

and fall back to Rovaniemi, establishing a 

screening front east of Rovaniemi on the 

line Kemiyarvi-AutinkyHi, which was to be 

held until the main force had safely passed 

northward through Rovanierni. J n the 

second phase XXXVI Mountain Corps 

would go north along the Arctic O cean 

Highway to its new sector south of Ivalo 

and tie in with the right flank of XIX 

Mountain Corps holding the front east ann 

south of Pechenga . XVIII M ountain 

Corp~ would withdraw northwe~tward 

over the Rovaniemi-Skibotten route and 

stop on a line northeast of the Swedish 

horder in the vicinity of Karesuando. (See 

Mal' 34. ) 

A definitive plan for the second phase 

could not be made in advance because how 

it would be executed depended on the season. In summer it could be carried out as 

described, but in winter the Finnish end of 

the Rovan icmi-Skibottcn route was impas-

,ahlr. In winter, therefore, both XXXVI 

Mountain Corps and XVII I Mountain 

Corps would have to go north over the 

~Ok'W, WFSt, K .T .D. AII. Jarbeitll.ng , Der "ondlichl' k'rieRHrhnll.p fatz , 1.1.- .11..1.44 , pp. 7, 25, 

OK W / '2040 file. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS-THE NORTH FLANK 269 

Arctic Ocean Highway, XVIII Mountain 

Corps continuing on into northern Norway and XXXVI Mountain Corps providing troops to man the Karesuando positions.s3 

To Twentieth Mountain Army the possibility of its having to carry out the terms 

of Fuehrer Directive 50 was a source of 

nagging concern. The army had pointed 

out when the Fuehrer directive was first 

issued that to try to hold northern Finland 

would almost certainly prove futile in the 

long run since the sea route around Norway could easily be cut, putting an end to 

both ore and supply shipments. The planning for BIRKE brought to light other 

dangers. Twentieth Mountain Army did 

not have enough manpower to construct 

suitable positions at Ivalo and Karesuando 

in advance and, in any event, could not 

start work at those places without revealing 

its intentions to the Finns. The withdrawal 

would be confined to a few roads, difficult 

to keep open in winter and exposed to 

round-the-clock air attack in summer; and 

in northern Finland the army would have 

to set up a front under the most unfavorable conditions of climate and terrain. 

The Soviet Terms Rejected 

For two weeks the Finnish-Soviet talks in 

Stockholm were conducted in secret. The 

Russians, meanwhile, continued their 

bombing raids on Finnish cities, hitting Helsinki on 27 February with a particularly 

heavy 300-plane raid. The Soviet terms 

had begun to leak out on the 26th, and on 

the 28th the Soviet Government published 

its demands in full: ( I) internment of 

:A (Ceb.) AOK 20, Ja Op. NT. 97/44. ArmtebeJehl Nr. 1 fuer die Durchfuehrung von "Birke," 

AOK 20 58629/10 file. 

Twentieth Mountain Army, either by the 

Finns alone or with Soviet help; (2) restoration of the 1940 boundary; (3) return 

to the Soviet Union of all military and civilian prisoners; (4) demobilization of the 

Finnish Army- whether partial or complete to be determined by negotiation; (5 ) 

reparations to be determined later; (6) the 

ownership of Pechenga to be negotiated. 

Points 2 and 3, concerning the boundary 

and the prisoner exchange, the Soviet Government insisted, were to be met before the 

armistice. On 8 March, in a softly worded 

announcement, the Finnish Government 

declared that those two points were unacceptable as preconditions of the armistice. 

It also objected to the demand for internment of Twentieth Mountain Army, claiming it was a technical impossibility. When 

the Soviet Union set 18 March as the deadline for a final reply, the Finns, on the 17th, 

rejected the terms but expressed a strong 

desire to explore the matter further." 

The Soviet stipulations were in fact more 

stringent than those Stalin had outlined to 

Roosevelt and Churchill at Tehran." Coincident with the Finnish rejection, the 

Soviet Government began adopting a 

slightly milder tone, indicating that it had 

not yet made its best offer, and a few days 

later declared itself willing to clarify the 

terms. On 26 March Paasikivi and the 

former Foreign Minister, Carl Enckell, flew 

to Moscow where Foreign Minister Molotov restated the terms and brought them 

into approximate consonance with Stalin's 

commitment at the Tehran Conference. 

The Soviet Union dropped its demand that 

some of the terms be executed even before 

1M New York Times, February 16, 26, 27. 28, 

March '21 , 1944. 

311 U .S. Department of State, Conferences at 

Cairo and Tehran , '943. p. 597 
270 

the armistice. It also no longer insisted on 

internment but gave the Finns the alternative of expelling all the German troops 

from Finland by the end of April 1944-

without the threat of "assistance" from 

Soviet troops. On two points the Soviet 

stand had hardened: it demanded $600 

million in reparations and full ownership 

of Pechenga, for which it offered to exchange the leased base at Hanko, one of 

the spoils of the '939-40 war." 

The Finns rejected the terms a second 

time on 18 April, giving as the reason the 

burden of reparations that would be laid 

upon the country. Still holding large 

stretches of Soviet territory and having an 

undefeated army in the field, they had obviously hoped to make a better bargain. 

Furthermore, the alarm and near panic 

which had motivated Paasikivi's trip to 

Stockholm in February had gradually subsided after Army Group North settled into 

the PANTHER position. 

In the early stages of the negotiations the 

German Government adopted an attitude 

of restraint, on the assumption that Finland 

was not yet ready for peace at any price 

and, consequently, a look at the Soviet 

demands might be the best remedy for the 

peace fever. As the Army Group North 

situation improved and Finnish dismay at 

the terms grew, Hitler began to apply 

pressure. In March he reduced the now 

of weapons to Finland, and in the first week 

of April he let Mannerheim be told that 

German weapons could not be given as 

long as a danger of their falling into enemy 

hands existed. On 13 April he halted all 

grain shipments to Finland, and on the 

,8th he stopped shipment of war materiel. 

:IG Blul"chcr, GeslIlIdter zwischen Diktatur und Demokrlltie . pp. 351 - 56. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

That the embargo existed was not officially 

communicated to the Finns. Its effects, of 

course, were quickly felt. 

At the end of the month the OKW invited Mannerheim's chief of staff to 

Fuehrer headquarters. There, after Keitel 

had taken him to task over recent Finnish 

policy, Jodi adopted a friendly tone and told 

him that an authoritative declaration was 

needed to the effect that German military 

equipment supplied to Finland would not 

one day be surrendered to the Soviet Union. 

Manncrheim attempted to meet the requirement by a personal letter to Hitler. 

But Hitler, who claimed the Mannerheim 

letter was too cautious and diplomatic, refused to relax the embargo beyond letting 

Finland have enough weapons and ammunition to prevent an outright decline in 

the army's combat capability." 

Throughout the winter, as for the past 

two years, the Finnish Army front was 

quiet; but in February Kare/ian Front began strengthening its forces opposite Twentieth Mountain Army. By early March the 

number of Soviet troops facing Twentieth 

Mountain Army had risen from about 

100,000 to 163,000, and all the signs 

pointed to a full-scale offensive before the 

end of the month. The heaviest build-up 

was in the XXXVI Mountain Corps sector astride the route across the waist of 

Finland to the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. 

There the Russians brought up two new 

divisions and four brigades plus rocket launchers and artillery, and extended their right 

fl ank northwestward until they had a 

springboard behind the German forward 

line of fortifi cations. On 22 March Twen37 OKW, WFSt , K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, Der noerdliche K riegsuhauplatz. 1.4·-31. 12 ·44 . pp. 5-1 I . 

IMT Doc 1795- PS. 
OFFENSIVES ON BOTH FLANKS- THE NORTH FLANK 271 

tieth Mountain Anny concluded that the 

build-up was completed and the offensive 

might begin any time.38 

As March drew to a close and the spring 

thaw approached, the danger of a Soviet 

offensive subsided. Dietl concluded that 

the Russians would have attacked if Fin-

• (Geb.) AOK 20, Ie Nr. luol 44, Taetigkeitsbericht du Abteiiung Ie fuer die Zeit uom 1.1.-

30.6.44, AOK 20 5863,11 6le ; (G,b.) ,10K 20, 

la N,. 352/44, an XVIII A.K., XXXVI A.K., 

XIX A.K., 23.3.#, AOK 20 58629/4 6le. 

land had accepted an armistice. In April 

Dietl proposed an operation to eliminate 

the threat to the XXXVI Mountain Corps 

flank and asked Mannerheim's help. The 

marshal refused to employ Finnish troops 

offensively, and Twentieth Mountain 

Army, lacking the forces to go ahead alone, 

was forced to leave the Russians their tactical advantage. The winter thus ended 

with the barest visible changes but with a 

deep subsurface weakening of tho GermanFinnish relationship. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Paying the Piper 

Mud and Strategy 

While Soviet offensives were grinding 

into the north and south flanks of the Eastern Front during January and February 

'944 the OKW, which was responsible for 

all the other theaters, was committed to a 

strategy of defending with forces in being 

the entire periphery of Fortress Europe. 

The Operations Staff, OKW, had advocated that line with increasing insistence 

since late '942 after the Dieppe raid, the 

battle of El 'Alamein, and the North African invasion showed that the Allies actually 

meant to create a second front. Fuehrer 

Directive 5' of 3 November '943 raised 

the OKW concept to the level of strategic 

policy. Subsequent events, starting at the 

end of the month with the Tehran Confer-

<"nce at which Roosevelt and Churchill 

promised Stalin a second front in the spring 

of '944, convinced the OKW it had set 

the correct course. 

In December the Operations Staff 

worked out a plan for stripping the other 

OKW theaters to the minimum should the 

Allies tie themselves down in one big invas,on. The Germans would thus not have 

to keep all of the threatened points in a 

high state of readiness; but the plan was 

shelved after the Anzio landing in January 

'943 seemed to indicate that the Allies 

were planning a number of simultaneous 

or successive landings along the European 

coasts anywhere from Greece to northern Norway. 

The Operations Staff, buttressing a report Keitel gave to Hitler on '3 February 

'944, concluded that Germany was conducting a strategic defensive on internallincs 

without being able to benefit fully therefrom because strong enemy forces in the 

Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, 

Africa, North America, England, and Iceland were free to attack the European 

coasts at any time and so tied down a large 

part of the German reserves. The staff 

affirmed that the German mission was to 

defend stubbornly every foot of ground in 

Russia until the initiative could be regained 

by beating off the expected big AngloAmerican landing plus any subsidiary landings. The forces thus freed could then be 

used to bring about a decision against the 

Soviet Union. 

Even as the paper was being written, 

the Operations Staff doubted whether 

the future deployment of German forces 

could be governed solely by the need to 

hold in the USSR and to meet and defeat 

Allied invasions in the other theaters. The 

Soviet thrust toward the Balkans presaged 

stepped-up partisan activity and political 

repercussions in Hungary, Rumania, and 

Bulgaria which, if military intervention 

were required, would impose an added 
PAYING THE PIPER 

strain on the German resources, those of 

the OKW in particular. 

On the other hand, through February 

1944 and as laid down in Fuehrer Directive 

S I, the policy of restricting the Eastern 

Front to its own resources had been, from 

the OKW point of view, remarkably successful. Despite the heavy fighting on both 

the north and south flanks, the OKW 

theaters had had to relinquish only one division, the 214th Infantry Division from 

Norway, and three regiments of recruits. 

After the second week in February it appeared to the OKW that the army groups 

in Russia had seen another winter through. 

Model had Army Group North firmly in 

hand and, anyway, was going back to a well 

fortified line. Army Groups A and South 

were less well provided for, but after the 

breakout from the Cberkassy pocket the 

Russians were not on the march anywhere. 

Although the whole south flank was hanging loose between the Dnepr and the next 

natural line to the west, the Bug River, the 

spring thaw was approaching and anyone 

who wanted to overlook the fact that the 

Russians had kept on the move through an 

abnormally warm winter could assume that 

in a mattcr of days, a few weeks at most, 

the mud would immobilize the front for a 

month or so. By the end of February the 

OKW was convinced the Russians would 

not try anything big before the thaw. On 

the 27th Hitler ordered the Adolf Hitler 

Division to pull out of the front northeast 

of Uman and get ready for a transfer either 

to Belgium or the Netherlands.' 

t OKW, WFSt, Die Kriegsschaupladze im Rahmen der Gesamtkriegsfuehrung, 1· 1.- 31.44 . pp. j -

11,21, '29, 47. OCMH files. 

273 

A Soviet Spring Offensive 

At the beginning of March 1944 the 

Eastern Front south of the Pripyat Marshes 

formed a very narrow, elongated S, which 

could be bisected vertically by a straight 

line drawn from Kovel' to the Dnepr 

slightly southwest of Krivoi Rag. ( Map 

24) Army Groups A and South still held 

about half the ground between the Bug and 

the Dnepr. They had lost the easternmost 

lateral railroad behind the Dnepr and all 

of the major Dnepr crossings except Kherson, but they still held the L'vov-Odessa 

railroad. For the first time in more than 

two months, the front- with one notable 

exception- did not show any sizable gaps. 

On the debit side, it followed no natural 

defense line except for two short stretches 

on the lower Dnepr and the Ingulets. The 

appearance of continuity on the situation 

maps was achieved by resorting to half a 

dozen different kinds of broken lines indicating various stages of weakness, in 

some sectors ranging down to uncertainty 

whether the positions delineated existed at 

all. 

On the Army Group South left flank 

Fourth Panzer Army, under persistent Russian pressure, failed to close forty miles of 

its front west of Shepetovka and lost Yampol' on 2 March. Manstein believed the 

Russians would try at least to push south 

and cut the L'vov-Odessa railroad between 

Ternopol and Proskurov before the spring 

mud stopped them. He was convinced 

more than ever that the point of greatest 

danger was on this flank, where a 3s-mile 

• Pz. AOK 4, la, Kriegstagebuch , Band 2, 1-3 

Mar 44. Pz. AOK 4- 494 q/!l file. 
274 

MAP 24 

advance would take the Russians to the 

railroad, another 65 miles would take them 

across the Dnestr, and 30 or so miles morc 

would carry them across the Prut and into 

the Carpath ians.' In all, a Igo-mile advance would unhinge three potential German defense lines, on the Bug, the Dnestr, 

and Ihe Prut. I n the south Sixth Army 

was still 100 miles east of the Bug, 200 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

THE SOV IET SPR ING OF FENSIVE 4 Irota rch-I!I April 1944 

.... -- G<'~"'_ '''''''.' .'' , • • ••••• Ge ..... ,_, .' .... 0 ••• 

.............. Go . . ....... , ......... . o ... ' .. .. . ,. ! .,. .. " " -"" .. io' .0 •• 00 .;., l; .... _" .• 

A 

I 

" I 

I 

/ 

miles east of the Dilestr, and nearly goo 

miles cast of the Prut. 

Tlt e Regroupment 

After the breakout from the Cherkassy 

pocket was completed Manstein began redistributing the un its bunched around the 

First Panzer-Eighth Army bounda ry. He 
PAYING THE PIPER 

moved the Headquarters, III Panzer Corps, 

four panzer divisions, and the artillery division north behind Proskurov. To Fourth 

Panzer Army he assigned two panzer divisions and three newly formed infantry divisions being sent from Germany. In the first 

days of March he shifted his three armies 

north by giving the threatened right flank 

corps of Eighth Army to Sixth Army, First 

Panzer Army's right flank corps to Eighth 

Army, and the right flank corps of Fourth 

Panzer Army to First Panzer Army. This 

gave First Panzer Army responsibility for 

Shepetovka and Proskurov and gave Fourth 

Panzer Army the gap west of TernopolShepetovka and the front north to Kovel'. 

In executing his backfield shift Manstein 

had to take two serious risks: in the first 

place, the weather, the mud, and the condition of the troops and equipment made 

it impossible to get all of the divisions relocated before the end of the second week 

in March, and secondly, transferring the 

panzer divisions took all the stiffening out 

of the right half of the Eighth Army front, 

which was doubly weakened because that 

was where the two corps smashed in the 

Cherkassy pocket should have been. 

Even though the Russians had, by I 

March, slowed down or stopped everywhere 

except west of Shepetovka and the pattern 

of the previous years could be expected to 

repeat itself after the full onset of the thaw, 

the signs were plentiful that they could 

resume the offensive at will. During the 

fighting in January and February the four 

Ukrainian fronts had at no time brought 

all of their strength to bear, and their reserves, instead of dwindling, had grown 

enormously. By mid-February the Stauka 

had five of its six tank armies in the area 

opposite Army Group South. Three of 

them stayed in reserve. At the end of the 

275 

month the sixth also had moved in. Several tank and mechanized corps stood opposite each of the German armies. During the winter the Russians had proved 

their ability to attack and maneuver in 

mud. American-built trucks had kept the 

mobile units going long after the comparable German equipment was completely 

mired. The Soviet infantry had fallen back 

on the old-fashioned panje wagon, the 

light, one-horse, high-riding rig that could 

negotiate all but the deepest mud. By 

March every Soviet mortar and machine 

gun crew and nearly every infantry squad 

had a panje wagon to carry weapons, ammunition, and rations. The wagons spared 

the men the exertion of plodding through 

mud under heavy loads and freed the units 

from day-to-day concern for their supply 

lines. 

Manstein was right in contending that 

the Russians would concentrate on his 

north flank. First Ukrainian Front, the 

most powerful of the Ukrainian fronts, after 

it turned over the zone fringing the Pripyat 

Marshes to the newly created Second BeloTUSJian Front, occupied the sector opposite 

the First and Fourth Panzer Armies. When 

Vatutin was seriously wounded on 29 February on an inspection tour Zhukov took 

command. Kanev's Second Ukrainian 

Front, strong in armor, stood opposite the 

badly weakened Eighth Army. Malinovskiy's Third Ukrainian Front, facing Sixth 

Army in the Dnepr Bend, had less armor 

than the other two but had drawn divisions 

from Fourth Ukrainian Front, which in its 

zone south of the Dnepr was concerned 

primarily with the Crimea. The plan was 

for First Ukrainian Front to crash through 

between First Panzer Army and Fourth 

Panzer Army, and strike across the successive river lines to the Carpathians. In 
276 

keeping with Soviet doctrine of the time, 

the main effort was to be supported by only 

slightly less powerful thrusts to the west by 

Second Ukrainian Front left of the Eighth 

Army's center and by Third Ukrainian 

Front through the center of Sixth Army.' 

First Ukrainian Front Attacks 

On 4 March First Ukrainian Front attacked. In the gap between the flanks of 

First and Fourth Panzer Armies, Third 

Guards Tank Army headed south. East of 

Shepetovka and due north of Proskurov First 

Guards Army pushed through First Panzer 

Army. The next day Thirteenth Army 

attacked west between Lutsk and Dubno. 

Caught between the two Soviet armies, 

LIX Corps on the First Panzer Army left 

flank fen back to the south away from 

Shepetovka. North of the railroad between 

Ternopol and Proskurov all Fourth Panzer 

Army could muster for the moment were 

some corps troops belonging to XXXXVIII 

Panzer Corps. Manstein ordered the First 

and Fourth Panzer Armies to stop the Russians north of the railroad and to attack 

into their flanks from Ternopol and Proskurov. First Panzer Army was to assemble 

III Panzer Corps with four panzer divisions around Proskurov- the divisions were 

still at Eighth Army, loading on trains or 

waiting to load. Fourth Panzer Army had 

two infantry divisions coming toward Ternopol by rail, but they were brand new divisions composed mostly of eighteen- year-olds. 

By 6 March the front between the First 

and Fourth Panzer Armies was torn open 

along a go-mile stretch. On the east LIX 

Corps was isolated at Staro Constantinov. 

~ Platonov, Vt oraya Mirovaya Voyna~ 1939-4$. 

p. 557. Zhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiyt OpeTotsii Ott!-

chestuennoy Voyny, p. 305. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Midway between Ternopol and Proskurov 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps had thrown up 

a short line using elements of the Adolf 

Hitler Division and the 7th Panzer Division. 

The latter did not have a single tank and 

expected, at most, ten back from repairs in 

several days. The trains bringing the first 

of the infantry divisions for Fourth Panzer 

Army had started unloading west of Ternopol; to unload in the city was already too 

dangerous. 

During the next four days the German 

defense stiffened. The two panzer armies' 

efforts to strengthen their flanks began to 

take effect-rather rapidly at that. Fourth 

Panzer Army used one of its new infantry 

divisions to establish a line north of Ternopol and sluiced the other into the city 

by rail. A third infantry division was on its 

way through Poland, and Manstein had 

promised a fourth to be transferred from 

Denmark. First Panzer Army pulled LIX 

Corps away from Staro Constantinov toward Proskurov and at the same time committed parts of three panzer divisions to 

close the gap between the corps and the 

army main force. Around Proskurov, III 

Panzer Corps drew its divisions together in 

a compact block that grew in strength 

daily as elements arrived from the Eighth 

Army zone and the units of LIX Corps 

drew closer. 

Simultaneously, Zhukov made his initial 

bid for full operational freedom. Several 

times Soviet onslaughts carried nearly to the 

center of Ternopol, but all were beaten 

back. Along the railroad east to Proskurov, 

Zhukov's tanks and infantry spread out on 

a broad front, but badly shaken though 

they were, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' two 

divisions held their front.' 

• OKH, GenSldH, Op. Ab •. IIlb, Lage Osl, 
PAYING THE PIPER 

Fuehrer Order 11 

On 8 March 1944, in Fuehrer Order 11, 

Hitler introduced a new major tactical concept to the Eastern Front. Although its full 

impact was not felt until later, the order 

did affect the battle then beginning on the 

southern flank. It was motivated both by 

Hitler's annoyance at losing Nevel and 

Rovno and by his growing willingness to 

adopt any measures, no matter how desperate, which might slow Soviet offensives. 

He had toyed with the idea of "fortresses" 

before: Stalingrad was an example. Fuehrer 

Order 11 created the "fortified place," a 

town or city astride communications lines 

and suitably manned and fortified, which 

in Hitler's words, "Was to perform the 

same functions as forts did in times past." 

Each "fortified place" was to have at its 

head a general or senior field grade officer 

who was directly responsible to the army 

group commander and could only be relieved of his mission by him and then only 

with Hitler's consent. The "fortified 

places" had one mission: to hold to the last 

man. They were literally Himmelfahrtskommandos (missions to Heaven ). The 

commandants received the authority of a 

corps commander, which meant that they 

could impose the death penalty. Hitler 

designated twenty-six cities and larger 

towns on still-occupied Soviet territory as 

"fortified places," among them Ternopo!. 

Proskurov, Kavel') Brody, Vinnitsa, and 

Pervomaysk in the Army Group South 

zone,s 

Stand 7.3., 8.3., 93., 10·3· abds. Pz. AOK 4. la 

Kriegstagebuch, Band :1 , 7- 10 Mar 44, Pz. AOK 

449417/ 2 file . 1\ Der Fuehrer, OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (I) 

NT , 21434/ 44, Fuehrer-Befehl NT. 11 , 8.3.44 , OCMH 

files. 

Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts 

Attack 

277 

Konev and Malinovskiy began their offensives against Eighth Army and Sixth 

Army on 4 March. Fourth Guards Army 

backed by Fifth Guards Tank Army and 

Sixth Tank Army hit the Eighth Army 

front northeast of Uman. The two German divisions there could not stand up to 

the massed Soviet infantry and tanks. On 

the fourth day Fifth Guards Tank Army 

pushed to within twenty-five miles of 

U man, and Konev opened a secondary 

attack west of Kirovograd on the Eighth 

Army-Sixth Army boundary. 

Two days later, on 9 March, Uman fell; 

the report reached Eighth Army only minutes ahead of an order from Hitler demanding that the city be held. During the 

next two days the whole left half of Eighth 

Army disintegrated; the flank lost contact 

with First Panzer Army; and the remnants 

of four divisions were shoved away south 

and west toward the Bug. The Chief of 

Staff, Eighth Army, on a reconnaissance 

flight along the Bug on 11 Mar~h, saw 

German troops drifting back toward the 

river singly and in small groups. They 

had no heavy weapons, and vehicles were 

jammed up and mired along all the approaches to bridges.' 

Against the Sixth Army center Malinovskiy threw a guards mechanized corps and 

Eighth Guards Army's three guards rifle 

corps. Hollidt had to stop the attack in the 

front if he was to stop it at all. He had 

mc;:>ved his two reserve divisions in close, 

but at one point the Russians hit an artillery battalion employed as infantry and 

• AOK 8, fa KTiegstagebuch NT. 3, 4 - 11 Mar 

44. AOK 8 58'98/3 61e. 
278 

secured a foothold. In two more days they 

shouldered their way in to a depth of fiv~ 

miles. On 7 March IV Guards M echanized Corps and IV Guards Cavalry Corps 

broke loose and, straight as a shot, thrust 

through twenty-five miles to Novy Bug. 

That night the Sixth Army staff barely had 

time to load its communications equipment aboard the command train. The 

train w,as under mortar and machine gun 

fire as It left the city. At the end of the 

day the army found itself in a by then familiar and thoroughly uncomfortable situation-split in two with strong enemy forces 

maneuvering at will twenty-five miles behind its front. 

On the 8th the army began taking its 

bulging north flank back "through cold 

channels," that is, without putting any 

orders in writing. The night before, Hitler 

had forbidden a withdrawal on the grounds 

that the mud made it impossible and the 

Russians in the breakthrough were not as 

strong as reported. During the day Hitler 

changed his mind to the extent of offering 

the army permission to go back to the line 

from the mouth of the Ingulets to Novy 

Bug. By then the Soviet cavalry and tanks 

were turning south behind the Ingulets and 

reaching out to the Ingul, the next river to 

the west. Kleist told Zeitzler Sixth Armv 

could not fight forward of the Bug. If i't 

did, it would be destroyed. It was time, he 

complained, for higher headquarters to 

stop rejecting everything the army group 

proposed. 

During the night on I 1 March Hitler 

ordered Sixth Army and Eighth Army to 

end their retreat "at the latest" on the 

Bug.' On the north, Eighth Army was al-

,. H. Gr. A, fa Kriegstagebuch, Band 3. Teil 6, 

3- 11 Mar 44, H. Gr. A 75126/26 file; AOK 6, Ia 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ready losing a deadly race to get divisions 

off its right flank and behind the Bug before the Russians could cross the river' 

The Hammer and the Anvil 

First Ukrainial1 Front's offensive was, by 

~he:econd week in March, falling short of 

Its mtended effect. Manstein's determined 

effort to hold the north flank kept the 

attack hemmed in from both sides between 

Ternopol and Proskurov. On 12 March 

the third new infantry division unloaded 

~ehind Ternopol and began deploying on a 

It?e south of the city. In the next three days 

FIrst and Fourth Panzer Armies rejoined 

their flanks, and on the 16th Fourth Panzer 

Army estimated that it would be able to 

clear the railroad in three more days. 

M anstein cautioned the army not to expend too much effort getting back on the 

railroad because it was already cut farther 

south, between the First Panzer-Eighth 

Army flanks.' 

Meanwhile, Zhukov had slacked off 

somewhat in the center and set his right 

flank armies in motion. On the north 

Thirteenth Army increased its pressure 

against Lutsk and Dubno and pushed the 

Germans out of both on 16 March. Farther 

north, the SS general commanding the 

"fortified place" Kovel' on the same day 

reported that he was surrounded and 

wanted to get out while he still could. From 

his chief, Himmler, he received a telegram "Y , ou were sent to Kovel' to hold it. Do 

that." In a morc realistic vein, Manstein 

Kriegstagebuch NT. II, I-XV, AOK 6 51151/1 

file; OKH, GenSldH, Op. Abl. Illb, Lage Osl, 

Stand 5·3, 6·3·, 7·3·, 8·3· , 9·3·, 10.3·, 11.3. abds . 

• AOK 8, 10 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, II Mar 44, 

AOK 8 58'98/3 file. 

• Pz. AOK 4 , la Kriegstagebuch, Band 2 , 11-16 

Mar 44, Pz. AOK 4- 494'712 file. 
PAYING THE PIPER 

ordered the Headquarters, XXXII Corps, 

the 13Ist Infantry Division, and the SS 

Wiking Division out of their rest areas in 

Poland and dispatched them east to relieve 

Kovel'. Both divisions had been in the 

Cherkassy pocket; neither had any heavy 

weapons; and the Wiking Division did not 

have enough rifles to arm all its men. In 

a singular piece of bad luck, a direct hit on 

an ammunition car blew up the armored 

train detailed to give them artillery support.

1O 

In the southeast, Kanev's offensive 

against Eighth Army had by II March torn 

away First Panzer Army's anchor on its 

right, and the infantry divisions of Thirtyeighth Army had plunged through, splitting 

off First Panzer Army's right flank corps. 

Assisted by the massive pressure of Second 

Ukrainian Front's tank armies going west 

between the Bug and the Dnepr, T hirtyeighth Army rolled up the First Panzer 

Army flank toward Vinnitsa. The Russian 

infantry were about 40 percent so-called 

"booty Ukrainians," recruits the armies 

scooped up as they advanced across the 

occupied territory; even so, the weight of 

their numbers was too much for the overstrained German divisions. 

Off the flank XXXXVI Panzer Corps 

slipped away laterally to the south trying to 

cover the Dnestr crossi ngs at Yampol' and 

Mogilev-Podol'skiy. It angled into the 

path of Soviet Sixth Tank Army, wa, 

pushed away to the west north of the river, 

and could not bring itself to a stop. On I 7 

March elements of the 75th Infantry Division which had crossed the Dnestr opposite 

Yam pol' blew the bridges there after Soviet 

tanks carrying infantry broke into the town. 

Two days later the bridges at Mogilev1(1 Ibid., 16- 19 Mar 44. 

279 

Podol'skiy were blown. The 75th Infantry 

Division reported that the Russians were 

crossing the river at several places, but it 

could not conduct a reconnaissance because 

its horses were worn out and the only vehicle it had was a Volkswagen.

l1 On 20 

March, when Thirty-eighth Army took Vinnitsa, its point was already jabbing southwest past Zhmerinka toward KamenetsPodol'skiy into the gap between the First 

Panzer Army flank and XXXXVI Panzer 

Corps. 

By 21 March Zhukov had massed enough 

strength-three tank armies, the First , 

Third Guards, and Fourth, plus First 

Guards Army---to smash the front between 

Ternapol and Proskurov with one blow. 

On that day 200 tanks of First and Fourth 

Tank Armies rammed through the front 

along the railroad and headed due south, 

carrying along with them like drifting 

islands the last remnants of the German 

line- the 68th Infantry, Adolf Hitler, and 

7th Panzer Divisions. 

On the 23d a First Tank Army for ce 

wheeled west against the infantry divisions 

on both sides of Temopol and threw them 

back ten miles. The garrison in the city 

stayed, in accordance with Fuehrer Order 

I I and because no one had time to get the 

"fortified place" designation lifted. On the 

east Third Guards Tank Army and First 

Guards Army reached Proskurov. During 

the day the lead elements of Fourth Tank 

Army, two tank and one mechanized corps, 

passed Chortkov, twenty miles north of the 

Dnestr. They were obviously heading 

across the river to meet Second Ukrainian 

11 Pz. AOK 1, l a, an ITI Pz. K ., 17.3-44; Pz. 

AOK 1, an H . Gr. Sued, 17.3.44; Beth. d. D. Tr. 

I. Tr., la , an Pr. AOK I, 18.3-44; XXXXVI Pr. 

K .. la, lin Pr. AOK I , 19.3.44; 75 I.D. , lin P=.. 

AOK I, 19.3.44. All in Pz. AOK I 58683/10 file. 
280 

Front's armor, which had crossed downstream, below Mogilev-Podol'skiy, and was 

going west,12 

When the Soviet tanks passed Chortkov, 

they cut First Panzer Army's lifeline, one 

single-track railroad. With the river at its 

back, the army was as good as encircled. 

On 23 March, Manstein gave First Panzer 

Army command of the 7th Panzer, Adolf 

Hitler, and 68th Infantry Divisions, which 

were drifting into the army's sector anyway. 

He ordered the army to take back its front 

on the north, anchor its right flank on the 

Dnestr, and attack west to reopen the railroad. Hitler, however, still insisted on 

holding Proskurov and reserved the decision concerning it to himself.13 Neither 

Manstein nor Rube, the army commander, 

believed that Proskurov could be held. 

Later the same day Hube directed all the 

troop commands to begin destroying nonessential vehicles and equipment and to 

requisition every panje wagon they could 

lay hands on to make themselves mobile." 

First Panzer Army Breaks Out 

On 25 March, Manstein flew to Berchtesgaden where, in a stormy afternoon interview with Hitler, he insisted that First Panzer Army had to break out, the order had 

to be given that day, and the army group 

had to be given at least one fresh corps to 

open a path from the west. Angrily, Hitler 

refused, claiming Manstein had "dribbled 

away" all the divisions he had given him 

" Pl . AOK I , la Kriegstagebu ch. Band 2 , 21 - 23 

Mar 44, Pz. AOK 4 494 t7 /2 file . 

13 H. Gr. Sued, la NT. '4'9144 an Pz. AOK J, 

23.3.44 . Pz. AOK I 586 83/ 10 file. 

IIpz. AOK I, la , an 111 Pz. K ., XXIV A. K ., 

XXXXVI Pr. K., LlX A .K., '3.3.44. Pz. AOK 

1 586831 I 0 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

and always wanted to go back but never 

held anywhere. At a second conference, 

after midnight, Hitler changed his mind, 

authorized the breakout, and gave Manstein the II SS Panzer Corps with the 9th 

and 10th SS Panzer Divisions (Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg ), and the looth 

Jaeger and the 367th Infantry Divisions. " 

On the 26th, while Manstein was flying 

back to his headquarters at L'vov, Fourth 

Tank Army turned a force east and took 

Kamenets-Podol'skiy behind First Panzer 

Army. By then Zhukov's and Konev's 

annor was fanning out behind the Dnestr to 

throw another ring around the panzer 

army. 

The decision to give Manstein more divisions was painful for Hitler and the OKW. 

It jeopardized the strategy laid down in 

Fuehrer Directive 5 I- and carefully nurtured through the winter- just when the 

Anglo-American invasion seemed most 

likely to come. The four infantry divisions 

sent east earlier in the month and the two 

Hitler gave on 26 March came out of 

OKW reserves and the Southeastern Theater, which was bad enough. Losing II SS 

Panzer Corps and its two spanking new 

panzer divisions cut directly into the antiinvasion forces, and divisions that went to 

the Eastern Front, experience taught, were 

a long time coming back. 

For the breakout First Panzer Army had 

two choices, neither very promising: it 

could go west and northwest toward Fourth 

Panzer Army or south across the Dnestr. 

Hube wanted to go south. On the west he 

faced two tank armies and would have to 

cross two sizable rivers, several smaller 

streams, and numerous gullies. South of 

the Dnestr he held a small bridgehead 

I~ Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 610- 12 . 
PAYING THE PIPER 

around Khotin, .<Iud t,he enemy forces appeared to be more scattered . . 'Manstein 

was concerned above all with keeping First 

Panzer Army on the north flank and preventing its being pushed into the Carpathians or sl ipping south behind Eighth 

Army; he also doubted that the army could 

get across the Dnestr, which at Khotin 

was about a mile wide and approaching 

flood stage. On 26 March Manstein 

ordered Hube to go west toward Fourth 

Panzer Army across the rear lines of the 

Fourth and First Tank Armies. lfl 

The tactical problem confronting Hube 

was an unusual onc, namely, to hold the 

army together, pull back his front on the 

north and cast, and attack to the rear. The 

effect would be to create an ambulatory 

pocket which would move west along the 

Dnestr like a giant amoeba. Hube divided 

the army into a north and a south group, 

each of which would both hold and withdraw with its infantry and attack with its 

armor. He concluded that getting acro&' 

the Zbruch River would be crucial. Everything depended on whether the army could 

get over in the first place and, secondly, 

once it had done so, whether it would have 

enollgh strength left to go any farther. He 

Rave the north g-rollp the mission of securing the first bridgehead on the Zbruch. 

That would cut the rearward lines of the 

Fourth Tank Army clements around Mogilev-Podol'skiy and enable the south group 

to break through and close up to the 

Zbruch. To take advantage of the "booty 

Ukrainians' " nervousness, the groups were 

to attack at night and in half-light of dusk 

or dawn. During: night marches the troops 

IG Pz.. AOK I, la, all H. Cr. Sued. 25 .344. and 

H . Cr. Sued. Ia Nr. 145s144. a1l Pz. AOK I , 

26.3.44. Pz. AOK 1 58683 / 11 file ; Manstein . Verlore"e Siege. p. 609. 

28 1 

were to close up in columns on either side 

of their panje wagons and use peasants as 

guides from village to village." 

On the opposing side, mud had prevented the Russians' from bringing up artillery to. stiffen their grip on the pocket. 

On 29 March the First Panzer Army north 

group secured two bridgeheads across the 

Zbruch. During the next two days, while 

the north group struck out toward the 

Seret, the next large river to the west, the 

south group closed to the Zbruch, and the 

north and east fronts dropped back. That 

the whole army would get across the Zbruch 

was then assured, but Zhukov was moving 

armor from the north to throw up another 

line west of the Serel. 

Hube estimated that he would need six 

days to take the army across the Seret at 

infantry speed, and that with the supplies 

il had and was receiving by air the army 

could not fight its way out of another envelopment. On the 31St he considered 

letting the tanks hammer through to Fourth 

Panzer Army alone. The infantry would 

then have to split up into groups of a hundred men or so and, following the example 

of the Soviet partisans, try to pick their way 

through the Sov.iet iines. JS 

At the turn of the month a 3-day blizzard 

slowed both sides but, on the whole, benefited First Panzer Army. The Air Force 

transports kept fl ying through the worst of 

the storm, and II 55 Panzer Corps completed the last leg of its train trip through 

Poland. 

17 Pt. AOK I , fa Nr. 756144 . (HI H. Cr. Sued . 

!J7.3 .44, and Pt. AOK I , /a Nr. 754 144. a71 Korpsgruppe Breit/I. K orpsgruppe Che vallerie, Gruppr 

Gol/nick. 27.3.44 . Pz. AOK 1 5868:\/ 11 file. 

t8 Pt. AOK I , / a. an H . Gr. Sued. 29.3-44; Pt. 

AOK I , O.B .. 1a Nr. 766/ 44, aTl H. Gr. Sued , 

3' .. 1-44. Both in Pz. AOK 1 58683 / 11 file . 
282 

On 2 April Zhukov called on the army to 

surrender before the end of the day. If it 

did not, he threatened, it would be destroyed and all captured officers would be 

shot before their troops as punishment for 

having senselessly spilled the blood of soldiers entrusted to them. That day the 

north group attacked across the Seret near 

Chortkov. 

When the weather began to clear, on the 

3d, Zhukov rushed in tanks and vehicles 

from the north and south to waylay the 

army on the Seret. But the next day the 

north group threw back two tank corps, 

pushed through Chortkhov, and carried its 

advance west. Hube concluded that the 

greatest danger had passed and the breakout would succeed. 

During the night of 4 April, 60 JU-S2'S 

loaded with ammunition and gasoline 

landed in the pocket, and next morning II 

SS Panzer Corps attacked from the Fourth 

Panzer Army flank. On the 6th the points 

of II SS Panzer Corps and the First Panzer 

Army north group met at Buchach on the 

Strypa River. By the loth the army had 

its front behind the Seret, II SS Panzer 

Corps had brought in 600 tons of supplies, and the breakout was assured. tD 

Sixth Army Retreats to the Bug 

In the second week of March Malinovskiy had enough strength around Novy Bug 

to strike due south to the Bug Liman at 

Nikolaev and encircle the southern half of 

Sixth Army or to carry the offensive west 

and get across the Bug behind the army. 

That he did neither, or rather that he attempted both, was Sixth Army's salvation. 

18 Pz. AOK t , Ia Kriegstagebuch Nr. 13, !:i:-IO 

Mar 44. Pz . AOK I 58683/2 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

On I 1 and 12 March, using several divisions taken out of the front on the east, 

Hollidt tried to pinch off the Soviet spearhead by closing in on Novy Bug. The 

counterattack could not gain any ground 

on the north; in the south it made fair progress until XXXIII Tank Corps hooked 

south and stopped it completely. After that 

Hollidt had no choice but to get the army 

behind the Bug fast. . 

In the meantime, Malinovskiy had repeated the mistake he had made a month 

earlier at Apostolovo. He had turned the 

Eighth Guards Army's armor and cavalry 

south toward Nikolaev and had sent Fortysixth Army, all infantry, west toward the 

Bug above Novo Odessa. Although Sixth 

Army could stop neither thrust, the splitting of the Soviet forces gave the army its 

chance to escape. The army's south group, 

in particular, did not have to confront 

both Soviet armies at the same time hut 

could meet the greater threat, Eighth 

Guards Army, first and then fight its way 

through Forty-sixth Army two days later. 

The battle took another unexpectedly favorable turn after 12 March, when 

Eighth Guards Army began ha,ing supply 

troubles. The tank units suddenly started 

operating cautiously, and the army command shied away from making the final 

leap down to Nikolaev and the Bug Liman. 

Consequently, only three Sixth Army divisions had to break out of complete encirclements. 

Nev.ertheless, the retreat from the Ingulets to the Bug was a punishing experience. The entire country between the two 

rivers is cut by 30- to loo-foot-deep balkas 

(gullies), many of which that year were 

partly filled with water. Sometimes whole 

divisions were forced to detour for miles 

before they found crossings and then, often, 
PAYING THE PIPER 283 

BALKAS-TVPICAL TERRAIN ALONG THE DNEPR IN THE UKRAINE 

guns and vehicles became hopelessly stuck 

in the bottom. When it rained, the ground 

everywhere dissolved into soupy mud which 

as it dried clung in heavy, viscous globs to 

!'hocs, tires, and tracks. 

By 15 March Sixth Army's south group 

had punched through Eighth Guards Army 

to the Ingul River. Six days later Hollidt 

had established a solid front on the Bug." 

He was himself, in a sense, to become the 

last casualty of the retreat. His health was 

broken, and at Fuehrer headquarters the 

speed with which Sixth Army had caved 

in the Dnepr Bend and on the Ingulets had 

left a lingering suspicion, which the army 

!lO AOK 6, Ia Krieg.stagebuch NT. II, I-XXXVIII, 

AOK 6 51151II file. 

group commander, Kleist, insisted was unfounded, that the army could have been 

"more tightly" led. On 2 I March, Hitler 

announced that a new commanding general would take over in a few days.:n 

Eighth Army Covers the Flank 

When Hitler, on I 1 March, agreed to let 

the Eighth and Sixth Armies go back to the 

Bug, Kanev's armored spearheads were 

already reaching out to the river. The 

next day Vll Corps, which was trying to 

defend Gayvoron and the crossings north 

and south of there, in the words of the 

~ H. Cr. A, Ia Kriegstagebuch, Balld 3. Teil 6, 

13,21 Mar 44, H. Gr. A 75126/ 26 file. 
284 

army's journal entry for that day, "hit bottom." The remnants of its divisions practically evaporated, and the Russians swept 

across the river. 

Both Manstein and the Eighth Army commander, Woehler, thought Second Ukrainian Front would most likely turn south 

between the Bug and the Dnestr to collaborate with the Third Ukrainian Front's 

armies going toward Voznesensk and encircle the Eighth and Sixth Armies. Eighth 

Army had the SS Totenkopf Division coming out of the front west of Kirovograd; it 

loaded parts of the division aboard Giganten, boxcar-size aircraft that were a cross 

between a glider and a transport, and flew 

them to Balta to start building a front between the two rivers. Next, Woehler took 

XXXXVII Panzer Corps ofT his right flank 

and shifted it across the river. At first he 

and Manstein intended to have the corps 

attack into the Soviet flank, and close up to 

First Panzer Army, but the mud and the 

speed with which the First Panzer Army 

flank was shoved away to the north prevented that. 

Eighth Army and Army Group A were 

both experiencing new kinds of trouble. 

Their rear echelons were being compressed 

into a narrow space east of Bessarabia. 

Because of promises he had made to Antonescu, Hitler was extremely chary of granting permission for German troops to move 

onto Rumanian soil. Kleist at last declared 

that Army Group A would move into Bessarabia "in spite of the Fuehrer and in 

spite of Antonescu." 22 More serious in the 

long run, the army and the army group 

were reduced to depending on the Rumanian railroads which, as the front drew 

closer, were falling into complete chaos. 

.. Ibid., 12 Mar 44. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

In Transnistria, the Rumanian occupation 

zone east of the Dnestr, the Rumanian railroad men shunted German troops trains 

onto sidings to make way for their own 

evacuation trains. When Eighth Army 

moved its headquarters from Pervomaysk 

to Kotovsk by rail, a distance of sixty-five 

miles, the trip took twenty-seven hours. 

In the third week of March Second 

Ukrainian Front turned two armies and 

two tank armies west toward Yampol' and 

Mogilev-Podol'skiy into the First Panzer 

Army flank and rear. That took pressure 

ofT Eighth Army and for the time being 

reduced the danger of a thrust south between the Bug and Dnestr; but on ,8 

March Woehler reported that even though 

Konev had diverted four armies, he still had 

four armies and a tank army he could use 

against the south flank. Woehler believed 

Konev would push across the Dnestr and 

turn south to cut ofT the Eighth and Sixth 

Armies. Eighth Army-all told, four infantry divisions, four kampfgruppen, and 

four and a half panzer divisions-could not 

stretch its line any farther. Woehler 

thought it was high time to go behind the 

Dnestr; even if the army did, it would lose 

many of its heavy weapons to the mud and 

the Russians and would have to be reequipped behind the Dnestr. The army 

group did not agree. Manstein's chief of 

stafT told Woehler the next day that Konev 

was making a mistake in crossing the 

Dnestr; he would not have enough strength 

to envelop the Eighth and Sixth Armies behind the river." Probably both estimates 

were partly right. Konev at that stage was 

clearly more interested in exploiting his 

complete operational freedom to the west 

1:1 AOK 8, Ia Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, 18, 19 Mar 

44, AOK 8 58'98/3 file . 
PAYING THE PIPER 

than in taking on the more difficult task 

of engaging the two German armies on his 

left. On the other hand, Eighth Army in 

fact did not ha\'e the strength to continue 

extending its flank west. 

On 20 March Manstein informed 

Woehler that Sixth Army would take O\·er 

pan of his line on the east to enable him 

to stretch his front west. The plan was to 

get XXXXVil Panzer Corps and all the 

army's tanks across the Dnestr for a jab 

into Konc\"s flank. Two days later 

Woehler reponed th at Second Ukrainian 

Frout had three armies and three tank 

armies drawing up to the Dnestr on a 60-

mile front between Kamenka and i\[ogib·-

Podol'~kiy. Armored reconnaissance units 

had crossed the river and wcre in Balti halfway to the Prul Ri,·cr. The Russians were 

building eight bridges on the Dnestr and 

soon would be across in strength. They 

could then turn south or continue on aeros. ... 

the Prut to the Carpathians and squeeze 

Eighth Army and Army Grollp A between 

the mountains and the Black Sea. Eighth 

Army, \\'ochler insisted, could not hold 100 

miles of front east of the Dnestr and build 

another 6o-milc front west of the rhocr; 

its mis.'5ion would hayc to be changed; the 

order to go behind the Dnestr would hayc 

to be given. 

Privately, the Ei~hth Army and Army 

Group A chiefs of stafT had discussed getting Eighth Army transferred to Armv 

Group A. They believed all Eighth Arm)' 

could do was to hold a front on the north 

long enough for Sixth Army to make good 

its escape from the Bug; and the)' apparently suspected that Manstein, thinking in 

terms of keeping his north flank ,trong and 

talking of an Eighth Army attack into 

Konev's Oank, was only secondarily con285 

cerned for the welfare of the two southern 

armies. On 24 March Woehler and Hollidt 

met at Woehler's headquarters and agreed 

that the time had come to take both armies 

away from the Bug. They decided that if 

the army group commands did nothing and 

the decision became imperath'e, they would 

act in concert without orders ~.j, 

The day before, Kleist had asked Manstein whether he thought Eighth Army 

could protect the Army Group A flank on 

the west. ~Ianslein had said no; at most, 

the army could cm'cr it between the Dnestr 

and the Bug but thcre, too, the Russians 

could get through if they really tried. On 

the 25th the Russians thrust their w,\Y into 

Balta, situated fi,·e miles north of the lateral 

railroad behind Eighth Army and astride a 

ridge line running deep behind Army 

Group A east of the Dnestr. 

That night Woehler and Kleist met at 

Kleist's headquarters in Tiraspol. The next 

morning Kleist called Zeitzler and told him 

he had taken command of Ei~hth Army. 

He had read" the orders for a withdrawal 

to the Dnestr and proposed to issue them 

that afternoon. (He had gi,·en Woehler a 

copy the night before. ) "Someone," he 

said, "must lay his head on the block." 

When Zeitzler advised him to see Hitler 

first, Kleist agreed he would the next day, 

after he had made certain the withdrawal 

wa,,; all set for an immediate start. On the 

27th Hitler consented to let the two armies 

go back, pro,·ided the,· held a bridgehead 

from Tiraspol to Odessa. He refused to 

consider giving up Odessa, the main supply 

base for the Crimea .'" 

II Ibid., 20- '24 Mar 44 . 

• H . Gr. A, Ja Kriegstagi!buch. Band 3. Teil 6, 

'23- '27 Mar 44. H. Gr. A 751'26/ '26 file. 
286 

Model and Schoerner Take 

Command 

On 30 March Hitler sent his personal 

Condor to pick up Kleist at his headquarters in Tiraspol and Manstein at L'vov. 

That night, at the midnight situation conference, he awarded both field marshals 

the swords to the Knight's Cross of the Iron 

Cross and relieved them of their commands. 

He told them he approved of everything 

they had done in the past months, but had 

concluded that on the Eastern Front the 

day of the master tacticians was past and 

that what he needed were generals who 

would drive their troops to the utmost anrl 

extract from them last ounce of capacit)" 

for resistance. When Manstein and Kleist 

departed, Model, promoted to generalfeldmarschall, and Schoerner, newly promoted 

to generaloberst, were waiting in the antcroom.

26 

Hitler had for long put off getting rid of 

Manstein. According to Goering, he had 

already "drawn the necessary conclusions" 

in early 1943. 27 Manstein, meanwhile, had 

persisted in showing fl ashes of military 

genius that made him indispensable in individual crises. In the aggregate, however, 

his displays of talented generalship had only 

made it harder for Hitler to avoid the 

realization that Germany was not merely 

passing through a period of adversity but 

entering one of hopelessness. Since December 1943 Manstein's successor, Model, 

had been standing by. The actual low 

point in Manstein's relations with Hitler 

had been reached on 27 January 194·}' 

when Manstein, while the Fuehrer was addressing the army and army group com-

- Ibid., 30 Mar 44 ; Manstein, VerloTene Siege. 

P· 61 4. S7 Goebbels Diaries, p. 265. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

manders, had interrupted (an unheard of 

occurrence when the fuehrer was speaking ) and objected to a remark that generals "ought to be the last to desert the 

flag." If Model had not been needed at 

Army Group North four days later, Manstein would probably not have lasted the 

two more months in his command. Z8 

Kleist had not engaged in any such 

dramatic encounter with Hitler, but he had 

consistently opposed him on the question of 

holding the Crimea and at the end had 

threatened to take matters into his own 

hands to get Sixth Army away from the 

Bug. In November 1943 he had proposed 

that Hitler devote himself mainly to internal and foreign policy and, in the style of 

World War I, create a First Quartermaster 

General of the Wehrmacht who would run 

the war on the Eastern Front and have 

strong advisory powers in the other theaters.::!!) 

It must have cost Hitler a tremendous 

effort to part amicably with Manstein and 

Kleist. That he did so evinced their stature 

in the Army. 

Even though it could probably be assumed that the end of the Soviet offensive 

was in sight, the state of Army Groups 

South and A, which Hitler on 5 April in a 

classic empty gesture renamed Army Group 

North Ukraine and Army Group Soulh 

Ukraine, was still precarious at the time 

Model and Schoerner were appointed. In 

the Fourth Panzer Army's sector Ternopol 

was encircled, and Brody was nearly encircled. First Panzer Army was at the 

critical point in its breakout. Sixth Army 

was beginning its retreat from the Bug. 

2!1 Tadigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonaiamts, '1.7 Jan 44. H 4 /12 file . 

• Draft letter in H Gr. A. l a, Unterschrifttn, H. 

Gr. A 751'1.7 /8 file. 
PAYING THE PIPER 

The Crimea was isolated. In the gap between the army groups' flanks Soviet spearheads had reached the Carpathians west of 

Chernovtsy and Kolomyya. 

Margarethe 

Behind the front the last act of an impromptu drama that could haw added to 

the army groups' troubles was \\'orking out 

slightly to their benefit. Toward the end 

of Februan' Hitler had decided a showdown with Hungary was due. He had instructed the Operations Staff, OKW, to 

refurbish its plan for Operation ;\[ARGARETHE, which the Commanding General, 

Southeas.t, would execute, probably sometime in the first half of ~[arch. Tactically, 

the operation was to be a variant of the 

Trojan Horse concept: German troops allegedly in transit through Hungary would 

suddenly SLOp, intern the Hungarian Army, 

and occupy the major centers. Rumania, 

he decided, did not need to be included; it 

would not defect because as long as Antoncscu stayed in power it had nowhere else 

to go. On, 5 March, after the SO\'iet offcnsi,'c had forced diversion of several 

MARGARETHE divisions to the East, Hitler 

decided to try an easier way and meet with 

the Hungarian Regent, Admiral Horth)", 

first. 

On the ,8th at Schloss Klesshcim, Horthy at first refused and then, finally, accepted Hitler's demands for a government 

oriented toward Germany and the right to 

station German troops on Hungarian territory; but he boarded his train and departed for Budapest without signing the 

protocol. The next morning German troops 

crossed the horder; and when Honhy's 

train reached Budapest shortly before noon, 

a German honor guard was at the station 

287 

to greet him. When Harthy's attitude 

stiffened after he reached the capital, Hitler 

concluded it would be necessary to strengthen the occupation forces and disarm the 

Hungarian Army. Horthy apparently saw 

what was coming, and on 23 i.\1arch, just 

a step ahead of a 6-hour ultimatum the 

German Foreign Ministry had ready, he 

appointed Field Marshal Doeme Sztojay, 

the Hungarian ~1inister in Berlin, Minister 

President of Hungary. Sztojay was acceptable to Germany, although Hitler 

would have preferred Bela Imredy, who, 

himself allegedly of Jewish descent, had 

headed an anti-Semitic goycrnmcnt in the 

late '930's. On the same day, Antonescu 

entered the picture with a demand that 

Hungary return the Rumanian territory 

Germany and Italy had given it in the 

Vienna Award of August '940. To evade 

that complication, the Germans declared 

all of Hungary east of the Tisza Ri"er part 

of the Eastern Front zone of operations, 

which by that time, it, in fact, nearly was. 

On 24 March, when ZhukO\"s spearhead 

approaching the Prut above Chernovtsy 

came within 5-ixty miles of the Hungarian 

border, the Operations Staff, OKW, and 

the Southeastern Theater Command 

changed their minds about demobilizing 

the Hungarian Army. They wanted to 

get Hungarian units into the Carpathians 

to close the passes, and on the 25th pre-

"ailed upon the Hungarian Army General 

Staff, which had, under the circumstances, 

proved surprisingly co-operative, to begin 

calling up men to fill out the home forces. 

Of the Hungarian occupation forces in 

Russia, VII Corps was already forming a 

front on the upper Prut. VIII Corps was 

still stationed behind Army Group Center. 

On the 27th Hungarian troops moving 

into the mountains reported meeting Ger-
288 

man stragglers from Army Group South. 

The OKW, which so far had avoided stationing its German units where they could 

be drawn into the Eastern Front, faced a 

dilemma: the border had to be defended 

and it could not put Hungarian troops in 

the Rumanian territory south of Chernovtsy. On the 29th it assembled two reinforced German regiments under a provisional corps headquarters. The next day 

they moved into the mountains as the 

Blocking Force (Sperrverband ) Bucovina. 

That still left the most threatened point, 

the Tatar Pass south of Stanislav, inadequately covered. On the night of 30 March 

Zeitzler told Army Group South to take 

command of the First Mountain Division, 

one of the OKW divisions in Hungary, and 

move it into the pass. JodI, Chief of the 

Operations Staff, OKW, protested to Hitler 

that the OKW was losing the last division 

in its central reserve; Zeitzler countered by 

calling into question the whole OKW 

strategy and the division of forces it had 

tried to enforce through the winter. Hitler 

agreed with JodI but, unwilling to have 

another internal upheaval on his hands 

just when he was getting rid of Manstein 

and Kleist, ordered the division to move 

close behind the pass and stay there as the 

OKW reserve pending a final decision." 

First Panzer Army Saved-A Fortress 

Sacrificed 

By the time Model took over at L'vov 

30 OKW. WFSt. Kriegstagebuch, Die OKW 

Kriegschauplaetze im Rahmen deT Gesamtkriegs-

/uthrung, pp. 53-56, OCMH files; OKW, WFSt, 

K,iegstagebuch , DeT Fall "Margarethe:' Teil II, 

pp. 9-70, OKW/206 file; OKW, WFSt, Kriegstagebuch, Die Ereignisse in Ungarn von An/ang 

A.pril bis zu beginn deT Schlacht urn Budapest unJ 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

on 3 April the worst was over for Army 

Group South. Brody had held, and II SS 

Panzer Corps was giving XIII Corps a 

short boost which would enable it to 

straighten its line. First Panzer Army's 

breakout was succeeding. 

All that was left was one last, small, and, 

under the circumstances, rather minor 

tragedy. In the "fortified place" Ternopol 

over 4,000 men, most of them eighteenyear-olds, had been encircled since 2 I 

March. On the 25th a tank force had 

nearly fought its way through with a supply column, but permission to evacuate the 

city had not been given, and the armor 

was not strong enough both to guard the 

trucks and to carry the attack over the last 

five or so miles. The next attempt wa, 

delayed until I 1 April, when the 9th SS 

Panzer Division could be spared from the 

relief of First Panzer Army. The SS-men 

set out in rain and deep mud. On the second day, Model asked permission to have 

the garrison break out. Hitler first refused, declaring the army group was 

"honor bound" to relieve Ternopol, but 

later changed his mind and agreed to let 

the order be given when the relief force 

had drawn somewhat closer to the city. 

The 9th SS Panzer Division, as almost always the case with new SS divisions, was a 

splendidly outfitted aggregation of raw 

troops and inexperienced officers. On the 

morning of the 14th Model took the tanks 

away from the SS division's staff and put 

them under an Army officer. The attack 

then carried several miles before being 

stopped again at the end of the day. By 

that time the Ternopol garrison was pushed 

zur endgueltigen Legalisierung des politischen 

Umschwungs, pp. 1-6, OKW/ '206 file. 
PAYING THE PIPER 

into a small area on the western edge of the 

city and under incessant air and ground 

attack. On the 15th the commanding general was killed. That night the senior officer in the pocket gave the order to break 

out. Fifty-three men reached the Fourth 

Panzer Army line. 3 1 

First Panzer Army came out of its encirclement in better shape than anyone had 

expected. No large number of its troops 

suffered the complete collapse of morale 

that had been observed in the survivors 

from the Cherka&sy pocket. The army 

stayed at the front, and on ,6 April TIT 

Panzer Corps attacked south across the 

Dnester. In Germany the army's feat \Va:-; 

celebrated as a victory, clouded somewhat 

when Hubc lost his life in a plane crash in 

the Austrian Alps the day he went to 

Bcrchtcsgaden to receive the diamonds to 

the Knight's Cross of the Tron Cross. 

OfT the army's right flank, in the second 

half of the month, Hungarian First Army 

( VII Corps and VI Corps, the latter 

formed out of divisions from the home 

forces) established a front arcing around 

Chernovtsy and following the line of the 

Carpathians south to the Rumanian border. 

Late in the month the Hungarians successfully withstood several rather heavy local 

Soviet attacks, rearousing the Germans' old 

suspicion that in Hungarian Second Army, 

which performed so poorly after Stalingrad, 

the Hungarians had foisted on the Wehrmacht their worst troops.:!:! 

aJ Pz. AOK 4, In KriegJlageblt ch. Band 2, 21 -

25 Mar 44, Pz. AOK 4 48417/ 2 file; Pt. AOK 4, 

In Kricgstngcbuch , 1.- 15444, II - I:' Apr 44, Pz. 

AOK 4 :)1492/1 file; Pz. AOK 4, /a , Che/·Noliull , 

1.1.- 15.6.44, 15- 17 Apr 44, Pz. AOK 4 5149'2 / 32 

file . 

:12 Pz. A 01\· I, I fl 1\' riegstagebuch Nr. 13, 12-30 

Apr 44, Pz. AOK I 5868312 file . 

289 

To the Dnestr 

The Sixth and Eighth Armies pulled 

away from the Bug on 28 March. At Nikolaev, where the only way across the 

Bug was a ponton bridge built by Austrian 

Army engineers in World War I, five Sixth 

Army divisions that had been holding a 

bridgehead rejoined the main force jllst in 

time. Around Novo Odessa the Eighth 

Guards and Forty-sixth Armies, having reassembled, followed close behind the German~ and began maneuvering for another 

chance to slice through Sixth Army's center. 

By 2 April the Sixth Army left flank 

was on the bridgehead line it had been 

ordered to hold around Odessa, but the 

Russians had drawn in tight and clearly 

planned to cut the bridgehead in two midway between Odessa and Tiraspol. On that 

day a sleet storm blew down from the 

Carpathians. The temperature dropped 

far below freezing; icc tore down telephone 

and power lines and clogged artillery pieccs 

and machine guns. 

The next night, at the height of the 

storm, Soviet tanks and cavalry broke 

through to Razdclnaya and turned south, 

splitting the bridgehead in half. In three 

more days the Russian force lunged deep 

behind Odessa to the Dnestr, capturing the 

city's water intake station ncar the village 

of Bclyaekva. Sixth Army then began a 

hasty retreat behind the river amid scenes 

of wildest confusion. At the railroad bridge 

and road bridge west of Tiraspol tralfic 

had been jammed up for weeks. The army 

had built five smaller bridges at various 

points, and on the muddy approaches to 

each miles-long columns of trucks, people, 

and cattle stood four and five abreast wait p 

ing to cross. Hundreds of trains jammed 
290 STALINGR AD TO BERLIN 

BRIDGE ON THE DNESTR AFTER THE RETREAT 

into Odessa, but only a few could be routed 

through to the west. 

The last Germans crossed the Dnestr on 

'4 April." The army group reported that 

the scene behind the river was reminiscent 

of Stalingrad. The Rumanian railroads 

had failed completely. The troops had no 

clothing and no supplies. The wounded 

were lying in the open at the sidings. The 

daily ration was 200 grams of bread." 

Probably as much because Malinovskiy 

had gone as far as he wanted to as for any 

other reason, Sixth Army did manage to 

get a front on the Dnestr from Dubossary 

» AOK 6, Ia Kriegstagebllch NT. 12, VlJ/-

XXXIII, AOK 6511511'2 filc. 

~ H. Gr. A. la Kriegstagebuch, Band 3, Teil 7. 

12 Apr 44. H. Gr. A 75126/27 file. 

south to the Dnestr Liman, but not before 

the Russians, as was their custom, had 

gained a number of bridgeheads, the largest of them south of Tiraspol at the center 

of the front. 

West of the Dnestr, Army Group South 

Ukraine was forced to make all the usc it 

could of the Rumanian Third and Fourth 

Armies. To keep the Rumanians in hand, 

the army group command devised an involved chain of command, which, while 

preserving appearances, actually subordinated Rumanian Fourth Army to Eighth 

Army and Rumanian Third Army to Sixth 

Army. Marshal Antonescu, the existence 

of his regime at stake, gave the alliance his 

desperate loyalty, but his soldiers at all levcis were interested only in personal SUf-
PAYING THE PIPER 

viva!. Many officers had stopped wearing 

their German decorations. After talking 

with the Commanding General, Rumanian 

Fourth Army, on 27 March, Woehler came 

away with the impression that the Rumanians "had no discernible desire to fight." 3~ 

During the first week in April, Eighth 

Army again raced to keep pace with the 

westward moving Russians. The Rumanians, after refusing to make a stand on 

the Prut, had promised to hold the so-called 

Strunga line between lasi and Targu 

Neamt, but they were talking of falling 

back to the narrows between the Danube 

and the Carpathians. In the second week 

of the month German panzer divisions counterattacking across the Prut stopped the 

Russian spearheads west of lasi. After that 

Eighth Arm)', Rumanian Fourth Army, 

and Blocking Force Bucovina built a continuous east-west line from DubosarryIasi-Targu Ncamt north along the mountains to the Army Group North Ukraine 

flank. 

The Crimea 

Seventeenth Army sat out the winter in 

the Crimea. (Map 25) After the last hope 

that Manslcin might come to its relief had 

faded in November 1943 and the Russians 

in the same month had taken beachheads 

on the south shore of the Sivash and on 

the Kerch' Peninsula, Zcitz1cr, Kleist, and 

Jaenecke had agreed the army should get 

off the Crimea. The), reasoned that the 

peninsula could not be held in the long 

rUIl, that the troops were needed on the 

main front, and that any further diversion 

of troops there would be an outright waste. 

3r. AOK 8, Ia Krit!gstagebuc/z Nt. 3, 27 Mar 44, 

AOK 8 58'98/3 file . 

291 

But Hitler had insisted the army stay put, 

and, during the winter, at the expense of 

Army Groups South and A, had increased 

its strength in German troops from one 

infantry division to five, plus two selfpropelled assault gun brigades. Marshal 

Antonescu, who would much rather have 

taken them out, had left the seven Rumanian divisions with Seventeenth Army. 

The army, keeping its main defense line 

on the Perekop Isthmus, had managed during the winter to reduce the Soviet beachheads to two very small areas, one at the 

southeastern end of the isthmus and one 

on the easternmost tip of the Kerch' Peninsula. If the Perekop Isthmus was lost, the 

only other place the army could make a 

stand was at Sevastopol. It had built the 

GNEISENAU line in a rough arc around 

Simferopol but had troops enough only to 

fight a rear-guard action there until the 

main force moved into Sevastopol. 

On 7 April 1944 Schoerner inspected the 

Crimea defenses, pronounced them in excellent shape, and in reporting that the 

peninsula could be held "for a long time" 

made one of the least accurate predictions 

of the war. The next morning Fourth 

U krni7lia71 Front attacked. The isthmus 

line held, but the Rumanian loth Division 

holding half of the Sivash bridgehead line 

was badly shaken the first day and collapsed 

the next. 

That night J aenecke took the line back 

to the base of the isthmus. Schoemer told 

Zeitzler the retreat to Sevastopol might have 

to begin any minute and therefore Jaenecke 

should be authorized to make the decision. 

He was confident, he said, that neither 

Jaenecke nor his chief of staff would jump 

to any hasty conclusions. Hitler of course 

refused. Instead, he dispatched Zeitzler to 

the army group headquarters where the 
292 

SEVAS 

MAP 25 

FOURTH UKRAINIAN 

FRONT 

BLACK SEA 

latter arrived on 10 April just in time to 

be told the Russians had pushed into the 

interior and the first stage of the retreat 

had started. Since the first stage, as 

planned, chiefly involved removing the 

troops from the Kerch' Peninsula, Hitler approved, but then, when he learned the next 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SEA 

OF 

A Z 0 V 

THE CRIMEA 

8Aprjl-13h4oy 1944 

10 G ,0 10 ~o " ,lU 

'w." "I ,1m; It-I ~'~T' ---,'C-~' '0 0 10 to ' 0 _KO"HU S 

day that the order for all units to withdraw 

to the GNEISENAU line had also been given, 

fell into a rage and accused Jaenecke of 

having lost his nerve." As the German and 

311 H. GT. A, la Kriegstagebuch. Band 3. Teil 4. 

7-1 J Apr 44. H. Gr. A 75126/24 file. 
PAYING THE PIPER 

Russian units retreated west of Kerch', the 

{"de/len dent Coastal Army (the former 

North Caucasus Frollt ) began applying 

pressure from the casl.:l 7 

When Schoerner and the Army Group 

South Ukraine chief of staff, who was on 

the Crimea at the lime, agreed that Jacncckc's decision had been necessary, Hitler 

authorized a withdrawal to the GNEISENAU 

line and, jf necessary, to Scvastopo!, but 

directed that Sevastopol was to be held 

indefinitely. Everyone, including Hitler, 

had previously believed that when the 

retreat began it would have to proceed 

continuously to the last stage, the evacuation . Schoemer reported that the GNEISENAU line and Sevastopol could not be held 

morc than three or four weeks. He had 

already instru cted the Navy to send a convoy from Constanta, Rumania, to take ofT 

the service troops. 

On the 12th, Soviet tanks broke into the 

GNEISENAU line in several places; the next 

day Simfcropol was lost. On 16 April, the 

Russians close behind them, the Seventeenth Army rear guard went into the main 

Seva,'opol line. A day later Hitler told 

Army Group South Ukraine to take out 

all troops and equipment not needed fol' 

the defense but again insisted that Sevastopol be held. 

Casualties in the first ten days numbered '3, 131 Germans and 17,652 Rumanians. The ration strength of Seventeenth 

Army stood at 75,546 Germans and 45,887 

Rumanians. The army estimated its combat strength at one-third of the German 

troops. The Rumanians, it reported, were 

not fit for combat and ought to be evacuated. It had, therefore, all together, five 

IT Plato llov, Vt ora ya MirouaJla Voyna , 1939- 45, 

p. 565· 

293 

kampfgmppen of approximately regimental 

strength facing three Soviet armies with a 

combined total of 27 divisions and 200 

tanks. 

In a midnight interview with Hitler at 

fuehrer headquarters on 21 April, Schoerncr argued that Sevastopol could not be 

held because Seventeenth Army lacked the 

strength, and the Navy could not keep it 

supplied because the convoys were already 

having to fight their way in . [n an atmosphere reminiscent of Stalingrad, Hitler 

marshaled his countcrarguments: a statement from General der Infanteric Karl 

Allmendinger, one of the Seventeenth 

Army corps commanders, that the army 

could hold Sevastopol if it were given some 

reinforcements, and a report from the 

OKM that the Navy could keep Sevastopol 

supplied as long as might be needed. He 

did not want to hold Sevastopol very long, 

Hitler insisted, only the six or eight weeks 

needed to keep Turkey quiet until he had 

beaten off the coming Anglo-American 

invaSion . 

Four days later, when the Commanding 

Admiral , Black Sea, at Schoerner's urging, 

went to Fuehrer headquarters, Hitler asked 

wh ether he had enough shipping tonnage. 

When he a»swered that he had, Hitler 

abruptly dismissed him without lelling him 

explain that having the tonnage and getting the ships through to the Crimea were 

different things. The OKM, seconded by 

the Air Force, had, according: to Zcitzlcr, 

given Hitler "a rosy picture" of conditions 

at Scvastopol. 

On the 28th Hitler called Jaenecke to 

Berchtesgaden and promised him "generous" reinforcements. On learning that the 

reinforcements amounted to fOllr battalions 

of half-trained recruits, Jacncckc, in an 

allempt to place the responsibility for what 
294 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SEVASTOPOL HARBOR 

was about to happen at Sevastopol where 

it belonged, submitted a letter requesting 

that Seventeenth Army be made directly 

subordinate to the OKH (Hitler)." Hitler 

thereupon declared that Jaenecke had demonstrated he was no longer able to conduct 

the defense of Sevastopol as directed, gave 

Allmendinger command of S,,'enteenth 

Army, and ordered that Jaeneeke not be 

allowed to return to the Crimea. In the 

meantime, Antoncscu had submitted a letter in which he bluntly labeled as nonsense 

the attempt to hold a distant beachhead 

when the homeland was in danger. Zeitzler 

did not give the letter to Hitler because, 

:18 H. Gr. A, Ia Kriegstagebu ch, Balld 3, Teil 4, 

12-31 Mar 43, H. Gr. A 75126/24 file. 

he said, ull would create an explosion." 

On 5 May the Russians hit the front 

north of Sevastopol. The attack was a 

feint. The main assault came on the 7th 

in the south behind Balaklava. By the end 

of the day the Russians had smashed 

through to the Saplln Heights, which gave 

them a clear field of observation over the 

whole beachhead to the tip of Cape Kherson yes. The next day the army regained 

its original north front but failed to retake 

the heights in the south. By then the losses 

were so great that it had become impossible 

to hold anywhere. That night Hitler agreed 

to let the army be evacuated. 

During the next four nights convoys with 

enough ships to take aboard all the troops 

stood ofT the cape, but some turned back 
PAYING THE PIPER 295 

SOVIET TROOPS ON SAPUN HEIGHTS 

to Constanta empty and others took aboard 

only a fraction of the men they could have 

carried. The Navy claimed that the whole 

cape was shrouded in smoke and the ships 

could not go inshore. The Chief of Staff, 

Seventeenth Army, insisted visibility was 

always adequate for ships to have found 

their way into the inlets, but several whole 

convoys failed even to try. The result was 

a tragic fiasco. Of 64,700 men still at 

Sevastopol in the first week of May, 26,700 

were left on the beach to fall into Soviet 

hands. In the aftermath the Commanding 

Admiral, Black Sea, and the Naval Commander, Crimea, were awarded the Knight's 

Cross of the Iron Cross; and Hitler ordered 

that neither Jaenecke nor Allmendinger 

was to be given another command until a 

court-martial had resolved "the suspicion 

that all was not done that might have been 

done to hold the Crimea." 39 

• H . Gr. A. la K,iegstagtbuch, Band 3. Teil 8, 

1-13 May 44, H. Gr. A 75126/28 file ; De, Oberbe-

/ehlshaber der 17. Armee, 10 Nr. 2338/ 44. an den 

Oberbefehlshaber der Heere sgruppe S.udukraine, 

13 .5-44; Cell. Maj. Ritter VO T! X ylnnder, Chef des 

Gtmerabtabes deT H eeresgruppe A, Stellungnahme 

zur Taetigkeit det Marine btJi der Krim Raeumung, 

6.11.44, (last two in H. Gr. A 75127/7 file) ; 

Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespusonalamts, 14jun, 25 lui 44. H 4/r2 file. 
CHAPTER XIV 

Prelude to Disaster 

Karelia 

The Soviet Offensive Begins 

The "black day" of the Finnish Army 

was 10 June 1944. After a massive artillery and air preparation on 9 June, accompanied by probing attacks, the Soviet 

Twenty-first Army on the morning of the 

10th centered its attack on the left flank 

division of Finnish IV Corps holding the 

western side of the front on the Isthmus of 

Karelia. In a massive assault three Soviet 

divisions annihilated one regiment of the 

Finnish division and before noon had penetrated to a depth of six miles. (Map 26 ) 

At that stage of the war an offensive 

against the Finnish Army was hardly a 

military necessity. Its rationale, as far as 

the Russians have explained it, was that it 

diverted enemy attention from the offensive 

build-up in progress opposite Army Group 

Center in Belorussia and that it fulfilled a 

sacred obligation to liberate all occupied 

Soviet territory.' The offensive appears 

also to have been motivated by a compulsion to establish Soviet claims as victor or 

liberator in non-Soviet areas of eastern 

Europe by actual military operations in 

some form, and it may have been designed 

to open the way for a more radical settling 

of the score with Finland than had been 

envisioned at Tehran. 

, IVOV (R ), IV, 113. 

Operationally, the campaign against Finland must have appeared a thoroughly routine exercise. The Finns had not in any 

wise been able to keep abreast of the past 

three years' advances in the technology of 

warfare. Relatively modest reinforcement, 

mostly in infantry and artillery, gave the 

Leningrad and Karelian Fronts crushing 

superiority. According to Soviet figures 

the two fronts had 450,000 troops, 10,000 

artillery pieces and heavy mortars, 800 

tanks, and 1,547 aircraft against the Finnish Army's 268,000 men, 1,930 artillery 

pieces, I 10 tanks, and 248 aircraft. 2 

The Finnish High Command was taken 

by surprise even though it had had warnings of an attack in the making as early as 

May, and on I June Finnish Army Intelligence had predicted that an offensive was 

to be expected within ten days. Four or 

five days before the attack the Russians had 

imposed radio silence- an almost infallible 

sign. But the Army operations chief was 

not convinced, and his judgment carried 

the greatest weight with Mannerheim.' 

When the attack began, the two Finnish 

corps defending the isthmus, III Corps on 

the left and IV Corps on the right, had 

three divisions and a brigade in the front, 

I Ibid., IV, 137-38. 

I General der Infanterie a. D . Waldemar Erfurth, 

Comments on Earl Ziemke, The German Northern 

Theater '0/ Operations, 1940- 1945, Jun 57, OCMH. 
THE SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 

AGAINST FINLAND 

June-July 19 44 

TTTTT'I"\"'!' FRONT LINE ON 10 JUNE ".-

•••••••• SECOND LI NE Of PREPARED POSITIONS {V T-lINEI 

I'TI"II'TI"II'nI VYBORG-VU()I(SI LINE (VKT-llN£1 

,.....-.,,......., U-I.IN[ 

" , 

MAP 26 

I , 

~ 

, , , , 

I 

, so MILES 

I I 

~ KILOMETERS 

-J..at4np"""fr1 

;;t""IYoA'I Kill/aid 0 

/' 

\ q Gofcliiltp 

,/ 

, II" 

'\ 

\ 

/ 

\ 

;. 

~ ~~ 

KIOO(K 

r-----> 

KARELIAN 

'-------' 
298 

three more divisions and a brigade in the 

second line, and the Armored Division stationed east of Vyborg. On the isthmus the 

Finns had three defense lines. The firstin the van- roughly followed the old 

Finnish-Soviet border. The second, immed;'ltely to the rear, laid out on terrain militarily more advantageous than the first, 

crossed the isthmus in an almost straight line 

from Vammelsuu on the Gulf of Finland 

to Taipali on Lake Ladoga. The third ran 

from Vyborg to Kuparsaari and along the 

north bank of the Vuoksi River to Taipali. 

This line had strong natural advantages but 

with work not started until November 1943 

it was far from completed.' Between the 

last isthmus line and the heart of Finland, 

the so-called Moscow Line followed the 1940 

border. It had some concrete emplacements and others were being built, but it 

had no natural advantages and could only 

be used for a last-ditch stand. 

The Germans had long doubted the 

Finns' capacity for resistance. In June 1943 

Dietl had repeated a prediction he had 

made in February of that year that the 

Finnish Army would not be able to withstand a strong Soviet attack. The Finns, 

he had stated, were superior to the Germans 

as forest fighters and in dealing with adversities of terrain and climate, but they preferred to avoid pitched battles.' In July 

1944, after the Soviet offensive had passed 

its peak, an OKW observer concluded that 

the Finnish setbacks could be blamed, at 

least in part, on lack of training and neglect 

of fortifications. He also believed that in 

June 1944 the Finns no longer expected a 

Soviet attack and that, until the shock of 

• Mannerheim, EnnntTungt!n, pp. SOl, 507. 

• OKW, WFS., Op. (H) NT. 00307' / 43, Berich. 

ueber die Reise des Majors d.C. Jordan nach Finnland vom 7. his 23.6.43. OKW/S6 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Russian breakthrough on 10 June produced a more realistic judgment, they had 

a tendency, induced by their experiences 

in the Winter War and in 1941, to underestimate the enemy. From the latter criticism, the Germans extracted a degree of 

wry satisfaction, since they had long felt 

that the Finns failed to appreciate fully the 

nature of Germany's problems on the Eastern Front.a 

To achieve and exploit the breakthrough 

Govorov's Leningrad Front had deployed 

two army headquarters (Twenty-first and 

Twenty-third), ten rifle divisions, and the 

approximate equivalent of three tank divisions. In the main assault area the Soviet 

artillery reportedly numbered 300 to 400 

guns per kilometer of front.' For striking 

power Govorov relied on his tremendous 

superiority in tanks, artillery, and aircraft. 

His rifle divisions' will to fight declined 

rapidly after the first few days' combat. 

The tactics- a tremendous commitment of 

troops and materiel on a narrow front and, 

following the penetration, exploitation by 

several corps abreast-followed the standard pattern of the Eastern Front." 

Immediately after the breakthrough on 

10 June, that IV Corps most likely could 

not hold in front of the second line became 

clear. Mannerheim gave the corps a division from the reserve and a regiment from 

III Corps, ordered the Armored Division 

to move up from Vyborg, began transfer-

'OKW, WFS., Op. (H) NT. 007561/44, Reisebericht ueber Frontbesuch in Suedfinnland, 13·7·44. 

OKW/ 56 file. 

10KW, WFSt, 1e//1 NT. 0445Ii44. N otiz zur 

Feindlage Finnland und (Geb.) AOK 20, 17.6.44. 

OKW/ 1559 file; Mannerheim, Erinnerungen, p . 

507 · 

• (Geb .J AOK 20, la NT. 2624144. Fuehrungsanordnungen Nr. 18, 21.7.44. AOK 20 65635/3 

file. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

ring a division from East Karelia, and recalled the 3d Brigade from Twentieth 

Mountain Army. By the 12th, IV Corps 

was in the second line. III Corps, which 

had not yet been attacked, also fell back. 

On the same day, Mannerheim ordered a 

division and a brigade out of East Karelia 

to the isthmus and asked the OKW to release the weapons and grain that had been 

meant for Finland but were being held in 

Germany under Hitler's embargo. The 

next day Hitler agreed' 

The Finnish High Command was forced 

to consider radical measures. On '3 June 

Mannerheim's chief of staff IOld Dietl that 

if the second line was lost, the Finns would 

give up the Svir and Maaselkii Fronts and 

pull back in East Karelia to a short line 

northeast of Lake Ladoga, thereby freeing 

1wo to three more divisions for the isthmus. 

Since November '943, work had been in 

progress on the so-called U -line, the line 

of the Uksu River-Loimola Lake-Tolva 

Lake. 

Dietl urged the Finns to carry out the 

planned witbdrawal but feared that out of 

reluctance to give up East Karelia they 

would hesitate too long." Later, he recommended to Hitler that the German policy be to tie the Finns to Germany by giving them as much support as possible and, 

at the same time, by requiring them 10 make 

the necessary tactical sacrifices, not allow 

them to dissipate their strength in an attempt to hang on in East Karelia. On the 

shorter line, he thought, the Finns might 

hold out indefinitely; they would then save 

• Waldemar Erfurth, Der FinniJche Krieg, '94'-

1944 (Wiesbaden, 1950). p. 231 j Mannerheim, 

E,innerungen, p. 508. 

10 (Geb.) AOK 20, la NT. :1:19/ 44. an OKW. 

WFSt, Herrn Generaloberst Jodi. 14.6.44. AOK 

20 586~9/JO file. 

299 

their country and at the same time spare 

the Twentieth Mountain Army the necessity of executing Operation BIRKE." 

While Dietl was at Mikkeli the second 

line on the isthmus was already under attack. It held for a day but on '4 June the 

Russians brought up their heavy weapons 

and, since- as a captured map later revealed-they had reconnoitered the second 

line in detail before the offensive began, 

were able to attack in force immediately. 

Overwhelming the Finns again with artillery and tanks, they cracked the second 

line at the village of Kutersel'ka and by '5 

June had smashed the Finnish front on an 

8-mile stretch from there to the coast. 

By then it was apparent that the Soviet 

main effort was being directed along the 

railroad line to Vyborg. The Finns had 

virtually no hope of stopping the Russians 

short of the city and were worried that they 

might reach and close the '7-mile-wide 

corridor between Vyborg and the Vuoksi 

River before III Corps and IV Corps could 

escape. Such a maneuver would in all 

probability be decisive, for it would end all 

Finnish chances of holding the VyborgVukosi line, force III Corps and IV Corps 

to go north across the V lloksi, and because 

there was only one bridge across the river, 

compel them to abandon much of their 

heavy equipment on the way. 

On ,6 June, Mannerheim ordered the 

retreat to the Vyborg-Vuoksi line. On the 

20th, after four more days of heavy fighting, IV Corps, the Russians close behind, 

moved into the line between Vyborg and 

the river. III Corps established itself on 

the north bank of the V uoksi and held a 

11 (Geb.) AOK 20, fa Nr. 23"44, Notizen fuu 

Vortrag beim Fuehrer, 16.1.44. AOK 20 58629/10 

file. 
300 

bridgehead on the south bank across from 

V uosalmi. Again the Finnish Army stood 

in the line where it had stopped the RusSians In 1940. 

The withdrawal had gone better than 

might have been expected, chieOy because 

Govorov, rigidly intent on Vyborg, failed 

to strike toward the Vyborg-V uoksi narrows. But the Finns still had no cause for 

optimism. The Soviet forces on the isthmus had been gradually in crcased to 20 

riOe divisions, 4 tank brigades, 5 to 6 tank 

regiments, and 4 self-propelled assault gun 

regiments. Against these Manncrheim, 

drawing on thc last units that could be 

spared from East Karelia, could assemble 

no more than 10 divisions and 4 brigades." 

German Aid 

The military crisis resulting from loss of 

the second Isthmus of Karclia line brought 

a political crisis in iL'i trail. After a secret 

Cabinet meeting on 18 June, the Finns reestablished contact with the Soviet Government. As another upshot of that meeting, Heinrichs asked the German military 

representative at Finnish headquarters 

whether Germany would be willing to provide aid other than weapons, specifically 

six divisions, to take over the front in East 

Karelia and release Finnish troops for the 

isthmus. 

In Germany the necessity for extending 

help to Finland had already been rccognized and accepted even though the Germans themselves were by then in trouble 

in Normandy and expected a new Soviet 

offensive to erupt any day. On 19 June, 

1.2 Manncrheim, Erinncrungen, p. 51 I; OKW 

WFSt, K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, der noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4.-31.12.44. pp. 18-:.l2, IMT Doc 

I 795-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SIX days after Hitler lifted the embargo, 

German torpedo boats delivered 9,000 

Panzer/au,t (44-mm. recoilless antitank 

grenade launchers) . Three days later 

5,000 Panzerschreck (8 8-mm antitank 

rocket launchers) were airlifted to Finland. 

Germany could not give the six divisions 

the Finns wanted, but on the 20th the 

OKW informed Mannerheim that it was 

ready to give every kind of help if the Finnish Army was genuinely determined to 

hold the Vyborg-Vuoksi line. Aside from 

weapons and supplies, the Germans offered 

the I22d Infantry Division, a self-propelled 

assault gun brigade (the 303d), and air 

units (a fighter group and a ground attack 

close support group [Stukas] plus one 

squadron) . The ground troops were 

drawn from Army Group North and the 

planes from Fifth Air Force in northern 

Finland and First Air Force, attached to 

Army Group North. The aircraft were 

transferred immediately and on 21 June 

flew 940 support missions for a Finnish 

Army.13 

Although the German aid was offered 

and, in part, delivered without a prior commitment on Finland's part, its price was 

known to both parties. On 2 I June, Mannerheim informed Hitler that Finland was 

prepared to establish closer bonds with 

Germany. The next day Ribbentrop flew 

to Helsinki to conduct the negotiations in 

person. The Finns, trying to avoid formally tying themselves to Germany, argued 

that in view of the strong popular sentiment for peace, which had already produced a movement to bring to power a govenmcnt orienLcd toward the Soviet Union, 

they could not enter into any sort of agree13 OKW, WFSt, K .T .B. AusaTbeitung, DeT 710erdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4 .-31.12.44, pp. 22, 27-

'9, IMT Doc J795- PS. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

ment that would have to be ratified by 

Parliament. Ribbentrop offered to compromise and accept a declaration signed by 

the President." On 23 June the German 

hand was strengthened when the Soviet 

Government informed the Finns that it 

would not discuss an armistice until the 

President, R yti, and the Foreign Minister, 

Ramsay, declared in writing that Finland 

was ready to capitulate and appealed to the 

Soviet Union for peace." 

On the 24th Ryti and Ramsay conferred 

with Mannerheim at Mikkeli. The next 

day Hitler added pressure. He stated 

categorically that a public clarification of 

Finland's attitude was to be secured. If 

not, support for Finland would stop. Late 

on the night of 26 June, R yti called in Ribbentrop and handed him a letter in which 

he stated that he, as President of Finland, 

would not make peace with the Soviet 

Union without the consent of the German 

Government and would not permit any 

government appointed by him or any other 

persons to conduct armistice or peace talks 

without German consent. lI.1 

The Germans got what they demanded, 

but in the form of an unenforceable contract, which the Finnish Government, the 

life of the nation at stake, had issued not 

altogether in good faith. The end result 

of Ribbentrop's mission was to obscure the 

obvious generosity of German aid extended 

at a time when it could scarcely be spared 

and to arouse, instead, in the minds of the 

Finns a feeling that they had been. blackmailed in their hour of greatest need. 

For the Finns the June negotiations had 

U Bluecher. Gesandter zwischen DiktatuT und 

Demokratie, p. 371. 

11 Mannerheim, Erinner"ngen, p. 513. 

II Bluecher, Gesandler zwischen Diktatur und 

Demokratie, p. 372. 

301 

one purpose- to get help in stopping the 

Soviet offensive. The R yti letter ·achieved 

that purpose, but the aid that came was 

less than the Finns expected. It was, in 

fact, less than the Germans had meant to 

give, because, in the meantime, the Soviet 

offensive against Army Group Center, 

which began on 22 June, had imposed a 

nearly overwhelming drain on German 

resources. 

The 303d Self-propelled Assault Gun 

Brigade reached Finland on 23 June, and 

the 122d Infantry Division arrived five 

days later. But a second assault gun brigade for Finland had to be diverted to 

Army Group Center at the last minute, 

and a corps headquarters to command the 

German units in Finland, although withdrawn from Army Group North, was never 

sent." German weapons and supplies, including some tanks and heavy equipment, 

continued to flow to Finland. The PanzeriaUJt and Panzerschreck greatly increased 

the Finns' ability to withstand tank attacks 

and played a major role in restoring the 

confidence of the Finnish Anny. 

The Last Phase 

On 2 I June the Russians occupied 

Vyborg. The Finns had evacuated it the 

day before. Although the Army had not 

planned to defend the old city, its loss was 

a blow to Finnish morale . Between Vyborg 

and the Vuoksi, the Russians deployed for 

another breakthrough; and on 25 June 

Twenty-first Army attacked the front near 

Repola with ten divisions reinforced by assault artillery, penetrating the line to a 

depth of some two and a half miles. In 

11 OKW, WFS'J K.r.B. Ausarbeitung, De, noerdliche Krit!gsschauplatz, 1.4.-31.12·44, pp. 19-30, 

IMT Doc '795-PS. 
302 

four days' heavy fighting the Finns succeeded in sealing off the breakthrough but 

could not regain their former front. The 

Russians kept the salient, which was the 

more dangerous in that it brought them 

close to good tank terrain. 18 

On [6 June Mannerheim had issued 

orders to give up East Karelia. He intended to withdraw gradually from the Svir 

and Maaselka Fronts to the general line 

Uksu River-Suo Lake-Poros Lake." At 

the last minute, as the withdrawal was 

starting, the OKW tried in vain to persuade 

him not to sacrifice East Karelia.

20 In 

thus going directly against the advice Dietl 

had given a few days earlier, the OKW was 

probably inAuenced by several considerations. The first, most likely, was Hitler's 

well-known aversion to giving ground 

volunt arily. More pertinent was the 

knowledge that in giving up East Karelia 

the Finns would lose their principal war 

gain, their last lever for bargaining with the 

Soviet Union and, consequently, their last 

tangible motive for staying in the war. 

The OKW reasoning had much to recommend it from the German point of view, 

but the Finns had no taste for desperate 

gambles- nor, for that matter, although 

they seemed to be acting in agreement with 

Dietl's advice, did they have any enthusiasm for last stands in the Goetterdaemmerung vezn. 

In the Maaselka and Aunus (Svir) 

Fronts, the Finns had 4 divisions and 2 

a Mannerheim, Erinnerungen, p. 515; OKW 

WFS" K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, De,. noerdliche K,iegsschauplatz, I.4.-31.1~·44. p. 31, IMT Doc 1795-

PS. 

111 (Geb.) AOK !:IO, fa NT. 234/44. 17.6.44. 

AOK :20 586:29/1 0 file. 

to OKW. WFS,. K.T.B. Ausarbeitung. Der noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4.-31.12.44. p. 30, IMT 

Doc '795-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

brigades. Opposite them stood I [ divisions and 6 brigades of Meretskov's Karelian Front. By evacuating the large bridgehead south of the Svir on [8 June the Finns 

escaped an attack that began the following 

day, but thereafter the withdrawal went 

less smoothly than they had expected. 

Seventh Army kept up an aggressive pursuit and, by crossing the Svir on either 

side of Lodeynoye Pole and staging a landing on the Ladoga shore between Tuloksa 

and Vidlitsa, threatened to push the Finnish divisions into the wilderness on the 

eastern side of the Isthmus of Olonets. The 

Finns evacuated Petrozavodsk on 30 June 

and two days later, Salmi. 

By [0 July the Finnish divisions were 

in the U-line. The Finns were by no means 

certain they could hold the U-line and began work on another between Yanis Lake 

and Lake Ladoga. They also considered 

going back to the Moscow Line." 

In the first days of July the Finns were 

given a short respite, at least on the Isthmus 

of Karelia. On the 4th Fifty-ninth Army, 

after taking over the extreme western sector of the isthmus in late June, occupied 

the islands in Vyborg Bay and attempted 

a landing on the north shore." There it 

was repulsed by the [22d Infantry Division, 

which had just arrived. At the same time, 

Twenty-third Army struck at the Finnish 

bridgehead south of Vuosalmi, but otherwise Leningrad Front confined itself to local 

assaults and regrouping, giving the Finns 

time \0 strengthen their defenses. 

In the Finnish High Command concern 

11Mannerheim. Erinnerungen. p. 518; Erfurth. 

Der Finnische Krieg. 1941-44. pp. 238, 241, 253; 

OKW, WFSt, Op. (H), Nr. 007561/44, Reisebericht ueber Frontbesuch in Suedfinnland. 13.7.44. 

OK W /56 file. 

D IVOV(R), IV, '43. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

for the future was growing, particularly 

with respect to manpower. At the end of 

June casualties had reached 18,000, of 

which no more than 12,000 had been replaced. On I July Mannerheim asked for 

a second German division and morc sel£-

propelled assault gun brigades. When 

Hitler responded with nothing but a promise to build up the assault gun battalion of 

the 122d Infantry Division to brigade 

strength, Mannerheim protested that in advising his government to accept the German 

terms he had assumed a heavy responsibility-if the units were not forthcoming, not 

only would the military situation deteriorate, but his personal prestige and influence 

in the country would be destroyed. Hitler 

replied with an offer of one self-propelled 

assault gun brigade before 10 July, another 

to be sent later, and tanks, assault guns, 

antitank guns, and artillery.u 

In the seco nd week of July th e Finns 

relinqUished the right bank of the Vuoksi 

south of Vuosalmi. The Russians followed 

up by taking a bridgehead on the north 

bank. Too weak to eliminate the bridgehead, the Finns tried to contain it. Despite 

this dangerous development and the continued heavy fighting, which brought Ihe 

number of Finnish casualti es to 32,000 by 

the 11th, the fronts on both sides of Lake 

Ladoga were beginning to stabilize. By 

IsJuly the Finns had detected signs-confirmed several days later- that, although 

the Soviet strength on the isthmus had risen 

to 26 rifle divisions and 12 to 14 tank brigades, the better units were being relieved 

and replaced with garrison troops. The 

III OKW, WFSt, K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, Der noerdLicht Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4.-31.12.44, pp. 31ft', IMT 

Doc I 795-PS. 

303 

tempo of the offensive could be expected 

to diminish.24 

Partisan Warfare at Its Height 

In 1943 and 1944 the Soviet partisan 

movement was firmly established. Its 

strength had leveled off at about 250,000 

men, but its influence on the lives and attitudes of millions in the occupied territory, 

from the Pripyat Marshes north, grew as 

the German prospects of victory dimmed. 

The movement, mainly through efforts 

from the Soviet side of the front, had become a tightly organized, closely controlled, 

and centrally directed military and political 

instrument. 

Organization 

By early 1943, the partisans had been put 

on a thoroughgoing military footing. The 

Chief of Staff of the Central Staff of the 

Partisan Movement, General Ley tenant 

Pantileimon K. Ponomarenko, was attached 

to the Soviet Army General Staff. The 

partisan units operating close to the front 

were directly under the staffs of the Soviet 

Army commands opposite them, those 

deeper in German territory being controlled 

from the headquarters in Moscow. Regular officers and enlisted men were detailed 

to the partisan units as training cadres and 

specialists. Partisan staffs, often manned 

by officers who had held Party or government posts in the occupied territory, were 

attached to the front and army headquarters; they maintained contact with the partisan units, controlled supplies for the units, 

represented the central partisan headquarters in organizational matters, and transM Ibid. , pp. 3'- 34. 
304 

mitted tactical directives from the military 

commands. 

In late 1942 or early 1943, after the military reorganization was in full effect, a certain amount of Party control had been reimposed, probably to save appearances, 

since partisan activity was in theory preeminently a Party function. The principal 

result of the change was that subsequently 

many of the existing partisan staffs were 

also assigned territorial (political ) designations. At the top, Ponomarenko, who was 

a political general and the prewar First 

Secretary of the Belorussian Communist 

Party, became chief of the partisan movement in the Belorussian S.S.R. As chief of 

the whole partisan movement he also 

headed the movement in the Russian Soviet 

Federated Socialist Republic, which did not 

have a separate territorial command.:!5 

The signal feature of the partisan movement in the occupied territory during the 

years 1943 and 1944 was the emergence 

of the so-called complexes, aggregations of 

brigades concentrated in specific areas 

under unified commands. The process attained its fullest development in Belorussia, 

where a dozen or more complexes appeared, 

one totaling 15,000 men in Rossano Rayon 

north of Polotsk; another of 14,000-

18,000 men along the Vshach River between Borisov and Lepel; one almost as 

large in the swamps along the Beresina 

River between Borisov and Lepel; more, of 

8,000,9,000, and 14,000 men, near Minsk, 

Senno, and Vitebsk. By mid-1943 at least 

three-fourths of the partisan strength was 

concentrated in such centers. The nurn-

:m Ralph Mavrogordato and Earl Ziemke, The 

Partisan Movement in the Polotsk Lowland (Technical Research Report 24, vol. 4), Air Research 

and Development Command, Human Resources 

Research Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., pp. 40- 44. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ber of partisans in Belorussia as of June 

1944, according to Soviet figures, was 

150,000 in 150 brigades and 49 detachments. 20 

The dominant trend in the partisan 

movement since 1941 had been toward con~ 

centratian, first into brigades, then into 

complexes-frequently also called divisions 

or corps (under the Party terminology, 

operative groups and operative centers). 

The immense forests and swamps of Belorussia and northwestern Great Russia fostered the tendency, and the Soviet Command promoted it partly because it simplified logistics, control, and surveillance, 

partly because it afforded the means for 

keeping in hand sizable stretches of territory and large numbers of people, and 

partly in the mistaken belief that strong 

partisan units could successfully undertake 

tactical missions against regular forces. 

Militarily, the partisan com plexes 

rarely justified the manpower, effort, and 

equipment expended to support them. 

Ostensibly, they denied the Germans access 

to vast areas; actually, most of them were 

established in areas the Germans had bypassed in 1941 and never brought fully 

under their military control. The centers 

served as fixed bases from which small 

detachments could be dispatched for attacks on the German lines of communications, but for such missions the number of 

men available probably exceeded by ten 

times the number who could be effectively 

employed within a complex's operating 

radius. The centers superficially formed 

nodes of strength; they were, however, 

islands. (A comparison could be drawn 

with the Japanese on the Pacific islands.) 

Lacking mobility, they did not constitute 

· IVOV (R), IV, 153. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 305 

A PARTISAN IN ACTION 

striking forces in the tactical sense, nor 

could one center deploy its forces to aid 

another under attack. No complex successfully withstood an attack by regular 

troops. 

From the standpoint of military effectiveness, the trend toward consolidation was, 

moreover, a dubious psychological and 

sociological phenomenon. Unlike a regular 

army, a partisan force is not ordinarily expected to win a war, only to contribute to 

the victory. What constitutes an adequate 

contribution is difficult to resolve even in a 

tightly controlled movement such as that 

in the Soviet Union. The average partisan did not engage in a single-minded pursuit of a heroic demise; he was more inclined to be preoccupied with staying alive. 

Finding himself in a service that was by 

definition dangerous, he engaged in a constant effort to reduce his personal risks. 

The same was true of the whole partisan 

movement; it was dedicated to its own preservation-not to self-destruction. Those 

attitudes were persistent and, in the long 

run perhaps, irresistible. The complexes 

offered security. Once they reached 

strengths of 5,000, 10,000, or more men, 

they became immune to small police actions, and since the Germans could rarely 

spare enough troops for large-scale counteroperations, they could exist relatively undisturbed for months, even years. The complexes also promoted morale, discipline, and 

-always important from the Soviet viewpoint-political orthodoxy, but at a con-
306 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

RUSSIAN PEASANT FAMILY WITH CART 

sider able cost in efficiency and effectiveness. 

Personnel 

The partisan movement drew its manpower predominantly from the peasantry 

and the Soviet Army men left after the 

194' battles. In the years '943 and '944 

those two groups in about equal numbers 

accounted for 80 percent of the total partisan strength. 

The peasants, for the most part, werc 

drafted. As partisans they were characterized by a fatalistic indifference to the war. 

Their class interests led them to regard partisan operations primarily as contributing 

to economic disruption, which reduced the 

profits from agriculture. At longer range, 

they viewed the Soviet and German systems as nearly identical evils, the chief difference being that the Soviet Union seemed 

more likely to win the war. To a minor 

degree, since the German system offered no 

compensatory attractions, they were also 

influenced by a sense of obligation to the 

Soviet regime as the legal and indigenous 

political authority. 

The stragglers were somewhat more 

positively motivated. The "business as 

usual" desires of the peasantry meant nothing to the soldiers, and their espousal of the 

Soviet cause represented a choice of the 

lesser of two evils. As soldiers they had 

clear obligations to the Soviet state, and as 

stragglers they were already, in the Soviet 

view, deserters. Partisan activity offered 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

them the opportunity to honor their obligations and, possibly, restore themselves to the 

good graces of the regime. German policy 

enhanccd the advantages of partisan 

activity as far as the stragglers were 

cOllcerned. Oulside the partisan movement they had three choices: to live illegally, subject to arrest at any time and cut off 

from legitimate employment; to surrender 

and endure the hardships of the German 

prison camps; or to add treason to the 

counts already against them by joining collaborator police and military units. Even 

so, the majority of the stragglers dissociated 

themselves from the war as long as possible, 

not joining the partisan movement until 

after 194 I, and then mostly out of the fear 

of punishment aroused by the approach of 

the Soviet Army. 

After 194 I the percentage of Communist 

Party members in the partisan movement 

had gone down rapidly. In 1941 Party 

members comprised as much as 80 percent 

of some individual units, and units in 

which Party members averaged from 25 to 

40 percent were not unusual. In the later 

years the Party contingent rarely accounted 

for more than 10 percent of the unit 

strengths. The shift was important because it renected a basic change in the Soviet concept of partisan warfare-from the 

idea of a relatively limited, elite movement 

that would rely on Party men, to a mass 

movement utilizing all available sources of 

manpower and substituting for political 

loyalty as the motivating force, the ability 

of the regime to extend its authority and 

coercive power into the occupied territory. 

From 1942 on the Party contingent in the 

partisan movement was important chiefly 

as one of the elements of Soviet contro!' 

The Party and Soviet state interests in the 

partisan movement were further upheld by 

307 

rigid adherence to the commissar system 

and by the NKVD 0.0. (Osobyi Oldel, 

after 1943 Smers"), special countersubversian and counterintelligence sections that 

kept tht': partisan units under surveillance. 

a peralio1lS 

In 1943 and 1944 the partisan units were 

well, even elegantly, equipped by guerrilla 

warfare standards. The Germans could do 

little to interfere with the low-altitude night 

supply flights across the front, and the complexes usually controlled enough territory 

to provide landing strips capable of accommodating planes as large as C-47's. In 

some places ground traffic back and forth 

through the front was possible, at times 

even for columns of men with horses and 

wagons. 

Nevertheless, achieving reasonable combat worthiness in the partisan units remained a problem to the end. The large 

contingent of inexperienced officers and 

high percentage of low-caliber recruits 

posed a constant danger of the movement's 

sinking into various kinds of erratic activity, 

losing its military usefulness, and, possibly, 

becoming a political liability. The rigorous 

external controls acttd as a check on the 

tendency toward internal disintegration, 

and the infusion into the partisan detachmets of regular Army officers and Soviettrained personnel raised combat effectiveness. By early 1943 every brigade had some 

partisan warfare specialists or Army officers 

to oversee training and discipline. 

The missions of the partisan movement 

were military, economic, and political- psychological. The military objectives were: 

( I ) to reduce German mobility and interdict German logistical support; (2) to 

gather intelligence; and (3) to destroy and 
308 

tie down German military manpower. The 

first, in Soviet parlance "the war of the 

rails," was the one on which the partisans 

expended the greatest amount of effort. 

OrdinariI)" in '943 and the first half of 

'944, the daily rate of demolitions on roads 

and railroads in the occupied territory ran 

into the hundreds, and occasionally, before 

Soviet offensives, it mounted into the thousands. Always a nuisance, the partisan attacks could and sometimes did badly snarl 

German communications at awkward moments. As sources of intelligence the partisan units were effective, though probably 

less so than the thousands of agents the 

Army and NKVD intelligence organs employed directly. In actually engaging and 

t)'ing down or destroying German military 

forces the partisans were least successful. 

The Germans rarely diverted first-class 

troops to light partisans for whom even the 

second- and third-rate German security 

and police units were always more than a 

match. 

The partisan movement, though a big 

inconvenience, remained on the whole a 

limited instrument of economic warfare, 

mostly because it was confined to the poor, 

relatively unproductive areas of northern 

Russia. In the south, which lacked the 

forest cover needed for concealment, partisan activity did not interfere seriously with 

German economic exploitation. But even 

in the north, in one of the least productive 

agricultural areas of the Soviet Union, 

Army Group North managed to live entirely off the land through '943. Ultimately, 

the most severe economic effects feU on the 

peasants, who frequently found themselves 

in an intolerable squeeze between the partisans and the Germans. 

In the political and psychological spheres, 

of course, the existence of a partisan movcSTALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ment was by itself a considerable accomplishment. The movement was, if nothing 

else, a means for sequestering a large segment of the manpower of the occupied territory. It could, further, intimidate or 

inspire to various forms of resistance other 

elements of the population. For the German soldier, the partisan movement injected into the war added uncertainty and 

terror. 

A"tipartisan War/are 

I n the spring of '944 the Germans conducted three large-scale anti partisan operations-the last of the war, as it turned out 

-against partisan complexes that in the 

Soviet view had reached the highest stage 

in their evolution: the stage at which they 

could engage regular forces on something 

like equal .terms. The Army Group Center 

left flank behind the Third Panzer and 

Fourth Army sectors had been the area 011 

the Eastern Front most heavily infested 

with partisans since the winter battles of 

'94'-42. There, in '944, First Baltic 

Fro"t wanted to employ the partisan complexes as a second front against which it 

would. one day smash the two German 

armies. The strongest complex, the socalled Ushachi Partisan Republic, controlled a 40-mile stretch of territory betwccn Lepe! and Polotsk. It was under 

the command of Col. Vladimir Lobanok, a 

former commissar and experienced brigade 

commander. Other complexes nearly as 

strong held territory east of Lepel to Sen no 

and to the south between Lepel and Borisov. The ,8,000 Ushachi partisans had 

been given lavish air supply and intensive 

training. In the spring of '944 they received orders to fortify their area and hold 

it against any German attempts to take it. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

Beginning on II April, 20,000 Third 

Panzer Army troops aimed two related operations, REGENSCHAUER and FRUEH LINGSFEST, against the Ushachi complex. The 

partisans offered dogged but uneven resistance. Although they had air support, extensive mine fields, and field fortifications 

in depth, they could not prevent the Germans' pressing relentlessly in on them. 

Many of the partisans, sometimes whole 

brigades, were green troops who had not 

been under fire before. Captured orders 

signed by Lobanok revealed the partisans' 

shortcomings: some brigades gave way 

under the first attack; others, staffs and all, 

panicked. Because of wide variations in 

performance, the brigades were frequently 

unable to conduct a co-ordinated defense 

or an organized retreat. Some of the partisans plundered the civilians." Advancing at a deliberately slow pace to keep a 

tight line and prevent the partisans from 

slipping through, the Third Panzer Anny 

troops by mid-May qlmpletely smashed the 

Ushachi complex. Partisan losses amounted 

to an estimated 7,000 dead and over 7,000 

captured. 

On 22 May Third Panzer Army began 

a large operation, KORMORAN, against several complexes in the area bounded by 

Lepel, Senno, Borisov, Minsk, and Molodechno. Again the defense was loose and 

unco-ordinated. Driving in from all sides, 

the Germans forced the partisans into an 

ever-narrowing pocket and set about systematically cutting them to pieces. KORMORAN had to be called off when the Soviet summer offensive started, but by then 

it had inflicted a reported 13,000 casualties 

on the partisans. 

1"1 Pz. AOK c, Ie/A.a., "Entwicklung der Bandnlage im Bereich der 3. Panzer-armee:' 28.4.44, 

Anlage 6:1, Pz. AOK 3 62587/ u file. 

309 

During July and August 1944, as the 

German annies retreated from Soviet territory, the partisan movement went out of 

existence. For most individual partisans the 

sequel was a profound disappointment. 

During the period of the great Soviet advance, Gennan agents reported that partisan units overtaken by the Soviet Army, 

instead of receiving the preferential treatment they expected, were granted short 

leaves and thrown into front-line units. 

Given the intensely suspicious nature of the 

Soviet regime and the heterogeneous partisan make-up, it is likely that even the 

dedicated partisans, after their return to 

Soviet control, counted themselves lucky if 

they avoided being remanded to Army 

punishment battalions. The trusted Party 

men in command no doubt benefited from 

their service. Those fortunate rank-andfile partisans who survived the political 

screenings probably managed at best to 

bask modestly in the glory of the continued 

favorable publicity given the movement as 

a whole in Soviet newspapers and magazines and in the published memoirs of the 

prominent commanders. 28 

The West and the East 

In the spring of 1944, German strategy 

faced its supreme challenge, that of a fullfledged two-front war. This grim test had 

become as inevitable as the passage of time 

itself. Like the approach of death, it had 

cast a long shadow and since Stalin grad 

had clouded every major German decision. 

For the Germans the second front existed 

before· it was a reality. It divided their 

• Ziemke, Composition and Morale of the Partisan Movement, pp. 1,9.13,31, 33f., 4tf; Mavrogordato and Ziemke, The Partisan Movement in the 

Polotsk Lowland, pp. 21,45. 
310 

armed forces and split their command, the 

latter perhaps more deeply than if there 

had actually been a second front. 

Zeitzler's attempt on 30 March 1944 to 

seize the OKW's 1st Mountain Division had 

brought to a head the long-standing confli ct between the OKW and the OKH 

over the deployment of the German ground 

forces. Hitler, shortly thereafter, directed 

Jodi to work out a strategic survey, to be 

distributed to the Chief of Staff, OKH, and 

the army group commands, showing clearly 

that the deployment was justified by the 

total German situation. By 13 April Jodi 

had completed the survey. He opened 

with the familiar argument that certain persons in the higher command echelons on 

the Eastern Front had out of ignorance of 

the total situation drawn false and even 

"dangerously cr:tical" conclusions. They 

had, he said, contributed to the spread of 

such subversive witticisms as: "Fifty-three 

percent of the Army is fighting in Russia 

for the existence of the German people, and 

the other forty-seven percent is sitting in 

western Europe waiting (or an invasion that 

doesn't come," or, "Germany lost World 

War I because of the Navy in being and 

will lose this one because of the Army in 

being." What those critics did not realize, 

he went on, giving history a severe wrench, 

was that Germany had been forced to take 

advanced footholds in Finland, Norway, 

Denmark, France, the Low Countries, 

Italy, and the Balkans to create the military and economic prerequisites for a long 

war against Great Britain, the United 

States, and the Soviet Union. Anyway, he 

added, to give up any of those places would 

bring Allied air bases closer to Germany 

and would lengthen rather than shorten 

the front. Therefore, he concluded, the 

only point in doubt was whether divisions 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

could still be spared for the Eastern Front. 

There he was on firmer ground. Of 131 

divisions in the OKW theaters, 4 I had the 

arms and equipment to make them suitable 

for employment on the Eastern Front, but 

of these 32 were already engaged, as in 

Italy and Finland, or defending the coasts. 

The remaining 9 represented about onethird of the reserves needed in the OKW 

theaters.29 

In April 1944 few would still have contended that the OKW theaters could be 

stripped for the benefit of the Eastern Front. 

On the other hand, Jodi's survey no doubt 

rang hollow to those who had argued since 

Stalingrad that Germany could not fight a 

war with two sets of armed forces, one committed in the East, the other for the most 

part tied down in a sterile so-called strategic 

defensive. 

In its tone the JodI survey was symptomatic of a psychological attitude that 

chronically affiicted Hitler and his personal 

entourage, namely, that Hitler made no 

mistakes; if things were going wrong the 

blame belonged elsewhere. By the same 

reasoning, those who thought differently 

were subversives and the defeats in Russia 

were there to prove it. The source of all 

current troubles seemed to be lack of faith, 

and at Fuehrer headquarters faith meant 

not only telling Hitler what he wanted to 

hear but believing it oneself. 

The ultimate result was that the inner 

circle at Fuehrer headquarters had become 

dedicated to preserving its own-and above 

all Hitler's-illusions. In March Hitler's 

III OKW, WFSl , Op. NT. 7710098144, Strattgischer Uebe rblick und V trteilung der Guamlstreitkraefte des deutschen Heeres. 13.4.44. OCMH 

filesj OKW, WFSt, K.T.B. Die OKW K,iegschauplaetze im Rahmen der Gesamtkriegsfuehrung, 1.1.-

3'.3.44, pp. 55-58, OCMH file •. 
PRELUDE TO DISASTER 

chief adjutant, Schmundt, observed that 

letters from Seydlitz, the ranking member 

of the Soviet-sponsored League of German 

Officers, to the generals in the Cherkassy 

pocket had aroused Hitler's mistrust of all 

generals. To soothe the Fuehrer, Schmundt 

persuaded the field marshals to sign a declaration denouncing Seydlitz. On 19 

March, in the presence of the other marshals, Rundstedt, the senior officer of the 

Army, rrad the document aloud to Hitler 

and then formally presented it to him." 

In April Hitler addressed the generals and 

told them every officer had to identify himself with the "ideas" of national socialism; 

there could be no such thing as an apolitical 

officer. In May, Guderian, who had convinced himself that his tanks, used the way 

he thought they should be used, could still 

win the war, wrote a letter intended for 

Hitler's eyes in which he characterized the 

Army General Staff as a body of weakkneed defeatists. When Zeitzler demanded 

that Hitler either reject the charge or accept his resignation as Chief of Staff, OKH, 

Hitler said only that in view of the situation 

at the moment he would not make a decisIOn. Toward the end of the month 

Schmundt toured the Eastern Front and 

returned with the impression that the 

changes in command of the two southern 

army groups "had produced especially 

favorable results."" 

In April and May 1944 it seemed, in 

fact, that destiny might yet bow to the 

Fuehrer's will. If the invasion could be 

defeated, Germany could turn its full 

strength east. The prospects of a victory 

10 Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heeresperssonalamts, 3.19 Mar 44. H 4/ 12 file. 

SI Ibid., 26 Apr, 9, 19-24 May 44. 

311 

in the West appeared good. By the end of 

April new panzer divisions had filled the 

gap in the western defenses created when 

II SS Panzer Corps was transferred east." 

The southern half of the Eastern Front 

was a jerrybuilt nightmare, but in the 

centef, 290 miles west of Moscow, between 

Vitebsk and Orsha, the gateway to the 

Soviet capital was still in German hands. 

At the closest point, the Russians were still 

550 miles from Berlin. In May the Russians occupied themselves with extensive 

troop movements, but gave no sign that 

they would do anything to make the Allies' 

landing easier. The Soviet May Day proclamation, which could, of course, be variously interpreted, set the liberation of all 

Soviet territory, "including the entire boundary from the Barents Sea to the Black 

Sea," as the first Soviet objective and appeared to put the drive toward Germany 

distinctly into second place.

33 Had they 

known, the Germans could probably also 

have drawn encouragement from the 

Stavka's directives issued to all the fronts 

in the first week of May ordering them to 

set up training programs, maintain general 

reconnaissance against the enemy, and 

clear a 25-km. strip behind their own lines 

to preserve security; in other words, to 

establish the routines that went with a long 

or at least indefinite period of inactivity. 3. 

Although in the spring German Army 

strength on the Eastern Front reached a 

new low (2,242,649 men ) and that of the 

Soviet Army another high (6,077,000 

men), in other respects German strength 

II OKW. WFSt. K.T.B., Die Entwicklung im 

Westen, 1.1.-31 .3.44. p. 38, OCMH files. 

u IVOV(R) , IV, 126. 

k Ibid .• IV, 127. 
312 

was actually in an upswing." Industrial 

output was rising. The Air Force total 

complement stood at 5,585 planes in January 1944 as against 3,955 the year before. 

Synthetic oil production reached its peak 

in April 1944, and stocks of aviation fuel 

were larger than at any time since 1941. 

The Jaeger Stab (Fighter Staff), organized 

in early 1944 to rationalize the aircraft 

industry, performed so effectively that fighter plane production rose every month between March and September 1944 even 

though the British and American Air Forces 

resumed daylight bombing in March." 

Enough tanks and weapons to equip new 

divisions for the Western Front and replace 

some of the losses in Russia were coming 

off the assembly lines. The best equipped, 

if militarily not always the most effective, 

segment of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS, 

reached a strength of 400,000 men in late 

3:0 The army group strengths were as follows: 

Army Group North, 540,965; Army Group Center, 792, 196; Army Group North Ukraine, 400,542j 

and Army Group South U kraine, 508,946. OKH, 

GenStdH, Org . .A.bl. (1) Nr. 1/17245/ 44, Iststaerke 

des Feldheeres Stand / .4.44. :J6.S.44. H 1/562 file. 

The Soviet figure is that given in Ist ori)'o Velikoy 

Otechestvennoy Voyny. volume IV, page 125. 

II Air Ministry (British ) Pamphlet 248, Riu and 

Fall 01 the German Air Forct, pp. 30 1-g0, 348. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

March." All in all, it appeared that Germany could await the next roll of the dice 

with confidence. 

By mid-June the dice had been rolled 

and Germany had lost. Beginning in April 

and continuing through May and into 

June the United States and British Air 

Forces staged raids that knocked out, if in 

part only temporarily, more than 40 percent of the Rumanian oil production and 

90 percent of the German synthetic oil 

capacity." On 6 June United States and 

British troops landed in Normandy, and 

in the next several days the strategy, carefully nurtured since Fuehrer Directive 51 

was issued in November 1943, collapsed. 

The "powerful counterattack" Hitler had 

envisioned did not materialize. Because 

he expected a second landing north of the 

Seine, Hitler failed to take enough troops 

from Fifteenth Army, which was closest to 

the beachhead, and decided instead to call 

in reinforcements from more remote areas. 

The German armies in Normandy were 

forced to the defensive. In the East the 

Russians were ready to march. 

n OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abe .• KriegJtagebu ch. 

25·6·43-31.3·44. ~4 Mar 44. H ~o4 file. 

.. Air Ministry (British ) Pamphlet ~48. Riu and 

Fall oj the German Air Force , p. 349. 
CHAPTER XV 

The Collapse of the Center 

Deception and Delusion 

In the first week of May J 944, looking 

beyond the lull then settling in along the 

Eastern Front, the Eastern Intelligence 

Branch, OKH, forecast two possible Soviet 

offensives: one across the line Kovel'-Lutsk 

cutting deep behind Army Groups North 

and Center via Warsaw to the Baltic coast; 

the other through Rumania, Hungary, and 

Slovakia into the Balkans. Believing the 

former would require so high a level of 

tactical proficiency that the Stavka would 

probably not attempt it, the Eastern Intelligence Branch concluded that the Soviet 

main effort would continue in the south 

toward the Balkans, where it could take 

advantage of the already shaky state of Germany's allies and finally establish the longcoveted Soviet hegemony in southeastern 

Europe. North of the Pripyat Marshes, 

the Eastern Intelligence Branch predicted, 

the front would stay quiet! 

The intelligence estimate jibed almost 

exactly with the thinking of the OKH and 

the army group staffs. The one difference 

was that Army Groups Center and North 

Ukraine were concerned over very heavy 

railroad traffic and other signs of a buildup in the Kovel'-Ternopol area. Zeitzler 

agreed that the activity off the inner flanks 

IOKH, GenS,dH, 1428/44. Zusammenfasunde 

Beurteilung der Feindlage VOT der deutschen Ostfront im Grossen, Stand 3-5-44. H 3/185 file. 

of the two army groups was not to be taken 

lightly, and he proposed taking units from 

Army Group Center and Army Group 

North to create a reserve army so that 

"then one would be able to do something 

if a big attack were to come." In early 

May, Army Group Center began reinforcing its right flank corps, LVI Panzer Corps, 

with tanks, self-propelled assault guns, and 

artillery. On J 2 May the Eastern Intelligence Branch revised its estimate: the 

main effort would still be in the south, between the Carpathians and the Black Sea, 

toward the Balkans, but a large offensive 

force was also being assembled between the 

Carpathians and the Pripyat Marshes to 

attack toward L'vov, Lublin, and Brest.::! 

The prospect of a secondary offensive 

between the Carpathians and the Pripyat 

Marshes had one almost attractive aspect: 

if the rest of the Army Group Center front 

stayed quiet as predicted, the attack would 

come at a place where the Germans for 

once could bring considerable strength to 

bear. On IO May Zeitzler suggested 

usmg the projected reserve army of 

which LVI Panzer Corps would form 

the nucleus, to strike first. The Army 

Group Center and North Ukraine staffs, 

apprehensive of another fiasco like Operation ZITADELLE, were cold to the idea, but 

Model saw in it a chance to employ his 

• H.Cr. Mitte, la, Kriegstagebuch, 1.-31-5-44. 

5-I!2 May 44. OCMH files. 
314 

Schild und Schwert theory of active defense and, presumably, an opportunity to 

euchre his less alert colleague, Busch, out 

of the very substantial array of strength 

then being assembled under Headquarters, 

LVI Panzer Corps. 

On the 15th, Model asked Hitler to let 

him have LVI Panzer Corps to try "an 

offensive solution." That the thought 

would appeal to Hitler was obvious. During the next several days reports from 

Model's headquarters prompted a change 

in the intelligence picture: it suddenly became clear that the offensive north of the 

Carpathians would miss Army Group Center completely. On 20 May Hitler transferred LVI Panzer Corps to Army Group 

North Ukraine. Army Group Center thereby gave up 6 percent of its front and lost 

15 percent of its divisions, 88 percent of its 

tanks, 23 percent of its self-propelled assault 

guns, 50 percent of its tank destroyers, and 

33 percent of its heavy artillery.' 

Busch, who had ignored a warning from 

Weiss, the Commanding General, Second 

Army, that Model was trying to get his 

hands on LVI Panzer Corps, surrendered 

the corps without a protest. As if that did 

not fully reveal his passive philosophy of 

leadership, Busch called in the army commanders on 24 May and told them the 

main, in fact the only, point of the meeting 

was to impress on them the Fuehrer's 

unshakable determination to hold the line 

in the East under all circumstances. He 

ordered the armies to curtail drastically all 

work behind the front and concentrate 

everything on the main line of resistance.· 

As it was, the army group had only one 

major switch position, the BIBER plan on 

Ilbid., 13-20, 29 May 44. 

'Ibid. , 24 May 44. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Beresina River, designated neither 

"line" nor "position" out of regard for 

Hitler's easily aroused suspicion that the 

annies were "looking backward" and because it actually did not amount to much. 

The Germans played exactly into the 

Russians' hands. The Soviet Command had 

a completely free strategic choice; it had 

the enemy hopelessly on the defensive and 

the forces and materiel to deploy in overwhelming strength anywhere on the front. 

In the third week of April, allegedly on the 

basis of a State Defense Committee decision 

that it was "necessary" to eliminate the 

residual threat posed by the German occupation of Belorussia, the Stavka initiated a 

covert build-up opposite Army Group 

Center and an elaborate deception that 

would mislead the Germans into assuming 

the summer offensive would again be in the 

south.' The opportunity for such a deception was there. During the winter the offensive deployment, including the tank 

armies, had been away from the center. 

The desired impression was already convincingly established; all that was needed 

was to build up the center without too 

much disturbing it. 

Around the first of May, at the same 

time the German attention was beginning 

to linger south of the Pripyat Marshes, the 

build-up began opposite Army Group Center from the Third Panzer Army left flank 

east of Polotsk to the Ninth Army right 

between the Dnepr and the Beresina south 

of Zhlobin. During May and the first 

three weeks in June the First Baltic and 

the FiTSt, Second, and Third Belorussian 

Fronts received increases of 60 percent in 

troop strength, 300 percent in tanks and 

self-propelled guns, 85 percent in artillery 

'lVOV(R), IV, •• ,. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

and mortars, and 62 percent in supporting 

air strength. Between I and 22 June more 

than 75,000 railroad carloads of troops, 

supplies, and ammunition were dispatched 

to the four fro"ts.' 

When the build-up was completed the 

number of Soviet combat troops in the offensive zone, from west of Vitebsk to south 

of Bobruysk, was 1.2 million- against an 

Army Group Center total strength of 

slightly over 700,000. All told, the number 

of Soviet troops readied to participate in 

the offensive, including reserves held back 

by the Stavka until the operation was in 

progress, was 2.5 million. Four thousand 

tanks, 24,400 cannon and mortars, and 

5,300 aircraft gave the Soviet forces 

armored, artillery, and air superiorities 

ranging upward from 10: I at the initial 

assault points.' 

The Russians concealed their movements 

skillfully, and the Germans did not begin to 

detect the activity opposite Army Group 

Center until 30 May, when Ninth Army 

reported a build-up north of Rogatchev.' 

Thereafter the signs multiplied rapidly 

as the deployment went into high gear, but 

they were not enough to divert the OKH's 

attention from Army Group North 

Ukraine, where Model was readying his 

"offensive solution" under the appropriate 

cover name SCHILD UNO SCHWERT. The 

Eastern Intelligence Branch dismissed the 

activity opposite Army Group Center a, 

"apparently a deception." 0 The Army 

Group Center command noted the changes 

I Platonov, Vtoraya Mirouaya Voyna, 1939-45. 

P·587· 

'IVOV(R), IV, 163. 

I AOK 9. Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 10,30 May 44. AOK 9 59691/1 file. 

t OKH, GenStdH, FHO N" 1794/ 44. Auszug 

aUI kuru Beurteilung der Ftindlage der Heeresgruppe Mitte uom 2.644-3.6.44 H 3/185 file. 

315 

on the Soviet side in the Third Panzer, 

Fourth, and Ninth Army sectors but scarcely reacted to them at all. Busch was more 

worried about Second Army's deep right 

flank and the chances of getting back LV 1 

Panzer Corps after Model had finished 

with it. 

On 14 June, Zeitzler called the army 

group and army chiefs of staff to a conference. In advance he stated that what was 

to be said "would not particularly concern 

Army Group Center." The expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine 

continued to preoccupy the OKH; even the 

predicted Balkan operation had receded 

into the background. At the meeting the 

chief of the Eastern Intelligence Branch 

warned that simultaneous attacks on Army 

Groups Center and South Ukraine could be 

expected as preliminaries to the big offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. lo 

During the next week the portents of 

trouble on the Army Group Center east 

front multiplied. The armies reported new 

Soviet units in their sectors. A downed 

Russian pilot confirmed rumors picked up 

by agents that Zhukov was in command. 

Prisoners stated that in the political indoctrination the emphasis was on retaking all 

the Soviet land as the first objective. On 

the night of 19 June partisans planted over 

5,000 mines on the roads and railroads 

behind the Second nd Fourth Armies. II 

At Army Group Center headquarters the 

reports aroused no excitement and only 

routine interest. A brief entry in the army 

group war diary under the date 20 June 

states that the stepped-up partisan activity 

"makes it appear that an early start of the 

10 H. Gr. Mitte. la, Kriegstagebuch. 1.- 30.644. 

14 Jun 44, OCMH fi;es. 

11 AOK 9. FuehTungsabteilung, KTiegstagebuch 

NT. 10. 15-20 Jun 44. AOK 9 59691/1 file . 
316 

offensive cannot be ruled out." On the 

afternoon of that day Busch flew to Germany where he intended to see Hitler at the 

Berghof on the 22d about administrative 

matters,12 

As the olten-repeated slogan "nur keine 

Schema" implied, a cardinal principle of 

German general staff doctrine was the 

avoidance of rigid or schematic tactical and 

operating conceptions. In June 1944 on 

the Eastern Front that rule was forgotten. 

To a Soviet deceptionJ the German commands added an almost hypnotic self-induced delusion : the main offensive would 

come against Army Group North Ukraine 

because that was where they were ready to 

meet it. 

Under Busch, Headquarters, Army 

Group Center, had become a mindless instrument for transmitting the Fuehrer's 

will. Busch did not intend to exercise any 

leadership outside the very narrow bounds 

of Hitler's order to hold the front exactly 

where it was. The state into which the 

army group had fallen was described by 

General der Infanterie Hans Jordan, in a 

22 June 1944 entry in his Ninth Army war 

diary: 

Ninth Army stands on the eve of another 

great battle, unpredictable in extent and 

duration. One thing is certain: in the last 

few weeks the enemy has completed an assembly on the very greatest seale opposite the 

army, and the army is convinced that that 

assembly overshadows the concentration of 

forces off the north flank of Army Grou p 

North Ukraine .... The army has felt bound 

to point out repeatedly that it considers the 

massing of strength on its front to constitute 

the preparation for this year's main Soviet 

offensive, which will have as its object the 

reconquest of Belorussia. 

U H. Gr. Mitte. la, Kriegstagebuch. 1.-30.6.44. 

20 Jun 44. OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

The army believes that, even under the 

present conditions, it would be possible to 

stop the enemy offensive, but not under the 

present directives which require an absolutely 

rigid defense . ... there can be no doubt . .. 

if a Soviet offensive breaks out the army will 

either have to go over to a mobile defense or 

see its front smashed . ... 

The army conSiders the orders establishing 

the "fortified places" particularly dangerous. 

The army, therefore, looks ahead to the 

coming battle with bitterness, knowing that it 

is bound by orders to tactical measures which 

it cannot in good conscience accept as correct 

and which in our own earlier victorious campaigns were the causes of the enemy defeats 

-{me recalls the great breakthrough and encirclement battles in Poland and France. 

The Commanding General and Chief of 

Staff presented these thoughts to the army 

group in numerous conferences, but there, 

apparently, the courage was lacking to carry 

them higher up, for no counterarguments 

other than references to OKH orders were 

given. And that is the fundamental source 

of the anxiety with which the army views 

the future. 13 

The Bat/Ie for Belorussia 

Plans and Forces 

The final directives for the offensive 

against Army Group Center went to the 

front commands on 3' May. (Map 27) 

The strategic objectives the Stavka set were 

to liberate Belorussia and advance to the 

Vistula and the border of East Prussia." 

Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevslciy were 

made responsible for planning the operation and were each to co-ordinate two 

fronts in its execution; Vasilevslciy, the 

13 AOK 9. Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 10, 22 Jun 44. AOK 9 59691/10 file . 

H The objectives are those given in Soviet 

sources. which almost always set the end objectives 

exactly on the line on which a given operation 

ended. 
THE BATTLE FOR BELORUSSIA 22 June -18 July 19 4 4 

FRONT LlNE , U JU N 

liil iiliilll FIiO NT lI E,I~JUl 

••••••• LITHUANIA POSITION 

xxxxx 

~,;1 L_J 

xxxx r:--"l J 

MAP 27 

l 

f,,' 

J 

~ \ )' \ } 

c , T 

l 

\ 

I 

\ 
318 

First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fro"ts 

and Zhukov, the Second and First Belorussian Fronts. The offensive was to be 

sprung on a wide, 30o-mile expanse from 

south of Polotsk to south of Bobruysk. The 

first phase objective was to chop out the 

German strongpoints and communications 

hubs, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogile\', and Bobruysk. After that, the forces on the flank, 

would close in upon Minsk from the northeast and southeast, following the OrshaMinsk and Bobruysk-Minsk roads, to envelop Fourth Army. Strong columns 

would go north past Minsk to Molodechno 

and from Bobruysk via Slutsk' to Baranovichi to block the escape routes from Minsk 

and to get control of passages through the 

chain of swamps and forests formed by the 

Pripyat Marshes, the Nalihocka Forest 

west of Minsk, and the swampy lowland 

north of Molodechno between the Viliya 

and Dvina Rivers. 

Their lines of thrust converging on 

Minsk, the fronts were deployed in a sweeping arc. First Baltic Front, ahout half of 

its sector facing Army Group North, from 

north of Polotsk to Vitebsk; Third Belorussian Front from Vitebsk to south of 

Orsha; Second Belorussian Front on both 

sides of Mogilev from south of Orsha to 

north of Rogatchev; First Belorussia" Front 

from north of Rogatchev to south of Kovel'. 

First Belorussian Front's sector was broader 

than those of the other three together, but 

only its right flank would be engaged. 

First Baltic Front, under General Armii 

Ivan K. Bagramyan, was to attack northwest of Vitebsk with the Sixth Guards and 

Forty-third Armies, cross the Dvina, and 

envelop Vitebsk from the west; as the offensive proceeded It would provide flank 

cover on the north. Third Belorussian 

Front, commanded by General Polkovnik 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

1. D. Chernyakovskiy, was split into two 

assault groups. On the north the Thirtyninth and Fifth Armies were to break 

through south of Vitebsk, complete the 

envelopment, and advance southwestward 

to Senno. On the south the Eleventh 

Guards and Thirty-fint Armies would attack on both sides of the road toward 

Orsha. After the armies had broken across 

the Luchesa River, the Cavalry-M echanized Group Oslikovskiy would begin a fast 

drive due west past Sen no." Third Belorussian Front held Fifth Guards Tank 

Army in reserve to be committed later behind either the north or south group, depending on how the battle developed. 

Subsequently, Chernyakovskiy, his main 

effort north of the Minsk-Orsha road, 

would advance via Borisov to Minsk and 

north of Minsk to Molodechno. Second 

Belorussia" Front, composed of the T hirtythird, Forty-ninth, and Fiftieth Armies, 

under the command of General Armii Matvei V. Zakharov, was to break open the 

center of the Fourth Army bridgehead east 

of the Dnepr, take Mogilev, and wall in the 

pocket around Minsk from the east. Rokossovskiy's First Belorussian Front (formerly Belorussian Front ) would employ the 

Third and Forty-eighth Armies cast of 

the Beresina and Sixty-fifth Army, Twentyeighth Army, and the Cavalry-Mechanized 

Group Pliyev west of the river to encircle 

Bobruysk. Having accomplished that, it 

would send one force northwest toward 

n The cavalry-mechanized groups first appeared 

as independent commands in the summer of t 944. 

Each had one tank or mechanized corps and one 

cavalry corps. They took their designations from 

the names of their commanding generals, in this 

instance General Ley tenant N. S. Oslikovskiy. 

Substantially smaller than the tank armies, they 

were primarily intended for the rapid exploitation 

of breakthroughs. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

Minsk and another west via Slutsk' to 

Baranovichi. 16 

The build-up for the offensive was accomplished with a minimum of unit shuffling. Toward the end of May the Germans became aware that West Front had 

been supplanted by the Second and Third 

Be/oTUssian Fronts-which should have 

alerted them but did not. Three new 

armies- Sixth Guards, Fifth Guards Tank, 

and Twenty-eighth- were put into the 

front. Up to 22 June German intelligence 

had not identified any of these. Apparently 

the manpower build-up was actually not as 

massive as in the previous offensives, and 

it was accomplished mainly by reinforcing 

units already in the front. By then the Soviet commands at all levels were capable 

of handling larger numbers of troops, and 

reintroduction of the rifle corps helped by 

extending the army's span of control. 

Except for the lengthening of its right 

flank along the Pripyat River, the Army 

Group Center front had not undergone important changes after late 1943. On the 

left Third Panzer Army held a sector on 

both sides of Vitebsk tying to Army Group 

North near Polotsk. Fourth Army tied in 

with Third Panzer Army north of Orsha 

and with the Ninth Army north of Rogatchev and held a bulging, 25- by 80-mile 

bridgehead east of the Dnepr. On its left 

Ninth Army covered around Bobruysk and 

to the southwest on a line that followed the 

Prut and Dnepr to south of Zhlobin and 

then veered southwest across the Beresina 

to the lower Ptich' and the Pripyat. The 

Second Army front followed the Pripyat 

upstream and joined the Army Group 

IG Tclpuchowski, Die sowjetische Geschicht e d es 

Grossen Vate rlaendischen Kriege!, pp. 365- 67 ; 

Zhilin, Vazhne)lshiye Operatsii Otechestuennoy 

Voyny, pp. 347-48 ; IVOV(R ), IV, 158-60. 

319 

North Ukraine left flank north of Kovel'. 

Army Group Center had 38 divisions, one 

of them Hungarian, in the front, 3 panzer or 

panzer grenadier divisions and 2 infantry 

divisions in reserve, and 3 Hungarian and 5 

security divisions stationed in the fear. 

Though still numerically the strongest army 

group, it also held by far the longest front, 

488 miles. Army Group North Ukraine, 

by comparison, had 35 German and 10 

Hungarian divisions, including 8 panzer 

divisions, and held a 219-mile front. Army 

Groups North Ukraine and South Ukraine 

together had 18 panzer or panzer grenadier 

divisions (including I Hungarian and I 

Rumanian armored division) as against 

Army Group Center's 3." The distribution 

of air support was similarly unbalanced. 

Of 2,085 combat aircraft on the Eastern 

Front, Sixth Air Force, supporting Army 

Group Center, had 775 and Fourth Air 

Force, supporting Army Groups North 

Ukraine and South Ukraine, had 845, but 

the Sixth Air Force strength included 405 

long-range bombers and reconnaissance 

planes intended for strategic missions. 

Fourth Air Force, on the other hand, had 

670 fighters and ground support bombers 

while Sixth Air Force had 275." 

Breakthrough 

On the morning of 22 June, the third 

anniversary of the invasion, the offensive 

against Army Group Center began." The 

First Baltic and Third Be/orussian Fronts 

attacked northwest and southeast of 

11 GenStdH, op. Abt!IIIb Pruef·Nr. 98046, 

Lage Ost, Stand :1:2.6.44 abds. 

18 Air Ministry (British ) Pamphlet ~48 , Rise and 

Fall of the German Air Force, p. 357· 

I' The first Soviet communique, issued on ~4 

June 1944, gave as the starting date ~3 June, since 

then used as such by all Soviet accounts. 
320 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET MOTORCYCLE TROOPS DASH FORWARD 

Vitebsk. Northwest of the city, Sixth 

Guards Army, which had moved in undetected, took Third Panzer Army completely 

by surprise. From the outset Third Panzer 

Asmy was in desperate trouble; the army 

group had to commit one of its reserve infantry divisions, and the OKH released a 

reserve division standing by in the Army 

Group North zone near Polotsk. Busch, 

who received the news at the Berghof, 

headed back to his headquasten; at Minsk 

without waiting for his interview with Hitler. 

The next day the Russians tore through 

Third Panzer Army and closed in behind 

Vitebsk. Extending the offensive south 

against Fourth Army, the Third and Second 

Belorussian Fronts drove toward Orsha and 

Mogilev, and by day's end Fourth Army's 

front was near breaking. During the day 

Busch reported that he could see no way 

of closing the Third Panzer Army front 

without giving up Vitebsk or getting new 

units from somewhere else. The OKH was 

not willing to take divisions from Army 

Group North Ukraine, and Busch did not 

want to take any from Second Asmy because he was still worried about an attack 

toward Brest." 

On the 24th First Belorussian Front hit 

Ninth Army and penetrated along its north 

boundary and south of the Beresina. Fourth 

Asmy's left flank corps was beginning to 

fan apart. In the Third Panzer Army secIQ H . Gr. Mitte~ la, Kriegstagebuch, 1.-3Q.6.44. 

22, 23 Jun 44. OCMH files. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

tor, the Russians reached Senno and east 

of there had tanks turning south behind the 

Fourth Army flank. Busch secured Hitler's 

permission to let four of the five divisions 

encircled at Vitebsk break out--too late. 

Everywhere else Busch held to his and 

Hitler's original idea of a rigid defense. He 

refused two requests to take back the Fourth 

Army bridgehead front, and the next day, 

when the Commanding General, Fourth 

Army, General der Infanterie Kurt von 

Tippelskirch, took matters into his own 

hands and ordered the withdrawal, Busch 

attempted to reverse the order and to force 

the units to retake their old front." When 

Ninth Army, on 25 June, wanted to take 

its main force out of the trap forming between the Dnepr and the Beresina, Busch 

answered that the army's mission was to 

hold every foot of ground and not give up 

anything on its own initiative.22 In the 

army war diary, the Commanding General, 

Ninth Army, Jordan, noted, "Having made 

a responsible report, one must accept the 

orders of his superiors even when he is con~ 

vinced of the opposite. What is worse is to 

know that the completely inadequate directive from the army group is not a product 

of purposeful leadership trying to do its 

utmost but merely an attempt to carry out 

orders -long overtaken by events," 23 

By the end of the fourth day Army Group 

Center had committed all its reserves without stopping or delaying the Russians anyn AOK 4, la NT. :2050/44. Die Entwicklung der 

Lage bei der 4. Armee waehrend deT ru.ssischell 

SommeroDensive 1944, pp. 3-8, AOK 4 64188 file, 

Z2 AOK 9, Sonderanlage zum Kriegstagebuch des 

AOK 9 NT. to, Ge/echtsbericht, Schlacht in WeissTuthenien vorn 24.6-1°4-44, p. 6, AOK 5 59691/ 

26 file. 

23 AOK 9, Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

NT. 10, 1.1.-10.7.44,25 Jun 44, AOK 9 5969 1/ 1 

file . 

321 

where. Five divisions were encircled and 

as good as lost at Vitebsk. Third Panzer 

ArI'llY was trying to hold on the Dvina and 

Ulla Rivers fifty miles west of Vitebsk. 

Fourth Army had taken command of Third 

Panzer Army's right flank corps, remnants 

of five divisions that were rapidly being 

pushed south out of a widening gap west 

and south of Senno. The Fourth Army 

front on the bridgehead could hold together 

only as long as it kept withdrawing. In the 

Ninth Army sector, Rokossovskiy's armies 

were heading toward Bobruysk from the 

east and the south. 

In executing the breakthroughs, the Russians showed elegance in their tactical conceptions, economy of force, and control 

that did not fall short of the Germans' own 

performance in the early war years. They 

used tightly concentrated infantry and artillery to breach the front on, by their previous standards, narrow sectors. The tanks 

stayed out of sight until an opening was 

ready, then went straight through without 

bothering about their flanks. 

The Soviet air support was concentrated 

against the German artillery, which, because 

the danger from' the air had not been great 

in the past, was stationed close to the front 

in open emplacements that gave wide fields 

for direct antitank fire but no protection 

against air strikes." The Russians had 

overwhelming air superiority. By contrast, 

German Sixth Air Force, nearly paralyzed 

by shortages of planes and gasoline, had, 

according to one account, only 40 fighters in 

working order on 22 June and not enough 

gas to keep them flying." 

:M AOK 9, Ia NT. 4565 144 , Begriffsbestimmung 

der Artl. - Schutzstellung, 11.9-44, in Akle V, H. 

Gr. Mitte 65004/ ,8 file. 

2:l Tippclskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Welt· 

krieges, p. 462 . 
322 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

A RUSSIAN WOMAN ATTACKS A GERMAN PRISONER 

The Bobruysk Pocket 

Ninth Army was the first to succumb. 

On 26 June the Russians were three miles 

southwest of Bobruysk and across the 

Mogilev road twelve miles north of the city. 

The in junction to hold every foot of ground 

stayed in force throughout the day. Early 

the next morning the army received permission to retreat to Bobruysk and the Beresina, which was what the army had wanted 

to do two days earlier and which could at 

least have been used as an excuse to maneuver for an escape northward toward 

Fourth Army. Before the army could act, 

however, an order arrived forbidding any 

sort of withdrawal. 

In the afternoon the OKH authorized a 

breakout to the north, but followed it with 

several sharply worded admonishments 

through the army group to hold the "fortified place" Bobruysk under all circumstances. By then it was too late. Ten Soviet divisions had closed the pocket. Two 

corps, a total of 70,000 German troops, 

were trapped in and east of Bobruysk. In 

the city thousands of leaderless troops milled 

about, panicky and confused. Headquarters, Ninth Army, outside the pocket, transferred its one intact corps to Second Army 

and, with no troops except half of the 12th 

Panzer Division coming in through Minsk, 

moved back to Marina Gorka, thirty miles 

southeast of Minsk, to try to hold open an 

escape route for Fourth Army. Rokossovskiy, just beginning to hit his stride, lost no 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

time in striking out for Minsk and behind 

Second Army toward Slutsk'." 

The Minsk Pocket 

In the Fourth Army sector Zakharov's 

lead elements crossed the Dnepr north of 

Mogilev on 26 June. By then the neighboring fronts were deep into the army's 

flanks. Tippelskirch on his own responsibility ordered his army to go behind the 

Dnepr. To the west, behind the army, lay 

a 40-milc wide band of swamp and forest 

between the Prut and the Beresina traversed only by the Mogilev-Beresino-Minsk 

road. If it retreated any farther, the whole 

army would have to go on that road and 

across one 8-ton bridge at Beresino. Radio 

monitors already had picked up messages 

to Soviet tank spearheads off the north 

flank ordering them to take the Beresina 

crossing. 

On the morning of the 27th Fourth 

Army radioed to army group, "Army requests directive whether to fig'ht its way 

west or let large elements be encircled." 

At noon the army group intelligence officer 

arrived at Fourth Army headquarters in a 

light plane with an order to hold the Dnepr 

line and the "fortified places" Orsha and 

Mogilcv. If it was forced back, the army 

was to set up another line on the Prut. 

Tippelskirch was certain he would have to 

withdraw, and in the afternoon, after receiving a report that the Russians were 

coming around the south flank, so directed. At the last minute Busch interposed an order that Mogilev was to remain 

a "fortified place." By then the RussianR 

Ie AOK 9, Sotlderanlage zum Kriegstagebuch des 

AOK 9 Nr. 10, Gefechtsbericht, Sehlacht in WeiHruthenien vom :14 .6-/0.744, pp. 7f, AOK 9 596911 

26 file. 

323 

were in Orsha. 

On 28 June the Fourth Army staff 

moved from Belynichi to Beresino over the 

road the army would have to take. The 

30-mile trip lasted nine hours. Columns 

of barely moving trucks choked the road, 

and between daylight and dark Soviet 

planes attacked the Beresino bridge twentyfive times. During the day two corps commanders were killed. To move at all the 

army staff had to organize details to clear 

burning trucks and dead horses off the 

road. 

At Beresino, Tippelskirch found waiting 

for him an injunction from Busch to get 

Fourth Army behind the Beresina fast. In 

his personal diary he noted, "This order has 

come too late!" Toward midnight another 

message from Busch relayed Hitler's decision to let Mogilev be given up. Nothing 

had been heard from that "fortified place" 

for twenty-four hours.

27 

On the morning of the 28th Busch gave 

Zeitzler a situation report. Ninth Army was 

smashed; Fourth Army was retreating; and 

Third Panzer Army, one corps left out of 

its original three, was pierced in numerous 

places. Nevertheless, Busch intended to execute Operations Order 8, which had come 

in during the night, to the letter. In that 

order Hitler, apparently using a ruler, had 

laid out a line due north and south of Beresino on which he demanded that all three 

armies stop. 

Busch was satisfied to have another line 

to try to hold. H e told Reinhardt, whose 

divisions were already west of the line, to 

attack because the army group was uiron" 

bound to the operations order. He in17 AOK 4, fa Nr. :1050/44. Die Entwicklung der 

Lage bei der 4. Armee waehrend der russischen 

SommeroDensive 1944. pp. 14-36, AOK 4 64188 

file. 
324 

structed Ninth Army, also west of the line, 

to commit its half a panzer division "offen_ 

sively." 

During the day the army group and the 

Operations Branch, OKH, concluded that 

the offensive against Army Group Center 

was more ambitious than they had previously assumed and probably was aimed at retaking Minsk, but the OKH believed a 

more powerful blow might yet be expected 

against Army Group North Ukraine. To 

resolve the dilemma, Hitler announced in 

the afternoon that Model would take command of Army Group Center the next day 

and at the same time retain command of 

Army Group North Ukraine to facilitate 

exchanges of forces between the two. Givmg Model command of Army Group Center was for Hitler also a handy way to 

sidetrack an OKH proposal to take Army 

Group North back to the line Dvinsk-Riga 

and so gain divisions for the battle in the 

center.2 8 

The change in command pleased the 

armies for other reasons. Ninth Army, in 

which General der Panzertruppen Nikolaus 

von Vormann had replaced Jordan as commanding general, received the news with 

"satisfaction and renewed confidence." 29 

Tippelskirch, in his last conversation with 

Busch, "could not resist expressing his bitterness over the developments which had 

resulted from the way the army group had 

been led." " The irony of Model's being 

called on to rescue Army Group Center 

from a disaster in which he was suhstantialMH . Gr. Mitte, fa Kriegstagebu ch, 1.- 30 .6-44 , 

28 Jun 44, OCMH files. 

!Ie AOK 9 Fuehrungsabteilung Kriegstagebu ch 

Nr. 10, 28 Jun 44, AOK 9 596gllt file. iIO AOK 4, /a NT. :;050/ 44. Die Entwicklung der 

Lage bei der 4. Armee waehrend der russischen 

Sommeroffensi ve 1944, p. 36, AOK 4 64188 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ly, if indirectly, implicated was overshadowed by the fact that he was obviously 

the man for the job. In the first place, the 

reinforcements from Army Group North 

Ukraine would otherwise have come slowly 

if at all; in the second, he was, next to 

Rundstedt, who was busy enough in France, 

the best tactical mind the Germans still had 

in active command. 

During the day of the 29th a Soviet plane 

scored a hit that blew away thirty feet of 

the Beresino bridge. After that was repaired, another hit knocked down forty-five 

feet of the span. Truck columns two and 

three abreast lined the road for thirty miles 

to the east. Behind Fourth Army, Headquarters, Ninth Army, had a thin screening line set up southeast of Marina Gorka, 

but deeper in the rear, off Fourth Army's 

north and south flanks, spearheads of the 

Third and First Beiorussian Fronts that day 

day reached Borisov and Slutsk'. 

Fourth Army's fate was sealed on 30 

June. The Russia,lS had tanks and selfpropelled artillery within range of the Beresino bridge. Even to get the troops across 

the river without their equipment appeared 

nearly hopeless." Elsewhere the army 

group gained a day's respite when the Russians stopped before Borisov and Slutsk'. 

Model told Hitler he might be able to hold 

both places if he could get divisions from 

Army Group North, which could spare two 

or three divisions if it pulled back its right 

flank, then still east of Polotsk. He also 

wanted Army Group North to extend its 

flank south and restore contact with Third 

Panzer Army, which had broken away two 

days before. Hitler ignored the proposals 

but instructed Model to start swinging Sec81 Ibid., p. 51 . 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

ond Army back to cover Slutsk' and Baranovichi. 32 

When the morning air reconnaissance on 

1 July showed a column estimated at 35,000 

German troops moving north out of Bobruysk along the west bank of the Beresina, 

Ninth Army sent a panzer regiment that 

opened a corridor from the west. The 

German luck did not hold. While the 

t.-oops from the pocket funneled through on 

foot to the railroad at Marina Gorka, Rokossovskiy's tank and motorized spearheads 

pushed past Slutsk' and Borisov toward 

Baranovichi and Molodechno. When 

word came that the Russians were at 

Bobovnya, thirty miles northwest of Slutsk', 

the Ninth Army staff pulled out of Marina 

Gorka toward Stolbtsy, on the railroad half 

way between Baranovichi and Minsk, 

where it hoped to hold the Neman River 

crossing, the last escape route south of 

Minsk. On the way it was stopped for several hours by troops streaming east and 

claiming the Russians were behind them. 

Around Minsk the roads were crammed 

with service troops and vehicles. Panic 

gripped the city. 

To open the road south of Minsk Ninth 

Army on 2 July directed the panzer division at Marina Gorka to strike toward 

Stolbtsy. The army staff had tried but 

failed to organize a scratch force of stragglers to defend the town. The stragglers, 

officers and men alike, disappeared as fast 

as they could be assembled. On the north 

Fifth Guards Tank Army was approaching 

Minsk. In the pocket some of the troops 

who had escaped from Bobruysk were 

aboard trains trying to get out through 

Minsk and Molodechno; the majority, on 

II H. Gr. MiHe , 14 Kriegstagebuch 1.-30.6.44, 

go Jun 44, OCMH 61 ••. 

325 

foot, plodded in heat and dust toward 

Stolbtsy. Except for a rear guard all of 

Fourth Army was across the Beresina, but 

its forward elements were stopped east of 

Minsk. During the day Headquarters, 

Fourth Army, went to Molodechno to try 

to hold open the railroad there. Ninth 

Army's panzer division did not get to 

Stolbtsy, which the Russians had entered in 

the morning, but' some of the troops from 

the pocket found a crossing farther downstream on the Neman. 

The next day Rokossovskiy's and Chernyakovskiy's troops took Minsk. Ninth 

Army tried and again failed to open the 

bridge at Stolbtsy. On 4 July the Russians going toward Baranovichi forced 

Ninth Army to center its effort there, and 

after that the only troops to get out of the 

pocket were individuals and small groups 

who made their way through the Nalibocka 

Forest, sometimes helped by the Polish 

peasants. 

In twelve days Army Group Center had 

lost 25 divisions. Of its original 165,000-

man strength, Fourth Army lost 130,000. 

Third Panzer Army lost 10 divisions. Ninth 

Army had held the pocket open long 

enough for some thousands, possibly as 

many as 10,000-15,000, of its troops to 

escape. By the time it reached Baranovichi Headquarters, Ninth Army, did not 

have enough of its staff and communicationS equipment left to command the divisions being sent north from Second Army. 

After a few days of trying to operate 

through Second Army's communications 

net, it was taken out and sent to the rear 

to reorganize. 53 

II AOK 9. Sonderanlage zum Kriegstagebuch 

des AOK 9 Nr. 10, Gefechbbericht, Schlacht in 

Weissruthenien uom 24 ,6.-10 .7.44, pp. 15-20, AOK 

9 59691/26 file ; AOK 4, la Nr, 2050/44. Die 
326 

Retreat 

By 1 July Model was certain the most 

easterly line he could try to hold was between Baranovichi and Molodechno. He 

expected some advantage from earthworks 

and trenches left there from World War I, 

but told Hitler he would need several divisions from Army Group North to defend 

Molodechno. He was worried most about 

his left flank. Between the Army Group 

North flank, "nailed down" at Polotsk by 

Hitler's orders, and the Third Panzer Army 

left flank northeast of Minsk, a 50-mile gap 

had opened. A gap nearly as wide separated the panzer army's right flank and the 

Fourth Army short line around Molodechno. Third Panzer Army could be encircled or simply swept away any time the 

Russians wanted to make the effort, and 

thereafter the road to Riga and the Baltic 

coast would be open. 

Although Model branded it "a futile 

experiment," Hitler insisted that Army 

Group North hold Polotsk and strike to the 

southwest from there to regain contact with 

Third Panzer Army. The Commanding 

General, Army Group North, Lindemann, 

reported that with two divisions, all he 

could spare if his flank had to stay at Polotsk, he could not attack. When on 3 

July, after receiving permission to go back 

a short distance from Polotsk, Lindemann 

continued to insist he could not attack, 

Hitler dismissed him and appointed Friessner in his place. 

When the Russians reached Minsk, Army 

Group Center, judging by past experience, 

assumed that they had attained their first 

Entwicklung der Lage be; der 4. Armee waehrend 

deT Tussischen Sommeroflensiue '944. pp. 55-78, 

AOK 4 64 . 88 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

major objective and, having gone 125 

miles, more than their usual limit on onc 

issue of supplies, would pause at least several days to regroup and resupply." The 

army group was mistaken. The first objective, indeed, had been reached, but the 

Stavka had ordered the offensive carried 

west on a broad front without stopping. 

First Baltic Front was to go toward Dvinsk, 

Third Belorussian Front to Molodechno 

and then via Vil'nyus and Lida to the 

Neman, and First BeloTUssian Front to 

Baranovichi and west toward Brest. Second BeloTUssian Front stayed behind to 

mop up around Minsk." 

The Russians moved faster than Army 

Group Center could deploy its meager 

forces even to attempt a stand. Russian 

troops were through the narrows south and 

east of Molodechno by 6 July, and the army 

group reported that they had full freedom 

of movement toward Vil'nyus. Second 

Army committed enough troops around 

Baranovichi to brake the advance a few 

days, but one panzer division and a Hungarian cavalry division could not stop four 

Soviet tank corps backed by infantry. 

Baranovichi fell on 8 July as did Lida, the 

road and rail junction west of the N alibocka 

Forest. 

By stretching its front west, Army Group 

North narrowed the gap to Third Panzer 

Army to about twenty miles. Friessner 

was going to attack south with three divisions, but First Baltic Front's Fourth Shock 

and Sixth Guards Armies began pressing 

toward Dvinsk and thus tied down everything on the army group's fl ank. Friessner 

then proposed as a "small solution" to let 

S/o H. Cr. Mitte, 1a Kriegstagebuch , 1.-3' .744, 

' - 3 Jul 44, OCMH files. 

:lliZhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiye Operatsjj Otechestuennoy V oyny. p. 353. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 327 

SOVlET MACHINE GUN CREW IN VIL'NYUS 

Sixteenth Army withdraw to the LITHuANlA position, a line being constructed from 

Kraslava east of Dvinsk to Ostrov; Hitler 

refused to consider going more than hall 

that distance. 

On the 8th Model reported that he could 

not hold the line Vil'nyus-Lida-Baranovichi 

-in fact, the attempt had already failed 

completely. The first town was surrounded 

and the latter two were lost. Since he did 

not expect any reinforcements within the 

next eight days, he could not attempt to 

stop the Russians anywhere. He asked for 

an audience with Hitler the next day. 

At Fuehrer headquarters, Hitler proposed giving him a panzer division from 

Germany and two divisions from Army 

Group North right away, two more later. 

With these Third Panzer Army was to attack north and close the gap. On the question of the "big solution," taking Army 

Group North back to the Riga-DvinskDvina River line, which was what Model 

wanted most, Hitler was adamant. Admiral Doenitz, he said, had submitted a 

report proving such a withdrawal ruinous 

for the Navy." 

For the next several days the Army 

Group Center front drifted west toward 

Kaunas, the Neman River, and Bialystok. 

The help from Army Group North did not 

come. Friessner could neither release the 

divisions promised Army Group Center nor 

• H. Cr. Mitt~, 1a Kriegstagebuch, 1.-31.7.44. 

5-8 Jul 44, OCMH file •. 
328 

attack south himself. Between the Dvina 

and the Velikaya, Second Baltic Front and 

the right flank army of Third Baltic Front 

were engaging Sixteenth Army in a series 

of vicious and costly battles. South of the 

Dvina, around Dvinsk, First Baltic Front 

troops cracked the line in two places. 

On 12 July Friessner reported to Hitler 

that he still proposed to attack south toward 

Third Panzer Army, but even if the attack 

succeeded it would have no lasting effect. 

Bagramyan's armies would keep on going 

west. Moreover, he could no longer maintain a stable defense anywhere on his own 

front south of Ostrov. He urged-Uif one 

wants to save the armies of Army Group 

North"-taking Armeeabteilung Narva 

back to Reval and from there by sea to 

Riga, Liepaja, or Memel and withdrawing 

the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies to the 

line Riga-Kaunas. "I cannot," Friessner 

wrote, "reconcile with my conscience not 

having made every effort in this fateful 

hour to spare these loyal troops the worst 

that could befall them and not having 

found for them an employment that would 

make it possible to hold the enemy away 

from the eastern border of our Homeland." 

If Hitler could not give him freedom of 

action he asked to be relieved of his command.s1 

Hitler, who rejected Friessner's proposal 

emphatically, had another plan. He intended to give Model five panzer divisions, 

including the big Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Division, and have them assembled behind Kaunas to attack and close 

the gap between the army groups. The 

OKH operations chief pointed out that the 

battle was moving too fast; in the time it 

., O. B. H. GT. Nord, Meldung an den Fuehrer, 

12.7.44. in MS # P-114a (Sixt), Teil V, Anlagen. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

would take to assemble the divisions, the 

front would undoubtedly change so greatly 

that the attack would be impossible. 

On 13 July Model reported that he 

would try to stop the Russians forward of 

the Kaunas-Neman RiveI-Grodno-Brest 

line, but he would have to use the 

fresh panzer divisions to do it. Counting 

new arrivals expected through 2 I July, he 

would then only have 16 fully combatworthy divisions against 160 Russian divisions and brigades. In a conference at 

Fuehrer headquarters in Rastenburg on the 

14th, Hitler changed his mind to the extent 

of giving Model the dual mission of first 

halting the offensive and then creating an 

attack force on the north flank." 

During the third week of the month the 

Third Panzer and Fourth Armies managed 

to come to stop on a line from Ukmerge 

south past Kaunas and along the Neman to 

south of Grodno. Second Army, echeloned 

east, was consolidating as it drew back toward Bialystok. The Ninth Army staff 

supervised work on a line protecting the 

East Prussian border and organized blocking detachments to catch stragglers. The 

army group was beginning to regain its 

balance. 

The Russians, having covered better 

than 200 miles without a pause, had for 

the time being outrun their supplies. They 

were now deep in territory ravaged by recent 

fighting, and bridges had to be rebuilt and 

rails relaid." Where there had been time 

to use it, the Germans' Schienenwolf (rail 

wolf), a massive steel plow towed by a locomotive had, as on other similar occasions, 

• H. Gr. Milte, Ia Kriegstagebuch . [ .-31.7.44. 

nZ- 14 Jul 44, OCMH files . 

• Zhilin, Vazhneyshiye Opera'sii Otechestvennoy Voyn)', p. 4~!Z; IVDY (R), IV, 190. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

turned long stretches of railroad into 

tangles of twisted rails and broken ties. 

A Threat to Army Group North 

On the 17th, the day the Russians 

marched 57,000 German prisoners through 

the main streets of Moscow to mark the 

victory in Belorussia, Army Group Center 

radio monitors intercepted messages to Soviet tank units north of Vil'nyus telling 

them to attack into the gap between Army 

Groups Center and North. Another, possibly greater, German disaster seemed to be 

at hand. Model advised the OKH he 

could not assemble the projected attack 

force in time to stop the Soviet armor; 

Army Group North would have to do it 

or suffer the consequences.·o 

Army Group North was fully occupied 

trying to get into the LITHUANIA position, 

which was beginning to crack at the points 

where it had been reached. On 16 July 

Fricssner informed Hitler that it was "a 

marvel" that the Russians had not already 

sent a force toward Riga to envelop the 

army group flank. He had nothing to use 

against them. He was taking one division 

out of the front at Narva; but it would be 

fully committed by the 20th; after that he 

would have no more reserves. "From then 

on," he concluded, "that the front will fall 

apart must be taken into account." 41 

In a conference with Model and Friessner on 18 July, Hitler ordered the fighting 

in the gap conducted with mobile forces. 

He would have two self-propelled assault 

gun brigades there in four days, and by that 

&0 H . Gr. Mitte, la Kriegstagebu ch, 1.-31 .7.44. 

14-17 Jul 44. OCMH files. 

no. B. H. Gr. N ord, Meldung an den Fuehrer 

als ObdH, ,6.7.44, in MS # P- 114a (Sixt), r eil 

V , Anlagen. 

329 

time Goering would have strong air units 

ready to help. The army groups would 

each supply some infantry and a half dozen 

or so panzer and self-propelled artillery 

battalions. Goering, who was present, for 

once screwed up his courage and remarked 

that one had to speak out, the only way to 

get forces was to go back to the Dvina line. 

Hitler agreed that would be the simplest. 

But, he contended, it would lose him the 

Latvian oil, Swedish iron ore, and Finnish 

nickel; therefore, Army Group North's mission would be to hold the front where it 

was "by every means and employing every 

imaginable improvisation." 42 Trying for 

the last time to talk Hitler around, Zeitzler 

carried his argument to the point of offering his resignation and, finally, reporting 

himself sick. Hitler countered with an 

order forbidding officers to relinquish their 

posts voluntarily." 

The Battle Expands to the Flanks 

By mid-July, when the frontal advance 

against Army Group Center began to lose 

momentum, the Stauka was ready to apply 

pressure against the flanks. In the north 

the gap between the Third Panzer and Sixteenth Armies, the "Baltic Gap," offered a 

ready-made opportunity. First Baltic 

Front, given the Second Guards and Fiftyfirst Armies, which had been moved up from 

the Crimea, deployed them for a strike west 

toward Shaulyay and from there north 

toward Riga. 

On the south, Army Group North 

Ukraine was still strong, by current German 

.t H . Cr. Nord. K .T.B., Buicht ueber den Fuehru-Vortrag im Wolfsschanze am 18.7.44, in MS 

# P- 114a, (Sixt), Teil V, Anlagen. ; 

13 Taetigkeitsbuicht des Chefs des Heuespusonalamts, 18 Jul 44. H4/J ~ file . 
330 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

GERMAN POW'S BEING PARADED THROUGH MoSGow, 17 JULY 1944 

standards, but it was not the massive 

"block" that had been created in May and 

June. It had lost three panzer and two 

infantry divisions outright and in exchanges 

had received several divisions that were 

not battle tested. In the southern tbreequarters of the North Ukraine zone, Konev's 

First Ukrainian Front had ten armies, three 

of them tank armies. In the northern 

quarter First Belorussian Front had three 

armies, reinforced during the second week 

of July by a guards army and a tank army 

transferred from the two southern fronts 

and the Polish First Army, a token force of 

four divisions. Apparently using the operation against Army Group Center as a 

model, Rokossovskiy and Konev had positioned their armies for thrusts in the north 

toward Brest and Lublin, in the center toward Rava Russkaya and L'vov, and in the 

south toward Stanislav." 

Army Group North Ukraine Broken 

Through 

The Army Group Center disaster mitigated the Army Group North Ukraine command problem somewhat in that it produced a slightly more flexible attitude in 

the highest headquarters. At the end of 

June Hitler lifted the "fortified place" designations on Kovel' and Brody and a week 

later allowed Fourth Panzer Army to give 

.. Platonov, Vtoraya MiTovaya Vayna, 1939-45. 

pp. 594-96; IVOV(R), lV, '06-08. 
XXX X 

~~ 

xxxxx r-, 

CENTER L_" 

SECOND BElORUSS)AN XXXXx __ 

FIRST BELORU SS1 AN 

--xxxxx --I 

xxxxx r-, NORTH UKRAI NE L_" 

XXXX 

SEV(~~EN H 

ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE 

AND THE NINTH ARMY 14 July - IS September 1944 

MAP 28 

11 i i " , 

GERNAN FIIONT LINE, I. ~UL 

GER' .... '" nlOIH LINE, 2. JUL 

G[II .. ... N FRONT LINE, 'SEP 

20 40 to "'LES 

i ! i)' I 

20 40 60 KilOMETERS 

1 

\ 

) 

/ 

\-, '\ 

8, ~ I' 

/' 

/ 
332 

up Kovel' and go into a shorter line fifteen 

miles west of the city. In the second week 

of July he also allowed the army to straighten a bulge on its right flank around Torchin. 

When Fourth Panzer Army started back 

from Torchin, Konev, hoping to catch the 

Germans off balance, opened his attack 

toward Rava Russkaya on 13 July, a day 

earlier than planned. (Map 28 ) That move 

disconcerted both sides. Third Guards 

Army made a ragged start. The German 

divisions in motion stopped where they 

were supposed to, but a division a few miles 

farther south crumbled and a panzer division ordered to backstop it was slowed by 

air attacks. Next day Thirteenth Army 

found the weak spot and worked in deeper." 

On 14 July two armies hit the First 

Panzer Army left flank due east of L'vov. 

The army had two reserve panzer divisions close behind the front. On the 15th 

they counterattacked from the south, 

stopped Thirty-eighth Army, and even 

drove it back a mile or two. But farther 

north Sixtieth Army opened a small breach 

in the German line. 

Without waiting for the gaps to be 

widened, Konev on 16 July committed 

First Guards Tank Army to the fighting on 

the Fourth Panzer Army right flank and a 

day later did the same with Third Guards 

Tank Army on the First Panzer Army left 

flank. The two German armies took their 

flanks back fifteen miles to a switch position 

named the PRINZ EUGEN, but before that 

was done the Russians penetrated the new 

front at the two crucial points. Elsewhere 

the withdrawal did not shorten the line 

enough to release troops either to close the 

t 6 Pz. AOK 4. fa Kriegstagebuch , 1.7.-15.8.44, 

1-14 Ju144, Pz. AOK 4 63015/ 1 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

gaps or to stop the westward rolling tank 

columns. 

On the 18th Soviet armored spearheads 

from the north and south met on the Bug 

River thirty miles west of L'vov." Behind 

them XIII Corps (five German divisions 

and the SS Division Galicia ), was encircled. 

During the same day First Guards Tank 

Army, going toward Rava Russkaya, 

crossed the Bug near Krystynopol. That 

night Fourth Panzer Army began taking 

its whole front back to the Bug. The withdrawal was necessary both because of the 

breakthrough in the south and because Second Army, its neighbor on the north, was 

being forced back toward Brest. Fourth 

Panzer Army reported that it had 20 tanks 

and 154 self-propelled assault guns in working order; the Russians had between 500 

and 600 tanks. The army's 12 divisions 

faced 34 Soviet riAe divisions, 2 mechanized 

corps, and 2 tank corps. The Russians had 

10 rifle divisions, 2 cavalry corps, and 4 

independent tank regiments in reserve. 

After 18 July the whole Army Group 

North Ukraine front from Stanislav north 

was in motion. Having waited for Fourth 

Panzer Army to start toward the Bug, First 

Belorussian Front began its thrust to Lublin. 

On the 20th Eighth Guards Army forced 

its way across the river nearly to Chelm. 

That day, First Guards Tank Army, 

striking between the Fourth and First 

Panzer Armies, reached Rava Russkaya, 

and Third Guards Tank A rmy passed north 

of L'vov, while the newly committed Fourth 

Tank Arm)' closed up to the city from the 

east. XIII Corps, encircled forty miles east 

of L'vov, was drawing its divisions together 

for an attempt to escape to the south before 

41 Platonov, Vt oraya Mirovaya Voyna, 1939-45. 

P·59B. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

the right half of the First Panzer Army 

front was pushed too far west. 

On 22 July the Second Army right flank 

went into the Brest defense ring. Against 

Fourth Panzer Army Soviet tanks rammed 

through at Chelm in the morning, covered 

the forty miles to Lublin by afternoon, and 

after nightfall 70 enemy tanks and 300 to 

400 trucks were reported going northwest 

past Lublin. Hitler refused to lift the 

"fortified place" designation, and the 900-

man garrison stayed in the city. In the gap 

between the Fourth and First Panzer 

Armies, by then thirty miles wide, First 

Guards Tank Army had an open road to 

the San River. Fourth Panzer Army told 

the army group that the only way it could 

save itself was to withdraw behind the 

Vistula and San Rivers without delay." 

During the day XIII Corps staged its breakout attempt, but it had too far to go. Of 

30,000 men in the pocket no more than 

5,000 escaped. Around L'vov First Panzer 

Army resisted more strongly than the Russians expected, which probably explains 

why Konev did not launch his planned 

thrust toward Stanislav. 

The Baltic Gap 

By 18 July the increased weight against 

the adjacent flanks of Army Groups Center 

and North was also being felt. (Map 29 ) 

A captured Soviet officer said that he had 

seen Second Guards Army moving west 

toward the Third Panzer Army north flank. 

Fifth Guards Tank Army, with Thirtythird Army close behind, had closed up to 

the Third Panzer Army front east of Kaunas and along the Neman River south of 

the city. Reinhardt, who had a weak 

n Pz. A.OK 4, la Kriegstagcbuch, 1.7.-15.8.44, 

18- 22 Jul 44, Pz. AOK 4 63015/ 1 file. 

333 

panzer division and 4 infantry divisions 

facing 18 rifle divisions, 3 tank corps, a 

mechanized corps, and 3 independent tank 

brigades, reported that he saw no chance 

of restoring contact with Army Group 

North and proposed that he be allowed to 

take back his flank on the north enough at 

least to get a strong front around Kaunas. 

Model, having returned from the day's conference with Hitler, told him the army 

would have to stay where it was. Stretching the facts slightly, he said Army Group 

North would take care of closing the gap. 

He promised Reinhardt the Herman Goering Division. 

During the next three days, while Fifth 

Tank Army increased its threat to Kaunas 

by working its way into several bridgeheads 

on the Neman, Second Guards Army moved 

west into the Baltic Gap and began pushing 

the Third Panzer Army flank south. By 22 

July the flank division, trying to hold off 

six guards rifle divisions, was beginning to 

fall apart, and the gap had opened to a 

width of thirty-six miles. During the day 

Second Guards Army's advance elements 

reached Panevezhis, forty miles behind the 

Third Panzer Army front. The army was 

down to a combat effective strength of 

13,850 men, but Model again refused a 

request to go back. As far as reinforcements were concerned, he told Reinhardt, 

the army would have to withstand the 

"drought" for two or three more days.·s 

Sixteenth Army, meanwhile, had completed its withdrawal into the LITHUANIA 

position on 19 July but had not been able 

to stop the Russians there. On the 22d 

Friessner ordered the army back another 

five to ten miles, which meant giving up its 

tIJ Pz. AOK 3. 1a Kriegltagebuch, 11.- 31.7.44, 

18- 23 Jul 44. Pz. AOK 3 64190/ 4 file . 
THE NORTH FLANK 

OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 

AND ARMY GROUP NORTH 

18 July-31 Auqus' 1944 

,.......,,.......,,......., G(R"U n.,,~l, ,I",. 

____ GtcR .. U ",eMf, •• UA 

TTTTTrT T"TTTI'TT Gu .. u "RDI<T, ), ~UG 

-w., r" ,Ot\-, 1-, _'-:'[lo,~L_j"i' .. ,~ .. 10 " Ii" 

MAP 29 

THIRTTTHIRD 

I 

~::~~~~ 1""'-' SECOND BELORUSSIAN 

1"""') FIFTlEfH 

) 

FORTY_ 

NINTH 

./' THIRD 

] SECOND BELORUSSiAN ) ____ XXXX)I---
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

northern anchor at Pskov. To Hitler he 

sent word there was no other way of holding the army together; the new line also 

would not hold, and then he would have 

to go back again. Soon, he added, the 

front would lose its Pskov Lake-Lake Peipus tie-in, and getting behind the Dvina 

would then become a "question of life or 

death" for the whole army group." 

Attentat!-Guderian--Schoerner 

In the Fuehrer headquarters on 20 July 

the Attentat (attempted assassination) 

against Hitler had taken place. A timebomb h~d injured all nineteen of the officers at the afternoon situation conference, 

three of them fatally, and had demolished 

the building in which the meeting was being held; but Hitler had escaped with 

minor iburns, bruises, and an ear in jury. GO 

In th~ first few hours after the explosion, a 

widespread anti-Hitler conspiracy centered 

in the Army and reaching into the highest 

command echelons, especially the Army 

General Staff, came to light. It was quickly smashed, and before the day was out 

Hitler had placed new men in a number of 

key posts. The most significant change as 

far as the Eastern Front was concerned was 

Guderian's appointment as Acting Chief of 

Staff,OKH. 

Guderian got the appointment by default. In fact, Hitler's first choice was 

General der Infanterie Walter Buhle, who 

n H. G!'. Nord, /a Nr. 126/ 44, 22.7.44, AOK 

18 64843/ J file. 110 Hitler later said that afte." the explosion the 

tremors in his left leg, which had long bothered 

him, almost disappeared, but, be added, the treat~ 

ment was not one he would recommend. Kg. , Wh. , 

S 121 / 44 , Besprechung des Fuehrers mit Gentraloberst Jodi am 31.744 i'l der Wollsschanze , EAP 

13-m-1olt file. 

335 

was among those wounded in the assassination attempt, and now could not assume 

the post until he had recovered." Hitler 

never completely forgave a general who had 

once failed him, but on 20 July '944 Guderian was perhaps the only general in the 

OKH not under direct suspicion. Although 

his motives were not entirely clear, Guderian had been the officer who, in Berlin 

on the afternoon of the assassination attempt, had turned back the tank battalion 

drawn up to take the SS headquarters on 

the Fehrbelliner Platz. He had, moreover, 

lately been full of ideas for winning the 

war, and he had not attempted to dissemble 

his low opinion of the field generalship 

on the Eastern Front since the time he had 

been relieved of command there. His 

recent charges of defeatism in the General 

Staff made it appear unlikely that he had 

been a member of the conspiracy. 

On his appointment, Guderian moved 

swiftly to give fresh evidence of loyalty to 

the Fuehrer and to dissociate himself from 

his predecessors. In an order to all General 

Staff officers, he demanded of them an 

"exemplary [Nazi] attitude" on political 

questions and that publicly. Those who 

could not comply were to request to be removed from th'e General Staff. "In order 

to ease the transition to, for them, possibly 

new lines of thought," he directed further, 

that all General Staff officers were to be 

given opportunities to hear political lectures 

and were to be detailed to National Socialist leadership discussions." 

On his first day in his new post Guderian 

demonstrated how he proposed to conduct 

&1 Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersona/amts, 20 Jul 44, H4 / 12 file. 

U Der Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres, an 

aIle Generalstabsoffiziere, :}9.7.44, EAP 21-C-12/sc 

file. 
336 

the war on the Eastern Front. When the 

Army Group North chief of staff told him 

Friessner was convinced the course Hitler 

was following would lose him the Baltic 

States and the Sixteenth and Eighteenth 

Armies to boot, Guderian dismissed the 

statement with a sneer, saying he expected 

"General Friessner will be man enough to 

give the necessary orders [to surrender 1 in 

the event of a catastrophe." 53 

After Friessner sent in his 22 July report 

his hours in command of Army Group 

North were numbered. The next day, at 

Guderian's behest, Friessner and Schoefner 

traded commands. Guderian told Model 

he was confident Schoerner would "put 

things in order" at Army Group North. 

It was time, he added, also to stiffen the 

Army Group North Ukraine command's 

backbone. " 

Schoerner went to Army Group North 

with a special patent from Hitler giving 

him command authority over all combat 

forces of the three Wehrmacht branches, 

the Waffen-SS, and the party and civil offices in the Baltic States." Unusual as such 

sweeping power was, substantively it did 

not amount to much. It placed at Schoerner's disposal a few thousand men who 

could be committed in the gap on the army 

group's south Rank; otherwise, its main 

effect was to underscore Hitler's determination to hold what was left of the Baltic 

States. 

11:1 Vorl rag du Chefs des Gen. St, deT H. Gr. 

Nord beim Chef des Gen. St. d. H. am 21.7.44. in 

MS # P- 114a (Sixt ), Teil V, Anlagen. 

&( Army Group North Ukraine was under Gcncraloberst Josef Harpe as Model's deputy. H. Gr. 

Mitte , 1a Kriegstagebu. ch, 1.-3 1.7.44, 24 luI 44, 

OCMH files. 

M Der Fuehrer, OKW, WFSt, QU.2 (Osl) Verw. 

I Nr. 007984/44, an GenStdH, Gen Qu., H . Cr. 

Nord, 24.7-44, H. Gr. Mittc 65004/4 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

aT he thrust is the best parry" 

Worried by the threatening developments 

the day before on his front and flanks, 

Model, early on 23 July, predicted that the 

Russians would strike via L'vov to the San 

River, thrust past Lublin to Warsaw, encircle Second Army at Brest, advance on 

East Prussia across the Bialystok-Grodno 

line and by way of Kaunas, and attack 

past the army group left flank via Shaulyay 

to Memel or Riga. During the day Model's 

concern, particularly for his south flank, 

grew to alarm as the Russians moved north 

rapidly between the Vistula and the Bug 

toward Siedlce, the main road junction between Warsaw and Brest. In the late 

afternoon, after severa.] of his reports had 

gone unanswered, Model called to tell the 

Operations Branch, OKH, it was "no use 

sitting on one's hands, there could be only 

one decision and that was to retreat to the 

Vistula-San line." The branch chief replied that he agreed, but Guderian wanted 

to set a different objective. Later the army 

group chief of staff talked to Guderian, 

who quickly took up a proposal to create a 

strong tank force around Siedlce but would 

not h~ar of giving up any of the most 

threatened points. "We must take the offensive everywhere!" he demanded, "To 

retreat any farther is absolutely not tolerable." 

Before qaylight the next morning Guderian had completed a directive which was 

issued over Hitler's signature. Army Groups 

North and North Ukraine were to halt 

where they were and start attacking to close 

the gaps. Army Group Center was to 

create a solid front on the line KaunasBialystok-Brest and assemble strong forces 

on both its flanks. These would strike 

north and south to restore contact with the 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

neighboring army groups. All three army 

groups were promised reinforcements. The 

directive ended with the aphorism "The 

thrust is the best parry" (der Hieb ist die 

beste Parade ). After reading the directive 

Model's chief of staff told the OKH operations chief it would be seven days before 

the army groups would get any sizable reinforcements- in that time much could 

happen." 

During the last week in the month the 

Soviet armies rolled west through the 

shattered German front. On 24 July First 

Panzer Army still held L'vov and its front 

to the south, but behind the panzer army's 

flank, 50 miles west of L'vov, First Tank 

Army, Third Guards Tank Army, and the 

Cavalry-Mechanized Group Baranov had 

four tank and mechanized corps closing to 

the San River on the stretch between Jaroslaw and Przemysl. That day Fourth 

Panzer Army fell back 25 miles to a 40-mile 

front on the Wieprz River southeast of 

Lublin; off both its flanks the Russians tore 

open the front for a distance of 65 miles in 

the south and 55 miles in the north. Second Army had drawn its three right 

flank corps back to form a horizontal V 

with the point ~t Brest. Behind the army 

a Second Tank Army spearhead reached 

the outskirts of Siedlce at nightfall on the 

24th, and during the day Forty-seventh and 

Seventieth Armies had turned in against 

the south flank. 

To defend Siedlce, Warsaw, and the 

Vistula south to Pulawy, Model, on the 

24th, returned Headquarters, Ninth Army, 

to the front and gave it the Hermann Goering Division, the SS Totenkopf Division, 

and two infantry divisions, the latter three 

M H. Cr. Mitte, fa Kriegstagebuch , 1.-3' .7.44, 

'3, '4 luI 44, OCMH files. 

337 

divisions still in transit. From the long 

colur;nns coming west across the Vistula, 

the army began screening out what troops 

it could. In Warsaw it expected an uprising any day. 

The next day Fourth Tank Army crossed 

the San between Jaroslaw and Przemysl. 

To try to stop that thrust, Army Group 

North Ukraine, on orders from the OKH, 

took two divisions from Fourth Panzer 

Army and gave the army permission to 

withdraw to the Vistula. In the Ninth 

Army sector Rokossovskiy's armor pierced 

a thin screening line around the Vistula 

crossings at Deblin and Pulawy and reached 

the east bank of the river. 

Morning air reconnaissance on the 26th 

reported 1,400 Soviet trucks and tanks 

heading north past Deblin on the Warsaw 

road. At the same time, on the Army 

Group Center north flank reconnaissance 

planes located "endless" motorized columns 

moving west out of Panevezhis behind 

Third Panzer Army. During the day Second Army declared it could not hold Brest 

any longer, but Hitler and Guderian refused a decision until after midnight, by 

which time the corps in and around the 

city were virtually encircled. 

In two more days First Panzer Army lost 

L'vov and fell back to the southwest toward 

the Carpathians. Fourth Panzer Army 

went behind the Vistula and beat off several attempts to carry the pursuit across the 

river. Ninth Army threw all the forces it 

could muster east of Warsaw to defend the 

city, hold Siedlce, and keep open a route 

to the west for the divisions coming out of 

Brest. South of Pulawy two Soviet platoons crossed the Vistula and created a 

bridgehead; Ninth Army noted that the 

Russians were expert at building on such 

small beginnings. 
338 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

. .,;". "' ~ .... ,.., .. .. " ~~~~:""" 

--- -: ",-' ;..- - . IMMOBILIZED GERMAN TANK NEAR WARSAW 

In the gap between Army Groups Center 

and North, Bagramyan's motorized col· 

umns passed through Shaulyay, turned 

north, covered the fifty miles to Jelgava, 

and cut the last rail line to Army Group 

North. In a desperate attempt to slow that 

advance, Third Panzer Army dispatched 

one panzer division on a thrust toward 

Panevezhis. Hitler wanted two more divi· 

sions put in, but they could only have come 

from the front on the Neman, where the 

army was already losing its struggle to hold 

Kaunas. 

The 29th brought Army Group Center 

fresh troubles. Nine rifle divisions and two 

guards tank corps hit the Third Panzer 

Army right flank on the Neman front south 

of Kaunas. Rokossovskiy's armor drove 

north past Warsaw, cutting the road and 

rail connections between the Ninth and 

Second Armies and setting the stage for 

converging attacks on Warsaw from the 

southeast, east, and north. 

On the 30th the Third Panzer Army 

flank collapsed, the Russians advanced to 

Mariampol, twenty miles from the East 

Prussian border, and could have gone even 

farther had they so desired. Between 

Mariampol and Kaunas the front was 

shattered. In Kaunas and in the World 

War I fortifications east of the city two 

divisions were in danger of being ground 

to pieces as the enemy swung in behind 

them from the south. Model told Reinhardt that the army group could not grant 

permission to give up the city and it was 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

useless to ask the OKH. Reinhardt replied, "Very well, if that is how things 

stand, I will save my troops"; at ten minutes after midnight he ordered the corps 

holding Kaunas to retreat to the Nevayazha 

River ten miles to the west. 

On the Warsaw approaches during the 

day Second Tank Army came within seven 

miles of the city on the southeast and took 

Wolomin eight miles to the northeast. In 

the city shooting erupted in numerous 

places. In the San-Vistula triangle First 

Tank Army stabbed past Fourth Army and 

headed northwest toward an open stretch 

of the Vistula on both sides of Baranow. 

Off the tank army's south /lank the OKH 

gave the Headquarters, Seventeenth Army, 

command of two and a half divisions to try 

to plug the gap between Fourth Army and 

First Panzer Army. 

On the last day of the month elements 

of a guards mechanized corps reached the 

Gulf of Riga west of Riga. Forty miles 

south of Warsaw Eighth Guards Army took 

a small bridgehead near Magnuszew. Between the Fourth and Seventeenth Armies, 

First Tank Army began taking its armor 

across the Vistula at Baranow. That day, 

too, for the first time, the offensive faltered: 

Bagramyan did not move to expand his 

handhold on the Baltic; apparently short 

of gasoline, the tanks attacking toward 

Warsaw suddenly slowed almost to a stop; 

a German counterattack west from Siedlce 

began to make progress; and Chernyakovskiy did not take advantage of the opening 

between Mariampol and Kaunas. 57 

Ii"I H. Gr. Mitte , la Kriegstagehuch , 1.-3 1.7.44, 

24-31 Jul 44, OCMH files ; Pz. AOK 4, la Kriegs· 

tagebuch, 1.7.-15.8.44, 24-31 Jul 44, Pz. AOK 4-

63015/1 j Pz. AOK 3, la Kriegstagebuch, 11 .-

31.7·44, 24-31 Jul 44, Pz. AOK 3 64190/4 file; 

AOK 9 Fuehrungsabteilung Kriegstagehuch Nr. 11 J 

24-3' Jul 44, AOK 9 64802/1 file ; MS # "4a 

339 

At midnight on 31 July Hitler reviewed 

the total German situation in a long, erratic, 

monologue delivered to JodI and a handful 

of other officers. The news from the West 

was also grim: there the Allies were breaking out of the Cotenlin Peninsula, and 

on the 31st U.S. First Army had passed 

Avranches. Nevertheless, the most immediate danger, Hitler said, was in the East, 

because if the fighting reached into Upper 

Silesia or East Prussia, the psychological 

effects in Germany would be severe. As it 

was, the retreat was arousing apprehension 

in Finland and the Balkan countries, and 

Turkey was on the verge of abandoning its 

neutrality. What was needed was to stabilize the front and, possibly, win a battle or 

two to restore German prestige. 5f' 

The deeper problem, as Hitler saw it, was 

"this human, this moral crisis," in other 

words, the recently revealed officers' conspiracy against him j he went on: 

In the final analysis, what can we expect of 

a front .... jf one now sees that in the rear 

the most important posts were occupied by 

downright destructionists, not defeatists but 

dcstructionists. One does not even know how 

long they have been conspiring with the 

enemy or with those people over there [Seydliz's League of German Officers]. In a year 

or two the Russians have not become that 

much better ; we have become worse because 

we have that outfit over there constantly 

spreading poison by means of the General 

Staff, the Quartermaster General, the Chief 

of Communications, and so on. If we over-

(Six!), T,i/ TV, pp. 740- 44 ; MS # "4b (Hofmann), Teil VII, pp. 78-8,; MS # 114a 

(Hauck), pp. 38-39. M That afternoon Guderian had told the Army 

Group Center chief of staff that an attack on both 

flanks absolutely had to be made in order to influence the current negotiations with Turkey. H . 

Cr. Mitte , fa K,jegstagebuch, 1.-31.7.44, 31 Jul 

44, OCMH files. 
340 

come this moral crisis . . . in my opnion we 

will be able to set things right in the East. 

Fifteen new grenadier divisions and ten 

panzer brigades being set up, he predicted, 

would be enough to stabilize the Eastern 

Front." Being pushed into a relatively 

narrow space, he thought, was not entirely 

bad; it reduced the Army's need for manpower-consuming service and support organizations.llo 

The Recovery 

In predicting that the front could be 

stabilized, Hitler came close to the mark. 

In fact, even his expressed wish. for a victory or two was about to be partIally gratIfied. Model was keeping his forces in hand, 

and he was gradually gaining strength. 

Having advanced, in some instances more 

than 150 miles, the Soviet armies were 

again getting ahead of their supplies. The 

flood had reached its crest. It would do 

more damage; but in places it could also be 

dammed and diverted. 

Crosscurrents 

On I August Third Panzer Army, not 

yet recovered from the beating it had taken 

&II On 7 July Hitler had ordered the new divisio~lS 

created. Most of the grenadier divisions were bUIlt 

around the staffs and supply and service elemen~s 

of divisions that had lost all or nearly all theIr 

combat troops in the early weeks of the Sov~et 

offensive. To get the personnel for the grenadier 

divisions and the panzer brigades, the Army had 

to use all the replacements scheduled for the Eastern Front in July and August and 45,000 men 

released from hospitals. OTg. Abt. (I) NT. 1/7272/ 

44, Notiz, 8.7.44, HI/220 file; OTg. Abt. NT. I 

2/46654144. Notiz, 9.9.44, H 1/222 file. 

$) Kg. Wh ., S 121144, BespTuhung des FuehTeTS 

mit GeneTalobeTSt JodI am 31.7.44 in du Wolfsschanze, EAP 13-m-10/J file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

between Kaunas and Mariampol, shifted 

the right half of its front into the East 

Prussia defense position. Third Belorussian 

Front, following close, cut through this last 

line forward of German territory in three 

places and took Vilkavishkis, ten miles east 

of the border. The general commanding 

the corps in the weakened sector warned 

that the Russians could be in East Prussia 

in another day. 

The panzer army staff, set up in Schlossberg on the west side of the border, found 

being in an "orderly little German city almost incomprehensible after three years on 

Soviet soil." But Reinhardt was shaken, 

almost horrified, when he discovered that 

the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, 

who was also civil defense commissioner for 

East Prussia, had not so much as established a plan for evacuating women and 

children from the areas closest to the front. 

The army group chief of staff said that he 

had been protesting daily and had been 

ignored; apparently Koch was carrying out 

a Fuehrer directive.G1 

In Warsaw on I August the Polish Armia 

Krajowa (Home Army), under General 

Tadeusz Bar-Komorowski, staged an insurrection. The Poles were trained and well 

armed. They moved quickly to take over 

the heart of the city and the through streets, 

but the key points the insurgents needed to 

establish contact with the Russians, the 

four Vistula bridges and Praga, the suburb 

on the east bank, stayed in German hands. 

Worse yet for the insurgents, south of 

Wo1omin the Hermann Goering Division, 

19th Panzer Division, and SS Wiking Division closed in behind the III Tank Corps, 

which after sweeping north past Warsaw 

.1 Pz. AOK 3. la KTiegstagebuch , 1.-20.844, I 

Aug 44. Pz. AOK 3 64190/5 file. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

had slowed to a near stop on 3 [July. In 

the next two or three days, while the Geeman divisions set about destroying III Tank 

Corps, Second Tank Army shifted its effort 

away from Warsaw and began to concentrate on enlarging the bridgehead at Magnuszcw, thirty-five miles to the south.62 

Stalin was obviously not interested in 

helping the insurgents achieve their objectives: a share in liberating the Polish capital and, based on that, a claim to a stronger 

voice in the postwar settlement for Premier 

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk's British-and-American-supported exile government. On 22 

July the Soviet Union had established in 

Lublin the hand-picked Polish Committee 

of National Liberation, which as one of its 

first official acts came out wholeheartedly 

in favor of the Soviet-proposed border on 

the old Curzon Line, the main point of contention between the Soviet Union and the 

Mikolajczyk government. That Mikolajczyk was then in Moscow (he had arrived on 30 July) negotiating for a free and 

independent Poland added urgency to the 

revolt but at the same time reduced the 

insurgents in Soviet eyes to the status of 

inconvenient political pawns.as 

Army Group North Ukraine on [ August 

was in the second day of a counterattack, 

which had originally aimed at clearing the 

entire San-Vistula triangle, but which had 

been reduced before it started to an attempt 

to cut off the First Tank Army elements 

that had crossed the Vistula at Baranow." 

Although Seventeenth Army and Fourth 

Panzer Army both gained ground, they did 

a AOK 9. Fuehrungsa bteilung Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. II, I Aug 44. AOK 9 64802/. file . 

.s Werner Markert, Osteuropa-Handbuch, Polen 

(Koeln-Graz, 1959), pp. 210-13· 

"Obkdo. H. Gr. Nordukraine . la Nr. 0852/ 44, 

an nach,. Pz. AOK 4. 29·7·44, Pz. AOK 4 63015/3 

file. 

341 

not slow or, for that matter, much disturb 

Konev's thrust across the Vistula. A dozen 

large ponton ferries, capable of floating up 

to sixty tons, were transporting troops, 

tanks, equipment, and supplies of Third 

Guards Tank and Thirteenth Armies across 

the river." By the end of the day Fourth 

Panzer Army had gone as far as it could. 

The next afternoon the army group had to 

call a halt altogether. The divisions were 

needed west of the river where First Tank 

Army, backed by Third Guards Tank Army 

and Thirteenth Army, had forces strong 

enough to strike, if it chose, north toward 

Radom or southwest toward Krakow." 

On the night of 3 August Model sent 

Hitler a cautiously optimistic report. Army 

Group Center, he said, had set up a continuous front from south of Shaulyay to the 

right boundary on the Vistula near Pulawy. 

It was thin-on the 420 miles of front 

thirty-nine German divisions and brigades 

faced an estimated third of the total Soviet 

strength-but it seemed that the time had 

come when the army group could hold its 

own, react deliberately, and start planning 

to take the initiative itself. Model proposed to take the [9th Panzer Division and 

the Hermann Goering Division behind the 

Vistula to seal off the Magnuszew bridgehead, to move a panzer division into the 

Tilsit area to support the Army Group 

North flank, and to use the Grossdeutschland Division, coming from Army 

Group South Ukraine, to counterattack at 

Vilkavishkis. He planned to free two 

panzer divisions by letting Second Army 

and the right flank of Fourth Army withdraw toward the Narew River. With luck, 

m IVOV(R), IV, 220. 

• Pz. AOK 4. la Kriegstagebuch, 1.7.- 15.8.44 , 

29 Jul- 2 Aug 44. Pz. AOK 4 63015/t file. 
342 

he thought, these missions could be completed by [5 August. After that, he could 

assemble six panzer divisions on the north 

flank and attack to regain contact with 

Army Group North." 

For a change, fortune half-favored the 

Germans. The Hermann Goering Division and the [9th Panzer Division boxed 

in the Magnuszew bridgehead. Against 

the promise of a replacement in a week or 

so, Model gave up the panzer division he 

had expected to station near Tilsit." The 

division went to Army Group North 

Ukraine where Kanev, after relinquishing 

the left half of his front to the reconstituted 

Headquarters, Fourth Ukrainian Front, 

under General Polkovnik Ivan Y. Petrov, 

was now also pushing Fourth Tank Army 

into the Baranow bridgehead. The bridgehead continue to expand like a growing 

boil but not as rapidly as might have been 

expected considering the inequality of the 

opposing forces." 

In the second week of the month three 

grenadier divisions and two panzer brigades 

arrived at Army Group Center. On 9 

August the Grossdeutschland Division attacked south of Vilkavishkis. Through 

their agents the Russians were forewarned. 

They were ready with heavy air support 

and two fresh divisions. This opposition 

blunted the German attack somewhat, but 

the Grossdeutschland Division took Vilkavishkis, even though it could not completely eliminate the salient north of the town 

before it was taken out and sent north on 

10 August. 7o 

17 H. Gr. Mitte, la Kriegstagebuch , 1.-31.8.44. 4-

Aug 44, OCMH files. 

115 Ibid., 5 Aug 44 . 

• Pz. AOK 4, la Kriegstagebuch , 1.7.-15.8.44, 

3-15 Aug 44. Pz. AOK 4- 6301S/t file. 

70 Pz. AOK 3, la Kriegstagehuch, 1.-20.8.44, 9, 

10 Aug 44, Pz. AOK 3 64190/.1 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

A Corridor to Army Group North 

In the first week of August the most 

urgent question was whether help could be 

brought to Army Group North before it 

collapsed completely. On 6 August Schoerner told Hitler that his front would hold 

until Army Group Center had restored contact, provided "not too much time elapsed" 

in the interval; his troops were exhausted, 

and the Russians were relentlessly driving 

them back by pouring in troops, often [4-

year-old boys and old men, at every weak 

point on the long, thickly forested front. n 

To Guderian he said that if Army Group 

Center could not attack soon, all that was 

left was to retreat south and go back to a 

line Riga-Shaulyay-Kaunas, and even that 

was becoming more difficult every day." 

On 10 August Third Baltic and Second 

Baltic Fronts launched massive air and artillery-supported assaults against Eighteenth 

Army below Pskov Lake and north of the 

Dvina. They broke through in both places 

on the first day. Having no reserves worth 

mentioning, Schoerner applied his talent 

for wringing the last drop of effort out of 

the troops. To one of the division commanders he sent the message: "Generalleutnant Chales de Beaulieu is to be told 

that he is to restore his own and his division's honor by a courageous deed or I 

will chase him out in disgrace. Furthermore, he is to report by 2 100 which commanders he has had shot or is having shot 

for cowardice." From the Commanding 

General, Eighteenth Army, he demanded 

"Draconian intervention" and "ruthlessn Oberbe/ehlshaber der H. Gr. Nord, "Mein 

Fuehrer!" 6.8.44, H. Gr. Nord 75137/2 file. 

'n H . Gr. Nord, Beurteilung der Lage durch H. 

Gr. am 6.844 an OKH, in MS # P- 114a (Sixt). 

Teil V, Anlagen. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

ness to the point of brutality." 

To boost morale in Schoerner's com· 

mand, the Air Force sent the Stuka squadron commanded by Major Hans Rudel, 

the famous Panzerknacker (tank cracker), 

who a few days before had chalked up 

his 300th Soviet tank destroyed by dive 

bombing. Hitler sent word on the 12th 

that Army Group Center would attack two 

days earlier than planned. From Koenigsberg the OKH had a grenadier division 

airlifted to Eighteenth Army." 

Army Group Center began the relief 

operation on 16 August. Two panzer 

corps, neither fully assembled, jumped off 

west and north of Shaulyay. Simultaneously, Third Belorussian Front threw the Fifth, 

Thirty-third, and Eleventh Guards Armies 

against Third Panzer Army's right flank 

and retook Vilkavishkis. During the day 

Model received an order appointing 

him to command the Western Theater. 

Reinhardt, the senior army commander, 

took command of the army group, and 

Generaloberst Erhard Raus replaced him 

as Commanding General, Third Panzer 

Army. 

The next day, while the offensive on the 

north flank rolled ahead, Chernyakovskiy's 

thrust reached the East Prussian border 

northwest of Vilkavishkis. One platoon, 

wiped out before the day's end, crossed the 

border and for the first time carried the war 

to German soil. In the next two days the 

Russians came perilously close to breaking 

into East Prussia. 

On the extreme north flank of Third 

Panzer Army two panzer brigades, with 

artillery support from the cruiser Prinz 

Eugen standing offshore in the Gulf of 

Riga, on the 20th took Tukums and made 

n AOK /8, 14 Kritgslagebuch, Teil 4h, Band /, 

10-12 Aug 44, AOK 186025112 file. 

343 

contact with Army Group North. On 

orders from the OKH, the brigades were 

immediately put aboard trains in Riga and 

dispatched to the front below Lake Peipus. 

The next day Third Panzer Army took a 

firmer foothold along the coast from Tukums east and dispatched a truck column 

with supplies for Army Group North. On 

the East Prussian border the army's front 

was weak and beginning to waver, but the 

Russians were by then concentrating entirelyon the north and did not make the bid 

to enter German territory. Reinhardt told 

Guderian during the day that to expand 

the corridor and get control of the railroad 

to Army Group North through Jelgava 

would take too long. He recommended 

evacuating Army Group North. Guderian 

replied that he himself agreed but that Hitler refused on political grounds. The offensive continued through 27 August, when 

Hitler ordered a panzer division transferred 

to Army Group North. 

At the end, the contact with Army Group 

North was still restricted to an IS-milewide coastal corridor. For the time being 

that was enough. On the last day of the 

month the Second and Third Baltic Fronts 

suddenly went over to the defensive." 

The Battle Subsides 

Throughout the zones of Army Groups 

Center and North Ukraine, the Soviet offensive, as the month ended, trailed off into 

random swirls and eddies. After taking 

Sandomierz on IS August First Ukrainian 

." H. Gr. Milte , fa Kriegstagebuch, 1.-31.8.44, 

16-31 Aug 44, OCMH files; Pt:. AOK 3, 14 

Kriegstagebuch , 1.-20.8 .44, 16--20 Aug 44. Pz . 

AOK 3 64190/5 file i Pt:. AOK 3, Ia Kriegslagebuch, 21.31.844, 21-28 Aug 44. Pz. AOK 3 

64190/6; MS # "4' (S;xt). T,il IV, p. 768. 
344 

Front gradually shifted to the defensive 

even though it had four full armies, three 

of them tank armies, jammed into its 

Vistula bridgehead." North of Warsaw 

First Belorussian Front had harried Second 

Army mercilessly as it withdrew toward the 

Narew, and in the first week of September, 

when the army went behind the river, took 

sizable bridgeheads at Serock and Rozan. 

But for more than two weeks Rokossovskiy 

evinced no interest in the bridgehead 

around Warsaw, which Ninth Army was 

left bolding after Second Army withdrew." 

In Warsaw at the turn of the month the 

uprising seemed to be nearing its end. One 

reason why the insurgents had held out as 

long as they did was that the Germans had 

been unable and unwilling to employ regular troops in the house-to-house fighting. 

They had brought up various remote-controlled demolition vehicles, rocket projectors, and artillery- including a 24-inch 

howitzer-and had turned the operations 

against the insurgents over to General von 

dem Bach-Zelewski and SS-Gruppenfuebrer 

Heinz Reinefarth. The units engaged were 

mostly SS and police and included such 

oddments as the Kaminski Brigade and the 

Dirlewanger Brigade. 71 As a consequence, 

111 Pz. AOK 4, Ia Krieg.stagebuch, 16.8-3.10.44, 

18 Aug-I Sep 44. Pz. AOK 4 63015/2 file. 

"H. Gr. Milte, la Krieg.stagebuch, 1·-31.8·44, 

15-31 Aug 44. OCMH filesj H. Gr. Mille, la 

Kriegstagehuch, 1.-30.9.44, 1-9 Sep 44. OCMH 

files. T7 The Kaminski Brigade, under Mieczyslaw 

Kaminski, a Pole who claimed Russian nationality and had attempted to create a Russian Nazi 

Party with himself as its Fuehrer, was composed 

of Cossacks and other Russians including Soviet 

Army deserters. Until the fall of 1943 it had held 

the so-called Self-Government Area Lakot in the 

heavily partisan-infested Bryansk Forest. After 

Lokot was lost, the ?,ooo-man brigade, with over 

20,000 camp followers and dependents, had graduany drilled westward with the retreating GerSTALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the fighting was carried on at an unprecedented level of viciousness without commensurate tactical results. 78 

On 2 September Polish resistance in the 

city center collapsed and 50,000 civilians 

passed through the German lines. On the 

9th Bor-Komorowski sent out two officer 

parliamentaries, and the Germans offered 

prisoner of war treatment for the members 

of the Armia Krajowa. The next day, in a 

lukewarm effort to keep the uprising alive, 

the Soviet Forty-seventh Army attacked the 

Warsaw bridgehead, and the Poles did not 

reply to the German offer. Under the 

attack, the 73d Infantry Division, a hastily 

rebuilt Crimea division, collapsed and in 

another two days Ninth Army had to give 

up the bridgehead, evacuate Praga, and 

destroy the Vistula bridges. The success 

apparently was bigger than the Stavka had 

mans, marauding as they went. Undisciplined and 

haphazardly armed and uniformed, the brigade 

resembled a 16th or 17th century band of mercenaries more than a modern military unit. In the 

fourth week of the uprising the Germans had Kaminski shot because he refused to accept any kind 

of authority. 

The Dirlewanger Brigade, under SS-Standartenfuehrer (Col.) Oscar Dirlewanger, was composed, 

except for the officers and a few others, of men 

from the concentration camps, some of them communists and other political prisoners, most of them 

common criminals. Dirlewanger was a drunkard 

who had once been expelled from the SS after 

being convicted of a serious moral offense. He had 

shaped the brigade in his own brutal image. Had 

it not been for Himmler's protection, he would 

more than once have been court-martialed for 

atrocities committed in and out of combat. 

71 The greatest atrocities, the massacres of men, 

women, and children in the Wola and Ochota 

Quarters on 5 and 6 August 1944. were committed before the operations against the insurgents 

actually began. Hitler and Himmler at first welcomed the uprising as an opportunity to destroy 

the capital of an ancient enemy and to create an 

object lesson for other conquered countries. Hanns 

von Krannhals, Der Warschauer Au/stand 1944 

(Frankfurt a. M., 1962 ), pp. 308-12. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CENTER 

wanted; on the 14th, even though 100 U .S. 

4-motored bombers flew a support mission 

for the insurgents, the fighting subsided." 

Until 10 September the Soviet Government 

had refused to open its airfields to Amcrican planes flying supplies to the insurgents. 

On 18 September American planes flew a 

shuttle mission, but the areas under insurgent control were by then too small for 

accurate drops and a sccond planned mission had to be canceled." 

During the night of 16-17 September 

Polish First Army, its Soviet support limitcd 

to artillery fire from the east bank, staged 

crossings into Warsaw. The Soviet account 

claims that half a dozen battalions of a 

planned three-division for ce were put 

across.81 The German estimates put the 

strength at no more than a few companies, 

and Ninth Army observed that the whole 

operation became dormant on the second 

day. The Poles who had crossed were 

evacuated on 23 September. On the 26th 

Bor-Komorowski sent parliamentaries a 

second time, and on 2 October his representatives signed the capitulation,S2 

The psychological reverberations of the 

summer's disasters continued after the 

battles died down. In September Reinhardt wrote Guderian that rumors in Ger-

'rII AOK 9 Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegstagebuch 

Nr. 11,30 Aug-1 4 Sep 44, AOK 9 64902/t file . 

I!G Markert, Osteuropa-Handbuch, Polen, p. 213; 

Cordell Hull , The Mem oirs of Cordell Hull (New 

York, 1948),11, 1447. 

" IVOV(R ), IV, '45. 

82 AOK 9, Fu ehrungsableilung, Kriegstagebllch 

NT. 11, ,6 Sep-s Oct 44, AOK 964802/1 file. 

345 

many concerning Busch's alleged disgrace, 

demotion, suicide, and even desertion were 

undermining the nation's confidence in 

Army Group Center. He asked that Busch 

be given some sort of public token of the 

Fuehrer's continuing esteem.

83 In the first 

week of October, Busch was permitted to 

give an address at the funeral of Hitler's 

chief adjutant, Schmundt, who had died 

of wounds he received on 20 July. If that 

restored public confidence, it was certainly 

no mark of Hitler's renewed faith either in 

Busch or in the generals as a class. He had 

already placed Busch on the select list of 

generals who were not to be considered for 

future assignments as army or army group 

commanders. After most of the eighteen 

generals captured by the Russians during 

the retreat joined the Soviet-sponsored 

League of German Officers, Hitler also 

decreed that henceforth none of the higher 

decorations were to be awarded to Army 

Group Center officers." 

Where Hitler saw treason in high places, 

others saw more widespread, more virulent, 

more disabling maladies: the fear of being 

encircled and captured and the fear of being wounded and abandoned. The German 

soldier was being pursued by the specters 

of Stalingrad, Cherkassy, and the Crimea. 

Once, he could not even imagine the ultimate disaster- now he expected it. 

u O.B. d. H. Gr. Mitte, an den Chef des Gen 

StdH, 10.9-44, in H. Gr. MiUe, la Akte V , H. Gr. 

Mitte 65004/18 file. 

Sf Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamts. '27 Jul, I. 5 Aug 44, H 4iT'2 file. 
CHAPTER XVI 

The South Flank 

Escape to the Carpathians 

The summer offensive against Army 

Groups Center and North Ukraine drove 

an enonnous blunt wedge into the center 

of the Eastern Front. The flanks, reaching 

out to the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea, 

still held up, but they were stretched taut 

and ready to snap under the slightest pressure. Though much of the strain was beneath the surface, it was not on that 

account any the less acute. 

Army Group South Ukraine 

By 23 July, when Schoerner was called 

in the early morning hours to take command of Army Group North, Army Group 

South Ukraine had experienced more than 

two months of deepening quiet ruffled only 

by Schoerner's strenuous training and fitness programs. The Russians had taken so 

many divisions off the front that the OKH 

directed the army group to do something 

about tying down those that were left.' 

The front had not changed since the Soviet spring offensive had stopped. On the 

left, in a very rough arc from Kuty to east 

of Iasi, Armeegruppe Woehler, Eighth 

Army with Rumanian Fourth Army sandwiched in its middle, held a sector-about 

lOb. Kdo. H . Gr. Suedukraine, Ia Kriegstagebuch, Band 3. Teil 10, 24 Jul 44) H. Gr. A 

75126/30 fil e. 

half in the eastern Carpathians and half 

east-west across Moldavia north of Targul 

Frumos and Iasi. Sixth Army reached 

from east of Iasi to the Dnestr River below 

Dubossary and then followed the river to 

about the center of the Soviet bridgehead 

below Tiraspol, where it tied in with the left 

of Rumanian Third Army on the lower 

river line. Sixth Army and Rumanian 

Third Army formed the Armeegruppe Dumitrescu under the Commanding General, 

Rumanian Third Army, Col. Gen. Petre 

Dumitrescu. (Map 30) 

Two large rivers, the Prut and the Siret, 

cut the army group zone from north to 

south, and the Russians were across the 

upper reaches of both. Rugged, wooded 

terrain in the Targul Frumos- Iasi area 

partly compensated for that disadvantage, 

at least as long as the army group retained 

enough German divisions to backstop the 

Rumanians. The biggest tactical change 

during the early summer was Army Group 

North Ukraine's retreat deep into Poland, 

which left Army Group South Ukraine virtually stranded east of the Carpathians. 

Malinovskiy's Second Ukrainian Front opposed Armeegruppe Woehler and Tolbukhin's Third Ukrainian Front, Armeegruppe Dumitrescu. 

At the time of the change in command, 

the Army Group South Ukraine staff's foremost concern was to determine how dangerous were the strains beneath the thin 
\. 

.0 

, . . ' .' 

'\ 

i 

>x '" a= 

t~ 

~~ 

f 

, 

r-, 

' I 

L.J 

\ 

~ 

, 

, 

! 

" , 

, 
348 

veneer of the quiet front and what could be 

done before they reached the breaking 

point. Two days before he was transferred, Schoerner wrote Hitler that leading 

personalities in Rumania were wavering 

and trying to establish contacts with the 

Allies, and that Antonescu was losing his 

hold on the country. Schoerner thought a 

personal interview with Hitler might 

strengthen Antonescu's position.' On 25 

July the army group staff drafted a report 

stating that after being forced to transfer 6 

panzer divisions, 2 infantry divisions, and 

2 self-propelled assault gun brigades in the 

past month, the army group could no longer 

hold its front against a full-fledged attack. 

The staff recommended that the army 

group be authorized in advance to pull 

back as soon as such an attack developed. 

That report was not sent, apparently because the estimate of the new commanding 

general, Friessner, was more optimistic.s 

Rumania 

The most pressing worry for the moment 

was the internal condition of Rumania. 

Army Group South Ukraine, although entirely dependent on the Rumanian railroads 

and forced in large part to subsist off the 

local economy, had no executive authority 

in Rumania. Everything had to be decided 

between Bucharest and Berlin; and the 

army group staff by late July was convinced 

that on the most important question, Rumanian loyalty to the alliance, something 

was seriously out of tune. That Antonescu, 

on whose personal authority alone the alliance was based, no longer possessed that 

authority, seemed to be no secret to anyone 

I Ibid., ~I Ju144. 

'Ibid., '5 Ju144· 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

in Rumania except three persons: the Marshal himself, Manfred FreiheIT von Killinger, the German Minister to Rumania, and 

General der Kavallerie Erik Hansen, the 

chief of the German military mission. The 

latter two were the responsible German 

representatives in Rumania. Both von Killinger, a World War I U-boat commander 

and long-time Nazi turned diplomat, and 

Hansen, an energetic but inflexible officer, 

were blinded by their own faith in Antonescu.' Consequently, they reinforced the 

already strong tendency in Hitler's circle to 

confuse Antonescu's personal loyalty with 

that of the Rumanian Army and people. 

The Army Group South Ukraine staff was 

certain that Antonescu was being kept in 

power only by his opponents' rapidly diminishing unwillingness to take the risks of an 

attempt to remove him, and that the country, Antonescu included, was staying in the 

war solely because its fear of the Russians 

still slightly exceeded its desire for peace. 

On 1 August, anticipating repercussions 

throughout southeastern Europe when 

Turkey broke diplomatic relations with 

Germany, which it did the next day, Friessner ordered each of his two armies to set 

up a mobile regiment that could be used to 

counter "possible surprises in Rumanian 

territory." II Strangely and, as it later 

proved, fatefully, the army group concentrated its attention almost exclusively on the 

dangers which would arise if Rumania defected. It did not pursue the, for it, equally 

vital question, What, if anything, remained 

of the Rumanian Army's never very strong 

will to fight? And the Rumanians held 160 

'Ion Georghe. Rumaeniens Weg zum Satellittnstadt (Heidelberg, 195~), pp. I 25ff. 

1\ Obkdo. H. Gr. Suedukraine, la Kriegstagebuch, 

Band 3, Tei! 11, I Aug 44. H. Gr. A 75U6/3' 

file. 
THE SOUTH FLANK 

miles of the army group's 392-mile-Iong 

front. 

In the first week of August, Antonescu 

went to Rastenburg to talk to Hitler. The 

two met under a darkening cloud of German reverses in France and the East and 

in an atmosphere of mutual complaints and 

suspicions; yet, in the last analysis, neither 

had any real choice but to tell the other 

what he wanted to hear. In May, after 

more or less open negotiations in Cairo 

with the Americans, British, and Russians, 

Antonescu had rejected one set of armistice 

terms. When secret negotiations conducted 

at the same time in Sweden with the Soviet 

Union alone had brought a somewhat more 

lenient offer, he had again not been able 

to steel himself to take the plunge.' The 

report on the conference at Fuehrer headquarters which reached Army Group South 

Ukraine described the results as "very positive." Hitler had told the Marshal what 

was being done to restore the German 

situation, and both parties had promised 

each other "everything possible." In the 

transmission, someone had added, "It now 

remains to be seen how far the promises will 

he carried out." 7 

Because many of the individual points to 

be discussed arose out of its presence on 

Rumanian territory and because the time 

appeared ripe for raising fundamental questions, the army group had sent its operations 

officer to Fuehrer headquarters while Antonescu was there. Friessner had sent along 

a letter for Hitler in which he stated that 

• Andreas Hillgrubcr, Hitler, K oenig Carol und 

Marschall Antont'lcu, Die Dtutsch-Rumaenischen 

Beziehungen, 1938- 1944 (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 

195-99· , Obkdo. d . H. Gr. Suedukraine, la Kriegstagebuch. Band 3. Teil 11 , 6 Aug 44, H. Gr. A 75 J~6/ 

31 file. 

349 

the army group could hold its front if it did 

not lose any more divisions but had to be 

prepared for all eventualities. He recommended giving the army group control of 

all German military activities in Rumania 

and the appointment of a single, responsible political agency with which the army 

group could collaborate. The operations 

officer, on Friessner's instructions, told 

Guderian that the OKH would have to 

reconcile itself to permitting the army group 

to go back to a line on the Carpathians and 

lower Danube if the army group had to give 

up more divisions or if the Rumanians became unreliable. After talking to Hitler, 

Guderian replied that he "hoped" if events 

took such a turn to be able "to give the 

necessary order in time." 8 The prospect 

that such an order would be given, however, faded after the talks with Antonescu 

revealed that, even though he had argued 

in the spring for going back to the Carpathians-Danube line, he had in the meantime convinced himself that for Rumania 

to sacrifice any more territory would be 

fatal.' 

To Keitel the army group operations officer broached the. question of having Friessner named Armed Forces commander in 

Rumania and proposed replacing Hansen 

with an officer "who would represent the 

German interest more emphatically." Keitel 

appeared impressed at first but, after the 

talks with Antonescu, said he saw no need 

for any changes because Rumania would 

stand by Germany "through thick and 

• Ibid., 8 Aug 44 . 

• Georghe, Rumaeniens Weg Zum Satellitenstadt J 

p. 403. Guderian in his memoirs (Erinnerungen 

eines Soldaten, page 330 ) states that Antonescu 

offered to let the front be taken back, but Antonescu's 

statement to Fricssncr later (see below, p. 351 ) 

makes it appear unlikely that he would have done so. 
350 

thin." 10 In sum, the tottering alliance was 

patched together for a last time at Army 

Group South Ukraine's expense. 

The Offensive Begins 

On 8 August air reconnaissance for the 

first time detected Soviet troop movements 

east of the Prut. Heavy traffic toward and 

light traffic away from the front confirmed 

that the troops were coming in, not going 

out. On the 13th the OKH took another 

division from the army group, bringing the 

total transfers since June to eleven divisions 

and the overall strength reduction to nearly 

one-third-much more, almost threefourths, in terms of panzer divisions. On 

that day, too, a rumor that Antonescu had 

been overthrown touched off a spell of confusion and near panic in the army group 

rear area. 

Armeegruppe Woehler reported on the 

16th that the Russians would be ready to 

attack in a day or two, probably west of 

Iasi, to drive a wedge between Iasi and 

Targul Frumos. The Rumanians, the 

Armeegruppe declared, were "completely 

confident." (See Map 30. ) By the afternoon 

of the 19th, after Second Ukrainian Front, 

Malinovskiy commanding, had launched 

artillery-supported probing attacks along 

the Armeegruppe Woehler front, the army 

group expected to be hit heavily the next 

day west of Iasi and predicted a secondary 

attack south of Tiraspol.u 

The day dawned hot and sunny on 20 

August 1944. The Soviet artillery laid 

down heavy barrages on two fairly narrow 

sectors, one northwest of Iasi, the other 

1°Obkdo. H. CT. Suedukraine. la Kriegstage· 

buch. Band 3. TeiJ II, 8 Aug 44, H. Gr. A 

75126/31 file . 

11 Ibid., 8--19 Aug 44. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

south of Tiraspol. By the time the infantry 

of Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts 

jumped off, several Rumanian divisions 

were about to collapse. 

Two of Armeegruppe Woehler's Rumanian divisions protecting Iasi abandoned 

their positions without a fight. On the 

west side of the gap left by the Rumanians, 

German reserves threw up a screening line, 

but on the east the Russians continued 

south, turning into Iasi in the afternoon. 

South of Tiraspol the attack struck the 

Sixth Army- Rumanian Third Army 

boundary. Sixth Army's right flank corps, 

the hardest hit, held its ground, but the 

Rumanian division tying in on the boundary collapsed, carrying with it its neighbor 

on the south. By day's end Friessner realized that the Rumanian's performance 

would fall below even their customary low 

standard. How far below he had yet to 

learn. 

The two Ukrainian fronts- Marshal 

Timoshenko co-ordinating for the Stavkahad, according to the Soviet figures, superiorities of slightly less than 2: I in troops, 

better than 2: I in artillery and aircraft, and 

better than 3: I in tanks and self-propelled 

artillery. All together Malinovskiy and 

Tolbukhin had 90 divisions and 6 tank and 

mechanjzed corps, 929,000 men. 

The main effort, by Sixth Tank Army 

and Twenty-seventh, Fifty-second, and 

Fifty-third Armies, was in Malinovskiy's 

sector northwest of Iasi. There Sixth Tank 

Army went in on the first afternoon, and by 

nightfall it and Twenty-seventh Army were 

driving for an operational breakthrough. 

On the right, north of Targul Frumos, 

Seventh Guards Army and the CavalryMechanized Group Gorshkov were poised 

for a thrust south along the Siret. Tolbukhin had the Thirty-seventh and Fifty-
THE SOUTH FLANK 

seventh Armies and two mechanized corps 

charging out of the Tiraspol bridgehead. 

On their left Forty-sixth Army had split its 

forces to envelop Rumanian III Corps on 

the lower Dnestr ,a 

On th e morning of the second day 

Friessner still thought the battle would develop about as had been expected. Although he did not have a clear picture of 

enemy strength, the army group's intelligence seemed to confirm that the build-up 

had not been up to the previous Soviet level 

for an all-out offensive. Furthermore, the 

main effort was against Armeegruppe 

Woehler and there the second line, the 

TRAJAN position on the heights behind 

Tasi, was considered exceptionally good. 

When Antonescu arrived at the army 

group headquarters in midmorning, Friessncr told him that he would close the front 

below Tiraspol and, taking everything he 

co uld fr om Armeegru ppe Dumitresc u, 

strengthen the north front enough to prevent a sweep behind the Prut. The Russians, he thought, could not bring as much 

strength to bear against Dumitrescu as they 

could against Woehler and, having gone 

deeper the day before than expected, would 

probably have to pause to regroup. Antonescu, formerly always the advocate of a 

fl exible defense, insisted that the front, including Tasi, absolutely had to be held. He 

declared that he was personally answerable 

for every piece of ground lost and it was 

not the fate of Bessarabia that was being 

decided but the fate of the whole Rumanian people "forever." 13 

During the day every report from the 

" IVOV(R), IV, 263-6). 

11 O.B. d. H. Gr. Suedukraine, Niederschrift 

ueber die BesprechlJ.7lg des Oberbe/ehilhabers mit 

M ar.schall Antonescu am ~1.8.44 Vorm. in Slanic, 

H. Gr. A )512)/9 file. 

351 

front brought more alarming news than the 

last. In the north Iasi was lost and the 

offensive expanded west to Targul Frumos. Tanks of Cavalry-Mechanized Group 

Gorshkov drove through the TRAJAN position at a point near Targul Frumos, and 

tank-supported infantry drew up to it along 

most of the stretch west of the Prut. Armeegruppe Woehler reported that five of its 

Rumanian divisions had fallen apart completely. South of Tiraspol a 20-mile gap 

opened between Sixth Army and Rumanian 

Third Army. 

In the afternoon Friessner decided to 

take Armeegruppe Dumitrescu behind the 

Prut and try to free enough German troops 

to reinforce Armeegruppe Woehler. The 

army group and the Operations Branch, 

OKH, agreed that would be only a first 

step in a withdrawal which could not end 

forward of the Carpathians-Danube line. 

Hitler, after being assured that Antonescu 

was now "letting himself be guided solely 

by military considerations" and therefore 

had no objections, gave his approval during 

the night. By then an order was out to 

Sixth Army to get everything it could behind the Prut immediately. The Sixth 

Army staff was among the first elements to 

go, because Russian tanks were already 

closing in on its headquarters at Komrat. 

For the next two days the battle continued as it had begun. The Rumanians, 

even the supposedly elite Rumanian Armored Division, refused to fight. The Russians moved south fast behind the Prut and 

through the torn-open center of Armeegruppe Dumitrescu without the Germans 

being able to commit anything against 

them. Behind the Prut the Soviet tank 

points reached Barlad and Husi on the 23d. 

Third Ukrainian Front's advance west 

carried past Komrat nearly to the Prut, and 
352 

Forty-sixth Army turned its left Hank southeast and on its right attacked across the 

Dnestr Liman to encircle Rumanian II I 

Corps and one German division. The main 

body of German troops, the whole front 

from the Prut east of Iasi to Tiraspol, was 

falling back to the southwest fast but not 

fast enough to outrace the Soviet pincers 

closing behind it. 

Rumania Surrenders 

In the early evening on 23 August army 

group headquarters heard that Antonescu 

had been called to an audience with the 

King in the afternoon; the government had 

been dissolved, and Antonescu and its members arrested. Later the chief of staff talked 

to von Killinger, who had returned from 

the palace where the King had informed 

him that a new government had been 

formed and it intended to sign an armistice. 

One condition that would not be accepted, 

the King had assured him, was that Rumania should take up arms against the Germans." But the King's broadcast that 

night was less reassuring. In it he stated 

that Rumania would join the United Nations against the common enemy- Germany- and, in what practically amounted 

to a declaration of war against Hungary, 

that Rumania denounced the Treaty of 

Vienna of 30 August '940 which had 

awarded the Szekler Strip in Transylvania 

to Hungary." 

The contradiction in the King's statements apparently arose from the existence 

of two sets of armistice terms. Although 

the Rumanian Government in the public 

If Obkdo. d. H . Cr. Sutdukraint, fa Kriegsta gtbuch . Band 4, Tt!il 1 , 20- 23 Aug 44, H. Gr. A 

75126/32 file. 

15 New York Times, August 24, '944. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

statement accepted the more stringent terms 

which had been offered by the three powers 

- the United States, Britain and the Soviet 

Union- at the negotiations which began 

that night in Cairo, the Rumanian delegation was instructed to secure amendments 

which would include the concessions the 

Soviet Union had offered in secret. The 

latter would have allowed Rumania to declare itself neutral in the conHict with Germany and, of much greater moment to the 

Rumanians, proposed arrangements which 

would assure the continued existence of an 

independent Rumanian state. IS 

Shortly before midnight on the 23d, 

Friessner telephoned Hitler an account of 

the Rumanian coup and told him he had 

taken command of all Wehrmacht elements 

in Rumania and was going to take the front 

back to the Carpathians-Danube line. At 

midnight the Operations Branch, OKH, 

relayed an order from Hitler to smash 

the "Putsch," arrest the King and "the 

court camarilla," and turn the government 

over either to Antonescu or, if he were linD 

longer available," to a pro-German general. 

On learning that von Killinger, Hansen, 

and the commanding general of the German air units in Rumania, General der 

Flieger Alfred Gerstenberg, were being held 

under guard in the legation, Friessner 

turned Hitler's assignment over to an SS 

It Hillgruber, Hitlu, K oenig Carol und Marschall 

Antonescu, die deutsch-Rumaenischen Beziehungen, 

1938- 44, pp. 196-97, 217· With a crushing victory 

in the making, the Russians were not inclined to 

compromise and the negotiations dragged out until 12 September when, probably as much because 

they were trapped by their own double dealing as 

for any other reason, they agreed to reduced reparalions, the return of the ceded territory in Transylvania to Rumania, and Rumanian civil administration of the areas outside the combat zone in 

compensation for placing the Rumanian armed 

forces under Soviet command in the war against 

Germany. 
THE SOUTH FLANK 

general whom he located in one of the installations outside Bucharest. The SS general reported at 0300 that troops would 

arrive from Ploe~ti in an hour and a half 

and would then move into the city. 

Before dawn Hansen called to tell Friessncr that the Rumanian War Minister had 

declared that if the German measures 

against the new government were not 

stopped within ail hour the Rumanian 

Army would turn its weapons against the 

German Army. Hansen added that he and 

the others with him were convinced the 

German forces were not strong enough to 

take Bucharest. When Friessner asked 

whether he was ueder restraint, Hansen 

replied that he was. 

Friessner transmitted a resume of the 

conversation to the Fuehrer headquarters 

along with a reminder that the King had 

allegedly promised not to fight the Germans. A few minutes later JodI called to 

say that Hansen was not making a free 

decision, anyway the whole affair was 

bound to go awry sooner or later, so it was 

best to make a clean sweep right away. 

Almost simultaneously, a call came in from 

Gerstenberg, whom the Rumanians had 

released thinking he would attempt to stop 

the impending German action. He described the new Rumanian Government as 

a small, frightened clique, protected only 

by a thin screen of troops around the capital. Friessner thereupon gave him command in the Bucharest area. 

At 0730 6,000 German troops began to 

march on the capital. Ten minutes later 

they met sharp resistance and were stopped. 

Shortly hefore noon, Gerstenberg admitted 

that so far he had not been able to get 

past the outlying suburbs. He had taken 

the radio station but nothing else worth 

mentioning. In the meantime, Fricssner 

353 

had learned that not a single Rumanian 

general was willing to go along with the 

Germans. 

In the afternoon, on Hitler's orders, 

Fourth Air Force bombed the royal palace 

and government buildings in Bucharest. 

The hombing not only gave the government an excuse for a complete, open breach 

with Germany, which it would probablv 

have effected anyway, but also united national sentiment against the Germans. As 

the day ended, the deadlock around the 

capital continued while Gerstenberg waited 

for reinforcements from the Southeastern 

Theater. Friessner had asked for troops 

from Hungary as well, but the OKW had 

replied that it was also "getting strange 

reports" from that country. 

Sixth Army Destroyed 

The 24th and 25th were days of unmitigated disaster for Army Group South 

Ukraine. On the 24th the armored spearheads of Second Ukrainian Front took 

Bacau on the Siret River and crossed the 

Barladul downstream from Barlad. Sixth 

Army, all of it except service troops, was 

drawing together south and east of Husi. 

Parts of two corps were west of the Prut, 

but the main body was still east of the river. 

The army headquarters, which from its 

location in Focsani only had intermittent 

radio contact with its corps, wanted to 

command the whole force to turn south 

and try to escape across the lower Prut or 

the Danube. Friessner, assuming that the 

Russians would close the crossings before 

Sixth Army could reach them, ordered a 

breakthrough west past Bacau to the Carpathians. 

On the 25th, when Rumania declared 

war, the destruction of the army group was 
354 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET SUBMACHINE GUNNER AlIACKlNG 

nearly complete. It did not know what 

was happening to Sixth Army or what 

would happen to the numerous German 

units and installations in Rumania. Friessner told the OKH that what was left would 

have to retreat into Hungary and close the 

passes through the Carpathians and the 

Transylvanian Alps. 

On the 26th Tolbukhin's troops took 

Kagul, completing the ring around Sixth 

Army, and Malinovskiy's forces began turning southwest across the lower Sirct. From 

the right flank of the 3d Mountain Division 

in the mountains west of Targu Neamt to 

the mouth of the Danube 250 miles to the 

southeast, Army Group South Ukraine had 

no semblance of a front anywhere. In that 

fantastic situation Hitler intervened with an 

order to hold the line of the Carpathians, 

Focsani, Galatz, and the lower Danube. 

The next day Malinovskiy's spearhead 

across the Siret took Focsani. Headquarters, Sixth Army, after trying briefly to hold 

a line between Focsani and Galatz with 

rear echelon troops, fen back toward Buzau. 

Fragmentary radio reports from the army's 

encircled divisions indicated that two pockets had formed, one, the larger ( 10 divisions), stationary on the east bank of the 

Prut east of Husi, the other (8 divisions) 

moving west slowly south of Husi. North of 

Bucharest the Rumanians had the German 

attack force surrounded. At PloC§ti the 5th 

Flak Division had lost the oil refineries and 
THE SOUTH FLANK 

half of the city. Eighth Army, going back 

from the Siret, had barely enough troops to 

organize blocking detachments in the Oitoz 

Pass and the passes to the north. The 

mountains offered cover, hut the deep flank, 

190 miles in the Transylvanian Alps from 

the southeastern tip of Hungary to the Iron 

Gate, was entirely unprotected. The planes 

of Fourth Air Force were using their last 

gas to fiy into eastern Hungary. On the 

south the Bulgarians, not officially at war 

with the Soviet Union and looking desperately for a way to keep the Soviet Army 

off their territory, were disarming and interning all Army Group South Ukraine 

troops who crossed the border. 

Retreat 10 the Carpathians 

During the night of 29 August OKH 

ordered Army Group South Ukraine to 

establish a solid front along Ihe spine of the 

Transylvanian Alps and the Carpathians 

tying in with the Southeastern Theater at 

the Iron Gate and Army Group North 

Ukraine on the Polish border. Hungarian 

Second Army, forming in eastern Hungary, 

was placed under Friessncr's command. 

The mountains, in fact, afforded the best 

defense line, provided that Friessner could 

muster enough strength to take and hold 

the passes on Rumanian territory in the 

Transylvanian Alps. How difficult that 

would be became clear the next day when 

he reported that of Sixth Army not a . ingle 

complete division had escaped. What was 

left. the headquarters and service troop. 

with some S,DDa vehicles, was jammed into 

the Bllzaul Valley and was as yet by no 

means out of the Russians' reach. 

The army group had, all told, four full 

divisions; three had been on the left flank 

and not hit by the offensive and one had 

355 

been on its way out of the army group zone 

and was returned after the offensive began. 

All the army group actually held was an 

intermittent front in the Carpathians. If 

the Russians decided to make a fast thrust 

north through the Predeal and Turnu Rosu 

Passes, the army group chief of staff' added, 

"The jig will be up out here." 

On 30 August, Malinovskiy's troops took 

Ploejti and the next day marched to BucharesLll In carrying out Stavka's orders, 

Malinovskiy, on 29 August, had split his 

forces. He had sent the Sixth Tank, 

T wenty-seventh, and Fifty-third Armies between the Danube and the Carpathians to 

clear southern Rumania to Turnu Severin. 

With the smaller half he undertook to force 

the Germans out of the eastern Carpathians. Fortieth Army moved against the 

relatively intact Eighth Army left flank. 

Seventh Guards Army and the CavalryMechanized Group Gorshkov were to force 

the Oitoz Pass and push across the mountains toward Sibiu and Cluj.'" 

When the Russians began to move west 

south of the mountains, Friessner decided 

he might yet have a chance to close at least 

the Predeal and Turnu Rosu Passes. (The 

Southeastern Theater Command had assumed responsibility for the Iron Gate. ) 

The remaining pass, the Vulcan, was at the 

moment out of reach of both the Southeastern Theater and Army Group South 

Ukraine. At the same time, considering 

the chances of getting the passes slight, 

Friessncr ordered the armies to reconnoiter 

a line on the Muresul River across the western end of the Szekler Strip. 

On 5 September Hungarian Second 

11 Obkdo. d . H . Gr. Suedukraine, la Kriegstagebuch. Band 4. Teil 1 , 24-3' Aug 44, H. Cr. /\ 

75126/32 file. 

" /VOV (R j, IV, 28 .. 
356 

Army attacked south from the VICinIty of 

Cluj to close the Turnu Rosu Pass. The 

day before, air reconnaissance had picked 

up signs that Second U krainia1l Front was 

beginning to turn north, and Friessncr had 

alerted the armies to get ready, if ordered, 

to act fast and get behind the Muresul in 

one leap. For the moment the order did 

not have to be given. Hungarian Second 

Army gained ground rapidly against feeble 

resistance by the hastily reconstituted Rumanian Fourth Army. ( Rumanian First 

and Fourth Armies went unrlcr Malinavskiy's command on 6 September.)" 

During the day Sixth Army brought its 

last troops out of the Buzaul Valley. But 

that and the Hungarians' success were only 

minor bright spots on a predominantly dismal scene. After hearing nothing for several days, the army group was forced to 

write orr as lost the five corps staffs and 

eighteen divisions in the two pockets. The 

Russians going west reached Turnu Severin, 

ten miles southeast of the Iron Gate, during 

the day. By evening Friessner had concluded he would have to take Sixth Army 

and Eighth Army behind the Mureslll but 

decided to wait a day or two-long enough 

to mitigate the unfortunate contrast of German troops retreating while their Hungarian allies were advancing. 20 

The Front Rebuilt 

Reireat 10 Ih e Muresul-Crisis 

in Hun gary 

Hungarian Second Army advanced again 

on 6 September, but not as fast as it had the 

II Ibid., p. '282. 

:t) Obkdo. d. H . Gr. Suedukraine, la Kriegstagebuch. Band 4. T ei[ 1.3' Aug-5 Sep 44. H . Gr. 

A 75126/32 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

day before. Sixth Army, which had taken 

command of Eighth Army's right flank 

corps, reported that the Russians were in 

the Oitoz Pass and, off the army's south 

front, were already through the Predeal 

Pass and assembling at Brasov. Friessner 

authorized the army to stast back during 

the night if the pressure became too great. 

He told Guderian that the Hungarians 

could not be expected to reach the Turnll 

Rosu Pass; the Rumanians had a.ked for 

Russian help. He had talked to the Hungarians and they were agreed on going 

back to a shorter line. 

The next day the Hungarian offensive 

came to a standstill. The effect of its first 

two days' success could be observed farther 

south. Soviet Sixth Tank A rm)', which 

had been going toward the Iron Gate, had 

stopped and turned north. One of its 

mobile corps was crossing the Turnu Rosu 

Pass, another was heading into the Vulcan 

Pass. By noon the lead elements were 

through the Turnu Rosu and in Sibiu, forty 

miles from the Hungarian front Friessner 

then decided to stop Hungarian Second 

Army, take it into a defensive line, and 

back it up with all the German antitank 

weapons that could be scraped together. 

Orders went out to Eighth and Sixth Armies 

to start withdrawing that night. During 

the night the Operations Branch, OKH, 

tried to interpose an order from Hitler forbidding the withdrawal. When the army 

group answered that it had already begun, 

the Operations Branch replied that Hitler 

"had taken notice" of the withdrawal to 

the tirst phase line but reserved all subsequent decisions to himself.:n 

Five days earlier Hitler had personallv 

~, H . Gr. Suedukraine, K riegstagebuch, Band 4. 

Teil :1, 6, 7 Sep 44, H. Cr. A 75126/33 file. 
THE SOUTH FLANK 357 

SOVIET TANKS ENTERING A RUMANIAN TOWN 

instructed Friessner to get ready to fall back 

some forty miles farther west than the proposed line on the M uresul River. I n the 

meantime he had changed his mind, hecause he was determined to hold onto his 

last legitimate ally, Hungary, and because 

he was arriving at a new and novel estimate 

of Soviet strategy. 

The first reason was the more immediate. 

Hungary, never a pillar of strength in the 

German coalition, had since Rumania capitulated been in a state of acute internal 

political tension. Horthy had dissolved all 

political parties and had declared his loyalty 

to Gcrmany. His first impulse had seemed 

to be to seize the opportunity to annex the 

Rumanian parts of Transylvania, to which 

Hitler was only too happy to agree after 

Rumania declared war. But by 24 August 

the internal condition of Hungary appeared 

w uncertain that the OKW moved two SS 

divisions in close to the capital to be ready 

to put down an anti-German coup. 

The events of the next few days, howevef, were at least superficially reassuring. 

The military in particular, appearing to 

be loyal to the alliance, set about mobiliz· 

ing their forces for the war against their 

ancient enemy Rumania with, under the 

circumstances, surprising energy. The appointment on 30 August of Col. Gen. Geza 

Lakatos as Minister President to replace 

Sztojay, who was sick, and the appointments to his Cabinet preserved the hold 

inside lhe Hungarian Government which 

the Germans had established in the spring. 
358 

On the other hand Horthy kept out representatives of the radical rightist, fanatically 

pro-German Arrow-Cross Party. 

The first overt alarm was raised on 7 

September when, in a flash of panic touched 

off by a false report that the Russians were 

in Arad on the undefended south border 

140 miles from Budapest, the Hungarian 

Crown Council met in secret and later, 

through the Chief of Staff, presented an 

ultimatum to the OKH: if Germany did 

not send five panzer divisions within twentyfour hours Hungary would reserve the right 

to act as its interests might require. Guderian called it extortion but gave his word 

to defend Hungary as if it were part of 

Germany and announced that he would 

send a panzer corps headquarters and onc 

panzer division. Later he added two panzer 

brigades and two SS divisions, bringing the 

total to roughly the five divisions demanded.:!:! Because Hungary was in so 

shaky a condition Hitler refused to sacrifice 

the Szekler Strip even though Friessner and 

the German Military Plenipotentiary in 

Budapest assured him that the Hungarians 

were reconciled to losing the territory. 

On 9 September Friessner went to Budapest where he persuaded Horthy to put his 

agreement to the withdrawal in writing. 

The impressions he received from talking to 

Horthy, Lakatos, and the military leaders 

were so disturbing that he decided to report 

on them to Hitler in person the next day. 

At Fuehrer headquarters Friessner learned 

the second reason why Hitler did not want 

to give up the Szekler Strip. He had concluded that having broken into the Baln OKW, WFSt, Kriegstagebuch , Die Erflignisst! 

in Ungarn von An/ang April his zu beginn deT 

Schlacht um Budapest und ZUT engueltigen Legalisierung des. poJitischen Umschwungs, pp. '5-2 1, 

OK W 1.06 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

kans (Third Ukrainian Front had crossed 

into Bulgaria on 8 September), the Soviet 

Union would put its old ambitions- political hegemony in southeastern Europe and 

control of the Dardenelles- ahead of the 

drive toward Germany. In doing so, it 

would infringe on British interests and the 

war would turn in Germany's favor because 

the British would realize they needed Germany as a buffer against the Soviet Union." 

Since the withdrawal had started, he agreed 

by the end of the interview to let the army 

group go to the Muresul on the conditions 

that the line be adjusted to take in the manganese mines at Vatra Dornei and that it 

be the winter line. He also decided, after 

hearing Friessner's report, to "invite" the 

Hungarian Chief of Staff for a talk the next 

day.2. 

In Budapest on the loth Horthy conferred with a select group of prominent 

politicians, and a day later informed the 

Cabinet that he was about to ask for an 

armistice and desired to know which of its 

members were willing to share the responsibility for that step. The vote went heavily against him-according to the account 

the Germans received at the time all but 

one against and, according to his own later 

statement, three for him. The Cabinet 

then demanded his resignation. He refused; or, as he put it in his M emoirs. he 

S3 At a time when a split between the Sovie t 

Union and the Weste rn Powers, remote as the possibility might be , was the brightest of Cermany's 

remaining prospects, such reasoning was not easy 

to refute . Friessner stated aher the war that he 

assumed that Hitler was talking from knowledge . 

not merely spinning empty theories. Hans Friessncr, Verratene Schlachten (Hamburg. 1956 ), pp. 

121 - 24. 

,. Obkdo. d. H. Gr. Suedukraine, fa Kriegstagebuch. Band 4. T til :1, 9 and 10 Sep 44, H. Cr. 

A 75126/33 file. 
THE SOUTH FLANK 

decided not to dismiss the Cabinet. " 

Either way, when the Hungarian Chief 

of Staff went to Fuehrer headquarters on 

the 12th he went as an ally. The day's 

delay had mightily aroused Hitler's suspicion, and he told the Hungarian military 

attache that he had no further confidence 

in the Hungarian Government. The Chief 

of Stafrs visit went ofT, as Antonescu's had 

in August, in mutual complaints and recriminations that were finally obscured by 

a thick fog of more or less empty promises. 

On his departure Guderian gave him a new 

Mercedes limousine, which came in handy 

a few weeks later when he went over to the 

Russians. 

Hiller Plans a Cou7Iteroffensive 

Army Group South Ukraine completed 

the withdrawal to the Muresul on 15 September. Tolbukhin's armies were temporarily out of the way in Bulgaria, and 

Malinovskiy's advance (rom the south was 

developing more slowly than had been expected. His tanks and trucks had taken a 

mechanical beating on the trip through the 

passes. On the other hand, a new threat 

was emerging on the north where Fourth 

Ukrainian Front on 9 September had begun 

an attempt to break through First Panzer 

Army and into the Dukla Pass in the Beskides of eastern Czechoslovakia and toward 

Uzhgorod. Behind that sector of the front 

the Germans were at the same time having 

trouble with an uprising in Slovakia in 

which the Minister of War and the one-

:::I OKW, WFSt , Kriegstagebu ch, Die Ereignisse 

in Ungarll lJo n Antang April bis t tl beginn der 

Schlacht urn Budapest und lUT endgueltigen Lega lisitrung des politischen Umschwungs, p. 2 1, OKW/ 

206 file ; Admiral Nicholas Horthy, M emoirs (Lon· 

don, 1956 ), p. 224· 

359 

division Slovakian Army had gone over to 

the partisans. 

While Friessner was at Fuehrer headquarters Hitler had instructed him to use 

offensively the new divisions being scnt. 

He wanted them assembled around Cluj 

for an attack to the south to smash Sixtlt 

Tank and Twenty-sevetlth Armies and retake the Predeal and Turnu Rosu Passes. 

Friessner issued the directive Oil 15 September, but the prospects of an early start 

were not good. Hitler had some of the 

reinforcements stop at Budapest, in readi· 

ness for a political crisis there. 

At the front, the Hungarians, who had 

not done badly against the Rumanians, 

were disinclined toward becoming earnestl), 

embroiled with the Russians. To give them 

some stiffening, the Army group merged 

Hungarian Second Army with Sixth Army 

to form the Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico 

under the Commanding General, Sixth 

Army, Fretter-Pico. On the 17th FretterPico reported that Second Army was in a 

"catastrophic" state and that onc mountain 

brigade had run away. 

T ank Battle at Debrecen 

At mid-month the Stavka also gave new 

orders. It directed Tolbukhin, still occupied in Bulgaria, to give Fort y-sixth Army 

to Malinovskiy, and it transferred the CavaIry-Mechanized Group Pliyev from First 

Ukrainian Front. It instructed Malinovskiy to scnd his main thrust northwest from 

Cluj toward Debrecen, the Tisza River, 

and Miskolc, expecting him thereby both 

to benefit from and assist Fourth Ukrainian 

Front's advance toward Uzhgorod. For a 

week, beginning on 16 September, Sixtlt 

Tank and Twenty-seventh Armies tried unsuccessfully to take Cluj, which, because of 
360 

Hitler's plan, wa. exactly the place Army 

Group South Ukraine was most determined 

to hold." 

Friessner was far short of the strength 

both to fight the battle at Cluj and establish a front west of there. On 20 September 

a minor Russian onslaught threw back to 

Arad the Hungarians covering his flank on 

the west, and the following day they gave 

up the city without a fight. Thereafter the 

Hungarian General Staff activated a new 

army, the Third, composed mostly of recruits and recently recalled reservists, to 

hold a front on both sides of Arad. Reluctantly, it agreed to put the army under 

Army Group South Ukraine. 

Losing Arad sent another wave of panic 

through Budapest even though the army 

group (redesignated Army Group South 

at midnight on 23 September) was certain 

that Malinovskiy did not yet have enough 

strength at Arad to attempt to strike out for 

Budapest. The German Military Plenipotentiary in Budapest reported on the 23d 

that the Hungarian command had completely lost nerve. It had pulled First Army 

back to the border, it intended to move two 

divisions of Second Army west, and it 

wanted to withdraw Third Army to the 

Tisza River. The OKH promptly whipped 

the Hungarians into line and had their 

orders rescinded. "In view of the Hungarian attitude," Guderian then sent several strong panzer units to "rest and refit" 

just outside Budapest." 

The Hungarians' nervousness was premature, but not by much. Malinovskiy 

was shifting his main force west to the 

Arad-Oradea area, and Army Group South 

had too few German troops to keep pace. 

• IVOV (R ), IV, .8.- 83· 

2'70kdo. d. H. Gr. Suedukraine, 10 KriegJtogebuch. Band 4, reil 2, 15- 23 Sep 44, H. Gr. A. 

75 126/ 33 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

On the 24th , when Friessner called for reinforcements, the Operations Branch, 

OKH, replied that it recognized the need: 

the reason the army group had not been 

given any so far was that Hitler was still 

convinced the Soviet Union would first attempt to settle affairs in the Balkans on its 

own terms. 

On the 25th elements of Sixth Tank 

Army, shifted west from Cluj, began elosing in on Orad ca. Fricssner informed 

Hitler that the next attack would come 

across the line Szeged-Oradea, either northwest toward Budapest or north along the 

Tisza to meet Fourth Ukrainian Front's 

thrust through the Beskides. He could not 

stop it without more armor and infantry. 

Operations Branch, OKH, replied that 

Hitler intended to assemble a striking force 

of four panzer divisions around Dcbreccn 

for an attack south, but that could not be 

done before 10 October. Until then Friessner would have to deploy the forces he had 

in trying to check the Russians in the 

Szeged-Oradea area. 

By the end of the month Hitler had 

fl eshed out his plan for the proposed striking force. The attack would go south past 

Oradea and then wheel west along the rim 

of the Transylvanian Alps to trap the Russians north of the mountains. After mopping up, Army Group South could establish an easily defensible winter line in the 

mountains. For a while it appeared that 

he might have time enough to put the striking force together. After taking Oradea 

on 06 September and losing it two days 

later when the Germans counterattacked) 

Second Ukrainiall Front reverted to aim c~s 

skirmishing.

2 8 

·Obkdo. d. H . Cr. Suedukraine. Ia Kriegstagebuch, Band 4. Teil :2 , 24- 30 Sep 44, H . Gr. A 

75 126/ 33 file ; Obkdo. d . H. Cr. Sued, fa Kriegs-
THE SOUTH FLANK 

) 

MAP 31 

The Stavka was also looking for a quick 

and sweeping solution. (Map 3 1 ) On it. 

orders, Malinovskiy deployed Forty-sixth 

tllgebu ch. Band 4. TeiJ 3, 1-5 Oct 44, H. Gr. A 

75126/34 file. 

361 

" , " ,. ~ 

• , .. , N N 41 ~, I 

ARMY GROUP SOUTH 

5 October-29 October 1944 

r-"I~"'" GER",.a.N "FlONT LINE,50GT 

- --- GERWAN FIIONT LINE.290CT 

20 0 20 40 fiOMILES 

iT\ni!j+--~i-i~'--~i!--~' 20 0 20 "0 60IULO~EfERS 

Army, Fifty-third Army, and the CavalryMechanized Group Pliyev on a broad 

front north and south of Arad for a thrust 

across the Tisza to Budapest. To their 

right Sixth Tank Army, now a guards tank 

army, was to strike past Oradea toward 
362 

Debrecen, the Tisza, and Miskolc, there 

to meet a Fourth Ukrainian Front spearhead that would come through the Dukla 

Pa" and by way of Uzhgorod. T he pincers, 

when they closed, would trap Army Group 

South and First Panzer and Hungarian 

First Armies. Twenty-seventh Army, Rumanian First Army, and Cavalry-M echanized Group Gorshkov were to attack toward Debrecen from the vicinity of Cluj. 

Timoshenko co-ordinated for the Stavka ." 

The plan was ambitious, too ambitious. 

Men and materiel for an extensive build-up 

were not to be had at this late stage of the 

general summer offensive; both fronts were 

feeling the effects of combat and long 

marches; and their supply lines were overextended. Because of the difference in 

gauges, the Rumanian railroads, if anything, were serving the Russians less well 

than they had the Germans, and Second 

Ukrainian Front had to rely mainly on 

motor transport west of the Dnestr. Malinovskiy's broad-front deployment gave him 

only about half the ratio of troops to frontage usual for a Soviet offensive." As a 

prerequisite for the larger operation Fourth 

Ukrainian Front's progress through the 

Dukla Pass was not encouraging; it had 

been slow from the start and at the end of 

the month the offensive was almost at a 

standstill. 

After the turn of the month the Soviet 

attack into the Dukla Pass began to make 

headway, partly because Hitler had taken 

out a panzer division there for his striking 

force, and on 6 October the Russians took 

the pass. That morning Malinovskiy's 

armies attacked. Hungarian Third Army 

melted away fast. At Oradea, however, 

III Zhilin, cd., Vazhneyshiye Operatsii Otechestvennoy Voyny, IV, 382. 

iIO Ibid., p. 383-

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Sixth Guards Tank A rmy met Germans 

and was stopped. 

On the 8th, as his left flank was closing 

to the Tisza, Malinovskiy turned CavalryMechanized Group Pliyev around and 

had it strike southeast behind Oradea. 

That broke the German hold." By nightfall a tank corps and a cavalry corps stood 

west of Debrecen, and Friessner, over 

Hitler's protests, ordered the Armeegruppe 

Woehler to start back from the Muresul 

line. 32 

The army group still had one panzer division stationed near Budapest and another, 

the first of the proposed striking force, at 

Debrecen. On 10 October the divisions 

attacked east and west below Debrecen 

into the flanks of the Soviet spearhead. 

Late that night their points met. They had 

cut off three Soviet corps. The army 

group envisioned "another Cannae," and 

Hitler ordered Armeegruppe Woehler to 

stop on the next phase line. 

The next day, when Sixth Guards Tank 

Army put up a violent fight to get the corps 

out, who had trapped whom began to brcome unclear. The flat Hungarian plain 

became the scene of one of the wildest tank 

battles of the war. Malinovskiy reined in 

on his other armies. By the 12th the Russians in the pocket were shaking themselves 

loose, and Friessner ordered Armeegruppe 

Woehler to start back again. On the 14th 

the Russians were clearing the pocket, and 

Army Group South began concentrating on 

getting a front strong enough to keep them 

from going north once more. In the Beskides Fourth Ukrainian Front was moving 

ifI Ibid. , p. 383. 

:1:2 Armccgruppe Frctter-Pico had taken command 

of Hungarian Third Army after it was formed and 

had transferred Hungarian Second Army to HeadCluarters. Eighth Army, as Armeegruppe Woehler. 
THE SOVTH FLANK 

slowly again south of the Dukla Pass and 

trying to get through some of the smaller 

passes farther east.ss 

H orthy Asks for an Armistice 

During the battle at Debrecen the Germans were aware that they were, as someone in OKH put it, "dancing on a volcano. " They sensed that in Budapest a 

break might come any day, almost any 

hour. Their suspicion was well founded . 

In late September Horthy had sent representatives to Moscow to negotiate an armistice, and on I I October they had a draft 

agreement completed and initialed without 

a fixed date. To be ready for any sudden 

moves, Hitler had scot in two "specialists," 

SS General von dem Bach-Zelewski and 

SS Col. Otto Skorzeny. Von dem Bach had 

long experience in handling uprisings, most 

recently at Warsaw. Skorzeny commanded 

the daredevil outfit that had rescued Mussolini. 

The crisis in Hungary resolved itself less 

violently than the Germans expected. As 

Hungarian head of state for a generation, 

Horthy had accumulated tremendous permnal prestige, but his authority had declined, and his political position was badly 

undermined. In the Parliament during the 

first week of October the parties of the right 

formed a prowar, pro-German majority 

coalition against him. The Army was split; 

some of the generals and many of the senior 

stafT ofTicers wanted to keep on fighting. 

On 8 October the Gestapo arrested the 

Budapest garrison commander, onc of 

Horthy's most faithful and potentially most 

effective supporters, and, on the 15th, it 

:l.'I Obkdo. d. H. Cr. Sued, In KriegJtagebuch. 

Baud 4. Teil 3. 6- [4 OCl 44. H. Gr. A 75126/34 

file. 

363 

arrested Horthy's son, who had played a 

leading role in the attempt to get an armistice. 

The Soviet Union demanded that Hungary accept the armistice terms by 16 

October. In the afternoon of the 15th 

Radio Budapest broadcast Horthy's announcement that he had accepted. By 

then he was acting alone. The Lakatos 

Cabinet had resigned on the grounds that 

it could not approve an armistice and Parliament had not been consulted on the 

negotiatjons. 

The next morning, to the accompaniment of scattered shooting, the Germans 

took the royal palace and persuaded Horthy 

to "request" asylum in Germany. In his 

last official act, under German "protection," Harthy appointed Ferenc Szalasi, 

the leader of the Arrow-Cross Party, as his 

successor. Szalasi, whose chief claim to 

distinction until then had been his in coherence both in speech and in writing, subsequently had himself named "Nador" 

(leader), with all the rights and duties of 

the Prince Regent.:I4 

On 17 Octoher Guderian, in an order declaring the political battle in Hungary won, 

announced that the next step would be to 

bring all of the German and Hungarian 

strength to bear at the front. How that 

was to be accomplished he did not say. In 

terms of the military situation the victory 

was one only by comparison with the immediate, total dissolution that would have 

come if Horthy's attempt to get an armistice had succeeded. Morale in the Hungarian Army hit bottom. Some officers, 

:It OKW , WFSl , KTiegstagebuch. Die Ereignisse 

in U,lganl VO II An/ang April his xu begi"" der 

Schlnellt lml Budapest und l'ur endgueltigen Leg. 

alisierllllg des politischen Umschlt'ungs. pp. 27- 39, 

OKWho6 file ; Horthy, Memoirs. pp. 232-38. 
364 

including the Chief of Staff, some whole 

units, and many individuals deserted to the 

Russians, who encouraged others to do the 

same by letting the men return home if 

they lived in the areas under Soviet control. 

To the Tisza 

On th e night of 16 O ctober Hitler 

ordered Army Group South to see the battle 

through at Debrecen but also to start taking 

Armeegruppe Woehler back toward the 

Tisza. Meanwhile, Malinovskiy had reassembled his armor, the two cavalry-mechanized grou ps and Sixth Guards Tank 

Army, south of Debrecen. On the 20th 

the Cavalry-M echaflized Group Pliyev 

hroke through past Debrecen, and two days 

later it took Nyiregyhaza, astride Armecgruppc ''''ochler's main linc of communications.

3:'; 

The Armecgruppe, which had also taken 

command of Hungarian First Army, it" 

neighbor on the left, held a bow-shaped line 

that at its center was eighty miles east of 

Nyiregyhaza. Friessner's first thought was 

to pull the Armeegruppe north and west 

to skirt Nyiregyhaza. His chief of staff 

persuaded him to try a more daring maneuver, namely, to have ''''ochler's right 

flank do an about-face and push due we" 

between Debrecen and Nyiregyhaza while 

'·· / VOV (R ). IV. :\84. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Sixth Army's panzer divisions, in the corner 

between Nyiregyhaza and the Tisza, struck 

eastward into the Russian flank. 36 

The maneuver worked with the fl air and 

precision of the blitzkrieg days. On the 

23rd the two forces met and cut off three 

Soviet corps at Nyiregyhaza. Before Russians could break loose, almost the whole 

Armeegruppe Woehler bore down on them 

from the east. In three days the Germans 

retook Nyiregyhaza. On the 29th the survivors in tbe pocket abandoned their tanks, 

vehicles, and heavy weapons and fled to the 

south. 

On that day, too, for the first time in 

two months, Army Group South had a continuous front. On the north it bent east of 

the Tisza around Nyiregyhaza and then 

followed the middle Tisza to below Szolnok, 

where it angled away from the river past 

Kecskemet to the Danube ncar Mohaes and 

tied in with Army Group F at the mouth 

of the Drava. But it was not a front that 

could stand long. The Tisza, fl owing 

through fl at country, afforded no defensive 

advantages-the Russians had easily driven 

Hungarian Third Army out of better positions than those it held on the open plain 

betwcon the Tisza and the Danube.:l 7 

311 Obkdo. d . fl . Gr. Sued . l a K .T .B. N oti:. ueber 

t!lIischiedelle FuehnmgsentschlueJJ e in der Schlacht 

678.10.44. H. Cr. A. 75126137a file . 

T. Fricssner, Verratene Sdliachten, pp. 150- 53: 

Obkdo. d . H. Gr. Sued . l a Krieg5tagebu ch . Bmld 

4. Tl'iJ 3.24- '29 Oct 44, H. Cr. A. 7)126/:'\5 file . 
CHAPTER XVII 

Retreat and Encirclement 

The Balkan Peninsula 

The Southeastern Theater 

The German Southeastern Theater was 

a haphazard structure in the true Balkan 

tradition. (Map 32) It had inherited 

many of that areas's ancient troubles and 

had acquired new ones arising out of the 

Axis invasion: tripartite (German, Italian, 

and Bulgarian ) occupation, Hitler's ruthless dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the 

tangle of interests and rivalries-German, 

Italian, Bulgarian, legitimate nationalist, 

separatist nationalist, and communist- not 

to mention Western and Soviet efiorts to 

build up the anti-German resistance with 

an eye at the same time on the postwar 

future. By the spring of 1943 an Allied 

seaborne invasion of the Southeastern Theater had been a possibility, and a year later 

the Russians were poised to break in from 

the east. 

Until August 1943 Italy had held the 

most territory, the western third of Croatia, 

Montenegro, an enlarged Albania, and 

two-thirds of Greece. Germany had held 

northern Slovenia, Serbia, Macedonia 

around Salonika, a strip of Greek territory 

on the Turkish border, the Piraeus, the 

islands in the Aegean, and Crete. Bulgaria 

had occupied western Thrace and Yugoslavian Macedonia. Hungary and Rumania had each taken a slice out of Yugoslavia north of the Danube. Croatia, including Bosnia and Hercegovina, was a 

semiautonomous state under Dr. Ante 

Pavelic and his Usta!i Movement. After 

Italy surrendered, Germany had taken over 

the Italian zone; the Bulgarian area had 

been enlarged somewhat; and puppet governments had been established in Albania 

and Montenegro to match those in Serbia 

and Greece. 1 

The Italian surrender had vastly increased the German military and administrative responsibilities. Troop requirements could only be partly met, and mainly 

with collaborator units at that. The theater command was dealt with more lavishly. 

Hitler had appointed Field Marshal Weichs 

as Commanding General, Southeast (Oberbelehlshabe, Suedost), and, in a sense, at 

the same time made him his own subordinate by naming him Commanding General, 

Army Group F. In his first function 

''''eichs was supreme commander in the 

theater; in the second he had operational 

command of the troops in Yugoslavia and 

Albania. To oversee the coastal defense 

on the Adriatic he was given the Headquarters, Second Panzer Army. Operational 

command in Greece and on the islands 

went to Generaloberst Alexander Loehr as 

Commanding General, Army Group E. 

Below the theater command but not di1 Werner Markert, Osteuropa.Handbuch, JugoJiawien (Koeln, 1954 ), pp. 102- 10. 
!; 

/ 

• / 

• • 

THE SOUTHEASTERN THEATER 

September 1944-Jonuory 1945 

,..-.,,.-., T"['~ONT,2'S[ 'It U 

I ltt '~OHT, ,S JAN ,,.5 

"P, t! I i I \ t !IO 'OO '-'LlS , , 

MAP 32 

( 

I'IFTY -TttIRO 

FIFTY-5[YUITI~ 

SECOND 

UKRAINIAN 

THIRD 

UKRAINIAN 

___ XK)()(X ___ -j SECOND 

t8UlG,l.R,"",1 

r 

FIRSf 

(8Ul(;AJII,AN) 

FOURTH 

(BULGARIAN) 

• 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

rectly subordinate to it the OKW had installed a Military Commander Southeast 

with territorial responsibility for military 

government and relations with the governments of the puppet states.' 

The Southeastern Theater Command 

had two military missions: to defend the 

coasts of the Balkan Peninsula; and to 

combat the guerrilla movements in the interior. Because of the mountainous terrain and because Germany could not afford 

to keep the equipment and vehicles required for mobile forces in an inactive theater, the coast defense was static, which 

forced Weichs to spread his strength thinly 

over a vast area. Some of his best units 

were on Crete and the islands in the Aegean, 

where by the spring of 1944 they were 

completely immobile and could be reached 

only by air or by small island-hopping 

boats. The troops that could be spared 

for the war against the guerrillas were 

always less than enough to conduct a 

thoroughgoing campaign. On the other 

hand, the Germans benefited from conRicts between the guerrilla movements. 

The first Balkan guerrilla movement, 

Col. Draza MihailoviC's Cetniks, had been 

organized before the 1941 campaign against 

Yugoslavia had ended; but after Tito's 

(Josip Broz' ) Partisans became active, the 

Cetniks had devoted the greater part of 

their effort to fighting them. Mihailovic, 

until May 1944 Minister of War in the 

Yugoslav government-in-exile, was concerned above all with ensuring the postwar 

return of the monarchy and Serbian predominance in the restored Yugoslavia. 

Tilo's Partisans were the strongest and 

most effective of the Balkan guerrilla forces. 

I Walter Goerlitz, Der Zweite Weltkritg, 193!r 

1945 (Stuttgart, 1952 ) , p. 147 · 

367 

They had received a great boost in strength 

when they succeeded in taking over large 

stocks of weapons, including some artillery 

and tanks, from the withdrawing Italians, 

and another after the Tehran Conference 

of November-December 1943, which had 

elevated the Partisans to the status of a 

national force and pledged them full Allied 

and Soviet support. Nevertheless the Germans, aided by the Cetniks and other nationalist groups, had managed until the 

fall of 1944 to keep Tito bottled up in the 

mountains of western Yugoslavia, the 

former Italian occupation zone which had 

all along been his stronghold. 

In Greece the guerrilla movements, communist and nationalist, had been slower 

getting started and were not nearly as 

strong as those in Yugoslavia. Despite 

British efforts to get them to work together, 

most of the time they preferred fighting 

each other to fighting the Germans. When 

the Communists began making headway 

against the nationalists, the latter negotiated a truce with the Germans which they 

kept until August 1944. 

In the German strategy the Southeastern Theater had at first threatened the 

British sea lanes in the eastern Mediterranean and had acted as a counterweight 

to Allied pressure on neutral Turkey. By 

mid- I 944 it had completely lost its effectiveness in both those respects. Militarily, 

as far as the war on the active fronts was 

concerned, the theater had become a liability; but a withdrawal anywhere would have 

given the Western Powers new bases or 

another foothold on the Continent, would 

possibly have led to Turkey's dropping its 

neutrality, and would, at the very least, 

have greatly increased the apprehensions of 

the Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Hungarian 

Governments. 
368 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

TITO (RIGHT) WITH PARTISAN LEADERS 

The forces in the Southeastern Theater 

were therefore tied down without being 

engaged, and they were looking seaward 

when the deadliest threat was at their backs. 

An about-race would~ perhaps, have carried 

with it severe military and political consequences; but that it would in any event, 

one day have to be made seems not to have 

been given adequate consideration. The 

reason appears to have been that the theater's role, to the extent that it still had onc, 

was regarded as strategic and therefore 

Hitler's and the OKW's concern. Weichs 

might be aware that he could suddenly 

find himself embroiled in the next tactical 

mess on the Eastern Front, but until that 

happened or was obviously about to happen the relationship between his theater and 

the Eastern Front was a matter of grand 

strategy that could be evaluated only at the 

highest command level. Moreover, as commander of an OK W theater, he was in a 

completely separate command channel from 

the Eastern Front and almost in a different 

war. 

Weichs and Hitler Wait and See 

The first overt change in the situation 

of the Southeastern Theater came in early 

August 1944. Turkey's break with Germany on the od raised a possibility of landings on the islands in the Aegean and gave 

the Bulgarian Government the nudge it 

needed to set a course out of the war. During the next two weeks Bulgaria re-estab-
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

lished consular relations with the Soviet 

Union and restricted German movements 

through its territory. A coup was out of 

the question because all the Germans had 

in that country was a small military mission, Weichs could not spare any troops, 

and the Bulgarian Army, considering the 

small part it had played in the war, was 

rather well outfitted with German tanks 

and planes. 

On [7 August the Bulgarian Premier 

told the Parliament the government was 

"determined to remove all obstacles to 

peace." 3 Weichs thereupon concluded that 

when Bulgaria defected he would have to 

take his troops in Greece back to the Yugoslav border because the flank on the east 

and the sea frontier in Thrace would become hopelessly exposed.' He did not 

know that his colleague on the east, Friessner, was having strong doubts about Rumania, and Friessner, on his side, did not 

learn until later about what was going on 

in Bulgaria.' Each general took for granted 

that the other was keeping his own house in 

order and both apparently assumed that 

Hitler had the political affairs in hand. 

Weichs was at Fuehrer headquarters on 

23 August when the report came in that 

Rumania was quitting the war. Because 

of Rumania and Bulgaria, Hitler then decided that the front in Greece, particularly 

on the Peloponnesus, was henceforth to be 

considered an outpost line to be evacuated 

if the Americans and British attacked. The 

'New York Tim~s. Augwt 19. 1944· 

'Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs, Auszt.lt'ge QUI 

dem Tagebuch des Feldmarschalls Freihen von 

Weichs aUI den Jahren 1943 und 1944. alU den 

Original-Notiun in Gabelsbuger Stenographie 

uebutragen dUTch GeneraLmajor a.D. Curt RiUer 

von Geitner (hereafter cited as Weichs Diary), 17 

Aug 44, MS, OCMH files. 

'Friessner, Yerratene Schlachten, p. 74. 

369 

weight of the defense would be moved north 

into Yugoslavia, and the "tendency" would 

be to draw Army Group E north and concentrate its strength around the AthensSalonika-Belgrade railroad.' 

On the 25th Hitler ordered all civilians 

and noncombatant military out of areas 

that might suddenly become combat zones.' 

The panic and confusion in Rumania, 

where the German personnel were trying 

to get out at the last minute, had inspired 

the order. Coming when it did, it gave 

Weichs a chance to pare down excess baggage and reduce the administrative overhead, which was especially high in Greece. 

where women, academicians, and others 

who preferred to contribute their bit toward the "final victory" in sunshine and 

surrounded by the monuments of antiquity, 

had found assignments particularly congenial. 

After Rumania surrendered, Hitler, the 

OKW, and Weichs were still inclined to 

wait and see, even though prudence, the 

condition of the theater forces, and the 

course of the battle in Rumania all would 

seem to have demanded an early decision. 

The Southeastern Theater forces were 

neither very flexible nor very reliable tactical instruments. The theater had a ration 

strength of 900,000 men, including naval 

and air contingents and what the Germans 

called "Wehrmachtsgefolge," the technicians, bureaucrats, police, and mere 

hangers-on who followed the armed forces 

into occupied countries. The ground com-

• Weichs Diary, 23 Aug 44 ; O .B. Suedos' (0. 

Kdo. H. Gr. F), Ia Kriegs'agebuch Nr. 3, 25 Aug 

44, H. Gr. F 6613611 file. 

, OKW, WFSt, Qu. 2 Nr. 06938/44, Evacuation 

in the Allied, Friendly, and Occupied Countries, 

10 Sep 44, in Office , Chief of Naval Operations, 

Fuehrer Directives and Other Top-Level Directives 

of the German Armed Forces, 1942-1945 (1948). 
370 

bat strength was, roughly, 600,000 men in 

38 divisions and brigades of which 7 were 

Bulgarian divisions and 9 foreign collaborator divisions which included in their ranks 

Russians, Italians, Arabs, and all of the 

Balkan nationalities. The 15 German divisions and 7 German fortress brigades 

were, in the main, not first-class units, and 

most of th em were not fully combat-trained 

or equipped.s The divisions were in part, 

and the fortress battalions almost entirely, 

made up of over-age and limited service 

men. Of the total strength, Army Group 

E in Greece had 300,000 men, some go,ooo 

of them on the islands. Its ratio of German 

to foreign troops was somewhat higher than 

in the theater as a whole; it had half of the 

German divisions and all but one of the 

fortress battalions.' The mobility of the 

units in the theater ranged from low to nonexistent. The lines of communication were 

sparse and primilive. Army Group E had 

one railroad, the Athens-Salonika-Belgrade 

line; it and the one or two reasonably good 

roads into Greece ran through Bulgarianoccu pied Macedonia. 

On 26 August, Weichs instructed a 

mountain division to move out of Greece 

and into southern Serbia just north of the 

Bulgarian occupation zone. On the 30th, 

certain by then that Bulgaria would be out 

of the war in a matter of days, he told the 

mountain division to stop at Nis and an SS 

division and an Air Force field division to 

I MS # P- 114C, Supplement, Die Kriegsereignisse au/ dem Balkan im Rahmen der deutschen 

OperationcII an der Ost/ront, '944- 45 (Generalmajor a. D. Curt Ritter von Geitner), T eil I, p. 46. 

~ MS # P- 114C, Supplement, Die Kriegsereignjue auf dem Balkan im Rahmen der deutschen 

Operaliollen an der Osl/ront, ' 944-45 (Generalmajor a. D . Erich Schmidt-Richberg), Teil II. p. II ; 

OKW. WFSt. K .T .B. Ausarbeitung, Der suedoestiiche KriegsIChauplatz, 1.4-3 1.12·44 , p. 336, 

IMT Doc 1794- PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

move into the Bulgarian zone from Greece 

and hold the road and rail junction at 

Skoplje. " 

The OKW, in no greater hurry than 

Weichs was, had issued an "Order for the 

Defense of the Southeast" the day before. 

It directed Weichs to deploy his reserves in 

the Belgrade-Nis-Salonika area and begin 

getting ready for a withdrawal in Greece 

to the line Corfu-Mount Olympus. To 

start getting the troops off the islands the 

furlough quotas were raised. But the ohject for the time being was "above all" to 

avoid giving the impression that an evacuation was under way.lI 

Bulgaria Surrenders 

The Bulgarians, since they were not at 

war with the Soviet Union, hoped to get 

terms that would let them revert to complete neutrality and keep Soviet troops out 

of the country. To give their case what 

substance they could they offered to assist 

Turkey in repelling any- by then, to say 

the least, hypothetical- German invasion 

attempt; they demanded that Germany 

withdraw its military mission; and they disarmed and interned the Germans who Red 

across the border from Rumania. But their 

negotiations with Soviet representatives in 

Turkey failed to make headway. 

On 2 September, the day Russian troops 

reached the border at Giurgiu on the 

Danube, a new Cabinet was fonned ; two 

days later Bulgaria unilaterally declared an 

end to the state of war with the Allies and 

a return to full neutrality. For the Russians that was not enough. Claiming a 

10 Ibid .. p. 336; Weichs Diary, go Aug 44. 

1I O .B. Suedost (0. Kdo. H . Cr. F), Ia Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 3 , 29 Aug 44, H . Gr. F 66135/1 file . 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

neutral Bulgaria would become a refuge for 

the retreating Germans, the Soviet Union 

declared war on 5 September. 

On the night of the 8th, after Third 

Ukrainian Front had crossed the herder 

during the day, Bulgaria declared war on 

Germany. By then the realignment was 

in full progress." The German military 

mission had left Bulgaria. In Macedonia 

the Germans were disarming and interning 

the Bulgarian occupation corps without 

much trouble. At Skoplje three Bulgarian 

divisions abandoned their weapons and 

equipment and fled into the mountains. At 

Prilep several regiments put up a fight that 

lasted into the fourth week of the month." 

A Front on the East 

The Rumanian surrender and Bulgaria's 

defection opened a 425-mile front on the 

east from the Hungarian herder to the 

Aegean Sea--one that Southeastern 

Theater Command had somehow to defend. For the moment the danger was 

greatest in the south, where a front had to 

be created east of the line Salonika-SkopljeNis if Army Group E was to have a chance 

to escape out of Greece. On 9 September 

Weichs shifted the Army Group E boundary north to Klisura and added Albania to 

the army group zone. That made Loehr 

responsible for the most vulnerable stretch 

of his own retreat route. Some Army 

Group E troops were already in Macedonia; others were coming to Salonika 

from the islands. At midmonth the army 

110KW, WFSt. K .T .B. Ausarbeitung, Der suedoestliche Kriegsschauplatz, J.4 ·-31. 1~44, pp. 337-

38, IMT Doc 1794- PS. 

u O.B. Sutdost (0. Kdo. H . Gr. F), /tJ Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, II, 18, 20, 24 Sep 44. H . Gr. F 

661351 I file. 

371 

group was succeeding in closing the crossings on the prewar Bulgarian herder and 

had a line on the Strimon River. It was 

troubled most by lack of means to transport the troops to the front and by the 

necessity for completely re-equipping those 

who came from the islands. 

In the Army Group F zone between 

Klisura and the Iron Gate, on 5 September, 

when the Sixth Guards Tank Army spearhead reached Turnu Severin, a motorized 

brigade going east to hold the Iron Gate 

was delayed in Belgrade where air attacks 

had destroyed the bridges. After the tank 

army turned north on the 6th, the Military 

Commander Southeast set up a thinly 

manned front that followed the Yugoslav 

border and straddled the Danube just west 

of the Iron Gate. At mid month Weichs 

sent part of a division and two police battalions into the Army Group South Ukraine 

zone to try to take and hold Timisoara, the 

southern gateway to the Hungarian plain 

and the Banal. Second Panzer Army had 

to stay where it was for the time being to 

hold Croatia in case Hungary surrendered 

and Croatia tried to follow." 

That Army Group E could not stay in 

Greece and that getting it out would, in 

time, become more difficult, mayhe impossible, were accepted facts at all German 

command levels, but Weichs was not letting 

himself be rushed, which apparently suited 

Hitler and the OKW. On 10 Septemher 

Weichs indicated he was not ready to make 

a decision. He told Loehr the decision 

would ~pend on how things went in 

Macedonia ; the theater command would 

give the order when the time came. U 

II MS # P- 114C, Supplement (Schmidt-Richberg), TeilIl, 64-7 1. 

1& O .B. Suedost (0. Kdo. H . Gr. F) , fa Kriegstagebu ch Nr. 3. 10 Sep 44, H. Gr. F 66135/1 file . 
372 

Meanwhile, to the Gennans' surpr.ise, 

the troops were coming off the islands by 

air, some even by sea, with no interference. 

It appeared to Weichs that the Allies were 

"trying to build golden bridges" for him. 

He and the rest of the German Command, 

including Hitler especially, wondered why 

the British and Americans, while smashing 

the retreat routes out of Greece through 

Yugoslavia, were at the same time letting 

the Germans get off the islands. 

The Allied Balkan Air Force had started 

RATWEEK on I September; it was intcnded to cut the exit routes from Greece 

and southern Yugoslavia and to help Tito's 

Partisans push cast into Serbia to mect the 

Russians advancing through Rumania. IG 

Heavy strikes on the 3d cut all the transportation arteries running through Nis and 

badly damaged all the Danube and Sava 

bridges at Belgrade. These and other 

attacks on the roads and railroads did not 

give the Partisans as much of a leg-up a. 

had, perhaps, heen expected; but, until the 

damage was repaired, they snarled German 

troop movements in eastern Yugoslavia, 

sometimes critically, as in the case of the 

motorized brigade going toward the Iron 

Gate, and they stalled all traffic except by 

air to and from Greece. 

The inexplicable tactics, from the German point of view, of the Allies led Hitler 

and the OKW to speculate that the British 

wanted to get the Ge·rmans off the islands 

but wanted to keep them in Greece as a 

18 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 

eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," 

vol. III. Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, Jan~ 

uary 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago, 1951), pp. 473-

74; Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London, 

'949), pp. 470- 83. 

17 Weichs Diary, 3 Sep 44; OKW, WFSt, K.T.B. 

Ausarbeitung, DeT suedoestliche KTiegJSchauplatr, 

1·4·-31.12-44. p. 343, IMT Doc I794-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

kind of police force and as a counterweight 

to the Russians." On 15 September Hitler 

authorized full evacuation of the islands 

and at the same time directed Weichs to 

"playoff against each other the crosscurrents" between the Soviet Union and the 

Allies in order to exploit the apparently 

p"-,,,ive attitude of the latter toward the 

German withdrawa1.' 8 

His scheme got no further. On that 

same day, in a surprise raid, British and 

American bombers hit the airfields around 

Athens, badly damaging them and destroying a large number of JU-52 transports. 

During the next few days British ships, including aircraft carriers with night fighters, 

moved into the Aegean, and German losses 

on the flights to and from the islands 

mounted. H) 

Nevertheless, Hitler continued to see in 

the absence of an attempt to invade the 

Greek mainland an impending falling out 

among his enemies and was, therefore, inclined to go on trying to keep his own hand 

in the game. That the British and Americans could be fully occupied in their other 

theaters, as in fact they were by then, and 

that neither the Western Powers nor the 

Soviet Union would have been willing at 

that stage of the war to risk a conflict over 

the Balkans, as was demonstrated by the 

Balkan arrangement Churchill and Stalin 

made in Moscow in October, seems not to 

have occurred to Hitler. 20 

If O.B. Suedost (0. Kdo. H. GT. F), la Kriegstagebuch Nr. 3, 15 Sep 44, H. Gr. F 66136/ 1 file. 

" OKW, WFSt, K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, Der suedoestliche KTi~gsschauplatz, 1.4.- 31 .12.44, p. 34, 

IMT Doc I794-PS. 

.. John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Volume VI, 

October 1944- August 1945 (London, 1956), vol. 

VI, pp. 41 - 43; Winston Churchill, "The Second 

World War," Triumph and TTagedy (Boston, 

1953 ), pp. 226-38. 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

In the third week of September Southeastern Theater Command detected the beginnings of a Soviet build-up on its eastern 

front. In Rumania, north of the Transylvanian Alps, Second Ukrainian Front 

moved Fifty-third Army into the AradTimisoara area. South of the mountains, 

lead clements of Forty-sixth Army, coming 

north across the Danube from Bulgaria, reached Turnu Severin. Another of 

Third Ukrainian Fronl's armies, the Fi/i)'-

seventh, was observed, south of the Danube, 

moving west toward the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. Most ominous was a sudden 

increase in the numbers of Soviet planes on 

the airfields in western Bulgaria and Rumania. Aerial photographs taken on 19 September showed 372 aircraft on two fields 

ncar Sofiya. 21 

The Bulgarians were deploying their 

home forces along the border. On 22 September Bulgaria proc1aimed general mobilization." Even though the actual Bulgarian capabilities were still in question, 

that they could contemplate going into action at all was an un pleasant surprise; the 

Germans had expected the Bulgarian Army 

to disintegrate in the aftermath of the surrender. 

On 18 September Weichs secured permission from the OKW to evacuate Corfu 

and start taking the front back from the 

coast in western Greece. Two days later 

he submitted, "as background for the 

Fuehrer's decision," a situation report calling attention to the Soviet and Bulgarian 

movements and the possibility that as a 

consequence Hitler would "soon and sud-

~l MS # P- 114c, Supplement (Schmidt-Richberg ), Teilll, p. 356. 

22 0KW, WFSt , K.T.B. Ausarbeitung, Der suedoest/iche Kriegsschauplatz. 1.4- 31.12.44, p. 342, 

IMT Doc '794- PS. 

373 

denly" be faced with "fundamental decisions regarding Greece.":!J His diary reveals that on 2 I September he still had not 

made up his own mind. An offensive in 

the crucial Skoplje-Nis sector, he helieved, 

could come soon and with it the danger of 

Army Group E's being eut off; therefore, 

the time was approaching when he would 

have to stop the flights from the islands and 

use the planes to fly Army Group E troops 

north to reinforce the Macedonian front. 

When should the decision be made? Loehr 

wanted it right away; but, Weichs reasoned, 

aside from the increased air strength, there 

were no "positive" signs that the Russians 

were about to do anything. If they wanted 

to, they could move fast, maybe so fast that 

any decision would then come too late to 

save Loehr's troops. Nevertheless, he still 

believed everything "humanly possible," including taking risks on the Macedonian 

border, ought to be done to get the men 

off the islands." He was apparently not 

yet thinking at all of forcing to an issue the 

bigger question, when to evacuate Greece 

altogether. 

In resolving his quandary, Weichs was 

not getting any help from his opponents. 

The Russians were moving, but neither as 

fast nor as purposefully as they might have. 

The flights to the islands, in spite of losses, 

were more than double the forty-four per 

day averaged early in the month. Even 

though Loehr had pulled his troops on the 

Peloponnesus back to two bridgeheads in 

the north, onc at Patrai and the other on 

the Isthmus of Corinth, the only sign that 

the Allies had so much as taken notice was 

a British landing on 2 I Septem ber on Kith13 O.B. Suedost (Ob. kdo. H. Cr. F), 10 Krieg!-

tagebuch Nr. 3, 18, 20 Sep 44, H . Gr. F 66135 / 1 

file . 

.. Weichs Diary, 2 1 Sep 44. 
374 

ira off the southern tip of the peninsula. 

While the Russians appeared to be giving it time, Southeastern Theater Command desperately needed all it could get. 

The front in the cast was pitifully thin. 

Communications to the front and laterally 

behind it were in a constant snarl from air 

and Partisan activity. The theater command was trying to go to war with, even 

by the then prevailing German standards, 

a motley assortment of units; and at its back 

stood Tito eyeing what were for him the 

ultimate prizes, Serbia and the capital, Belgrade. In Greece, Army Group E had 

several divisions either moving or ready to 

move north, but some of the units, those 

from the islands, were unarmed and completely immobile, and all overland traffic 

was slow. 

Without waiting to complete an orderlv 

build-up, a Third Ukrainian Front force, 

on 22 September, crossed the Danube into 

the bend west of Turnu Severin. At first, 

the Russians were just strong enough to 

make modest headway against the German 

outposts there, but by the 25th Weichs began to become concerned. He decided to 

put in the J st Mountain Division to clean 

out the bend. Tolbukhin by then had one 

division across the river and four standing 

by on the other side. 

Early on the morning of the 27th a report 

reached Weich's headquarters in Belgrade 

that Second Ukrainian Front's left flank 

was advancing west between Timisoara 

and the Danube. He had parts of two SS 

divisions at Timisoara and a motorized 

brigade north of the Iron Gate but nothing 

in between; the assumption had been that 

the Russians were more likely to go northwest past Timisoara into Hungary. Weichs 

right away suspected what was comingSTALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

two thrusts from the east on either side of 

the Danube toward Belgrade, to be reinforced, perhaps later, by Tito's forces from 

the west- but he did nothing." Although 

the motorized brigade north of the Danube 

was in trouble and on the 28th was nearly 

encircled, the counterattack south of the 

river was going wel1. 

On the 29th the opinion in Weich's 

staff' was that "gradually" it was beginning 

to appear, at least "the thought could no 

longer be discounted," that the Soviet 

LX XV II CorpJ and FortY-Jixth Army, 

both in the sector between Timisoara and 

the Danube, had Belgrade as their "general 

objective." During the day Weichs decided to bring up from Greece, in addition 

to a Jaeger division on the way, two regiments, one by rail and one by air. 

Belgrade- Decision To Evacuate 

Greece 

On the 30th Weichs and his staff for the 

first time became genuinely alarmed. North 

of the Danube the Russians had 3 corps in 

action against 7 y, understrength German 

battalions; south of the river the 1st Mountain Division was engaging 4, possibly 5, 

Soviet divisions; in both places the Russians had at least again as much strength in 

reserve. Weichs once more mulled over in 

private the question what to do about Army 

Group E and concluded that a decision 

would have to be made soon. 2G 

By 2 October the theater command was 

painfully aware that it was almost helpless. 

Bad weather kept the regiment scheduled 

to come by air grounded in Greece. No 

one could tell when the other regiment 

.. Weichs Diary, '27 Scp 44. 

" Ib id .. 30 Sep 44. 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

would arrive; the first trains bringing the 

Jaeger division were just corning into Belgrade-they had been on the way fourteen 

days." 

On the od the Operations Staff, OKW, 

giving Wcichs a nudge, asked him to set 

the time for evacuating Greece. He promised an answer in twenty-four hours. The 

next day he and Loehr agreed that everything could be ready to move on 10 October, and the theater command ordered 

Army Group E to evacuate Albania, southern Macedonia, and Greece. The flights 

to the islands were to continue as long as 

the gasoline stores in Greece lasted and the 

airfields stayed in German hands. Hitler 

approved.28 

In Serbia, half the battle for Belgrade 

was lost before it had properly begun. On 

4 October the Russians reached Pancevo 

on the north bank of the Danube ten miles 

downstream from Belgrade. In two morc 

days they took Pancevo and pushed the 

Germans back into a small bridgehead 

across the river from Belgrade. To get his 

communications equipment out of danger, 

Weichs, on 5 October, moved his headquarters from Belgrade to Vukovar. On 

that day he also changed the designation 

of the Military Command Southeast to 

Armeeabteilung Serbia and proposed to the 

OKW that Second Panzer Army be taken 

away from the coast to a line in the mountains. In doing so, he relieved the former 

Military Command Southeast of its territorial fun ctions and made a start toward 

converting Second Panzer Army from an 

amorphous collection of coast defense detachments into something like a tactical 

I'IO.B. SuedO$l (0. Kdo. H. Gr. F) , Ia Kriegs· 

tag~bll. h Nr. 3, I , :J Oct 44, H. Gr. F 66135/1 

file . 

~ Ibid ., 2, :3 Oct 44 ; Weichs Diary, 3 Oct 44. 

375 

organization. In two respects the Germans' luck seemed to have improved, On 

3 October the railroad bridges at Kraljevo 

and Mitrovica, out since early September, 

were repaired and the troop trains from 

Greece could run straight through to Belgrade; and Soviet Forty-Sixth Army, by 

the time its left flank closed up to Belgrade, 

had turned its main force northwest to join 

the offensive acr06S the Tisza into Hungary. 

But Weichs still had more troubles than 

he could handle, and time was working 

against him. To make the attempt to clean 

out the Danube bend west of Turnu 

Severin, the 1st Mountain Divison had 

been forced to strip its original front on the 

Bulgarian border. Just after the first of 

the month the Russians crossed the border 

past the division's south flank, and Partisans moved in behind it, cutting the divi· 

sion's supply lines. An SS division tried to 

restore contact from the south; hut Fiftyseventh Army kept coming across the border 

and poured through wherever it found an 

opening on the front from Bela Palanka 

north to the Danube. 

One mechanized corps slipped past Bor 

unnoticed and on 8 October appeared in 

the Morava River valley fifty miles behind 

the front. There, by nightfall, it had 

crossed the river and cut the railroad running into Belgrade from the south. In the 

meantime, the Partisans had pushed into 

Serbia southwest of Belgrade and west of 

Nis. On the 9th Bulgarian First Army began attacking past Bela Palanka toward 

Nis. 

Weichs told the troops coming by rail 

from the south to unload at Kragujevac and 

attack north to clear the Morava Valley. 

He gave Headquarters, Second Panzer 

Army, command on the Tisza and on the 
376 STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

YUGOSLAV PARTISANS ON THE MOVE 

Danube south to Belgrade. The army, its 

withdrawal from the coast nearly completed, could bring two divisions east, but 

that would take several weeks. For the 

moment all it could do was free Headquarters, Armccabteilung Serbia, to concentrate on defending Belgrade. The 

Armeeabteilung decided to take all the 

troops it could get by paring down the Belgrade defenses-about the equivalent of onc 

division- and strike cast to the mouth of 

the Marava, link up there with the 15t 

Mountain Division, and then advance upstream along the Marava to meet the 

assault coming from the south. 

The attack out of Belgrade reached the 

Marava and, on the 12th, carried upstream 

to Velika Plana where the Russians had 

first c:ros.t;cd the river, hut it wa~ too late. 

Fifty-seventh Army had a whole mechanized corps across. By noon on the 13th the 

Soviet armor was deploying six miles south 

of Belgrade for the advance into the city. 

Meanwhile, the I st Mountain Di\·ision had 

withdrawn west to the Morava and joined 

the force in the river valley, hut, with the 

Russians at Belgrade, both were cut off. 

Weichs put all the troops in the Morava 

Valley ·under the Commanding General, 

1St Mountain Division, Generalleutnant 

Walter Stettner Ritter von Grabcnhofcn j 

ordered Armeeabteilung Serbia to hold 

Belgrade until Stettner could break out and 

get across the Sava j and instructed Second 

Panzer Army to station some troops south 

of the upper Sava in case Stettner had to 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

go farther west. 

On the night of the '4th the Russians 

and Partisans entered Belgradc. By the 

next afternoon they had taken the center of 

the city; Armeeabteilung Serbia put all the 

strength it could spare, including a motorized artillery ballalion from Second Panzer 

Army, into a bridgehead around the Sava 

bridge. During the day on the '5th Stettner started going west and his point reached 

Grocka fifteen miles southeast of Belgrade. 

The next day he gained another tcn miles 

but failed in an attempt to reach the city on 

the '7th. After gelling word that he intended to try again on the ,8th, Armeeab· 

tcilung Serbia suddenly lost radio contact, 

and thereafter nothing morc was heard 

from Stettner. An officer who came across 

the Sa va two days later stated that Stellner 

had enjoined destruction of the heavy 

equipment and an escape to the west 

toward the Sava . 

On the '9th Armeeabteilung Serbia evacuated the Belgrade bridgehead. On the 

2 18t some thousands of Stettner's troops 

crossed the Sava at Sabac; 12 ,000 was the 

number recorded in the Army Group F 

journal, but a later entry states that 

the actual number "was substantially 

smaller." 211 

Army Gro,,/) E's Withdrawal 

Aller also losing Nis on '5 October, 

Wcichs had no front at all in the '20 miles 

between Nis and Belgrade and no prospcet 

of doing anything abollt it. He gave Second Panzer Army command from Belgrade 

north and told it to bring the Russians to 

2\1 MS # 114C, Supplement (Schmidt-Rich berg) , 

pp. 96-136: 0 .8 . Suedost (0. Kdo. H. CT. F) , fa 

Kriegslagebll ch Nr. 3. 21, 25 Oct 44, H. Gr. F 

66135/1 file . 

377 

a stop on the line of the Tisza, Danube, 

Sava, and Drina Rivers. He gave Army 

Group E command north to Kraljevo and 

the responsibility for kceping open its retreat route Skoplje-Kraljevo-Visegrad. Second Panzer Army was to hold the road 

open from Sarajevo to Visegrad. Army 

Grollp E had decided to stop on the line 

Scutari-Skoplje-Klisura; now it would 

have to go farther north and west to the 

Sara jevo-Mostar area. 30 

Even after Belgrade and Nis were lost, 

and with them the most direct route out of 

Greece, Weichs' lengthy irresolution regarding Army Group E was more and 

more looking like masterful deliberation. 

The more than a month's delay had given 

Loehr time to ship out the noncombatants 

and superfluous equ ipment, and to commandeer enough civilian trucks and automobiles to give himself some mobility. By the 

time the rnove began on 10 October every 

unil was poised and ready. The timetable 

was perfected, and the British, who were 

cautiously moving onlo the Peloponnesus, 

did nothing to disrupt it. Just when Army 

Group E began to move, Balkan Air Force 

shiftcd thc greater part of its effort from 

Yugoslavia to support of the British in 

Greece, thereby giving the army group 

some relief in the north and not adding any 

noticeable pressure from the south. 

The German rcar guard left Athens on 

the '3th, stopped brieny on the line Metsovon Pass-Larisa on the 21st, and then reslimed thc march north. On the 3' st 

Salonika was evacuated, and on the night 

of I November the rear guard crossed 

the Greck border. On the islands 45,000 

men, a third of them I talians, were left 

behind. Someone had invented the euphemWeich5 Diary, 14- 18 Oct 44. 
378 

ism Kernfestung (core fortress) to make it 

appear that they still had a mission. 

In the last week of October the Russians 

and Bulgarians made strong bids to take 

Kraljevo and Skoplje. Having the troops to 

spare and the railroad, Loehr could meet 

the challenge, if in both places none too 

soon. On 2 November Army Group E 

;topped the Russians at Kraljevo and in the 

next several days halted the Bulgarians east 

of Skoplje. The success of the withdrawal 

through Macedonia was then assurcd. 3t 

North of Skoplje the army group would 

have to veer west onto poorer roads, but it 

would be spared the almost certain disaster 

of a winter march through the coastal 

mountains. 

A Front on the Drina 

In the last two weeks of October Second 

Panzer Army had to retreat. Its best units 

were smashed, and the rest were in a 

complete tangle. It was so short of troops 

that it put the physically and psychologically battered survivors of Stettner's force 

back into the front without a rest, securing 

the equipment for them by disarming the 

SS Handschar Division, a beautifully outfitted but unreliable division of Balkan 

Moslems. Off the army's north flank the 

Russians were across the Tisza and going 

west to the Danube. 

Weichs, as Commanding General, Army 

Group F, had tried to create a front on the 

east; but, as Commanding General, Southeast, he had failed to make the decision that 

would have enabled him to do so; he had 

therefore fought the battle for Belgrade 

'L OKW, WFSt, K.T.B. Ausarbeitung. Der suedoestliche K riegJJchauplatz, '4- 3' .12·44. pp. 344-

50, IMT Doc 1794-PS. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

piecemeal, always several steps behind the 

enemy. Nevertheless, after he had lost 

Belgrade and as the month wore on, it began to look, in the north as well as in the 

south, as if he had displayed a genuine feeling for timing and a talent for sure-footed 

retrograde maneuver. Tolbukhin left the 

pursuit west of Belgrade and the Tisza 

mostly to the Partisans. Toward the end 

of the month Fifty-seventh Army shifted its 

corps north of the Danube. This gave Second Panzer Army a chance to make a 

phased withdrawal between the Danube 

and the Sava, where it had no river line to 

fall back on. On 2 November the army 

stopped; its front followed the Danube from 

the Hungarian border to Vukovar, and 

from there it bridged the river gap to the 

mouth of the Drina and then followed the 

Drina south. The next day Army Group 

F confirmed that Fifty-seventh Army's main 

force had gone north into Hungary to join 

the offensive toward Budapest. 32 

Budapest 

The First Thrust 

In the Army Group South sector, on 29 

Octoqer Forty-sixth Army, reinforced by a 

guards mechanized corps, attacked west of 

Kecskemet, about halfway between the 

Danube and the Tisza. (Map 33) Malinovskiy was trying to push the offensive 

to Budapest without pausing for a build-up. 

Fourth Ukrainian Front's thrust from the 

north had bogged down, and his armies, 

the annored forces in particular, were in far 

from prime condition. The CavalryMechanized Group Gorshkov had disa Ibid" 21 Oct-3 Nov 44; Weichs Diary. 21 

Oct-3 Nov 44; MS # 114e, Supplement (SchmidtRichberg ), pp. '44- 49. 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

MAP 33 

appeared. Probabl y it was merged with the 

remnants of the Pliyev Group. Malinovskiy 

expected that as Forty-sixt h Army advanced, it would case the way for Seventh 

Guards Army to cross the Tisza. He had 

another two mechanized corps standing by 

to make the fin al push to Budapest." 

~ IVOV (R ). IV. 390" 

379 

6th GU AROS TANK 

--c=" -____ ,_N __ -I 

ARMY GROUP SOUTH 

29 Oc tober - 30 December 19 44 

GERUIIN FRONT.2:90CT 

!iililii iJ lllii 

GEIi UIIN FRO'H, 300EC 

20 0 2:0 . 0 60 MIL ES 

L' "-' i"ITi'T. 1-1 -rl _'-r, -,1'"-_-" 20 0 20 . 0 ~I LO "[TE:RS 

Fort y-sixth Army began to roll on the 

second day and took Kecskemet on the 

3 1St. Headquarters, Sixth Army, as 

Armeegruppc Fretter-Pico, then took command of all German and Hungarian units 

between the rivers. It was bringing German divisions down from the Tisza front, 

but on the 3 1St all it had was one panzer 

division. On 2 November the Soviet point 
380 

was seven miles south of Budapest. Hungarian Third Army had virtually evaporated. The next day the leading Soviet 

tank column broke into the Budapest 

bridgehead, a semicircular ring of defenses 

the Germans had laid out east of the 

Danube skirting the suburbs, but by then 

Armeegruppc Fretter-Pico had two SS 

divisions and a panzer division in the 

bridgehead. OfT Forty-sixth Army's east 

flank five panzer divisions were moving in 

on the line of the Budapest-Cegled-Szolnok 

road. On 4 Novemhcr Hitler ordered Army 

Group South to concentrate all the strength 

it could in the Cegled-Szolnok area for an 

attack west toward Kecskemet to cut the 

Russians ofT, but Seventh Guards Army 

had already crossed the Tisza, taken both 

Cegled and Szolnok, and was ready to 

attack north.3f 

While German and Soviet tanks battled 

in the Budapest suburbs on 4 and 5 November, the city, according to the Army Group 

South war diary, "completely lost its head." 

The panic was inspired as much by a minor 

incident inside the city as it was by the 

approaching Russians. German engineers, 

fusing demolition charges beneath the 

Danube bridges, accidently set one ofT and 

blew several spans out of the Margaret 

Bridge. The accident brought to the surface the population's most deep-seated 

fear: the Germans when they left would 

unloose a crippling wave of destruction. 

The city was anything but in a mood to 

sacrifice itself at the last minute. The 

populace wanted to believe reassurances by 

the Russians that they were not as bad as 

&4 H. Gr. Sued, Kriegstagebuch Entwuerfe, Band 

4 , Teii 3,29- 3' Oct 44, H. Gr. A 74126/ 35 file ; 

H. Cr. Sued, Krillgstagebu ch Entwuer/e, Band 4, 

Tt!ii4, 1- 4 Nov 44, H. Gr. A 75126/ 38 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Gennans painted them." 

On the 5th Soviet radio traffic revealed 

that the units assailing Budapest were running short of ammunition.:J6 Malinovskiy, 

eager for the capture of Budapest to coincide with the 7 November anniversary of 

the Bolshevik Revolution , urged them on. 

To the commanders he wrote: "Comrades, 

exert yourselves so that we can lay the Hungarian capital at the great Stalin's feet. 

Fame and rewards await you; if you fail I 

fear for your health." 3 7 But on the 6th 

Forty-sixth Army took its troops and tanks 

out of the bridgehead and back to a line 

several miles to the south. The ammunition shortage and a small assault Armeegruppe Fretter-Pico had staged against its 

right flank, a much watered-down version 

of the counterthrust Hitler had called for, 

made the army command cautious. It also, 

probably, was keeping the experiences at 

Debrecen and Nyiregyhaza in mind. 

I n Budapest, desperately ignoring the 

future, the residents eagerly, it seemed to 

the Germans frivolously, grasped the 

chance to return to their everyday routines. 

Combing the city, the Germans and the 

Hungarian Gendarmerie rounded up the 

soldiers of Hungarian Third Army- those 

they could find- and returned them to the 

front. The trip was not a long one; it could 

be made by streetcar. Many of the Hungarian officers took to spending their nights 

at home. 

M alinouskiy M aneuuers 

By the time Forty-sixth Army gave up 

a /bid ., 4 Nov 44 ; Obkdo. ATmgr. Woehler. /0 

Nr. 215°144. an den Chef des Gen. Stabes der H . 

Gr. Sued, 8.11.44. H. Gr. A 75 1116 / 39 file. 

*' H . GT. Sued , Kriegstagebu ch Entwuerfe, Band 

4, Teil 4, 5 Nov 44, H. Cr. A 751116 / 38 file . 

I1 Friessner, Veratene Schlachten, p. 168. 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

the attempt, Malinovskiy apparently had 

concluded that Budapest could not be taken 

head-on. The Stavka, agreeing, directed 

him to put the Seventh Guards, Fifty-third, 

Twenty-seventh, and Fortieth Armies into a 

broad-front attack wes't from the Tisza.'8 

In the succeeding weeks he committed these 

armies in a series of enveloping maneuvers 

that very likely could not have been more 

elaborate had they been specifically designed to make the job look hard. 

At the same time, Friessner was trying 

to talk Hitler and Guderian out of trying 

to defend Budapest in a house-to-house 

battle. He resolved, if he could not hold 

the enemy on the edge of the city, to go 

behind the Danube and blow the bridges. 

The army group did not have the strength, 

he said, to fight the Russians and simultaneously suppress the "big-city mob." 

Hitler was unconvinced; still, he did not 

issue a definite order for a house-la-house 

defense until 26 November; as of that date 

the army group had not constructed any 

positions inside the city- for fear of inciting 

the people." 

Malinovskiy began the roundabout 

approach to Budapest on II November. 

His armies attacking away from the Tisza 

headed northwest, their extreme left flank 

skirting the northeastern corner of the Budapest bridgehead. On the fifth day they 

reached Hatvan and Miskolc. Hatvan, on 

the southern fringe of the Matra Mountains, controlled a low-lying corridor leading northwest to the Danube bend above 

Budapest. Miskolc, in the Sajo River 

valley twenty-five miles southeast of the 

Czechoslovakian border, was an iron, steel, 

• IVOV (R ), IV, 39'-

• H. Gr. Su~d. la K,i~gJlagebuch. Nov. 44, " 

Haelfte. '23. '26 Nov 44, H . Gr. A 751'26 / 40 file. 

381 

and arms-producing center situated astride 

a fairly easy route into Slovakia. The advance stopped on, roughly, the line Budapest bridgehead-Hatvan-Miskolc. The German front wavered and buckled but did not 

break. At Miskolc Armeegruppe Woehler 

also had to deal with an uprising; the factory workers had barricaded themselves in 

the plants to prevent the Germans from destroying them. 

On 22 November Forty-sixth Army sent 

several divisions across the Danube to Csepel Island, the elongated island south of 

Budapest. Friessner thought the stage was 

being set for the push into the city, but the 

Russians stopped after they had taken the 

southern half of the island. On the 25th 

they started taking units out of the Hatvan 

concentration and shifting them south to 

the Danube. Severe as the bloodletting at 

Hatvan and Miskolc had been, Army 

Group South considered itself fortunate. If 

Second Ukrainian Front had put all its 

weight behind a thrust straight through to 

Budapest, the consequences would have 

been much more serious!O 

Tolbukhin Joins In 

In the second half of November Third 

Ukrainian Front took its turn. After his 

main forces went north, Tolbukhin had 

moved his headquarters from Belgrade to 

Baja on the Danube in southern Hungary. 

On 7 November he had taken a small 

bridgehead on the Danube across from 

Apatin ten miles north of the Army Group 

F-Army Group South boundary. 

On the loth the OKW had extended the 

Army Group F zone north to Baja to give 

Weichs responsibility for defending his own 

IIG Ibid., 1';- :15 Nov ••. 
382 

flank, since Army Group South was too 

heavily engaged northeast of Budapest to 

maintain morc than a token defense by 

Hungarian Second Army on the Danube. 

That night the Russians had established a 

second bridgehead at Batina fifteen miles 

north of Apatin. It, too, was small, but the 

Russians soon began unloading bridging 

equipment there, a sign that they had something big in mind. Second Panzer Army 

was getting a division from Italy, and 

Weichs had directed Army Group E to send 

several divisions as soon as they could be 

brought through from the south; when they 

would arrive, however, was hard to tell. 

For the moment, Second Panzer Army, 

struggling to keep the Partisans off its supply lines, barely had enough troops to 

screen the bridgeheads. 

On 22 November Fourth Guards and 

Fifty-seventh Armies broke out of the two 

bridgeheads. During the next several days 

they cleared the southern tip of the DravaDanube triangle, and on the 26th took 

Mohacs. A major offensive west of the 

Danube was clearly in the making. Fiftyseventh Army struck west toward Pees and 

Kaposvar. Fourth Guards Army turned 

northwest toward the northeastern tip of 

Lake Balaton. 

Again Weichs' chief handicap was his 

own earlier indecision ; he had potential 

reserves but no prospect of bringing them 

to bear in time. Army Group E's with· 

drawal had gone without a hitch through 

mid-November. Then, on the 18th, Bulgarian Second Army had opened a strong 

attack north of Skoplje. The next day Balkan Air Force bombers had destroyed the 

Drina bridge at Visegrad, backing up truck 

and troop columns eighty five miles east to 

Kraljevo. In Albania strong partisan units 

hemmed XXI Mountain Corps in on all 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

sides as it tried to join the retreat. Army 

Group E had to put back into its own front 

some of the troops it had intended to release, and the rest were stalled in central 

Yugoslavia 200 miles and more from where 

they could do any good. 

Aided by a miners' uprising, the Russians 

took Pecs on 29 November. They were 

nearly out of the short range of hills between the Drava and the Danube and 

thereafter could be expected to gain speed. 

The Germans had so far not determined 

where to put the weight of the defense. 

Friessner was certain Tolbukhin would 

make a two-pronged thrust northwest, his 

left going toward the southern tip of Lake 

Balaton to take the oil fields and refineries 

near Nagykanizsa and his right going past 

the lake to envelop Budapest from the south 

and west. Weichs tended to agree but, 

when it came to deciding where to commit 

Second Panzer Army, was inclined to 

assume the offensive would go due west toward Zagreb to cut his main communications lines out of the Balkans. Friessner 

wanted Second Panzer Army to put its 

main effort north of the Drava and keep it 

there; Weichs would have allowed the army 

to withdraw behind the river, leaving Army 

Group South to find the means to defend the 

area between the river and Lake Balaton.'11 

On I December Tolbukhin definitely 

showed his hand; Fifty-seventh Army made 

a quick thrust northwest from Pees to 

Kaposvar, and Fourth Guards Army swept 

north along the Danube. That night Hitler 

gave Army Group South command of Second Panzer Army. The next day Friessner 

ordered the army to break contact with 

n Ibid., 15-30 Nov 44 ; O.B. Suedost (0. Kdo. 

H. Gr. F). 10 Kritgstogtbu ch Nr. 3. 7-30 Nov 44. 

H. Gr. F. 66135/1 file; Weichs Diary, 15-30 Nov 

44· 
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

Army Group F and concentrate on getting 

and holding a front between the southern 

tip of Lake Balaton and the Drava southwest of Nagykanizsa. 

Tolbukhin's northward thrust forced 

Army Group South into a round of unit 

shuffling that was nearly as wearing on 

troops and equipment as combat and that 

could quickly have proved fatal had the 

Russians themselves not been far below top 

form. Hungarian Second Army had practically vanished. To close the ensuing gap 

between Lake Balaton and the Danube, 

Fretter-Pico was having to put in German 

divisions from the Budapest-Hatvan area. 

The transfer of a panzer division from the 

Miskolc front led to the loss of that city by 

4 December. 

Budapest Encircled 

On 5 December, when Fourth Guards 

Army approached the northern end of Lake 

Balaton, the Second and Third Ukrainian 

Fronts resumed the drive to envelop Budapest. Forty-sixth Army, back under Third 

Ukrainian Front, attacked from Csepel 

Island across the west channel of the 

Danube to Ercsi. The Seventh Guards and 

Sixth Guards Tank Armies ripped through 

beyond Hatvan. On the 8th Malinovskiy's 

advance reached Vac on the Danube bend 

north of Budapest, and Tolbukhin's closed 

to the line Lake Balaton-Velencze Lake 

southwest of the city. 

The OKH decided to give Friessner two 

panzer divisions and three 60-tank Tiger 

battalions for a counterattack. The question was, Attack in the north or the south? 

Friessner saw the greater danger in the 

south, between the lakes; Guderian believed 

it was in the north. In the end, Hitler 

decided to deploy the reinforcements as 

383 

Friessner proposed, partly for tactical reasons, partly because he was worried about 

losing the bauxite mines situated between 

the lakes near Szekesfehervar. 

The decision made, Friessner waited for 

the panzer units to arrive and (or a change 

in the weather. Rain and above-freezing 

temperatures had turned the plain southwest of Budapest into a morass; in places 

the roads and entrenchments were under 

water. The weather, the need to rest their 

troops, and, apparently, another fit of caution like those they had several times recently displayed also held back the Russians in the Balaton-Velencze Lake-Budapest sector. If they moved before the German armor arrived and before the ground 

froze, Friessner would clearly be in trouble; 

they had the strength to keep going, if 

need be, with infantry alone. Armeegruppe 

Fretter-Pico was manning the Ig-mile front 

between Velencze Lake and the Budapest 

bridgehead with one volksgrenadier division 

(goo infantry), 800 police-mostly non· 

Germans- and some Hungarian hussars, 

altogether about 2,500 men. 

North of Budapest, after taking Vac, 

Sixth Guards Tank Army and Seventh 

Guards Army did not try to cross the 

Danube; instead, they went northwest into 

the Bocrzsenyi Mountains toward Sahy 

(Ipolysag ), the northern gateway to the 

western Hungarian plain. To defend Sahy, 

Friessner had to take a panzer division from 

the Budapest bridgehead and bring in the 

Dirlewanger Brigade from Slovakia where, 

since the end of the Warsaw uprising, it had 

been fighting partisans. The Dirlewanger 

Brigade had six full-strength battalionsthe concentration camps gave it a more 

than ample replacement pool- but committing it at the front was risky. Part of its 

troops were German Communists, and all 
384 

were considerably less than dedicated 

soldiers of the Reich. The officers were 

roughnecks and sadists, impromptu executioners rather than tacticians. On 14 

December, after one of Dirlewanger's battalion commanders put up a thin outpost 

line where he should have committed his 

whole battalion, the Russians took Sahy." 

The commander may have had a reason for 

keeping his men back: the next day a company of Communists deserted j and in the 

succeeding days the brigade slid into a state 

that by normal standards would have been 

considered mutiny-some troops shot their 

officers, some deserted, some did both. 

After it took Sahy Sixth Guards Tank 

Army did not make a major bid for a 

breakthrough into the plain deep behind 

Budapest, but Guderian thought it would. 

South of Budapest, meanwhile, the panzer 

divisions for the counterattack had arrived, 

but the rain continued. The weather, 

though colder, was not cold enough to 

freeze the ground solid, only enough to 

thicken the mud. Guderian, getting more 

nervous by the day, on q December urged 

Friessner to get going. The Army, he insisted, could not afford to have strong 

panzer forces standing around idle. Friessner answered that he had to wait for a 

heavy freeze; otherwise, if anything went 

wrong, he would lose all the tanks, and even 

if the attack succeeded, most of them would 

be disabled by the second day. After arguing it out with Fries.~;ner face to face on the 

18th, Guderian agreed to wait, provided 

the staffs and the infantry of the two panzer 

divisions were sent north in the interim to 

help hold the front west of Sahy. 

On 20 December Malinovskiy attacked 

UH. Cr. Sued , Ia KriegJtagebuch , Du. 43, I . 

Ha elfte, 1-15 Dec 44, H. Gr. A 75126 / 43 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

out of the Boerzseny Mountains south of 

Sahy, and Tolbukhin struck on either side 

of Velencze Lake. During the day a tank 

column going northwest from Sahy reached 

the Hron River, but south of Sahy the Germans had enough new strength coming in 

-the infantry of Friessner's panzer divisions- to prevent a penetration along the 

Danube. The next day the German armor, 

two of the panzer divisions without their 

staffs and infantry, counterattacked west of 

Velencze Lake, but they had to try to cover 

the whole front. While the German tanks 

roared back and forth burning up their 

gasoline, Tolbukhin's infantry, avoiding the 

roads, pressed along through the woods and 

still unfrozen swamps, keeping out of reach. 

Many of the tank commanders did not even 

realize what was happening until, seeking 

to refuel, found they had to fight their way 

to the gasoline dumps and, as often as not, 

discovered the Russians had been there before them. Guderian insisted that with 

what he described as "a tank armada larger 

than any ever seen before on the Eastern 

Front" the army group ought to be able to 

stop the Russians. Friessner replied that 

without infantry the tanks were helpless. 

By 22 December it was certain the Russians were trying for what the Germans 

called the "small solution," the close-in encirclement of Budapest. Except for a secondary strike to the northwest to take 

Szekesfehervar, Tolbukhin's thrust was due 

north from Velencze Lake toward Esztergom. When Friessner suggested taking the 

front on the Budapest bridgehead back to 

the inner ring to gain a division for the 

battle west of the city, the OKH replied 

that Hitler had "political scruples" about 

endangering the capital. Friessner answered that then Budapest would be encircled. On the night of the 22d the Oper-
RETREAT AND ENCIRCLEMENT 

ations Branch, OKH, telephoned that 

Friessner and Fretter-Pico had been relieved; Woehler would take the army group 

and General der Panzertruppen Hermann 

Balek would replace Fretter Pico. 

Guderian then told the new commanding generals they should have only one battle cry, "Attack!"-by patrols, locally or on 

a big scale. Germany, he said, could not 

afford a setback in Hungary that would 

force it to divert forces from the successful 

offensive in the west; the fate of the Reich 

was at stake. 

In the illusionary strategy being pursued 

in the German High Command Budapest 

had become linked with the Ardennes 

offensive. Hitler had said that losing Budapest would reduce the effect of the victory in the west by 50 percent. Moreover, 

and of greater significance for the future, 

to Hitler Budapest had become a symbol. 

as Stalingrad once had been: there could 

be no question of giving up the city even if 

it meant, as Guderian indicated, diverting 

strength from the offensive in the Ardennes. 

Tactically, as he promptly demonstrated, 

Woehler agreed entirely with Friessner. In 

his first telephone conversation as army 

group commander with Guderian, Woehler 

asked leave to take a division out of the 

Budapest bridgehead. Guderian answered 

that the decision given Friessner, not to take 

out troops or reduce the bridgehead, was 

irrevocable. Army Group South, he continued, had more armor "than any other 

place," enough to retake the Lake BalatonVelencze Lake-Budapest line; and he was 

going to send an officer from the OKH to 

investigate why that armor had not been 

properly used. 

In Budapest substantial military readiness for a siege had been achieved. The 

bridgehead line of defenses had been ex385 

tended around the city on the west, barricades and tank traps had been constructed, 

and buildings had been altered to house 

firing positions. Headquarters, IX SS 

Mountain Corps, under SS-Obergruppenfuehrer (Lt. Gen.) Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, had taken command of the four 

German and two Hungarian divisions and 

assorted smaller units in the bridgehead that 

were to form the garrison. In contrast, 

next to nothing had been done about the 

civilian population. Szalasi, who had originally not wanted to defend Budapest, had 

lately, after talking to Hitler, changed his 

mind; however, clinging to his supernumerary role, he disclaimed any direct responsibility for the city. The people, unwilling 

to abandon their homes and possessions, 

had ignored his halfhearted evacuation 

orders, and the Germans had been reluctant 

to enforce an evacuation because the small 

comer of Hungary they still held was already crammed with refugees and any more 

would have had to be taken into Austria or 

Germany proper. Budapest 'wore a holiday 

appearance; Christmas shoppers filled the 

streets; but deaths from malnutrition were 

beginning to be reported. The army group 

chief of staff had told Guderian that the 

army group opposed putting troops into a 

siege in which they would also have to stand 

off over a million starving people. Guderian had replied that the question was 

"immaterial." 

During the day on 23 December, Fourth 

Guards Army took Bicske and cut the road 

and railroad running west out of Budapest. 

That left only a mountain road into the 

city from the northwest, through Esztergom. On the afternoon of the 24th Woehler called Guderian again to argue that 

historically Budapest had always been defended only on the west bank of the 
386 

Danube. Guderian's mood had changed; 

he said he saw several possibilities, including giving up Budapest, but he would have 

to talk to Hitler first because the matter 

affected grand strategy. Three hours later 

he gave Woehler Hitler's decision : Budapest, including the bridgehead, was to be 

held; the army group could take up to two 

divisions out of the bridgehead; the OKH 

would send the Headquarters, IV SS 

Panzer Corps, and transfer the 55 Divisions 

Totenkopf and Wiking from Army Group 

Center; in the three or four days before the 

reinforcements could arrive "everyone who 

can carry a rifle" was to be put into the 

front around Budapest. 

By the 24th, it was too late to take divisions out of Budapest. The first divisions 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Woehler ordered to move had to be put into 

the line around the western suburbs. Army 

Group South no longer had any chance of 

stopping Tolbukhin's spearhead going 

north. On 26 December it reached Esztergom and completed the encirclement. The 

next day the Russians pushed the garrison 

back to the inner defense ring. On the same 

day, a surprise thrust west almost carried 

to Komarno, the best staging area for a relief operation. On the 28th, the Russians 

suddenly stopped. By then Hitler had 

several more divisions en route to Army 

Group South, and the plan for the relief 

was taking form. U 

is H. Gr. Sued, fa Kriegstagebuch. Du. 44, 2 . 

Haelfte, 15-28 Dec ....... H. Gr. A 75126 / 45 file . 
CHAPTER XVIII 

Defeat in the North 

The Finnish Armistice 

In the last two weeks of July 1944 the 

Finnish Army began to regain its equilihrium. On orders from the Slavka, Leningrad Front shifted to the defensive on the 

Isthmus of Karelia.· In East Karelia only 

Thirty-second Army, on Seventh Army's 

right cast of Ilomantsi, continued to advance, and it was not headed toward any 

strategic objective. The Stavka had apparently decided that to clinch the victory 

in Finland would take more troops and 

materiel than it was willing to spare from 

the offensive.o;; against Army Groups Center 

and North. 

Cobelligerenc), Dissolved 

To the Finns the fate of Army Group 

North was almost as momentous U'i that of 

their own army. Once the Baltic coasl 

was in Russian hands the sea routes to Germany, on which the Finns depended for 

foodstuffs and almost all of their military 

equipment and supplies, could he cut. The 

10" of Pskov on 23 July and of Narv" 

four days later were staggering hlows for 

them. The shock was intensified when. 

two days after Narva had fallen , Hitler 

ordered the 122d Infantry Division hack 

to Army Group North. Mannerheim 

l IVOV (R L IV, 143. 

lJ4-7B 0-68-26 

asked that the division depart through 

Hanko rather than Helsinki to avoid 

alarming the public. The OKW insisted 

that the decision to recall the division had 

only been made because the Finnish front 

was relatively quiet and assured Mannerheim that help would be sent if another 

crisis developed, but, under the circumstances, these explanations rang hollow. 2 

In a secret meeting on 28 July at Mannerhcim's country house in Sairala the Finnish leaders decided that Ryti should resign 

as President of Finland. On 4 August the 

Finnish Parliament elevated Manncrheim 

to the presidency without the formality of 

an election. The stage was set for a 

repudiation of the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement and a new approach to the Soviet 

Union. 

The Germans suspected that the change 

was not to their advantage. That Manncrheim intended to rally the national resistance appeared far less likely than that 

he would assume the mantle of peacemaker. Powerless to exercise any substantial influence over Finnish policy, they 

nervously hastened to reassure Mannerheim. On 3 August, in response to a Finnish inquiry concerning the military situation in the Baltic States, the OKW sent 

I OKW, WFSt , K.T .B. Aumrbeitung, Dtr noad· 

fiche Krie gsschau platL. 1.4-31.12.44. pp. 33-35. 

IMT Doc >795- PS. 
388 

Schoefner to report to Manncrheim in person and announced that Keitel would follow in a few days. 

To draw encouraging conclusions from 

the Army Group North situation required 

a man of Schoefner's zeal and determination. Filth Guards Tank Army was just 

then standing on his army group's rearward communications lines west of Riga. 

The repercussions were being felt in Finland: the Lufthansa had suspended commercial air traffic between Germany and 

Finland and the direct telephone connections had been broken. Undaunted, 

Schoerner promised the Baltic littoral 

would be held, Army Group North would 

be supplied by air and sea, and armored 

forces from East Prussia would reopen the 

land lines. Ironically, his promises were 

kept-at least, long enough for the Finnish 

to get out of the waf before they were completely isolated. 

In August the Finnish military position 

was, if only temporarily, as favorable as 

even a confirmed optimist would have 

dared predict a month or so earlier. Third 

Panzer Army opened a corridor to Army 

Group North. Between mid-July and midAugust the Russians reduced their forces 

on the Isthmus of Karelia by ten rifle divisions and five tank hrigades; on 9 August, 

in East Karelia, the Finnish Army ended its 

last major operation in World War II with 

a victory when the 14th Division, 2 1st 

Brigade, and Cavalr), Brigade trapped and 

all but wiped out two of T hirl),-secolld 

Army's divisions in a pocket ea<o;l of I1 o~ 

mantsi. 3 It appeared that as in the ,,,Tinter 

War of '939-40, although the Soviet 

• Eero Kuussaari and Vilho Niilemaa, Su omen 

Sola, 1941 - 1945 (Helsinki, 1948), pp. 249-53. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Union could claim a victory, its offensive 

fell short of the success it ought to have 

had, largely for the same reasons- underestimation of the Finnish capacity to resist 

and rigid, unimaginative Soviet tactical 

leadership. 

Keitel went to Helsinki on I7 August, 

carrying an oak leaf cluster for Mannerheim and a Knight's Cross of the Iron 

Cross for Mannerheim's chief of staff. To 

present an encouraging picture of the Ger~ 

man total situation at that time was 

enough to strain even Keitel's indomitable 

optimism. The Allied breakout in Normandy had succeeded, and the liberation 

of Paris was only days away. III southern 

France a secondary offensive was developing rapidly. In Italy the Gennans were 

driven back to the Gothic Line, and on 

the Eastern Front the Russians stood on 

the outskirts of Warsaw. The end for Germany suddenly seemed very closc, much 

closer than it was, 

Mannerheim took the Keitel visit as an 

opportunity to clear the air, possibly not so 

much for the Germans' benefit as to pave 

the way for an approach to Moscow. The 

60,000 casualties incurred during the summer, he said, had been replaced, but Finland could not endure a second bloodletting on that scale, Turning to what was 

probably also uppermost in Keitel's mind, 

the status of the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement, he stated that Ryti, in a desperate 

hour, had made a contract which had 

proved highly unpopular. Finland regarded 

that contract as nullifed by Ryti's resignation. Keitel's response, a lame refusal 

to accept the statement on the ground that 

he was not empowered to receive political 

communications, betrayed the Germans' 

impotence, 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

Decision 

In Finland, after the middle of the 

month, peace sentiment increased daily, 

and rumors of all sorts gained currency. 

The report that Rurnania had sued for an 

armistice injected a sense of urgency. On 

25 August, through its legation in Stockholm, Finland asked whether the Soviet 

Go\,ernment would accept a Finnish armistice delegation. An accompanying note 

stated that Mannerheim had told Keitel he 

did not consider himself hound hy the RyliRibhcntrop agreement. I A fonllal note 

repudiating the agreement was sent to Germany the following da),. 

In it' reply on 29 Aug,"t the SO\·iet 

Gm-crnmcnt made its willing-ness to receive 

a dclq~alion conti ngent all prior fulfill111('111 of t\\'o condition,,: Finland had to 

hreak ofT relations with Germany immediately and must order all German troops 

to leave Finnish territory within two weeks, 

at the latest by 15 September, and in case 

the Germans failed to comply the Finn" 

would take measures to intern them. The 

Parliament accepted the Soviet conditions 

on 2 September and on the same da\' 

approved a gO\'ernment motion to break 

rclatiom with Gcrmam', 

The decj ... ion took the German" hv slIrpri"e. Althoug-h the German 1 ini"~er in 

Heh.:inki had heen informed on 31 August 

that the negotiation" had heen opened, the 

Genllan" more than half expected the 

terms would pro\'e unac('cptahlc. In the 

pa"t a glance at the Soviet terms had heen 

the he.;;t meano; of inhihiting Finni<.; h peace 

"entiment. On 2 Septemher, in a la,,; t-

• OKW. WFSt. K .T.B. Ausarbt!itung, Da 'lOudficht! Krit!gJSchaupfatz. 1.4,-31.12.44. p. 4 7. IMT 

Doc 1795- PS. 

389 

minute attempt to inspire a repetition of 

that pattern, Generaloherst Lothar Rendulic, who had replaced Dietl in command 

of Twentieth ~[ountain Army after the 

lauer wa" killed in a plane crash on 23 

J une, had called onrvl annerheim and cmpha'iized that the Soviet demand,,; might 

provoke a con nict between Gerrnan and 

Finnic.;h troop" which, he maintained, 

would result in 90 percent lo~ses on both 

side.. since the he"t soldier:.; in Europe 

would he opposing eac~ other.~ 

The Finni"ih leaders were already fully 

aware of the risk" they ran in severing the 

tic" with Germany. One of these, the 

danger of an economic collap"c after German 'L"si.;; tance stopped , they had temporarily <I\'crtcd in Aug ust \\'hen Sweden 

ag-rccd to ('O\'er the Finni"h requirement" 

in g rain and some othcr foodstuffs for six 

months. Another was the pO""ihility that 

"ollie c1clllcnt", particularly in the Army, 

would rcfu\C' to acknowledge the surrender 

and create internal dissension or join the 

German". 1 t raised alongside Rcndulic's 

specter of a German-Finnish conniet that 

of a civil war. 

During the sumrner the Germans had , in 

fact, toyed with various ideas for keeping 

Finnish resistance alive by extra-legal means. 

In June, when Ribbentrop went to Helsinki, 

he had proposed, somewhat wildly, that the 

German ~1inister find "a thousand reliahle 

men to take over the Government." II Hitler. 

shortly hefore Dietl W:LS killed, had in'trllcted 

him to draw Finni"h troop.;; into TV"'cnticth 

Mountain Army in the ovent of " separate 

• (Geb.J AOk" 20, Du Obubeft!hlshabcr. la NT. 

356/44, an OKW, JYFSt. 4.9.44, AOK 20 6:16351 

12 file . 

• Blucrhcr. Gewndtrr m 'ische1! Diktatllr und 

Dt!Tll oArntie. p. 369. 
390 

peace.' Later Rendulic envisioned the 

122nd Infantry Division in southern Finland as a nucleus around which a Finnish 

" " istance could be built and proposed one 

of the Finnish generals as a man who 

might bc persuaded to take the lead.' 

None of these projects got beyond the talking stage; and onc which was tried after 

the armistice, reactivation of the traditional Finnish 27th Jaeger Battalion (a 

World War I German unit which had 

given the Finnish Army almost the whole 

of il~ officer corps), attracted only a scattering of voluntccrs.!I The ovcnvhelming 

majority of the Finnish population was 

willing to follow its government; moreover, the Finnish Government had been 

careful throughout the war to prevent the 

emergenre of potential Quislings. 

After announcing their intention to 

meet the Soviet conditions, the Finns 

formed an armistice delegation- which, as 

it developed, would also have to negotiate 

the peace terms a') well- under the leadership of Minister President Antii Hackzell. 

Mannerheim undertook to clarify the Finnish action in a personal letter to Hitler 

and explained that although Germany 

could nevcr he completely destroyed, Finland, a small nation, could be, both as a 

people and a nation j therefore, Finland 

had to make peace to preserve its existence. 

In a second Iettcr, to Stalin, he proposed 

a cease-fire to prevent further bloodshed 

while the negotiations were in progress. 

1 OKW, WFSt , K.T .B. Ausarbeitung, Der noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4-3 1.1:J.44, p. 43, IMT 

Doc 1795- PS. 

• (Ceb.) AOK 20, la Nr. 1010144. Notit fuer 

Besprechung O.B. mit Chef OKW, 14.8.44, AOK 

20 65635/1 2 file . 

• OKW, WFSt, K.T .B. Ausarbeitung, Der noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4.-3'.12 .44, p. 54. IMT 

Doc 1 795-PS. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Both sides accepted 0700 on 4 September 

as the time; although the Finns stopped 

their operations as agreed, the Russians, 

either by mistake or to underscore their 

victory, let theirs run another twenty-four 

hours. 1o 

The Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow on 7 September, but the Soviet Government delayed a week before presenting 

its terms. Restoration of the 1940 border 

waC) a foregone conclusion. In addition, 

the Soviet Union demanded the entire 

Pechenga region and a 50-year lease on 

Porkala, which would give it a base astride 

the main rail and road routes in southwestern Finland and within artillery range 

of the Finnish capital. The reparations 

were set at $300,000,000, to be paid in 

goods over a 5-year period." The Finnish 

Army was to withdraw to the I 940 border 

within five days and be reduced to peacetime strength within two and a half 

months. The Soviet Union was to be 

granted the right to use Finnish ports, airfields, and merchant shipping for the du10 Mannerheim, Erinnerungen, pp. 525. 529, 

530. 

1\ The reduction from the earlier demand for 

$600,000,000 was probably in part brought about 

in spring of 1944 by a Finnish propaganda effort 

that had used the opinions of Swedish economists 

to demonstrate to world opinion that the first demand could not be met and in part by a concession to American and British objections in principle 

to reparations. The Finns later maintained that the 

Soviet Union had only given the appearance of 

relenting. By insisting on using the year 1938 as 

the price ba$e and restricting the quantity of wood 

products it would accept, it nearly doubled the 

actual value of the reparations. The Soviet "take" 

was further increased at the 1945 Potsdam Conference by $60,000,000 as compensation for German property in Finland and property removed 

from the territory ceded to the Soviet Union. 

Later the reparations burden was eased somewhat, 

partly through British intercession, by extension or 

the payment period, first to six years and then to 

eight. 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

ration of the war against Germany; and a 

Soviet commission would supervise the armistice, which was to become effective the 

day it wao;; signcd.'~ 

On 18 September the Cahinet formally 

considered the terms but could not reach 

an agreement. The Soviet Union demanded that the signing he completed hy 

the following afternoon. Early on the 

morning of the 19th Parliament gave il' 

approval after being informed that, under 

the most favorable circumstanccs, Finland 

could not continue the war more than another three months. In Moscow the armistice L"i signed ~hortly hefore noon.' " 

Retreat From N orthem Finland 

Finland's appeal for an armistice left the 

Germans in a slate of painful indecision 

regarding Twentieth Mountain Army, 

mainly because none of the possible courses 

of action gave morc than a hope of avoiding a disaster. Although the army rema ined committed to the execution of 

Operation BIRKE, the withdrawal to a front 

in the extreme north of Finland, for the 

sake of the nickel mines, there was no assurance it would succeed in establishing a 

tenable front in the north, not to mention 

the near certainty that sooner or later its sea 

routes would be cut, making its downfall 

inevitable. On the other hand, the risks 

of a continuous withdrawal through the 

Finnish Arctic into Norway, with winter 

only weeks away, appeared equally great. 

The TANNE operations, the occupation 

of the Aland Islands and Suursaari, also 

presented several formidable disadvantages. 

TANNE WEST had been in doubt since its 

I. Mannl!rheim, Erinnerungen, pp. 531 , 543ff. 

U Ibid., pp. 532 -33. 

391 

inception because of Sweden's interest in the 

Aland Islands and the necessity for avoiding any provocation that might result in 

1o,,; of the Swedish iron are and ballbearin.':s. On 3 September Hitler decided to 

ahandon TANNE WEST hecause the division from Denmark assigned to the operation could not be spared,l~ On the same 

day, the Navy, which was responsible for 

TANNE OST, reported that it could not he 

executed hecausc no trained troops were 

availahle,'!' 

Birke 

On 6 September BIRKE began. (Map 

34) The decision to hold Pechenga and 

the region surrounding it in northern Finland had not heen revealed to the Finns. 

The operation was to he conducted at a 

deliherate pace that would allow enough 

time to transfer the army's supplies and 

keep the two southern corps, XXXVI 

Mountain Corp3 and XVIII Mountain 

Corps, in position to deal effectively with 

a Soviet or Finnish pursuit. 

A scriou<.; concern for the army's open 

right flank was allayed when the Finnish 

14th Divi~ion offered to keep contact on 

the right until XVI II Mountain Corps 

had withdrawn behind the horder. What 

would happen thereafter was a question on 

which German and Finnish opinion differed sharply. The Finns maintained that 

the Russians would not go beyond the 

1940 horder. They contended that, therefore, once the Germans were hehind the 

horder the withdrawal would hecorne 

u OKW, WFSt , K .T.B. Aus12rbeitrmg, Der noerdliche Kriegsschauplatz, 1.4·-3 1.12·44, pp. 46, 5~ . 

11 Office, Chief of Naval Operations, War Diary, 

German Naval Staff, Operations Divisions ( 1948 ) 

(hl!rl!after citl!d as SKL, Naval War Diary ), vol. 

61, p. 58. 
THE GERMAN WITHDRAWAL 

FROM FINLAND 6 S,pl,mb,r 1944_30 Jonuor~ 1945 

__ Gl_ FRONT lll<E ON 6 SV 1944 

_ _ S",,'T&N PMHJONS 

_ FOlltlfl{D LIIn: 

MAP 34 

Schulz""ollsl,Uul'lQ 

h,ld 10 310ct 

~ 

xxxxx 

KAREllAN 

~ 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 393 

.. 

GERMAN OUTPOST IN FlNLAND 

purely a routine troop and supply movemenlo Rcndulic claimed the Finns had 

either lost tOllch with reality or were being 

deliberately dishonest. He thought it extremely unlikely that the Russians would 

respect the horder and much more prohable that they intended to find or create 

an excuse for occupying all of Finland 

north of the line Tornio-Suomussalmi, essentially the Twentieth ~1ountain Army 

zone. Hl He ~l~ wrong, but as a prudent 

cOlllmander he could not well have asslimed otherwise. 

XVIII ~[ounlain Corps accomplished 

its march hack into Finland without a 

hitch. Elements of Twen t),-sixlh Army folI. (Geb.) AOK 20, la Kriegstagebuch, 1.9.-

,8.12.44. 6 Sep 44, AOK 20 65635/2 file. 

lowed to the border and stopped. XXXVI 

r.,IIountain Corps received two shocks: one, 

when the Nineteenth Army took advantage 

of the north flank extension it had made in 

the spring and cut the corps' main retreat 

route; the other, when T -34 tanks the Russians had somehow moved through the 

forests and swamps went into action deep 

in the corps' flank. Bul the corps had 

long ago built an alternate road south of 

the one that was cut, and the tanks' performance did not equal their initial psychological impact. 

As '5 Septemher approached, the last 

day of grace allowed under the armistice 

for a voluntary German evacuation, relaliom hetween Twentieth Mountain Army 

and the Finnish Anny remained cordial. 
394 

Rendulic admonished his troops to behave 

"loyally" toward the Finns, and the Finnish liaison officer at army headquarters 

disclosed that his command was willing to 

"make compromises" hut wanted to create 

the impression "outside" that it had broken 

with the Germans completely." On 13 

Septemher the Finns informed Twentieth 

Mountain Army that they would order all 

railroad rolling slock between Rovaniemi 

and Sail a moved west of Rovaniemi on 

the 14th but would do nothing if the Germans took pos.<;cssion of the equipment. 

Twentieth Mountain Army, in return, 

agreed to turn the port of Qulu over to 

Finnish troops on the I5th,III 

The first break in the spirit of mutual accommodation came from the German side. 

In thc sccond week of Septemher the Navy, 

after the naval liaison officer on Suursaari 

reported that the Finnish commandant on 

the j"land had said he would never fire on 

German troops, ~uddcnly changed its estimate of the prospects for TANNE OST. 

Encouraged, Docnitz declared that so important a strategic point ought not be 

ahandoned to the Soviet Union without a 

fight. When successive reports from the 

liaison officer indicated that the Finns 

might evacuate the island by the 12th, 

Hitler, on I I September, ordered a landing to be executed within the week. 

A naval task force embarked a regiment 

at Reval and began the landing on the 

morning of the 15th. After the first wave, 

1,400 men, was ashore the Finnish garrison opened fire, and shortly after daylight the Rmsians joined in with heavy air 

17 (Cd.) AOK ~O , 10 Krie3liagebuch , 1.9.-

18 /~ 44 , 14 Sep 44, AOK 20 65635 / 2 file. I' (Ceb .) AOK ~O, la Nr. 1194/ 44, Fortutzu'lg 

der Belprechungen mit dem Sonderbeauftragtn 

des Oberkommandol der {inn. Wehrmacht am 12.9. 

abendl, '3.9 .44, AOK 20 65635/ 5 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

strikes. The second wave could not be 

landed, and part of the first wave was left 

stranded on the beach. The Finns claimed 

700 prisoners.

1D 

Manncrhcim retaliated with a demand 

that Twentieth Mountain Army immediately evacuate the area south of the line 

Olllu-Suomussalmi and give up the Baltic 

coast from Oulu to the Swedish border. 

Rendulic refused but offered to negotiate 

for a gradual withdrawal. That suited 

Mannerheim who, having given the Soviet 

Union a demonstration of good faith at 

SlIursaari, apparently had no desire to become further embroiled with the Germans. 

By the 17th Rendulic's and Mannerheim's 

representatives had agreed on what the 

Finnish operations chief described as "fall 

maneuvers, IJ a phased withdrawal that 

would let the Germans set their own pace, 

keep the two forces out of each other's 

way, and at the same time let the Finns 

report progress "of the advance" to the 

Russians. The one question that most 

bothered the Germans was how long the 

Finns could keep their side of the bargain. 

Rendulic observed that, although they did 

not want to fight the Germans, they were 

determined to have peace at any price and 

would therefore accept all Soviet demands. zn 

For ten days the "fall maneuvers" went 

exactly as planned. On 26 September 

Twentieth Mountain Army reported that 

the Finns were following from phase line 

to phase line according to the agreement 

and leaving so much no-man's-land be-

" SKL, Naval War Diary, vol. 61 , pp. 156, 231 , 

'2 55.333,393; Mannerheim, E,innerungen, p. 53t . 

JO (Cd .) AOK :10, la, BelfJrechung des O.B. mit 

dem Sonderbeauftragten del {inn. H.Q . Obrtl. 

Haahti, 18.9.44; (Ceb.) AOK ~O, la N,. ':190/ 44, 

an OKW, WFSt, 20.9.44. Both in AOK '20 65635/ 

6 file . 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

twecn the forces that exchanges of fire were 

scarcely possihle. The Finnish panzer division wa'i committed along the Oulu-Kcmi 

road, the worst route that could have been 

chosen for an armored division because of 

the many river crossings, and the German 

troops were destroying the bridges and ferries as they passed, sometimes while the 

Finns stood by and watched." 

The picture changed suddenly on the 

morning of 28 September. A Finnish battalion opened fire at Pudasyarvi and during the day rejected several German offers 

to restore the trucc. At midnight Rendulic sent Finnish Lapland Command an 

ultimatum demanding that it reaffirm the 

agreement or take the consequences of full 

ho' tilities. On I October fighting broke 

out in the ports of Kemi and Tornio, 

where Finnish troops who had been guarding industrial plants took possession of several road and railroad bridges. During 

the day the Finnish 3d Division, coming 

hy sea from Oulu, began disembarking at 

Tornio. The incident of the bridges 

brought several excited messages from the 

OKW- Hitler apparently saw a tactical 

parallel with the Allied attack two weeks 

earlier on the Rhine bridges at Arnhem 

in Holland. Rendulic did not feel the 

bridges at Kemi and Tornio were that important, but to placate Hitler and because 

it might be worthwhile to keep the Finns 

from using the ports a while longer, he 

ordered counterattacks. 

On 2 October the Finns rejected Rendulie's ultimatum, on the grounds that an 

agreement contrary to the Soviet-Finnish 

armistice terms could not have been made 

and that any exchanges of information 

n (Geb.) AOK :10, la Nr. 1349/ 44. an OKW, 

WFSI, .6.9.44, AOK 20 65635/6 file. 

395 

which might have taken place between individuals were not binding on the Finnish command." The next day Rendulic declared that Twentieth Mountain 

Army would henceforth operate against 

the Finns "without restraint." Abandoning the policy, thus far scrupulously observed, of restricting property destruction to 

roads, railroads, and bridges, he ordered, 

liAs of now, all cover, installations, and 

objects that can be used by an enemy are 

to be destroyed.":!3 

The fighting in K~mi and Tornio lasted 

until 8 October. The one understrength 

division Rendulic was able to commit had 

only a small chance of success from the 

first and none at all after 6 October, when 

the Finnish II th Division landed at Kemi. 

The last two days of the battle were taken 

up entirely with extricating part of the 

division from a Finnish encirclement. On 

the 8th the Germans retreated north, and 

by then the main forces of the XXXVI 

and XVIII Mountain Corps had passed 

through Rovaniemi. The Finns, satisfied 

with their successes at Tornio and Kemi 

(they had brought in foreign journalists to 

witness the fighling), followed close behind the Germans but did not attack 

again.:!" 

Nordlicht 

In the meantime, the Operations Staff, 

OKW, had taken under review the whole 

German strategic position in Scandinavia 

and Finland. The review, concerned principally with the question of leaving Twenill Genlt. Siilasvuo. Be/h. d. /innischen Gru.ppe 

Lappland an dem O.B. d 20. (Ceb.) Armee. 2.10. 

44. AOK 20 65635/7 file . ., (Geb.) AOK 20, 1a Kriegstagebu. ch, 1.9.-

18.12.44,3 Oct 44, AOK 20 6563Shl: file. 

M Ibid., 3-10 Oct 44. 
396 

tieth :\(ountain Army in northern Finbnd, 

was tied also to the grm .... ing hostility of 

Sweden and to the increased strategic importance of the .L\orwcgian submarine bases, 

O\ving to the recent loss of the French bases 

and the projected resumption of full-scale 

<; ubmarinc wa rfare with improved V-boat 

tvpes. The Operations Staff concluded 

that the British na\"al and a ir forces formerly committed against the French bases 

would he lured north by the :\orwegian 

hases, Twentieth :\[ountain Army's vulnerahle sea su pply lines, and the desire to 

prc\"ent the So\"iet 'Cnion's getting a foothold in nonhern Scandina\"iu. It also 

found that to hold northern Finland was 

no longer worth the risk since the war 

production chief. Speer, had recently 

stated that the stockpiles of nickel in Germany were adequate. On the other hand, 

taking Twentieth :\[ou nta in Army into 

:\orway offered a chance to strengthen the 

:":orwcgian defenses against the Allies a nd 

against Sweden. On 3 October. after 

seeing the Operations Staff's conclusions. 

Hitler appro\'ed a withdra\\'al into ~orway to the Lyngen position, a potentially 

a lmost impregnable short line across northern :\orway from the Lyngen Fiord to the 

northernmost tip of Sweden. In the next 

two day~ the preliminary orders were sent 

to Twentieth .\fountain Army and the 

code name ::\"ORDLICHT was a.ss ned. ~.) 

Tactically, ;\"ORDLICHT was an extension 

of IltRK £ with the added problems of setting XIX ~[ ountai n Corps, east of Pechenga, in motion and e\'acuating the army's 

eight months' stockpile of supplies. As an 

expedition by a 200,ooo-man army with 

all its equipment and suppLies across the 

-.s OKW. WFSt , K .T.B. AUIa,b~itung , Da naadliche KriegHchauplatt, 1.4.-31.12.44, pp. 63-66. 

IMT Doc I 795-PS. 

ST.-\LJl\GRAD TO BERLJ:\ 

Arctic in winter it had no parallel in 

military history. The season was already 

far advanced. Reichsstrasse 50) the German-built coastal road in northern :\orway. was normally considered impassable 

between Kirkenes and Lakselv from early 

October to the first of June because of 

snow; therefore, even though the fall of 

t 944 was unu,uall\" mild, X IX ~[ untain 

Corp3 would need luck and would ha\'e 

( 0 be west of La kseh" by 15 ;;\o\'ember at 

the latest. XXXVI ~[ou ntain Corps could 

lISC an all-weather road from h 'alo to Lakseh-. The road XVII [ ~[ untain Corps 

would lL'C was about half completed between Skibotten and .\[uonio and unimpro\'ed between '\luonio and RO\'aniemi: 

its low-carrying capacity was at Jea'it in 

part compensated for by its heing the most 

sou therly and direct route to the Lyngen 

Fiord. 

\\-hile the roads and weather posed unprecedented technical problems, the tac· 

tical situation was certain to be dangerous 

and could at any moment become catas· 

trophic. The Finn ish .-\rm\" could, potentially, stage offensives with superior forces 

against hoth the XXXVI and XVI II 

~[ oun tain Corps. The Russians could be 

trusted not to let X IX .\fountain Corps 

e;;cape without a fight and beyond that had 

a \'ariety of choices_ They could try to 

wavla~' XXXVI ~[ unt ain Corps at I\'alo; 

strike across the head of the Gulf of Bothnia and through northern Sweden to cut 

the army off at ::\"an'ik, demanding from 

Sweden use of the Lulea-:\"arvik railroad 

as a quid pro quo for the Germans' use of 

the Swedish railroads in 194 I; or they 

could carry the pursuit through northern 

Finland into ~orway. 

From all appearances British and .-\merican inten'ention was only slightly less cer-
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 397 

-

GERMAN TWENTIETH MOUNTAIN ARMY TROOPS WITH REINDEER AND SLEDS 

tain than trouble with the Russians. 

Reichsstrasse 50, broken by numerous ferry crossings and, lying close to the coast for 

long stretches, was temptingly vulnerable 

to naval and air strikes. Not to be taken 

lightly either was the danger from Sweden, 

which having abrogated its trade agreements with Germany appeared to be veering toward a complete break. Twentieth 

Mountain Army was already under standing orders to avoid any incident that could 

be construed as a provocation, a difficult 

task since XVIII Mountain Corps' route 

of march took it directly along the Swedish 

border for several hundred miles. 

The Bailie in the Arctic 

How the first phase of NORDLIcHT would 

be executed was determined by the Russians who, after a build-up the Germans 

had watched apprehensively since midSeptember, opened an offensive against 

XIX Mountain Corps on 7 October. (Map 

35) XIX Mountain Corps stood in the 

line it had held since late sumrncr 194 I . 

On the left the 6th Mountain Division 

held the fortified front on the Litsa River, 

and on the right the 2d :Mountain Division manned the strongpoint line stretching 

southwest toward Ivalo. The Divisions-
' . • . , 

.. 

• t--! ~Z80CT , 

" ~ J: , 

. , " " ." 

~ " ., . " 

:. ~ . ......... ,'" 

"".-" 

" 

: 

MAP 35 

r~l '" 

L_J 

",,"" 

THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE AGAINST 

XIX MT CORPS 

7-28 Ocfober 19 4 4 

TTm'TTT GERMAN ~OSITlON, DATE 1"'[HC.t.f[O 

19 .1 1,0 'f MILU 

( "iilii,,1 i 10 0 10 o( ILOM[T£II$ 

'" IXXXII 

xxxx r-----l FOURTEENTH L--J 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

gruppe van der Hoop held a front across 

the neck of the R ybatchiy Peninsula, and 

the 210th Infantry Division manned the 

coastal defenses between Pechenga Bay 

and Kirkenes. Opposite XIX Mountain 

Corps, Fourleenlh Army had been brought 

up to a strength of five rifle corps, 97,000 

mcn against the mountain corps' 53,000. 

On the R ybatchiy Peninsula the N ort hern 

Defense Area had two naval brigades." 

X IX Mountain Corps, nevertheless, had 

to make a stand to protect the corps rC4 

treating from the south and to safeguard 

the tremendous stockpiles of supplies and 

equipment which were beginning to be 

evacuated. 27 

On the morning of 7 October CX X X I 

Rifle Corps hit the 2d Mountain Division 

strongpoint line at the division boundary 

south of Chapr Lake. XCIX Rifle Corps 

joined in on the right. The two corps, 

supported by artillery, aircraft, and- to the 

Germans' surprise-tanks, swept over several of the German strongpoints and by 

noon had almost reached the Titovka 

River on the Finnish-Soviet border. The 

2d Mountain Division, badly shaken, retreated toward Luostari along the Lan 

road. At Luostari the army's main artery, 

the Arctic Ocean Highway, was threatened. 

Rendulic ordered the 6th Mountain Division to evacuate the Litsa front and release 

troops to protect the highway. 

On 9 November CXXVI Lighl Rifle 

Corps attacked around the 2d Mountain 

K lVOY(R ), IV, 368. 

IT Anticipating that Twentieth Mountain Army 

might be isolated, Hitler in 1942 had ordered the 

army's supply reserves built up. By the time NORDLIC HT was executed many of the items in the army 

depots had become, as one officer put it, "rare commodities" in Germany, and the chances of the 

army's being resupplied when it reached Norway 

were not good. 

399 

Division south flank toward the Arctic 

Ocean Highway. On the Lan road the 

division's north flank was driven back, and 

a gap opened between it and the flank of 

the 6th Mountain Division. Rendulic dispatched as reinforcements a regiment and 

two battalions from XXXVI Mountain 

Corps. 

The 10th was a day of crises. At midnight the 121h Naval Brigade staged a 

landing on the mainland west of the Rybatchiy Peninsula and during the day 

turned the flank of Divisionsgruppe van 

der Hoop, forcing it back from the neck of 

the peninsula. Between the 2d and 6th 

Mountain Divisions CXXXI Rifle Corps 

sent two regiments due north through the 

gap to cut the Russian road, the 6th 

Mountain Division's main route west. Off 

the 2d Mountain Division's right flank 

CXXVI Lighl Rifle Corps made good its 

threat of the day before and cut the Arctic 

Ocean Highway five miles west of Luostari. Rendulic ordered the 6th Mountain 

Division to clear the Russian road and 

then withdraw to the line Pechenga-Luostari. He also dispatched the 163d Infantry Division north from Rovaniemi by 

forced marches and ordered the Kolosyoki 

Nickel Works destroyed. The latter was a 

demolitions job of major proportions." 

In the next two days the 6th Mountain 

Division reopened the Russian road and, 

together with Divisionsgruppe van der 

Hoop, withdrew toward Pechenga. The 

2d Mountain Division managed to hold 

the road junction at Luostari. The Rus-

• The Kolosyoki works had been completely 

bombproofed. Some of the installations were buried 

in bunkers deep underground ; others, left on the 

surface, were protected by massive concrete "bells." 

Reputedly the works had stronger antiaircraft defenses than any other spot on the Eastern Front. 
400 

sians by then held about five miles of the 

Arctic Ocean High\vay. To prevent their 

expanding their hold west, Kampfgruppe 

Ruebel (two regiments of the 163d InfantI]' Division under the commanding 

general, Generalleumant Karl Ruebel j set 

up a screening line straddling the highway. 

On 13 October, while Kampfgruppe 

Ruebel and the 2d ~Iountain Di\'ision 

attacked north and south in an unsuccessful attempt to clear the highway, C.L\T I 

Light Rifle Corps sent a force north between them and cut the Tamer road. 

thereby effecti\'cly i'Obting the 2d and 6th 

~lountain Divisions and the Divisionsgruppe van clef Hoop. 5ince in the rocky 

tundra large units could not mo\"c off the 

roads. [n onc '\'cck Fourt eenth Army had 

destroyed a front on , ... ·hich the Germans 

had lavished three vears labor. Rcndulic 

ordered the di,"j"ion, 10 gi\'C tip Pechenga 

and Luostari and withdr~l\'''' to the ::\orwegian border. 

Even the Soviet troops, most of them 

specialiy trained, could not maintain a fast 

pace across the tundra for long. On the 

14th they stopped to regroup. The three 

German di\-isions fought their way through 

on the Tarnct road during the next se\Tral 

days, but by the time they were out the 2d 

~[ountain Division was in such poor condition that it had to be sent south to rest 

and refit behind Kampfgruppe Ruebel. 

On the 18th, expecting the Russians to 

start moving again in a day or so, Rendulic 

ordered Kampfgruppe Ruebel to withdraw 

to Salmyarvi in three days and, since that 

would give the Russians access to the road 

that had been used to transport the nickel 

ore between Kolosyoki and Kirkenes, told 

the 6th ~!ountain Division to defend the 

southern approaches to Kirkenes. When 

STALI:\"GR...-\D TO BERLI~ 

these movements were completed XIX 

~!ountain Corps and Kampfgruppe Ruebel would be separated and facing oppo<ito 

directions. 

On 18 October Fourt emth Army resumed the ofl"ensi\'e, putting four of its 

corps into an attack on the Kampfgruppc 

Ruebel. The kampfgruppe escaped the 

full force of the frontal attack by drawing 

back along the Arctic Ocean Highway. hut 

its position became precarious the next day 

when CXXVll Light Rifle Corps attacked 

around the Rank and threatened to cut 

the highway behind it. To keep its line 

of retreat open il had to fall back to the 

Kaskama Lake narrow". SO\'iet pressure 

then slackened as the kampfgruppe continued its withdrawal to h·alo. 

CXXXI Corps attacked the 6th ~fountain Division front screening Kirkenes. 

aiming its thrust at Tamet. where the hydroelectric plant that supplied po\vcr to 

Kirkenes was located. Bv 22 October the 

plant was under fire. and Rendulic. informing the OKW that without eleclricity 

to operate dock facilities ships could not 

come into Kirkenes, requested permission 

to stop evacuating su pplies and operate according to the tactical situation. After 

several hours' delay the permission \,,'as 

granted, and subsequently the troops easl 

of Kirkenes feU back rapidly, the last passing west onto Reichsstrasse 50 on the 24th. 

After rearguard actions on the 27th and 

28th the Soviet pursuit slowed down. Of 

the corps' supplies one-third (45,000 tons) 

had been saved." 

• XIX (Ceb .) A.K .. Kurzbericht ueber die 

Kamplhandlungen im PetStml O und Varangerraum 

c.·om 7.10.44,5,11.44. :\OK ~o 75034/ 1 file ; (Ceo.) 

AOK ~O. la Kriegstagebuch , 1.9, 18./~ 44. ~8 

Oct 44. -",OK ~o 6563512 file . 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

On 26 October the withdrawal from the 

Varanger Peninsula began. The Russians 

followed as far as Tana Fiord. Ahead of 

XIX Mountain Corps two Army of Norway divisions had moved in hetween 

Ski bot ten and Laksclv to defend the 

vulnerable points on Reichsstra').')c 50 until 

Twentieth Mountain Army had passed. 

On orders from Hitler, intended to prevent 

either the Soviet Union or the free Norwegian Government from taking a foothold north of Lyngen Fiord, Rendulic instituted a scorched-earth policy. The 

civilian population (some 43,000 persons) 

was evacuated, mostly by small hoal~ to 

avoid jamming the Reich~stra~sc.:HI 

Nordlicht Completed 

In the XXXVI Mountain Corps zone, 

in mid-October, the 169th Infantry Division occupied the SCHUTZWALL position, 

which had heen constructed south of Ivalo 

for BIRKE. On the east, in the direction of 

Lutta and Ristikcnt, it established a screening line. There on 2 I October the corps 

experienced a brief alarm when radio 

monitors identified the Soviet Nineteenth 

Army headquartcrs and three divisions in 

the Lutto Valley. However, ground reconnaissance established that the radio 

traffic was a dcception. 31 

After the units of the former Kampfgruppe Ruebel passed through Ivalo toward Laksclv, the Lutta front was abandoned on 30 October, and the withdrawal 

from the SCHUTZWALL position hegan the 

10 (Geb.) AOK 20 , O. Qu./Qu. 1 Nr. 5001 / 44 . 

Bericht ueber Evakuierung Nordwegens, '5.12.44, 

OKW/138.2 file. 

IL (Geb .) AOK 20 , 1a Nr. 467/ 44, an Cen. Kdo. 

XXXVI (Cd .) A.K., 21.10 .44, AOK 20 65635112 

file. 

401 

next day. On 2 November the 2d 

Mountain Division entered Reichsstras.'ie 

50 at Laksrlv to begin the final stage of the 

XIX and XXXVI Mountain Corps retreat. The next day the rear guard of the 

169th Infant.ry Division left Ivalo." 

On 29 October, after holding Muonio 

until the large ammun ition dump there 

had been evacuated, XVIII Mountain 

Corps hegan falling hack to the STURMBOCK position west of Karcsuando. There, 

in the fortifications constructed for BIRKI~J 

the 7th Mountain Division stayed behind 

to hold the narrow strip of Finnish territory projecting northwestward between 

Sweden and Noway as a temporary flank 

protection for the Lyngen position and the 

units coming west on Reichsstrassc 50. 

On 18 December the rear guard on 

Reichsstrasse 50 passed Billefiord. The 7th 

Mountain Division stayed in the STURMBOCK position until 12 January 1945 when 

it began a leisurely march baek to the 

Lyngen position, which in the meantime 

had heen manned by the 6th Mountain 

Division. 

At the end of January NORDLICHT wa' 

terminated. At the extreme northwestern 

tip of Finland a small slice of Finnish 

territory that had been included in the 

Lyngen position stayed in German hands 

until the last week of April 1945. East 

of Lyngen Fiord to the Varanger Peninsula, Norwegian Finnmark was empty except for small German detachment'i at 

Hammerfest and Alta that continued evacuating supplies until February 1945. In 

January the Norwegian Government scnt 

a token police force from England and 

:L2 OKW, WFSt, K .T.B. Au.sarbeitung, Der noerd. 

liche KriegHchauplatz, 1.4 .-3'.12.44 , p. 75, IMT 

Doc I 795- PS. 
ARMY GROUP NORTH 

RETREAT TO COURlAND 

14 Septlmb'r-23 October 1944 

,.......,,...... ....... _ .......... . ........... .......... "" ........ oc. 

'r;. I ;. 'r,;o Z ~.!_.!: .... 

MAP 36 

r NOlttll" """ L_J 

• 

I 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

Sweden; and thereafter the Soviet forces 

gradually withdrew, leaving only a detachment at Kirkenes. 3J 

Although Operation NORDLlcHT constituted an outstanding display of skill and 

endurance, good fortune was possibly 

equally significant in its success. Of the most 

serious dangers and threats which had been 

anticipated none materialized . The 

weather was as favorable as could have 

been expected in the Arctic, alld winter set 

in much later than usual. Most fortunately of all for Twentieth Mountain 

Army, NORDLICHT was executed exactly at 

the time when the resources of both the 

Soviet Union and the Allies were stretched 

to the limit on the main fronts, so that the 

Soviet effort was modest and the Allies 

put in no appearance at all. 

Army Group North's Retreat 

to Courland 

The Finnish armistice, Twentieth 

Mountain Army's withdrawal, and the 

failure to take Suursaari almost completely 

invalidated Hitler's long-standing rationale 

for holding the northward extension of the 

Eastern Front; and tactically Army Group 

North was, by mid-September 1944, in a 

most dangerous position. (Map 36) The 

front, from the latitude of Koenigsberg 

north, had been reduced to a serpentine 

coastal strip averaging 70 to 80 miles in 

width and somewhat over 400 miles long. 

It was pinched near the center, in the 

Tukums-Riga area, where Fifth Guards 

Tank Army had broken through to the 

&'I Ibid" p. 75; (Geb.) AOK 20, Kriegstagebuch, 

1.9.- 18.12.44, '24 Oct-IS Dec 44. AOK 20 656351 

'2 file; (Geb.) AOK 20, fa Kriegstagebu ch, '9.,:J. 

44- 5 .18.45. passim, AOK 20 75038/'2 file. 

403 

coast at the end of July, to a width of less 

than 20 miles. Essentially, Army Group 

North and Third Panzer Army were committed in an elongated, meandering beachhead, vulnerable everywhere and dangerously shallow. 

Vasileuskiy's September 0 IJensiue 

In August, Vasilevskiy took in hand the 

planning and co-ordination for the three 

Baltic fronts. Govorov's Leningrad Front 

stayed under the direct control of the 

Stauka, and its left boundary was shifted 

south to give it the sector flanking Tartu 

between Lake Peipus and the Vortsjaerv. 

In September Govorov transferred Second 

Shock Army from the vicinity of Narva to 

south of Tartu for a thrust north behind 

Armeeabteilung Narva. The Baltic fronts 

deployed for converging thrusts toward 

Riga, each initially putting two armies into 

its main effort. That of General Armii 

I. I. Maslennikov's Third Baltic Front was 

to go southwest via Valga and Valmiera. 

Second Baltic Front, under Yeremenko, 

was to strike due west from Madona. 

Bagramyan's First Baltic Front had the 

shortest distance to go, thirty-five miles 

from Bauska to Riga. 3

" 

That Bagramyan had a possibility for a 

second, most crucial thrust- to the Baltic 

coast across the Tukums-Riga corridorhas been omitted from Soviet accounts of 

the planning. However, contemporary 

German intelligence reports show that in 

addition to the Fourth Shock and Fortythird Armies at Bauska, Bagramyan had a 

stronger force, the Fifth Guards Tank, 

Sixth Guards, and Fifty-first Armies, deH fVOV(R ). IV, 345-46; Platonov, Vtoraya . 

Mirovaya Voyna , ' 93!r45, p. 618. 
404 

ployed in the vicinity of Jclgava.'" If he 

and Vasilevskiy had not in facl planned to 

use those armies to cut the Tukums.Riga 

corridor, they committed, to say the least, 

a remarkable tactical oversight. 

The Soviet build-up proceeded slowly 

enough for the Germans to be able to full ow 

il in detail. Army Group North's problem 

wa.< dismayingly simple. The prudent and 

ohvious decision would have heen to take 

the army group out of the Baltic States 

while the Tukums-Riga corridor was still 

open. Since, as wa~ also ohviolls, there 

was almost no likelihood of that decision 

heing madc, the army ~rollp had constructed a network of rearward positions. 

The most important- as the only oncs with 

a chance of heing held -were the Wenden 

position, a quarter circle on a 6o-milc 

radius from Riga; the Scgcwold position, 

tcn miles inside the Wenden position; and 

the Mitau-East and Dvina positions, on an 

almost straight line heginning twenty miles 

south of Riga and connecting with the 

Segewold and Wenden positions on the 

east. 

Even Schocrncr could not hring himself 

seriously to contemplate holding Estonia 

and northern Latvia against a determined 

Soviet attack; the Russians were 35 miles 

fronl Riga un the south and 50 miles from 

the coast helow the Vortsjaerv, while in 

Estonia Armeeahteilung Narva's left flank 

wa~ 120 and its right flank 220 miles from 

Rig-a. The army /:roup had prepared Map 

Exercise ASTEK, which waco; called that hecallSC of Hitler's antipathy to planning for 

retreats, hut was actually an advance directive to Arnwl'ahteilung Narva and EightII OKfI GenStdH , OfJ . Abt. IIlb , Ptlu/ Nr. 

Ul104, I.age Osl, Stand, 1.9 .44 abds. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

eenth Army for a withdrawal to the Wenden position. 'tJ 

The OKH, however, intent on holding 

the Tukums-Riga corridor, on 12 September instructed Third Panzer Army to reinforce its left flank corps for an attack from 

Auee into the rear of First Baltic Frollt's 

concentration around and west of Ballska." The chances of the army's being 

able to accomplish that feat vanished on 

the morning of 14 September when First, 

Second, and Third Baltic Fronts attacked 

and First Baltic Front made a dent four 

miles deep in the Gennan line. The other 

two front< did not do as well either that 

day or the next, but on the 15th Bagralllyan's force, taking advantage of the foothold in the German line it had gained on 

the first day, drove a spearhead through to 

the Mitau-Ea.l;j,t position, twenty-five miles 

south of Riga." Sehocrner asked for permission to evacuate Estonia, stating that it 

was "the last minute to get away from 

there at all."" The next day he flew to 

Fuehrer headquarters to report in person. 

As always, Hitler was reluctant to 

approve a retreat. With inverse logic, he 

argued that II I SS Panzer Corps on the 

outer flank between Lake Peipus and the 

Gulf of Finland would not he ahle to get 

away in any event. He also claimed that 

the Soviet Union had peace feelers out, 

and he needed the Baltic territory to hargain with. He hemoaned, al;j, in every 

previous discussion of the suhject, the 

·Obkdo. H . Cr. Nord . la Nr. :100/ 44. Be/ehl 

/I.lU Durt h/uehrlHiR PlarlSfJiel "Aster." '4.9.44 , in 

MS # P- 114a in (Sixt ), Teil V. Anlage,. . 

n Pz. AOK .1. la Kriegstagebu ch, 1.- 30.9.44, I~ 

Sep 44. Pz. AOK ... 64190/ 7 file . 

• Platonov, Vt oraya Mirovaya Voyna , '939-45. 

P· 61 9· N MS # P- 114a (Sixt), Teil V , p. 907 . 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

Navy's loss of its Baltic training area. In 

the end he gave a conditional "yes'" after 

being assured that under Exercise ASTER 

the withdrawal would not begin for another two days and could he canceled in 

the meantimc,-4O 

During the day on the 16th, Third Panzer Army started its attack. None of the 

three divisions committed found a soft spot 

in the Soviet front, and by day's end they 

were pushed out of the few places they had 

managed to penetrate. That night Guderian told Reinhardt that because "great 

things" wcre in progress in foreign policy 

(the alleged Soviet peace feelers? ) Hitler 

"absolutely had to have a success either 

at Third Panzer Army or at Army Group 

North." The "instant" he could see that 

his attack was not going to succeed, Reinhardt was to report it to Hitler and get 

ready to transfer the divisions to Army 

qroup North.'l 

On the 17th Second Shock Army struck 

north past Tartu, breaking Armeeabteilung 

Narva's hold between the Vortsjaerv and 

Lake Peipus. That night Schoerner drastically revised ASTER. He ordered III SS 

Panzer Corps to make the I20-milc march 

from the Narva River to Paernu on the 

Gulf of Riga by the 20th. Its baggage and 

supply trains were to be evacuated through 

Tallinn or shipped across the straits to the 

Baltic islands" The withdrawal therewith 

became a more or less controlled flight 

with very slender prospects of success. The 

«I Tagebuch Generalobusl Jodi, Chef des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes des Oberkommandos der 

HI ehrmacht (hereafter cited as Jodi Diary ), 16 

Sep 44, IMT Docs IBo9-PS and IBII - PS. 

41 Pz. AOK 3, Ia Kriegstagebuch, 1.- 30.9.44, ,6 

Sep 44, Pz. AOK .1 6419017 file. 

n Excerpt from H . Gr. Nord, Ia Kriegstagebuch, 

18 Sep 44, in MS # P- I 14a (Sixt ), Teil V, Anlagen. 

405 

corps might run away from onc encirclement only to be caught in another; Eighteenth Army had reported that it could not 

hold on to the southern tip of the Vortsjaerv any longer,U 

For several crisis-ridden days the fate of 

Army Group North hung by a thread that 

miraculously never quite broke. Schoerner 

gave Eighteenth Army a clutch of antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and small 

motorized detachments from Armeeabteilung Narva and ordered it to keep its grip 

on the Vortsjaerv." Subsequently the 

army's line buckled but did not break. 

On I 7 and I 8 September Third Panzer 

Army's attack picked up momentum and 

drove a I a-mile-deep wedge into Bagramyan's flank; but by the 18th the army was 

in the uncomfortable position of not being 

able to keep going, because Army Group 

North needed reinforcements, and of not 

being able to stop completely, because 

that would free too many Soviet troops. 

Reinhardt believed that he had , nevertheless, at a critical moment prevented Bagramyan from putting his reserves into the 

attack north of Bauska and from developing a second thrust across the TukumsRiga corridor.405 

On the I gth a spearhead from Bagramyan's First Baltic Front went past Baldone 

nearly to the Dvina ten miles south of 

Riga, but it did not have enough force to 

press farther. On the 20th III SS Panzer 

Corps reached Paernu, having disengaged 

on the Narva front with astounding ease. 

Meanwhile the other Armeeabteilung 

N arva corps1 II Corps, had executed a 

n AOK 18 Fu ehrungsab teilung Kriegstagebu ch , 

Teil4h, 17 Sep 44. AOK 18 52614/3 file. 

«Ibid. , 18 Sep 44. 

~ Pz. AOK 3, Ia Kriegstagebu ch, 1.-30.9. 44. 18 

Sep 44, Pz . AOK 3 64 I 90/7 file . 
4111; 

130-degree turn pivoting on the northern 

end of the VOftsjacrv. 4

•

J 

Hitler was still angling for a victory of 

some sort. On the 20th he transferred 

Third Panzer Army to Army Group North 

and authorized Sdl0crncr to continue the 

ASTER withdrawal past the Wenden position to the Scgcwold pusition. The infantry 

divisions freed hy taking Eighteenth Army 

and Armccahtcilung Narva into the :-;hurlcr 

line were to be used to relieve several panzer divisions in the Third Panzer Army 

front on the 'l'ukums-Riga corridor. 

Schoefner was to plall II COllllteroITcllsivr 

using the panzer divisions to altack from 

west of Shaulyay and infantry divisions in 

a converging- thrust from nurth uf Ibusk'l.H The ohjt:ctivl' was to tlcstroy Hagralllyan's forn's in tht: salienl helow Riga 

and push the fronl nul to a straighl line 

hctwccli thl' Scgt'wold position and Shaulyay. 

Between 20 and 14. Seplt'llIhn Va-.:ill"vskiy tricd again to at:hicvc his orig-inal oJ,-

jcetive of cutting up and dl'slroyillg Arm)' 

Group North. Using half it dozl'n divisions that 110 longtT had to he hdd hack 

after Third Panz('f' Army's olT('nsivl' sill 1-

sided on th(: 19th, Forty-third Arm)1 

pllshed dose!' to Riga. On tilt' 12d Sl'l:ow/ 

/Jaltit; Front, with Illas."ied lanks and infantry, smashed X Corps wesl of Madonil, 

and Third /Ja/tir Front hroke through pil"it 

Valga. 

South of Riga thl' SS Pallzn Cn.'lIatiia 

Division Nordland, after forenl marches 

that in fOllr days hrought it 2:)0 miles from 

the outermost flank Oil the GIIH of Finland, 

- -

." MS # I' "411 , (Six! ), ·1'eil V , p. 91:1 . 

<l Ext·'.,pt fnoll1 ()KII llI·ilt·" to Army Gn'lIp 

Non!. , :.lCI SI'P 44, ill MS # 1' 114a (Sixt ), Te:il 

v . Alt/(I/.:ell . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

arrived jusl in time on the 22d to prevent 

a calastrophe. Againsl X Corps Yercmcnko 

failed lo (;ommil his mohile reservcs in timc 

lo exploit the advanlagc."11 Third Ball;c 

Front's thrust carried to Vall1liera, hut 

lhat was nol deep enuugh lo do more than 

complicatc the German wilhdrawal SUIlIt·-

what. On the 25lh Sixtcenth ArJllY reported that First /Jailie Frollt had givell lip 

the allempt to reach Riga and had "sanificed" the most advanced spcarht ads, 

which were then heing cul ofT and dt·-

stroyed.~11 By the morning of 27 Septemher the Gerrnans werc in the Segcwold 

position, and the Second and Third Ual/it" 

Fronts also went over lo the ddensiv(' ~' " 

Ua~rllmyan's Thrust to the Baltic 

Tactically, the Septcmher ofTellsivt· 

againsl Army Group North had had tht' 

opposile of ils intcnded effect. Instead of 

splitting th(' arlllY grou]>, it had rt.'titlCed 

the German front north of Riga-Madolla 

hy hetter than two-thirds, fWIlI 240 milt,s 

to ahout 70 milt-s. Armceahteilung Narva 

and th(' Eightc('nth and Sixh't'nth Armit's, 

tlwir strength en.dl'll but org-anii:atillflally 

intac.t, had hcen cOl11prc .... "it·d into a tight 

knot ;iround Riga. For the Soviet forc('s, 

the hreaklhrough to Riga had, consequently, become hoth more dirTiclih and less 

profitable. On 27 September Sixt<rnth 

Army reported heavy encmy truck trarTie 

going sollthwcst_ away from its front. f' l 

The S/(lUkn had decided on the 24th to 

.~ AOK IH , Fu ellnmg.HlbteiiuIlg KriegJta/.:ebu ch . 

Teil 4h. ~O ~4 Sep 44, AOK I A ~:\614 3 fil e. 

u AOK 16. Ja Krieg.rtagebuch JI, ~~ Sep 44, 

AOK 16 6o!ln~ ~ filt· . 

r .. MS # P 114a ( Sixt ), Teil V , pp. 914- 19. 

M AOI\ 16. Ja I\riegJt(lgebuch II, '17 Sep 44, 

AOK 16 fio'1fl!l / '1 flit' . 
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

make a fresh start. In the last week of the 

month Bagramyan dispersed his concentration south and southeast of Riga and 

moved the Fourth Shock, Forty-third, 

Fifty-first, and Fifth Guards Tank Armies 

to the Shaul yay area for a thrust west to 

Memel (Klaypeda) . The Second and 

Third Baltic Fronts retained their missions 

to attack on a broad front toward Riga 

and were, as the operation progressed, to 

pursue Army Group North into Courland." 

Leningrad Front was ordered to occupy 

the Baltic islands, Muhu, Saaremaa, and 

Hiiuma. On Bagramyan's left Third 

Belorussian Front prepared to commit an 

army in an attack toward Tilsit. 53 

At the end of the month Hitler was 

more than ever detennined to have Army 

Group North attack. During a conference 

with Schoerner on the 28th he moved the 

jump-off point for Third Panzer Army to 

south of Shaul yay and that of Sixteenth 

Army to west of Riga. Two days later 

Schoerner told Hitler that the army group 

would first have to take its front cast of 

Riga back, close to the city, start evacuating Riga as a precaution, absorb some 

30,000 replacements (yet to be sent), and 

execute an extensive regroupment. He 

believed 3 November would be the earliest 

date on which the attack could start,lI4 

On the 30th the Army Group North 

chief of staff told the operations officer, 

Third Panzer Army, that most likely there 

would be no offensive because the Russians 

61 Courland, the westernmost province of Latvia 

and the historic Grand Duchy of Courland, is 

hounded on the west by the Baltic, on the north. 

east by the Gulf of Riga, and on the south by the 

Lithuanian border. 

~ IVOV (R ), IV, 354. 

r.. Excerpt from H . Gr. N ord, /0. KriegJtagehuch, 

30 Sep 44, in MS # P- 114a (Sixt ), Teii V, An· 

lagen. 

407 

would strike first, but the mission was "not 

unwelcome" because it gave the army 

group a chance to make some useful disposItIons. Third Panzer Army had reo 

ported earlier in the day that the H eadquarters, Fourth Shock Army, had been 

identified northwest of Shaulyay and the 

Soviet radio traffic in that whole area had 

suddenly stopped." 

Although the signs were clear, the Army 

Group North staff as late as the morning 

of 5 October did not believe First Baltic 

Front could finish redeploying its armies 

in less than ten days. It was therefore in· 

clined to tailor its regroupment to the 

schedule for its own projected attack on 

the assumption that this would also bring 

enough forces into the right place in time 

to stop the Russians. Several panzer divisions had moved into the Shaulyay-Raseynyay area by the 5th, but Third Panzer 

Army was still woefully weak in infantry. 

The 55lst Grenadier Division west of 

Shaulyay was holding a 24-mile line that 

it could man only at strongpoints. The 

first infantry reinforcement for the army 

was not expected until l6 October." 

On 5 October First Baltic Front 

attacked west of Shaul yay toward Meme!. 

The next day Bagramyan put in Fifth 

Guards Tank Army to make a run for the 

coast, and Thirty-ninth Army on Third 

Belorussian Front's right flank began 

attacking toward Tilsit. During the day 

Leningrad Front, having occupied lightly 

defended Hiiumaa and Muhu several days 

earlier, staged a landing on Saaremaa. 

In a day and a half the Russians took 

c.r; Pl. AOK 3 , /a KriegJlagebuch, 1.- 30 .9 .44, 30 

Sep 44. Pz. AOK 3 64190/ 7 file. 

H Excerpt from H . Cr. N ord, Ia Kriegstagebuch, 

5 Oct 44, in MS # P- 114a (Sixt ), Teil V. An· 

lagen . 
408 STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

SOVIET TROOPS CROSSING EAST PRUSSIAN BORDER IN AMERICAN-BUILT TRUCKS 

all of Saaremaa except the Socrve Peninsula at the southwestern tip. Far more 

serious, the Third Panzer Army front broke 

open on the 7th. Fifth Guards Tank Army 

and FortY-lhird Army wenl through and 

two days later reached the coast north and 

south of Memc!. The Third Panzer Army 

command post was overrun and the staff 

had to fight its way Qut to Nlemel, where 

XXVIII Corps, caught between the two 

Soviet armies, was being forced into a 

beachhead around the port. 

Knowing what the Fuehrer would expect, Schoerner dec1ared he would attack 

toward Memcl. To get enough divisions 

and to defend the northern tip of Courland, where Leningrad Front would have 

less than twenty miles of water to cross 

after it took the Soerve Peninsula, he proposed giving up Riga. Soviet submarines 

were in the Gulf of Riga; the port was 

under artillery fire; the last convoy sailed 

on 10 October; the city was hardly worth 

holding. Still, Hitler protested and delayed a day before giving his approva!. 

Army Group North had the strength (0 

hold its own in Courland and could probably have spared enough forces (0 mount 

a powerful counterattack, but the issue was 

to be decided elsewhere. On 10 October 

the OKH returned Third Panzer Army to 

Army Group Center. With a single corps 

---one corps was at Memc1 and one had 

been cut ofT with Army Group North-the 

army had to defend the Army Group Center flank against the strong thrust T hirt)'-
DEFEAT IN THE NORTH 

ninth Army was making toward Tilsit. 

What was happening to Army Group 

North was another military disaster of 

which there had been many. The threat 

to Anny Group Center was something else, 

since a Russian advance onto German territory in East Prussia threatened the whole 

German outlook on the war. The Stauka 

had set its traps well, and the last was 

about to be sprung. 

On 16 October two, later three, Soviet 

armies charged across the East Prussian 

border between Schirwindt and the Romintener Heide toward Gumbinnen. On the 

third day of the battle Hitler had to transfer armor from Third Panzer Arm)" and 

let the army go behind the Neman. On 

the 21St, under the influence of two shocks 

409 

-the loss of the first German city, Aachen, 

to the Allies and a report from Fourth 

Army that in another day Gumbinnen 

might be lost- he ordered Army Group 

North to go over to the defensive in Courland." 

The Soviet bid for a deep breakthrough 

into East Prussia failed two da)"s later, and, 

although Third Panzer Army's retreat behind the Neman had substantially reducer! 

its chances of success, Army Group North 

again proposed to attack south to restore 

contact. At the end of the monlh Hitler 

rejected this proposal as unfeasible and began withdrawing divisions from Courland. 

&r H . Gr. Nord, fa Nr. 4587/ 44. ~1.'o.44. in 

MS # P- 114a (Sixt ), Teil V, A,liage1l. 
CHAPTER XIX 

The January Offensive 

Two Fronts, the Fuehrer's Will, 

and German Resources 

On Christmas Eve, 1944, Guderian 

dined at the Adlerhorst, the Fuehrer headquarters in the Taunus Mountains tcn 

miles northwest of Bad N auheim. Hitler 

had left Rastenburg early in the month 

and after a short stay in Berlin had, before 

the Ardennes offensive began, moved to 

the headquarters from which he had directed the victorious 1940 campaign 

against France. Guderian had arrived 

that morning after an overnight trip in his 

command train from the OKH headquarters at the Maybachlager in Zossen, south 

of Berlin. He was there to ask Hitler to 

call off the offensive in the West and send 

the surplus strength east. During the past 

forty-eight hours it had become certain 

that the Ardennes operation would not 

achieve its planned objective, and on the 

Eastern Front north of the Carpathians the 

Russians had completed the heaviest buildup of the war. 

Hitler refused to surrender the initiative 

in the West and scoffed at the OKH's 

figures on the Soviet forces deployed 

against Army Groups A and Center. He 

called the build-up "the greatest bluff since 

Genghis Kahn." He refused to consider 

creating reserves for the East either by taking units from the West, (rom Norway, or 

from Courland; the Eastern Front would 

have to shift for itself. At dinner that 

night, Himmler, who had lately embarked 

on a military career- as an army group commander in the West, advised Guderian not 

to worry SO much; the Russians, he insisted, 

would not attack; they were trying "a 

gigantic bluff." All Guderian's visit ac~ 

complished was that Hitler waited until the 

next day, when the Chief of Staff was on 

the way back to Zossen and out of touch 

for several hours, to order Headquarters, 

IV SS Panzer Corps, and two panzer grenadier divisions transferred to Army Group 

South to relieve Budapest. 1 

The Downtur1l 

For Germany in the last days of 1944 

the end did in fact not seem as near as it 

had in midsummer. The vise the Allies 

and the Soviet Union had talked about was 

not closing. The Ardennes offensive was 

not going to be a strategic blow that would 

give Germany a free hand against the 

Soviet Union; but the Germans had the 

initiative, and it would be a while before 

the Allies could take up their march into 

the heart of the Reich. North of the 

Carpathians the Russians had made no 

substantial advance in two and a half 

months, and, after being almost completely 

1 Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldalen, pp. 

345-49· 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

destroyed in August, Army Group South 

was so close to holding its own in Hungary 

that a relief of Budapest did not appear 

impossible. Army Group E was in the last 

stage of its withdrawal from Greece, Albania, and southern Yugoslavia. In Italy, 

Army Group C had stopped the British 

and Americans at the Gothic Line. 

Nevertheless, Hitler's strategy wa s 

bankrupt. He was rigidly committed to 

holding everything he still had. He had 

put his last block of liquid military assets 

into the attempt to bail himself out in the 

West and failed. He could only fight for 

time, and he knew it. In late December 

he told one of the generals, "The war will 

not last as long again as it has lasted. That 

is absolutely certain. Nobody can endure 

it; we cannot and the others cannot. The 

only question is, who will endure longer? 

It must be' he who has everything at stake. 

We have everything at stake.":'! But even 

so, he did not have nearly as much lime as 

he apparently imagined; the German 

capacity to hold Qut, to endure, was heading into an irreversible downward spiral. 

Both on the east and the west, Germany's 

enemies had unmatchable materiel superiority. German industrial output had withstood the ravages of the bombing surprisingly well, but it was on a seesaw that progressively dipped lower, stayed down longer, 

and rose more slowly. The aircraft plants 

had turned out 3,000 fighters in September 

1944, a wartime high. In October jet 

fighters had begun to come off the lines. 

In December fighter production was still 

higher than in any month before May 

t Sten ogr. Dienst im F.H.Qu., Bespru hung des 

Fuehrers mit Gen . Maj. Th omalt am 28.12 .44 im 

Adlerhorst . OCMH files. 

411 

1944.' Armored vehicle production, including tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled assault guns, reached its wartime 

peak of 1,854 units in December 1944, but 

mainly because the heavy components had 

long lead times and therefore had been put 

into the production pipeline months earlier. 

On the other hand, the base of the industrial pyramid was crumbling. Heavy 

bombing of the Ruhr in December reduced 

pig iron, crude steel, and rolling mill production for that month to about half of the 

September 1944 level and one-third that 

of January 1944.' The bombing had also 

by late 1944, according to the U .S. Strategic Bombing Survey, so severely damaged 

the German railroad system that the country "could not hope to sustain, over any 

period of time, a high level of war production." ~ 

Industries with short lead times were 

already feeling the pinch. The motor 

vehicle industry was hard hit both by bomb 

damage to its plants and by the breakdown 

of the railroads. In October and November 1944 the assembly plants turned out 

12 ,000 trucks by rebuilding all the disabled 

Army trucks that could be found in Germany. In December only 3,300 of the 

6,000 new trucks needed were produced, 

and Hitler earmarked 70 percent for the 

offensive in the West.6 In January the 

truck strengths authorized for panzer and 

panzer grenadier divisions would have to 

be reduced 25 percent, and the Army would 

3 Air Ministry (British ) Pamphl et 248, Rise and 

Fall 0/ th e German Air Forct, p. 309. 

, U .S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of 

St'rategic Bombing on the German War Economy, 

3 1 October 1945, pp. 249, 257, 263, 279. 

!l U .S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report 

(European War ), 30 September 1945, p. 64. 

·OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt. IIlb, Kriegstagebuch, 1.5 .44- 10.245, 5, 6 Dec 44, H 1/ 454 file . 
412 

have to begin mounting the panzer grenadiers on bicycles. 7 Hitler tried to console himself with thoughts that the armored 

divisions had too many vehicles anyway, 

that the time of the sweeping maneuver 

was past, and that, if it came down to 

cases, the infantry divisions could move 

faster than the so-called mobile divisions, 

which he said only created traffic jams.' 

Militarily, what hurt most was the catastrophic decline in oil production that had 

begun in May 1944. In spite of the toppriority Geilenberg program to disperse, 

repair, and build synthetic oil plants, output had fallen during the summer. In 

September, because of the bombings, no 

synthetic plants had operated. The 

Rumanian oil had been lost at the end of 

August. In October and November synthetic oil production had resumed at a low 

ratc, but by the end of December, renewed 

heavy bombing had knocked out all but 

one of the large plants, and 20 percent of 

the small ones.' Army Group South held 

the Hungarian fields at Nagykanizsa, but, 

owing to loss of the refineries at Budapest 

and resistance by the workers, the gasoline 

output was not enough to meet the army 

group's own requirements,tO In June 1944 

the German Air Foree had consumed 

180,000 metric tons of aviation gasoline; 

its total supply for the rest of the war 

amounted to no more than 197,000 metric 

10KH. GtlrlStdH, Gen. Insp . d. Pz. Tr./Org 

Abt Nr. 1/427/45, Herabutzung des LKW Solis 

bei PZ.·u. Pz. Gren. Divn., 22.1.45, H 1/37 file. 

a Stenogr. Dienst im F. H. Qu .• Besprechung des 

Fuehrers mit Gen. Maj. Thomale am 29.12.44 im 

Adlerhorst, OCMH files. 

'Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet 248, Rise and 

Fall 0/ the German Air Force, p . 352. 

10 H . Gr. Sued, Kriegstagebuch, Du. 44, 2, 

Hael/te, 27 Dec 44, H. Gr. A 75126/ 45 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

tons.1l Although a ircraft production 

stayed high through the end of the year, 

the Air Force lacked enough gasoline to 

give the pilots adequate training and to 

employ the planes effectively. The shortage of motor fuel was almost as stringent, 

and the Army had similar trouble. with its 

armored vehicles. 

Although the downturn in military man· 

power had begun earlier than the decline 

in production, it had to a degree been 

amenable to various palliative measures; 

by late 1944 most of these that showed 

any promise, and some that did not, had 

been or were being tried, and they were 

not bringing in enough mcn to prevent the 

German Army's burning out at thc core. 

Between June and November 1944 the 

total German irrecoverable losses on all 

fronts were 1,457,000, and of these 

903,000 were lost on the Eastern Front. \2 

On I October 1944 the Eastern Front 

strength stood at 1,790,138, about 150,000 

of these Hiwis (Russian auxiliaries)." 

This was some 400,000 men less than in 

June and nearly 700,000 less than in 

January 1944, when the Western Theater 

could still be regarded as a scmireserve. 

11 USSBS, Effects 0/ Strategic Bombing on the 

German War Economy, p. 81. 

11 The breakdown was as follows: Western Thea· 

ter 440,000, Southwestern Theater (Italy ), 97,000; 

Southeastern Theater (the Balkans), 17,000; Army 

Group North, 94,000; Army Group Center 435,000 ; 

Army Group A, I 17,000; Army Group South, 243,-

000; Twentieth Mountain Army, 14,000. OKH, 

GenStdH, Org. Abt. Nr. 1/ 15412/ 44 , Au/schlues-

.felung der unwiederbringlichen Verlu ste Juni-November 1944 nach KriegsschauPlaetze, 2.1244, 

H II 450m file . 

13 The army group strengths on I October 1944 

were as follows: Army Group North, 420,844 ; 

Army Group Center, 694,812; Army Group A, 

457,679 ; and Army Group South, 216,803. OKH 

GenStdH, Org. Abt. (I) Nr. 1/11854144, an OKW, 

W, Ag., 1, 12.1.45, H 1/562 file . 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

The manpower shortage was affecting most 

the old and experienced divisions. In the 

period 1 September to 31 December 1944 

one-third of the replacements for all fronts, 

500,000 men, went into new or completely 

rebuilt divisions. At the end of the same 

period the old divisions had over 800,000 

unfilled authorized spaces- after a 

700,000-space reduction in the 1944 tables 

of organization. If 

In August 1944 Hitler had called on 

Goebbels, as Reichs Plenipotentiary for 

Total War, to procure a million men 

through party channels. They were to be 

used to create new divisions and were to be 

called up without regard for previous draft 

status. At the year's end Goebbels had 

secured 300,000 new recruits and about 

200,000 interservicc transfers. 15 In Octo~ 

ber Hitler had activated the V olksstuTm- a 

home guard- under party leadership, composed of men aged .6 to 60 otherwL'f 

draft-exempt. The members were to be 

put into Army uniforms, if available; if 

not, they were to wear the party uniform 

or civilian clothes.16 He had also authorized the "Gneuenau" and "Bluecher" programs whereby some 200,000 mcn were to 

he organized into territorial divisions in the 

eastern military districts. In November, 

for the first time, he had agreed to allow 

Russian collaborator troops to fight on the 

front in the East and actually to constitute 

the long-talked-about Russian Army of 

Liheration with Vlasov as its commanding 

u OKH, G~nStdH. Op. Abl., G~ amt Zu-und 

Ab£a~ngl! du F~ldhurl!s vom I.Q.43-31."-44: 

OKH . Gl!nStdH, Org. Abt. z.b.V ., Zu amm~n tl!llung d~r buhu ufassll!n Einsparungl!n von Plantdl~n . 29.8.44. Both in OCMH files. 

15 All ~ml!in~s Hur~samt , Stab 11, Stand du 

COl!bbl!is-Aktion vom 5 .1.45, 6.1.45. H. 1/;\5 file. 

'· OKH, Cl!nStdH, Org. Abt., Kril!gstagduch, 

1.10·-31.10·44,8 Oct 44. H th33 file. 

413 

general." In the attempt to sustain the 

Army's combat strength, Hitler was not 

above permitting somc organizational and 

arithmetical sleight of hand. He authorized artillery corps with brigadc strengths, 

panzer brigades of two battalions, and 

panzer J aegeT brigades with one battalion. 

For the months August through December, 

the number of men called up (1,569,000) 

slightly exceeded the total decline in field 

strength for the same period, but a closer 

look revealed that 956,000 of the recruits 

would not reach the field until well after. 

January 1945." 

In October and November 1944, the 

Organization Branch, OKH, had called 

for combat-condition reports from the 

armies and army groups. As was to be 

expected, they all agreed that what they 

needed most were more replacements. 

They reported that troop morale was 

"affected" by the recent losses of prewar 

German territory in the West and in East 

Prussia and by the "terror bombing." The 

general attitude of the troops was still confident, but for the "great majority" the 

confidence was grounded "exclusively" on 

the hope that soon new weapons would 

appear which could stop the air raids and 

break the enemy ground superiority .1I~ 

If On 10 February 1945. when the first division 

created was turned over to Vlasov. it lacked 55 

percent of its clothing and equipment and 85 percent of its motor vehicles. OKH, G~nStdH, Org. 

Abt. Kril!gstagl!buch , 1.11.- 3 1.11.44, 23 N ov 44. 

H t/224 file ; Gen . d . Freiw. Vub . im OKH Nr. 

103 1145. an Chef des Gl!n. Stabl!S dl!s Hures, 

10.2.45, OCMH files. 

11 Obube/ehlshabl!r des Ersatzhures, AHA Stab 

IT (1) Nr. 450/ 45 , Pl!rsonl!lle .Auswutung Hur 

fuer Duember 1.945. H 1/ 35 file . 

If OKH. Gl!nStdH, Org. Abl. Nr. 12 / 47810/ 44. 

Auszug au.r den Stellungnahme der Oberbefl!hl.rhabu der Armun und Hurl!Sgruppen zu dl!n Zustandsbericht von 1.10.44. 7.11.44. H ' / 224 file. 
414 

How deeply in trouble Germany was 

Hitler knew better than the poor Landsers 

and grenadiers who still believed in secret 

weapons. He also knew exactly what he 

was going to do--in fact, had known all 

along. He had, in the past, wavered, even 

lost his nerve completely, when his fortune 

was at a crest but never when it was in a 

trough. On 28 December '944 in the 

Adlerhorst, addressing the commanding 

generals of the divisions that were to open 

an offensive on New Year's Day in northern Alsace, he admitted that the Ardennes 

offensive had failed and that Germany 

would henceforth be fighting for it' naked 

existence. Then he went on: 

I would like to interpose immediately, 

gentlemen, when I say that. you should not 

infer that I am thinking of losing the war 

even in the slightest. I have never in my 

life learned the meaning of the word capitulation, and I am one of those mcn who has 

worked his way up from nothing. For mc, 

therefore, the circumstances in which we find 

ourselves today are nothing new. The situation for me was once altogether different 

and much worse. I say that only so you 

can judge why I pursue my goal with such 

fanaticism and why nothing can break me 

down. I could be yet so tortured by worries 

and, as far as I am concerned, my health 

could be destroyed by worry without its in 

the slightest changing my decison to fight 

until in the end the balance tips to our side. 20 

The refrain was an old one, but formerly, 

even in a similar speech to the generals on 

the eve of the Ardennes offensive, it had a 

strong political and strategic counterpoint. 

Hitler then still spoke as a statesman and 

strategist bringing his will into play to ac-

.. Sten ogr. Dienst im F. H . Qu., Ansprache des 

Fueh rers vor Divisionskommandeuren v. 28.'2-44, 

OCMH files. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

complish purportedly rational objectives. 

Now his will alone was all that counted; 

armies and battles were secondary; what 

was important and all that was important 

was that he not weaken. He went on to 

tell the generals that history refuted the 

argument that one had to look at impending defeat from the sober military point of 

view; in the last analysis, it was the 

strength and determination of the leadership that decided whether wars were won 

or lost. He cited Cannae and "the miracle of the House of Brandenburg" when 

Frederick the Great, defeated in the Seven 

Years' War, regained by the Peace of 

Huhertushurg all the territory he had lost 

and some to boot after the coalition against 

him fell apart. Hundreds of thousands 

were to die while Hitler awaited the second 

such miracle. 

Guderian Goes to the Eastern Front 

On 5 1anuary '945 Guderian visited the 

Army Group South headquarters in Eszterhaza. During the following night his train 

took him north across Czechoslovakia to 

the Army Group A headquarters, in Krakow. It was no ordinary inspection tour. 

He was deeply troubled. The Budapest 

relief operation was taking more time than 

could prudently be spared for it, and 

Army Groups A and Center were expecting an offensive, more powerful than any 

they had experienced, to start in the middle 

of the month. 

North of the Carpathians the Eastern 

Front had not changed significantly since 

the end of summer. (Map 37) Between 

Christmas and New Year's Army Group 

North in Courland had beaten off the third 

Soviet attempt in three months to break 
THE JANUARY 1945 OFFENSIVE 

AGAINST ARMY GROUPS A (CENTER) 

AND CENTERCNORTH) 

FIRST BALTIC 

20 0 20 4 0 6[)~II..OMETE~5 

'30 

'"\ r-::xxxxx -

......,,..,,,,,,~~ 391~ 

f~ ) '" ~ .} c81~ THIRD 

",-: t BELORUSSIAN 

,1 -'" T1"tr,o : \ 11th GUARDS 

13 January - 31 January 1945 

,...., 1"""""1 ~ GEIUIA", FIlONr l1NE.12 JAN 

TTTTTTTTTTTt GE~ MA"'FIIONT lIHE.3IJAH 

10 0 2[) 4[) 60Mll($ 

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I,; I' 

'.... .. .... ;; .) i·.. . .. :} )~ "" 

'\ r=:l \.,/ ~.;:,r i \ XVISS ~ LSECON,] 'J ~_xxxxx- L_/:, - I ) i .. ~ '(( t'..:.L>J.lj.l~~,~~ ~ 1/ Il ~ 50t~ 

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. ~<_.·f (~,; ... -- -...J 481h ,'.... I 651h 

SECOND 

BELORUSSIAN 

:' \i. .--'. ] 70lh '; g{ 'P. \ :,_) ] ~I~ GUARDS TANI( i ,: ~\~ ~ \--XXXXX _ _ 

... ~\;;; ~ 

XltXX \;;' : ~ ,,~'-' 471h 

r - -l ... --.' ,,/ '\ 151 (POLISH) 

L '_INTHJ "", .,_ \ 2 d (POLISH) 

::t I ., FIRST BELORUSSIAN 

-~ .... -( t: U III GUARDS TANI< 

xxxxx-',(D.'..~, ~ '." .... 1- "\.., 51h.,SHOCK 2dGUAROS TANK r ". ____ ", f \...! : ",,,\ 81h GUARDS I 'I 12 "'\. 6151 

~ , /~~ 1 691h 

UXX :f,.~ ~~ ~ ~ \.- /'}'" 1 33e1 

r---, ",~:, .h ,! 1 __ xxxxx-- FOURTH pz - •• ~ "', 1(* 

L __ ...J .""". J I J , __ / +:J / r4.....J.....; 61h 

_____ \:-J......... : } 3e1 GUARDS 131h j..i- '-. : 411\ TANI( 

~1.1- "'---" , \.\ 51h GUARDS FIRST UKRAINIAN 

" •. ~ 3e1GUARDS 21s1 

XXXX ') \ 52d TANI( 

r-, -- , 59" SEVENTEENTH -"'7)0~;., "\ 60th l_.J _______ .,,;.. .... 

..t1-'#.'#. ~ \ 1 XXltXX--

___________ e .: '?, .' 1 -

~E~:::~. !.:::,:'-_., \ I 38th 

~ J I \IUGUARDS 

.t.t.t.t.t 3 1 fOURTH UKRAINIAN ____..1 .l 

1 "" ................ ) ~ / ...,.J 18th '1/',;';::::: .................. 

MAP 37 
416 

open its front. Elsewhere the front had 

been calm since the first week in Novemocr, when a Fourth Army counterattack 

drove the Soviet armies in the seclor east 

of Gurnuinnen off all but a fifteen-mile 

by fifty-rnilc strip of East Prussian territory. 

The outstanding features of the Army 

Group A and Center fronts were the five 

Soviet bridgeheads: Rozan and Serock on 

the Narcw; Magnuszcw, Puiawy, and 

Baranow on the Vistula. They were the 

wedges that could splinter all the rest. In 

November Army Group A had taken command of Ninth Army; thereafter its zone 

reached from Modlin to the northern 

border of Hungary. Its amlies-Ninth, 

Fourth Panzer, Seventeenth, and Armccgruppe Heinrici ( First Panzer Army and 

Hungarian First Army ) -straddled the 

direct routes of attack into Germany proper. 

Army Group Center, with the Third 

Panzer, Fourth, and Second Armies, covered the East Prussia- Danzig area. The 

months of quiet had given the army groups 

time to huild a close-meshed network of 

field fortifications extending back from the 

Vistula and N arew to the Oder. The 

major road junctions were ringed with defenses and designated as fortresses. 

The Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH. 

at first had thought that the next Soviet 

offensives would be aimed at taking East 

Prussia and clearing the lower Vistula and 

at taking Upper Silesia and Vienna III a 

wide pincers movement that would also 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

engulf Czechoslovakia." In December the 

estimate changed: the main effort, the 

intelligence branch predicted, would be by 

the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian 

Fron's against Army Group A, and the 

attack would go west and northwest. A 

simultaneous thrust against Army Group 

Center was to be expected, possibly with a 

more limited objective than the full con· 

quest of East Prussia, because the efforts 

to smash Army Group North had so far 

not succeeded." By early January it 

appeared that the Russians would also go 

for the "big solution" against Army Group 

Center, the thrust to the lower Vistula, and 

that against Army Group A they intended 

to go deep, possibly as far as Berlin." 

Strength comparisons showed that oppo· 

site 160 German units of roughly division 

or brigade size on the whole Eastern Front 

the Russians had 414 units in the front, 

261 in front reservcs, and 219 in reserves 

in depth." Even with allowances for a 

Soviet unit size 30 percent smaller than the 

~I OKH, GenSldH, Abt. Fremde Heere Osl (/J 

Nr. 401:1/44, Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deuls· 

eher Osl/ront im Crossen. 10.11.44. H 3/ 185 file. 

"OKH. CenStdH. Abt. Fremde Hare Osl (/) 

Nr. 4404/ 44, Zusammenfauende Auswertung der 

wiehligsten Cefangenenaussagen und MeJdungen 

des Geheime'l Meldedien stes und der Frontauf· 

klaerung. 5.1:1.44, H 3lt8S file . 

»OKH, GenStdH, Abt. Fremde Hure Osl (I) 

Nr. 8If45. Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deulseher 

Osl/ront im Crossen, 5.1.45. H 3lteS file. 

J' The breakdown of Soviet forces was as foll ows: 

Units in the Front Fronl R.,snvu ReJervu in Oeplh 

TOial 414 Total 26\ Toul. . 219 

Rille divisiun. 25J Rille division. "' Rille divisions 67 

Rille brieade, 30 Rille brigades H Rifle brieade. 13 

Cavalry divisions 1) Cavalry divisions 3 Cavalry division • . 6 

Tank brikadn . 2. Tank btikadn .. .. Tank bri,adel . " Tank r~gimenlS .. Tank rellimentJ ,. II Tank re,imentl ., Asullll (lun relimenlS ., Assail!! II:lln ret;imenu . 50 ASlallh elln re(limenn . ... OKH. GenStdH. F.H .O. (lie) Preufnummer :103:1,KraeftegegenueberJteliung Stand 1:1.1.45, H 3/ I '20 file . 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 417 

SOVIET PLANES ON A MISSION 

German and an over-all 40 percent under 

authorized strengths (with no similar understrength allowance for the German 

units), the Soviet superiority worked Ollt 

at over 2.3: I. The actual ratio was in 

fact higher, and at the crucial points it was 

overwhelming. Against Army Group Center the Second and Third BeloTltssian 

Fronts ' had 1,670,000 men, over 28,000 

artillery pieces and mortars, and 3,300 

tanks and self-propelled artillery, which 

gave them over-all superiorities of 2.8: I in 

troops, 3-4 :1 in artillery, and 4.7:1 in 

annor.:!t. In their sectors opposite Army 

Group A, the First Belorussian and First 

Ukrainian Fronts had a total of 2,200,000 

troops, 6,400 tanks and self-propelled artil-

~ /VOV ( R ), V, 97. 

!ery, and 46,000 artillery pieces (including 

heavy mortars and rocket launchers) . 

Against these the German Ninth, Fourth 

Panzer, and Seventeenth Armies could 

field about 400,000 troops, 4, I 00 artillery 

pieces, and 1,150 tank ~o At their points 

of attack, the bridgeheads, the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts had the 

Germans outnumbered on the average by 

9: I in troops, 9- 1 0: 1 in artillery, and 

10: I in tanks and self-propelled artillery. 

In the Magnuszew bridgehead alone First 

Belorussian Fronl had 400,000 troops, 

8,700 artillery pieces and mortars, and 

1,700 tanks. 27 

211 "Vislo-Oduskaya opera:si"a v tsi/rakh." Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal (February. 1965). 

r. /VOV (R ), V, 6 .. 
418 

In the air on , January '945, the Germans could put up I,gOO planes on the 

Western Front, and 1,875 on the Eastern 

Front. The main effort was still in the 

West. North of the Carpathians the Firsl 

and Sixth Air Forces had some 1,300 

planes. The Russians had over I o,ooo. ~), 

The Army Group A staff had a plan 

ready to present to Guderian when he 

arrived in Krakow. The outlook, no 

matter what the army group did, was not 

good. In December, prompted hy the lo~, 

of two reserve divisions to Army Group 

South, the army group chief of staff had 

conducted a waf game which showed that 

the Russians could break through and 

reach the Silesian border in six days anti 

that they could be stopped on the OdeI' 

was by no means certain. A subsequent 

study showed that the most the army group 

could do was to give itself what might be 

a fighting chance. The first major switch 

position, the so-called HUBERTUS line, 

paralleled the western face of the Baranow 

hridgehead about five miles to iL~ rear and 

then ran in an almost straight line north 

to the western tip of the Magnuszew 

bridgehead. The army group proposed to 

pull back to the HUBERTUS line in the two 

nights before the offensive hegan- to get 

the inner Aanks of the Fourth Panzer and 

Ninth Armies out of probahle encirclement, get Fourth Panzer Army's right 

flank out of the front on the Baranow 

bridgehead hefore the Soviet artillery preparation started, shorten the front, and give 

the am1Y group some reserves. Guderian reviewed the plan and approved it on 8 

January, hut that Hitler would do likewise 

:zs Air Ministry ( British ) Pamphlet 248, Rise alld 

Fall 0/ the Germall Air Fo rce. p. 386: MS # P-

[14.C ( Hauck ), Tl'il Vlll , p. 8. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

was scarcely to be expected,:!u 

On the gth, after having also received an 

Army Group Center proposal to go back 

from the Narew to the line on the East 

Prussian border, Guderian reported to 

H itler in the Adlerhorsl. According to 

Guderian's account, Hitler refused to believe the intelligence estimates of Soviet 

strength and told him whoever had concocted them ought to be placed in an 

asylum. He also rejected both army 

groups' proposals.:lO The surviving fragment of the stenographic record contains 

rambling remarks by Hitler on the folly of 

having given ground in Rus.'Sia in the first 

place and an admonishment that those 

who were "beginning to whine" ought to 

look at the example of what the Russians 

had gone through at Leningrad." 

That night, after Guderian had gone, 

Hitler was still thinking of arguments to 

refute the intelligence figures. The enemy 

needed 3: I numerical superiority in tanks, 

he said, just to stay even; the Russians 

could not have a~ many guns ;;LS Guderian 

claimed; they were not "n1ade of artillery"; 

and, even if they did have the guns, How 

many rounds could they fire? Ten or a 

dozen per piece. Referring, apparently, to 

the Army Group A plan, he grumhled, 

"This operational idea- to go back here 

[pointing], create two groups, and attack 

with them- is downright dangerous." ~:! 

Whether Hitler wanted to believe it or 

not, the respite was over. On 3 January 

2\0 MS # P-114c (Hauck ), Teil Vill. p. [2. 

:10 Guderian, Erilll/l'1l1ngen eines Solda/ell. p. 

35 I. 

31 Stenogr. D iel/st i", F.H.Qu ., Teil einer L agebesprechu11g 1'011 AU/filiI: }flllllar. 1945. OCMH 

files. 

~Ste"ogr. Dien st im F. H. QIl .. Abelldlage 1'0111 

9 }alllwr 1945 i111 Adlerllorst. OCMH files. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

he had officialy abandoned the objectives 

of the Ardennes offensive; on the 8th he 

had issued an order to let the spearhead 

army, the Sixth SS Panzer Army, fall hack 

and become a reserve to meet Allied counterattacks.:'3 The offensive in northern 

Alsacc was still on, but it had, at most, 

nuisance value. On 7 J anuary Army 

Group A detected fresh Soviet units moving into the front on the west face. of the 

Baranow bridgehead. In the Pulawy and 

Magnuszcw bridgeheads the Russians wefe 

reinforcing their artillery. The final deployment was obviously under way.H 

The Stauka's Plans 

The Stauka had prepared two offensives, 

related but separated geographically by the 

course of the Vistula west of Warsaw. The 

stronger of the two was to he opened betwecn Warsaw and the Carpathians by the 

First Belorussian and First Ukrainian 

Fronts with an assist on the left from 

Fourth Ukrainian Front . First Belorussian 

Front, Zhukov commanding, was to strike 

out of the Pulawy bridgehead toward 

Lodz, out of the Magnuszew bridgehead 

toward Kutno, and on its right fl ank encircle Warsaw. Kanev's First Ukrainian 

Front was to break out of the Baranow 

bridgehead westward toward Radolllsko, 

turning one force northwest to collahorate 

with the First Belorussian Front left nank 

in destroying the Germans in the KielceRadom area and another southwest toward 

Krakow and the Upper Silesian industrial 

area. Suhsequently, both (rants were to 

53 OKW, WFSt , Uebersich t ueber die Akten des 

WFSt aus dUll Jan.-Feb . 1945 . OCMH files. 

so OKH . GenStdH , Op. Ab/. , I a Kriegstagebuch . 

Bd. 13.7 J an 4.'i, H 77 / 17 file . 

419 

advance abreast west and northwest toward the Oder. North of the Vistula hend 

Second Belorussian Front. Rokossovskiy in 

command, was to break out of the Serock 

and Rozan bridgeheads, strike northwest to 

the Baltic coast, cut off East Prussia, and 

clear the line of the lower Vistula. On 

Rokossovsk iy's right, Chernyakovskiy's 

Third Belorussian Front was to attack duc 

west south of the Pregcl River toward 

Koenigsberg, split Third Panzer Army off 

from the Army Group Center main force, 

and envelop Fourth Army among and west 

of the Masurian Lakes.3r, 

Strategically, th e Stauka intended 

nothing less than to end the war- in about 

a 4s-day operation, according to its estimates. Following standa rd general starT 

practice, the detailed plan covered only the 

initial phase. Its success was considered 

certain, and no more than 15 days were 

allotted to it. The second phase would require somewhat more daring and time, hut 

not much more of either. The Stauka 

knew that the German center, the Army 

Group A zone, was dangerously weak. 

The forces on the fl anks, particularly Army 

Group Center in East Prussia, appeared 

relatively stronger, hut in the leao;;t favorahle 

situation they could he immohilized. 

Therefore, in the second phase, for which 

30 days were allowed and which would 

follow the first without a full stop, the 

Stauka intended to run the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts straight 

through to Berlin and the Elbe River.'" 

During the four months, September to 

January, th ~ Soviet Command provided 

-'0 Zhi~in , Vazhne),shiye Operatsii Otechestvenno), 

V oyny, pp. 466, 486. 

.. S. Shtemenko, "Kok plonirovaias poslednyaya 

kampani),a po razgromu gitlerovsko)' Germanii." 

Vo),ulllo-i.rtorirheskiy Zhurllo1 ( May. 1965 ). 
420 

massive logistical support for the coming 

offensive. The railroads in eastern Poland 

were converted to the Russian gauge and, 

at the Vistula bridgeheads, were extended 

across the river. First BeLorussian Front 

received over 68,000 carloads of supplies, 

only lO percent less than had been sent to 

all four fronts before the June 1944 offensive against Army Group Center. Over 

64,000 carloads went to First Ukrainian 

Front . At the Magnuszew bridgehead, 

First Belorussian Front stockpiled 2.5 million artillery and mortar shells and at the 

Pulawy bridgehead 1.3 million. By comparison, in the whole Stalingrad operation 

Don Front had fired less than a million 

artillery and mortar rounds. Together, 

First Belorussian and First Ukrainian 

Front's gasoline and diesel oil stocks 

amounted to more than 30 million gallons. 

Second and Third BeloTussian FrontsJ 

located off the main road and railroad nets 

and having less crucial missions, would 

have to economize somewhat on motor fuel 

and rations but not on ammunition. Together the two fronts had as initial issues 9 

million artillery and mortar rounds, of 

which two-fifths were earmarked for the 

opening barrage.:i1 

In preparing for the offensive, the Soviet 

Command had recast its troop indoctrination program. For a year or more, the central theme had been the liberation of Soviet 

territory, but henceforth the Soviet armies 

everywhere would be fighting on foreign 

soil. The new theme, in a word, was 

Vengeance! It was disseminated in meetings, by slogans, on signs posted along the 

roads, and in articles and leaflets authored 

by prominent Soviet literary figures. Politn IVOV (R ), V. 64, <0, . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ical officers recounted stories of crimes the 

Gemans had committed against Russian 

women and children and of German looting and destruction in the Soviet Union. 

Soldiers and officers told what had happened to their own families. The objective was to give each man the feeling that 

he had a personal score to settle." 

The starting date for the offensives, according to Soviet accounts, had originally 

been 20 January. After Churchill, on the 

6th, asked Stalin what he could do on the 

east to take some of the pressure off the 

Allies, it was moved ahead eight days to the 

12th." In December, except for the sideshow going on around Budapest, the Eastern Front, from the Allies' point of view, 

had been dismayingly quiet. At midmonth 

Stalin had told U.S. Ambassador W. 

Averell Harriman that a winter offensive 

would be launched, but he did not offer 

more precise information. On 15 January 

Stalin talked to Air Chief Marshal Sir 

Arthur W. Tedder, who headed a SHAEF 

(Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force ) party sent to learn the Soviet 

intentions. Stalin explained that the offensive I\ad been delayed by the weather but 

had been started earlier than intended because of the Allies' difficulties in the west; 

his objective was to reach the line of the 

Oder." 

German intelligence reports confirm 

that after mid-December the Stavka had 

probably been waiting for a change in the 

weather. The winter was colder than the 

one before, but snow, fog, and clouds interfered with air activity and artillery observa-

:sa Ibid., V , 67 , 104. 

• Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 278- 80. 

to Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command. 

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II 

(Washington, 1954 ), pp. 405-07 . 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

tion. Starting early undoubtedly cost the 

Russians something; on the other hand, 

with the Yalta Conference in the offing, it 

was no disadvantage to Stalin to have his 

armies on the move, Poland in his pocket, 

the Soviet-supported Lublin government 

safely established in Warsaw, and the 

Allies in his deht for a favor rendered a 

shade late. 

From the Vistula to the Oder 

Breakout 

On the west face of the Baranow bridgehead, between the Vistula and the Lysogory, XXXXVII I Panzer Corps had 

three divisions, one man for each fifteen 

yards of front. The divisions had a dozen 

self-propelled assault guns apiece, and each 

corps held about 100 in reserve. The front 

was no more than a chain of strongpoints. 

Fifteen miles back, the reserve corps, 

XXIV Panzer Corps, had deployed two 

panzer divisions, and it had stationed two 

more panzer divisions off the north face of 

the bridgehead. To make the breakout, 

First Ukrainian Front had five armies, two 

tank armies, and better than a thousand 

tanks. 

In the early hours of 12 January the 

temperature stood a few degrees above 

freezing. The roads were icy. Low-hanging clouds and fog would, as they had for 

several days past, keep the aircraft 

grounded. Before dawn the massed Soviet 

artillery, estimated at 420 pieces per mile, 

laid a barrage on the northern twothirds (approximately twenty miles) of 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' front. After 

three hours the fire shifted to a strip pattern and the infantry moved out into the 

421 

openings. The Germans were caught forward of the main battle line; they had 

expected the Russians to wait for better 

weather. During the morning the Russian 

infantry drove in deep; by noon it had 

opened gaps wide enough for the armor to 

come through. XXXXVIll Panzer Corps' 

three divisions were cut up and destroyed. 

XXIV Panzer Corps had orders to counterattack, but its two divisions west of the 

bridgehead were overrun in their assembly 

areas. 

On the 13th Fourth Tank Army wheeled 

northwest toward Checiny, and Filty-second Army and Third Guards Tank Arm)' 

pushed due west past Chmielnik. During 

the night some of the tank spearheads had 

reached the Nida River. Across the Nida 

a 40-mile-wide path to Upper Silesia and 

the Oder was open. On the north flank 

XXIV Panzer Corps, what was left of it, 

dug in around Kielce!l 

Ninth Army expected the attacks out of 

the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads 

when they came on 14 January, but it 

fared only slightly better. The Russians 

broke into the German artillery positions, 

and both defending corps lost half their 

strengths on the first day. 

On the 15th Forty-seventh Army on 

the First Belorttssian Front right flank 

broke through north of Warsaw to Modlin, 

and Thirty-eighth Army, the right flank 

army of Fourth Ukrainian Front, began 

pushing west toward Krakow. During the 

day Thirteenth, Fourth Tank, and Third 

Guards Armies pushed XXIV Panzer 

Corps out of Kielce, thcrchy removing that 

n Obkdo. H. Gr. Mille. la Nr. 339/45; AOK 4. 

1:J.I.45 (both in AOK 4 65728/ 1 file ); MS # P114C (Hauck ), Teil VIIl. pp. 16- 20; Platono", 

VtoraYfl MiroUfl)'fl V oyna. '939- 45. p. 68B. 
422 

not very significant threat to First U kraillian Front's flank. 

On the 13th Hitler had ordered two infantry divisions transferred from the Wesl. 

The !lcxt day, in a move that was to hurt 

Army .Group Center, which was also under 

attack, more than it benefited Army 

Group A, he ordered Center to give up 

Panzer Corps Grossdcutschland and il~ two 

divisions to Army Group A. On the 15th 

he ordered Army Group South to send two 

panzer divisions to Army Group A. 

From Zassen, on the second and third 

days of the hattlc, Guderian sent two situation estimates to the Adlcrhorst. The 

tenor of hoth was the same : the Eastern 

Front could not survive without reinforcements from the West; at the very leao;;l the 

Army Group South offensive would have 

to be stopped and the armored divisions 

sent to Army Group A." The intelligence 

estimate of "5 January stated flatly that 

the offensive against Army Group A could 

not be stopped with the forces then on the 

Eastern Front.-t3 Hitler refused either to 

stop Army Group South or to send more 

divisions from the "Vest. 

On the night of the 15th Hitler moved 

his headquarters from the Adlcrhorst to the 

Reichs Chancellory in Berlin. Minutes before the departure, Guderian cal1ed and, 

as JodI recorded it, "Requested urgently 

that everything be thrown cast." H The 

·' OKH . CenStdH . Op. Abt .. I II Nr. 450010/ 45, 

An den Fuehru ulld Obustrn Belthlshabtr du 

W ehrmllcht , '4.1.45; OKH, CenS tlJH . Op. Abt., 

III Nr. 450 0 11 / 45. An d en Fu thru ulld Oberstell 

Belthlshaber der Wth,ma cht , J5 .1.45. Both in H 

22 / 6b file . 

.~ OKH , CenStdH . FHO Nr. 2 / 45. Beurteilung 

du Gesamtltilldlage im Osten l'om '5.1.45 . H 22 / 

6b file. 

" j odl Diary. ' 5 jan 45. 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

next day, when Guderian talked to him in 

Berlin, Hitler said that he was going to 

send Sixth SS Panzer Army's two corps, 

the most readily available reserves in the 

West, to the Eastern Front, but to Army 

Group South in Hungary, not to Army 

Group A. He had decided that the outcome of the war hinged on holding th" 

Hungarian oil fields." 

Back in Berlin, Hitler took the Eastern 

Front directly in hand. On 16 J a nua ry he 

relieved Generaloberst Joseph Harpe and 

gave Schoerner command of Army Group 

A, calling Rendulic in from Norway to 

take over Anny Group North. During 

the day, apparently before Hitler had 

arrived in Berlin, the OKH had issued 

a directive giving Army Group A freedom of decision in the great bend of the 

Vistula, including authority to evacuate 

Warsaw, When Hitler saw the directive 

he ordered a new one written to supersede 

it. Fighting from the map, as was his 

habit, he demanded "as a minimum" that 

Anny Group A stop on, or regain, a line 

from cast of Krakow to west of Radomsko 

and thence along the Pilica River to the 

vicinity of Warsaw ; Warsaw and the Vistula to Modlin were to be held. The army 

group was to be told that the two panzer 

divisions from Army Group South would 

be the la' t it would get for two weeks; by 

way of a concession, it could let Seventeenth Army and Armeegruppe H einrici go 

far enough back in the Carpathian" to release a division or two.tG 

". Guderian, ErinlluulIgen ti,us S oldaten, p. 357 . 

iOOKH . Ge'IStdH . Op. Abt. , In K riegJ tagebu ch 

Bd. 135 . ,6 j an 45, H 22 / '5 file ; OKH, GerlStd H , 

Op. Abl .. l a N, . 45001 / 45. Weisulig luer die wei· 

tue KampUuehrung bei H UTe sgrupptll A u,uJ 

M itl e. 6.1.45 . H 22 / 6b fil e. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

Pursuit 

On I7 January the Russians completed 

the breakout phase of the offensive. First 

Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts had 

cleared the entire line of the Vistula from 

east of Krakow to west of Modlin. On 

that day XXIV Panzer Corps, the last 

island of resistance between the two fronts, 

broke loose northwest of Kielce and began to drift erratically as it fought its way 

west to the Pilica. Konev's spearheads 

were across the Pilica and up to Czestochowa and Radolllsko. First BeloTussiall 

Front took Warsaw. The Stauka ordered 

Zhukov and Konev to accelerate the 

thrusts toward the Oder and instructed 

Kanev to use his second echelon, mostly 

infantry which had not yet been in action, 

and his left flank units to take Krakow and 

the Upper Silesian industrial arca. H 

The failure to hold \Varsaw set off an 

explosion in Berlin. Army Group A rcported that the revised directive had come 

too late; the Warsaw garrison had destroyed its supplies and was leaving the city 

by the time it arrived. Hitler suspected 

sabotage- not without reason, by his lights: 

the original OKH directive was hardly one 

which any officer acquainted with Hitler 

could have expected him to approve. On 

,8 J anuary he had the three senior officers 

in the Operations Branch, OKH, arrested. 

The next day he signed an order that took 

away the last shreds of discretion left to 

the field commanders. Henceforth every 

army group, army, corps, or division commander was to be personally responsible 

for seeing to it that every decision for an 

operational movement, whether attack or 

<1 Zhilin, Vazhneyshiye Operatsii Otecheltvenn oy, 

Vo),n),. p. 474 ; IVOV( R ), VI, 80. 

423 

withdrawal, was reported in time for a 

counterorder to be given. The first principIc in combat would be to keep open the 

communication channels, and all attempts 

to gloss over the facts would be met with 

Draconian punishmcnt." ~ 

Schoerner, as always, made his presence 

felt from the moment he took command. 

One of his first acts was to dismiss the 

Commanding General, Ninth Army, General der Panzertruppen Smilo Freiherr von 

Luettwitz, on the charge that on the day 

Warsaw was lost his conduct of operations 

had hcen insufficiently "clear and rigorous." 4!t General der Infanterie Thcodor 

Busse took command of the army. Schoerner had given the army group the first taste 

of his by then well enough known ruthlessness; others in all ranks were to feel it before the battle ended. 

Also in the Schoerner style, the reports 

and orders coming out of army group 

headquarters began to exude confidence . 

The daily report of ,8 January stated that 

the mission of defending thc Upper Silesian 

industrial area could be usuccessfully" ac· 

complished if the two panzer divisions com· 

ing from Army Group South arrived soon. 

The Soviet thrust toward Posen, going into 

a gap between Fourth Panzer Army and 

Ninth Army, would require "a speedy 

... On '23 January the OKH issued an implementing directive which stated that special radio teams 

would be stationed with selected army and corps 

headquarters. Through them the commanders were 

to report all important events immediately and report at least four times a day "all the facts that 

may be necessary for decision making by the highest leadership." Der Fuehrer, Nr. 00688145, an die 

Oberbefehlshaber deT KriegHchauplaetze , der Heeresgruppen und Armeen , J9 .1.45 , H 22 / 4 file ; Obkdo. 

d . H . Cr. Mitte , Ia Nr. 404 /45, an AOK 4, 23.1.45, 

AOK 4 65728 / t file. 

n Schoerner's comment of 2 February '945 in 

von Lucttwitz's personnel file . 
424 

development of new forces," but it, too, 

could then be stopped and counterattacks 

could be begun on its flanks. The report 

did not indicate where the army group 

proposed to get the new forces. 

The next day Schoefner gave Seventeenth Army the mission of defending 

Upper Silesia, ordered Fourth Panzer 

Army to stop the Russians west of Czestochowa and on the line of advance toward 

Breslau, and ordered Ninth Army to hold 

between Lodz and the Vistula and at the 

same time counterattack south off its right 

flank. If the assignments to Seventeenth 

Army and Ninth Army had at least theoretical substance, the mission given to 

Fourth Panzer Army bore slight relationship to hard reality. The army had 

nothing left but parts of two divisions and 

one or two brigades; XXIV Panzer Corps 

and the remnants of the army's left flank 

divisions were still encircled and fighting 

their way northwest into the Ninth Army 

sector.~o 

By [g January the offensives against 

Army Groups A and Center were both 

running full tilt. The army groups had lost 

contact with each other, and in the Army 

Group A zone broad gaps had opened between the Ninth and Fourth Panzer and 

between the Fourth Panzer and Seventeenth Armies. South of Lodz Ninth 

Army's XXXX Panzer Corps and Panzer 

Corps Grossdeutschland were trying to 

hold a short line until XX IV Panzer Corps 

(Gruppe Nehring) could cross the Pilica. 

East of Breslau Fourth Panzer Army was 

being thrown back to the German border; 

at Namslau and east of Oppeln the Russians were across the border.~1 Seventeenth 

10" MS # P- I 14a ( Hauck ), reil V III, pp. 30-:ll . 

~I In the former German territory east of the 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Army had a nearly continuous 40-mile 

front on the eastern border of the Upper 

Silesian industrial area; but it lost Krakow 

on the [gth. 

The Soviet armies moved in columns on 

the roads, the tank armies averaging 25- 30 

miles a day and the infantry armies 18 

miles. First BeloTuSJian Front's main 

force struck past Lodz toward Poznan, 

First Ukrainian Front's toward Breslau 

while its infantry turned off the flank toward Upper Silesia." The weather had 

cleared and the overwhelming Soviet air 

superiority added to the Germans' troubles. 

The Luftwaffe had begun shifting fighter 

and ground support aircraft east after 14 

January, but the losses, mostly in planes 

captured on the ground when their landing 

fields were overrun, outnumbered the new 

arrivals. Aircraft repair and assembly 

plants dispersed in Poland to escape the 

Allied bombing were falling into the Russians' hands. 53 

Behind the front vehicles of all descriptions jammed the roads leading into Germany. In the mass of humanity fleeing 

westward were civilian refugees, party and 

administrative personnel, and not a few 

stragglers from combat units; Army Group 

A did not have enough military police even 

to begin screening out the latter. The 

Ode:r and Neisse Rivers and in East Prussia, Polish, 

in some instances Russian, names have been sub. 

stituted for all the German place names. Between 

1939 and 1945 the Germans changed the place 

names in the Polish territory absorbed into the 

Rei ch. In this narrative the pre·1933 place names 

are used. 

~ OKH . CenStd H , Op. Abt .. / a Kriegstagebu ch . 

Bd. '.15 , '9}an 45. H 22/15 file : OK H . CenStdH . 

Op. AbtI Jl/b , Pru ef·Nr. 52831, Lage Ost, Stand 

t 9.1.45 Abends; Platonov. V toraya Mirova)'a V 0)'· 

na. '939- 45 , p. 649· 

:'.:I Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet 248, Riu nnd 

Fnll of the C,.,mntl Air Fora. p. :-\86. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

refugee treks, a long-familiar sight on the 

Eastern Front, for the first time were composed of Germans. For the first time, too, 

the treks did not need to be urged onward; 

they were propelled by sheer terror. The 

Russian vengeance on German civilians 

was swift, pcrnonal, merciless and, more 

often than not, brutal. To debate here 

whether the misery and destruction the 

Germans visited on half of European 

Russia in the execution of Nazi occupation 

policy exceeded the rape, arson, pillage, 

and wanton murder that accompanied the 

Russian march into Eastern Gennany 

would be profitless. Certainly thousands 

on thousands of Germans and Russians 

suffered horribly and most of them innocently. The sheer, massive inhumanity of 

the war on the Eastern Front in World 

War II has no equal in modern history. 

The cluster of industrial cities in Upper 

Silesia had succeeded the bombed-out 

Ruhr as Germany's number one coal- and 

basic-metals-producing center. At the end 

of the third week in January the factories 

and mines were still going full blast. To 

the east Seventeenth Army's left flank stood 

like a windbreak, but it wa'i open on the 

north where Fourth Panzer Army was 

being shoved west toward the Oder. On 

2 I January Konev turned Third Guards 

Tank Army at Namslau and sent it doubling back to the southeast along the Oder 

behind Seventeenth Army's flank. 

On 22 January XXIV Panzer Corps 

made contact with Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland on the Wart he River near 

Sieradz. Caught in the Russian tide, both 

corps continued to drift west. On the 

same day the First Ukrainian Front left 

flank reached the Oder. During the next 

three days Konev's armies closed up to the 

425 

river on a 14o-mile stretch between Cosel 

and Glogau. At Breslau Fourth Panzer 

Army held a bridgehead; upslream and 

downstream from the city the Russians 

crossed the river in half a dozen places. 

Schoerner ordered counterattacks; the 

armies could not execute them."1 

Army Group ViJtula 

On the 25th First BeLorussian Front's 

main force passed Poznan heading due 

west toward Kucstrin on the Oder. Its 

advance was now taking it away at a right 

angle from Second Belorussian Front. 

which had turned north along the east 

bank of the Vistula. On that lengthening 

front between Ihe Vistula and the Oder 

Hitler had put in the newly created Army 

Group Vistula and given Himmler 

command. 

Guderian had wanted to bring Weichs 

and his headquarters up from Yugoslavia 

to command Army Group Vistula, but 

Hitler professed to see signs of authentic 

if late-blooming military talent in Himmler's recent handling of Army Group 

Oberrhein. Hitler gave Himmler the mission of closing the gap between Army 

Groups Center and A, prevenling breakthroughs to Danzig and Poznan, and holding open a corridor to East Prussia. He 

gave Himmler the further responsibility of 

organizing the national defense behind the 

whole Eastern Front.s:; 

When Himmler arrived on the scene on 

23 January, one of the missions was al-

... OKH, GenStdH , Op. Abt., 11M Nr. J059145 . 

Weisung luer die Fortluehrung det Schlacht i,l 

Schlesien. 26.1.45 (25.1.45) , H 22 / 4 file . 

""" OKH, WFSt , U ebersicht ueber die Akten deJ. 

WFSt aus dem Jan .-Feb . '945 . 21 Jan 45, OCMH 

files. 
426 

ready obsolete; Second Army had broken 

away from the Army Group Center flank 

and the Russians were closing up to the 

Baltic coast at the mouth of the Vistula; 

Army Group Center was cut off. Second 

Army had a front along the lower Vistula, 

but west of the river all the way to the 

Oder, as Himmler reported, there was 

"nothing but a big hole." " By 25 January another of the missions was beyond 

executing; on that day the Russians passed 

Poznan. 

Himmler had come east in the Sleiermark) his tremendously long and elegantly 

outfitted special train. It was parked at 

first in the station at Deutsch-Krone. In 

it he had a mobile command post from 

which he controlled his vast personal empire. He carried along with him skeleton 

staffs for his functions as Reichsfuehrer-SS, 

Minister of the Interior, Chief of the German Police, and Commanding General of 

the Replacement Army, to mention only 

the most important. Each of the staffs 

had its own clerks and files. The train 

was outfitted with radio and teletype, but 

the sets, fully occupied with administrative 

traffic, could not also carry that of an army 

group command. Himmlcr, moreover, 

would not have neglected his political interests for the sake of the army group. As 

an army group commander he had nothing 

- no communications with his front line 

units, no staff, virtually no troops, and 

no vehicles. For several days on his island 

of luxury, which contrasted grotesquely 

with the columns of refugees wandering 

through the snow and cold outside, he had 

no more contact with the war than he 

:Ie Abu hri/t Funschreiben des Reichs/uehrtrs-SS 

an SS-Cruppenfuehrer Fegelein. 23.1.45 . H 12 4 

file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

could get from occasional, mostly outdated, 

situation reports. The first of his military 

staff to arrive was the operations officer, 

an Army colonel, who made the trip from 

Berlin by car. Several days later the chief 

of staff, an SS general with no starT experience, arrived. ; 

On 26 January, for no discernihle purpose, unless it was to confuse students of 

the war, Army Group North was renamed 

Army Group Courland, Army Group Center became Army Group North, and Army 

Group A became Army Group Center. 

The next day Army Group Vistula took 

command of Ninth Army, thereby extending its zone south to Glogau on the Oder. 

The army group front, if it could be called 

a front at ali, followed the Vistula from 

its mouth south to Kulm, then veered west 

north of the Netze River until it turned 

south again on the Tirschtiegcl switch 

position, which, following a chain of lakes, 

was about fifty miles east of Kucstrin on 

the north, and at its south end tied in on 

the Oder above Glogau. 

The rivers and lakes, though plentiful in 

the army group zone, afforded no defensive 

advantages. Nearly all were frozen solid 

enough to carry heavy tanks. To defend 

the l60-mile line north of the Netze and 

the Tirschtiegel switch position Himmler 

had, on 27 January, two improvised SS 

corps headquarters, one provisional corps 

headquarters, three divisions (one of them 

a newly formed Latvian SS division ), and 

assorted odds and ends, Ninth Army remnants, V olkssturm, and whatever else could 

be scraped up locally or behind the Oder. 

Off the front, two divisions were encircled 

a: MS # - 408, Au/uichllungen Oberst i.C . Eismann als 1a der Heeresgruppe "Weichsel" (Obe rst 

i. C. a. D. Hans Georg Eismann ), pp. 11 -35. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

in the fortress Thorn (Torun ) and an 

equally strong force was encircled in Poznan. Headquarters, Ninth Army, brought 

with it one corps headquarters and little 

morc than the staffs of three divisions. 

XXIV Panzer Corps and Panzer Corps 

Grossdelltschland, still fighting their way 

out, had gone under Army Group Center. 

The Thaw 

Reinforcements were starting to flow 

east; Gneisenau battle groups set up by the 

Replacement Army and battalions composed of the personnel of training centers, 

NCO, and weapons schools. Hitler had 

refused Guderian's repeated requests to 

evacuate Army Group North (Courland ), 

but on I7 January he had ordered out of 

Courland a panzer division and 2 infantry 

divisions and, five days later, an SS Corps 

headquarters and 2 SS divisions. The 

corps headquarters and the 5 di"isions were 

to go to Army Group Vistula. By 25 January one of the divisions had reached 

Gdynia. On the 22d Hitler had ordered 

the Western Theater to give up Sixth SS 

Panzer Army and a n additional panzer 

corps: all together 6 panzer divisions, a 

yolks-grenadier division, 2 brigades, and 

several yolks artillery corps.1I8 He still intended, however, to send the stronger part 

of those forces, the I and " SS Panzer 

Corps, to Army Group South. 

By 27 January four of Fourth Ukrainian 

Front's armies had closed in on and almost 

encircled the Upper Silesian industrial area. 

Third Guards Tank Army, bearing down 

from the northwest, deliberately left the 

:.8 OKW, WFSt, Op. (H ) Nr. 88149/45 011 O.B. 

West. 22.1.45 in OKH, GenStdH. Op. Abt .. K .T .B. 

Anlagen, Bd. 4. H 22 / 6b file . 

427 

southern end of the pocket open to let the 

Germans escape and thus avoid a laslditch hattie that would have destroyed the 

mines and factories. ~' 11 Between the 28th 

and the 30th Seventeenth Army retreated 

out of the pocket. Because of his known 

ruthlessness, Schoefner could sometimes order retreats that Hitler would have forbidden to any other general. In the meantime, 

Ameegruppe Heinrici had begun withdrawing in Czechoslovakia to behind the 

High TaIra. 

On 27 and 28 January a blizzard blew 

across central Europe piling deep snowdrifts on the roads in the Army Groups 

Vistula and Center zones. Then, at the 

turn of the month, the temperature rose 

rapidly; the snow melted; and the ground, 

a few days before frozen rock hard, began 

to thaw. On I February Himmler wrole 

to Guderian, "In the present stage of the 

war the thawing weather is for us a gift 

of fate. God has not forgotten the courageous German people." The Germans, he 

went on, were fighting in their own country ( he added, " unfortunately") where 

they had good road and railroad networks; 

the Russians were having to bring their 

supplies forward long distances either by 

truck, over much poorer roads, or by air. 

The warm weather, he thought, would give 

the Germans a chance to bring in and deploy their reinforcements, would slow the 

Soviet tanks, make them more vulnerable, 

and might even afford opportunities to " retake pieces of precious German ground." GO 

The thaw, coming when it did, was 

in fact something of a gift of fate. 

~ Zhilin, Vazhneyshiye Operatsij Otechest venno), 

Voyny, p. 479 ; Platono\" Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , '939-45, p. 695· 

toRFSS Nr. 101 /:111730, nachr. H errn Gell. 

ObIt. Gu.derian. 1.:1 .45. H 22/5 file. 
428 

Zhukov was beginning to worry about 

his lengthening north flank (the old 

Soviet flank sensitivity ); his troops had, 

moreover, covered more than 250 miles 

without a pause. Kanev's right flank 

had gone nearly as far. On the Oder 

Schoefner was hammering together something like a front. The thrust toward Berlin between the Oder and the Army 

Group Vistula front in Pomerania was becoming too narrow for the Soviet taste. 

On 4 February, in a teletype message to 

Hitler, Schoefner wrote, "My Fuehrer: I 

can report that the first onslaught of the 

great Russian offensive against Army 

Group Center has been substantially intercepted. The front is still under pressure 

in many places, but in others we are making local counterattacks." GI By then a 

semicohcrent front was also beginning to 

take shape in thc Army Group Vistula 

zonc. 

After putting in most of its second 

echelon and reserves on the north flank, 

First Belorussian Front had rcached thc 

Oder north of Kuestrin on 3 I January. By 

3 February it had closed to the Oder from 

Zehden south to its left boundary, but then 

it stoppcd. At Kuestrin and Frankfurt thc 

Russians were forty miles from Berlin. The 

Germans held bridgeheads at both places, 

and the Russians had bridgcheads north 

of Kuestrin and south of Frankfurt.';' 

East Prussia 

At the beginning of December 1944 

Army Group Center had 33 infantry divi-

·'OKH . GenStdH. Op. Abl., I.M . Abschri/t 

Fernschreiben Gen. Ob;t . Schoenlu an den C hef 

des GenStdH. 4.:1.45. H '1.'1./5 file . 

., Zhilin, Val.hneyshiye Operats;; Otechestt'ennoy 

Voyny. p. 476. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

slons and 12 panzer or panzer grenadier 

divisions. Of the latter 3 were in the front, 

9 in reservc. The army group held a 360-

mile front, roughly tcn miles of frontage 

per division, about as good a ratio as the 

Germans were accustomed to at that stage 

of the war. To the rear, in East Prussia, 

it had an extensive system of field fortifications and on the border of East Prussia 

and around Koenigsberg some concrete 

emplacements; the latter had been built 

before the war and would have been more 

valuable if in the meantime the guns and 

barbed wire had not been removed and 

installed elsewhere, in thc Atlantic Wall, 

for instance. 

In early December Army Group Center 

could havc faced an attack with confidence; by the turn of the year it no longer 

could; in the intcrval it had lost 5 panzer 

divisions and 2 cavalry brigades by trans.-

fers. On 4 January Reinhardt estimated 

that the R ussians had 5 armies on the 

Narew and an equally strong group of 50-

60 divisions south of the Neman in the 

Goldap-Schillfelde arca. Since he was on 

notice to give up another panzer division 

(ordered a few days later), he concluded, 

with obvious irony, that the OKH considered East Prussia less important than 

other areas and was willing to risk a large 

loss of territory there. He asked for a 

directive telling him what part of East 

Prussia had to bc held SO that hc could 

deploy the reserves he still had." Hc did 

not get an answer. 

Army Group Center Isolated 

On 12 January, in an attempt to mislead the Germans and tic down their re-

· Obkdo. d . H . Gr. M itte. la Nr. 111 / 45 , an 

OKH. GenStdH. Op . Abt .. 4 .1.45. H '1.'1. / 4 file. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

serves, the Russians attacked Fourth Army 

north and south of the Romintcncr Heide. 

The next day, opening the offensive in 

earnest, Third BeLorussian Front hit Third 

Panzer Army at Stallupoenen and Pil'kallen. On the 14th Second BeloTussian 

Front attacked Second Army out of the 

Serock and Rozan bridgeheads. Both 

armies held up well in the fir~l two days, 

went into the main battle line, and patched 

the holes. Fog prevented the Russians 

from bringing their air power and armor 

into play ti~ Unfortunately for the army 

group, this momentary success-especially 

by comparison with what Army Group A 

was experiencing, looked almost like a 

defensive victory. On the '4th, when 

Guderian reported to Hitler that apparently Army Group Center could prevent an 

operational breakthrough on the Narew 

and into East Prussia, Hitler ordered 

Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland and its 

two panzer divisions transferred to Army 

Group A." 

On '5 January Second Army was 

pushed back to the first switch position. In 

the north the weather was clearing, and 

during the day heavy air and tank attacks 

forced Third Panzer Army to start drawing in the front south of Pil'kallen to prevent its breaking apart. The next day the 

weather cleared in the Second Anny sector, and a tank spearhead broke through 

past Nowo Miasto. Second BeLorussian 

Front's main force, five annies, one of them 

a tank army, plus a tank corps, a mechanized corps, and a cavalry corps, was beginning to move out of the Rozan bridgehead. 

&< MS # P- 114b (Hofmann), Teil IX, pp. 10-

". u; OKH. GenStdH, Op. Abt., Ia Nr. 450 010 / 

45, An den Fuehrer und Obers/en Befehlshaber der 

Wehrmacht. 14 .1.45, H 22 / 6b file . 

429 

From Nowo Miasto it aimed northeastward toward the mouth of the Vistula. 

The two armies and a tank corps, pushing 

out of the Serock bridgehead to provide 

cover on the left in the direction of Bielsk 

and Bromberg, would have no trouble; the 

Army Group A Rank south of the Vistula 

had broken away. Third Belorussian 

Front, having failed to break through on a 

broad front, began shifting its weight north 

to the Pil'kallen area. For Army Group 

Center the obvious next move was to start 

pulling back the still untouched Fourth 

Army so as to get divisions to close the 

breakthrough against Second Army and 

prevent, jf it could, the envelopment of its 

right Rank. Reinhardt proposed this on 

the ,6th. 

By the '7th Second Army was clearly 

strained to the limit. After Guderian told 

him that afternoon that Hitler refused to 

let Fourth Army withdraw, Reinhardt 

called Hitler and was treated to the 

Fuehrer's standard lecture on the futility of 

voluntary withdrawals. The most Hitler 

would agree to was taking two divisions 

from Fourth Army by thinning its front. 

On ,8 January Second Army's front 

snapped, opening a gap on both sides of 

Mlawa. Reinhardt put in a panzer corps 

headquarters and the entire army group 

reserve, seven divisions, but knew they 

were not likely to he enough. The next 

day the leading Soviet tanks stood south of 

Gilgenhurg; Fifth Guards Tank Army was 

ready for the dash to the coast. On that 

day, too, Third Panzer Army's front broke 

open north of the Pregel River. 

The 20th was a relatively quiet day ; 

Rokossovskiy and Chernyakovskiy were getting ready to shift into high gear. Hitler 

again refused to let fourth Army move. 
430 

He promised a panzer division from Army 

Group North and twenty naval replacement battalions from Denmark. 

The offensive picked up speed on 2' 

January. Against Second Army, Secolld 

BeloTussian Front went as far as Deutsch 

Eylau and turned a force north toward 

Allenstein. Third Belorussiall Front took 

Gumbinnen, removing that obstacle on the 

route to Koenigsberg along the Pregel. The 

thrust to the coast to cut off the army 

group was developing; Second Army reported that it might delay but could not 

prevent it. More alarming, the attacks 

south of the Pregel and toward Allenstein 

seemed to presage an attempt to force the 

whole army group away from the coast 

and into an encirclement in the interior of 

East Prussia. Fourth Army was already 

lying in the bottom of a lopsided sack • 30 

miles from the coast. 

After Reinhardt reported that all the 

lower commands were pressing for relief 

and that a complete loss of confidence in 

the higher leadership was impending, 

Hitler finally agreed to let Fourth Army 

withdraw to the eastern edge of the Masurian Lakes. This was something, but far 

from enough. Reinhardt noted in his 

diary that in the long run the army group 

would have to take everything back to the 

Heilsberg triangle, the line of fortifications 

built in the 1920'S when all the 100,000-

man Reichswehr expected to be able to 

defend in the event of war was Koenigsberg and a foothold in East Prussia. For 

tcn years no one had imagined that relic 

of German weakness would ever again figure in a military plan. 

By nightfall on 23 January Second 

Belorussian Front had cut all the roads 

and railroads crossing the Vistula except 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the coast road through Elbing. After 

dark, Fifth Guards Army's lead tank detachment approached the city. Finding thaI 

it had not been alerted-the streetcars were 

running and on one street German soldiers 

from a local armored school were marching in formation- the Russian crews 

turned on the headlights of their tanks and 

rolled through the main streets firing as 

they went. By daylight, when the next 

wave of Soviet tanks arrived, the Germans 

in Elbing had recovered enough to fight 

them off and force them to detour cast 

around the city. In the meantime, however, the Russian lead detachment reached 

the coast, and Army Group Center was 

isolated. 

Reinhardt reported that he would put 

all the troops he could musler into counterattacks from east and west to restore contact. Hitler, anticipating withdrawals elsewhere to get the troops, countered with an 

order forbidding Reinhardt to take Fourth 

Army farther west than Loetzen and 

Ortclsburg. As reinforcements, he offered 

instead the two divisions at Memel, which 

he had insisted until then on holding as 

"a springboard to Army Group North." 

The divisions would have to be brought 

south by small boats or over the Kurische 

Nehrung, the narrow, 6o-mile-long tongue 

of sand hills spanning the Bay of Courland. 

For nine days Third Panzer Army had 

managed to preserve a front of sorts by 

retreating gradually toward Koenigsberg; 

but on 24 J anuary the Russians broke 

through south of the Pregcl and threatened 

to cut off Koenigsberg on the south. The 

army group command was trapped between reality and Hitler's illusions. Reinhardt knew he could not hold Koenigsberg 

and the Samland Peninsula, let the Fourth 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

Army front continue to bulge eastward to 

the Masurian Lakes, and still counterattack 

to the west. But he could not bring himself to confront Hitler with those issues and 

he went so far as to transfer to Third Pan· 

zer Army two divisions Fourth Army had 

taken out for the counterattack. When 

Fourth Army evacuated the outer defenses 

of Loetzen without permission during the 

day on the 24th, Reinhardt said nothing; 

he knew the army would have to go back 

farther, much farther; but he also accepted 

without protest Hitler's angry demand for a 

full-scale investigation,GO 

Treason? 

On the afternoon of the 24th the Commanding General, Fourth Army, General 

der Infanterie Friedrich Hossbach, acting 

independently, called in three of his corps 

commanders. He told them that the army's land communications with Gennany 

were cut and no relief could be expected. 

therefore, he had decided to break out to 

the west. The breakout and retreat would 

begin on the night of the 26th, or on the 

next day. He intended to put the whole 

army into it and to give up East Prussia. 

The civilians would have to stay behind. 

That sounded horrible, he said, but it 

could not be changed; the paramount objective had to be to get the army back to 

Germany proper with its combat potential 

.. MS # P- 114b (Hofmann ), Teil IX, pp. 13-

41 ; OKH, Ct nStdH, 01'. Abt., fa K,iegstagtbuch 

Bd. '35. '5- 21 Jan 45, H 22/15 file ; OKH, Gen 

StdH. 01'. Abt. , 112 Kriegstagebu ch Bd . 136, ~u

24 Jan 45, H 22/16 file; Platonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , 193!r4S, pp. 67C- B4 ; 1, S. Korotkow, 

Die Zuschlagung der Ostpreuuen-GruPPierung der 

deutschfaschistischtn Truppel'l , in P. A. Shilin, ed., 

Die wichtigsttn Operationtn del GroHen Valeriaendilchen Kriegel (Berlin, 1958 ), pp. 555- 59. 

431 

intact." He did not mention Third Panzer 

Army. Probably he assumed that this army 

would have to make its own choice whether 

to go or to stay when the time came. On 

the necessity for an attack ·to the west he 

and Reinhardt agreed in general terms, 

and the withdrawal east of Loetzen had 

showed that Reinhardt was not determined 

to hold on the east. Hossbach apparently 

concluded that it was not worthwhile to 

tell him more. 

On the 25th Chernyakovskiy's troops got 

to within twelve miles of Koenigsberg on 

the southeast. They seemed again to be 

intent on pinching off the neck of the sack. 

Fourth Army's east front was ninety miles 

from the coast; on the coast the Fourth 

and Third Panzer Armies' fronts, back to 

back, were less than forty miles apart. 

That night Reinhardt, who had been 

wounded in an air raid during the day, 

tried to persuade Guderian that the time 

had come to reduce the bulge. Guderian 

insisted that the front stay where it was; 

he refused to hear of any further withdrawals. During the day the army group 

had been renamed Army Group North 

and Second Army had been transferred to 

Army Group Vistula. 

Fifth Guards Tank Army had a solid 

hold on Baltic coast northeast of Elbing by 

26 January. On its right Fourth Army deployed divisions for the breakout. The 

movement west weakened the army's southeast and northeast fronts; Loetzen was lost, 

and the Russians, crossing the frozen lakes . 

punched numerous holes in the front. Before noon the army group reported that it 

wa, about to order Fourth Army to with-

., Transcript in AOK 4. la, Beilagen z:um K .T .B .• 

Notiz:en ueber Ferngespraeche, 14.1.- :15 .1.45, AOK 

464185/ 1 file . 
432 

draw thirty miles to the line WartenhurgBischofsburg-Schippenbeil-Friedland. Talking to Hitler, Reinhardt added that he intended, further, to break out to the west 

and take the front into the Heilsherg 

triangle. Hitler replied that he would 

give a decision later and hung up. 

Realizing that he W';:L\) heing presented 

with a fait accompli, Hitler fell into it rage. 

He told Guderian what Reinhardt projected, diametrically opposed his, Hitler's, 

basic plan and was treason. He demanded 

that Reinhardt and Hossbach be relieved 

immediately. To the army group he sent 

an order forbidding any withdrawal beyond the line Wartenburg-Nikolaikenwhich would only have cut a narrow slice 

off the southeastern tip of the bulge. 

Thereafter communications with the OKH 

suddenly ceased; no one with any authority 

would talk to the anny group. Finally, at 

1915, Reinhardt decided on his own responsibility to let Fourth Army withdraw 

to the line he had originally proposed. 

He tried to sweeten the dose by reporting that the army group would try to 

get a solid front "at the latest" in the 

line Wartenburg-Bischofsburg-Schippenbeil-Friedland. Two hours later a telegram came through relieving him and his 

chief of staff. 

Before noon the next day Rendulic was 

in command. He had orders from Hitler 

to hold Koenigsberg and what was left of 

East Pr.l1ssia. The counterattack to the 

west had begun during the night, although 

by then it was wasted effort. Only the 

breakout and retreat that H ossbach had 

planned could have succeeded, and with 

Rendulic in comrnand and Hitler alerted 

that was impossible. 

At the end of the month, General dcr 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Infanterie Friedrich Mueller, who had 

made a reputation as an improvisor during 

the retreat from Greece, replaced Hos,'ibach. The withdrawal Reinhardt had ordered before he was dismis.'icd took some of 

the pressure orr Fourth Army's cao;;L front, 

but on the north Bagramyan's First Ballic 

Fronl had added its weight to the advance 

on Koenigsberg and had pushed Third 

Panzer Army onto the Samland Peninsula. 

On the south Fourth Army held open a 

narrow corridor into Koenigsberg. The 

greatest danger was that the R u'iSians in 

Samland might go the remaining fifteen or 

!So miles to Pillau on the Frischc Nchrung 

and cut the army group's sea supply line. 

( From Pillau trucks could Cross the frozen 

bay to Heiligenbeil. ) 

On 1 February Fourth Army made a 

last attempt to break through to Elbing. 

It fan into a strong counterattack and wao;; 

stopped dead." 

During the succeeding days the flood 

of civilian refugees out of East Prussia 

reached its peak. Some were taken out by 

boat, most walked to Danzig across the 

Frische Nehrung and the Vistula delta. 

By mid-February 1,300,000 of the 2 ,300,-

000 total population were evacuated; of 

those who stayed about half were V olksslurm and others absorbed into the Wehrmacht. 69 

Rendulic, in the few months left in the 

war, was setting out to carve for himself 

a niche in history next to Schoerncr. One 

characteristic remarked on by all of his 

former superiors had been his absolute 

nervelessness. For him, keeping the army 

g roup in East Prussia raised no questions 

118 MS # P- 114b (Hofmann ), 1'eillX. pp. 45- 60. 

·OKH , WFSt , Uebersicht u.eber die Akten des 

WFSt (lUS dem Jan .-Feb . '945 , 15 Feb 45 , OCMH 

files. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

other than how it could best be accomplished. In one order he made the battalion and regimental commanders responsible for every "foot of ground" voluntarily 

given up and appended the example of a 

captain he had ordered shot the day before 

for taking his battalion back a mile after 

it had been broken through." In another, 

he ordered "flying courts-martial" created 

to scour the rear areas. Every soldier not 

wour,ded, picked up outside his unit area, 

was to be tried and shot on the spot.' I 

The Budapest Relief 

While Soviet armies marched on Germany north of the Carpathians, a tragic 

drama played to a gruesome finish on the 

Danube at Budapest. In sheer horror 

nothing since Stalin grad compared with the 

Budapest siege. Almost the entire population, normally over a million, was trapped 

in the city without the barest provision 

for subsistence or health, driven to the cellars by air and artillery bombardments. 

In most quarters, the electricity, gas, and 

water services failed in the first days. The 

garrison had less than the fragmentary 

supply and medical services that had remained with Sixth Army at Stalingrad. 

Faulty staff work in the IX SS Mountain 

Corps headquarters had lost most of its 

supply stockpile, including 450 tons of ammunition and 300,000 rations, to the Russians the day the pocket closed." On 3' 

December Army Group South sent a river 

'!O AOK 4. la Nr. 1371/45. Nachstehender Befehl zur Kenntnis, 2.2.45, AOK 4 65728/1 file. 

n AOK 4, fa Nr. 1350145. Naehstehender Be· 

/ehl zur Kenntnis und weiteren Veranlassung, :1.:1. 

45, AOK 4 6572811 file. 

~'O. . d . Armeegruppe Balek, fa Nr. 791 145. an 

Obkdo. H . Gr. Sued. 30.1.45. H. Gr. A 75126/54 

file . 

433 

boat loaded with 400 tons of supplies down 

the Danube; it ran aground upstream from 

the city. The air supply was an old story: 

winter weather, gasoline shortages, and lack 

of airstrips in the pocket reduced the flow 

to a mere trickle. 

Consequently, the foreseeable margin of 

time for the relief operation was very narrow, SO narrow that the army group immediately began to consider a breakout 

and evacuation. The apparent pressure of 

time also strongly influenced the army 

group's choice of its approach route. (Ma p 

38) From the front southeast of Komarno 

the distance to Budapest was about thirty 

miles, about half of it through the Vertes 

Mountains. Northeast of Szekesfehervar, 

though the distance was ten miles greater. 

the terrain was good for tanks; but the assembly would have taken five days longer 

and would have required more gasoline. 

Against strong doubts, the savings in time 

and gasoline prevailed, and at the end of 

December the army group and the OKH 

agreed on the approach from Komarno." 

The OKH directive contemplated a breakout "in the most extreme case" but reserved the decision to Hitler. U 

The operation began on New Year's 

Day. During the night an infantry division crossed the ice-choked Danube five 

miles west of Esztergom and, striking behind the Russians south of the river, gave 

IV SS Panzer Corps a quick start along 

the Komarno-Budapest road. In the 

mountains a start was not enough. On the 

second day, the prospects several times appeared good, but the Russians always had 

just enough infantry and antitank guns to 

n H. Gr. Sued, fa Kriegstagebueh. Dez. 44. :1. 

Hael/te. 20-~1 Dec 44, H. Gr. A 75126/45 file. 

16 H . Cr. Sued, fa Nr. 1145 , an Armeegruppe 

Balek. 1.1.45. H . Gr. A 75126/49 file. 
( 

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FB'ALCI(~ 

L.!.SIXTH!J 

XXXI( 

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(H~NGAR~Nl 

MAP 38 

I THE BUDAPEST 

RELIEF OPERATION 

1-26 January 1945 

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, 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

keep IV SS Panzer Corps from shaking 

itself loose. In another twenty-four hours 

the Russians had the defense tightly in 

hand, and by the time Guderian arrived at 

the Army Group South headquarters, on 

5 January, Sixth Guards Tank Army was 

ready to counter north of the Danube with 

an advance across the Hron River toward 

Komarno. 

Guderian, nevertheless, brought with 

him a set of objectives that raised the relief 

operation, so far not glowingly successful, 

to the status of a major offensive, The 

army group was first to retake Budapest 

and the line Lake Balaton-Velencze LakeErcsi and then turn south to destroy the 

enemy west of the Danube." On 6 January, the day Guderian left, IV SS Panzer 

Corps came up against a solid front; the 

offensive had run tight." During the day, 

too, the Sixth Guards Tank and Seventh 

Guards Armies attacked, gaining better 

than eight miles, and threatened the IV 

Panzer Corps rear from north of the 

Danube. 11 

On 7 January, in an attempt to catch 

the Russians off guard, I Cavalry Corps 

broke into their line northwest of Szekesfehervar. The momentary surprise was not 

enough; Fourth Guards Army reacted fast 

and before nightfall was contesting every 

yard of ground. The day was a dark one 

for the army group. Both of its attacks 

were stalled." 

In the meantime, at Budapest in the 

7& H . Gr. Sued, la, Bemerkungen Gen. Obsl. Cuduian anlae.ulich seines Besuches am 5.1.45, H . Gr. 

A 75126/49 file. 

,. H . Gr. Sued, Ia Kriegslagebuch, Jan . 45, 1. 

Hael/te, 1-6 Jan 45, H . Gr. A 74126/48 file. 

"IVOV( R ), IV, 399. 

,. H. Gr. Sued, la Kriegstagebuch, Jan . 45, 1. 

Haelfte, 7 Jan 45, H. Gr. A 741'26/48 file. 

435 

week since New Year's, the Russians had 

smashed the old bridgehead front around 

Pest, the hall of the city east of the Danube. In the ensuing house-to-house battle, 

the wounded could not be cared for, the 

fires put out, or the dead buried. Describing the scene, a Gennan war correspon· 

dent wrote, "A nauseating stench of decaying corpses is carried with a rain of sparks 

over the ruins." 78 In numerous places 

where they had driven deep into the city, 

the Russians mounted loudspeakers that 

they used, whenever the noise of battle 

subsided, to announce where the next artillery salvos or aerial bombs would fall 

or to call on the Germans and Hungarians 

to surrender while they still could. 

On the 7th, the Budapest garrison appeared to be rapidly approaching the end 

of its strength. Driving snow and lowhanging clouds kept the supply planes 

grounded; artillery and small arms ammunition were running short; the city population was hostile; and the Hungarians 

were deserting. Balck believed the order 

to break out would have to be given within 

twenty-four hours. Woehler decided to 

take his chances north of the Danube, let 

the IV SS Panzer Corps and I Cavalry 

Corps operations go on for another day, 

al)d try a quick infantry thrust through 

the Pilis Mountains, off the IV SS Panzer 

Corps north flank, that might at least give 

the breakout a better prospect of success. 

The next day Hitler refused to approve 

a breakout. This left the army group no 

choice but to keep on trying to punch 

through the front. Woehler then began 

to prepare what he called "a hussars' ride," 

~ Peter Gosztony. "D~r Kampf um Budap~ t 

1944/ 45 (V)," in Wehrwissens haftli h~ Rundschau (December, 1963), pp. 92-105. 
436 

a fast thrust through to Budapest by a 

motorized battalion. It might, for a few 

hours, open a corridor through which supplies could be sent into the city or through 

which the garrison could escape if Hitler 

changed his mind. 

For the army group, getting a relief 

column through to Budapest was the first 

objective; Hitler's primary, perhaps only, 

concern was to get the front out to the 

Danube. On the gth he talked about 

shifting IV SS Panzer Corps south for a 

try between Lake Balaton and Velencze 

Lake. The next day, a counterattack 

north of the river eliminated the threat to 

Komarno, but the "hussars' ride" failed. 

On the 11th Hitler awarded SS-Oberstgruppenfuehrer PfefTer-Wildenbruch the 

Knight's Cross of the Iron Cros. and renewed the order to hold Budapest. The 

next morning he ordered the army group 

to shift IV SS Panzer Corps south. 

In five days, over mountain roads and 

through snowdrift., IV SS Panzer Corps 

marched seventy miles to the northern tip 

of Lake Balaton. On 18 January it 

jumped ofT east, and by nightfall the next 

day it had covered the forty miles to the 

Danube at Dunapentele. The Germans 

appeared to have recovered their touch, 

and the IV SS Panzer Corps stafT predicted 

a fast push to Budapest even though Third 

Ukrainian Front had put in a tank corps 

and had two guards mechanized corps still 

uncommitted. 

Elsewhere, the day's developments were 

less encouraging. North of the Danube the 

last elements of two panzer divisions being 

transferred to Army Group A departed, 

leaving the front east of Komarno to be 

held by one infantry division. In the Budapest pocket, during the night and early 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

morning hours, PfefTer-Wildenbruch had 

evacuated Pest, a move that was long overdue but for which he had received Hitler's 

permission only the day before. In crossing the bridges, which were raked the 

whole time by Soviet fire, the troops from 

Pest took heavy losses. Nevertheless, the 

bridges stayed jammed with humanitymen, women, and children, young and old, 

wounded who could barely walk, and 

vehicles of all descriptions from trucks to 

baby carriages- until, shortly before daylight, the charges were set ofT that destroyed the elegant spans that had been the 

pride of Budapest. 

For the next three days the Russians 

fought hard to hold a front flanking VeIencze Lake on both sides. The German 

panzer divisions chewed their way through, 

taking Szekesfehervar and reaching the 

Vali River on 22 January, but by then 

they had lost most of their initial momentum. 80 In the meantime Woehler and 

Balek had become uncomfortably aware 

that the Headquarters, IV SS Panzer 

Corps, in spite of its good showing on the 

18th, was not competent to command a 

large-scale ofTensive. The commanding 

general, Obergruppenfuehrer (Lt. Gen.) 

Herhcrt Gille, was a well-meaning bumbler 

who spent most of his time at the front. 

The chief of stafT took a lighthearted attitude toward paper work, so lighthearted 

that on the 22d Balek had to go out himself to find out where the front was. 

Woehler decided to keep Gille, who was 

at least something of a morale builder, and 

get rid of the chief of stafT." 

., H. Gr. Sued, la Kriegstagebu ch, Jan 45, I. 

Had/te , 7- 2'1 Jan 45. H . Gr. A 741'16/ 48 file. 

$L O.B.d. H . Gr. Sued, /uer K.T.B., 26.1.45 in 

H. Gr. Sued, la Anlagen Jan 45, 2. Haelfte , H . Gr. 

A 751'16/51 file. 
THE JANUARY OFFENSIVE 

On 22 January Guderian urged Woehler 

to consider whether he could clean out the 

whole west side of the Danube with his 

own forces and some help from the Southeastern Theater. The success so far had 

whetted Hitler's appetite for a victory, and 

Guderian was obviously worried about 

having to divert more forces to the south. 

The question was a very serious one, he 

said, Ita matter of conscience." He did 

not reveal what he knew by then, namely, 

that Hitler intended to send Sixth SS 

Panzer Army's two SS corps into Austria 

behind Army Group South. 

IV SS Panzer Corps wasted the day of 

the 23d sorting out its units east of Szekesfehervar. The next day it closed to the 

Vali on a broad front but failed to get 

across. Woehler proposed that Second 

Panzer Army attack toward Kaposvar 

from south of Lake Balaton to siphon some 

of the Soviet strength away from IV SS 

Panzer Corps. The OKH told him not to; 

Hitler was nervous about the oil fields and 

was afraid Second Panzer Army would 

get into trouble. 

After a probing attack upstream along 

the Vali on 25 January failed to create an 

opening, Woehler reported the next day 

that a fast breakthrough to Budapest was 

impossible; the Russians had reinforced 

every likely point of attack. Guderian then 

proposed turning IV SS Panzer Corps 

south to join Second Panzer Army in an 

offensive between Lake Balaton and the 

Danube. The army group asked whether, 

since in that case the advance toward Budapest would be stopped, the order to 

break out should not be given. 

The answer came on the 27th when 

Hitler in an order of the day again called 

on IX SS Mountain Corps to hold out 

437 

until it was relieved. The pocket was then 

about three miles wide and four miles long. 

Into it were jammed 34,000 German and 

Hungarian troops, 10,000 wounded, and 

300,000 Hungarian civilians. 82 

On their side, for several days past, the 

Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts had 

ominously reshuffled units. Malinovskiy 

had taken Sixth Guards Tank Army out 

of the Hron River bridgehead. Its neighbor on the north, the Cavalry-Mechanized 

Group Pliyev, had been relieved by Bulgarian divisions. German Intelligence bad 

lost track of both the tank army and the 

cavalry-mechanized group. Northeast of 

Szekesfehervar and northwest of Dunafoldvar, Tolbukhin had pushed through heavy 

armored build-ups." 

On 27 January a dozen ritle divisions 

with strong armor behind them hit the 

southeastern face of the IV SS Panzer 

Corps salient between Dunapentele and 

the Sarviz Canal. When Guderian 

brought in the first reports that afternoon, 

Hitler ordered the Budapest relief stopped. 

It no longer made sense, he said. Ignoring 

Guderian's remarks about the garrison, he 

asked whether Sixth SS Panzer Army's two 

corps were moving-snow and gasoline 

shortages had delayed their getting out of 

the Ardennes and back to the railheads. 

JodI said one corps would reach Vienna in 

fourteen days, the other four or five days 

later. Relieved, Hitler remarked, "They 

will arrive just in time; the next crisis will 

be down there." at, 

a H. Gr. Sued, 14 Kriegstagebuch, Jan. 45, :1 . 

Hael/te, ~~ ~n Jan 45. H. Gr. A 751~6/50 file. 

113 DKH, GenStdH, F.H.D. Nr. 5:17/45, Kuru 

Beurteilung der Feindlage uom :18.1.45, H ~~/l6 

file. 

IWo Stenogr. Dienst im F. H. Quo, Lagebespruhung 

uom !l7.1.45. OCMH files. 
CHAPTER XX 

The Defense of the Reich 

Missions 

German 

For the German people, the first week 

of February was the darkest of the war. 

The coming months would bring despair 

and destruction but not another shock 

equal to the sudden appearance of the Russians on the Oder River. Three weeks 

earlier, the front had still been deep in 

Poland and nowhere on German soil. Now 

Upper Silesia was lost; in East Prussia a 

German army group was being cut to 

pieces; West Prussia and Pomerania were 

being defended by a skeleton army group 

under a novice commander; and the defense of the Oder would have to be entrusted to armies that had already been 

defeated on the Vistula and chased across 

Poland. If the Russians maintained their 

rate of advance, and there seemed to be 

no reason why they could not, they would 

be on the Rhine in another three weeks. 

In the depths of a crisis, Hitler had always found relief and refuge in the untrammeled power of decision and the illusion of being able to determine the outcome. He did so again that first week of 

February. To Himmler's Army Group 

Vistula he gave four missions: to establish 

a solid front on the Oder upstream from 

Schwedt; to stop the Russians south and 

west of Stargard and hold a staging area 

there for an attack into the flank of Second 

Guards Tank Army, which was leading 

the advance to the Oder; to keep his front 

anchored on the Vistula in the east; and, 

lastly, to prevent the Russians from pushing north into Pomerania and West Prussia. As a postscript Hitler added that after 

the Elbing road had been cleared Second 

Army was to "resume" the advance toward 

Army Group North.' In his orders to 

that army group he did not mention 

restoring contact with Second Army. He 

told Rendulic to place his main effort in 

the north, in the Koenigsberg area, and 

on the southwest to hold the line Braunsberg-Wormditt and prevent Fourth Army's 

being pushed away from the coast.' 

The directive to Army Group Courland, 

which on 3 February had successfully seen 

through what was called the Fourth Battle 

of Courland, instructed it to finish transferring two infantry divisions to Army 

Group Vistula and one to North (ordered 

on I February ) and prepare to take out a 

fourth division.' Generaloberst HeinrichGottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel. 

Rendulic's successor, answered that losing 

another division gave him "a fright," his 

1 OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., /a NT. 450 067/ 45, 

Wt'isung /uer H . Cr. We ichul. 2 .2-45. H . Gr. 

Weichsel 751~~h file . 

I OKH, GenStdH, Op . Abt., fa NT. 450 081 145 , 

Weisung fUM H . Gr. N ord, 7.:1 .45, H 22 /3 92a file. 

• OKH, GenStdH, Fuehrungsgruppt, Chel, Weis. 

ung fUM H . Gr. Kurland, , .2.45, H 22 /392a file . 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

front was becoming so thin. On the other 

hand, he observed, the army group was 

not tying down an equal proportion of 

Soviet strength, and he, therefore, did not 

believe holding Courland served a militarily 

useful purpose. He hinted that the whole 

army group ought to be evacuated before, 

with the advent of spring, the days began 

to lengthen.' 

On the southern half of the front, Army 

Group Center's mission, to try to get a 

front on the Odee, was obvious without a 

directive. In the Army Group South zone, 

even though Hitler ranked the N agykanizsa 

oil fields as the strategically most vital area 

on the whole Eastern Front, it appeared 

that for the near future, at least, the initiative would have to be surrendered to the 

Russians. The Budapest relief had failed, 

and Hitler had no further interest in the 

garrison except to have it hold out as long 

as possible. On the night of 5 February 

he again refused to pennit a breakout, 

claiming that it could not succeed anyway. ' 

The I and II SS Panzer Corps were on 

the way to Austria, but troop movements 

by rail across Germany were taking more 

time than had once been required to reach 

central U.S.S.R. The Western Theater 

Command reported that frequently the 

stations were bombed out before the troops 

reached them; the trains had to be made 

up and loaded at night without any lights; 

the rolling stock was in poor condition; 

sometimes tanks and trucks broke through 

the car beds; up to one-third of the cars 

were unusable.

6 The days when a main 

'Ltr, von Vietinghoff to Guderian, 8 Feb 45 , in 

MS # P- 114a (Sixt ), T~jl V , Anlag~n . 

~ OKH. G~nStdH, Op. Abt. (IN), Fu~hr~rlJortrag Natht 5 .16.2 .45, 6.2.45, H 22 / 5 file. 

• O.B. W~Jt . Ch~1 del G~n. Stab~J. la Nr. 359 / 

45, AbtranJport der Pz.-V erba~nd~ nach d~m OJ-

, 11.2.45. H 22 / 5 file . 

439 

line could be cleared for troop trains were 

past; even the existence of a continuous 

line of any kind to the destination could 

not be guaranteed from hour to hour. 

On 6 February, Hitler ordered Woehler 

to station four of the SS divisions near 

Gyar and the fifth behind Nagykanizsa. 

Their presence was to be kept secret, and 

they would stay under the control of the 

OKH., The Russians, Hitler predicted, 

were ready to strike toward Vienna. The 

mission of the army group was to hold 

Nagykanizsa, Szekesfehervar, and Komarno 

and prevent the breakthrough to Vienna.' 

Soviet 

In three weeks the Soviet Army had accomplished its most spectacular victory of 

the war. Stalin could go to Yalta with 

Poland in his pocket. While his armies 

stood scarcely more than a day's march 

away from the German capital, the Allied 

armies on the west were still fighting to retake ground they had lost during the 

Ardennes offensive. On 26 January, 

Zhukov reported that, if he were allowed 

four days to bring up fresh troops, supplies. 

and some new equipment, he could be 

ready by I or 2 February to attack toward 

Berlin. Konev stated that he could be 

ready two or three days later to carry the 

offenl3ive across the Oder in his sector. 8 

The offensive had run thus far without 

a hitch. The Soviet armor and other 

mechanical equipment, no doubt, needed 

T OKH, G~nStdH , Op. Abt. , la Nr. 450077 / 45. 

W~j ung luer d~n Abw~hrklJmpl d~r H. Gr. Su~d. 

6.2-45, H 22 / 392a file . 

s Shtemenko, "Kak planirolJalaJ poJl~dnylJ)'a kampaniya po razgrom itl~r olJJ kiy Germanii:' Vo)'~n­

-i ,j h~ ki)' Zhurnal (May, 1965 ). 
440 

to be replenished and repaired.' The infantry, on the other hand, particularly that 

of Zhukov's and Konev's fronts, had engaged in comparatively little heavy fighting. Soviet casualties in January, the Germans calculated, were close to 20 percent 

less than the average monthly losses during 

the four months' 1944 summer offensive. 

Because of the relatively light Soviet casualties and the splitting off of additional 

German forces, the offensive, Gennan Intelligence concluded, "Has imposed an 

enormously greater strain on OUf own 

strength than it has on that of the enemy." 10 

The January thaw, which a former Soviet 

correspondent remembers as "Bringing out 

the snowdrops and purple crocuses in neglected gardens," was the most untoward 

occurrence of the offensive thus far. II The 

ice breaking up in the Oder made the river 

more of an obstacle than it might otherwise 

have been, and the mud slowed the Soviet 

tanks and possibly increased the effectiveness of Hitler's bicycle-mounted Panzerjaeger against them, but those were petty 

annoyances. 

In response to Zhukov's proposal to 

strike toward Berlin in the first days of 

February, Stalin raised only one objection. 

He told Zhukov that he was worried about 

the thinly held go-mile sector between the 

First BeloTussian and Second Beiorussian 

Fronts' flanks and instructed him to wait 

until Rokossovskiy had come farther west. 

He thought that would take ten days or 

• G . Zhukov, "No. Berlinskom napra vlenii ." V o· 

yenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal (June, 1965 ). 

10 0KH, GenStdH. FHO. NT. 45 145, Beu,teil. 

ung der reindlage VOT deutscher Ost/,ont irn 

Grossen. 25.:1.45, H 3/ 196 file. 

H lIya Ehrenburg, The Wa,: '94' - 1945 (Cleve. 

land, 1964 ). p. 162. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

two weeks." The Stavka then ordered 

Zhukov to shift his front's weight west as 

Rokossovkiy advanced and to concentrate 

on expanding the bridgeheads flanking 

Kuestrin. 

Meanwhile, the other fronts were to 

keep moving. The Stavka transferred 

Rokossovskiy's three right flank armies to 

Third Beiorussian Front, thereby relieving 

him of any concern with the cleaning out 

of East Prussia, and directed him to use 

his remaining armies plus an army from 

the reserve to occupy West Prussia and 

Pomerania from Danzig to Stettin. 

Konev, under orders to push toward Dresden, in seven days shifted three armies, 

including Third Guards Tank Army, from 

Upper Silesia to the Steinau bridgehead 

north of Breslau.lS 

The Soviet Offensive Falt ers 

Konev Slops on the Neisse 

On 8 February First Ukrainian Front 

attacked out of the Steinau bridgehead between Glogau and Breslau with five 

armies, two of them tank armies. (Map 

39) German Intelligence had detected the 

shift from Upper Silesia early, and the 

OKH had put three divisions, two of them 

still rebuilding, at Schoerner's disposal. 

Schoerner also had to worry about the 

Brieg-Ohlau bridgehead south of Breslau, 

where two armies and two tank corps had 

for several days been threatening to break 

away and cut the army group's lateral 

IS Zhukov, "Na Berlinskorn nap,avlenii," Vo)'en . 

no·istoricheskiy Zhu,nal (June , 1965 ). 

I' Platonov, Vto,aya Mi,ovaya Voyna. '939- 45. 

p. 705; Zhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiye Operatsii O chest· 

vennoy V oyny. p. 488 ; MS # PI14C ( Hauck), 

Teil VHf. p. 58. 
• 

j 

THE SOVIET 4 FALT~t~ENSIVE 

Februory-24 r--'I r-'I Febr uary 1945 

'!'nTTT GEHMAN ~II TTTT'!" GER MAN ~ OO/f LIN[,4FEB 

'" RONT LINE ,"'" 

! 1 , , 20 r II II I i I "{l eO.IIU5 

!O O~Oii ! 40 'O~ILO"ETERS 

MAP 39 

, 

I 

/ 

( 

~) 

xxxx 

r::-

l!ALC~ _.:J 

''" 

• \ 

) 

4th GUARbS 

I 

R 

r 

, 

r"/ 

! r 

, 

FOURTH 

UKRAINIAN 

I't GUARDS 

r 

18th 

, 

6th GUARDS TANK 

CAVAL,.RY MECHANIZE ' PLlYEV. 0 GROUP 

,> 
442 

communications lines fOlWard of the Sudeten. He had relocated the Fourth Panzer 

- Seventeenth Army boundary to give the 

former responsibility for the Steinau bridgehead and the latter for the Brieg-Ohlau 

bridgehead. 

On the first day, the 8th, Third Guards 

Tank Army battered its way out of the 

southern end of the Steinau bridgehead 

and the adjoining small Leubus bridgehead. 

By nightfall it reached the outskirts of 

Liegp.itz and began turning elements southwest behind Breslau." On the I oth the 

army went past Liegnitz to the Bober 

River below Bunzlau. To the north 

Fourth Tank Army overran Panzer Corps 

Grossdeutschland and took Primkenau, 

seven miles east of the Bober. To frustrate 

Fourth Panzer and Seventeenth Armies' 

attempts to prevent the thrusts out of the 

bridgeheads from meeting behind Breslau, 

Kanev then resorted to the maneuver he 

had employed east of the Oder in January. 

He turned Third Guards Tank Army south 

and in three days' heavy fighting encircled 

Breslau; 35,000 troops and 1 16,000 civilians stayed in the city,ll'i The main thrust 

continued west to and across the Queiss 

River and northwest across the lower Bober 

north of Sagan. The fortress Glogau 

(4, I 00 soldiers and 7,800 civilians) was 

encircled.lII 

Relieved temporarily by Third Guards 

Tank Army's turning south, Fourth Panzer 

Army, on 14 and 15 February, counterattacked along the Bober north of Sagan. 

11 OKH, CenStdH, op. Abt. 11M, Tagermeldung der H. Gr. Mitte, 8.2.45, H 22/18 file . 

Ui OKH, GenStdH. Op. Abt. (1!M), Vortrag.rnotit Btr: Festung BTuiau, '7.2 .45. H 22/ 5 file . 

II OKH, GenStdH. Op. Abt. (11M) , Tagesmeldung der H . Gr. Mille uom '3.2.45 . '42.45. H 

22 / 19 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

cutting behind Fourth Tank Army, which 

was driving toward the Neisse. By the 16th 

Third Guards Tank Army had turned west 

again and was ready to strike across the 

Queiss toward Goerlitz. Schoerner Ihrew 

one panzer division into a flank altack 

from the south, but that could not even 

slow the tank army. By the 18th Fourth 

Tank Army had cleared its lines to the 

rear, and in the next three days five Soviet 

armies closed to the Neisse from its confluence with the Oder to five miles north 

of Goerlitz; from there the front angled 

east and slightly south in an almost straight 

line to the Oder at Oppeln. 

On 2 I February the OKH advised 

Army Groups Vistula and Center that the 

Soviet main effort would be on the OdcrNeisse line between Schwedt (on the right 

flank of Army Group Vistula's Oder front ) 

and Goerlitz; the expected thrusts toward 

Berlin and Dresden would probably be accompanied by secondary offensives into 

Pomerania and toward Moravska Ostrava." Five days earlier the Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, had concluded that 

because of the progress of operations in 

Lower Silesia and Pomerania the Stauka 

had decided it did not need to worry abollt 

the flanks any longer and could go ahead 

with the offensive into central Germany . 

Agent reports on 15 February indicated 

that First Belorussian Front was drawing 

infantry off the front in Pomerania to relieve the First and Second Guards Tank 

Armies along the Oder. By the 17th the 

two tank armies were out of the OdeI' 

front and appeared to be regrouping in the 

rear for an attack west. Along the river, 

11 OKH, CenStdH . Op. Abt .. la Nr. 450138145, 

Weisung fuer die Fortfueh,ung der Operationerl 

be; den Heer esg ruppen Mill e und Weichsel2 1.2.45, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 75122 /:1 file. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 443 

SOVIET INFANTRYMEN ApPROACH A DISABLED GERMAN TANK 

agents and air reconnaissance were picking 

up numerous other clues to an offensive in 

the making: heavy artillery and antiaircraft batteries were moving up, mine fields 

were being cleared, changes were being 

made in radio traffic patterns, and new 

tanks and trucks were being brought in. 

In the Army Group Center zone Third 

Guards Tank Army's fast about-face wesl 

of Breslau showed it was obviously in a 

hurry to get to the Neisse. Air reconnaissance disclosed that the Polish railroads 

had been relaid to east of Poznan (the 

Poznan fortress held out until 23 February) and cast of Breslau. In Lower 

Silesia the Soviet engineers were rushing to 

build bridges on the recently crossed rivers, 

an indication that the First U krainia71 

Front planned to keep the offensive rolling. 

From one of the Soviet tank corps the 

Germans captured maps covering the area 

between the Elbe and the Neisse." 

Crossing the Neisse against the six divisions Fourth Panzer Army had on the river 

should not have been difficult; nevertheless, 

on 2 I February Konev called a halt. Perhaps the offensive had not gone as well as 

he had expected. The Germans two or 

three times had created at least inconvenient situations, and the tank armies had not 

achieved a fu1l-scale operational break11 OKH, Ge"StdH, Fremde Heere Ost (lJ, Ny. 

817/ 45,83'/ 45.873/ 45. 896/45.90 9/45.934/45. 

Kuru BeurteiluTig der Feind/age vom 12.245,31.2. 

45, 15.2.45, 16.2.45. 17.245. 18.2.45. H 22 119 

file. 
444 

through. Most likely, however, the decision to stop First Ukrainian Front on the 

Neisse was part of a fundamental revision 

of Soviet strategy brought on by develop: 

ments of which the operation in Lower 

Silcsia was only a part. 

The Oder, West Prussia, 

and East Prussia 

While the First Ukrainian Front was engaged between the Oder and the Neisse, 

the First and Second Belorussian Fronts 

had been grappling for elbow room against 

Army Group Vistula. Zhukov had used 

the infantry armies on his right flank to 

clean out the pockets at Arnswalde, 

Schneidemuehl, and Deutsch-Krone and 

had ordered his first echelon to enlarge the 

Oder bridgeheads." With four untested, 

incomplete divisions~Doebcritz, Kurmark, 

Gross-Berlin, and 30 Januar- and two 

panzer divisions from the Western Theater, 

Ninth Army had put up a stiff fight on the 

river. 

In the first week of the month the Russians had joined the three small bridgeheads at Guestebiese, Kienitz, and Genschmar north of Kucstrin, expanded the 

Aurith bridgehead south of Frankfurt, and 

taken a new onc at Goeritz in which they 

pushed far enough north and west to cut 

off the Kuestrin fortress. But on 9 Febru1G Himmier, not always so perceptive in military 

matters, had quickly appreciated the disadvantages 

in establishing his headquarters at Deutsch-Krone 

and had moved behind the Oder to an alternate 

SS command post in the woods south of Prenzlau. 

There , with the river between him and the Russians and with a full retinue, including masseur 

and private physician, he could hold court in the 

style befitting the Reichsfuehrer-SS, keep in touch 

with affairs in Berlin, forty-five miles away by 

autobahn, and still be at least a part-time army 

group commander. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

ary a Ninth Army counterattack had reopened a corridor to Kuestrin. Even 

though the army was nowhere near strong 

enough to execute the order Hitler had 

issued the next day, to "smash" all the 

Oder bridgeheads within forty-eight hours, 

it had held its ground, in places gained a 

little, and might have done better had it 

not had to transfer a panzer division to 

Army Group Center. 

On 10 February Second Belorussia1l 

Front had attacked west of Grudziadz. In 

the West Prussian woods and swamps the 

thaw had made the going rough, and Second Army had fought hard to stave off the 

fate that had befallen its neighbors to the 

east. Advancing slowly, the Russians had 

reached Choinice on the 14th. A breakthrough there would have cut off Second 

Army in West Prussia; the army's center 

now dipped southeast of Grudziadz. When 

Weiss asked permission to evacuate Grudziadz, contending that he could either keep 

the contact on his right or defend West 

Prussia ahd the port" Danzig and Gdynia. 

but not do both, Himmler had answered 

that Second Army had three missions: keep 

a secure contact on its right, protect the 

ports, and hold Grudziaz. In the latter 

instance it was to follow the "great example" of Courbiere. Examples from the 

Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic 

Wars had recently become popular in 

Hitler's circle, and, unfortunately for many 

a German soldier, it seemed that nearly 

every old Prussian city had successfully 

withstood a siege in one war or the other.zo 

On the 15th Second Belorussian Front had 

pushed north and cast between Chain icc 

10 Unterlagen fuel' das Fernschreibgespraech RF 

8SI0.B. AOK ::1, ,6.::1.45 and RFSS und O.B. H. 

Cr. Weichsel, an O.B. ::1. Armee, ,8.2.45, H. Gr. 

Weichsel75122/3 file. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

and Grudziadz; but after gaining another 

five or so miles on the west and twenty on 

the east without achieving a breakthrough, 

Rokossovskiy had stopped the offensive on 

19 February. 

In East Prussia, by 13 February, Third 

Belorussian Front had pushed Fourth 

Army out of the Heilsberg triangle. First 

Baltic Front had forced the remnants of 

Third Panzer Army, renamed Armccahtcilung Samland, back to the tip of the Samland Peninsula. Together, the two fronts 

had isolated Koenigsberg. In another 

week, Third BeloTussian Front had confined Fourth Army to a 35- by 15-mile 

beachhead around Heiligenbeil. In the 

fighting the front commander, Chernyakovskiy, was killed and Vasilevskiy took 

command. Though the German position 

was hopeless, that of the Russians was at 

least frustrating. Heavy snowfalls early in 

the month followed by a sudden thaw had 

snarled Soviet supply movements and interfered with air operations. First Baltic 

Front, short on equipment and ammunition from the start, did not have first cia" 

troops or leadership. The presence of two 

major commands operating against three 

separate groups in a small area induced on 

the Soviet side something like a musclehound condition. 

Toward the end of the third week in the 

month, the Stavka, after some urging, got 

Bagramyan to disregard Koenigsberg for 

the time being and concentrate his forces 

against the Germans on Sam land while 

Vasilevskiy did the same against the Heiligenbeil pocket. But on the 20th, two days 

before Bagramyan's push wa'i to begin, 

Armeeabteilung Samland launched a spoiling attack that caught the Russians off 

guard and carried all the way to Koenigs445 

berg. The end of the battle for East 

Prussia, to the Ru~ians the "cradle of German militarism," was not yet in sight. The 

Stavka abolished First Baltic Front, joined 

its units to Third Belorussian Front as the 

Samland Group, and gave Vasilcvskiy a 

month to reorganize and clean out the 

German pockets.

21 

By the end of the third week in February 

the great Soviet 1945 winter offensive had 

come to a dead halt. Caution was in the 

air. Obviously, the Stavka had decided 

that the time to deliver the death blow was 

not yet. The Stavka's decision coincided 

exactly with two incidents: one took place 

at Stargard in Pomerania, the other on the 

Hron River in Hungary. 

Operation Sonnen wende 

The Stargard offensive ranks as onc of 

the war's closest approaches to a planned 

fiasco. The idea of a two-pronged counterattack east of the Oder to pinch off the tip 

of the Soviet spearhead aimed at Berlin 

was Guderian's. It was an attractive vari~ 

ant of Hitler's pet formula for stopping 

breakthroughs- hold the corner posts and 

counterattack on the Hanks. But, to evade 

the compelling logic of Guderian's argument that Sixth SS Panzer Anny should be 

one of the attack groups, Hitler opted for 

a single-pronged offensive out of the Stargard area. 22 

11 IVOV(R) , V, 165-171. 

!I In the first wt:ek of February part of Headquarters, Sixth 55 Panzer Army, moved in brieRy 

behind Ninth Army ; and the commanding general, Oberstgruppenfuehrer (General ) Josd (Sepp) 

Dietrich, submitted a rough plan for an attack 

from the Guben-Crossen area to meet the Stargard 

force on the Warthe at Landsberg east of Kuestrin. By then his panzer divisions were headed 

toward Hungary. and an announced "separate or-
446 

Having lost the southern half of his 

offensive, Guderian became all the more 

determined to see through the half that 

was left. He demanded breadth (three 

attack groups on a 30-milc front), depth, 

and speed. Above all, speed. The offensive, he insisted, had to be readied and 

executed "like lightning" before the Russians could get a firm hold on the Oder. 

Himmler, at first, when all he saw was the 

chance for a brilliant victory, was enthusiastic. 23 

In what, for the time, was itself a remarkable feat, the OKH scraped together 

two corps headquarters and tcn divisions, 

seven of them panzer divisions, for the 

Stargard offensive. To bring together 

quickly a force that size over railroads 

operating, when they ran at all, at about 40 

percent of normal efficiency because the 

engines were burning lignite, and to outfit 

and supply it in the face of catastrophic 

equipment, ammUnitIOn, and gasoline 

shortages was all but impossible. By 10 

February, the eighth day of the assembly, 

of the trains loaded less than half had 

arrived.2~ 

Headquarters, Third Panzer Army, was 

ordered out of Sam land to take command, 

but because it arrived latc the command 

stayed in the hands of the newly created 

Headquarters, Eleventh SS Panzer Army. 

Under a strict injunction not to commit 

any of the forces allocated for the offensivc 

prematurely, the army group was hard put 

to hold the assembly area and finally had 

to put several of the new divisions into the 

der" assigning him divisions from the West was 

never issued. OKH, Gel1StdH. Op. Abt., f a Nr. 430 

073/45. an H. Gr. Weichsel, 4 .2.45; SS- Pz . .AOK 

6 , la Nr. 287/ 45, an H. Gr. Weichsel, 8.2.45. Both 

in H. Gr. Weichsel 75 12212 fi le. 

D MS # 0-408 (Ei!mann ), p. 80. 

I' Jodi Diary, TO Feb 45. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

front anyway. The upshot was that the 

army group staff and the OKH soon 

diverged in their thinking as to when the 

offensive could start. 

Talking to Himmler on 9 February, 

Guderian, in an offhand manner he sometimes affected, remarked, by way of soliciting the actual decision, that he expected 

the offensive would be in progress by the 

16th. Himmler replied that he was not 

ready to commit himself to a specific datc 

and wanted to await the next several days' 

developments before making a decision.'" 

Unfortunately for Himmier, his patent lack 

of qualifications as an army group commander left his judgment open to question 

even when it appeared sound. In 

Guderian he met an antagonist whose own 

judgment was less than impeccable. 

Guderian apparently convinced himself 

that Himm1er was stalling to conceal his 

incompetence." The idea was not difficult 

to come by since Himmier, in moving his 

headquarters behind the Oder and refusing 

to show himself anywhere near the front, 

had revealed a deficiency of combative 

spirit that contrasted sharply with the martial tone he cultivated in speaking and 

writing. 

On 13 February Guderian arranged a 

showdown and, in Hitler's presence, demanded that hi. deputy, General der 

Panzertruppen Walter Wenck, be given a 

special mandate to command the Anny 

Group Vistula offensive." At the end 

1'; Gespraech Reichs/uehrer-SS- General Guderian am 9.2.45, H. Gr. Weichsel 75122 / 2 file . 

• Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, p. 

375· 

IT Wenck, long-time Sixth Army chief of !taff 

and one of the top-rated General Staff officers, was 

officially chief of the Command Group (Fuehrungsgruppe), OKH, a post Guderian created after 

his own appointment .:s Chief of Staff, OKH. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

Hitler told Wenck that he was to go to 

Army Group Vistula with a "special mandate/' but he did not say what Wenck's 

authority was,:!s The effect was to take the 

power of final decision away from Himmlcr 

without specifically giving it to Wenck, 

which probably suited Guderian exactly, 

since he seems to have been intent mainly 

on using Wenck to force his own concepts 

on the army group. 

Wenck, on his arrival at Army Group 

Vistula, and after paying his respects to 

HimmlcT, went across the OdcT to 

Eleventh SS Panzer Army to inspect the 

preparations in pcrson--a wonhwhilc undertaking since Himmler had thus far not 

taken the trouble to do it and the Eleventh 

SS Panzer Army staff, an upgraded corps 

staff under SS-Oberstgruppenfuehrer 

(General ) Felix Steiner, fell short of being 

the ideal instrument for conducting a 

major offensive. After satisfying himself 

that the units for the offensive were in facl 

not fully assembled or equipped, Wenck 

resorted to the unpromising alternative of 

starting piecemeal, mostly, it would appear, 

to satisfy Guderian. On the night of 14 

February Eleventh SS Panzer Army reported that on the hasis of the tota l Eastern 

Front situation , as Wenck descrihed it, the 

army realizcd that cven a small attack was 

urgently needed; it intended, therefore, to 

make a thrust toward Arnswalde (seven 

miles off the front with a small encircled 

German garrison) the next morning,~{l 

The one-division Arnswalde attack 

caught the Ru!;..;;ians unawares; the division's point reached the town in the early 

111 MS # P- 114b (Hofmann ), Teil IX , Anhang 

3 1 , p. 51. 

:!QSS Pt. AOK ", Abendoritntieru'lg. 14.2 .45. 

H. Gr. W('ichs('1 751 'l'l1'2 file. 

447 

afternoon . It would have taken more sclfcontrol than Army Group Vistula and the 

OKH shared between them to throwaway 

so tempting a start. The army group 

ordered the whole operation, hopefully 

code-named SONNENWENDF. (Solstice ), to 

hegin the next day. 

'Unready and inexperienced, Eleventh 

SS Panzer Army wasted the 16th trying to 

feel out the enemy. It was not until th{' 

afternoon of the 16th that the army command was prepared to decide tentatively 

where to concentrate its effort; hy then. 

even though Steiner insisted he could get 

rolling within another two days, the offensive was stuck.:!o That night, on the way 

hack from a conference with Hitler, Wenck 

was severely injured in an automohile accident. That he could have salvaged 

SONNENWENDE, as Guderian later c1aimed. 

is douhtful. 

Rain and mud confined the tanks to the 

roads. Himmlcr ordered the attack to continue throup;h the night of the 17th, but 

that did not help." The next day mine 

fields and strong antitank defenses hrought 

SONNENWENDE to its inglorious conclusion. 

Eleventh SS Panzer Army had gained at 

the most two to three miles by the nip;ht of 

the 18th, when hy a "directive for regroupmcnt," Himmler stopped the offensive,:!z 

As far as the Germans could tell, the 

offensive had hardly evoked a ripple behind the Soviet front. Ninth army reported 

on the t 9th that the Oder sector was " conspicliollsly" quiet; all th{' signs indicated 

:10 AOK, l a. LageorielltiuIHI.f(. 17.~ 45. H. Gr. 

Weichsf'i 75122/1 file. 

~IH . Gr. Wei chsel.la NI'. 150t 145. n11 O.B. II . 

Anna, 17.2.45 . H . Gr. W('i('hsc l 75 1'2'2 / 1 file . 

!II H . Gr. Weir/Hel. I a Nr. 1520/ 45 . WeisulIg 

filer V orb ert'itung del' Um.~1 uppitl'ung im A bschnitt 

de s AOK 11. H. Gr. Wcichsel 751'2'2 / 3 fil(' . 
448 

that First Belorussian Front would attack 

toward Berlin within the next few days. 

Ninth Army predicted that, off its right 

flank, First Ukrainian Front would be crossing the Neisse in a day.lI3 On the 21St, 

in con junction with the directive issued to 

Army Groups Vistula and Center on that 

day, Hitler officially ended SONNENWENOE 

and ordered Himmler to transfer a corps 

headquarters and three of the divisions to 

Army Group Center." Headquarters, 

Third Panzer Army, took command of the 

divisions that were left, and Steiner and his 

staff, currently not in favor with Himmlcr, 

moved across the Oder to act as a central 

collecting agency for stragglers." 

Unknown to the Germans SONNENWENDE had achieved an impact on the 

Soviet side altogether out of proportion to 

the befuddlement that had surrounded the 

operation since its inception. A complete 

failure on the ground, it, nevertheless, hit 

exactly the most fragile feaure of the Soviet 

plan, the requirement for a certain amount 

of daring in the second phase of the offensive. At mid-February, unless the Germans were deliberately deceived, which is 

unlikely because it would have been pointless, the First Belorussian and First Ukrainiall Frollts were fully deployed for the 

attack toward Berlin. SONNENWENDE, as 

the Germans observed, did not disturb the 

deployment; but on I7 February the 

Stauka suddenly scrapped the whole original plan and ordered Zhukov to turn north 

and join Rokossovskiy against Army Group 

a AOK 9. la, Abudorientierung am 19.2.45, H . 

Gr. Weichsel 7512'2 / 3 file . 

U See above, p. 44'2 . 

:. OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., la Nr. 450 134/ 45, 

an H. Gr. Wei chsel, 21.2 .45; H. Gr. Weichsel, la, 

Vermerk ueber Ferngespraech Gruppen/uehrer Lammerding mit Oberst i. G. Eismann am 21.2 .45. 

Both in H. G. Weichsel 751'2'2 / 3 file . 

STALIN GRAD TO BERLIN 

Vistula." Four days later Konev stopped 

on the Neisse. 

The Hron Bridgehead 

Before SONNENWENDE had run its brief 

and ragged course, Army Group South had 

begun laying the last small roadblock on 

the Soviet road to victory. On 10 February Woehler had returned from Berlin 

with Hitler's permission to use I SS Panzer 

Corps in a drive against the Hron River 

bridgehead to deny the Russians that platform for an attack toward Bratislava and 

Vienna." The chance looked too good to 

miss; nearly all of the Soviet armor was 

out of the front, refitting. 

Hitler in the meantime had all but forgotten Budapest. The pocket in Buda, encompassing the government buildings and 

the royal castle and protected on the east 

by the river, had proved a strong fortress. 

The populace had become apathetic, and 

what internal disturbance there was came 

almost entirely from' the armed bands of 

Arrow-Cross Party members, who shunned 

combat and devoted themselves to murder 

and plundering. Troop morale had stayed 

relatively high as long as the relief 

appeared to have even the barest chance of 

succeeding. Rations for the fighting troops 

had had to be reduced to horse-meat soup 

and a third of a pound of bread per day. 

The wounded in the cavernous cellars of 

the royal castle received only thin soup. 

On 29 January, the German national holiday celebrating Hitler's accession to power, 

Himmler had sent what was announced as 

• See Platonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna, 1939-

45, pp. 703- 704 ; Zhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiye Operalsii Otechestvennoy Voyn y , p. 490. 

:rJ H. Gr. Sued, la Kriegstagebu ch, Febr. 45, I. 

Hael/te , 10 Feb 45, H. Gr. A 75126/ 53 file. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

a special added ration. When the airdrop 

containers were opened they were found 

to contain canned horse meat, cookies, and 

cigarettes. 

On 10 February Hitler had conferred 

the oak leaf cluster to the Knight's Cross 

of the Iron Cross upon Pfeffer-Wildenbruch. That last-minute gesture to stiffen 

the morale of the commanding general 

was, if at all, only relatively more effective 

than the similar attempt had been in the 

case of Paulus at Stalingrad." The garrison was down to its last ammunition and 

rations and split into two pockets, both too 

small for airdrops. On the morning of the 

1 1 th Pfeffer-Wildenbruch had issued 

orders for a breakout to the west. That 

night the defenders had attempted to force 

their way out along the Italian Boulevard 

(subsequently renamed Malinovskiy Boulevard ). The staffs took a roughly parallel 

route through a subterranean drainage 

canal. Many were killed coming out of 

the castle gates, and few had gotten as far 

as the suburbs. Of close to 30,000 Germans and Hungarians-Io,6oo wounded 

were left behind- less than 700 reached 

the German lines. 39 

The Hron bridgehead offensive began 

on 17 February and achieved a complete 

surprise. In a week the Germans pushed 

the front east to the river. The success was 

dimmed slightly by a suspicion that the 

Russians, after being caught off guard initially, had deliberately sacrificed the bridge-

• Gosztony, "Der Kampf urn Budapest 1944/ 45 

(V )," Wehrwisunschaftli che Rundschau (December, 1963 ). 

,. OKH, Gn. StdH. Op. Abt. 1!S, Fu nkspruch 

des IX. SS-Geb . A.K. , 1~ 45 , H 22 / 5 file ; H . 

Cr. Sued. 10 Kriegstagebuch, Febr. 45., I. Hael/te , 

T4 Feb 45. H. Gr. A. 75 126/ 53 file . 

449 

head rather than disrupt their armor's refitting. Encouraged, nevertheless, Woehler, 

on 2 I February, revived the planning for 

a major offensive in the Balaton-DravaDanube triangle. 

Under its original concept of taking 

some mild risks on the flanks, the Stavka 

had intended to dispatch Second Ukrainian 

Front toward Brno and Vienna in the 

wake of Zhukov's and Konev's main 

thrust •. " On I7 February, the day the 

Berlin operation was canceled and the day 

the Germans hit the Hron bridgehead, a 

new order went out to Timoshenko instructing him to plan and co-ordinate an 

independent offensive by both of his fronts 

against the German south flank." For the 

time being, the Germans having shown 

some bite, the Russians decided to wait. 

The German Condition 

For Germany the blunting of the Soviet 

winter offensive could be no more than a 

reprieve. By mid-February the Replacement Army no longer had enough small 

arms to equip the new divisions. The 

manufacture of powder had fallen below 

the level required to maintain ammunition 

production. Against a monthly demand of 

1,500,000 tank and antitank artillery 

rounds, January output was 367,000. For 

lack of aviation gasoline, the OKW was 

forced to order a radical reduction in the 

combat employment of aircraft ; the planes 

were to be used only at decisive points and 

then only when nothing else was practo Shtemenko, "Kak planiTovalnJ poJlednyaya kampaniya po ratgromu gillerovJkoy Germanii," Voyenno-iJloricheJkiy Zhu rnal (May, 1965) . 

n IVOV (R ), V, 192 . See also Platonov, VIaTaya MiTovaya Voyna , 1939-45. p. 707. 
450 

ticable." On the west the defense of the 

Rhineland was beginning to crumble. 

Parry and Thrust-Vienna 

On 22 February Woehler submitted to 

Hitler four outline plans for an offensive 

to be executed under the wistful cover 

name FRUEHLlNGSERWACHEN (Awakening 

of Spring). (Map 40) The objective, 

ostensibly, was to put a more substantial 

buffer between the Russians and the 

Nagykanizsa oil fields. This required a 

main thrust to the southeast out of the area 

between Lake Balaton and Velencze Lake, 

but the Russians were strongest west of 

Budapest, in the flank and rear of such a 

thrust. For lack of time and forces, 

Woehler had to reject at the outset the 

tactically soundest approach: to clear out 

the Budapest-Velencze Lake-Vertes Mountains area before striking between Lake 

Balaton and the Danube. He recommended a compromise, a short initial phase 

that would get a solid front facing north 

between Velencze Lake and the Danube to 

be followed by a turn and thrust south. At 

a conference in Berlin on 25 February 

Hitler decided to place the main effort 

from the start into an attack southea<it between the Sarviz Canal and the Danube 

because it promised the best opportunity 

for a big gain fast." 

"The Awakening of Spring" 

No one-except, possibly, those diligent 

/oJ OKW. WFSt, K .T .B. Ausarbeitung Jan .-Febr. 

45, 11 , 15,18, 20 Feb 45, OeMH files. 

'" Obkdo. d. H . Cr. Sued, fa Nr. 64/ 45, Votsch. 

latlge futr AngrilJ "Fruehlingserwachen," 2!l .2.45, 

H !:I2/ 6b file; H . Gr. Sued, 14 Kriegstagebuch, Feb. 

45, 2. Hatlfte , 25 and '27 Feb 45, H. Gr. A 75126/ 

55 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

students of past experience, the Russiansnoticed that the stage was set for a second 

ZITADELLE. Again at the end of a disastrous winter the enemy pressure had suddenly relaxed and Hitler found himself 

holding an uncommitted reserve. Again 

Hitler decided to try for a prestige victory. 

Again the Stavka let him have the next 

move. 

The Germans played out their part with 

near somnambulistic unconcern. Woehler 

dutifully called attention to the danger on 

the north flank and to Sixth SS Panzer 

Anny's weakness in infantry, but no one 

protested the pointlessness of conducting a 

major offensive merely to gain ground that 

most likely could not be defended. The 

Operations Staff, OKW, questioned 

whether in view of all the other threats and 

dangers Sixth SS Panzer Army could justifiably be tied down in Hungary until midApril or beyond, but followed up with an 

imprecise proposal for a truncated offensive 

that would have gained nothing except, 

perhaps, a slight savings in time; the suggestion was consigned directly to the files." 

FRUEHLlNGSERWACHEN began at midnight on 5 March when Army Group F 

troops took bridgeheads on the Drava 

opposite Donji Miholjac and Valpovo. 

The next morning Second Panzer Army 

attacked out of its center toward Kaposvar. 

Sixth SS Panzer Army, deploying in mud 

and driving wet snow, had reported it 

would be ready to start that morning, but 

as often the case with estimates by SS commands, when morning came only I SS 

Panzer Corps on the west side of the Sarviz 

Canal was ready. II SS Panzer Corps, in 

the crucial sector east of the canal, did not 

u OKW, WFSt , K .T .B. Ausa,beitung Jan .-Feb,. 

45, ~~ Feb 45. OCMH files. 
THE VIENNA OFFENSIVE 

Match - April 1945 

" , I" I~II~ " , 

MAP 40 

GER"~OI FAONT LI NE. 5 "_A 

GEII ... N fAONr LIOIE , JO " . " 

GER".N fRONI LI NE. 15 ~PR 

20 '" .0 MlI-rS 

I I" I I 

10 20 30 _0 ~ILO"ET£RS 

( 

7Th Gua,d. 

SECQNQ UKRAINIAN XXXXX __ _ 

TIiIRD UKRAINIAN 

9Th G~o,d. 

26Th 
452 

start until the following morning. 

The weather was wann; the snow had 

melted; off the roads the mud was deep; 

and the roads themselves were mined and 

swept by Soviet antitank fire." Elaborate 

security precautions had failed to keep 

secret the build-up that had taken more 

than a month. 

Except for aircraft, the Stavka had left 

its own offensive build-up in the Second 

Ukrainian Front zone intact. Third 

Ukrainian Front, which it had heavily reinforced with aircraft, artillery, and antitank guns, had built a broad Belt of mine 

and artillery-protected defenses between 

Lake Balaton and the Danube. In December, when drifting ice endangered boat 

traffic on the river, Third Ukrainian 

Front's engineers, using the supports of a 

destroyed bridge at Baja, had erected a 

cableway capable of carrying 600 tons 

every twenty-four hours. After the river 

froze solid, the engineers had also laid a 

road and gasoline pipeline over the ice." 

On 7 and 8 March I SS Panzer Corps 

cut through successive defense lines on the 

west side of the Sarviz Canal and gained 

nearly twenty miles. By then Tolbukhin 

had committed his second echelon, Twentyseventh Army and almost all his rcscrvesthree rifle corps, a tank corps, a mechanized corps, and a guards cavalry corps. tT 

Because he had spread his armor thin he 

still could not mount a bid for the initiative 

anywhere. On the fourth day he asked for 

the strategic reserve, Ninth Guards Army. 

which had recently been moved into the 

Kecskemet area as a precaution, but the 

U H. Gr. Sued, 1a Krjegstag.buch, Maerz 45, 1. 

Hatlfte , 5. 6 Mar 45. H. Gr. A 7.5126/58 file . 

•• ZhiJin, ed., Vllzhn')lshiye OPeratsii Olula.s!-

venno), Voyny, p. 508; IVOV(R ). IV, 406. 

fT IVOV(R), V, 200. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Stavka decided it was essential to save the 

army for its own projected offensive.fo8 

On the loth, in snow and rain, I SS 

Panzer Corps closed to the Sio Canal and 

the next night took two small bridgeheads. 

The advance revealed how well dug in the 

Russians were, which augered ill for II SS 

Panzer Corps. On the cast side of the 

Sarviz Canal the corps had gained no more 

than five miles by 12 February. 

On the 13th, having pulled together his 

armor, Tolbukhin counterattacked on both 

sides of the Sarviz Canal. To keep the 

initiative, Woehler proposed taking out II 

SS Panzer Corps, which was attracting the 

heaviest counterattacks, and putting the 

weight of both SS corps east of the canal, 

where the sandy ground would make the 

going somewhat easier for the tanks. 

Hitler withheld approval until late on the 

night of the 15th; he suspected, correctly 

as it turned out, that II SS Panzer Corps 

would be diverted to meet the coming 

Soviet offensive. 

The Soviet Counteroffensive Begins 

On the afternoon of 16 March the 

Soviet offensive began in snow and fogand therefore without substantial annor or 

air support-against IV SS Panzer Corps 

and the south flank of Hungarian Third 

Anny on the front between Velencze Lake 

and Bicske. The original plan had been to 

dispatch Second Ukrainian Front toward 

Vienna in an advance straddling the 

Danube, but to exploit the chance to trap 

Sixth SS Panzer Army east of Lake Balaton, the main effort had been shifted south 

to Third Ukrainian Front's right flank. 

"Ibid., p. 200 ; Zhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiye Oper· 

at jj Otechestuennoy Voyny. p. 5 11. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

The thrust was aimed west and northwest 

along the line Szekesfehervar-VarpalotaPapa-Sopron-Vienna. Inside it Second 

Ukrainian Front would attack along the 

Danube toward Gyor. 4D 

On the second day, Hungarian Third 

Army's flank collapsed and the Russians 

pushed through the Vertes Moutains north 

of Mor. Neither of the large mobile forces, 

Sixth Guards Tank Army or First Guards 

Cavalry-M echanized Group ( formerly 

Cavalry-Mechanized Group Pliyev ), had 

appeared yet to exploit the hreakthrough. 

Army Group South decided to cancel the 

attack east 01 the Sarviz Canal "lor the 

time being," and send I SS Panzer Corps 

into the area southwest of Szekeslehervar 

for a counterattack. By day's end it was 

also getting II SS Panzer Corps ready to 

turn around and move north. 

Malinovskiy began turning his left flank 

army north toward Komarno behind 

Hungarian Third Army on the 18th. On 

the same day Tolbukhin's Ninth and 

Fourth Guards Armies broke through IV 

SS Panzer Corps between Mor and 

Velencze Lake. Tolbukhin was slow in 

taking advantage 01 the latter breakthrough: Sixth Guards Tank Army wa' 

not ready because it had had to regroup 

south after the change in plans." During 

the day Woehler decided to attempt a cas· 

tling maneuver: he ordered 6th SS Panzer 

Army and its two corps to shift north into 

the sector between Velencze Lake and the 

Danube and gave Sixth Army command 

between Velencze Lake and Lake Balaton. 

Sixth SS Panzer Army successlully made its 

way out hetween the lakes, but I SS Panzer 

U Zhilin, ed., Vazhneyshiye OpuatJii Otechestvennoy Voyny. p. 533. 

10 lI~id .• p. 535. 

453 

Corps failed to get a firm Iront in its new 

sector on the edge 01 the Bakony Forest 

west 01 Varpalota. 

On 20 February Sixth Guards Tank 

Army attacked between Varpalota and 

Szekeslehervar toward the tip 01 Lake 

Balaton. Hitler demanded that Szekeslehervar be held, which meant in effect that 

Sixth Army had to stay east 01 Lake Balaton. On the 21St, except for a tenuous 

corridor along the lake shore, Sixth Army 

was encircled. Hitler refused to let go 01 

Szekeslehervar. The OKH explained he 

was alraid that il he did, the whole Iront 

would start to "slip," which was what wac; 

happening in any event. Woehler replied 

that he did not dare risk another encircle· 

ment; the memory of Budapest was too 

recent; the armies were already infected 

with the Kessel (pocket) psychosis. Varpalota lell in the afternoon, and that night, 

Hitler's protests notwithstanding, Szekcsfehervar fell. 

For the next twenty-lour hOllrs Sixth 

Army ran a gantlet between the Russians 

and the lake. No one could tell Irom 

hour to hour how much longer the pocket 

might 'tay open. The army command lost 

track 01 IV SS Panzer Corps completely 

---01 deserters rounded up 75 percent were 

SS-men. That the army survived at all 

probably has to be charged mostly to Sixth 

GuordJ T nnk Army's late and uncertain 

start. 

By 23 Fehruary Sixth Army was west 01 

the lake, but still in trouble. During the 

day Tolhukhin's troops took Veszprem, the 

key point and main road junction in the 

Bakony Forest. Malinovskiy's lorces on 

that day split the bridgehead Hungarian 

Third Army was holding west 01 Esztergom 

and lorced the army to retreat across the 
454 

river. On the south Army Group F evacuated its two bridgeheads on the Drava. 

Second Panzer Army, still attacking, gained 

some five miles south of Lake Balaton-an 

exercise in futility. At day's end Hitler 

gave Woehler permission to take a division, 

no more, from Second Panzer Army. 51 

During the day the Stavka had issued 

orders for the next phase of the offensive. 

The Ninth Guards and Sixth Guards Tank 

Armies were to strike toward Koszeg, 

Twenty-sixth Army toward Szombathely, 

and Twenty-seventh Army toward Zalaegerszeg. 52 

From the Commanding General, Sixth 

Army, Ba1ck, came an ominous report. He 

said the troops were not fighting the way 

they should. Some were saying the war 

was lost anyway, and they did not want to 

be the last to die. All were afraid of being 

encircled. The loss of confidence was 

spreading into the higher commands. &3 

On 25 February the Russians completed 

the breakthrough phase of the offensive. 

Sixth Guards Tank Army came out of the 

Bakony Forest east of Papa. Sixth SS 

Panzer Army held a front from Papa north 

to the Danube at Komarno, but the anny, 

although numerically relatively strong, was 

showing a.;;tonishing shortcomings. The 

SS-men from top to bottom appeared unable to adjust to conditions in which they 

did not have ample equipment and supplies 

and plenty of time to plot every move. 

Sixth Army had the impossible mission of 

holding its right Aank on Lake Balaton to 

protect Second Panzer Army and maintaining contact with Sixth SS Panzer Army 

&1 H. Gr. Sued, 10 Kriegstagebuch, Maerz 4$, :J . 

Had/It . • 6-23 Mar 45. H. Gr. A 75126/ 60 file. 

U /vOV(R), V, '07. 

u Ibid .. 23 Mar 45 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

on its left. South of Papa the gap between 

the armies' flanks was tcn miles wide, and 

Woehler told Guderian he could think of 

no way to close it. Replying to a demand 

from Guderian that Sixth Army "finally 

come to a stop," Balck insisted that the 

tactical crisis by itself could be mastered 

were it not for an acute loss of faith in the 

leadership, rooted, he said, in Stalingrad 

and Budapest: the troops simply would not 

hold. To add to the Germans' troubles, 

Second Ukrainian Front began attacking 

across the Hron that day.~· 

To Vienna 

The next day the Second and Third 

Ukrainian Fronts began what Soviet 

accounts later described as the pursuit, an 

adequate enough term except that it implies on the enemy side either a planned 

retreat or a rout. Hitler would not have 

permitted the former, and the Russians 

never quite achieved the latter. A more 

precise description would be an attempted 

active defense with wholly inadequate 

means and inappropriate objectives. 

On 27 March the Sixth Guards Tank, 

Fourth Guards, and Ninth Guards Armies 

crossed to the Raab River on a broad front 

west of KOszeg. The meager reinforcements coming to Army Group South were 

destined- because o( Hitler's concern (or 

the oil- for the flanks, two divisions to 

Second Panzer Army and one to Eighth 

Army. After hearing that Hitler continued 

to insist on holding Komarno for the oil 

refineries, the army group chief of staff told 

the OKH to have him look at an aerial 

photograph; There was nothing there anymore but bomb craters. Second Panzer 

N Ibid., 25 Mar 45. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

Army, which had so far been spared, reported that it expected an attack soon. 

Its Hungarians were deserting "in droves," 

and it asked to go back to the main defense 

line between the Drava and Lake Balaton. 

When the army group forwarded the request with its endorsement, Guderian 

answered that to lay the matter before 

Hitler was a waste of time, for him the 

words "oil fields" were "spelled in capitals." 55 

In another two days Sixth Guards Tank 

Army had crossed th e Raab between the 

Si xth and Sixth SS Panze r Armies' flanks 

and drawn up to the Austrian borde r in the 

Koszeg-Szombathely area. Hiller let th e 

two armi es withdraw to the Austrian 

border defenses but made the armies on 

th eir flanks stay put. At nightfall on th e 

29th Eighth Army still had a tenuous hold 

on Komarno . Se cond Panze r Army, 

attacked for the first lime during the day, 

had lost Nagybajom in th e center of ils 

front south of Lake Balaton and had taken 

command of Sixth Army's right flank corps 

at th e southern tip of the lake to protect its 

deep flank and rear. 

On 30 March, Sixth Guards Tank 

Army crossed the border and turned north 

toward the corridor between the mountains 

west of Wiener Neustadt and the NeusiedIer Lake. On its right Ninth Guards 

Army and Fourth Guards Army began to 

wheel northwest toward Vienna. Hitler 

demanded a counterattack to close the gap 

behind the tank army ; Woehler replied 

that neither Sixth Army nor Sixth SS 

Panzer Army had the slightest prospect of 

even starting a counterattack. The army 

group would consider itself lucky if Sixth 

SS Panzer Army could create, ahead of the 

M Ibid., '17 Mar 45. 

455 

Russians, some kind of a front between 

Wiener Neustadt and the lake. He had 

sent officers of his staff out to the troops; 

they had all reported that the men were 

exhausted and morale was low; to expect 

them to stage a counterattack was futile. 

Sixth Army, moreover, was in almost as 

much trouble on its right as on its left. It 

had broken away from Second Panzer 

Army's flank, and Twenty-seventh Army 

was pushing south." 

At the end of the month Tolbukhin and 

Malinovskiy closed in on Vienna. Second 

Ukrainian Front north of the Danube went 

to Bratislava. The Third Ukrainian Front 

right flank pushed into the narrows between the Danube at Bratislava and Neusiedler Lake. On 2 April Sixth Guards 

Tank Army thrust past Wiener Neustadt 

toward Vienna. Second Panzer Army had 

retreated west of Nagykanizsa to a line in 

the heights that barely contained the oil 

fields. 

To defend Vienna, Hitler sent the 25th 

Panzer Division and the Fuehrer Grenadier 

Division. On the 3d he ordered Woehler 

"finally" to attack the flanks of the breakthrough and to give up trying to oppose 

the Soviet armored spearheads frontally." 

After Woehler replied that the army group 

was in no condition to counterattack and 

had to put something in front of the Russians to keep them from breaking away 

"into the infinite," Hitler called Rendulic 

in from Courland and gave him command 

of Army Group South." 

"Ibid., go Mar 45 ;' OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt.! 

Tllb , Prue/. NT. 73504. Lage Ost, Stand 30.3 .45 

abds. 

5T OKH, CenStdH. Op. Abt .• fa Nr. 450 :156145. 

an de" O.B. d . H. Cr. Sued. 3.4 .45. H ~~ 390a 

fite . 

.. H . Cr. Sued. fa Nr. 133145. an OKH. Cen 

StdH. Op. Abt .• 3.4.45. H " / 389 fil, . 
456 

When Rendulic arrived at the army 

group headquarter.; in the Alps southwest 

of SI. Poelten at midnight on 7 Aprileven army group commander.; did not 

travel fast in Germany any more- the Russians were in Vienna to the Guertelstrasse 

and on the Danube west of the city." 

Third Ukrainian Front had brought F ortysixth Army across the Danube to the north 

bank and was advancing beyond the 

MaTava to envelop Vienna on the north. 

In those last days Skorzeny, on a special 

mISSIon from Hiller, appeared in Vienna, 

hanged three officer.; on the Floridsdorf 

Bridge, and claimed that the situation in 

the city was "dismal," no orders were being 

given, and despondency and other "signs 

of disintegration" were widespread.

GO Reodulic, who, whatever else he was, did not 

associate himself with the nihilistic bitterender.; of the SS, protested that Vienna was 

no different from any other large city with 

street fighting and a disaffected population 

and threw Skorzeny out." The battle 

went on in the city until the afternoon of 

13 April but without any attempt to create 

another Budapest. 

At the end of the second week in April, 

Sixth SS Panzer, Sixth, and Second Panzer 

Annies had an almost continuous front in 

the outlying Alps from west of St. Poelten 

to the Drava east of Varazdin. The loss 

of the Hungarian oil fields had gone almost 

unnoticed in the greater excitement over 

Vienna. After they crossed the Hungarian 

border the Russians relaxed their pressure 

against the two southern annies. 

.. Lothar Rendulic, Celcaempft, Gesiegt, Geschtagen (Heidelberg, 195~ ), p. 310. 

10 OKH, CenStdH, Op. Abt. NT. 4444/ 45, an 

H. GT. Sued, 10.4 .45, file H 22/ Bb. 

". O .B. d. H . Gr. Sued. /a Nr. 136145 , an OKH, 

GenSldH, 0,. Abt., 10.4.45. H 22/ 389 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

In the second half of the month, the 

weight of the offensive shifted north of the 

Danube. The First Guards Cavalry-Mechanized Group attacked across the Morava 

toward Brno, and Fourth Ukrainian Front 

bore in toward Olomouc against the bulging Army Group Center right flank. Hitler ordered Army Group South to retake the 

small Austrian oil field at Zister.;dorf 

twenty-five miles north of Vienna. The 

attempt was not made. 

Closing In? 

The abortive Stargard operation brought 

lbe Germans a substantial, unexpected, and 

unearned dividend of time that, while it 

appeared to do no more than prolong the 

agony, may have profoundly affected Germany's future. In the fit of caution that 

took hold in mid-February, the Stavka dismantled its preparations for an advance to 

Berlin and beyond into central Germany 

and committed its main forces in marginal. 

wholly unspectacular clearing operations 

on the flanks in Pomerania and Silesia. 

For nearly a month and a half, Berlin and 

the German territory west of the Oder appear to have dropped out of the sight even 

of the Stavka. No doubt, observing that 

the Allies were still west of the Rhine, 

which they did not cross anywhere until 

the end of the fir.;t week in March, the 

Soviet command concluded it had time 

enough. This could have provided a rationale for cleaning out the flanks in anticipation of a deeper thrust into Germany 

than originally intended and, meanwhile, 

letting the Allies bleed themselves ollt; but 

the sequence of events in March indicates 

that caution and a consequent inability to 

decide upon a clean-cut, direct solution to 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

the final strategic problem also weighed 

heavily. 

Zhukov and RokoHovskiy Against 

Army Group Vistula 

In a major intelligence estimate submitted to Hitler on 26 February, the 

Eastern Intelligence Branch, OKH, predicted that the Soviet main effort would be 

"concentrated exclusively in the decisive 

direction- toward the west." It seemed 

obvious that the Soviet Command would 

concentrate exclusively on perpetuating the 

crisis on the German side in order to effect 

a decision in the war. The intelligence 

analysts found it difficult to imagine that 

the Stavka would let itself be deflected 

from the supreme objective by illusory 

threats to its flanks, especially after the 

Stargard failure. Moreover, with hetter 

than six million mcn against the Germans-' 

two million, it appeared the Russians could 

handily cope with any diversions the Germans might attempt and at the same-time 

carry the advance forward in the main 

direction. 62 In terms of combat readiness 

the Soviet armies were in good shape; the 

estimated 680,000 casualties in January 

had been less than the Soviet forces had 

sustained in any of their other recent major 

• At ~ million the German strength was slightly 

higher than on I January 1945 . The increase was 

in the form of new divisions and divisions trans· 

ferred from other theaters. Of 660,000 German 

casualties in January and February less than half 

had been replaced, which meant a further "burning out" of the old Eastern Front divisions. A 

fourth of the total German strength in the east 

(556,000 men) was bottled up in Courland and 

East Prussia. OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt. (1), 

Tages-und Gefechtsstaerke der H . Gr. des Osthures, Stand :1·8.:1.45, H 1/ 450e file; OKH, GenStdH, 

Org. Abt. Nr. 1493/45, Personalle Auswertung 

Heer luer Jan .-Feb . '945, :13.3.45, H 1/ 454 file . 

457 

offensives.S3 The prediction was wrong, 

but the logic of the situation on which it 

was based was ultimately compelling for 

both sides, and for the Germans, as long 

as the war lasted, it was inescapable. 

On 25 February the deployment of the 

First Belorussian and First Ukrainian 

Fronts' four tank armies indicated that 

both fronts were oriented west. (Map 41) 

The First and Second Guards Tank Armies 

of First Belorussian Front were out of the 

line, and, although both were north of the 

Wart he, neither had intervened in the 

Stargard battle. Fourth Tank Army was 

on the Neisse between Guben and Forst, 

and Third Guards Tank Army was west 

of Goerlitz. 

Between 24 and 26 February the Germans picked up the first signs of a change 

in the Soviet intentions. On the 24th 

Second Belorussian Front launched heavy 

probing attacks along its whole front west 

of the Vistula. On the extreme left flank, 

at the Third Panzer Army- Second Army 

boundary, Nineteenth Army, newly arrived 

from Finland, struck a weak spot, broke 

in on the first day, and by the 26th, when 

it took Bublitz, had covered about half the 

distance to the Baltic coast. On the 26th 

agent reports from the First Ukrainian 

Front zone confirmed that Fourth Tank 

Army had left the Guben-Forst area and 

moved south to Liegnitz." The Germans 

.. OKH, GenStdH, Abt. Fremde Hure Ost, Nr. 

45/ 45, Beurteilung der Feindlage vor deutscher 

Osllront im grossen, Stand :15.:1.45, H 3/196 file . 

M Obkdo . d. H. Gr. Weichsel, lc/ AO, Stellungnahme der H. Gr. Weichsel .tUr Frage der /eindlichen Entschluss/a.ssung luer die Operation gegen 

West-Pommern, 6.3.45,' OKH, GenStdH, FHO , 

Vortragsnotiz zur Beurteilung der Frage ueber 

eine Entschlussaenderung im Bereich der 1 . Ukrainischen und I. und :1 . Weissrussischen Front im 

Verlauf der Kaemple ende Februar- Anlang Maerz, 

5 .3.45. Both in H 3/196 file. 
8 I C 

1'1 GUARDS 

3' SHO~ TANK 

FiRST BELO,WSSIAN ---XXXXX---

FIRST UKRAINIAN 

CLOSING IN 

24 February-30 Morch 1945 

INlfloI.l SOVIET DISPOSITIONS 

1ST, 20AND Jo 6£LORIJ$SIAN FRONTS, 23 reB 4$ 

IST,AN() 4T1ft/KHAtNIAN I'RONTS,JOFC84!J 

,....,,....,,..... GER .... N FRO"lTS,23FE8IU5 

- -- GERI"",N FRONTS,30,..."".5 

,. . ! 'I: " I ,. . MAP 41 

,. 

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40 60YIlU 

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( 

~I I r 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

concluded that as a brief prelude to the 

main offensive the Stauka had decided to 

eliminate all semblances of threats to the 

flanks. In Pomerania the OKH expected 

the Russians would be content with splitting apart the Third Panzer and Second 

Armies and breaking the land communications to Danzig and Gdynia. In Silesia 

it expected them to attempt to force the 

Seventeenth Army and the Armeegruppe 

Heinrici back to the Sudeten Mountains 

and as a dividend, if it could be done fast, 

take the Moravska Ostrava industrial complex. elI 

A map captured on February revealed 

that Second Belorussian Front was in fact 

aiming for the coast east of Koeslin to split 

the Third Panzer and Second Armies." 

Army Group Vistula ordered a counterattack into the Russian flanks east and 

we.,t of Bublitz, but Second Army was dangerously short of artillery ammunition and 

gasoline, and the army group had trouble 

finding gas for the armor it was bringing 

in on the west. During the last two days 

of the month, Rokossovskiy reined in on his 

armor and set his infantry to opening the 

flanks. On I March, while the German 

counterattack made minor progress east of 

Bublitz, III Guards Tank Corps crossed 

the road and railroad east of Koeslin, cutting the communications to Second Anny 

and to Danzig and Gdynia, the main bases 

of supply for Army Groups North and 

Courland.

6 f 

II! OKH, G~nStdH, Op . Abt., 1a N,., 450 159/ 45. 

an H . Cr, Weichul, 37.:1 .45; OKH, GenStdH, Op. 

Abt., Ia NT, 450 158/ 45. an H . Gr, MiUe , 27 .':1 .45 . 

Both in H !l'l/ 6b file. 

"Obkdo. H . Cr. Weichsel. Allge-meine Lage 

Stand :18.2.45 00.00 Uhr, H. Gr. Weichsel 751'2'2 / 3 

file. 

.,. ..tOK 2 , la NT. °387, an H . Gr. Weichsd, 

~5 45; H. Gr. Weichu l . la Nr. ~059 45 . Weis459 

On I March, after apparently waiting to 

see whether the Germans would repeat the 

Stargard attempt, First Belorussian Front 

attacked Third Panzer Army's center at 

Reetz. Third Shock Army made the 

breakthrough, and the First and Second 

Guards Tank Armies followed, the former 

going north toward Kolberg and the latter 

northwest toward the lower Oder. Only 

weeks before, the Goebbels propagandists 

had released the movie Kolberg, a color 

epic-the most lavish ever made in Germany-depicting Gneisenau's successful defense of the city against the French in 1807. 

On 4 March First Guards Tank Army 

reached the coast, isolated Kolberg, and 

made contact with the left flank of Second 

Belorussian Front, which took Koeslin on 

that day. Third Panzer Army's left flank 

was trapped and was breaking up into 

small pockets. Hitler ordered the army to 

counterattack to close the "gap." General 

Kinzel, the one-time Army Group North 

chief of staff recently called in as Himmler's "second chief" to replace Wenck, told 

Guderian's deputy to tell the Fuehrer he 

was fighting the war "on paper" and not 

in accordance with reality; the situation 

W"iS hopeless; and the only thing left to do 

was to save what could be saved of the 

army for the battle on the Oder." 

The following day First Guards Tank 

Army joined Second Belorussian Front to 

give it an assist against Second Army, and 

ung fuu Kampffuehrung an der Naht 3. Pz. Armu 

und . Armu, ~7 45,· H. Gr. Weichul, Allgeme;n. Lag. Stand 1.3.45 00.00 Uhr (both in H. 

Gr. Weichsel 751~~ 3 file ); OKH, GenStdH, Op . 

Abt./111b Pruef. Nr. 64346, Lage O.a Stand 1.3 .45 

abds. 

·Obkdo. H. Gr. Weichsel, Allgemeine Lage 

Stand 45 00.00 Uhr; Allgemeine LaRe Stand 

5 .3 .45 00 .00 Uhr; and Gesprauh Chef d. OplItntionsabt., Gen . Krebs, Mit Gen. Lt. KinZlll , 4 .3 .45 , 

H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/ 4 file. 
460 

Zhukov turned his flank west toward the 

Oder." During the next few days, while 

Hitler went on talking about a counterattack, Third Panzer Army was pushed 

into a bridgehead east of Stettin. After a 

quiet day on the 12th, Hitler instructed 

Army Group Vistula to consider how it 

could expand the bridgehead enough to 

open the port of Stettin for contact by sea 

with Danzig and Gdynia." 

W.hen the Russians resumed the assault 

against the bridgehead on the 15th, Hitler 

ordered Third Panzer Army to stay on the 

defensive and release several divisions as 

reinforcements for Ninth Army." Late on 

the afternoon of the 19th General der 

Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffe!, whom Hitler had put in command 

of Third Panzer Army several days earlier 

after taking a sudden dislike to Raus, reported that the battle in the bridgehead 

was at an end one way or the other: Hitler 

could either give up the bridgehead before 

the day's end "or lose everything tomorrow." Hitler gave his approval an hour 

later.12 

Goebbels' propaganda epic about Kolberg barely escaped being also engulfed in 

the Third Panzer Army's disaster. The old 

city on the Baltic, which had surrendered 

only one of the three times the Russians 

• Zhilir" V Qzhne)'shiyt Operahii Otechestvennoy 

¥oyny, p. 494· 

'to Obkdo. H. Gr, Wei chstl, 10. Nt. :1984/45. Ttlgesmeldung, 1:J .3.4S; OKH, GenStdH, op. Abt., 

10 Nr. 450184/45 an H. Gr. Weichsel, ' 3·3-45· 

Both in H. Gr. Weichsel 75nl:~/4 file. 

n OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., fa Nt. 450 189/ 45 . 

WeiJUng filer die Vorbullitung der Abwehrschlacht 

an der unteren Oder, ,6.3.45,' H . Gr. Weichsel, la, 

Vermerk. '5.3.45. Both in H Gr. Weichsel 75122/5 

file. 

H H. Gr. Weichstl, Vermtrk, Ftrngespraech Gen. 

Kinzel-Cen. Krebs, '9.3.45, 17, 50 Uhr, H. Gr. 

Weichsel 751~~/5 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

besieged it in the Seven Years' War and 

had stood off Napoleon's troops, though lost 

at least did not capitulate. The garrison 

held out until the 18th. By then 80,000 

inhabitants and refugees had been evacuated by sea, and the last few hundred 

soldiers escaped on board a destroyer. 

Rokossovskiy's operation against Second 

Army took longer and could not be brought 

to as clean-cut a conclusion. By 1 1 March 

Second Belorussian Front had reached a 

line skirting the west half of the Bay of 

Danzig about ten miles in from the coast. 

A day later First Guards Tank Army broke 

through to the coast at Puck and cut off 

the northernmost German corps, which 

subsequently withdrew to the He! Peninsula. 

On the 13th, in a command shuffle occasioned by command changes in the West 

and in Italy, von Vietinghoff returned to 

Italy, Rendulic returned to Army Group 

Courland, and Weiss was appointed Commanding General, Army Group North. At 

the same time, Second Army, General deT 

Panzertruppen Dietrich von Saucken commanding, was transferred to Army Group 

North. Hitler told Weiss to hold the Hel 

Peninsula, Gdynia, Danzig, Pill au, the 

Frische Nehrung, and enough ground on 

the mainland in East Prussia to keep 

contact with Koenigsberg." Hitler and 

Doenitz still considered the Baltic ports essential for the Navy. 

For ten more days Second Army held 

its own against the full weight of Rokossovskiy's front. On 23 March the Russians 

finally reached the coast at Sopot, splitting 

Gdynia off from the German main force 

n OKH, ClnSldH, 0/1 . ..fbt., la Nr. 450 1831 

45, an H. Cr. Nord, 11.3.45, H. Gr. Weichsel 

'5 1~~ 5 file. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

at and east of Danzig. From that entering wedge, they took Gdynia on the 28th 

and Danzig two days later. The Second 

Army survivors retreated cast into the Vistula delta. 

After 13 March Third Belorussian Fronl 

had pushed Fourth Army into a ten by 

two mile beachhead west of Heiligenbeil 

before Hitler on the 29th finally allowed 

the army to retreat across the Frisches Haff 

to the Nehrung. By then the army had 

left 60,000 able-bodied men and 70,000 

wounded. Hitler ordered the army to keep 

all but the most seriously wounded for usc 

as replacements as they recovered.;· At 

the end of the month, Army Group North 

precariously straddled the Bay of Danzig 

from Samland and Koenigsberg to the 

mouth of the Vistula; the remnants of two 

corps held small beachheads north of Gdynia on the Hel Peninsula.

7s 

Forlress Berlin 

The Soviet advance from the Vistula to 

the Oder had astonishingly little visible 

effect in Berlin. Life in the capital and its 

close environs, which housed the entire central government and the highest Wehrmacht commands with their main communications centers, continued in its accustomed routine that by then had long included the frequent American and British 

bombing raids. The exodus of governmental officers, siege preparations, and 

panic that had marked the German approach to Moscow in Octoher t 94 I were 

l' Obkdo. H. Gr. Nord, la Nr. 2556145, an 

OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., 29.3.45, H 'l'll7a file; 

OKH, GenStdH, Op . Abt., In Nr. 450 255/45, an 

den a .B. der 4. Armee, 3+45. H 22/389 file. 

r~ OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. IITb, Pruef-Nr. 

73504, Lage Osl Stand 30.3-45 abds. 

461 

completely absent. Russian tanks might 

be on the Oder, scarcely a day's running 

time away, but what was to be done in 

Berlin still depended entirely upon the 

Fuehrer. Even the questions when and 

how the city would be evacuated or defended could not safely be raised without a 

cue from Hitler, and he was thinking of 

retaking Budapest, not of defending Berlin. 

At the end of January, in fact, very little 

had been done to prepare defenses anywhere west of the Oder. For political and 

psychological reasons, Hitler had insisted 

that military operational control not be imposed on German territory until the very 

latest possible time. Therefore, the OKW 

had waited until 14 January before giving 

the OKH authority to issue directives concerning fortification and defensive preparations to Wehrkreis III, the military district 

which included Berlin and a broad band 

of territory on either side of the city east to 

the Oder." 

On 2 February Keitel issued the first 

written order concerning Berlin. In it he 

made the Commanding General, Wehrkreis III, responsible for defending the city. 

The Wehrkreis was a housekeeping and 

administrative command without pennanently assigned tactical troops. The Keitel 

order merely increased the Wehrkreis commander's authority over troops that might 

be stationed in his area and gave him command "for ground combat" of the 1st Flak 

Division, the Berlin antiaircraft artillery. 

For his tactical orders the Wehrkreis commander would report directly to Hitler at 

the daily situation conferences. 17 

At the end of the third week in Febru-

'It Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht IV, 1290. 

TT Ibid., p. 1291. 
462 

ary, Hitler still had not expressed a decision 

on Berlin. An OKW inquiry to the Reichs 

Chancellory regarding the "intentions of 

the highest governmental agencies in the 

event of a battle for Berlin" brought the 

reply that the only instructions issued so 

far were to stay in Berlin. That the city 

might become involved in the fighting "or 

even encircled" had not been discussed. 

Women and children were being allowed 

to leave, but no public announcement 

would be made." 

Early in March, beginning with the 

transfer of Wehrkreis Ill's responsibility to 

Generalleutnant Hellmuth Reymann as 

Commander, Berlin Defense Area, the 

planning for Berlin assumed a somewhat 

more concrete aspect. Reymann's title indicated how little had been accomplished 

until then: the term "defense area" was 

applied to "exceptional cases of fortresses 

not yet completed. m9 

On the 9th Reymann signed the Basic 

Order for the Preparations to Defend the 

Capital. In parts of it Hitler's rhetoric 

stands out unmistakably. The mission was 

to be to defend the capital "to the last man 

and the last shot." The battle was to be 

fought Uwith fanaticism, imagination j 

every means of deception, cunning, and 

deceit; and with improvisations of all 

kinds ... on, above, and under the ground." 

"Every block, every house, every story, 

every hedge, every shell hole" was to be 

defended "to the utmost." That each defen.der was trained in the fine points of the 

use of weapons was less important than 

that "each ... be filled with a fanatical desire to fight, that he knows the world is 

holding its breath as it watches this battle 

TI Ibid" p. 1327. 

n Ibid., p. 1304. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

and that the battle for Berlin can decide 

the war."·o 

Berlin was to be another fortress, the last 

in a chain that had stretched east to Stalingrad. The outer defense perimeter was 

plotted about twenty miles from the center 

of the city. Inside it were two more rings, 

onc about ten miles from the city's center, 

the other following the S-Bahn, the suburban belt railway. In each of eight pieslice-shaped sectors a commandant was appointed. A small inner ring around the 

government quarter was designated Sector 

Z (Ziladelle, or citadel) . The troop dispositions, however, indicate that Hitler really 

considered the fortress as a marginal affair. 

Aside from the 1st Flak Division, which 

would remain in the antiaircraft defense 

until ground fighting began, Reymann had 

as reserves six battalions, two of them 

Volksslurm, one a guard battalion, and the 

rest SS and police. The sector commandants would not actually command any 

troops until the code word CLAUSEWlTZ, 

the enemy approach warning, was given. 

They would then assume command of the 

V olksslurm and any troop units that happened to be in their sectors and of whatever troops' came in or were driven in from 

the outside. 11 

Hitler was, no doubt, fully aware that 

the capital and the German heartland 

could be defended, if at all, only on the 

Oder-Neisse line, not on the Berlin S-Bahn. 

As long as he imagined that he still had 

strategic choices-as recently as the competition between the Stargard and Buda-

., Verteidigungsbereich Berlin, la, Op. Nr. 400/ 

45, Grundsaetzlicher Belehl fuer die Vorbereitungen 

zur Verteidigung de, Reichshauptstadt, 9.3.45, 

Zeitsch,ilt fuer Militaergeschichte, 2/ 1965, pp. 

177--94· 111bid. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

pest operations, for instance-he had neglected the Berlin sector. As a consequence, the front on the Oder and Neisse 

was only little less of a sham than the Berlin 

fortress. 

By early March Hitler and the rest of 

the German Command were agreed that 

a Soviet breakthrough toward Berlin was 

the greatest danger they faced, partly because the Russians had lately been moving much faster than the Americans and 

British but equally because they could conceive no greater horror than having the 

Russians march into the center of Germany. On the other hand, Hitler claimed 

knowledge that the Russians were not completely settled on Berlin and central Germany as the next objectives. That was 

Zhukov's intention, he maintained, but 

Stalin wanted a two-pronged offensive into 

western Czechoslovakia via Moravska Ostrava and the Moravian Gate on the north 

and Bratislava-Brno from the south, to be 

executed either before or simultaneously 

with the Berlin offensive." 

Late a. it was, the Oder-Neisse defense 

would have been neglected longer had not 

Hitler decided on 15 March in a flash of 

"intuition" that the Russians would choose 

the Berlin operation, which presumably, 

since every threat to their right flank was 

eliminated, they could begin almost any 

day." That night he conferred with 

Himmler, Guderian, and Busse. If he had 

time before the Russians moved, he wanted 

Ninth Army to strike north out of its own 

bridgehead at Frankfurt and "smash" the 

Soviet concentration south of Kuestrin.8f 

.. OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Notiun Rack 

Fuehrervortrag am '9.3 nachmittags, H '.Z'.Z / 7b file. 

NH. Gr. Weichul, la, Ve,merk, 15.3 .45. H . Gr. 

Weichsel 7SIU/S file. 

at Jodi Diary, 15 May 45. 

463 

The next day he told Himmler to get ready 

for battle on the lower Oder and particularly to strengthen the Kuestrin-FrankfurtGuben sector.'s 

The apparent imminence of the crucial 

battle agitated the German command. Guderian and Speer, in an attempt to avoid 

adding to the approaching final defeat a 

complete internal dislocation in Germany, 

ordered that henceforth during withdrawals roads, bridges, and railroads were 

to be rendered temporarily unusable but 

not destroyed-allegedly to facilitate their 

restoration when the lost territory was retaken.86 Hitler, on 19 March, branding as 

an "error" the idea that temporary disruption of communications would be 

enough, ordered a full-scale seorched-earth 

policy and canceled "all directives to the 

contrary." In Four days later, however, 

when Goehbels in his capacity as Gauleiter 

of Berlin proposed to convert the Charlotten burger Chausee into a landing strip, 

Hitler, displaying another of his characteristic vagaries, forbade him to cut down the 

trees flanking the boulevard in the Tiergarten.88 

When Guderian secured lukewann backing from Doenitz in an attempt to persuade 

Hitler to evacuate Courland and bring the 

troops back to Germany, Hitler refused on 

the ground that besides causing heavy 

iii OKH. GenStdH. op. Abl .• 10. Nr. 450/ 45. 

Weisung fuer di, Vorber,itung der .Abwehrschlacht 

an der unteren Od,r. ,6.3.45; Obkdo. H . Gr. 

W,;chsei • .Abt. To. Nr. 54/45. Weisung /u,r di, 

Varber,;tung der Abwehrschlacht an der unter,n 

Od,r. '7.3.45. Both in H . Gr. Weichsel 75122/5 

file. 

·OKH. GenStdH. Op. Abt .• la, Natiz. 10 .3 .45 • 

file H 22/7b. 

.., OKW. WFS, . Op . Qu. :1 Nr. 00:17" / 45. 19.3· 

45. H 22/,b file . 

• St,nagr. Dienst im F.H.Qu .. Lagebesprechung 

am Abend des :19.3.':5. OCMH files. 
464 

German losses, it would release a large 

number of enemy divisions. Rendulic's return to Courland underscored Hitler's determination to hold out there. On 13 

March the so-called Fifth Battle of Courland, begun on 27 February, had ended. 

Von Vietinghoff had reported that the 

army group probably could not withstand 

another really determined onslaught." 

In a different direction, an effort to remove Himmler from the Army Group 

Vistula command, Guderian had more 

success. At the middle of the month 

Himmler almost gladly accepted Guderian's offer to propose his retirement. After 

the Stargard fiasco and the consequent loss 

of favor with Hitler, he had evaded direct 

responsibility for the army group and had 

finally withdrawn under his physician's 

care to his estate at Hohenlychen, claiming 

to be suffering from angina pectoris. On 

20 March Generaloberst Heinrici took command of Army Group Vistula, and two days 

later Hitler agreed to let Guderian bring in 

the Army Group F staff to replace most of 

Himmler's staff." 

Guderian's own tenure was nearing an 

end. Hitler had resolved to give him "a 

long leave for his health" and was waiting 

impatiently for Wenck to recover sufficiently to assume the duties of Chief of 

Staff, OKH." Lately, Hitler had indicated that he would have preferred to 

• Office, Chief of Naval Operations, Fuehrer 

Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German 

Navy, 1945. p. 85 ; QUdo. H. Gr. Kurland, /0 

Nr. 956/ 45. Late Rack 2o·taegiger Dauer 5. Kurlandschlacht, 7.3.45 and OKH, G.nStdH, Op. Abl" 

14 Nr. 3249/45, Notiz nach Fu,hrervo,t,ag am 

17.3. nachmittags, H 22/7b file. 

10 OKH, G,nStdH, Op. Abl., Nofiz nach Fuehr-

'rvortrag am 22.3.45 nachrnittags, H 22/ ,b file. 

h. St.nogr. Dienst im F.R.Qu., Lag.hsp,,,hung 

Gm Abend des 23.3.45. OCMH file •. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

dispense with conventional military organizations and leadership altogether. What 

he needed, he said, were men like those 

who had created the Freikorps (freebooting detachments) after World War I, men 

who could hammer together units on their 

own. The best such officers he had at the 

moment, he thought, were the SS-men von 

dem Bach, Skorzeny, and Reinefarth. The 

two Army generals he rated liighest were 

unavailable, both having recently been 

jailed for illegally appropriating captured 

property." 

Before Ninth Army could organize its 

spOiling attack out of the Frankfrut bridge· 

head, First Belorussian Front, on 22 

March, irrupted from its bridgeheads 

flanking Kuestrin and encircled the gar· 

rison in the Ku estrin All Sladl (the Kues· 

trin Neu Sladl, east of th e Order, had fall en 

earlier in the month). A cou nterattack by 

two panzer division that had been ear· 

marked for the Frankfurt operation fail ed 

on the 24th. After that, Heinrici and 

Busse concluded it would be better to forgo 

a second attempt and conserve their 

strength, but Hitl er read Heinrici a lecture 

on "the futility of always being a move 

behind the enemy" and demanded th e 

attack, to "smash" the Soviet build·up be· 

fore it was compl eted. 

On 27 March the second attempt to relieve Kuestrin failed. After an angry interview with Busse and Guderian the next 

day, Hitler gave Guderian six weeks' "sick 

leave" and made General der Infanterie 

Hans Krebs, Wenck's substitute, acting 

Chief of Staff, OKH. Krebs, who had 

been Busch's and mo<e recently Model's 

• St'RO". Dienst im F.H. QU'J Einnln, S,it," 

,in" Lag,b,spr,chung, Fd.-Ma'rz 1945. OCMH 

file •. 
THE DEFENSE OF THE REICH 

chief of staff, was known for his unquenchable optimism and his chameleonlike ability 

to adapt to the views of his superior.;. On 

go March the commandant in Kuestrin, 

Reinefarth, decided against a heroic demise 

and ordered the breakout from the Ait 

Stadt." 

Konev in Upper Silesia 

The Soviet Upper Silesian offensive, 

as it developed in late March, appeared to 

confirm Hitler's assumption that the Russians planned a large operation in Czechoslovakia as a prelude or a companion 

piece to the thrust to Berlin and into central Germany. Indeed, the Upper Silesian 

offensive remains difficult to explain in 

any other terms. The Soviet authorities 

maintain that nothing more was intended 

than was accomplished, namely, to force 

Army Group Center away from the Oder 

above Oppeln and back to the edge of the 

Sudeten." Although the operation did remove a possible, though remote, danger to 

Konev's deep right flank and shortened his 

front somewhat, it fell far short of improving the situation in the south as radically 

as was being done in Pomerania and West 

Prussia. Such an improvement could only 

have been accomplished by a deep thrust 

into Czechoslovakia to Olomouc, Bmo, 

and in the Prague direction behind Army 

Group Center. 

First Ukrainian Front had been slow 

liS Guderian, Erinnerungen einllS So/daten, p. 389; 

Obkdo. d. H. Gr. WeichseI, lo. N,. 4405/ 45. Tagesmt!ldung, 22.3.45; Obkdo. H. Cr. Weichsel,la Nr. 

4496/ 45. Tagtsme/dung, 24.3.4$. Obkdo. H. Gr. 

Weichstl, 10. Nr. 4684/ 45, To.gesmeldung, !17.3.45; 

O.B. H. Gr. Weichsel, Notizen, fl6.3.45 . Last two 

in H . Gr. Weichsel 7SU!l/S file. 

.. Zhitin, Die wichtigsten Operationen des Grossen 

Vaterlaendischen Krieges, p. 597. 

465 

getting the offensive ready to move. 

Apparently its armor had needed refitting; 

on 14 March all of the larger armored 

units were out of the front. But by then 

Fourth Tank Army, out of action for 

nearly three weeks, was rested, re~ 

fitted, and, together with Twenty-first 

Army, was deployed and ready for the 

offensive in the Grottkau area west of 

Oppeln. The Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth 

Armies were likewise ready in the Oder 

bridgehead north of Ratibor. East of 

Moravska Ostrava the reinforced right 

flank of Fourth Ukrainian Front had run 

a preliminary attack for three days beginning on 10 March. The Germans, watching the build-up, had trouble deciding 

what to make of it, particularly after the 

rapid success against Army Group Vistula 

east of the Oder made it appear that the 

offensive across the Oder and Neisse could 

come soon.gll 

On 15 March First Ukrainian Front 

attacked south of Grottkau and west out of 

the bridgehead north of Ratibor. Fourth 

Ukrainian Front resumed its thrust toward 

Moravska Ostrava. In a day or two, 

Fourth Ukrainian Front's attack stalled. 

Konev's armies, because of their overwhelming materiel superiority, had the 

upper hand from the start but did not 

make, from the Army Group Center point 

of view, alarming progress until the afternoon of the 17th, when Fourth Tank Army 

sluiced a tank corps through a small gap 

east of Neisse, and linking up with the 

force coming west out of the Ratibor 

bridgehead, encircled LVI Panzer Corps 

southwest of Oppeln. That the Com-

·OKH, GenSldH, .A.bt. Fremde Hure Ost, Nr. 

13U/ 45, Kuru Beurleilung der Feindlage vom 

8.3.45, H 3/!lt J file . 
466 

manding General, Seventeenth Army, General der Inlanterie Friedrich Wilhelm 

Schultz, was caught in the breakthrough 

and chivied across the Silesian landscape 

until almost nightlall by Soviet tanks did 

not enhance the speed 01 the German reaction. On the 20th LVI Panzer Corps 

escaped Irom the pocket with heavy losses." 

On 22 March Konev turned his attack 

south toward Opava, and Fourth Ukrainian Front began striking west toward 

Ratibor. To the Germans it appeared that 

the main phase 01 the offensive was just 

beginning. The thrusts in both directions 

were being gradually reinlorced, and by the 

"H. Cr. Mitt«, ia Nr. 1631 / 45. an den Fuehrer, '7.3.45; H. Gr. Mitte , Fernspruch an den 

Fuehrer, [8.3.45; OKH, GflnStdH, Op . .A.bt., 14 

Nr, 3347/45. Fernspruch H. Gr. MiUe Nr. 1633/ 

45.20.3.45. Both in H 22/386 file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

26th Konev had brought Fourth Tank 

Army down Irom the Neisse area." 

On the 30th Schoemer had to give up 

Ratibor to prevent a breakthrough to 

Moravska Ostrava. He reported that the 

Russians appeared as intent as ever on 

lorcing their way past Opava and Moravska Ostrava into the Moravian basin." In 

the Army Group South zone the First 

Guards Cavalry-Mechanized Group was 

heading northwest through Slovakia toward 

Moravia. Then a day later, without having 

reached any' 01 their apparent objectives, 

the First and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts 

stopped the offensive. 

t1' OKH. GenStdH, Abt. Fremde Hure OS'. Nr. 

1776/45. Kurze Beurteilung de, Feindlage vom 

26·3·45. H 3/ 211 file. 

M H. Cr. Mitte, la N,. 1930/45. an den FUflhrer 

und Obersten Be/ehlshabu der Wehrmacht. 30. 

3·4$. H 2'J / 7a file. 
CHAPTER XXI 

Berlin 

The Eve of the Battle 

While the Russians conducted their sideshows in Pomerania, \Iv est Prussia, and 

Silesia, the Allies took charge in the center 

ring in a style that by the end of March 

had completely changed the strategic picture in Germany. They had closed to the 

Rhine along its whole length, had deep 

bridgeheads across the river, and were rapidly completing an encirclement of the 

Ruhr that would chop Army Group Bout 

of the German front, opening for them a 

broad boulevard east to the Elbe. In 

Switzerland they had entered into secret 

negotiations looking toward the surrender 

of the German forces in Italy. From these 

the Russians, though infonned, were excluded. 

The Soviet Decision To Take 

Berlin 

In Moscow on the night of 31 March 

the Allied representatives presented to 

Stalin a message from General of the Army 

Dwight D. Eisenhower outlining the Allied 

Supreme Commander's plans for his operations in central Germany. Eisenhower 

stated that his next objective, after he had 

encircled and destroyed the Germans in the 

Ruhr, would be to split the enemy forces 

by making a junction with the Soviet 

armies. He believed that could best be 

accomplished by a thrust along the line 

Erfurt-Leipzig-Dresden. As soon as he 

could, he would make a secondary advance 

to meet the Russians in the RegensburgLinz area and so prevent the Germans 

from establishing a redoubt in southern 

Germany. 

Replying- with altogether unusual alacrity- the next day, Stalin agreed that the 

Allied and Soviet forces should meet as 

Eisenhower proposed in the Erfurt-LeipzigDresden and Regensburg-Linz areas. Berlin, he added, had lost its former strategic 

significance, and the Soviet Supreme Command planned only to allot secondary 

forces in that direction. The Soviet main 

offensive, he stated, would probably be 

resumed in the second half of May.' 

Even as Stalin wrote, the Soviet annies 

from north of Opava to the mouth of the 

VL,tula were beginning, in almost frantic 

haste, the redeployment for an operation 

that had Berlin as its primary objective. 

In Upper Silesia, where First Ukrainian 

Front's offensive ended on 31 March with 

the abruptness already noted, Fourth Tank 

Army, redesignated "Guards," was pul1ing 

its units out of the front, getting ready for 

the move north to the Neisse. The air 

units that had flown support missions on 

the First Ukrainian Front left flank were 

1 Herbert Feis, Churchill. Roosevelt, Stalin 

(Princeton, 1957 ), pp. 604-05; Ehrman, Grand 

Strategy. VI. 132, '42. 
... 

v. 

\ \. X1UOO( 

EWELFTH! (U S) 

( ...... 

[ I 

MAP 42 

s. 

/ 

] 

] 

NINETEENTH 

SECOND 

SHOCK 

FORTY· NINTH 

E\..O ~SlAH 

SECOND I(I()I,lI.~USSIA N T !lELO FIRS SIXTl'.fIAST 

TtllRD 

THIRO OUAAOS 

U.NIt 
BERLIN 

moving north as was Fifth Guards Army 

from the area west of Breslau. SecQnd 

Belorussian Front, which with First Guards 

Tank Army still attached was fully committed against the remnants of German 

Second Army on the Bay of Danzig on 30 

March, was starting a fast about-face and 

a march to the lower Oder.' 

The true mood of the Soviet Command, 

disguised in the deliberate tone of Stalin's 

reply to Eisenhower, was revealed on 3 

April when Stalin, protesting the negotiations in Switzerland, wrote to President 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, "As regards my 

military colleagues, they, on the basis of 

information in their possession, are sure 

that negotiations did take place and that 

they ended in an agreement with the Germans, whereby the German Commander 

on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring 

[Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring] 

is to open the front to the Anglo-American 

troops and let them move east, while the 

British and Americans have promised, in 

exchange, to ease the armistice terms for 

the Germans." Sounding very much like 

a man who had just discovered that he 

had for some time been looking in the 

wrong direction-and drawing false conclusions from his original faulty assumption 

-Stalin added almost plaintively, "I realize that there are certain advantages resulting to the Anglo-American troops ... 

seeing that the Anglo-American troops are 

enabled to advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance; but why 

conceal this from the Russians, and why 

s OKH, GenStdH, Fremde Hurt Osl, NT. 19091 

45, Kuru Beurteilung der Feindlage vom 1.4·45; 

N,. 1966145. Kuru Beurteilung de' Feindlage vom 

3.4-45. Both in H 3/'21 J file. 

469 

were the Russians, their allies, not forewarned?" :1 

Hitler Worries About the Flanks 

On 30 March, Hitler had warned Army 

Group Vistula that the developments on 

the Western Front could induce the Russians to attack across the Oder without 

waiting to redeploy their forces from East 

and West Prussia. (Map 42) He directed 

the army group to construct a main battle 

line two to four miles behind its front and 

emplace the artillery so that it could lay 

down barrages between the two lines." But 

he apparently still was not convinced that 

the decisive battle would be at Berlin. He 

had ordered the loth SS Panzer Division 

transferred from Army Group Vistula to 

Army Group Center and stationed southeast of Goerlitz, where it appeared that 

Third Guards Tank Army might attempt a 

breakthrough south toward Prague. On 2 

and 3 April he transferred the Fuehrer 

Grenadier Division and the 25th Panzer 

Division to Army Group South for the 

defense of Vienna.' The transfers cost 

Army Group Vistula half of its armored 

and mobile forces. 

In orders to Army Groups North and 

Courland, Hitler re-emphasized their missions of tying down enemy forces away 

from the main front and denying the Russians access to the Baltic ports. Too late 

'Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U .S.S.R., 

Corrupondence Between the Chairman of the 

Council of Ministllrs of the U.S.S.R. and the 'pres· 

idene of the U.S.A. and the Prime Minister of 

Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War 0/ 

'94'- '945 (Moscow, 1957), II, 160. 

• OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., fa Nr. 450243/45. 

an H. Gr. Weichsel, 30.3.45, H ~~ 390a file. 

~ OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Kriegstagebuch 2 .-

8.4.45.2.3 Apr 45. H ~~/, file. 
470 

to save the garrison, much less the civilians, 

he authorized a breakout (rom the Glogau 

(ortress on 30 March.' He demanded that 

Breslau hold out as "an example (or the 

whole German people" and "the surety for 

a change in the East." , 

On 2 April Headquarters, Army Group 

North, was recalled, and the Second and 

Fourth Armies went under the direct command o( the OKH. Alter Second Belorussian Front turned west, the Soviet 

strength opposing Second Army sank rapidly, leveling off in the second week o( the 

month at about nine divisions against the 

Germans' six.' 

On 3 April the sixth and last Courland 

battle ended (begun t7 March ) . Although Army Group Courland was badly 

weakened, Hitler instructed it to stay in the 

(ront it then held in order to draw the 

maximum enemy (orces against itsel! and. 

presumably, away from the front in 

Germany.' 

Koenigsberg had become a prestige ob- · 

jective (or Hitler and (or the Russians. On 

6 April Vasilevskiy threw (our armies into 

a converging attack, and on the 9th the city 

surrendered." Hitler had the (ortress commandant, General der In(anterie Otto 

Lasch, condemned in absentia to death by 

hanging. Alter Koenigsberg (ell, Hitler, 

partly as an expression o( his displeasure 

and partly because there was no longer any 

· OKH. G~nStdH , 0/1. Abt., 1a Nr. 394, 145 . an 

H. Gr. Mitte , 30.3.45 . H 'l'l/ 7a file. 

T Dt!1T Fuehrer, an den Kommandanten de' Festung Bredau, Gen . d . 1nf. Nieh off. 6.4.45. H 'J.'J./ 

8b file . 

• AOK . la Nr. 747/45. an OKH, Op. Abt., 

H :J'l / 6b file . 

• OKH, GtnStdH, Op. Abe., Ja Nr. 450 246145. 

an H . Cr. Kurland, 3'.3 .45. H ~~ 6a file. 

10 AOK 4, la Nr. 47:1';45, an OKH, Op . Abt., 

10.4 .45, H !2!2 / 8b file ; PJatonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya 

Voyna , 1939-45 , p. 702 . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

need for two army commands in the area, 

sent Headquarters, Fourth Army, out of 

East Prussia and combined what was lelt o( 

the amlY with Second Army to (orm the 

Army o( East Prussia. 

Soviet R edeployment and Plans 

In the lirst two weeks of April the Russians executed, apparently under Zhukov's 

direction, their (astest major redeployment 

o( the war. First Belorussian Front pulled 

its boundary down (rom the Baltic coast to 

the level o( Schwedt as Second Belorussian 

Front moved in on its right; First Ukrainian Front shilted its main weight (rom its 

lelt and center to its right. The three 

Soviet fronts had all together 2.5 million 

men, 6,250 tanks, 7,500 aircraft, 41,600 

artillery pieces and mortars, 3,255 multiple 

rocket projectors, and 95,383 motor vehicles.

1t 

In view o( the dark suspicions aroused 

by the recent Allied successes, the redeployment and the coming offensive had one 

overriding objective: to take possession at 

top speed o( at least the German territory 

east o( the Elbe, the projected Soviet occupation zone. To do that, even disregarding 

- though the Russians undoubtedly did not 

-the likelihood that i( the Allies had made 

a deal their occupying Berlin was part o( it, 

the main effort had to be against Berlin 

because, strategic objective or not, the 

battle (or possession o( the Soviet zone 

could not be won, above all not won quickly, until and unless the city was taken. 

The plan (or the offensive was a threeway compromise: it centered the main 

weight o( the attack on Berlin but provided 

I1"Berlinskaya operatsiya v tsifrak h." V O}'t' lln oo 

istOTicht'skiy Zhurnal ( April, 1965 ). 
BERLIN 

for simultaneous maximum breadth and 

depth of penetration. To achieve an early 

start, it accepted the handicap of Second 

Belorussian Front's starting several days 

late. It also left open a chance for a quick 

turn south into Czechoslovakia off the left 

flank. 

First BeloTussian Front positioned its 

main force, five armies including the First 

and Second Guards Tank Armies, for a 

frontal attack toward Berlin out of the 

Kuestrin bridgehead. At the eastern edge 

of the city the armor was to veer north and 

south, forming the northern arm of a close· 

in encirclement and supporting the encirclement on the south. Second Belorussian 

Front was to cross the Oder north of 

Schwedt and strike toward Neustrelitz. 

This thrust was to force Third Panzer 

Army back against the coast and cover the 

advance toward Berlin on the north; hut 

because Rokossovskiy needed more time for 

his deployment and would start at kast 

four days late, First Belorussian Frollt 

ordered two of its armies to provide Rank 

cover on the north by a thrust south of the 

Finow Canal to Fehrbellin. A second 2-

army force was to attack toward Brandenburg out of the bridgehead north of Frankfurt, cover the main force on the south, 

complete the southern arm of the Berlin 

encirclement, and, in conjunction with 

First Ukrainian Frollt forces, envelop what 

was left of the Ninth and Fourth Panzer 

Armies on the Oder and lower Neisse. 

First Ukrainian Front planned two 

thrusts: one, by the Third and F ourt h 

Guards Tank Armies plus three infantry 

armies, to go across the Neisse between 

Forst and Muskau and to carry via Spremberg west and northwest, the other, by two 

armies, from north of Goerlitz to Dresden. 

471 

Kanev's primary mission was to close to the 

Elbe on the stretch from Dresden to Wittenberg where the junction with the Americans was expected. He intended to carry 

the advance as far north and west as Belzig and from there furnish elements to support the First Belorussian Front right flank 

at and south of Berlin. The object apparently was to hold to the minimum the First 

Ukrainian Front forces that would become 

tied down in the fighting around Berlin in 

order to permit an early regroupment south 

for an advance via Dresden toward Prague; 

but the tank armies on the north flank were 

an insurance and a variant of the plan 

provided for their being turned sharply 

north toward Berlin." The responsibility 

for co-ordinating the whole offensive was 

Zhukov's. In early April he turned command of First BeloTttssian Front over to 

Sokolovskiy." 

Hiller Prepares for the Baltle 

The Germans no longer had the manpower, war plant, or transportation to accomplish a true build-up on the OderNeisse line. To defend the sector directly 

east of Berlin, Ninth Army had t 4 divisions. Opposite it, First Belorussian Front 

deployed 18 Soviet armies with a complement of 77 rifle divisions, 7 tank and mechanized corps, 8 artillery divisions, and an 

extensive assortment of artillery and rocket 

launcher brigades and regiments. Third 

Panzer Army, on Ninth Army's left, had 

I I divisions; Second BeloTussian Front 

11 Platonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , '93!r45, 

pp. 720-23; Zhilin, Vazhnt!yshiyt! Opuatsii Ott!-

ehestvt!nnoy V oyny, p. 554. 

11 OKH, GenStdH, F.H .O. Nr. :1166/ 45, Wesentliehe Merkmale des Fein dbildes vom 1$.44$, H 

3/ 1035 file . 
472 

moving in against it had 8 armies totaling 

33 riRe divisions, 4 tank and mechanized 

corps, and 3 artillery divisions plus a mixture of artillery and rocket launcher brigrades and regiments. First Belorussian 

Front had 3,155 tanks and self-propelled 

guns; Second Belorussian Front had 951; 

Ninth Army and Third Panzer Army had 

512 and 242, respectively. First Belorussian Front had 16,934 artillery pieces to 

Ninth Army's 344 pieces of regular artillery 

and 300 to 400 antiaircraft guns. Third 

Panzer Army had practically no artillery 

other than 600 to 700 antiaircraft guns. 

Second Belorussian Front had 6,642 artillery pieces,l4 In spite of strict conservation, motor fuel and ammunition stocks 

could not be accumulated at anywhere 

near the rate required for a major operation. On 11 April the artillery ammunition in the Army Group Vistula zone stood 

at .9 of a basic load. First and Second 

Belorussian Fronts had 3.2 and 1.9 basic 

loads as initial issues for their vastly greater 

arrays of artillery." 

Hitler did little to compensate for deficiencies. He ordered the antiaircraft guns, 

most of which were taken from the Berlin 

air defense, emplaced so that they could 

fire on ground targets. The armies added 

depth to the front by constructing the 

WOTAN position ten to fifteen miles to the 

rear. To replace the Panzer divisions 

transferred to Army Groups South and 

Center, Hitler promised Heinrici 100,000 

troops but only delivered about 35,000 untrained Air Force and Navy men. 

u "Berlinskaya operabiya u ts;frakh ," Voyennoistoricheskiy Zhurnal ( April, 1965) ; MS # P-1 14b 

114b (Hofmann ), TeilIX. pp. 52, 123. 

111 OKH, GenStdH, Op . Abt. /fW, M orgenmeldung der H . Gr. Weichsel, 11.4.45 . H 22/387 

file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

The total German situation was too uncertain to permit any coherent planning in 

the event the defense on the rivers failed. 

The one overriding objective left was to 

prolong the war. Hitler had never been 

more firmly in command, and as long as 

he lived there was no way out short of total 

defeat in the field or the miracle he predicted. Anticipating an Allied-Soviet junction that would split Germany in two, 

Hitler, on 10 and 14 April, issued orders 

naming Doenitz commander in chief in the 

north and Kesselring in the south. The 

appointments were to take effect after the 

contact between the two areas was broken. 

Hitler expected to retain the supreme command in one or the other himself. " 

On the 15th Hitler transferred command 

of the Berlin city defense to Army Group 

Vistula; until then it had been directly 

under him. That night at the army group 

headquarters the Berlin commander, Reymann, took part in what for him must 

have been a dismayingly painful conference. Speer, there on a mission of his own 

- to oppose Hitler's scorched-earth policy 

- told Reymann that the destruction of the 

bridges and other facilities in the city 

would have doubtful military value but was 

certain to cause starvation, epidemics, and 

an economic coIl apse that might take years 

to overcome. Heinrici agreed and added 

that, if it came to that, the army group 

did not propose to fight in the city; Ninth 

Army would retreat past it on both sides." 

I'Draft for a White Book' pertaining to the 

Doenitz Government (cited hereafter as Draft 

White Book). OK W /1892 file. 

IT OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., fa Nr. 15174/ 45, 

an H. Gr. Weichul, '5.4 .4$j H. Gr. Weichsel, 

Aktennotiz, Besprechung Reichsminister Spur und 

Kdt. Festungsbertich Berlin, 15.4-45. Both in H. 

Gr. Weichscl 751~n/6 file . 
BERLIN 

At midmonth, aside Irom the by then 

obvious First Belorussian Front concentra· 

tion east 01 Berlin, the Germans had only 

a hazy and, in one important respect, completely lalse picture 01 the Soviet deployment and intentions. Hitler and Schoerner 

-who took his cue Irom the Fuehrer- had 

become convinced in late March that the 

Russians would try both the so-called 

Zhukov (Berlin) and Stalin (Prague ) 

offensive solutions. In April German Intelligence lost track 01 Third Guards Tank 

Army, placing it east 01 Bunzlau where it 

would have been deployed had it intended 

to attack south toward Zittau into the gap 

between the Erzgebirge and the Sudeten 

and thence toward Prague." On 10 

April Schoerner, awarded his marshal's 

baton five days belore, told Hitler, "It is to 

be assumed that the enemy attack will be 

centered in the area between Goerlitz and 

Loewenberg [that is, southwest 01 Bunzlauj."" The Eastern Intelligence Branch 

estimate 01 13 April hedged a bit on the 

question 01 where the attack would come 

but reached essentially the same conclusion, 

namely, that First Ukrainian Front's main 

offensive concentration was northeast of 

Goerlitz-Loewenberg. 20 Consequently. 

when the Soviet offensive began, Schoerner 

was holding hall 01 his reserves, two panzer 

divisions, filty miles southeast 01 the Soviet 

main effort. 

On I I April Hitler advised Heinrici to 

order his army group into its main battle 

l.f OKH, GenStdH, op. Abt., llIb PTuef. Nr. 

78929, Lage Os" Stand 16.4.45 ahds. 

~ H. Cr. Mitte , 14 N.,. :Jl60145 . an Fuehrer 

und Obusten Befehlshaber du WehTmacht, 10.4. 

45. H ~~ 8b file. 

to OKH, GenStdH, F.H.O. Nr. 2133/ 45. Westntliehe Merkmale des Feindbildes vom 13.4 .45 H 

3/1 035 file . 

473 

formation that night or the next. The 

Americans, he explained, had reached the 

Elbe at Magdeburg that day; the Russians, 

il they wanted to take their share 01 central 

Germany, might be lorced to attack belore 

they were ready." (The vanguard 01 U.S. 

Ninth Army reached Magdeburg on the 

11th, and alter crossing the Elbe was filtythree miles Irom Berlin at nightlall the next 

day.) 

On the 12th Krebs told the Army Group 

Vistula operations officer that the Fuehrer 

was convinced the army group would have 

a "colossal" victory; nowhere in Germany 

was a Iront so strongly held or so well supplied with ammunition. The operations 

officer replied that the Fuehrer should also 

consider the enemy's strength, that the 

ammunition the army group had could 

hardly last lor the expected long fight, and 

that its motor fuel was already short." 

On the 14th five Soviet divisions and 

200 tanks tried unsuccessfully to storm the 

Seelow Heights west 01 Kuestrin. When 

the attempt was not repeated the lollowing 

day, Heinrici concluded that the Russians 

might have decided to wait a while longer. 

He considered ordering the troops out 01 

the main battle line and into the original 

Iront, but decided not to because the previous day's attack had showed that they were 

"clinging" to the main battle line and 

needed every physical support they could be 

given." Hitler in an order 01 the day on 

14 April ranted about traitorous German 

1[\ H. Gr. Weichsel, la, Anruf la Op. Abt. an la 

H . Gr. Weichsel, H. Gr. Weichsel 751~n 6 file. 

II H . Gr. Weichs", la, Ftrngespraech zwischen 

Chef d. GenSldH und la der H. Gr. Weiehsel, 

12.4.45, H. Gr. Weichsel75122 / 6 file. 

R H . Gr. Weichsel, leIA.O., Aktennotiz zum 

Vortrag btJim O.B. am 15.4.45. H. Gr. Weichsel 

75122 /6 file. 
474 

officers in Russian pay and German women 

reduced to barracks whores and pretended 

to see the hand of a benign power in the 

"death of the greatest war criminal of all 

time" (Roosevelt), and boasted that he 

had done so much since January to 

strengthen the front "that the Bolsheviks 

this time too will suffer the old fate of Asia 

and bleed to death before the German capital." He called for the defense "not of 

the empty concept of a Fatherland but of 

your homes, your women, your children, 

and thereby our future." 24 

The Encirclement 

Konev Breaks Through 

First Belorussian and First Ukrainian 

Fronts attacked before dawn on 16 April. 

First Belo~ussian Front, the stronger, also 

had by far the tougher assignment. Its 

main force, deployed in a 20-mile sector 

between W riezen and Seelow, had to cross 

the marshy bottomland of the Oder and 

Alte Oder and take the Seelow Heights. 

The attack, begun in darkness, was intended to achieve surprise, and batteries of 

powerful searchlights had been positioned 

to illuminate the German line and blind 

the defenders. The infantry moved out 

behind a shattering artillery preparation, 

but the lights did not have the expected 

effect. In the mud, smoke, and darkness 

the waves of infantry piled up on each 

other. By daylight, the confusion was complete. The Russians were lucky that the 

Gennans, nervous and preoccupied, failed 

to appreciate what had happened and so 

M OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Ia N,. 1368145, 

an den O .B. H. Gr. Sued, etc., 14.4-45. H 22/ 8b 

file. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

left them to work out the problems by 

themselves. 

During the day, apparently on orders 

from Stalin, Sokolovskiy committed the 

First and Second Guards Tank Armies, 

which could not help tactically, since the 

Gennan line was not broken anywhere, but 

which added mightily to the tangle as the 

armor tried to push forward. At nightfall 

the divisions that had charged in the morning behind unfurled banners were all still 

in front of the Gennan main battle line. 

To make the day complete, neither of First 

Belorussian Front's two flanking forces had 

any success. U 

The perfonnance was comic opera 

played by five annies on a 20-mile stage. 

But the Russians could afford their mistakes, and the Gennans could not afford 

theirs. Against Fourth Panzer Army on 

Schoerner's left flank, Konev's infantry 

crossed the Neisse between Muskau and 

Forst and north of Goerlitz, breaking in as 

deep as six miles. 

After the Third and Fifth Shock Armies 

and Eighth Guards Army again failed to 

get moving on the morning of the second 

day, Sokolovskiy threw in a reserve armythe F orty-seventh-and both tank annies 

and zeroed in on two small areas, southeast of Wriezen and at Seelow. Two reserve panzer divisions, slowed by air 

attacks, arrived just in time to hold them to 

minor gains.:Zs 

On the 18th Sokolovskiy drew his armor 

together more tightly and broke in ten to 

twelve miles west of Wriezen and south-

~ OKH, GenStdH, op. Abt., 14 Kriegstagebuch, 

16.-:14.4 _45. 16 Apr 45, H 22/3; Zhilin, Vazhneyshiye Operalsii OtechllStvennoy Yoyny, p. 556. 

• H . Gr. Weichsel, la, Tagesmeldung, 17.4.4S, 

18·4·45, H Gr. W~ichsel 75nlll/6 file; Platonov, 

Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , 1939-45, p. 7ll3. 
BERLIN 

west of Seelow. Ninth Army held its front 

together through the day. Heinrici reported that the battle was approaching iL' 

climax and would soon be decided." 

The Russians were straining to the utmost, putting service troop3 into the front 

and threatening the death penalty for failure to advance on orders.!!'S Zhukov-according to the Soviet official history, the 

Stavka-had changed the plan on the second day and had ordered the Third and 

Fourth Guards Tank Armies to strike for 

Berlin as soon as they broke through. He 

ordered Second Belorussian Front, not yet in 

action, to direct its advance southwest instead of northwest so as to complete the 

Berlin encirclement from the north in case 

First Belorussian Front failed to get 

through." 

At the end of the third day First U krainian Front's northern (orce was on the Spree 

north and south of Spremberg and across 

the river south of the city. Its southern 

force was approaching Bautzen. Schoerner 

also reported that the battle was reaching 

its climax in his zone. He thought the 

Russians' extremely heavy losses might be 

exhausting their ability to keep up the 

attack, and he intended to put his last 

troop and ammunition reserves into counterattacks the next day. 30 

At Fuehrer headquarters 18 April was 

.., OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., Ia Kriegstagebuch, 

1.-19.4.45. ,8 Apr 45. H 22/3 file; H. Gr. Weich. 

sel. la, Tagesmtldung, ,8.4.45. '9.4.45, H. Gr. 

Wcichsd 75 1 '2'2 / 6 file . 

III OKH, CenStdH, F.H.D. Nr. 2215/45. Wesentliche Merkmale des Feindbildes vom 18.4.45. H 

3/217 file~ 

.. Platonov, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna, 1939-45, 

p. 7'4; IVOV (R I, V, ,66. 

10 OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt., liM, TagesmeJdung der H . Gr. Mitte vom 18.4.45, '9.4.4$, H 

22/392h file. 

475 

a day of optImIsm. During the situation 

conference held in the small hours of the 

morning, Hitler expressed the belief that 

the offensive against Fourth Panzer Army 

had "substantially" run itself tight.:'l\ Doenitz's adjutant recorded that the "voices of 

hope were loud." As far as he could determine, however, much of the optimism 

seemed to be based on Keitel's dubious rule 

of thumb that offensives stalled if they had 

not made the breakthrough by the end of 

the third day." Hitler told Generaloherst 

Karl Hilpert, Commanding General, Army 

Group Courland, that his army group 

would have to hold out "until the turn that 

has occurred in every war has taken 

place." 33 

The next day the south group of First 

Belorussian Front's main force got as far 

as Muencheberg. The north group, Second Guards Tank Army in the van, hroke 

through west of Wriezen. It could have 

gone faster and farther, but the flank covering force was not yet out of the bridgehead. Hitler, "determined" to fight out 

the hattie of Berlin on the Ninth Army 

front, gave Heinrici permission to take all 

the combat-worthy troops he could find out 

of the Berlin defenses." 

Meanwhile, First Ukrainian Front wa~ 

putting its armor across the Spree north 

and south of Spremberg. South of Sprem2IOKH , GenStdH, Op. Abt., la Nr. 4810 / 45. 

Notizen nach Fuehrervortrag Nacht 17/ 18.4, 18.4 . 

45, H 22/388 file. 

II Walter Luedde-Neurath, Regierung Doenitz 

(Goettingen, 195 1),!. 25. 

sa H . Gr. Courlan ,Besprechung O.B. der H . G. 

Kurland- Fuehrer am 18.4.45, MS # P- 114a 

(Sixt), Teil V, Anlagen. 

,. OKH, GenStdH, Adjutant des Chefs des 

Generalstabes des Heere s, NT. 1458/45, Notizen 

nach Fuehrer Vortrag am 194.45, nachm, H 22/ 

8a file. 
476 

berg the Fourth Panzer Army still had a 

vestige of a front; north of the city almost 

the whole Third Guards Tank Army was 

across the Spree. Schoerner reported that 

he had "hopes" of stopping Kanev's southern thrust toward Bautzen. He intended 

to try again to close the front on the north, 

but, he added, "The laboriously organized 

defense in depth has only in a few places 

accomplished what one was forced to 

promise oneself from it." ~ 

On the 20th, Hitler's birthday, the battle 

for Berlin was lost. The Third and Fourth 

Guards Tank Armies pulled away from the 

Army Group Center flank and by day's 

end had strong armored spearheads thrusting north past Jueterbog, the Army's 

largest ammunition depot, and closing up 

to the German screening Jinc tcn miles 

south of Zossen. Second Belorussian Front 

attacked across the Oder from Schwedt to 

Stettin under the cover of smoke and crcated several bridgeheads. North of Berlin 

Second Guards Tank Army reached Bernau. The south group of First Belorussia .. 

Front's main force was still having trouble 

pushing toward Berlin, but it got a spearhead through to the southwest past 

M uencheberg to Fuerstenwalde behind 

Ninth Army. 

Busse, the Commanding General, Ninth 

Army, reported in the morning that the 

only way he could get a solid line east of 

Berlin was by taking his front back from 

the Oder at and south of Frankfurt." No 

reply came from Fuehrer headquarters untiI late in the afternoon when Krebs called 

·OKH, GenStdH, op. Abt., Fernspruch des 

Oberbe/ehlshabtrl det Heeresgruppe Mitte , Ia Nr. 

2363/45, an den Fuehrer urad Obersten Be/ehlshaber det Wehrmacht, 19.4.45, H 22/ 8a file . 

• H. Cr. Weichsel, la, Orientiuung Gen. BusseChef. 20·4·4$ , H. Gr. Weichsel 751'22/7 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Heinrici to say that Hitler doubted whether 

the troops, particularly the heavy antiaircraft guns, could be gotten away from the 

Oder and wanted to talk to him before 

making a decision. The army group chief 

of staff replied that Heimici was away at 

the front but had said that he could not be 

responsible for mastering the situation if 

the order were not given soon. 3 ; 

By then the Russians were approaching 

Fuerstenwalde. During the early half of 

the night, by telephoned commands relayed 

through Krebs and the Operations Branch, 

OKH, Hitler tried to juggle divisions to 

stop the Russians at Bernau and Fuerstenwalde. Half an hour after midnight Heinrici returned, called Krebs, and told him 

that he now had orders to hold everywhere 

and at the same time take out troops to 

support the thr~atened deep flanks. He 

was convinced that the mission could not 

be fulfilled and would "never succeed." He 

proposed to go to the Fuehrer, tell him so, 

and ask to be relieved and allowed to "take 

up a riAe and face the enemy." 38 

Hitler Decides To See the Battle 

Through 

The observance of the Fuehrer's birthday before the afternoon situation conference had been subdued. The Chief of 

Staff, OKL, Generaloberst Karl Koller, 

had brought word that the last roads south 

would not stay open many hours longer. 

Those who were to go south would have to 

leave shortly by automobile because the 

:If H. Gr. Weichul, 1a. Notiun ueber am 20.4.45 

gefutlhrte Fungespraeche, H. Gr. Weich scI 75122 / 

7 file . 

• H. Gr. Wei chul, Notiun des Obsllts. v. Witnkowski ueber am ~o 45 ge/uehrte Ferngespraeche , 

H. Gr. Weichsel 751'12 / 7 file. 
BERLIN 

Air Force did not have the planes to fly 

them out.3t1 

During the night General der Gebirgstruppe August Winter, JodI's deputy, who 

was to be chief of staff of Command Staff 

B (the southern command post), departed 

with most of the essential personnel of the 

Operations Staff, OKW, and the Operations Branch, OKH. Goering left at high 

speed after midnight, having had to take 

cover for several hours in the public air 

raid shelters in Berlin, where he had a last 

opportunity to wring some laughs out of 

his old joke stemming from a speech he 

had made early in the war in which he had 

told the Germans they could "call me 

Meyer if the Allies ever bomb Berlin."" 

It was expected that Hitler would also 

leave Berlin, probably for the south, because there was not enough of a staff left 

in the city and because after the big Army 

communications center at Zossen was lost, 

which could happen almost any hour, command from the capital would be impossible." Hitler had that day given Doenitz 

full power over materiel resources and 

manpower in the northern area.<fo2 

The 21st, although the First Russian 

artillery shells fell in Berlin that day, 

brought a glimmer of good news; Fourth 

Panzer Army made some local progress in 

a counterattack northwest of Goerlitz. 

Hitler saw in it the makings of a major 

thrust that would close the 40-mile gap between the Army Group Vistula- Army 

Group Center flanks, and from that illusion 

he derived a "hasic order" which Krebs 

• Karl Koller, DeT letzte Monat (Mannheim, 

1949), p. 16. 

.a Ibid., p. 19. 

U Joachim Schultz, Die letzten 30 Tage (Stutt. 

gart, 1951). pp. ,6--'9. 

"Draft White Book, OKWII8g2 file . 

477 

transmitted to the army group by phone 

in the midafternoon. The "successful" 

attack at Army Group Center would soon 

close the front at Spremberg; therefore, it 

was "absolutely necessary" to hold the 

corner post at Cottbus. (Ninth Army had 

taken command the day before of Fourth 

Panzer Army's left flank corps at and north 

of Cottbus.) Ninth Army would set up a 

front facing west between Koenigswusterhausen and Cottbus and attack west into 

the flank of the Russians going toward 

Berlin from the south. Steiner would command an operation to close the front north 

of Berlin on the line of the Berlin-Stettin 

autobahn. Third Panzer Army would 

eliminate "every last bridgehead on the 

Oder" and get ready to attack south." 

Reymann, relieved as Berlin commandant, 

would comand the front south of Berlin." 

Heinrici had given Steiner's I II SS 

Panzer Corps headquarters, which had no 

troops of its own, the task of scraping together enough to set up a screening line on 

Third Panzer Army's flank along the 

Finow Canal. In the order that went out 

to Steiner in the late afternoon, Hitler elevated Steiner's command to an Armeeabteilung and gave him the 4th SS Police 

Division, the 5th Jaeger Division, and the 

25th Panzer Grenadier Division, all north 

of the Finow Canal, and LVI Panzer 

Corps, standing east of Berlin with its north 

flank just below Werneuchen. With the 

three divisions Steiner was to attack south 

from Eberswalde on the canal to the LVI 

Panzer Corps flank and close the front . 

UH. Gr. Weichsel, la, Vermerk , ~I.4.4S, H. Gr. 

Weichsel 75122/7 file . 

"H. Gr. Weichsel, la, Notiun ueber am ~O.4-4S 

gefuehrte Ferngespraeche, H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/ 

7 file. 
478 

To the tactical directive Hitler added, 

"Officers who do not accept this order 

without Teservation are to be arrested and 

shot instantly. You yourself I make responsible with your head for its execution." U 

As soon as he received the order Steiner 

called the army group headquarters to report that it could not be carried out. Of 

the 4th SS Police Division only two battalions were at hand, and they were not 

armed for combat. The 5th Jaeger and 

25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions were tied 

down in the front and could not be used 

until the 3d Naval Division arrived from 

the coast to relieve them.u 

When Krebs phoned a resume of the 

Steiner order to the army group headquarters, Heinrici asked him to impress on 

Hitler the necessity for taking back Ninth 

Army, which was being encircled and even 

then could no longer withdraw toward Berlin but would bave to go around the lake 

chain south of the capital. If Hitler insisted on keeping his previous orders in 

force, then Heinrici asked to be relieved 

because be could not exccute them and he 

could not reconcile tbem with his conscience and his responsibility to the troops. 

Krebs answered that the Fuehrer took the 

responsibility for his own orders." 

On 21 April Second Guards Tank Army 

gained nearly thirty miles north of Berlin, 

and an attack soutbwest of Werneucben 

carried to the Berlin outer defense ring. 

North of Mueggel Lake the First Guards 

'1\ OKH, GenStdH, op. Abl., la Nr. 4887/45, 

21.4.45, H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 file . 

• 1 H. Gr. Wt!ichsel, Nolizen des ObstIls, v. Wienkowski ueber am 21.4.45 gefueh,te Fernges/JrtJeche, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 file. t1 Ibid. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Tank and Eighth Guards Armies also 

reacbed the outer defense ring. Between 

Mueggel Lake and Fuerstenwalde Ninth 

Army observed a strong build-up in progress, but the Russians did not continue the 

attack to the southwest to cut the army off 

from the city. Behind Ninth Army the 

point of Third Guards Tank Army reached 

Koenigswusterhausen. 4

' 

The Soviet command decisions on the 

2 I st were intended, first, to accomplish the 

encirclement of Berlin and, in the second 

order of business, to envelop Ninth Army. 

North of the capital the two armies that 

had been assigned the flank thrust were 

finally making enough speed to take over 

their screening mission, and Sokolovskiy 

ordered the Second Guards Tank and 

Forty-seventh Armies to concentrate on 

completing the encirclement. Approaching Berlin, First Guards Tank and Eighth 

Guards Armies had slowed down and then 

come almost to a stop on the outer defense 

ring, which delayed the encirclement of 

Ninth Army southwest of the line Mueggel 

Lake-Fuerstenwalde. First Belorussian 

Front's 2-army force in the Frankfurt 

bridgehead had not accomplished any-' 

thing; its original mission had become 

superfluous and it was, therefore, assigned 

to assist in the encirclement of Ninth Army. 

The Third Guards Tank and Thirteenth 

Armies' rapid advance had stretched thin 

the enveloping front behind Ninth Army 

and had tended to draw the two Soviet 

armies east. On the 21St Konev put in 

Twenty-eighth Army from the reserve to 

take over part of the front against Ninth 

Army and free the Third Guards Tank and 

M OKH, G,nSldH, op . .4bl. (Ill) N,. 4898145, 

Tagesmtldung vom u .4 .45, :1:1.4.45, H 22/3 file. 
BERLIN 

Thirteenth Armies to close in on Berlin 

from the south while Fourth Guards Tank 

Army attacked toward Potsdam." 

At the afternoon situation conference on 

the 22d Hitler broke down. When, having 

waited impatiently through the morning 

and early afternoon for a report from 

Steiner, he learned that Steiner had not 

attacked, he fell into a tearful rage, declared that the war was lost, blamed it all 

on the generals, and announced that he 

would stay in Berlin to the end and kill 

himself before the Russians could take him 

prisoner. Keitel and Jodi refused an order 

to fly out to the southern command post 

and pledged themselves to stand by him. 

As had happened many times before, the 

emotional storm passed quickly. Jodi remembered that they had the newly created 

Twelfth Army, of which Wenck had 

assumed command after his recovery, facing west on a line southeast of Magdeburg 

but not yet solidly tied down." Hitler first 

rejected as a waste of time a suggestion that 

they turn the army around and have it 

n Platonoy. Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna , 193~45. 

p. 7~5 j Zhilin, Vazhneyshiye Operatsi; Otechestvennoy Yoyny, p. 561. 

aoTwelfth Army was created in early April 1945. 

It had seven divisions, including a panzer and a 

motorized division, all newly formed from the tank 

and officer training schools in central Germany. 

Its initial mission had been to assemble in the 

Harz Mountains and attack west to reli eve Army 

Group B. By I ~ April, the day on which the army 

headquarters assumed effective command, the of. 

fensive in the Harz had become all but impossible, 

and in the succeeding da)'s, while organizing its 

divisions, the army had assumed the mission of 

defending the general line of the Elbe and Mulda 

Rivers from north of Magdeburg to south of Leip· 

zig. The army's single notable asset, for the time a 

considerable one, was the youth and high morale 

of its troops. MS # B-606, The Last Rally, Bat· 

ties Fought by the German Twelfth Army in the 

Heart of Germany (Oberst a. D . Guenther Rei chheim ). 

479 

attack east. Then, in a few minutes, he 

took up the idea and was off on another 

round of planning. 

During his breakdown, Hitler had finally 

admitted that hi, regime was utterly bankrupt. For him and his close associates all 

that was left was the consolation they could 

draw from keeping the machinery running 

even though it could accomplish nothing. 

Keitel was the outstanding example. Filled 

with purposeless dedication, he took on 

himself the role of field marshal-messenger 

and set out to carry the turn-around order 

to Wenck, a task which could be and, in 

fact, was accomplished far more quickly by 

phone.:;! 

Before the conference ended, Krebs was 

on the phone to Heinrici telling him the 

Fuehrer was making the' decision; Schoerner and Wenck would be briefed; Wenck 

would attack east; Schoerner's attack east 

of Bautzen was succeeding; Ninth Army 

would have to hold Cottbus and the Oder 

line to the south of Frankfurt. In short, 

Hitler was back at trying to build a front 

east of Berlin. 

The reports coming in from the front 

revealed how slim the chances were. 

Steiner called after dark to report that he 

had not been able to attack because his 

troops were not assembled. Heinrici 

ordered him to attack that night, ready or 

not. Against Third Panzer Army, Second 

Belorussian Front had, by nightfall, taken 

a bridgehead ten miles long above Stettin. 

Ninth Army lost Cottbus and was broken 

through south of Frankfurt. North of 

Berlin Russian tank points were on the 

Havel River, and on the cast the Russians 

II Schultz, D;! leeztt!n 10 Tagt!, p. 21 j Koller. 

Du Iddt! M onat, pp. 27-3 1. 
480 

had at one point penetrated the inner defense ring. 

But when Krebs called Heinrici again 

at nine o'clock, he was full of optimism. 

The Wenck attack would bring relief fast, 

he said; one division would attack that 

night. Heinrici disagreed. Wenck had a 

long way to go. Heinrici wanted at least 

to take Ninth Army back twenty miles or 

so out of the bulge on the Oder upstream 

from Frankfurt. "Tell the Fuehrer," he 

added, "I do not ask this because I am 

against him but because I am for him." " 

Finally, at midnight, Heinrici was authorized to let Ninth Army withdraw to a line 

from north of Cottbus to Lieberose, 

IIeeskow, and the Spree. In doing so, 

Busse was to free divisions for an attack 

west to meet Twdfth Army." 

Completing the Circle 

The next day, the '3d, the encirclement 

of Berlin entered its final stage. First Belorussian Front committed its second echelon, 

Third Army, to cut the narrow corridor 

connecting Ninth Army with Berlin. From 

the south the Third Guards Tank and 

Thirteenth Armies closed to the outer defense ring, and Fourth Guards Tank Arm)' 

approached Potsdam. North of Berlin 

Second Guards Tank Arm)' crossed the 

Havel below Oranienburg and began turning south. In the city that afternoon Hitler 

held his last big situation conference. When 

it broke up, Keitel went out to bring his 

lIS H. Gr. Weichul. Notiun des ObsatI. v. Wienkowski ueber am 22.4 .45 gefuehrte Ferngesprauhe, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 61e;OKH, GenStdH, Op. 

Abt.!1W, ragtsmeldung H Cr. Weichsel vom 22 . 

4.45, H 22/3 file. 

lIS H. Gr, Weichul, la Nr. 6019/45. an AOK 9. 

22.4.45. H. Gr. Weichsel 75122 /7 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

"personal influence" to bear on Twelfth 

Army, and Jodi headed north with the 

OKW staff to Neu Roofen, behind Third 

Panzer Army." 

In the afternoon Hitler ordered General 

der Artillerie Helmuth Weidling, Commanding General, LVI Panzer Corps, to 

take over with his troops, which Busse had 

wanted to use to protect Ninth Army's 

north flank, the eastern and southeastern 

defenses of the city. Hitler later also made 

Weidling, whom he had only the day before intended to have shot, defense commandant of all Berlin. When Krebs announced the appointment, Weidling said 

he would rather they had shot him." 

After the situation conference, Heinrici 

received a telephoned order to stop the 

Steiner attack "at once," give up the Eberswalde bridgehead, and shift Steiner's 

headquarters and all the troops that could 

be released west of Oranienburg for an 

attack into the flank of the Russians crossing the Havel. The order added that 

Twelfth Army was sending XXXXI Panzer Corps to hem the Russians in from the 

west. 56 Steiner had made some progress 

south of Eberswalde early in the day but 

far short of enough to have any effect. 

By the end of the day, Hitler, through his 

order pulling LVI Panzer Corps into Berlin, had made it a certainty that Ninth 

Army would soon be completely isolated 

and encircled. When Heinrici talked to 

&4 Schultz, Dit LtWtn 30 Tatt, p. 24; Zhilin, 

VazhneYJhiye OperatJii OtteheJtvennoy Voyny. p. 

56.; IVOV (R ), v , .75. 

M "Agoniya fa JhiJtJkoi k/iki v Berlinye," VoyennoiJtoricheJkiy Zhurnal (October, November, 1961 ). 

M H. Gr. Weichul, la. Fernmuendlicher Befehl 

OKH, GtnStdH, 23.4.45: H. Gr. Weichul, la Nr. 

6039/45. an Pz. AOK 3. 23.4.45. Both in H . Gr. 

Weichse1 75 1'1'1/7 file. 
BERLIN 

Busse that night, after the telephone connections had been out all day, the latter 

reported that he would have to make the 

breakout to the west with small arms, since 

artillery ammunition was exhausted. His 

north front was disintegrating because it 

was losing the support it had been getting 

from Berlin. He summed up his predicament in a sentence, "I was kept forward 

too long." Heinrici replied, "That was a 

crime." When they finished, Heinrici 

called Wenck and told him he must rescue 

his "old friend," Busse.!); 

On the 24th the Russians worked systematically to complete the great circle of 

steel and fire around Berlin. The battle 

was lost; it would have been given up but 

for one man, who, prematurely aged, 

palsied, and buried under 20 feet of earth 

and concrete out of sight and hearing of 

the destruction rolling in on him, demanded and got absolute obedience. Berlin was no Stalingrad. It might hold out, 

through fanaticism and terror, for a few 

days, no more. On the north and east the 

Russians were approaching the S-Bahn defense ring. During the day the First BeLorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts' forces 

met at Bohnsdorf to close the encirclement 

on the southeast and isolate Ninth Army. 

Fourth Guards Tank Army reached the 

lakes flanking Potsdam, and Second 

Guards Tank Army, coming from the 

north, went as far as Nauen and south 

almost to Spandau. In the city LVI Panzer Corps occupied the southeast sector; 

the rest was held by V olkssturm, SS, and 

Hitler Youth formations. The four massive 

flak towers stood like stranded concrete 

~1 H. Gr. Weichsel, Notizen des Obstlts. u Wienkowski ueber am 23-4-45 geluehrte Ferngespraeche, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 751'2'2 / 7 file . 

481 

battleships, powerful yet helpless. Weidling 

discovered that his predecessors had tried to 

exercise command through the public telephone system." 

Deprived of all but the last remnants of 

his once elaborate command apparatus, 

Hitler, nevertheless, ordered, "The OKW 

... will command in accordance with my 

directives which I will transmit through the 

Chief of Staff, OKH, who is with me." 

He terminated the OKH command functions and undertook to command in the 

north directly through the Operations 

Staff, OKW, and in the south more loosely 

through the Command Staff B and the 

army groups. For the south he issued a 

halfhearted directive to create, as far as 

that could still be accomplished, a redoubt 

in the Alps. His conception of how that 

should be done did not go much beyond 

the general statement that it was to be "en_ 

visioned as the final bulwark of fanatical 

resistance and so prepared. " For him the 

war had narrowed down to Berlin. He 

established as "the main mission" of the 

OKW to attack from the northwest, southwest, and south to regain contact with Berlin and "so decide ~he battle for the capital 

victoriously." :59 • 

In Jodi and Keitel, Hitler had ideal collaborators in futility. Neither gave a 

thought to anything beyond getting 

through to the Fuehrer, above all not to 

tbe question, Why? Before the day was 

out Jodi had changed the directions of the 

Ninth and Twelfth Armies; the one was 

!WI "Agoni)'a fashistskoi k1jki v Berlinye," Vo)'ennoistoricheski), Zhurnal (October, November, 1961 ). 

110 Der Fuehrer, OKW, WFSt, Op. Nr. 88875 / 45, 

an Ob. d. L. R.M. Go~ring, :14.4 .45j Der Fuehrer, 

OKW, WFSt, Op. Nr. 88854/ 45. :14.4.45. Both in 

H '22/389 file. 
482 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

FESTIVITIES AFTER MEETING OF U.S. AND SOVIET TROOPS AT TORGAU 

to attack northeast, the other northwest toward Berlin.GO 

On 25 April the Soviet spearheads met 

northwest of Potsdam. On the Elbe, U.S. 

First Army and Soviet Fiflh Guards Army 

made contact at Torgau. In an order to 

Doenitz, Hitler described the fighting in 

and around Berlin as the "battle for the 

German fatc," all other fronts and missions 

being secondary. He instructed the Admiral to send reinforcements to Berlin by 

air and to the fronts around the city "by 

10 OKW, lVFSt . Op . fR) , and 12. Armee, 25+ 

45. H ~2 8a filej H. Cr. Wei chsel, Notizen des 

Obstlts. v. lVienkowski ueber am 24+45 gefuehrte 

Ferngespraeche. H. Gr. Weichsel 751'22 / 7 file. 

land and by sea.""' The OKW had already directed the theater commanders to 

regard the conflict with the Soviet forces as 

paramount and to accept "greater losses of 

territory to the Anglo-Americans" for the 

sake of releasing units to be cornmitted 

against the Russians,G2 

To the extent that the German fate still 

remained to be decided, the day's most sig· 

nificant development was neither at Berlin 

nor on the Elbc but on the Oder, where 

Second Belorussian Front, completing the 

8IOKW, WFSt. Op., Adolf Hitler an CrOHod. 

miral Doenitz, 25.4.45, OKW/ 6 file . 

.. OKW, WFSt, 0/1. Nr. 88/45 on CUI Feldm. 

Kesselring. 24.4.45. OKW/ 6 file. 
BERLIN 

breakout it had begun the day before from 

its bridgehead south of Stettin, crossed the 

Randow Swamp toward Prenzlau. 

The Last Act 

"A Day of Hopes" 

Half an hour after midnight on the night 

of 25 April a directive that Hitler had 

written the evening before reached the 

OKW headquarters at Neu Roofen. It 

called for the "fastest execution of all relief 

attacks, without regard for flanks and 

neighbors." Although he must have known 

that his time was running pitifully short, 

Hitler still insisted on attempting nothing 

less than to restore a complete and solid 

front on the east. Twelfth Army was to 

attack northwest from Belzig to Ferch at 

the tip of the twin lakes south of Potsdam 

while Ninth Army attacked west to meet it. 

After they had joined, both armies were 

to advance toward Berlin from the south 

"on a broad front." Ninth Army, meanwhile, was also to hold its eastern front so 

that Army Group Center could close up 

from the south. Steiner was to attack toward Berlin from northwest of Oranienburg with the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 3d Naval Division, and the 7th 

Panzer Division. Third Panzer Army was 

to "prevent an expansion of the Oder 

bridgehead." as 

Jodi answered that all the relief attacks 

had begun or were about to begin. He 

also called attention to the Second Belorussian Front threat east of Prenzlau and 

a 2 r Army Group (British ) build-up 

southeast of Hamburg that indicated a 

N OKW, WFSL op .. an ChilI WFSt , 26-4.45 . 

H 2:Z / 389 file. 

483 

thrust toward Luebeck. To counter those 

he proposed withdrawing the German 

forces on the coast west of the Elbe." 

Weidling remembered 26 April as "the 

day of hopes"; Krebs repeatedly phoned 

him at his command post in the Bendlerstrasse to announce good news. 6

;. The 

naval liaison officer's morning report to 

Doenitz reflected the interpretation that 

was being put on Jodi's message in the 

Fuehrer bunker: the Ninth and Twelfth 

Armies were having "gratifying successes"; 

Steiner was "making progress"; and 

Schoerner's attack at Baulzen showed that 

uwhen the will is there, the enemy can be 

defeated even today.JlGG Hitler's resurgent 

confidence found expression in his reply to 

JodI. He wanted the Elbe line held and 

the "bridgehead" east of Prenzlau not only 

contained but reduced. He did not object 

to taking forces from west of the Elbe, but 

it should be done without losing the ports. 

E m den, Wilhelmshaven, and Wesermuende, or losing the use of the Kaiser 

Wilhelm (Kiel) Canal." 

In the evening the telephone lines to 

Berlin went dead, and the communications 

to and from the pocket were shifted to lineof-sight short wave received and transmitted from a balloon run up near the 

OKW headquarters. In a spirit of se\!-

immolation, Jodi and Keitel intended to fly 

into the city that night Jar one more situation conference, but the landing strip in 

the Tiergarten was closed by smoke, shell 

N OKW. WFSt , Op. Nr. 88885145. an R~jchJkan l~j B~rljn . :16.4-45. H 22 / 389 file . 

lIII "Agoniya /aJhistskoi kliki v Berlin " Voyen-

'I o-ist oricheskiy Zhurnal (October, N ovember , 

1961 ). 

.. Adm. FH Qu. Yoss, V Adm. :JlI45, Lagebeurt~ilung 26.4.45, OK W 1 1889 file . 

• 1 OKW, WFSt, Op. Nr. 694 145 . an Ch ef WFSt. 

26.4 .45 . H 22 / 389 file. 
484 

holes, and wrecked aircraft. The last to 

land that night were Generaloberst Robert 

Ritter von Greim and Hanna Reitsch, the 

daredevil woman test pilot. Hitler promoted von Greim to Generalfeldmarschall 

and appointed him Commander in Chief, 

OKL." 

During the day on the 26th the German 

commands launched into the pursuit of 

two incompatible and, considering the state 

of the German forces, mutually exclusive 

objectives: Heinrici became intent on holding together what was left of his front and 

rescuing Ninth Anny, while Keitel and 

Jodi concentrated entirely on the Berlin 

relief. Heinrici wanted to save what could 

still be saved. Keitel and Jodi tried to 

force reality to submit to the Fuehrer's will. 

To them this was nothing new. They had 

watched him sacrifice armies in an almost 

unbroken succession of similar attempts 

since Stalin grad. It was the essence of the 

Fuehrer principle; it was Hitler's formula 

for victory; and it had one fault-it never 

worked. 

Steiner had advanced and taken a small 

bridgehead on the Havel west of Oranienburg during the night, but after daylight 

he was stopped. All he had was the 25th 

Panzer Grenadier Division. The 3d Naval 

Division was strung out on the railroads 

between Oranienburg and the coast, and 

the 7th Panzer Division, brought into 

Swinemuende by sea from Danzig only 

.. Hitler had, two days before, dismissed Goering 

from all his official posts (including, as Bormann 

put it, that of Reichs Chief Hunter ) and had him 

arrested. Goering, who until then considered himself Hitler's anointed political heir and successor, 

had been misled, by a remark of Hitler's that he 

would "leave the negotiating to Goering," into 

inquiring whether Hitler intended by his decision 

to stay in Berlin to turn the powers of government 

over to him. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

days before, had no vehicles with which 

to move out of its assembly area west of 

Neubrandenburg. Before noon Heinrici 

proposed giving up the Steiner attack, because it could not be expected to succeed, 

and using the divisions against the breakthrough east of Prenzlau. JodI refused." 

By late afternoon Second BeloTUlsian 

Front had chewed through Third Panzer 

Anny's last reserves and was approaching 

Prenzlau. Manteuliel started taking back 

his flanks to get troops to put into the gap 

opening in his center. Heinrici concluded 

that a decision had to be made concerning 

Steiner; his operation could not influence 

the fate of Berlin and it was tying down 

the army group's "last and only" motorized 

division. The question was, where could 

the decision come from? By direct interference JodI and Keitel had practically removed Steiner from Heinrici's command. 10 

Twelfth Army, the mainstay of the relief 

operation, did not expect to accomplish 

more than to get a wedge through that 

would allow the Berlin civilians and garrison to escape. After several changes, its 

assigned missions were to assist the Steiner 

operation from the west with XXXXI 

Panzer Corps, cover the Elbe line and 

defend Brandenburg-to hold open a corridor between the Russians and the Americans-and advance northeast from Belzig. 

On the 26th, XX Corps, the relief corps, 

was engaged in defending the line Brandenburg-Belzig-Wittenberg to protect its 

staging 'area. 71 

Ninth Army began its breakout with a 

thrust west to the Baruth-Zossen road. Its 

• Jodi Diary, 26 Apr 45. 

TO H. Gr. Weichul. Notizen des Obdltl. u Wien-

'kowski ueber am 26.4.45 gefuehrte Ferngespraeche, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 7Sl Ut / 7 file 

n MS # B-606 (Reichheim). 
BERLIN 

strength was sinking fast. The night before, all the promised air supply had been 

diverted to Berlin. JodI, after his last 

telephone conversation with Hitler, was 

still determined to "make clear to Ninth 

Army that it must turn sharply [north] 

together with Twelfth Army to relieve 

Berlin." a Jodi and Heinrici argued over 

where the air supply, such as it might be, 

should go. Heinrici maintained that the 

army deserved the aid because the higher 

commands were responsible for its being 

where it was. JodI insisted that the people 

of Berlin and the "Head of State" could 

not be left in the lurch and suggested that 

any thought to the contrary was treason." 

Off Ninth Army's south flank, Schocrner's 

attack, having made about fifteen miles in 

six days, was close to a standstiIl with forty 

miles yet to go. 

Keitel and Jodi in Command 

During the night of the 26th Third 

Panzer Army withdrew to the Uecker 

River and the line of the lakes south of 

Prenzlau. It was the army's last chance 

to keep from being overrun, and it failed. 

The next morning Rokossovskiy's tanks 

broke through past Prenzlau and his infantry streamed into the gap behind them. 

In the afternoon Hcinrici's chief of staff 

went to Doenitz's headquarters in Ploen to 

report to the admiral that the army group 

was defeated, could not stop the Russians. 

and was retreating west through Mecklenburg. 

H Heinrici expected a decision from 

n J odI Diary, ~6 Apr 45. 

"H. Gr. Weichsel, N otiun des Obstlts. v. Wiell· 

kowski ueber am 264.45 gefuehrte Ferngespraeche, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 file. 

485 

Docnitz, he was disappointed. At a situation conference several hours before-at 

which Docnitz and Himmler, to their mutual chagrin, both insisted on receiving 

Keitel's and JodI's reports seated as was 

Hitler's practice- it had been decided 

that Doenitz would not exercise military 

command until it hecame impossible for 

the OKW to secure its orders from Hitler. 

In any event, nothing much could have 

been expected of Doenitz's military judgment; he had lately begun to quibble about 

holding Stettin and Swinemuendc, where 

Third Panzer Army's north flank was 

threatened with encirclement, so that the 

Navy could keep contact with Army Group 

Courland." Doenitz might have stretched 

his civil powers to include negotiating a 

surrender; but he was not the man for 

that; though less ostentatiously, he counted 

himself among Hitler's paladins as much 

as did JodI and Keitel. 

The OKW, marking time on 27 April, 

issued commands in all directions. To stop 

the Prenzlau breakthrough, Headquarters. 

Twenty-first Army (the former Fourth 

Army Staff), under General Tippelskirch, 

was to be put in with two regiments, 

neither of them available for at least another twenty-four hours." Hitler had lost 

faith in Steiner, and an order went aut for 

XXXXI Panzer Corps to take command 

of the Oranienburg attack, but the corps 

headquarters was too far away to assume 

effective command." Hitler had called on 

the Ninth and Twelfth Armies to do their 

duty, to unite and attack toward Berlin, 

"OKM, Admiral beim Ob. d. M .. Kriegstage. 

buck des Ob. d. M., 27 Apr 45, OKM/ 4 file . 

~ OKW, WFSt , Op. (H) Nord o.~t NT . .1821/ 

45. an H. Gr. Weichsel, 27.4.45. H. Cr. Wci chscl 

751 'l'l/7 file. 

tI J odI Diary, 27 Apr 45. 
486 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

GERMAN TROOPS CLOGGING A ROAD AFTER ESCAPING THE RUSSIANS 

and so attain "the decisive turning point of 

the war.";; To the order to the annies 

Keitel added, " History and the German 

people will despise everyone who docs not 

do his utmost to save the situation and the 

Fuehrer.'! 18 Keitel directed SchoeTner, in 

case contact with the OKW was lost, to 

keep on attacking north from Bautzen toward the Ninth and Twelfth Annies." 

T1' OKW. WFSt. Krebs 011 Chef WFSt, 27.445, 

H 22/389 file. 

'11 OKW, WFSt , Op. Nr. 88861/45. an H . Cr. 

Weichsel. 9. Armee, 12. Armee, 27.4-45, H 2'1./ 

38g file. 

-:11 OKW, JVFSt, Op. NT. 88866145. Weimng 

filer die KampDuehrung im Suedraum fuer den 

Late in the afternoon JodI at last concluded, "The enemy clearly has broken 

through Third Panzer Army at Prenzlau." 

He decided, "onerous as it is," to stop the 

Steiner attack; but he could not, even yet, 

bring himself to give it up completely. 

The order to Heinrici stated that he could 

have the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division 

and the 7th Panzer Division for a counterattack into the Russian flank from the 

southwest. Presumably, afterwards the diFall. dau urunittelbare Fuehrung durch Chef OKW 

nicht mehr gewahrleistet ist, 27-4.45, H 22/389 

file. 
BERLIN 

VISIOns were to be turned south toward 

Berlin again." 

An hour and a half before midnight 

Manteuffel called the army group and reported that half of his divisions and the 

flak artillery had quit fighting. A hundred 

thousand men were fleeing west. He had 

not seen anything like it even in 1918, 

Manteuffel said; it would take hundreds 

of officers to stop them. The war was 

over, he added; the soldiers had "spoken"; 

some of the officers would stand and let 

themselves be shot, but that would not accomplish anything. He proposed sending 

Jodi out to see for himself what a waste 

of time it was to talk about relieving Berlin; 

all that was left was to negotiate, preferably 

with the Allies, and meanwhile retreat west 

fast enough to hold the remnants of the 

army together." 

The next morning, 28 April, Keitel set 

out toward the front intending to lend the 

stimulus of his presence to the preparations 

for the counterattack on the Third Panzer 

Army flank. At Zehdenick on the Havel, 

to his huge astonishment and dismay, he 

encountered a rear party of the 5th Jaeger 

Division surveying a defense line on the 

river. He had thought the front was 

twenty miles farther east and, complying 

with his orders, would stay there. Subsequently he also learned that the counterattack from Templin would not be made. 

Heinrici and Manteuffel had decided the 

evening before that the 7th Panzer Division 

and 25th Panzer Grenadier Division could 

not be assembled there in time and, there-

., Jodi Diary, 27 Apr .,Sj Schultz, Die 'elden 

30 Tage. p. 37; OKW, WFS, . Op. Nr. 8886,145. 

6n H. Gr. Weichsel, :J7·4 4-5, H 22/389 file . 

." H. Gr. Weichsel, la, Aktennotiz, Ferngespraech 

Gen. v. Manttuffel mit Gen. Maj. v. Trotha, :J7.4. 

45, H. Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 file. 

487 

fore, should be put in farther north, east 

of Neubrandenburg and Neustrelitz, to oppose the Russians frontally. 

In the afternoon Keitel met with Heinrici 

and Manteuffel. By then Jodi had been 

on the phone to Heinrici talking of treason 

and threatening the "ultimate consequences" if Heinrici did not execute orders as they were given. In what Heinrici 

described as a "colossal discussion" and an 

"atrocious development," Keitel ordered 

the army group to stand and to counterattack southeast of Neustrelitz. 

Keitel gave the order to stand in the 

midst of a front that was disintegrating all 

around him-Heinrici took three hours 

covering the twenty or so miles back to his 

headquarters. The roads were clogged 

with refugees and retreating troops; Neubrandenburg was completely blocked. The 

troops, Heinrici observed, were "marching 

home in columns." 

Mter midnight Heinrici called Keitel 

and told him that the Russians had reached 

the Havel on Third Panzer Army's south 

flank. Keitel replied that that was what 

happened when "one gives up positions 

voluntarily." Heinrici protested that he 

had been deprived of the authority to make 

decisions within his own command. Keitel 

answered that it had been necessary because the Fuehrer's orders were not being 

carried out and therewith relieved Heinrici, 

ordering him to turn the command over 

to Manteuffel as the senior army commander." 

• H . Gr. Weichsel, Nolinn des Obstlts. v. Wienkowski ueber am 28.4.45 ge/uehrte FerngespraecheJ 

H . Gr. Weichsel 7512'J/7 file . Various accounts 

have been given of the incidents leading up to 

Heinrici's dismiual. Some ma.:ntain that Heinrici 

had decided to retreat west and surrender to the 
488 

In and around Berlin on that day, 28 

April, the end was approaching rapidly. 

Keitel kept alive the fiction of an attack 

from Oranienburg, but the only one of the 

relief operations that had any prospect of 

being executed was Wenck's. Ninth Army's breakout failed; the tank point in the 

lead became separated and was not heard 

from again. Busse reported that the army 

was neither in condition to make another 

concerted attempt nor to hold out much 

longer." In Berlin eight Soviet armies had 

begun attacking through the S-Bahn ring 

on the 26th, after heavy bombings during 

the previous day and night. By nightfall 

on the 27th the Russians had cut off Reymann's force in Potsdam and pushed the 

Berlin defenders into a pocket nine and a 

half miles long from east to west and from 

one to three miles wide. On the west the 

pocket still reached nearly to the Havel 

River, but the Russians had closed the crossings. In the center, the Soviet armies 

competed for the honor of taking the 

Reichstag -which to the Russians, even 

though it had boen a charred ruin since 

'933, was the symbol of the Third Reichand had driven in spearheads from the 

north and the south to the edges of the 

government quarter." 

Americans. Manteuffel had, in effect, proposed 

doing that on the night of 27 April. Although the 

ultimate effect would have been the same, it appears (rom the Army Group Vistula records that 

Heinrici's decisions on '27 am! 28 April were made 

in the light of the immediate tactical situation and 

not as part of a farther reaching plan. See also 

Schultz, Die ',tzltn 30 Tage, p. 47 ; Goerlitz, Du 

Zweite Wdtkrieg, '93!r45, p. 363; Tippelskirch. 

Ceschichte des ZWllitliR We!tkrieges. p. 578. 

.. H. Gr. Weichsel, Morgllnmeldung 28.4.45, H . 

Gr. Weichsel 75122/7 file . 

.. I. W. Par-otkin, "Der Letzle Schlag," Zeitschrift fuer MilitaugllSchichte. 3/1965. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Too Late for a Miracle 

The battle for Berlin was fought outside 

the city; what went on in the capital was 

hardly more than a contested mop-up. 

The fortress had never come into existence. 

When SS-Brigadefuehrer (Brig. Gen.) 

Gustav Krukenberg came into Berlin on 24 

April to take command of the SS Nordland 

pivision, he found the Havel bridges near 

Spandau barricaded but not defended. 

From there he drove through all of west 

Berlin "without encountering soldiers or 

defense installations of any kind." In the 

Fuehrer bunker, Krebs told him that the 

ninety volunteers from the Charlemagne 

Division Krukenberg bad brought with 

him were the only ones who had arrived of 

numerous officers and troop units ordered 

into Berlin. The Nordland Division, Krukenberg discovered, had the strength of 

about a battalion. Three days later, when 

he became a sector commander in the 

center of the city, his command post was a 

subway car with neither telephone nor 

lights." The fighting in Berlin lasted as 

long as it did because a great metropolis, 

bombed out though it might be and no 

matter how amateurishly fortified, cannot 

be quickly taken even against a lame defense, particularly not by troops who know 

the war is over and intend to see their 

homes again. 

Berlin did not go down, as Hitler had 

imagined, in a Wagnerian burst of glory 

but in a ragged wave of destruction and 

despair. Corpses hanging in the streets, 

the work of single-officer flying courtsmartial that passed only death sentences, 

showed soldiers and civilians what they 

• Erich Kuby, "Dill Russeil in Berlin, 1945," 

Der Spieglll (May 26, 1965 ), pp. 94-96. 
BERLIN 489 

THE REICHSTAG AFTER THE FALL OF BERLIN 

could expect of their own leadership. BUI 

that leadership was operating on residual 

momentum, it could no longer formulate, 

deliver, or enforce purposeful orders. Individuals might be hanged; whole units 

could hide out. With rqckets and artillery. 

the Russians evened the scorcs for Leningrad and Stalingrad as far as they could. 

But in the cellars in which Berlin life had 

centered for months (Berlin was heavily 

bombed 83 times between I February and 

2 I April ) Soviet shells had nowhere ncar 

the effect that Allied bombs had had, nor 

did they greatly add to the damage already 

inflicted on the city.8(i 

• Ibid., May 5. 196,;. p. 84· 

Scenes of horror were commonplace; 

but the most famous, the alleged deliberate 

flooding of subway tunnels filled with 

wounded and civilians, appears to have 

been mostly invented. The official who 

was in charge when the subways wefe 

pumped out in October 1945 has stated 

that tbe flooding was gradual and none of 

the bodies found showed evidence of 

drowning. All apparently had died of 

wounds before being placed in the tUIloe15. 81 

In an attempt to stiffen the Berliner's resistance, Goebbcls had, since January, sat87 Ibid" May 26, 1965. p. 100. 
490 

urated the news broadcasts with refugees' 

accounts of Russian atrocities, among them 

the pathetic instance of a woman who insisted that she had been raped exactly 

twenty-four times. What had happened in 

East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia also 

happened in Berlin, but by then Soviet 

policy discouraged personal acts of license 

and vengeance. As indication of an intent, at least, to restore order quickly, General Polkovnik N. Z. Berzarin took control 

as city commandant on 28 April. 

Hitler did not concern himself with the 

human aspect of the fighting in Berlin any 

more than he had when the front was deep 

in Russia. The concrete Fuehrer bunker 

and the steady roar of the diesel-driven 

ventilating system provided almost perfect 

insulation against sight and sound; nevertheless, occasionally, shell explosions close 

by shook the bunker and the ventilators 

drew in dust and fumes. The tiny bunker 

rooms were more crowded than ever, 

mostly with persons engaged in caring for 

and protecting Hitler, or in maintaining 

his contact with the outside. Of the top 

Nazi hierarchy only Goebbels and Bormann stayed, Goebbels out of loyalty to the 

Fuehrer and because he had vague faith in 

the miracle, Bormann to promote his own 

interests and do what damage he could to 

his rivals. The parade of generals had 

ended. Until the 27th Hitler continued 

to hold the regular situation conferences. 

Although he attempted still to maintain 

the tone of a strategist, his span of practical 

concern had narrowed to such decisions as 

the appointment of a detachment that was 

to act "in case a Russian tank by some sly 

trick or other digs me out of here." A recurring theme in his rambling discourses was 

the correctness of his decision to stay in 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Berlin-as an object lesson to all the generals who had ordered retreats and as the 

only means of achieving a "moral" victory 

that would convince the British and Americans of his val ue to them in the, in his 

opiition, forthcoming conflict with the Russians.sl 

During the night of 28 April Weidling 

brought a breakout plan to Hitler. The 

Fuehrer listened with some interest but 

then declared it was better that he stay 

where he was, otherwise he would only 

have to await the end "somewhere under 

the open sky or in a farmhouse." 89 Hitler 

had made his last military decision. At 

midnight Doenitz's liaison officer in the 

bunker radioed, "We will hold out to the 

end." 90 Greim and Hanna Reitsch flew 

out that night in an old training plane a 

Luftwaffe pilot managed somehow to land 

and get off the ground again. Greim had 

orders to organize air support for Wenck's 

attack. 

During the evening, news had reached 

the bunker of Himmler's attempt to negotiate an armistice through Count Folke 

Bernadotte, and in the early morning Bormann disp>,tched the following radio message to Doenitz: "The foreign press reports fresh treason. The Fuehrer expects 

that you will act with lightning speed and 

iron severity against all traitors in the North 

German area. Without exception, Schoerner, Wenck, and others must give evidence 

of their loyalty through the quickest relief 

of the Fuehrer." '1 

• Lagebesprechungen, 23. 25. 27 Apr 45. in 

Der Spiegel, January 10, 1966 . 

• "Agoniya fashishkoi leliki II Ber/inye," Voyen. 

no·istoricheskiyZhurnal (October, November. 1961 ). 

.a Fuehrerhauptquarder, Adm. VOH, B. NT. 1/ 

SKL 8051/45, an Ob. d. M ., '9.4.45, QKW .88g 

file. 

t! Bormann, an Grossadm. D oenitz, 29.4.45, OK. 

W/ .88g 61e. 
BERLIN 

At daylight on the 29th Wenck's XX 

Corps attacked with the Clausewitz, 

Scharnhorst, and Theodor Koerner Divisions, all so-called youth divisions made up 

of men from the officer training schools. 

To a dismal scene, they added a last flash 

of the old German elan and by afternoon 

covered fifteen miles to the tip of Schwielow Lake southwest of Potsdam; but the 

flanks were open and the Lehnin Forest behind them was filled with Russians who 

were rapidly recovering ;rom the initial sur· 

prise and shock. To continue the advance 

toward Berlin, still twenty miles away, was 

clearly out of the question. Nter dark the 

Potsdam garrison made contact and began 

coming out by rowboats across the lakes." 

Later in the night Keitel authorized Wenck 

to stop the attack, "If the Commanding 

General, Twelfth Army, in full knowledge 

of his present situation at XX Corps and 

despite the high historical and moral responsibility that he carries considers continuing the attack toward Berlin not executable ... . " 93 

Through the better part of the day on 

29 April Army Group Vistula was without 

an effective command. Heinrici refused 

to order any withdrawals, which meant in 

effect that he gave no orders at all. He 

learned during the day that Jodi had intervened in the internal workings of the 

army group to the extent of instructing at 

least one of the corps on the south flank 

to report to him immediately any withdrawal orders coming from the army 

group." In the morning Manteuffel de-

"MS # B-606 (Reichheim). 

u OKW, WFSt, op. Nr. 88863/ 45, an AOK 1>, 

29.4.45. H 22/389 file. liM H. Cr. Weichsel, Notizen des Obrtlls. v. Witnkowski ueber am :19.4.45 ge/uehTte Ferngespraeche, 

H. Gr. Weichsel 751'2'l/7 file. 

491 

clined to take command, stating in his message to Keitel, "Beg not at this time of crisis 

in own army to be charged with the mission that the [present 1 commanding general, who has the full confidence of all 

commanders, is alleged not to have carried 

out." 115 The anny commanders, Manteuffel and Tippelskirch, whose Headquarters, Twenty-first Army, was then taking 

over the south front from Steiner, had 

agreed beforehand not to let the command 

be taken out of Heinrici's hands. 

In the afternoon, Keitel and Jodi, knowing that Tippelskirch also intended to refuse, went to Tippelskirch's command post 

and in an interview that took place between 1600 and 1700 prevailed on him to 

take acting command until Generaloberst 

Kurt Student could arrive from Holland. 

Keitel "reminded Tippelskirch of his duty 

most forcefully." Tippelskirch, although 

he, like most German generals found it 

virtually impossible to refuse a direct order, 

was no coward and had shown independence of judgment before, notably as Commanding General, Fourth Army, during 

the 1944 collapse of Army Group Center. 

Apparently what convinced him to desert 

Heinrici was Jodi's argument that the 

army group had to hold as much territory 

as it still could, not for the sake of relieving Berlin, but to give the political authorities something with which to bargain." 

During the day Second BeloTussian 

Front's offensive carried past Anklam on 

the north, past Neubrandenburg and Neustrelitz in the center, and across the Havel 

in the Zehdenick-Liebenwalde sector in the 

tel Pr. AOK 3, l a NT. 3550/ 45, an Ch~f OKW, 

'9.4.45, OKW/ 6 file. .. AOK 21, Krjegrtagebuch 31.10.44-30.5.45, 29 

Apr 45, EAP- 21 - X-13 file; OKW, WFSt, V~Tlauf 

d~s ~9.4.45 , OKW/6 file. 
492 

south. Behind Army Group Vistula, Field 

Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's 21 

Army Group established a bridgehead 

across the Elbe at Lauenburg upstream 

from Hamburg. Doenitz, worried by the 

threat of a thrust from Lauenburg toward 

Hamburg and Luebeck, asked that the reinforcements for Army Group Vistula and 

Twelfth Army be committed on the Elbe 

instead." Shortly after noon, the balloon 

being used to beam voice transmissions into 

Berlin was shot down. Since its headquarters by then was practically in the 

front, the OKW began moving north from 

Neu Roofen several hours later. 

In the Fuehrer bunker the 29th was a 

day of waiting while, above ground, destruction rained down on all sides. Hitler 

had married his long-time mistress Eva 

Braun the night before and in the early 

morning hours had written his personal 

and political testaments. In the latter he 

named Doenitz his successor as Reichs 

President and the head of state and, dictator to the last, appointed a Cabinet to 

take office under the admiral with Goebbels 

as Chancellor and Bormann, Party Minister. He knew almost to the hour how 

much time he had left. Weidling had reported that the planes had dropped only a 

few tons of supplies during the night; in 

the coming night he expected none at all; 

most likely, the ammunition would run out 

by nightfall on the 30th." 

Before midnight Hitler dispatched his 

last message. In five short questions 

addressed to JodI he reached for the miracle one more time: 

I7OKW, WFSt, Verlau! des 29.4-4S. OKW/6 

file. 

• ",Agoniya /ashislsk oi kliki v Berlinye," Voyen. 

IIo.istorichukiy Zhurnal (Oc tober, November, 

'96. ). 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

1. Where are Wenck's spearheads? 

2. When will they attack again? 

3. Where is the Ninth Army? 

4. To where is it breaking through? 

5. Where are Holste's [XXX XI Panzer 

Corps] spearheads? lUI 

There would be no miracle; the Fuehrer 

had to be told; and Keitel, conscious of history, took the responsibility. In the dry, 

impersonal language of a situation report 

he put a period to one of the greatest and 

most disastrous military adventures the 

world had ever seen : 

To 1. Wenck's point is stopped south of 

Schwielow Lake. Strong Soviet attacks on 

the whole east flank. 

To 2. As a consequence Twelfth Army 

cannot continue the attack toward Berlin. 

To 3 and 4. Ninth Army is encircled. A 

panzer group has broken out west. Location 

unknown. 

To 5. Corps Holste is forced to the defensive from Brandenburg via Rathenow to 

Kremmen. 

The attack toward Berlin has not progressed at any point since Army Group Vistula was also forced to the defensive on its 

whole front from north of Oranienburg via 

[Neu] Brandenburg to Anklam.'" 

On the afternoon of the 30th, between 

1500 and 1530, Hitler and his wife committed suicide. The SS guards carried the 

bodies ou tside, tried to burn them in gasoline, and when that failed and the gasoline 

ran out, buried the remains in a nearby 

shell hole. A quarter mile away the Russians were storming the Reichstag. Bormann sent a radio message to Doenitz telling him that he was appointed Hitler's successor and was "empowered immediately to 

M MNA ISKL, Adolf Hitltr fue,. Gen. ObIt . Jodi 

(ZeppeUn), '9.4.45, OKW/ 6 file. 

100 OKW, WFSt, Op. N,.. 88868145. an Reichs· 

kanzlei, 30.4.45. OK W 16 file. 
BERLIN 

take all of the measures required by the 

current situation." 101 Bormann did not, 

however, include the most vital piece of information, namely, that the Fuehrer was 

dead. That was a trump he was not ready 

to let out of his hand. 

The Sand Runs Out 

At exactly the time the SS-men were disposing of Hitler's body behind the pile of 

rubble that had been the Reichs Chancellory, Keitel transmitted a directive to Winter at the Command Staff B. The first 

sentence read: "The attempt to relieve 

Berlin has failed." In the north, Keitel 

continued, the intention was to have 

Twelfth Army fight its way north to Army 

Group Vistula and thereafter, with the 

combined forces, to hold a line from the 

mouth of the Elbe to Havelberg (at the 

confluence of the Havel and the Elbe) and 

thence north to Rostock. The mission for 

1 the south was to form "a great ring" with 

the main effort in the east "to preserve as 

much territory as possible from Bolshevism." "The battIe to win political time," 

the directive concluded, "must be continued. Every attempt at military or 

political dissolution must be put down with 

ruthless force." 102 

Those who were left in the Fuehrer 

bunker that night still held three assets, 

which they hoped to use to their own advantage: the knowledge that the Fuehrer 

was dead, the seat of the government 

(what was left of it), and what could have 

been the two most powerful offices in the 

101 Der Ob erb efehlshaber der Kriegs-marine, Abschrift , Geschl. FT 1807 /301AG '4 v. 30+. 30.4.45 . 

OKW/ .889 file. 

101 OKW, WFSt , Op . NT. 88868. an Gen. Lt. 

Wint 4!'r, FuehrungJS tab Bt 30 .4-45 . OKW/ 6 file . 

493 

successor government. At 0 I 00 I May 

Krebs went through the lines to carry for 

Stalin's exclusive information the news of 

Hitler's death and to try to negotiate an 

armistice that would allow the successor 

German Government to function in the 

capital. He was taken to Eighth Guards 

Army's forward command post, where the 

Commanding General, Chuikov, heard his 

proposal. Later, probably with instructions from Moscow, Sokolovskiy arrived to 

interview Krebs and give him his answer. 103 

At 1000, possibly because it appeared 

that Krebs had not gotten through, Bormann sent a second radio message to Doenitz. Laconic as the first, it stated only 

that the testament was in force j Bormann 

would come to Ploen; and he advised not 

making the information public until he 

arrived.lO< At noon Krebs returned. The 

Russians had agreed to let Doenitz come 

back to Berlin and assemble the government there, but they demanded capitulation and would not grant an armistice. 

Goebbels insisted that in accordance with 

Hitler's wishes there be no capitulation and 

reiterated his already announced resolve to 

share the Fuehrer's fate. 

In the afternoon, just twenty-four hours 

after the event, a message signed by Goebbels and Bormann informed Doenitz that 

the Fuehrer was dead and named the 

major appointments Hitler had made in 

addition to Doenitz's own.lO~ (Three 

couriers carrying copies of the testament 

for Doenitz and for Schoerner-whom 

Hitler had appointed his successor as Commander in Chief, Army- had left the 

bunker on the 29th. None of them 

'~IVOV(R ), v, 286. 

101 Funklpruch, Abschrift, Bormann fuer Grossadmiral Doenitz, 1.5 .45, OKWh88g file . 1. White Book, OKWh8g2 file. 
494 STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

REMAINS OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLORY 

reached his destination.) Goebbels and 

his wife committed suicide after killing 

their children. Bormann probably was 

killed trying to make his way out of Berlin 

to claim his post in Doenitz's Cabinet. 

Krebs and Generaloberst Wilhelm Burgdorf declared that they intended to commit 

suicide and probably did. 

Weidling considered a breakout, but he 

had neither the room nor the means to 

organize it. At five o'clock on the morning 

of 2 May he crossed the lines and surrendered the city. l OG It was another two 

days before the fighting died completely. 

'flII"AgOlli),o /a.shistskoi kliki /.I Berlinye:' Voyenllo-istoricheskiy ZhlJ.rnal (October, November, 

1961 ). 

Doenitz, on I May before he knew Hitler was dead, had pledged "immutable 

loyalty" to the Fuehrer and "to conduct 

this war to its end in the manner the 

unique, heroic struggle of the German people demands." 107 But Doenitz's loyalty 

was professional not sentimental. The next 

day he detennined that the German military situation was hopeless, a conclusion 

which until then he seems successfully to 

have avoided. In directives issued during 

the day he established as his policy to continue the war against the Soviet Union in 

order to keep as many Germans as possible 

101 GroHadmira l D fl enitz, an Fuehrerhauptquartier. 1.545, OKW/1889 file. 
BERLIN 495 

A POW CAM? WHERE THE U.S. ARMY HELD 160,000 GERMANS 

from falling into Soviet hands and to offer 

resistance to the Americans and British only 

to the extent that they interfered with the 

attainment of the first objective. He decided to attempt to evade the unconditional 

surrender by negotiating piecemeal surrenders "at the army group level." As a 

first step, he appointed Generaladmiral 

Hans-Georg von Friedeburg head of a 

delegation to negotiate an agreement with 

Montgomery to spare Hamburg and "to 

discuss farther-reaching questions." lOS 

For Army Group Vistula the end came 

108 OKW, WFSt, Op. (H) NT. 88800/ 45. an 

Fuehrungsstab B, 2S45, OKW/ 6 file; White Book, 

OKW/J8g2 file . 

quickly and more mercifully than the Germans could have expected. The 2 I Army 

Group, after breaking out of its Elbc 

bridgehead the day before, on 2 May 

reached the Baltic coast at Luebeck and 

Wismar. Elements of U.S. Ninth Army 

pushed cast to Ludwigslust and Schwerin. 

In Schwerin the American armored tfOOpS 

captured the Army Group Vistula quartermaster section. Student, who had taken 

command on the 1St, escaped just ahead of 

the American tanks. Seco nd BeLorttssian 

Front reached Wiuenbcrge, Parchim, and 

Bad Doberan. Between the two fronts the 

Third Panzer and Twenty-first Armies 

were squeezed into a corridor fifteen to 
496 

twenty miles wide, stretching from the Elbe 

to the coast. During the night Manteuffel 

and Tippelskirch surrendered their armies, 

which by then had almost completely disintegrated, to the Americans.'" Jodi had 

drafted an order authorizing such a move, 

but it went into the files with the notation: 

"Could no longer be transmitted." 110 

Twelfth Army's XX Corps had begun 

falling back southwest of Potsdam during 

the night of I May. In the morning it had 

taken through its line go,ooo Ninth Army 

survivors whom, by means of radio contact established the day before, it had 

guided away from the . strongest Russian 

concentrations. On the afternoon of the 

gd Wenck sent General der Panzertruppen 

Maximilian Freiherr von Edelsheim across 

the Elbe to U.S. Ninth Army to negotiate 

a surrender. The next morning Ninth 

Army consented to let as many of the German Ninth and Twelfth Armies' troops 

cross the Elbe as could without (except for 

the wounded ) assistance from the Americans. Between the morning of the 5th and 

the night of the 7th most of Wenck's force 

found refuge behind the Americail line. m 

Army Groups Center and Courland and 

Army of East Prussia, those monuments to 

Hitler's strategy, posed greater problems. 

Doenitz's first impulse had been to order 

Army Group Center to start retreating 

westward at once; but he had been disWf Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, p. S80; MS # 0-408 (Eismann). pp. 

274-80· uo OKW. WFSt. Op. (H) Nr. OOPJO/45. an H . 

Cr. WeicJue', ~.s.4S. OKW/6 file . 

IU MS # B-22o, Die Kapilulationsvuhandlunttm de, 12. (deutschen) Arm,.,. -mit dtr 9. 

(americanischen) Armu am 4. Mai in Stendal 

(General der Panzertruppen a. D . Maximilian 

Freiherr von Edelsheim) ; MS # 8-606 (Reichheim) . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

suaded by Keitel who, drawing the wrong 

conclusions to the last, had argued that if 

the army group left built-up lines, it would 

not be able to preserve a solid front. To 

Army Group Courland and Army of East 

Prussia, Doenitz sent word tbat he intended 

to secure British and American toleration 

of, "under certain circumstances support 

for," an evacuation that would return to 

Germany 50,000 men from Army Group 

Courland and as many as 100,000 from 

Army of East Prussia "in the first ten 

days." 112 On 4- May, when von Friedeburg reported that Montgomery had 

agreed to accept the surrender of all the 

German forces in Holland, Denmark, and 

north Germany, Doenitz instructed him to 

contact Eisenhower for the purpose of 

negotiating another partial capitulation. 

He was "ahove all to explain to Eisenhower 

why a total capitulation on all fronts 

appears impossible to the Grand Admiral." 

On the 6th von Friedeburg reported that 

Eisenhower insisted on an immediate and 

simultaneous unconditional surrender. 

SUTTender 

On the afternoon of the 6th Jodi arnved 

at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces in Reirns. Doenitz had 

sent him with instructions to lay before 

Eisenhower again "completely and openly" 

the reasons why a total capitulation was 

impossible. Failing of success in that, he 

was to try to get a phased capitulation with 

as long an interval as possible between the 

time the fighting terminated and the time 

WI de Maizier., Obstlt. i.C., Punk,. fUlr d,n 

mu,ndlich," Vortrag b.j d,n Ob. und Ch'fs d,r 

H. Cr. Kurland und d,s A.O .K. Ostpr,ussen, 3.$. 

45, OKW/ 6 file. 
BERLIN 497 

JODL ARRIVING AT REIMS TO NEGOTIATE AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER 

the troops had to surrender their anns and 

cease all movements. Fifteen minutes after 

midnight Doenitz received a radio message 

from JodI stating that Eisenhower insisted 

the total capitulation be signed "today" to 

take effect at midnight on the night of 8 

May; otherwise, he would close all the 

Allied fronts to Germans, including individuals; coming from the east. JodI added, 

"I see no way out but to sign." 

Doenitz concluded that JodI, who before 

his departure had been the one who argued 

most strongly against the total capitulation, 

must have become convinced that no better 

terms could be attained. He empowered 

JodI to sign, and at 1245 the new Foreign 

Minister, Graf Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, 

announced the surrender over the German 

radio.u s At 0 I go Doenitz ordered Schoefncr, Rendulic, and Loehr to take their 

fronts west as fast as they could and to 

"fight their way through the Russians" if 

they had to; all hostilities against the Allies 

were to stop at oncc,114 At 0141 Jodi 

placed his signature on the Act of Military 

Surrender. The time for all German force~ 

to cease active operations and lI to remain 

113 Draft White Book, OK W / I 892 fil e; Karl 

Doenitz, Z ehn Jahre ulld zwanzig Tage (Bonn. 

'958 ), p. 462 . 

111 OKW. WFSt , Nr. 89002/45, all Ob. Sued , 

7-545, OKW/6 file . 
498 

in the positions occupied at that time" was 

set at '301 Central European Time on 8 

May. (The fonnal ratification was completed in Berlin a half hour before midnight on 8 May.) no 

Having signed the surrender, Doenitz 

and the OKW were not certain they could 

enforce it in the east. That uncertainty 

was undoubtedly in part inspired by their 

own desire to see the terms concerning surrender to the Russians evaded to the greatest extent possible without incurring severe 

reprisals. JodI had taken out some advance insurance by securing a statement 

from Eisenhower's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. 

Walter Bedell Smith, that the OKW would 

not be held responsible if "individual 

soldiern and some troop units" did not 

follow orders and refused to surrender to 

the Russians.l1· 

The source of most concern was Army 

Group Center, because it was the largest 

single force still on the Eastern Front, because it had the farthest to go to reach the 

Allied lines (of those that had any chance 

of doing so at all), and because no one 

knew how Schoerner would react to the 

surrender. Schoerner had reported on , 

May that he had a tight hold on his troops 

and was starting to manufacture his own 

ammunition and motor fuel. ll 1 The last 

that had been heard from him was that he 

intended to fight his anny group through 

to the line of the Elbe and V1tava (Moldau) before surrendering.'" On the 8th 

an OK W staff colonel with an American 

ua Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 488-g3. 

1H OKW, WFSt, NT. 00 10010/45. an General-

/eldm. K.ssel,ing. 8.5.45. OKW/6 file. 

Uf H. Cr. Mitt., an OKW, WFSt, Op., :1.$.45. 

OKW/6 file. 

WI Kesselring, 6ft OKW. F.ldmarschall Keitel. 

8.5.45, OKW/6 file . 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

officer escort went to Schoerner's headquarters. The colonel reported that 

Schoerner had ordered the surrender terms 

observed but claimed he did not have the 

means to make certain they were carried 

out everywhere. The colonel "assured him 

that the command difficulties would be 

brought to the attention of the Americans 

and the OKW." no The OKW need 

neither have worried that Schoerner would 

attempt a last-ditch battle nor have hoped 

that he would find a means to extricate his 

anny group. Schoerner deserted his troops 

on the 8th and in civilian clothes flew a 

light plane out of Czechoslovakia. He was 

arrested in Austria ten days later by First 

Panzer Anny troops and turned over to the 

Americans. 120 

The OKW calculated the actual 

strengths (Anny, Navy, Wa!len-SS, and 

Air Force ) on the Eastern Front at the 

hour the surrender went into effect as 

follows: 121 

Total. ... . .. . 

Southelltern Theater ............... . . 

Army Group Ottmllork (formerly SOuth} ...... . 

Army Group Center .. . ................. . 

Army of Eau Pru .. ia . . ......... . 

Army Group Courland .. .... . ... . ..... . ..... . 

Slrenlth 

1,510,CXXJ 

Im,CXXJ 

430,CXXJ 

6OO.<XX> 

l00.<XX> 

2OO.!XXl 

U' Beilage Zil Arilage 7 OKW, WFSI, la Nr. 

010840/45. Au/zeichnung ueber die Di.nsereis. des 

Obust i. C . M,yu-Detring zu Feldmarschall 

Scho,rn" Gm 8·5·4-5, 10-5.45. OKW/1887 file. 

l.W New York'Tim,s, May 2r, 1945. 

1ft The ration strengths, which included various 

auxiliaries, were in most cases substantially higher. 

B'ilag. 1 zu Anlagll4 OKW. WFSI.la Nr. 010840/ 

45. Slaerkiln du Osl/ron'. Schaetzung Stand 8S 

4S. 0000 Uhr. 11-5.45, OKW/1887 file; OKW, 

Gen. Qu., An die Ueb,rwGchungskommission beim 

OKW, ".5.45. OKW/g file. 
BERLIN 499 

KEITEL SIGNING THE SURRENDER TERMS AT SOVIET HEADQUARTERS IN BERLIN 

Only Army Group Ostmark succeeded in 

saving a major part of its force from Soviet 

(or Yugoslav ) captivity. For the approximately one and a quarter million troops 

who became prisoners of war in the East 

after the surrender it was to be a long way 

home. 
CHAPTER XXII 

Conclusion 

The most striking aspect of the GermanSoviet conflict in World War II was the 

vastness of its dimensions. With scarcely an 

interlude, the fighting lasted for 3 years, 10 

months, and 16 days. From autumn 1941 

to autumn 1943 the length of the front was 

never less than 2,400 miles and for a time 

late in 1942 it reached 3,060 miles. The 

conflict seesawed across eastern and central 

Europe between the Elbe and the Volga, 

the Alps, and the Caucasus. The German 

armies thrust 1,200 miles into the Soviet 

Union and Soviet troops countermarched 

1,500 miles to Berlin. The total number 

of troops continuously engaged averaged 

between 8 and 9 million, and the losses 

were appalling. The Wehrrnacht dead 

from all causes apparently numbered between 3 and 3.5 million. The military 

service deaths on the Soviet side rea,ched 

more than 12 million, about 47 percent of 

the grand total (26.8 million) of soldiers of 

all nations killed in World War II.' The 

1 The Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Republic (volume I, 

Number 7, ~5 June 1953) gives 13.6 million as 

the total Soviet military losses, including 1.75 million permanently disabled. 

The much larger Soviet losses can be accounted 

fc.r by the extremely heavy losses of the 1941 and 

I ~4~ campaigns, less efficient medical services, and 

thl~ Soviet tactics, which throughout the war tended 

to be expensive in terms of human life. The Germans, on the other hand, although they often 

deliberately sacrified masses of men, by doctrine 

expended manpower sparingly. 

war and the occupation cost the Soviet 

Union some 7 million civilians and Germany about 1.5 million. The losses, civilian and military, of Finland, the Baltic 

States, and eastern and southeastern European countries added millions more. 

The great struggle completely unhinged 

the traditional European balance of power, 

and the line on which it ended retained all 

the essential characteristics of a military 

front. The war consolidated the Soviet 

regime in Russia, and enabled it to impose 

the Communist system on its neighbors, 

Finland excepted, and on the Soviet occupation zone in Germany. The victory 

made the Soviet Union the second-ranking 

world power. 

The Soviet victory was a victory of raw 

manpower and industrial production by a 

regime that could exploit both with complete ruthlessness. The Germans contributed in two ways: after their initial blitzkrieg attempts failed, by trying to force a 

stalemate in the World War I style; and by 

the extreme and uncompromising nature 

of their war aims. The one placed a price 

in blood and materiel on ground; but the 

price could not be set higher than the 

Soviet Union could pay ·and, consequently, 

the Soviet leadership was guaranteed a virtually unbroken series of victories without 

which it might not have been able to extract such heavy sacrifices from its people. 
CONCLUSION 

The other gave the Soviet people no choice 

except that between an indigenous and a 

foreign tyranny. 

However serious, all the German mistakes counted for less than the genuine, 

spontaneous heroism, self-sacrifice, and industry of the Soviet people. The Soviet 

bureaucracy proved itself capable of mobilizing manpower, industry, and agriculture 

for the war effort even under the tremendous handicap of having lost in the first 

months nearly two-thirds of its resources, 

industrial plant capacity, and agricultural 

production. The principal achievements 

were the relocation and rebuilding of existing industries, the construction of new 

mines and plants, the development of new 

agricultural lands, and, far from least, the 

unprecedented and unequaled concentration on war pro<luction. In actuality, the 

absolute increase in Soviet productive 

capacity was less important than the massive 

concentration on turning out the implements 

of land warfare, guns, ammunition, tanks, 

and fighter and ground-support aircraft. 

The Soviet Union enjoyed certain important advantages over the other major 

belligerents. It fought on one front. Except to a minor extent in the Far East, it 

did not have to contemplate the emergence 

of other theaters. It fought an exclusively 

land war. It fought on its own or immediately adjacent territory and hence did not 

need to establish lengthy new supply lines, 

particularly over water, or construct and 

stock remote bases. Its troops and civilian 

population generated economic demands of 

a much lower order than did those of most 

of the other belligerents. Additionally, the 

Soviet Union received 10.2 billion dollars' 

worth of lend-lease assistance, mostly from 

the United States. Although, as the Rus501 

sians maintain, they fought the war with 

weapons of their own design and manufacture, that they could do so owed in no small 

part to the support it received through 

lend-lease. Between 22 June 19.P and 20 

September 1945 the Soviet Union received 

among other items 409,526 jeeps and 

trucks, 12,161 armored vehicles, 325,784 

tons of explosives, 13,041 locomotives and 

railroad cars, and 1,798,609 tons of foodstuffs. 

Against the Spviet quantitative advantage in manpower and materiel, Germany 

had a general qualitative advantage, specifically, a higher level of military proficiency. The ratio of the one to the other 

was not constant, and the shift was in the 

Soviet favor. The qualitative gap narrowed and, as the war progressed, declined 

in significance. The quantitative gap 

widened. 

The Germans' advantage was not 

enough to secure a victory in 1941 and 

1942, and by late 1942 the quantitative 

element predominated. The Gennans 

accepted the terms imposed thereby even 

though they ran directly counter to the 

principles under which Germany had 

fought the war thus far. The German 

High Command did not attempt again to 

formulate a strategy founded on their 

superior generalship and tactics. To have 

done so would probably have required at 

the outset a decision to fight for a draw. 

As the war went on, the qualitative advantage that remained to the Germans was in 

the middle and lower command echelons 

where its effect was mitigating but not 

decisive. Eventually, the higher German 

commands passed to the hands of generals 

who tried merely to substitute quality for 

quantity. By then the Soviet Union had 
502 

developed commandef5-Zhukov, Vasilevskiy, Konev, and possibly othef5-and formations, the tank armies in particular, that 

although they were still not the equals of 

the Germans in their prime, had achieved 

effective parity in performance. This 

achievement plus the quantitative advantage more than compensated for the continuing Soviet lag in other respects. 

Every assessment of the German decline 

and defeat must inevitably take into account Hitler, his leadership, and his responsibility. The single national leader was a 

distinguishing feature of World War II. 

The tendency toward fusion of the military and political authority in wartime was 

not new. What was unusual was that 

popular opinion strongly inclined toward 

entrusting the powers of military decision 

to the political rather than military leadership. Franklin D. Roosevelt generally refrained fr·om intervening in military operations. Churchill did intervene when he 

could and would gladly have done so more 

often had he not been discouraged by his 

own and the combined staffs and by the 

example of his American colleague. Stalin 

left his mark on Soviet strategy but, after 

the painful lessons learned early in the war, 

contented himself for the most part with 

a largely counterfeit military image. Hitler, 

however, decided German strategy from 

the outbreak of the war to its end, and 

after December 194 I he was in direct command of the German ground forces. 

The responsibility for the German mistakes was chiefly Hitler's as was a major 

share of the credit for the successes. Undoubtedly, the former were greater than the 

latter and more decidedly his own; therefore, at the highest command level he was 

responsible for the German defeat. More 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

fundamentally, he also bore the responsibility for the root causes of the defeat: the 

attempt to pursue unlimited objectives with 

limited means; and the creation of a political system that made itself intolerable to 

most of the rest of the world. 

But Hitler was no mere incompetent 

accidentally propelled into a commanding 

position from which he could sabotage the 

efforts of the military professionals. His 

conduct of the war displayed a devastating 

logic that even at its most destructive found 

at least as many convinced adherents as it 

did opponents among the leading military 

men. He inspired public confidence and 

represented the will of the nation to a 

greater degree than any other person or 

group. He gave Germany the kind of 

leadership it wanted. Where he failed was 

in not posses5ing the ability to produce the 

results he promised; that failure was appreciated earlier by some than by othen but 

by all too I'lte. 

In statistical terms, numbers of troops 

engaged, length of front, distances covered, 

and major battles fought, the Eastern 

Theater dominated the war against Germany. On the basis of those statistics and 

ignoring the fact that space and distance 

in the Soviet Union meant less than in the 

rest of Europe, the Russians claimed the 

preponderant contribution to the war 

against Germany. 

To determine the true proportions of the 

Soviet contribution to the victory the 

theater must be looked at in strategic perspective. Four significant limiting features 

can be identified immediately: the war. in 

the East was a ground war in a single 

theater; the Soviet Union contributed 

nothing to the employment of strategic air 

power against Germany; the Soviet con-
CONCLUSION 

tribution to the war at sea was small, SO 

small that the Baltic Sea remained a German lake and the German naval training 

ground until 1945; and the Soviet Union 

benefited through being relieved of the 

second front threat in the Far East. 

Proper perspective also requires an examination of how the German defeat was 

accomplished on the ground. Stalingrad 

and the North African Campaign put an 

end to the period of the German strategic 

initiative and demonstrated that both the 

Allies and the Soviet Union had achieved 

the capability of bringing superior strength 

to bear at decisive points. In the aftermath of Operation ZITADELLE the Soviet 

Union took the strategic initiative on the 

east. On the west the Allies began exercising their own strategic initiative with the 

invasion of Sicily. Subsequently, in their 

deployment, the Germans rated the threats 

from east and west as about equal. In 

fact, they were inclined to regard that from 

the west as potentially the more dangerous 

because of the shorter distances to the German vital centers. Up to the time of the 

landing in Normandy, even though the 

Allies were actually engaged only in a secondary theater in Italy and great battles 

were being fought on the Eastern Front, on 

balance the Allied and Soviet strategic 

accomplishments were about equal. The 

German strength was split about evenly 

between east and west. 

Essentially, until the late spring of 1944 

the Soviet Union and the Allies were maneuvering into position to deliver the crucial 

blows. ,. The environments were different. 

For the Allies the war had a global aspect 

in which air and sea activities and logistics operations weighed heavily. Theirs 

was the problem of staging a gigantic am503 

phibious invasion, a one-shot, do-or-die 

undertaking that afforded no latitude for 

preliminary sparring and an appallingly 

black and white prospect of victory or detbe still substantial buffer of Soviet terrifeat. The Soviet problem was to reduce 

tory the Germans held and get within striking range of the Reich. The Soviet forces 

had cleared the Ukraine and northern Russia and were deployed in the center on the 

axis Warsaw-Berlin. They had exacted 

and had themselves paid heavy prices in 

blood and materiel. The Allies had completed the less spectacular but technologically and economically more demanding 

preparations on their side and had in the 

meantime brought the air and sea operations against Gennany nearly to a climax. 

The invasion succeeded. By the end of 

summer the Allied armies had plunged to 

the German border, and the Soviet armies 

had reached the Vistula and the border of 

East Prussia. In December Hitler committed his last strategic offensive potential 

on the west, and the Russians broke through 

to the Oder. From mid-February 1945 to 

mid-April the Soviet armies stood on the 

Oder, and the Allies crossed two-thirds of 

Germany to the Elbe. By then, fear and 

hatred and the. will of one man were all 

that kept the war alive. 

The Soviet contribution to the victory in 

Europe was important but not overwhelming. Soviet postwar claims notwithstanding, the war in no sense demonstrated the 

superiority of Marxist theory. The German-Soviet contlict was euphemistically 

billed in Germany from the start as a crusade against Bolshevism, but the Soviet 

Government chose not to submit its system's popularity to a direct test and, instead, nominated itsel! to lead a war for 
504 

national survival. The Soviet people opted 

for the indigenous dictatorship. That was 

possibly the most enduringly important decision of World War II. The margin of 

decision was narrow, and even though the 

Germans failed to offer more than superficial inducements, remained so until the 

last glimmer of an alternative had vanished. 

The war was a true test of strength between 

ideologies only in that the Soviet regime 

evinced greater adaptability in identifying 

itself with Russian nationalism. 

Likewise, Soviet strategy in World War 

II was by no means a convincing display of 

ideological superiority. It was cautious, 

methodical, and politically oriented. Its 

most distinguishing feature was the heavy 

political overburden it carried. At, no 

doubt, some considerable additional cost in 

life and materiel, the Soviet armies always 

fought for ground as much as to defeat the 

enemy. The Soviet command planned its 

operations as if under a compulsion to 

legalize every territorial acquisition by acSTALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

tual ntilitary conquest. In the end, when 

time had run out, it went so far as to insist 

on staging a sham battle for Czechoslovakia; sintilarly it had insisted on a token 

invasion of Bulgaria after that country surrendered. Soviet strategy was grasping 

rather than sweepingly aggressive as the 

German strategy had been; it was inhibited, psychologically defensive, and 

morally ruthless. 

Nevertheless, the German defeat was an 

outstanding victory for Marxism in that it 

broke the quarantine in Europe which had 

for a generation ~onfined communism as a 

system of government within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. That changed 

the complexion of the war in its final stage 

and made genuine peace impossible. In 

the postwar era it has sometimes appeared 

that any alternative would have been preferable. Probably none could have been 

devised that would not in some form have 

given Hitler his miracle. 
Appendix A 

Table of Equivalent Ranks 

German 

Reichsmanchall * 

Generalfeldmarschall 

None 

None 

Generaloberst 

General der Infanterie, der 

Artillerie, cler Flieger, 

and so forth 

Soviet 

None 

Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza 

Glavnyi Marshal 

Marshal 

General Annii 

General Polkovnik 

u.s. Equivalent 

None 

General of the Anny 

None 

None 

General 

Lieutenant General 

Generalleutnant General Ley tenant Major General 

Generalmajor General Mayor Brigadier General 

* Created for Hennann Goering in July 1940 and held only by him. 
Appendix B 

Comparative Sizes of Major Commands, 

November 1942 to May 1945 

German 

1. Army Groups 

On the Eastern Front 4 to 5 

plus the Twentieth Mountain Army 

and the Finnish Army to September 

1944 

2. Armies 

2 to 4 in an army group 

3. Corps (including Panzer Corps) 

2 to 7 in an army 

4. Divisions 

2 to 7 in a corps 

Soviet 

1. Fronts 

10 to 12 

2. Annies 

3 to 9 in a front. Probable 

average 5 to 7 

3. Rifle Corps 

An average of 3 in an anny 

4. Divisions 

2 to 3 in a corps 

A UTHORIZED STRENGTHS, DIVISIONS AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS, ARMORED CORPS 

AND DIVISIONS 

Panzer Divisions 

( 103 to 125 tanks) 

Motorized Divisions 

(48 tanks) 

Infantry Division, 9 battalions 

Infantry Division, 6 battalions 

Artillery Divisions 

( 113 guns) 

14,000 

to 

17,000 

14,000 

Tank Corps (189 tanks) 10,500 

15,000 

12,700 

Mechanized Corps 

(186 tanks) 

Rifle Divisions 

Guards Rifle Divisions 

3,380 Artillery Divisions 

(210 guns) 

16,000 

9,375 

10,585 

6,550 
Note on Sources 

I 

When the Allied armies overran Germany in the spring of 1945, they uncovered tons of German official records. The 

military collections were brought to the 

United States and remained in military 

custody until their transfer to the National 

Archives in 1958. Shortly after completion 

of research for this volume, the majority of 

captured German records were returned 

to the Federal Republic of Germany. 

Microfilm copies of these records and 

guides containing descriptions are available 

from the National Archives and Records 

Service, General Services Administration, 

Washington, D. C. 20408. 

In the continuing absence of significant 

Soviet documentary evidence the German 

military records remain the best source for 

the study of German and Soviet operations 

in World War II. Of the German collections the Armed Forces High Command 

(OKW), Army High Command (OKH ). 

and field commands (army groups, armies, 

corps) are the most useful. Of the relatively few pertinent German Air Force 

records that have survived, the best general 

summary is Air Ministry (British) Pamphlet 248, The Rise and FaU of the German Air Force (London: His Majesty's 

Stationery Office, 1948 ). The German 

Navy was not involved directly in the main 

operations on the Eastern Front; however, 

three items from the naval records are extremely valuable for the light they often 

shed on the functioning of the German 

Command at its highest level. They are 

the OKM, Weisungen OKW (Fuehrer), 

193!r45, a unique collection of Fuehrer 

and other top-level German directives, published as Walter Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers 

Weisungen fuer die Kriegsfuehrung 1939-

1945 (Frankfurt a. M.: Bernard und 

Graefe, 1962); the War Diary, German 

German Naval Staff, Operations Division 

(Kriegstagebuch, SKL ), a comprehensive 

Chronological account of the war as seen 

from the Naval High Command; and the 

Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing 

With the German Navy, 1939-45 (1947), 

summaries of Fuehrer conferences attended 

by the Commander in Chief, Navy, or his 

personal representatives. 

In matters pertaining to the Eastern 

Front the OKW records have several limitations: the collection is incomplete, the 

Eastern Front was not an OKW theater 

and, particularly during the period covered in this volume, the OKW was deliberately excluded from influence on and 

often even from direct knowledge of events 

and decisions relating to the Eastern Front. 

Nevertheless, the OKW War Diary 

(OKW, SteUvertretende Chef des Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes, Kriegstagebuch) , 

published as Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht ( Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab) , edited by Percy Ernst 

Schramm (Frankfurt a. M.: Bernard und 

Graefe, 1961-1965), is the most comprehensive and complete chronological highlevel record of the entire war on the German side. Helmuth Greiner's Aufzeich-
508 

nungen ueber die Lagevortraege und 

Besprechungen im Fuehrerhauptquartier 

vom 12.August bis zum I7 Maerz 1943 

(MS # C - 065a) affords a valuable supplement to the OKW War Diary, as does 

Percy E. Sehramm's The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War, I JanuarY-7 May 1945 (MS # C - 020). 

Both Greiner and Schramm worked from 

notes they had made as keepers of the 

OKW War Diary. In spite of some questionable details, Joachim Sehultz, Die 

Letzte 30 Tage (Stuttgart: SteingrubenVerlag, 1951), is apparently what it purports to be, a rendering of the OKW War 

Diary for the last month of the war. The 

Tdgebuch Generaloberst Jodi, Chef des 

Wehrmachtfuehrungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Jodi Diary) 

sheds random but sometimes crucially important light on decisions and events from 

the source closest to the top of the German 

High Command. 

The most voluminous and complete of 

the OKW records pertinent to the German-Soviet conflict are those dealing with 

the last days of the war and the capitulation. They include German strength and 

loss estimaJes for the final period of the 

war, material., concerning the change in 

government and the decision to capitulate, 

and a draft of a projected White Book 

setting forth the history of the establishment and policies of the Doenitz government. The file BefehIe vor der Kapitulation und anlaesslich Kapitulation an die 

Truppe contains the Armed Forces Operations Staff orders issued after the OKH was 

dissolved. 

The 0 KH was the central staff for the 

conduct of the war against the Soviet 

Union, and after September 1942 the 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Eastern Front was its exclusive and sole 

operational responsibility. The OKH records that have survived, though substantial 

in bulk, are fragmentary. No complete, 

consecutive account similar to the Halder 

Diary or the OKW War Diary is available 

for the later years of the war. The diary 

of the Operations Branch, OKH, is reasonably continuous only for the months January to April 1945. The most valuable of 

the OKH documents are the Lage Ost 

(Situation East) maps, printed daily by the 

Operations Branch, OKH, at a scale of 

I : 1,000,000 and showing both the German 

and Soviet dispositions. The set is virtually complete and is the source, with some 

corrections and additions to Soviet dispositions, for the maps which appear in this 

volume. 

Of the documents of the Organization 

Branch, OKH, those that are still in existence give information concerning German 

strengths, losses, replacements, manpower 

resources, and changes in the Army organizational structure. The most nearly continuous of the OKH files, though far from 

complete, are those of the Eastern Intelligence Branch (Fremde Heere Ost ). The 

Eastern Intelligence Branch produced a 

vast number of intelligence estimates dealing with individual sectors and with the 

whole Eastern Front. It issued frequent 

short- and long-range summaries and from 

time to time made comparisons of German 

and Soviet strengths. Enough of these 

have survived to form a complete intelligence picture for the Eastern Front as it 

appeared to the Germans. The relatively 

small files of the Inspector General for 

Armor (Gen eralinspekteur der Panzertruppen ) contain significant documents relating to Guderian's incumbency and his 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

appointment as Acting Chief of Staff, 

OKH. A particularly valuable document 

for the light it sheds on Hitler's attitudes 

towards his generals and the Army General 

Staff in the period October '942 - October 

'944 is the Taetigkeitsbericht des Chefs 

des H eerespcrsonalamls, the activity report 

of the OKH officer personnel section for 

the time during which it was directly under 

Hitler and his chief adjutant, Schmundt. 

It is fortunate that both the OKW and 

the OKH records proviile their best coverage for the last months of the war, the 

period for which relatively few field command records remain in existence. 

One important set of high-level documents not properly belonging either to the 

OKH or the OKW collections is Fuehrer 

Conference Fragments (Fragmenten des 

Stenographischen Dienstes im F. H. Qu. ), 

translated excerpts of which have been 

published in Felix Gilbert, ed., Hiller 

Directs His War (New York: Oxford University Press, '95')' and which have heen 

published in full in Helmut Heiber, ed., 

Hillers Lagebesprechungen, (Stuttgart: 

Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, '962 ). The 

Fuehrer Conference Fragments are the 

remains (fifty in all for the months December '942 to March '945) of the transcripts 

of situation and other military conferences 

kept by the stenographic service in the 

Fuehrer headquarters. 

For the history of the war against the 

Soviet Union the army group records are 

the prime sources. The army group commands were the direct link between the 

High Command (Hitler and the OKH ) 

and the front, and were, within the limits 

imposed by Hitler's method of command, 

themselves originating agencies for operational decisions. In accordance with Ger509 

man practice the field commands each kept 

an Ia (Operations) war diary in which 

were recorded the incoming and outgoing 

orders, summaries of reports and conferences, situation estimates, the progress of 

operations, weather, temperature, and 

other items of operational or historical significance. The orders, reports, and so 

forth, were filed separately in annexes 

(Anlagen) to the war diaries. Together, 

the Ia war diaries and their Anlagen were 

the central records of the field commands. 

At the army group level the war diaries 

were generally kept with a conscious eye to 

history, sometimes by trained historians; 

and frequently the commanding generals 

and chiefs of staff confided matters to the 

war diary that were not recorded elsewhere 

or transmitted outside the command. The 

army group records also provide operational plans, after action reports, transcripts of telephone and other conferences, 

message files, and files of Chefsachen-top 

secret documents that were not entered in 

the war diaries. 

Of the army group Ia war diaries the 

following segments have survived: Army 

Group A (South Ukraine, South) , October '942-3' March '945, with Anlagen, 

October '944 - March '945; Army Group 

Don (Anlagen only), 7 December '942-

28 February '943; Army Group North, , 

October '942 - '5 June '944 with scattered Anlagen; Army Group Center, scattered Anlagen for the years '943 and '944 

only (a photostat of the Ia war diary 22 

August '943-24 September '944 was 

secured from the former keeper of the war 

diary, Prof. Herman Gackenholz); Army 

Group Vistula, Anlagen with longhand 

notes for the war diary 2' January - 29 

April '945. Morning and evening reports 
510 

(portions of the September 1944-May 

1945 war diaries of Army Group North 

and Courland) were available to the 

author of MS # P - 1 14a, Der F eldzug 

gegen die Sowjelunion im N ordabschnill 

der Osl/ronl, and are extensively quoted in 

the text and appendices. 

The records of the armies are similar to 

those of the army groups in organization 

and content, but the armies usually did not 

have the top-level contact that the army 

groups had. In bulk the army records are 

far more voluminous than the army group 

records, partly beca use in most instances the 

war diaries and Anlagen are nearly complete to July 1944 and partly because the 

army records contain more after action reports, operational plans, and reports on 

an ti partisan operations. 

II 

Except for captured records, interrogations, and analyses which have filtered 

through the German wartime intelligence 

agencies, virtually no significant Soviet documents relating to military operations in 

World War II have been made available. 

During the war the Soviet Army's Directorate of Military History, under the 

former Chief of Staff, Boris M. Shaposhnikov, from late 1942 until his death in 1945, 

issued through its department for the Utilization of the War Experience several series 

of monographs dealing with selected operations. Of those the most thoroughgoing 

and candid, and therefore the most restricted in distribution (division commanders and above), were the so-called Sborniks 

(Collections [of Materials for the Study of 

the War Experience-M alerialov po izucheniyu opyla vo)'nyJ). The purpose of 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Sborniks was not primarily historical; 

they were intended to coach the higher 

commanders in battle-tested tactics; but to 

do that they had within limits, that is to 

say, avoiding criticism which struck higher 

than the 'ronl headquarters, to be concrete 

and objective. For the latter part of the 

war the Sborniks dealing with Stalingrad 

and the 1942 - 43 winter offensive are the 

most useful. 

In the postwar period up to and for 

several years after Stalin's death, the few 

Soviet histories of military operations in 

World War II that appeared read like 

anthologies of the wartime communiques 

from Moscow, which, in fact, they for the 

most part were. Interpretation was restricted to panegyrics to Stalin and vituperrative blasts against former friends and 

enemies alike. The most suhstantial publication to appear was a collection of Stalin's 

orders of the day interlarded with some of 

his other public utterances on ntilitary subjects. 

In the years following the Twentieth 

Party Congress (I 955), at which Soviet 

Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev gave impetus to a new approach to the study of 

World War II and announced the forthcoming publication of a Soviet official history of the war, the Soviet writings on 

World War II rapidly grew to a flood. 

The volume of information, however, 

though large by comparison with that released earlier, was not proportionate to the 

number of. new works that found their way 

into print. Several of these stand out as 

marking high-water points in the disclosure 

of concrete information. The first to appear was Vazneishie Operalsii Velikoy 01-

cheslvennoy Voyny (Moscow: Voen. Izdat., 1956 ), edited by Col. Pavel A. Zhilin. 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

It was a collaborative work and a collection 

of battle studies rather than a complete 

narrative history. It was carefully doctored 

to present a homogenized impression of 

military infallibility, but it did deal with 

the early defeats-as defensive successes. 

Stalin's name virtually disappeared, and 

the glory and credit were redistributed to 

the Party, the Army, and the Soviet people. 

Scattered mention of mistakes and errors, 

none big enough or reaching high enough 

to roil the smooth surface, gave a touch of 

critical analysis. Nevertheless, the book's 

great virtue was that it came closer to being 

a factual narrative than any Soviet work 

on World War II published up to that 

time. In 1958 General S. P. Platonov 

published a complete, one-volume history 

of World War II, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna (Moscow: Voen. Izdat.) The Platonov 

volume carried somewhat further the trend 

toward limited objectivity begun in the 

Zhilin volume and broached aspects of the 

Soviet conduct of the war that Zhilin's 

fragmentary approach had side-stepped. 

Both Zhilin and Platonov were associated 

with the Soviet Army Directorate of Military History and both were member.; of the 

editorial board of the Soviet military historical journal Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal. After Platonov other comprehensive 

single-volume histories appeared, some, like 

K. S. Kolganov's Razvitye T aktiku Sovetskoy Armii v Cody Velikoy Otchestvennoy 1941-45 (Moscow: Voen. Izdat., 

1959 ), dealing with specific aspects of the 

war. Platonov's history remains the best 

of the shorter works. B. S. Tel'pukhovskiy, 

Velikaya Otchestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 (Moscow: Voen. 

Izd"t., 1959), an inferior, blatantly theatrical piece of historical writing, deserves 

511 

mention on two counts: the author named 

all the important commanders-not a univer.;al practice in Soviet writing of military 

history-and, apparently because the book 

is a revision of an earlier work published 

in 1955, Mar.;hal Zhukov figures more 

prominently than in other Soviet works. 

The absolute high-water mark, at least 

for the time being, in the Soviet writing 

on World War II was reached with the 

publication, beginning in 1960, of the sixvolume official Istoriya Velikoy Otchestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuze 1941-

1945 (Moscow: Voen. Izdat., 1960-{i3 )· 

The official history cover.; in substantial 

detail the whole military, political, and 

economic history of World War II, including its origins and its aftermath. The 

author.;hip is collective and includes prominently three of the writer.; mentioned 

above, Zhilin, Platonov, and Tel'pukhovskiy among some dozens of others. Certain 

of the sections dealing with Soviet military 

operations appear to follow, in places almost word for word, the Platonov history. 

On the whole, the accounts of military 

operations carry forward the trends observed in the Zhilin and Platonov works 

without achieving g e n u i n e frankness. 

Names, dates, units, tactical maneuvers, 

and operational plans are given more coherent treatment than in the earlier works. 

Soviet mistakes, defeats, and setbacks, with 

relatively few known exceptions, though 

not ignored, are often as not handled so 

obliquely as to escape all but the closest 

attention. Strengths, losses, and other statistics are given in detail for the Gennan 

'and other annies but not for the Soviet 

forces. For the fir.;t time a few Soviet 

strengths are given in concrete figures, but 

the Soviet casualties and losses continue to 
512 

be thoroughly ignored. The volumes are 

heavily documented with sources published 

outside the Soviet Union but only with 

meaningless file-number references to S0-

viet documents. The process of high-level 

decision making i, left nebulous except for 

frequent citations of uniformly correct, 

timely, and presumably unanimous decisions and directives from the Stavka. 

III 

To provide the Army with a comprehensive record of the German military experience in World War II, the Foreign 

Military Studies Program of the Historical 

Division, United States Army, Europe, 

produced by the time it was terminated 

in 1961 some 2,400 manuscripts. The 

authors were, for the most part, former 

high-ranking German officers. At first 

they wrote mainly from memory about 

events in which they had personally 

played key roles. Beginning in 1948 more 

comprehensive projects were initiated. 

These were assigned ' to teams who then 

made use of records in the custody of the 

United States Army, records secured 

through private sources, interviews, and 

their own experience. The over-all supervision and direction was in the hands of 

the Control Group, headed throughout its 

existence by Generaloberst a. D. Franz 

Halder. In 1954 the Historical Division, 

United States Army, Europe, published a 

complete list of the manuscripts then completed or projected in the Guide to Foreign 

Military Studies 1945-54' A full set of the 

manuscripts is on deposit in the Office of 

the Chief of Military History, Department 

of the Army, Washington, D.C. A second 

set has been furnished to the historical ofSTALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

fice of the German Bundeswehr. 

In the Foreign Military Studies Series 

the war against the Soviet Union is covered 

at the strategic level by MS # T », Generaloberst a. D. Gotthard Heinrici, Der 

Feldzug in Russland ein operativer Ueberblick; and at the army group level by MS 

# P-II ¥, Generalleutnant a. D. Friedrich Sixt, Der Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion im Nordabschnitt der Ost/ront, by 

MS # P-114b, General der Infanterie 

a. D. Rudolf Hofmann, Der Feldzug gegen 

die Sow.ietunion im Mittelabschnitt der 

Ost/ront, and by MS # P-114c, .General 

der Artillerie a. D. Friedrich Wilhelm 

Hauck, Die Operationen der deutschen 

H eeresgruppen an der Ost/ront 1941 bis 

1945 suedliches Gebiet. The events of 1944 

and 1945 in the Southeastern Theater are 

covered in MS # P-114c Supplement, 

Generalmajor a. D. Erich Schmidt-Richberg and Generalmajor a. D. Curt Ritter 

von Geitner, Die Knegsereignisse au/ dem 

Balkan' im Rahmen der deutschen Operationen an der Ost/ront, 1944-1945. Army, 

corps, and division operations are treated 

selectively in separate studies. 

Particular aspects of the war in the East 

are dealt with in, among others, MSS # 

P-<>6o a-<>, Generalmajor a. D. Hellmuth 

Reinhardt aqd others, Small Unit Actions 

(condensed version published as Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-269, July 

1953, Small Unit Actions Dunng the German Campaign in Russia) and MS # T12, Generalmajor a. D. Oldwig von Natzmer and others, Das Zurueckkaempfen eingekesselter Verbaende zur eigenen Front 

(published as Department of the Army 

Pamphlet 20-234, January 1952, Operations 0; Encircled Forces). Incidents and 

events of particular historical interest are 
NOTE ON SOURCES 

treated in such accounts as MS # B--{)06, 

Oberst a. D. Guenther Reichheim, The 

Last Rally, Battles Fought by the German 

Twelfth Army in the Heart of Germany, 

and MS # B-220, General der Panzertruppen a. D. Maximilian Freiherr von 

Edelsheim, Die Kapitulationsverhandlungen der 12. (deutschen) mit der 9. (amerikanischen) Armee am 4 Mai 1945 in 

Stendal. 

The Foreign Military Studies Program 

also produced important primary source 

materials for the study of the war in the 

Soviet Union. In addition to the Schramm 

and Greiner works already mentioned, 

those pertinent to the last years of the war 

are MS # C-073, General der Infanterie 

a. D. Waldemar Erfurth, Finnlands Letztc 

Krieg (published as Der finnische Krieg 

(Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950 )); MS # 

D-406, Generaloberst a. D. Kurt Zeitzler, 

Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen 

im zweiten Weltkrieg; MS # D-408, 

Oberst i. G. a. D. Hans Georg Eismanh, 

Aufzeichnungcn Oberst i. G. Eismann als 

Ia der Heeresgruppe Weichsel; MS # C099 c, d, i, I, m, and 0, General der Artillerie a. D. Walter Warlimont, Commentaries on the OKW War Diary (text in 

German ); MS # P-049, Warlimont, Die 

Strategie der deutschen obersten Fuehrung 

im Zweiten Vierteljahr 1943; MS # P215, Warlimont, Interpretation and Commentary on the Jodi Diaries, 1937-1945 

(text in German including a tranl;Cription 

of the diaries by General Warlimont) ; and 

(no MS number) GeneralfeIdmarschaIl 

Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs, Auszuege 

aus dem Tagebuch des Feldmarschalls 

Freiherr von Weichs aus den Jahren 1943 

und 1944, aus den Original-N otizen in 

Gabelsberger Stenographie uebertragen 

513 

durch Generalmajor a. D. Curt Ritter von 

Geitner. 

IV 

The body of general literature dealing 

with the German-Soviet conflict is large 

and growing. Very little of it, however, has 

been written in English or found its way 

into the language through translation. 

Comprehensive bibliographies, periodically 

brought up to date, are to be found in the 

Revue d'Histoire de La Deuxieme Guerrc 

Mondiale and the Buecherschau der Weltkriegsbuecherei. Both list books and articles in all languages and carry bibliographical articles and reviews of significant 

works. HiIlgruber and Jacobsen's lengthy 

introduction to Boris S. TeI'puchowski, Die 

Sowjetische Geschichte des Grossen Vaterlaendischen Krieges, 1941-1945 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard und Graefe, 1961) 

provides a useful analytical bibliography 

and a study of the Western and Soviet 

approaches to the history of the war. 

The works thus far available in English 

deal with certain selected aspects of the 

war. Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and 

the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leiden: E. 

J. Brill, 1954 ) covers the period of the 

Nazi-Soviet pact and Hitler's decision to 

invade the Soviet Union. Department of 

the Army Pamphlet 2D-261a, The German 

Campaign in Russia-Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Washington,. 1955), 

provides the background for thc present 

volume pending publication of the projected first and second volumes in the 

OCMH series on the Soviet-German war. 

Alexander DalIin, German Rule in Russia. 

1941-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 

1957), provides a comprehensive history of 
514 

the Gennan occupation, and the War Documentation Project, Project "Alexander' 

Studies (Washington: Air Research and 

Development Command, 1953-55)' condensed in John A. Armstrong, ed., The Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison: 

University of Wisconsin Press, 1964 ), 

furnish a similarly comprehensive account 

of the Soviet partisan movement. Alexander Werth, Russia at War (New York: 

Dutton, 1964) covers the whole war from 

the Soviet side in considerable detail but 

not systematically. T. Dodson Stamps and 

Vincent J. Esposito, eds., A Military History of World War II With Atlas (West 

Point: United States Military Academy, 

1953) contains a summary of military operations 1941-1945 and excellent maps. The 

best short account of Gennan operations, 

Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des 

Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn: Athenaeum, 

1956), has not been translated. The author 

was both a trained historian and a corps 

and anny commander on the Eastern 

Front. The two most substantial Gennan 

works translated to date are Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Dutton, 

1952) and Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1958 ). Both 

are memoirs and to some extent display 

the deficiencies of that genre. On the Soviet side the memoir literature is increasing, but the individual works are very narrowly focused. The best example available 

in English is Vasili I. Chuikov, The Battlc 

for Stalingrad (New York: Holt, Rinehart 

and Winston, 1964). 

The Soviet operations were for the most 

part carried out independently of its role 

as a member of the World War II coalition 

against the Axis Powers, the chief reasons 

being the relative isolation of the front in 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

the Soviet Union, the static Soviet strategic 

position, and the reservations which the 

Soviet Union attached to its membership 

in the Big Tbsee. The Soviet part in the 

whole war against Gennany has been described in, among others, Herbert Feis, 

Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, N. 

J.; Princeton University Press, 1957); 

Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: 

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962); 

Maurice Matloff and Edward M. Snell, 

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 

1941-1942 (Washington, 1953); Maurice 

M. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington, 

1959) ; and John Ehnnan, Grand Strategy 

(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 

1956), Volumes V and VI. The Soviet 

version of that aspect of the war is given 

in Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyn)' 

Sovetskogo Soyuza, '94'-'945 and in G. 

A. Deborin, Vtoraya Mirovaya Voyna 

(Moscow: Voen, Izdat., 1958). 

Finally, the massive Allied aid shipments 

to the Soviet Union through the Arctic 

ports and the Persian Gulf have been 

treated in T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian 

Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington, 

1952); Richard M. Leighton and Robert 

W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 

1940-1943 (Wa.hington, 1955 ); S. W. 

Roskill, T he War at Sea (London : Her 

Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954- ) ; 

Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United 

States Naval Operations in World War 

II," The Battle of the. Atlantic, September 

1939-May 1943 (Boston : Little, Brown, 

1951 ) and Samuel Eliot Morison, "History 

of United States Naval Operations in 

World War II," The Battle of the Atlantic 

Won, May 194:rMay '945 (Boston : 

Little, Brown, 1956). 
Armccabtcilung 

Armcegruppe 

kr~hof 

East ' Vall 

Ferdinand 

/1'011' 

Fuehrer 

(;,./1/1/)(' 

Guards 

Hero of tIlt' Sovict Union 

/-liwj. Hi//m'illi,!!/' 

1 ron G:1tc 

j a cOf' ,. " .I Ll- 52 

Ka:11pfgruppc 

Knight' ~ Cross of the Iron Cross 

Glossary 

A Gennan command intCfmed iate between :1 

corps and an army. usually under an enlarged 

corps headquarters 

A group of armies. a German command 

arrangement under which one army headquarters was subordinated to another 

Hitler's Bavarian retreat 

The projected German fortified line acros<; the 

Soviet Union from Narva on thc Ibltic Sca 

to Mclitopol on liw Black Sea ;).nd on \\ hidl 

work was b('gun in Augll,t 19r1 

A German tank first produced in early 19-U. 

It mounted an 88 mill. long-banded antiwnk 

gun in a fixed turret on a Tiger tank chassis. 

The Ferdinand weighed 7~l ton ... carried 200-

mm. front armor, ;-lIld had a top :-.pccd of 12 . .1 

miles per hour. 

A SO\'ict army group 

Hitler's titlc as German chid of sta lc 

A German ad hoc military fonnation. usualhcomposed of more di"isions th<l11 a nOfllni 

corps but utili zing a corps cOlllmand apparatus 

An honorific designation givcn to Soviet units 

which had distinguished thcmselvn in comhat 

The highest Soviet miliury decoration 

Russian auxiliaries sCI'\'ing with German unit!' 

on the Eastern F ront in va rious noncomhatant capacities 

The 2-mile-long gorge and rapid:, on Ihe 

Danube Ri\'cr abo,'c TuJ'tlu S('n'rin 

Term used to de!'igna tc German li~hl infantry 

The German Ju nkers 52 trimotor tr;lIlspnrt airplane 

A means of desi~ nating Ccrman divisions which 

had been spriotlsly rcduced 1Il strength 

through combat losses 

The highest class of the I ron Cross and thc most 

prized of the German \\-orld \\. ar 11 military 

decorations 
516 

Maybachlager 

NKVD 

OKH 

OKL 

OKM 

OKW 

Panje 

Panther 

Panzer III 

Panzer IV 

Panurgrenadier 

Panzerjaeger 

Reichsfuehrer-SS 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

The OKH command and communications center at Zossen south of Berlin 

Narodnyi Komissariat Venutrennikh Del (Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the 

Soviet internal security organization) 

Oberkommando des Herres (The German Anny 

lligh Command) 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (The German 

Air Force lligh Command) 

Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (The German Navy High Command) 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (The German 

Armed Forces lligh Command) 

German World War I army slang for Poles and 

Russians. Used in World War II to deocribe 

the Soviet peasant wagons. 

A German tank, originally designated Panzer V , 

that first went into quantity production in 

early 1943. It mounted a long-barreled 75-

mm. gun, and in its sloping armor and low 

silhouette it was patterned after the Soviet 

T34. The Panther weighed 50 tons, carried 

lID-mm. annor on the turret front, and had 

a top speed of 35 miles per hour. 

A German prewar-model tank, mounting in its 

latest version (1942) a long-barreled 50-mm. 

antitank gun. The Panzer III weighed 24.6 

tons, carried 50-mm. front armor, and had a 

top speed of 35 miles per hour. Although 

the Panzer III disappeared from combat in 

the last yean of the war, its chassis continued 

to be used in several model. of self-propelled 

assault guns. 

The latest of the prewar German tanks, and 

mounting in it! final version (1942) a longbarreled, high-velocity 75-mm. gun, it replaced a short, 75-mm. low-velocity gun. The 

Panzer IV weighed 26 tons, carried 6O-mm. 

front armor, and had a top speed of 25 miles 

per hour. 

Armored infantry 

Literally, tank hunters. Bicycle.mounted German troops armed with antitank grenades 

and rockets and organized in early 1945. 

Himmler's title as chief of the S5 
GLOSSARY 

Reichsstrasse 50 

Szekler Strip 

Schild und Schwert 

Self-propelled assault gun 

SS 

Stauka 

Stuka 

T34 

Tiger 

Trek 

Totenkopf 

Volksgrenadier 

Volkssturm 

Walfen--SS 

Winter War 

Wehnnacht 

Wiking 

German-built road in northern Norway from 

Narvik to Kirkenes 

A piece of territory in eastern Transylvania 

which had been in dispute between Hungary 

and Rumania during the interwar period and 

was awarded to Hungary through German 

mediation under: the Treaty of Vienna, 30 

August 1940 

A German theory. of active defense 

A lightly armored, tracked vehicle mounting a 

relatively heavy gun and intended to be used 

as close-support artillery 

Schutzstalfel (Elite guard of the Nazi Party) 

Stauka Verkhovnovo, Glaunokommandouaniya 

(the Soviet Supreme Command) 

SturtzkamPlflugzeug (Dive bomber) 

The tank that was the mainstay of the Soviet 

armored forces throughout World War II. 

Put into quantity production in early 1941, it 

mounted a 76.2-mm. gun (after early 1944 

an 85-mm. gun) , carried 45-mm. front 

armor, and had a top speed of about 30 miles 

per hour. Sloping armor on the turret and 

glacis' plate gave it particularly good protection against antitank gun fire. 

A German tank, originally designated Panzer 

IV, that first appeared in action in late 1942. 

Mounting an adaptation of the German 88-

mm. antiaircraft gun, the Tiger weighed 63 

tons, carried l00-mm. armor on the turret 

front, and had a top speed of 25 miles per 

hour. 

A refugee column 

Death's head 

Designation given to a number of German 

divisions hastily formed after July 1944 b)' 

filling up burned-out divisions from the Eastern Front with new recruits 

The German home guard com posed of overage 

and draft-deferred men 

The combat units of the SS 

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 

The German Armed Forces 

Viking 

517 
Code Names 

ASTER (Aster) Map Exercise 

BARBAROSSA (Barbarossa) 

BIBER (Beaver) Plan 

BIRKE (Birch) 

BLAU (Blue) 

BUEFFEL (Buffalo) 

FRUEHLlNOSERWACHEN 

(Awakening of Spring) 

FRUEHLINGSFEST (Spring Festival) 

GNEISENAU line 

GoTENKOPF (GoTH'S Head) 

HABICHT (Hawk) 

HAGEN (Hedge) position 

HEINRICH 

HUBERTUS line 

KORMORAN (Cormorant) 

KUOELBLITZ (Ball Lightning) 

LITHUANIA position 

MARGARETHE 

Army Group North plan for withdrawal in the 

Baltic States, September 1944 

The 1941 German offensive in the Soviet Union 

Major switch position in the Army Group 

Center zone, 1944 

The Twentieth Mountain Anny withdrawal to 

northern Finland, 1944 

The 1942 German offensive in the Soviet 

Union. The code name was also used for the 

planned Army Group North withdrawal to 

the PANTHER position, fall and winter 1943-

44. 

Army Group Center's withdrawal in FebruaryMarch 1943 

The Army Group South offensive south of 

Budapest, March 1945 

German anti partisan operation in Belorussia, 

April 1944 

Gennan prepared position on the Crimea flanking Simferopol, 1944 

The German bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula, 1943 

A proposed Gennan operation across the Donets 

River in the Chuguyev-Kupyansk area, 

March 1943 

Gennan line of field fortifications constructed 

across the base of the Ore1 salient, July 1943 

Gennan antipartisan operation conducted west 

of Nevel in November 1943 

Gennan switch position behind the Baranow 

bridgehead, 1944-45 

German antipartisan operation in Belorussia , 

April 1944 

A German antipartisan operation in the Surazh 

Rayon of Belorussia, February 1943 

Switch position behind Army Group North, 

July 1944 

Gennan plan (or the military occupation of 

Hungary, September 1943 
CODE NAMES 

NORDLlCHT (Northern Lights) 

PANTHER position 

PRINZ EUGEN 

(Prince Eugene) posItlOn 

REOENSCHAUER (Rain Shower) 

ROLLBAHN (Highway) ·position 

SCHILD UND SCHWERT 

(Sword and Shield) 

SCHUTZWALL (Bastion) position 

SILBERSTREI. (Silver Streak) 

SONNENWENDE (Solstice) 

STURMBOCK (Battering Ram) 

TANNE OST (Fir East) 

TANNE WEST (Fir West) 

TRAJAN position 

WINTERGEWITTER (Winter Storm) 

WOTAN (Woden) position 

ZITADELLE (Citadel) 

The Twentieth Mountain Army withdrawal 

into Norway, 1944-

The northern half of the projected East Wall, 

1943-44. Also used for a projected expan· 

sion of Operation HABICHT. 

Switch position behind Army Group North 

Ukraine, July 1944 

Gennan operation against the partisans in Bela· 

russia, April 1944 

Line of field fortifications paralleling the Lenin· 

grad-Chudovo highway in the Army Group 

North zone, 1943-44 

A projected Army Group North Ukraine 

offensive, June 1944-

Gennan line of fortifications south of Ivalo, 

Finland, 1944 

German propaganda campaign, May-July 

1943, intended to increase Soviet desertions 

The Gennan counteroffensive at Stargard, February 1945 

Gennan line of fortifications west of Karesuando, Norway, 1944 

The Gennan landing on Suursaari Island, 

October 1944 

A projected German occupation of the Aland 

Islands 

Rumanian fortified line near Iasi 

The StaIingrad relief operation, December 1942 

The southern half of the projected East Wall, 

fall 1943. Also used for the German switch 

position constructed behind the German Oder 

front, April 1945. 

The Gennan operation against the Kursk bulge, 

July 1943 

519 

Index 

Aachen: 409 

Adlerhorst: 414.,418, 4!U 

Aegean Sea: 371, 37~ 

Air attacks 

Allied: Ilg. 212, 3 Ill, 372, 38g. 411-12,41 3. 439. 

461 ,489 

German: 9-10, 133. 135. 2HZ , 343, 353. 389 

Soviet: 135. 141, 231 , 267. 269. 289. 321, 323, 

324.332.342.394.429,435.488 

Air doctrine, German: 2UI-13 

Air doctrine, Soviet: 26 

Air Force, German : 9-10, 61, 133. '44. 212- 13. 

293- See aiio Air attacks, German; Air units. 

German ; Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann ; 

Luftwaffe. 

Air Force, Soviet: 29. 140, 146-47. 191. See also Air 

attacks, Soviet. 

Air reconnaissance, German: 128, 261 , 264, 325. 

337,350 ,356.443 

Air strength, German : g, 18, 59. 6" 92-93, 133. 

135-36, 311-nZt 319, 321, 411 , 424 

Air strength, Soviet: '29.3'2,50,52, 135- 36, '40, 

146-47,296,321,35°.373.418.424.470 

Air supply. German. See Logistics, German, supply 

operations by air. 

Air supply, Soviet. See Logistics, Soviet, supply operations by air. 

Air support, German: 61,92 . 93-94,133,135. 2HI, 

213,300.3 19.343 

Air support, Soviet: I.p , 146-47. 191 , 241 , 321, 

342 ,467-69 

Air units. German 

air force field divisions: 20. 48-49, 62. 100, 115. 

248 

2d: '99.200 

loth: 251,253 

First Air Force : 10. 197 

Second Air Force: 10,18 

Fourth Air Force: '0, 18, 6" 69, 77, 92-93, 135, 

3 '9,353 

Fifth Air Force : 10 

Sixth Air Force : '35,3 19.32 1 

Aircraft, German: 281 ,284, 411 

HE-II "5: 61 

JU-52's: 59, 61 , 234,282, 28g, 372 

Stukas: 135, 263,300,343 

Aircraft. Soviet: 29, 85 

Aircraft production 

German: 133,3 11-12 , 4 11.4 12 

Soviet: 26,27.29 

Akhtyrka: 151 , 152, 156, 157 

Aksay River: 63, 64, 7' 

Aland Islands: 268, 391 

Albania: 365,37',375,382,411 

Allenstein : 430 

Allied forces: 25. 109, 137, 143, 256,300,339.348, 

349.365,367,373-74,388,395.396-97,409, 

420,456-57 , 463 , 469 , 484. See also Air attacks. 

Allied j Armies, U .S. j Army Group 2 I, British ; 

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D .; 

Great Britain; Montgomery. Field Marshal Sir 

Bernard L.; United States. 

and Ardennes offensive: 385,410,414,418--19, 

439 

and drive to Berlin: 409,411-12,439, 467,470, 

471, 473. 489. 492 , 495,496. 497.498.503 

at Elbe: 472, 473.482, 492 

and second front: 119, 121 , 129, 163, 182.210, 

216-17.223,265.272-73,280,293,309- 12 

and surrender of Germans: 495-99 

Allmendinger. General der Infanterie Karl : 293, 

294. 295 

Alps: 456. 481 

Alsace offensive, German: 419 

Alta: 401 

Alte Oder: 474 

Ammunition shortages, German. See Logistics, German. shortages, ammunition. 

Ammunition shortages. Soviet. See Logistics. Soviet, 

shortages, ammunition. 

Anklam: 491 , 492 

Antipartisan operations, German: 105. 113-15, 131, 

202-03.308-09. See also Partisan operations. 

Antitank weapons, German: 53, 120, 1~4-45 , 300. 

301,3°3,472 

Antitank weapons, Sovie t : 129. '47. 452 

Antonescu, Marshal Ion: 122. 157. 164, 179,244, 

284, 287. 290. 291, 294. 348, 349, 349n. 350, 

35 1.352.359 

Anzio landings: 256, 272 

Apatin: 381,382 

Apostolovo: 240, 242, 243,244, 282 

Arad: 358, 360, 36., 373 

Arkhangelskoye: 244-

Arctic, operations in : 396-403 

Arctic Ocean: 10 

Arctic Ocean Highway : 268. 399-400 

Ardennes offensive: 385. 410, 414 , 418-19, 439 

Armeeabteilungen 

definition: 68n 

Fretter-Pico 68, 74, 75, 84, 86. Set: also Armeegruppen, Frelter-Pico. 

Holliet: 71,74,75,84.86.88,90,92, 137· See 

also Armies. German, Sixth. 
522 

Armccabteilungcn- Continucd 

Kemp£: go. See also Armecabte ilungen, Lanz. 

Operati on H ABICHT : 12 7 

Operation ZlTADELLE: ' 33-37 

renamed Eighth Army: 153 

summer campa ign, 1943: '49-53, 156 

winter campaign, [942-43: 91-96 

Lam: 86, 8g. go, 9 1 

Narva: 265.328,403 , 404. 4°5, 406 

Samland: 445 . Set: al.so Armies, German, Third 

Panzer. 

Serbia: 375-77. See also South eastern Theater 

Command . 

Steiner: 477 

Armccgruppcn 

D umitrcscu: 346, 35 ' 

Frctter·Picn : 359. 3620 , 379. 383. Set also 

Armies, German, Sixth . 

Hcinrici: 416, 427,459. See also Armies, German, First Panzer. 

Ha th : 60, 60n 

Woehler : 346, 350-52, 362 , 362 0, 364. 38 1. Set 

also Armies, German, Eighth. 

Armia KrajowQ ( Polish H ome Army ) : 340, 344 

Armies, Bulgarian 

First: 375 

Second: 382 

Armies, German. Su also Armeeabtcilungen. 

Army of East Prussia: 4 70, 496, 498 

Army of Norway: 9, 10, 209, 401 

First Panzer: 17 

arrest of Schoerner: 498 

in Carpathians: 359,362, 416 

in Caucasus: 71, 72 , 75 

counteroffensive, spring 1943: 85, 86, 90, 

9 ' , 92, 93, 94-95 

in D nepr line: 1]5-77, , 80, 18 1-82, 186, 

188-89 

encirclement, March 1944: 275-76, 278-83, 

286,288-89 

summe r campaign, ' 943: '27 , ' 37 , '38, '44. 

160-62 , 164-66, 168, 169 

summer campaign, '944 : 332-33, 337 , 339 

winter campaign, 1943-44: 220, 222 , 223 . 

224, 225-26, 227-38, 244, 275-76 

Second: 17, 16 

defense of D anzig-We st Prussia: 4,6, 426, 

42 8-30, 43 ' , 438, 444. 459, 460, 469, 4 70 

in Dnepr bridgehead: 191-96, 411 

summer campaign, '943 : 152, ' 58-60, 164 . 

, 65 , 166, 167, 17° 

summer campaign, 1944 : 3 ' 5, 319.320, 322, 

325, 326, 328,333, 336,33 7, 34' 

winter campaign, ' 942-43: 81 , 84, 90, 97 , 

115 , 'I], ,26 

Second Panzer: g8, "5, I' 7, ' 24, ' 26 

in Hungary: 382, 437.45°, 454. 456 

summe r campaign, 1943: 137, 138--39, 14°. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Armies, German-Continued 

Second Panzer- Continued 

'41 , 152 

in Yugoslavia: 367, 371,375-76, 37i-78, 382 

Third Panzer: 47 , 98, '4', ,60, 170. Su also 

Armeeabteilungen, Samland. 

antipartisan ope rati ons: 1' 3-15,308-09 

defense of East Prussia: 416, 419, 420, 43 1, 

445, 446 

Nevel gap : '99, 202 . 204, 205-07, 481 

in Oder line: 446, 448, 459-60, 471. 4 77, 

479, 483, 484, 485-87, 495-96 

summer campaign, 1944 : 314, 3 ' 5, 3 19-21 , 

323,3 24, 326-29,333- 35, 337, 338, 340, 

342-43,388, 403. 405 

surrender: 496 

Fou rth : 47. 98, 116, 206, 308, 485, 491 

defense of East Prussia: 416, 419, 429- 32, 

438, 445, 461 , 470 

summer campaign, ' 943: '4' , ' 59, , 64. , 67 , 

'70 

summer campaign, 1944: 3 '5, 31B, 319, 320, 

32' . 323, 324, 325, 326, 32B, 339, 341 

Fourth Panzer 

counteroffensive, spring ' 943: go, 92 , 93-97 

in Dnepr line: , 84-88, 18g 

on Oder and Neisse: 440-42, 443, 4 7 ' , 4 74 . 

475, 476, 477 

Operation ZITADE LLF. : 126, ' 27. 129, 132, 

133. ' 35, ' 36, ' 37. 138 

re lief of Stalingrad : 49, 52, 53 , 54, 54n, 56, 

58,59-65 summer campaign , '942: ' 7, 18, ' 9, 39, 41 , 

44 

summer campaign, ' 943 : '49-54, ' 56-57 , 

160, 164, 165, 166-67 , 168, 169 

from V istula to Oder: 416, 4' 7, 41 8, 425 

win ter campaign, 1942- 43: 66, 69, 71 , 72, 

73,74,75,84, 86, 88-90 

winter campaign, '943-44: 2,8-23, 244- 4 7, 

273 , 275-76,27 8,280,282,286, 288 

Sixth. Su also Armeeabtei lun gen , H ollid t ; 

Armeegruppen, Frene r-Pico. 

defeat on Dnestr: 348, 350, 3.5 I , 353-55, 

356 

enc irclement at Stalingrad: 50, 52- 55 , 57 , 

58, 60- 65, 69-71 ,75-80 

in Hungary: 353-55,356, 359, :n9, 456 

Operation BLAU: 17, ' 9, 22 ,39-46 

spring campaign, 1944: 277-78, 282-84 , 

286, 289-93 

summer campaign, 1943: 138, ,60-62, 16S, 

17 ' , 175 

winter campaign, 1943- 44: 226, 238-44. 

'74 

in WOTAN position: 1 is, 177-79, 183-84. 

188 

Sixth 5S Panzer: 4' 9, 422 , 42i , 437 , 445, 445n, 
INDEX 

Armies, German-Continued 

Sixth S8 Panzer-Continued 

450-55,456 

Eighth 

Armeeabteilung Kempf renamed Eighth 

Army: 153 

defeat on Dnestr: 348,355-56 

defense of Kharkov: 154-57 

in Dnepr line: 166, 168,169, 184, 186-89 

in Hungary: 362, 362n, 454. 455 

spring campaign, 1944: 275, 276, 277-78, 

279,281,283-85. 289,290 

winter·campaign, 1943-44: 222, 223, 226-

38,24 1 ,244. 275 

Ninth: 81,116 

defense of Oder line: 444, 4450, 447, 463, 

464. 47 1 . 472 , 475, 476,477 

in Dnepr bridgehead: 192, 195, Ig6 

encircled, Apri1194S: 478-80, 481-82,483-

86,488,492 

Operation ZITADELLE : 128-29, 131 , 132, 

133-36, 138-4 1 

in Rzhev salient: 48, 100, 105-07, 1'7 

summer campaign, '943: 152, 158-60, 164. 167 

summer campaign, '944: 315. 3 16, 319, 

3'0-'5,337-38,344,345 

surrender: 496 

from Vistula to Odcr: 416,417,418,421, 

423-24, 426 

Eleventh: 17,18,56,100,101 

Eleventh SS Panzer : 446,447 

Twelfth: 479, 479n, 480, 481, 483, 484-86, 491 , 

49', 493 

activated: 479, 479n 

surrender: 496 

Fifteenth: 3 12 

Sixteenth: 101,184,21 I 

defense of Riga : 406, 407 

Nevel gap: 200,203,204,207 

to PANTHER position: 248, 256, 257, 259, 

,64-65 

summer campaign, 1944: 327 ,328,329,333, 

336 

Seventeenth 

behind Oder: 442, 459, 466 

in Caucasus : 26,72 

in the Crimea: 179-81, 186, 188,238,240, 

29 1'"""95 

defense of Upper Silesia: 339,341 , 416, 417 , 

422, 424-25 , 427 

in GOTENKOPF: 118 

Eighteenth: 101 , 199,203, 204,205 

retreat in Baltic States: 404, 405-06 

retreat from Leningrad: 22 I , 248, 250-64 

summer campaign, 1944: 328,336,342 

Nineteenth: 457 

Twentieth Mountain: 19, 102) 197,299, 412 

retreat from Finland: 389-403 

Armies, German-Continued 

Twentieth Mountain-Continued 

situation, fall 1943: 208-11 

situation, winter 1944: 267-7 I 

Twenty-first: 485, 491, 495'"""96 

Armies, Hungarian 

First: 289,360,362 ,364, 416 

523 

Second: 39,66,81,289,355-56,359,360, 362n, 

38',383 

Third: 360,362, 362n, 364, 380, 452, 453 

Armies, Italian 

First: 119 

Eighth: 39, 49,63,66,68 

Armies, Polish. See Polish Home Army. 

Armies, Rumanian 

First: 356, 362 

Third: 9, 44. 48,49,50,53.54,56,59, 62 , 66,7 1, 

1290, 346, 35 I 

Fourth: 9, 54. 54n, 55, 56, 60, 60n, 290, 291, 346 

Fourth: 356 

Armies, Soviet 

First. See Annies, Sovie t, First Guards. 

First Guards: 41,50,68,84,91,92,94,96,2 18, 

220,276, 279 

First Guards Tank: 39, 40 

attack into Pomerania and West Prussia: 

442,457,459.460 

Berlin operation: 469, 471 , 474, 478 

summer offensive, 1943: 151 , 152 

summer offensive, 1944: 332-33,337.339, 

34 1 

winter offensive, 1943-44: 218, 224-26, 

228, 279, 1281 

First Polish : 330, 345 

First Tank. See Armies, Soviet, First Guards Tank. 

Independent Coastal Army: 293 

Second Guards: 71.73. 160,329.333 

Second Guards Tank 

advance to Oder: 43 8,442, 457, 459 

advance to Warsaw: 337.339,341 

Berlin operation: 47 I , 474, 475, 476. 478, 48 I 

Second Shock: III, 251. 253, 403, 405 

Second Tank . See Armies, Soviet, Second Guards 

Tank. 

Third: 318,475,476,480 

Third Guards: 68, 177,33 2, 421 

Third Guards Tank 

attack across Dnepr: ,84,187 ,220 

attack across Neisse: 469,471,473,478 

attack across Orler: 441-42, 443, 457 

spring offensive, 1944: 276,279 

summer offensive, 1943: 139. 164, 171 

summer offensive, 1944: 332, 337,341 

Vistula-Oder ope ration: 42 1, 425, 427 

winter offensive, 1942- 43: 82,92,96 

Third Sh ock: 108, 199,12012,203.204,459.474 

Third Tank. See Armies, Soviet, Third Guards 

Tank. 
524 

Armies, Soviet-Continued 

Fourth Guards: 226,228,277.382,383.385. 435. 

453. 454.455 

Fourth Guards Tank: Son, 70, 139 

attack across Neisse : 467.471,475. 4,6, 479. 

480, 481 

attack across Odee: 457.459 

operations in Upper Silesia: 465-6, 

spring offensive, 1944 : 279.280, 28, 

summer offensive, 1944: 332,337.342 

Vistula-Oder operation: 421 , 442 

Fourth Shock: 202,203.204. 205. 206,326, 403. 

4°7 

Fourth Tank. See Armies, Soviet, Fourth Guards 

Tank. 

Fifth: 15',318,343 

Fifth Guards: 137. 154. 181 , 469. 482 

Fifth Guards Tank: 277 

defense of Kursk: '37 

operations in East Prussia: 429, 430, 43' 

Stalingrad opf'ration: 49.50, 52,53.54.540, 

63. 68.75 summer offensive, 1943: 1St, t81 

summer offensive, 1944: 3 1B, 3 19. 325. 333, 

388, 403. 407 

Fifth Sh ock: 63,68,73, 92, 160, 474 

Fifth Tank. Set Armies, Soviet, Fifth Guards 

Tank. 

Sixth: 5°, 68, 91,92, 94, 204 

Sixth Guards: 149, 151,318,3 19,320,326, 403 

Sixth Guards Tank 

operations in Hungary: 359,360,361,362, 

364, 371, 383, 384, 435. 437, 453. 454. 

455 

spring offensive, 1944 : 279 

summer offensive, '944: 350,355,356 

winter offensive, 1943-44: 228 

Sixth Tank . Set Armies, Soviet, Sixth Guards 

Tank. 

S~ v~n th: 302,387 

Seventh Guards: 350, 355, 379, 380, 38 I, 383. 4S5 

Eighth Guards: 177. 18S. 242. 277. 282 , 289. 

332.474.478.493 

Ninth Guards: 452, 453, 454. 455 

Tenth Guards: 159 

El~lJ~nth: 139 

El~v~nth Guards: 146,2°4,2°5 , 206.318,343 

Thirteenth: 159. HO, 246, 276, 278, 332, 34 1, 

421 . 478. 479. 480 

Fourtetnth : 102,399,400 

Ninete~nth: 393 

T wentidh: 106 

Twenty-first: 41 , 5°,52,53, 76n, 78, 159 . 296, 

2g8, 465 

T wenty-second: 106 

T wenty-third: 298,302 

Twenty-fourth: 50, 52, 76n 

Twenty-sixth : 393,454 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Armies, Soviet- Continued 

Twent y-seventh: 350,355.359, 362, 38 1, 442, 

454.455 

wenty-~ighth: 179.318,319, 478 

Th irty-first: 106,318 

Thirt y-second: 387,388 

Thirty-third: 318,333,343 

Thirty-se v~n th: 350 

Thirt -~ighth: 185,279,332,421 

Thirty-ninth: 106.206,318,407, 408-09 

Fortieth: 81, 220,224,355,381 

Forty-first: 106 

Forty-second: 251,253. 255 

Forty-third : 206,3 18, 4°3, 406, 4°7, 4°8 

Forty-sixth: 183, 242, 282, 289, 351, 352, 359, 

361 ,373,374,375,378-86.456 

Forty-seventh: 337,344,421,474,478 

Forty-~ighth: 318 

Forty-ninth: 3 18 

Fiftieth: 318 

Fifty-first : 50,52,53,54, 60, 71,73, 179.329, 

403, 40 7 

Fifty-second : 164, 350, 421 

Fifty-third: 350, 355,361,373, 381 

Fifty-sev~nth: 5°,52, 53.54, 76, 151 , 153. 154. 

350,373. 376-77,378, 382 

Fift y-ninth: 302, 465 

Sjxtj~th: 159, 185, ,87, 189, 220, 246,332, 465 

Sixty-second: 37.40,41,43.50, 76n, 78 

Sixty-third: 41 , 50, 52 

Sixty-fourth: 37, 41 ,50. 76n 

Sixty-fifth: 50.52, 53, 76n, 3 18 

Sixty-sixth: 50, 76n 

Sixty-seventh: I 1 I 

S~lJ~ntjeth: 337 

Armies, U.S. 

First: 482 

Ninth: 473, 495-96 

Armor, German use of: 50, 120, 216, 228,362 ,384. 

385, 397-98, 452. Set also Armor strength, 

German; Tanks, German. 

Armor, Soviet use of: 26. 30. 50, 5'2, 75. 146-47. 

149, 166,321 ,362 ,393 ,399 , 474-75. S ee also 

Armor strength, Soviet ; Tanks, Soviet. 

Armor strength, German: 50, 52 , 76, 76n, 127 , 129. 

131, 136, 144, 145, 151, 16'2 , 197 , 33'2, 350, 

384,385, 4 17, 471 -7'2 

Armor strength, Soviet: 29, 50,52, 75, 76, 76n, 1'27 . 

144, 145. lSI , 162 , 197, 296,332, 350, 417 . 

470, 4 71-7 2 

Army. British Eighth: 119 

Army Group, '21, British: 483.495 

Army Groups, German 

A. See also Army Groups, German, Center; Army 

Groups, German, South Ukraine. 

armies and dispositions, January 1945: 414 . 

4. 6 

casualties: 412n 
INDEX 

Army Groups, German- Continued 

A- Continued 

B 

in Caucasus: 63, 64. 66, 7 I, 72-75 

in GOTENKOPF: 85.92,118,124, 143, 157 , 

164.165.171 

Operation BLAU, '942: 3-4,17,18-19,22,39 

renamed Army Group Center, 26 January 

1945: 426 

renamed Army Group South Ukraine, 5 

April 1944 : '286 

on south flank, 1943: 143. 152, ' 54, ' 57. 

166, '77, 179. 180, t81 , 183.218, 238 

strength: 340, 417 

winter campaign, 1945: 416-18, 419. 421-

22.423, 424. 425.429 

leaves Eastern Front: go 

Operation BLAU, 1942: 3. 17 , ,8-19, 22, 39. 

66 

Stalingrad: 47,48, 49,52, 53. 59 

strength: 340 

winter campaign, 1942-43: 66, 68, 72, 73. 

81 ,82, 86, 87 

C: 411 

Center: go, 91, 144, 151-52, ' 54,223, 2g6, 30t. 

See also Army Groups, German, A; Army 

Groups, German, North. 

under Busch, condition of: 3 I 6 

casualties: 325, 412n 

defense of Dnepr bridgehead: , 89-96 

defense of East Prussia: 414, 416, 4'7, 4, 8, 

419, 421 , 424, 425, 426, 428--33 

defense of Oder-Neisse line: 439, 442 , 443, 

456, 465-66, 469,476,477. 483 

defense of Rzhev salient: 105-08 

deployment, January '945: 4'4. 4,6 

intelligence estimates. fall 1942: 47- 49 

Nevel gap: 197-207 

'94' campaign: 9, 10, 11-1 3, '4.3 1,32 

Operation BUEFFEL: '15-'7, 124 

Operation ZITADELLE: 124, 128, ' 3 1, ' 33, 

136, 139-42 

partisan and anti partisan operations: '03. 

'04,308--09 

renamed Army Group North, 26 January 

1945: 431 

Soviet summer offensive, 1944: 3 13-28,337, 

338, 339n, 34~, 342, 343,345,346,408 

strength: 34. 34n, 314. 3 19, 328, 412n 

summer campaign, 1942: 17.22, 98-100 

summer campaign, '943: 157-73 

surrender: 496, 498, 499 

Courland: 426, 438,459,460,469-70, 485, 496, 

498. See also Army Groups, German, North. 

D, 5 

Don. See also Army Groups, German, South. 

activated, 20 November '942 : 56 

renamed Army Group South, 14 February 

Army Groups, German- Continued 

Don- Continued 

1943: 90 

525 

Stalingrad relief operations: 59,61, 62, 63, 

64,66, 68, 7 1 ,7 2,73,79 

winter campaign, '942-43 : 73,74.75,8 1-

87.90,9 1 

E: 365.369-70,371,373,374-75,377,382,411 

F: 364,365.371,377.378,381,382,405 

N orth: 124, 13 1, 144. 154, 157, 162, 209, 210, 

221,267,268,4 16, 422. See also Army Groups, 

German, Center j Army Groups. German, Courland, 

defense of East Prussia: 430, 438, 459, 460, 

461 , 469-70 

Nevel gap: 197-207 

194' campaign: 9, II, 12, '3, '4, :P, 99 

renamed Army Group Courland, 26 January 

1945: 426 

retreat to Courland: 403-09 

retreat from Leningrad: 248-66, 27 3 

Soviet partisans: 103, 104, I 13 

strength: 34, 34n, 41'2n 

summer campaign, 1942: 17,'2'2, 98, 100-102 

summer campaign, 1944: 324-25,326,327. 

328,329,333-35,336,337,338,341,342, 

343,348,387-88 

winter campaign, 1943: 109-13 , I I7 

North Ukraine: 286. 291 , 313, 314, 315. 3 16, 

3 19,320,324.329-33 .336-;\7,341 ,342,348, 

355. See also Army Groups, German, South. 

Oberrhein: 425 

Ostmark: 499 

Sbuth: '7.33. 21'2 , 248, '265, 291, 422 , 423 , 498. 

See also Army Groups, German, North 

Ukraine ; Army Groups, German, South 

Ukraine. 

Army Group Don renamed South, 13 February '943: 90 

Army Group South Ukraine renamed South, 

23 September 1944: 360,371,412 

battle at Debrecen: 360-62 

in Dnepr line, fall 1943: 175-77, 179, 180, 

t81-89, 19 1. 216 

encirclement of Budapest: 378-86 

1941 campaign: 9, 11-12 , 14,3 1,88 

Operation FRUEHLJNGSERWACHE N: 450- 54 

Operation ZITADELLE: 118, 124, 126, 127 , 

128, 129, 133-38, 139 

recapture of Kharkov, spring '943: 94-105 

renamed Army Group North Ukraine, 5 

April '944: 286 

retreat rrom' Hungary: 454-56, 466, 469 

retreat to Tina River: 364 

siege of Budapest: 4'0, 4'4, 422 , 427, 433-

37, 439, 448-49 

spring campaign, 1944: 273-85. 286, 288 

strength: 412n 
526 

Army Groups, German- Continued 

South- Continued 

summer campaign, '943: 138, '43-44, '49-

57.158, 159-66, 168-73 

winter campaign, ' 942-43: 90--94 

winter campaign, '943-44: 218-47 

South Ukraine: 286,290,293. 319, 346--52, 353-

60. Su also Army Groups, German, A j Army 

Groups, German, South. 

Vistula 

activated: 425-26 

defense of Berlin : 472- 88, 491 -92 

defense of Pomerania and West Prussia: 43 1, 

438. 442, 443-44, 456-61, 464 

Stargard offensive: H5-48, 456 

surrender : 495-96 

Arnhem bridges: 395 

Arnswalde: 444. 447 

Arrow·Cros5 Party: 356,363. 448 

Artillery, Gennan use of: 10 1, '56-57, 162, q8, 

233- 34,25 1,32 1 .469 

Artillery, Soviet use of: 32, 46,146, '49, 156, 160, 

'77, 178. 184, 185.236, 2g8, 321, 421 

Artillery strength, German : 9, 350, 416--17, 471 -72 

Artillery strength, Sovie t: 146, 296, 350, 416--1 7. 

470. 47 1-72 

ASTER plan: 404. 405. 406 

Astrakhan: 133 

Athens: 372,377 

Athens-Salonika-Be lgrade railroad: 369, 370 

Atrocities: 113-15, 344n, 420,425, 489-90 

Attentat: 335 

Auee: 404 

Aunus (Svir) Front : 102,302 

Aurith : 444 

Austria: 439, 455 

Autinkyla: 268 

Aydar River : 84 

Bacau: 353 

Baeh-Zelewski, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Erich von 

dem: 203, 204, 344, 363, 464 

Bad Doberan: 495 

Bad Nauheim: 410 

Bagramyan, General Armii l van K.: 318.328,338, 

339, 403-04, 405, 406-07. 432,445 

Baja: 381-82, 452 

Bakony Forest: 453,454 

Balaton, Lake: 382,383, 385, 435, 436, 437. 449, 

450 , 452, 453, 454, 455 

Balck, General der Panzertruppen Hermann: 385, 

435,436, 454 

Baldone: 405 

Balkan Air Force (Allied): 372,377,382 

Balkans: 3 13, 339, 358, 367-78 

Baku: 18 

Balaklava : 294 

Balta: 284, 285 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Balti: 285 

Baltic coast: 47,3 13,326,387,419. 457, 495 

Baltic Fleet, Soviet: 268 

"Bailie Gap": 329.333-35 

Baltic Sea: 10, I I I, 268, 339,502-03 

Baltic States: 24,336, 482, 500. See alJo Estonia; 

Latvia ; Lithuania. 

Banat: 37 1 

Bara novichi: 3 18,3 19,325,326,327 

Baranow: 339,341 ,342. 41 6,418, 41 9,421 

BARBAROSSA, plans and early operations: 7- 13 

Barlad: 351, 353 

Barladul River: 353 

Barvenkovo: 94, g6 

Basic Order 13: 131 

Basie Order 22: 214 

Basic Order for the Preparations to Defend the 

Reich Capital: 462 

Batina: 382 

Battalion, Finnish 27th Jaeger: 3go 

Bauska: 403, 404, 405 

Bautzen: 475, 476, 479, 483, 486 

Bauxite mines: 383 

Beaulieu, Generalleutnant Chaics de: 342 

Beeskow: 480 

Beketovka: 53 

Bela Palanka: 375 

Delaya Tserkov' : 222,223 

Belgian volunteer forces: 23 I 

Belgorod: 8g, 97. 133, 135. 137, 149, 15 1 

Belgrade: 370,371,372,374,375-76,377,378 

Belokalitvenskaya : 66,73,74 

Belomorsk: 102 

Belorussia: 2g6, 304, 3 14, 3 J 6 

Bely: g8, 106, 107 

Belyaekva: 28g 

Belynichi: 323 

Belzig: 483, 484 

Berchtesgaden: 122,244,280, 28g, 293 

Derdichev: 218, 219, 220, 224 

Beresina River: 196,304,31 4,318,3 19,320,32 1, 

322, 323, 324, 325 

Beresino: 323, 324 

Beria, Lavrenti P.: 29 

Berislav: 178 

Berlin : 419, 422 , 445, 469, 473, 503. See also Allied 

forces, and drive to Berlin. 

defense of: 472, 488-89 

encirclement: 474-83 

preparations for defense: 461-64 

relief operations: 484. 485, 493 

Russians enter:' 488 

Soviet advance toward: 427-28, 439-40, 442, 

456, 46 7, 470-7 1 

Berlin Defense Area: 462 

Berlin-Stettin autobahn: 477 

Bernadotte, Count Falke: 490 

Bernau: 476 
, 

INDEX 

Berzarin, General Polkovnik N. Z.: 490 

Beskide Mountains: 359. 360, 362-63 

Bessarabia : 9.24.284-

Bialystok: J 1,327, 328, 336 

BIBER plan: 314 

Bicske: 385. 452 

Bicycles: 412, 440 

Bit:lsk: 4'29 1 

Billefiord: 40 I 

BIRKE: 268-69. 299.391,396, 401 

Bischofsburg: 432 

Black Sea: g, 72, 313 

BLAU, 1942: 3-4. 15-80 

BLAU , '943-44: 248-66 

Blitzkrieg: 93-94. '45 

Blocking Force (S perrverband ) Bucovina: 288, 29' 

"Blul!cher" program: 413 

Bober River: 442 

Bobovnya: 325 

Bobruysk: 318, 319. 32 1, 322, 325 

Bock, Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von: 9, 14, 17) 18 

Bocrzsenyi Mountains: 383.384 

Bohnsdorf: 481 

Bol'shaya Lepatikha: 239, 241,242, 243 

Balva River: 158 

Bombing. See Air attacks, Allied ; Air attacks, German; Air attacks, Soviet. 

Ba r: 375 

Borisov: 304,308,309,3 18, 3'25 

Bor.Komorowski, General Tadeusz: 340, 344. 345 

Bormann, Martin: 119-20, 484n, 490, 492, 493 

Bosnia: 365 

Bothnia, Gulf of: 270,396 

Brandenburg: 471 ,484.492 

Bratislava: 448, 455, 463 

Brauchitsch, Generalfeldmarschall Walter von: 5, 

7, 11 , 12, 15,3 1, 56, 87 

Braun, Eva: 492 

Braunsberg.Wormditt line: 438 

Breslau: 424, 425, 442 , 469, 470 

Brest·Litovsk: 69, 313, 320, 326, 328, 330, 333, 

336,337 

Bridges: 48,57, 172, 177, 184, 225,238-39,279, 

285, 289-90,323,324,325,344,377,380,382, 

395,436. 443 , 452. Set also River crossings. 

Brieg..Qhlau bridgehead: 442 

Brigades, Finnish 

Cavalry: 388 

3d: 2911-99 

21St: 388 

Brigades, German 

Dirlewanger: 344, 3440 

Kaminski: 344, 344n 

SS Brigade Norland: 186 

303d Self-Propelled Assault Guo: 300,301 

Brigade, Soviet, 12th Naval: 399 

Brno: 449,456,463, 465 

Brody: 246, 277,286, 288,33 1-3'2 

Bromberg: 429 

Bryansk: 3',97 

Bryansk Forest: ,04,344n 

Bryansk·Roslavl' railroad: 167 

Bublitz: 457. 459 

Buchach: 282 

Bucharest: 353. 355 

Buda: 448 

527 

Budapest : 358,359, 360, 36" 363, 410-11 , 420, 

448, 453, 454, 461 

encirclement: 378-86 

relief operations: 414, 433-37, 439 

siege of: 433-37. 448- 49 

Budenny, Ma.rshal Semen M . : 30,35-36 

BUEFFEL: 115-17. 124, 126,14' , 249 

Bug Liman: '282 

Bug River: ,8' , 223, 226, 243. 273, '274, '277, '278, 

282 , 283, 285, 286, 289. 33'2 , 336 

Buhle. General der Infanterie Walter: 335 

Bukrin: t 70, 184 

Bulgaria: 208,272 ,355,358.365,367,368- 69, 370, 

373, 50 4 

Bulgarian Army: 369-70,373,378. Set also Armies. 

Bulgarian. 

Bunzlau: 442, 473 

Burgdorf. Generalobcrst Wilhelm: 494 

Busch. Generalfeldmarschall Ernst: 192-93, 195, 

203.205-06.314.315-16.321.323- 24.345 

Busse. General der Infanterie Theodor: 423. 463. 

464, 476. 480, 481 , 488 

Buzau: 354 

Buzaul Valley: 355.356 

Buzuluk River: 240,241 ,242 

C-2 rocket: 120-2 ' 

Cairo: 349 

Carpathian Mountains: 246, 274. 281, 287, 289, 

291,313-'4, 337 , 346.351 , 352, 353-56, 410, 

4 19.4'12 

Castling maneuver: 9'.220-21 , 453 

Casualties 

Finnish: 302-03, 388 

German: 79.138,213.214, 325,412, 412n, 500, 

500n 

Rumanian: 293 

Soviet: 23,79, 213-14. 309, 457,500. 500n 

Caucasus: 3,4. '5-19.33.39.74 

Caucasus Mountains: 72 

Cavalry. Soviet: 90, 193-94, 246. See also H orses. 

Cavalry·Mechanized Groups, Soviet: 318n. Set also 

Groups, Soviet. Cavalry-Mechanized. 

Baranov: 337 

First Guards: 453. 456, 466 

Gorshkov: 350,35'.355,362. 378-79 

Oslikovskiy: 3 18. 3' Sn 

Pliyev: 31B. 359, 361, 36'2, 364, 379. 437, 453 

Cease·fire, Soviet·Finnish: 390 

Ccgled: 380 
528 

tetnicks: 367 

Chapr Lake: 399 

Checiny: 421 

Chelm: 332 

Cherkassy: 169,188, 18g 

Cherkassy pocket: 224.226-36, 226n, 274. 279, 28g. 

345 

Chernigov: '54. '70 

Chernobyl: ' 70, 'gl, 193 

Chernovhy: 28,. 288, 28g 

Chernyakovskiy, General Polkovnik I. D.: 318,325. 

339.343. 4 19.43 1,445 

Chevalleric, Generalleutnant Kurt von der: g8, lOa , 

108 

Chief of the Naval Staff, Soviet: 30 

Chid of Staff, Soviet Army: 30 

Chmielnik: 421 

ChiT River: 37-38, 39.52, 54, 55. 57. 59, 6" 62, 

63,66,68 

ChiT Station: 54. 55 

Choinice : 444-

Chortkov : 279-80,262 

Chudovo: 253 

Chuguyev: 127, '53. 154 

Chuikov: 46, 493 

Churchill, Winston S.: Ilg, 267. 269. 272,372,420, 

50' 

Civil defense, German: 340 

Civilians 

German: 425.432,500 

Norwegian: 401 

Russian 

evacuated by Germans: 88, 116, 141 , 164. 

168, '72,244.249 

Soviet use of, as troops: '72,189 

used by Germans for labor : 84. 141, 168 

CLAUSEWITZ: 462 

Climate. Su Weather. 

Cluj, 355-56, 359-60, 36, 

Coal fields : 12,87-88, '44, 425 

Collaborator forces, German: 123 , 369-70, 413 , 

41 3n 

Command Staff B, German: 477. 481 , 493 

Command structure, German: 3. 5-6. 10, 7&-77. 

163-64,286 

Command structure, Soviet: 25-27.29-31 .36. Su 

also Sta vka of the Supreme Command. 

Commands, Soviet 

Northwest: 30 

Southwest: 30, 31 

West: 30 

Commissar of Defense: 29, 30 

Commissar system, Soviet: 26-27,29.36 

Committee of Three: 119-20 

Communist Party, Soviet: 29, 103,304,307,309 

Conscription, German: 213 

Constanta: 293 

Corfu: 370,373 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Corinth, Isthmus of: 373 

Corps, Finnish 

JII : 298.299 

IV, '96 

Corps. German 

I Cavalry: 435 

I 5S Panzer: 427, 439,448,450,452,453 

JI: 101-()2,405 

JI SS Panzer: 135, 136, 137, 138, 139.280. 282 , 

288.427.439,45°.452 

IJI: 152 

III Panzer: 135. 13 7. 222, 223, 224-26, 228, 

231-33. 259, 262, 275, 276, 289 

JII SS Panzer: 4°4.405,477 

IV : 54. 261 

IV Panzer: 78 

IV SS Panzer: 386,410,433-37.452,453 

VJI : 79, 187,222,223,224-26.228,283,287 

VIJI: 48, 265,287 

IX SS Mountain: 385,433,437 

X: 265,406 

XI: 78,79.156,226.228-38 

XIII: 159. 160. 164, 187. 189,2 19. 222,246-47. 

288.332-33 

XIV Panzer: 39,4 1,53.57,78 

XVII, 59,63 

XVIII Mountain: 102,268, 269,393.395.396-

97,401 

XIX Mountain: 102, 238, 268, 396, 397-400, 

401 

XX: 484,491 

XXI Mountain: 382 

XXIII, 135 

XXIV Panzer: 39. 13 7,138, ,87.222,42 1,423. 

424.425. 427 

XXVII, '43 

XXVIII, 408 

XXIX , 16, 

XXX: 24'-43 

XXXVI Mountain: 102, 136.268,269,270,27 ' , 

393,395,396,401 

XXXVJI Panzer: '35 

XXXX Panzer: 184, 185,424 

XXXXI Panzer: '35, 480. 484. 485, 492 

XXXXII: 222.223. 224. 225, 227-38. 279 

XXXXIII, 197 

XXXXVI Panzer: 135,222.224-26,279 

XXXXVII Panzer: 226,228,231,284.285 

XXXXVIII Panzer 

at Kiev: 186-87.189 

Operation BLAU : 39,50 

spring campaign, 1944 : 276 

at Stalingrad: 54,61,62,63 

on Vistula: 421 

winter campaign. 1943-44: 220, 221, 222, 

224. 247 

in ZITADELLE : '35. 137 

L : 251,255 
INDEX 

Corps, German--Continued 

LI: 58, s8n, 78, 79 

LIV, '59 

LVI Panzer: 313-14. 315.466, 477. 480, 481 

LVII Panzer: 61 , 62, 63-65.69 

LIX: g8, 186, 18g, 21g. 221 , 222, 223-24. 244. 

247. 275 , 276 

Grossdeutschland Panzer: 42'2, 424, 425. 427, 

42 9, 442 

Provisional Corps Raus: 135 

55 Panzer: 86, 89-90, 91, 97 . Su also Corps, 

German, II S5 Panzer. 

Corps, Hungarian 

VI: 28g 

VII: 81, 28g 

Corps, Italian, Alpini: 8, 

Corps, Rumanian 

III: 351,352 

VI: 53,54, 55.60,61 , 71 

VII: 53. 54.54°, 60, 61,7',72 

Corps, Soviet 

1 Guards Mechanized: 165. 166, 177 

II Guards M echanized: 162 

III Ca valry: 79 

III Gua_Tds Tank : 74.340-41 , 459 

IV Guards Cavalry: 57, 278 

IV Guards M echanized: 161 , 278 

IV Tank: 57 

VI Stalin: 106 

VIII Caualry: 79 

XXIII Tank: 165. 166, ' 77 

XXVI Tank, 57 

XXXllJ Tank: 282 

LXXVlI, 374 

XCIX R;f/" 399 

CXXVI Light Rifle: 399-400 

CXXVIJ Light Rifle: 400 

CXXXI R;f/" 399, 400 

Corps, Soviet, mechanized: 50n 

Corps Detachments, German: 234n 

B: 23, '235 

C, '46 

Cosel: 4'25 

Cossacks: 203 

Cottbus: 477, 479, 480 

Counterinsurgency. See Antipartisan operations, 

German. 

Courland: 407, 407n, 409, 410, 4'4-16, 427, 431l39,457, 464 

Bay of: 430 

Fourth Battle of: 438 

Fifth Battle of: 463-64 

Sixth Battle of: 470 

Crete: 365,367 

Crimea: 12,32, 179-81 , 186, 188, 220, 221,238, 

240, 241 , 244, 275-76, 285, 286-87, 291-95, 

345 

Croatia: 111:11: , 365, 371 

Csepel Island: 38 1, 383 

Curzon Line: 341 

Czechoslovakia: 416, 427,463, 465, 471,504 

Czestochowa : 423, 424 

Danzig: 416, 425, 440, 444,459, 460,461 

Danzig, Bay of: 460, 469 

529 

Danube River: 291 , 351, 352-53, 354, 364. 370, 

37 1,372.374,375.376, 377,378.381 ,382 , 

383,385-86,433,435,436,437, 449,450,452, 

453, 454. 455 

Dardanelles: 358 

De Beaulieu, Generalleutnant Chale!. See Beaulieu, 

Generalleutnant Chales de. 

Deblin: 337 

Debrecen : 359.360, 36 1-62,364,380 

Deception, Soviet: 240-41 ,3 14-15,3 16,401 

Decora tions, German, military: 2B6, 3BB, 436,449 

Decorations, Soviet, military : 170, 171, 264 

Degrelle, Leon: 231 

Demidov : 9B, 170 

Demolition, German: 88, 140-41,380,399 

Demolition, by Soviet partisans: 141 ,308 

Demyansk: 32,98, 101 , 102, 111-1 3, 115 

Denmark : 5 

Derkul River: 68,84 

Deserters, Soviet: 41 , 131 , 131n 

Desna River: I T7, 154, 158, 160, 164.165-66, 167, 

168, 170 

Deutsch Eylau: 430 

Deutsch-Krone : 426,444, 444n 

Dietl, Generaloberst Eduard: 211, 267. 271 , 298, 

299,302,389 

Dietrich, S8-0berstgruppenfuehrer J osef (Sepp): 

445n 

Dirlewanger, 55-8tandartenfuehrer Oscar: 344n 

Divisions, Finnish 

Armored: 298 

3d , 395 

11th : 395 

14th: 388,39 1 

Divisions, German 

AdoU Hitler (55): 73,85,86,89, 139. 186,225, 

'273, 276, 279, 280 

Charlemagne (55): 488 

Clausewitz: 491 

Das Reich (58 ): 73,85,86, 89.90,92, 94, 152, 

156 

D.oeberitz: 444 

Feldherrnhalle Panzer Grenadier: 259, 262 

Fuehrer Grenadier: 452, 469 

Frundsberg. See Divisions, German, loth 58 

Panzer. 

Galicia (58): 332 

Gross-Berlin: 444 

Grossdeutschland: 73, 89, 136, 152, 156, 341, 

34' 
530 

Divisions, German- Continued 

Handschar (55): 378 

Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer: 328, 333, 

337. 340, 341-42 

Hohenstaufen. See Divisions, German, 9th 55 

Panzer. 

Kurmark: 444-

Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (55 ) : 182 

Panzer Grenadier Nordland (55 ) : 406, 488 

Panzer Grenadier Wiking (88 ): 64, 71 , 7'2, 74, 

94. 137. '5'2,23 1,234, 235,279, 340, 386 

Scharnhorst: 491 

Theodor Koerner: 491 

Totenkopf (55 ) : 92,94, 15'2, 156, 183 , 18,. 284. 

337.386 

1St Flak: 461,462 

1St Infantry: 250 

1St Mountain: 288, 310,374. 375,376 

1St S5 Panzer. S ee Divisions, German, Leibsta nd· 

arte Adolf Hitler (55 ). 

1St Panzer: 186 

2d Mountain: 397.399-400 

'2d Parachute: 186 

3d Mountain: 68, 354-

3d Naval: 478,483.48, 

3d Panzer: 86, 152 

4th Panzer: 74, .86 

4th 55 Police: 477, 478 

5 th Flak: 354 

5th Jaege r: 477, 478, 487 

6th Mountain: 94, 397 , 399- 40 I 

6th Panzer : 49, 6' , 149 

7th Air Force Field : 6ll, 87 

7th Mountain: 40 I 

7th Panzer: 6ll, 71 , 7ll, 74, 15ll, 156, 187, 247. 

276,279, 280, 483, 486, 487 

7th 55: 73 

8th Panzer: 166, 167, 247 

9th Panzer: 241-43 

9th SS Panzer: 280, 288 

loth S8 Panzer: 280, 469 

11th Panzer: 61,71 ,72, 74, 84,86,183 

12th Panzer: ll58, 259, ll61 , 263, 266, 322 

13th Panzer: 161 , 162, 179 

14th Panzer: 57, 181-82, 183 

16th Motorized Infantry; 55, 63, 7ll, 75 

16th Panzer : 57, 195- 96, 225 

17th Panzer: 62-63, 94, 225, ll ll6 

18th Artillery: 225 

19th Panzer : 340, 34 1-4ll 

22d Panzer: 49, 6t 

23d Panzer: 61 , 137, ll41 

24th Infantry: 261 

24th Panzer: 18,-83, 184, 186, 228, ll29-31 , 

24 1, 243 

25th Panzer: 182, 185, t87 , 209, 455, 469 

25th Panzer Grenadier: 477, 478, 483,484, 486, 

487 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Divisions, German- Continued 

29th Motorized Infantry: 49, 54 

30 Januar: 444 

57th Infantry: 156,234 

58th Infantry: ll58, 259, ll61, 26ll 

61St Infantry: 253 

68th Infantry, 279, 280 

7lld Infantry: 234, ll 36 

73d Infantry: 344 

75th Infantry: 279 

88th Infantry : 234 

looth Jaeger: 280 

I 12th Infantry: 234 

122d Infantry: 300.301 ,302, 387, 389-90' 

131St Infantry: 279 

163d Infantry: 399 

167th Infantry: '49 

169th Infantry: 401 

210th Infantry : 396 

lU4th Infantry : 265,2 73 

304th Infantry: 74 

332d Infantry: '49 

336th Infantry: 62 

340th Infantry: 247 

367th Infantry: 280 

389th Infantry: 234 

416th Infantry: 268 

454th Security: 246 

551st Grenadier: 407 

Divisions, Italian 

Celere : 68 

Sforzesca: 68 

Divisions, Rumanian 

Armored: 351 

1St Armored: 49. 50, 61 

loth: 291 

Divisions, Spanish: t 9n-20n 

250th, "Blue": 144, 208, ll48 

Divisions, Soviet rifle: Son 

Divisionsgruppe van del' Hoop: 397-99 

Dnepr Bend: 18t , 183, t88, ll22, ll23. 23B. 243, 275, 

.83 

Dnepr River: 9, II , 31. 94, 97, '44, 149, 152, 

154, 159, 165-66, 16B, 170-73 , 18t , 2 1B. 226, 

ll43, 244. 273, 279, 31B, 319. 321 . 323 

description: 174.238-39 

Dnepr line operations: 174-96 

Dnepropetrovsk : 66, 87, 91, g2, 94, 127, 169. 171, 

,83 

Dnepropetrovsk·Stalino rail line: 87, 91 

Dnestr River: 246, ll74, 279, 280, 281 , ll84, 285, 289. 

290, 346, 351 , 352 

Doctrine . See also Strategy, German ; Strategy, 

Soviet. 

German military : 500 

German staff: 362 

Sovi et military: 25-28 

Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl: 109, 259, 32 7, 394, 
INDEX 

Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl- Continued 

460, 472, 477. 482, 483. 485. 490, 492, 493-

94,496--g8 

Don River: '5-17.39.40,47-49.53-57.59.61-64, 

66,7°,72 -75,85. 86 

Don River bend: 18,23.37-38,39,40-4' 

Don-Chir bridgehead: 39. 59, 61, 63. 64 

Donets Basin: 31.32,33.34.87.97. '37, 138, '44, 

162, 165.220 

Donets River: 33,66,68,7',73,74-75,81,82-84, 

8g. go, 96, 97, I 18, 126-27. ' 35. t 43-44, 154, 

164. '7 2 

Donji Miholjac: 450 

Double envelopment, Soviet concept of: 145-46, 

147, 148. See also Encirclement operations, 

German; EncirclclT.cnt operations, Soviet. 

Drava River: 364. 382-83, 449. 450, 454, 455, 456 

Dresden: 440,442,467.471 

Drina River : 377.382 

Dubno: 246,247.276,278 

Dubossary: 29°,291,346 

Dudchino River: 244 

Dukla Pass: 362,363 

Dumitrescu, Col. Gen. Petre: 346 

DunafOldvar: 437 

Dunapentele: 436 

Dust, effect on operations: 178 

Dvina' position: 404 

Dvina River: 11,31,159,206,318,321,327,328, 

335, 342 

Dvinsk: 249,264,324,326,327,328 

Dzhurzhentsy: 233,234,235, 236,437 

East Karelia: 299,3°2,387, 388 

East Prussia : 24, 316, 338, 339, 340, 343, 409, 416, 

419, 425, 428-33, 438, 440, 445, 457n, 460, 

5°3 

East Wall: 121 , 122, 153-54, 173, 174,249,265. 

See olso PANTHER position; WOTA N position. 

Eberswalde: 477, 480 

Edelsheim, General der Panzertruppen Maximilian 

Freiherr von: 496 

Eisenhower, General of the Army, Dwight D.: 467 , 

469, 496-97 

Elbe line: 483, 484 

Elbe River: 419,443, 467,471 , 473, 482, 492 , 493, 

495-96, 498,503 

Elbing: 430, 431 , 438 

Elista: 75 

Emden: 483 

Encirclement operations, German: 11-12, 13, 31, 

33, 40, 94, 97, 106-07, 115, 226-27, 36 1-62 , 

364 

Encirclement operations, Soviet: 14, 50, 53-61, 62-

6~, 69-7 1, 75-80, 81, 82-85, 108-09,226-28, 

240, 253-54, 261 , 275-76, 278-83, 286, 288-

89,321 ,322-23,332,354,378-86, 442, 474-

82,483-86,488,492. See also Double envelop531 

Encirclement operations, Soviet-Continued 

ment, Soviet concept of. 

Enckell, Carl: 269 

Engineer troops, German: 225 

Envelopment. See Double envelopment, Soviet concept of; Encirclement operations, German; Encirclement operations, Soviet. 

Ercsi: 383, 435 

Erfurt: 467 

Erzgebirge: 473 

Estonia: 262,4°4 

Estonian forces: 262,263 

Esztergom: 384, 385, 386, 433, 453-54 

Eszterhaza: 414 

Fastov: 185,187,220 

Fehrbellin: 471 

Feldjaeger (courier) battalions: 214- 15 

Ferch: 483 

Finland: 13, 19n, 24, 109, III. 121 , 126, 208--11. 

248,339, 500. See also Finnish Army ; Mannerheim, Marshal Carl ; Ryti, Risto. 

armistice: 387-91 

German aid to: 300-30 I , 302-03 

rejection of Soviet peace terms: 267-71 

Soviet Kar:e1ian offensive: 296-303 

and withdrawal of German forces: 390-403 

Finland, Gulf of; 100-101 , 154, 197,262,298, 4°4 

Finnish Army: 6, 9. 10, '9n, 101, 102, 109, 208. 

296-3°3,387,388,39°,393. See also Brigades, 

Finnish; Corps, Finnish; Divisions, Finnish. 

Finnish Lapland Command: 395 

Finnmark, Norwegian: 401 

Finow Canal: 471,477 

Focsani: 353,354 

Foraging, by Soviet troops: 147-48 

Forst: 457.471,474 

Fortifications: 75-76, 133-35, 139. 249,416,428, 

430,462. See also East Wall; HAGEN position; 

LITHUANIA position; PANTHER position; PRINZ 

EUGEN position; ROLLBAHN position; SCHUTZWALL position ; WOTAN position. 

"Fortified places": 277, 278, 279, 288, 316, 322, 

323,330-3 2,333 

France, Southern, secondary offensive in: 388 

Franco, Generalissimo Francisco: 208,265 

Frankfurt: 428, 444, 463. 464, 471 , 476, 478, 479 

Freikorps: 464 

Fretter-Pico, General der Artillerie Maximilian: 68, 

359,379-80,383 

Friedeburg, Ceneralaamiral Hans-Georg von: 495, 

496 

Friedland: 431-32 

Friessner, General der Infanterie J ohannes: 326, 

329,333,348.349,35°,351,359-60,362,369 

commands Armeeabteilung Narva: 264-65 

commands Army Group North: 326 

directs retreat to Hungary: 355-58 
532 

Friessner, General der Infanterie J ohannesContinued 

estimate of Army Group South Ukraine condition, 

July 1944' 348 

and Hitler's estimate of British and Soviet intentions: 3580 

interview with Antonescu: 351 

orders attack on Bucharest : 353 

orders retreat to Tisza: 364 

plans attack toward Budapest: 383-85 

relieved of Anny Group South command: 38S 

trades command with Schoerner: 336 

Frische Nehrung: 432,460 

Frisches Hafl': 461 

Fronts, Soviet: 28,30,147 

Belorussian: 191, 196, 223. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, First Belorussian. 

Bryansk: 33.85.136,151,158,191,202. See also 

Fronts, Soviet, Second Baltic. 

Central: 97. 133. 158, 159, 167. 168, 169-70, 

191. See also Fronts, Soviet, Don. 

Don: 49.50,62,73,76,760,79-80,420. See also 

Fronts, Soviet, Cutral. 

Kalinin. See also Fronb, Soviet, First Baltic. 

Nevel gap: 197-99,200--202 

offensive at Rzhev : 106-07 

renamed First Baltic Front: 202 

summer offensive, 1943: 141,160,170 

winteroffensive,1941-42! 32 

Karelian.: 270,296,302 

Leningrad 

advance to Narva River: 257,259,264-65 

Leningrad Military District: 29 

liberation of Leningrad: 250 

offensive against Finland: 296--g9, 302, 387 

operations in Baltic States: 403.407.408 

siege of Leningrad: 111-12,157,197 

South: 33, 73, 85. 138, 175. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, Fourth Ukrainian,' Military Districts, 

Soviet, Odessa. 

Southeast: 40,43. See also Fronts, Soviet, Stalingrad. 

Southwest: 32, 33, 37. See also Fronts, Soviet, 

Stalingrad; Fronts, Soviet, Third Ukrainian. 

disbanded, July 1942: 37 

Kharkovoffensive, 1942: 33 

Kievan Special Military District: 28, 29 

operations at Stalingrad: 50, 68, 73 

reactivated, November 1942: 49 

renamed Third Ukrainian Front: 175 

summer offensive, 1943: 138, lSI, 160, 164, 

166,174-75 

winter offensive, 1942-43 : 85,86,96,97 

Stalingrad: 37. 40,43.50,60, 62, 7 1, 73. See 

also Fronts, Soviet, Don,' Fronts, Soviet, South. 

Steppe: 135,151.152,171,175. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, Second Ukrainian. 

Transcaucasus: 85 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Fronts, Soviet-Continued 

Volkhov: 111,157,198 

liberation of Leningrad: 250,251-53.257, 

259.264 

Voronezh: 68. See also Fronts, Soviet, First 

Ukrainian. 

defense of Kursk : 133 

summer offensive, 1943: 151,164, 168,1 71, 

175 

winter offensive, 1942-43: 81,85,96,97 

West: 206 

attack at Rzhev : 106, 107 

1941 operations: 29, 31, 32 

Orel salient: 136, 141 

replaced, May 1944: 319 

summer offensive, 1943: 159.168, 170 

First BaUic. See also Fronts, Soviet, Kalinin. 

abolished: 445 

activated: 202 

attack on East Prussia : 432,445 

attack toward Riga: 403, 404, 405-06, 407 

employment of partisans: 308 

summer offensive, 1944, build-up: 314 

summer offensive, 1944, operations: 319. 

326,329 

summer offensive, 1944. plans: 318 

First Belorussian: 464. 473. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, Belorussian. 

attack into Pomerania: 444,448,457.459 

Berlin offensive, operations: 474,475, 476, 

478,480,481 

Berlin offensive, plans: 470--71 

strength, April 1945: 471-72 

strength, January 1945: 417 

summer offensive, 1944, build-up: 314-15 

summer offensive, 1944, operations: 320, 

324. 326, 330, 332, 333 

summer offensive, 1944. plans: 318 

Vistula-Oder offensive, operations: 421,423, 

425,428. 440,442. 444 

Vistula'-Oder offensive, plans: 416 

First Ukrainian: 191,473. See also Fronts, Soviet, 

Voronezh. 

attack toward M oravska Ostrava: 457-59, 

465-66 

attack to Neisse: 440--44, 448 

Berlin offensive, operations: 474-76,480--83 

Be-rlin offensive, plans: 467,471 

recaptur~ of Kiev: 184, 186 

spring offensive. 1944: 278 

strength, January 1945: 417 

summer offensive, 1944: 330,343-44 

Vistula-Oder offensive, ope rations: 421-25 

Vistula-Oder offensive, plans: 416, 419-20 

Voronezh Front renamed: 175 

winter offensive, 1944: 219,227,275 

S econ d Baltic 

attack on PANTHER position: 264,265 
INDEX 

Fronts, Soviet-Continued 

Second Baltic-Continued 

Bryansk Front renamed: ~O!l 

operation in Baltic States: 403. 404, 406-07 

summer offensive, 1944: 328,342,343 

Second Belorussian: 275 

Berlin offensive: 46,. 470, 471, 475. 476, 

479, 482-83. 484.491--9 2 , 495 

drive to Baltic, 1945: 429-30, 440, 444-45. 

457, 459, 460 

strength, April 1945: 471-72 

strength, January 1945 : 417 

summer offensive, 1944, build-up: 3'4-15 

summer offensive, 1944. operations: 316-18, 

320.326 

Suond Ukrainian. Su also Fronts, Soviet, Steppe. 

attack toward Krivoi Rag: 181-83 

bridgeheads at Cherkassy: t88, 18g 

at Korsun' Shevchenkovskiy: !226-!27 

operations in Hungary: 360, 362, 373, 374. 

381 ,383 

spring offensive, 1944: 276,277-80, 283-85 

Steppe Front renamed: 175 

summer offensive, 1944: 350,353-56 

Vienna offensive: 437, 449, 452, 454.455 

Third Baltic: 328, 342. 343. 403. 404. 406. 407 

Third Belorussian. See also Groups, Soviet, Samland. 

activated: 319 

operations in East Prussia: 419, 420, 428-

30,44°,445,461 

strength. January 1945 : 417 

summer offensive, 1944, build-up: 314-15 

summer offensive, 1944, operations: gI9-20, 

324,g26,340, 343. 407 

summer offensive, 1944. plans: 318 

Third Ukrainian: 183.24°,241. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, Southwest. 

enters Bulgaria: 358,37 1.373 

in Hungary: 381, g83, 436, 437. 452 

operations in Yugoslavia: 373.374.381 

Southwest Front renamed: 175 

spring offensive, 1944: 276,277.284 

summer offensive. 1944: 350. 35 t 

Vienna offensive: 454.455. 456 

Fourth Ukrainian: 240,275.456. See also Fronts, 

Soviet, South. 

advance to Dnepr: 177-79.241 

attack toward Moravska Ostrava: 465-66 

in Beskides: 359,360, 362-6g. 378 

Crimean operation: 291-95 

South Front renamed: 175 

summer offensive, 1944: 342 

Vistula-Oder offensive: 419. 421. 427 

FRUEHLINCSERWACHEN. Operation: 450--52 

FRUEHLINGSFEST, Operation: 309 

Fuehrer Directives: 21, 340. See also Operations 

Orders. 

Fuehrer Directives-Continued 

2l: 7 

46: 105 

50: 210, 211 ,268-69 

51: 216-17,272.273,280,312 

533 

Fuehrer headquarters: 3, 10,55,87,9°, 163, 168. 

See also Hitler. Adolf. 

Fuehrer Order 10: 199-200 

Fuehrer Order II : 277,279 

Fuerstenwalde: 476,478 

Galatz: 354 

Gasoline shortages, German. See Logistics, German. 

shortages, gasoline. 

Gasoline shortage" Soviet. See Logistics, Soviet. 

shortages, gasoline. 

Gayvoron: 283-84 

Gdynia: 427.444. 459, 46~1 

Geilenberg program: 412 

General Staff, German Army: 21 , 56 

General St~ff, Soviet Army: go 

Geneva Convention: 113 

Genschmar: 444 

Gerstenberg, General der Flieger Alfred: 352-53 

Gestapo: 36g 

Giganten: 284 

Gilgenburg: 429 

Gille, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Herbert: 4g6 

Giurgiu : 370 

Glogau: 425, 426,440,442,469-70 

Gneiunau I::!attle groups: 427 

GNEISENAU line: 291-93 

"Gneiunau" program: 413 

Gniloy Tikich River: 232,233,235.237 

GoebbeIs, J oseph: 15, 123, 130, 413. 460, 463. 490, 

492,493-94 

Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann: 9, 15.20,58, 

124.2 12.259.329. 477.484 

Goerlitz: 442,444,457,469,471,473,474,477 

Goldap-Schillfelde area : 428 

Golikov, General Ley tenant F. 1.: 85 

Golodayevka: 138, 160 

Golubinskaya: 57 

Gomel: 154, 170, 191-92, 193, 195 

Gor'kiy: 133 

Gorodnitsa: 222 

Gorodok : 204, 205, 206 

GOTENKOPF: 82,84.85,118,124,154,157.164, 

165,171 

Gothic Line: 410-1 I 

Govorov, General Polkovnik L. A.: 251 , 253, 259, 

261,263,264,298,300.403 

Great Britain: 9-10, 352, 377. See also Allied 

forces. 

Greece : 365,367,371-72,373,374-75,377,411 

Greim, Generaloberst Robert Ritter von: 484, 490 

Grocka: 377 

Grodno: 328,336 
534 

Crottkau: 465 

Groups, Soviet. See also Fronts, Soviet. 

Cavalry-Mechanized 

Baranow: 337 

First Guards: 453. 456, 466 

GOTshou : 350,35',355. 3611, 378-79 

Oslikovskiy: 318, 3 18n 

Pliyu): 3 18,359. 36 1, 362, 364. 379, 437, 

453 

Popov: 86,9 1,94, 96, '47 

Sam/and: 445 

Grozny: ' 9 

Crudziadz: 444- 45 

Gruppc von der Chcvallerie: g8, 100, 107. 11 3 

Guben: 457-59. 463 

Guben-Crossen area: 4450 

Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz: 339", 405 

appointed acting Chief of Staff, OKH: 335 

attitude on Nazism: 335 

and Budapest : 384-85.435.437 

criticism of General Staff: 311 

and defense of Berlin: 463. 46. 

dismissal : '4, 464 

and Himmler: 410, 446, 464 

and Hungary: 358,359.363 

as Inspec tor General for Armor: 120, 129-3°, 

216,3 11 

in 194' offensive: 12 

report to Hitler, 9 Ja nuary '945: 4,8 

and retreat to Austri a: 454 

role in 20 Jul y '944 events: 335 

and Stargard offensive: 445-48 

and summer campaign , 1944 : 342,343,349 

tour of Eastern Front, January 1945: 4'4, 4, 8, 

435 

visit to Adlerhorst, 24 December '944: 41 0 

and winter campaign, 1945: 4,8, 422,425, 429, 

43· 

Guertelstrasse: 456 

Guestebicse: 444 

Gumbinnen: 409, 4,6, 430 

Gumrak : 57,76,77-78 

G)'or: 439,453 

HAB'CHT: , 26-28 

Hackzell, Ministe r President Antii : 390 

HAGEN position: ' 39. '40, '4' - 42 , 152, 158 , 

Halder, Gcneraloberst Franz: 3-4,5,7, '0- " , 12 , 

17,21 ,23,3 ' ,56,102 

Hamburg: 483, 492,495 

Hammerfest: 40 ' 

Hanko: 268,270,387 

Hansen, General der Kavallcrie Erik: 348, 349, 352, 

353 

Harpe, Gcncraloberst J oseph: 4 22 

Harriman, W, Averell: 420 

Harz Mountains: 479n 

Halvan: 38',383 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Hausse r, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Paul ; 90, 97 

Havel River: 479-80, 484, 487, 488, 491 , 493 

Havelberg : 488, 493 

HE-II"S : 6, 

Hedgehogs: 4' , 57 

H Urt:spusonalamt: 21 

Heiligenbeil : 445, 461 

Heilsberg triangle: 430, 432, 445 

Heim, Genera lleulnant Ferdinand: 54n 

HEINRICH: 203, 204 

Heinrici. Generaloberst Gotthard 

commands Army Group Vistula : 464 

and defense of Berlin: 472, 473, 475. 476, 477, 

479, 480, 484-87 

dismissal : 487, 487n, 49' 

and encirclement of Ninth Army : 480-81 , 484 

requests to be relieved: 476, 478 

Hel Peninsula: 460, 46, 

Heldengedenktag address: '5 

Helsinki: !l67, 387 

Hercegovina: 365 

H ero of the Soviet Union, See Decorations, Soviet. 

High Tatra : 427 

Hil/swillige: 20 

Hill 239,0: 233.234. 235.236 

Hilpert, Generaloberst Karl : 475 

Himmler, Reichsfu ehrer-SS Heinrich : !l59, 278, 

3440. 4 10, 448, 485 

and antiparlisan operations: 105 

a ttempt to get an armistice: 490 

command methods: 426. 444n 

commands Army Group Vistula: 425 

and defense of Berlin: 463 

and defense of Pomerania-West Prussia: 425-26, 

439, 444,459 

and Guderian: 446-47, 464 

Hitl er's assessment of: 425 

retirement from command : 464 

and Stargard offensive: 446- 48 

and Warsaw uprising: 344n 

H itler, Adolf 

and abolition of the General Staff: 21 

antipartisan measures: 105, 11 3-15 

and Antonescu: '79, !lH. 294, 349 

assassination attempt, 20 Jul y 1944: 335 

assessment: 502 

and BARBAROSSA: 12-13 

and BAR8ARossA plan: 6-g 

and 'the Cherkassy pocket: 22B, 229, 232 

command methods: 5. 10- 11 , 14-15,223 

commands Army Group A: 4 

and the Crimea: 179-81, 244. 293-95 

decision to remain in Berlin: 490 

and defense of Berlin: 461 , 462,463.464. 469-

70.472- 74. 475, 476.477-80,482, 483. 492 

and defense of Dnepr line: 175, '77, 183, 186, 

189, 192, 194, 195 

and defense of East Prussia: 429, 430, 432, 438 
INDEX 

Hitler, Adolf--Continued 

and defense of Koenigsberg: 470 

and defense of Pomerania and West Prussia: 457. 

459, 460 

and Demyansk pocket: 101-02, 112-1 3 

determination to invade Russia: '24.25 

East Wall decision : 123.153-54 

estimate of Soviet strength, 24 December 1944: 

4 10 

fanatical resistance doctrine: 14,22,78, 160 

the generals' declaration of loyal ty: 3 I I 

and H orthy: 287.363 

influence on psychological warfare: 148 

interview with Guderian, 9 January 1945: 418 

last days of: 482.84, 490, 492-93 

leadership principles: 130, 214. :n5-16, 438, 464 

and manpower procurement: 119-20, '213 , 214. 

4 1 3 

and miracle of House of Brandenburg: 414,504 

and naval affairs: 109, 26B, 405 

and Nevel gap: 199-'200, 20 I, 203-05, 207 

and new weapons: 74.120.130 

and Normandy invasion: 312 

occupa tion policy: 105123-24 

official functions: 3, 3n. 5 

and Operation BUEFFEL: 1 15-17 

and Operation MARGARETHE: 287-88 

and operations in Hungary: 356, 359. 360, 364. 

380,439,450,452.454.455.456 

personality: 56.73.85.87.91--92,130,186,217. 

221,223. 258,260-61.490 

plans attack on Leningrad: 101 

plans for HABICHT and PANTHER: 127-28 

plans for 1942 offensive: 4. 17 

plans for ZITADELLE: 124-26. 128-30, 131-32 

proposals that he relinquish command: 87,91,163 

and recapture of Kharkov: 91-92 

relations with allies: 121-22 

relations with Finland: 209.210-11, 268, 269-

70, 299, 389, 390 

relations with generals: 3-4, 5, 21, 87-88, 154. 

163-64, 199-200, 207, 212-13, 221, 256-57, 

286,3 11.329,345.464 

responsibility for German defeat: 502 

and retreat to Courland: 403. 404-05, 406, 407, 

409 

and retreat from Greece: 369,372,375 

and retreat from Leningrad: 250, 253, 254-55, 

257, 260, 266 

and retreat from Vistula to Oder: 422, 423, 425. 

438 

scorched-earth policy: 171 . 463, 472 

and siege of Budapest: 381, 384, 385, 435, 436, 

437.439.448-49 

speeches: 15, 44.2 14. 256-57.311,414 

and spring campaign. 1944: 278,280,283,285. 

,88 

and Stalingrad: 48, 54. 56, 57, 58-59, 61. 62-63. 

234-7l} 0-68-36 

Hitler, Adolf- Continued 

65, 69. 70-7 1, 76-77,78 

and Stargard operation : 445-47 

535 

as a strategist: 119. 124-26, 143. 163, 165. 173, 

179-80. 209, 211,216-17 ,223.3 10,3 12 ,339, 

358,410.411,414,439,462-63,502 

suicide: 492 

and summer campaign, 1943 : 153, 154, 156, 160, 

162, 164. 165, 168, 169, 171 ,3 14,321.326, 

327,328,329, 333. 339. 34 1,349, 352, 354 

and summer offensive, 1942: 18-29, 39, 44. 46 

and surrender of Italy : 139 

tactical conceptions: 15,22.87. 177,206,216. 

221 ,223,256,258,422 , 445, 462 

testaments, personal and political: 492 , 493 

and Twentieth Mountain Army: 210-11,268-69 

view of British-Soviet rivalry: 358,372 

and war production: 119, 120,411 

and Warsaw uprising: 344n 

and winter campaign, 1941-42: 13-15 

and winter campaign, 1942-43: 72, 73, 74. 82, 

85--90.91-92 

and winter campaign, 1943-44: 220-21, 223, 

228, 232, 238, 243-44. 254-55. 257, 260, 266 

and world opinion: 44.92. 128,132-33, 195 

ZITADELLE canceled: 139-40 

Hitler Youth: 481 

Hiwis (Russian auxiliaries): 412 

Hoeppner, Generaloberst Erich: t 4 

• 

Hollidt, General der Infanterie Karl: 71, 72-73, 

74. 75. 160-61 . 162, 164. 240. 241. 242-43. 

277. 282.283, 285 

Holste: 492 

Home guard. See Volk ssturm. 

H orses: 9; 9n. 172. 229, 279· See also Cavalry, 

Soviet; Panje wagons. 

Horthy, Admiral Miklos: 122, 287,357-58,363 

Hospitals: 168,234 

Hossbach. General der Infanterie Friedrich: 431, 

43' 

Hoth. Generaloberst Hermann 

assessm~nt: 212 

and battle at Kiev: 185-88 

comments on Rumanian troops: 44, 53 

Hitler's opinion of: 212 

and recapture of Kharkov: 92,94.96--97 

relief: 212 

and retreat to Dnepr: 152, '57. 167, ,68, 169 

and Stalingrad encirclement: 53, 54, 60, 70, 72, 

74 

and summer offensive, 1942: 39,41 

and ZITADELLE : 137 

Hron River: 384,435, 437,445,448-49,454 

Hube, Generaloberst Hans: 188-89, 226. 280-82, 

::!S9 

HUBERTUS line: 418 

Hungarian forces: 17, 19n, 48, 87, 144, 167, 170, 

287. 289. 359, 360, 454-55· See also Armies, 
536 

Hungarian forces- Continued 

Hungarian ; Corps, Hungarian. 

Hungary 

attempt at an armistice: 363-64 

attitude toward the war: 122,208,357-58,360, 

367 

German military intervention in: 287 

plan for German occupation of: 208, '272-73. 

26,-88 

and treaty of Vienna: 352 

Husi: 351,353.354 

Iasi: '291, 346. 350, 351. 352 

limen, Lake: 101 , 248, '253. 260, 261 , 262, 263. 26, 

I1 omantsi: 388 

Imredy, Bela : 287 

Infantry, Soviet, evaluation of: 147 

logu! River: 243. 278,283 

Ingulets Rive r: 244. 273, ~78, 283 

Intelligence. Finnish: 296 

Intelligence, German: 28, 34. 36, 47 , 48, 49. 105, 

143-44. 160, 213-14. 250, 256, 264, 313. 3 t 4. 

3 15. 319 • • p6, 4t8, 420, 422, 439-40,442-43. 

457-59. 47 3 

Intelligence, Soviet: 4.32-33, 76, 161, 200, 264. 

30 7,308, 4'9 

Ipa Ri ver : '96, 223-24 

Ipolysag: 383-84 

Iron Gate: 355,356, 37 ' , 37~. 374 

Iron mines: '44, 38. 329 

Isthmus Front: 102 

Italian forces: 17. 19n, 48, 68, 87. Su also Armies. 

Italian ; Corps, Italian ; Divisions. Italian. 

Italy: 121 -22. 139-40, 152, 195, 208, 2' 0, 365, 388, 

4 11 , 460, 467 

Ivalo : 210,268,269,396,397, 401 

Izvestia: 267 

I zyum: 33,87,96.127, 138, '43, ,60, ,62 

Ja eger Stab: 312 

Jaenecke, General der Pioniere Erwin: 180-81 , 

29 1-95 

Jaroslaw: 337 

Jashkul: 54 

Jelgava: 338,404 

J eschonnek, Generaloberst Hans: 129, 212-13 

J odi, Generaloherst Alfred: 12,91, 126, 212 ,270, 

339 

assessment: 487 

chief of Armed Forces Opt'rations Staff: 3 

functions: 4, 5. 21 

influence on strategic planning: 5,2 1, 163. 288, 

310, 479 

in last days of the war: 479, 480, 481,483-87 , 

49 1,492 

negotiates surrender: 496-97 

and Operation ZITAOELLE: 132 

relationship with Hitler: 4,57, 479, 481, 483, 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

J odi, Generalobe rst Alfred-Continued 

485 

visit to Finland: 210-11 

J ordan, General der Infanterie Hans: 3 16,32 1,324 

JU-52'S: 59.61,234,282,372 

Jueterbog: 476 

Kagul : 354 

Kaiser Wilhelm (Kiel ) Canal : 483 

Kalach: 40, 50n, 52, 54, 55-56.57.62 

Kalinin : ' 3 

Kalinkovi chi: 193-94 

Kalitva River: 68 

Kalmius River: 162, 164. ,65 

Kamenets-Podol'skiy: 279,280 

Kamenka Ri ve r: 220,222,223,241,243.285 

Kamensk: 66, 71, 86 

Kaminski, Mieczyslaw: 344n 

Kampfgruppe: 156, 19' , ~47 , 293 

Kampfgruppe Ruebel: 400, 40 I 

Kandalaksha: 102, 268 

Kanev: 169,222,226 

Kaposvar : 382, 437 

Karachev: '59 

Karelia, Isthmus of: 102, 209, 296-303,387,388 

Karc suando: 268--69, 40 I 

Karpovka : 57 

Kaskama Lake: 400 

Katyushas. Su Rocket projectors. Soviet. 

Kaunas: 327,328,333,336-37.338--39.340, 342 

Kazatin : 218, 19 , 2~0, 222 

Kecskemet : 364,378,379, 45'2 

Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm: 3-4,5, 12 , 

21, 119, ~67 , 270, 272, 349-50, 387-88, 475. 

479. 480, 493 , 496 

assessment: 48, 

and defense of Berlin : 461 

last days of war: 484, 485-86,487.491, 492 

"Kessd ( pocket ) psychosis": 453 

Kemi: 395 

Kemiyarvi: '268 

Kempf, General der Panzertruppen Werner: 90, 

'30, 152-53 

Kerch': 186 

Kerch' Peninsula: 32, 154, 179. 291 , ~9~ 

Kerch' Strait: 85 

Kern/estung: 378 

Kcsselring, Gcncralfeldmarschall Albert: 469, 47~ 

Kesten'ga : 102 

Khalkuta: 54 

Kharkov: 3 ' , 32, 33. 85, 86, 87, 89-90, 92, 124, 

126-27. 128, 135, 143-44 

Germans retake: 94-97 

Russians rctake: 149-57 

Kherson: 178, 179, 182,273 

Khersonyes. Cape: 294 

Khil'ki : 234, 235 

Kholm: 98, 101 ,248 
INDEX 

Khotin: 280-81 

Khrushchev, General Ley tenant Nikita S.: 23. 40 

Kiel Canal: 483 

Kielce : 4'9, 421,422 

Kienitz : 444-

Kiev: 92, 97. 154. ,67. 168, 169. '74. ,8g. 216, 

~u 8, 229 

in BARB A RO SS A plan: 7.9 

liberation of: 184- 86, 188, 193 

Killinger, Manfred Freiherr von: 348, 352- 53 

Kinzel, Generalleutnant Eberhard: 257, 260, 459 

Kirkcnes: 396, 397-99,400, 401--03 

Kirov: 116, 167 

Kirovograd : 223.226-2 7. 244. 277. 28, 

Kithira: 373-74-

Klaypeda: 407 

Kleist, Generatreldmarschall Ewald von: 82, 93. 

165.166, 177 , 231 , 243. 283.284, 291 

appointed to command Army Group A : 7 I 

commands Eighth Army: 285 

and the Crimea: 179-81 

dismissed by Hitler: 286, 288 

and retrtat to Bug: 243-44-

and retreat to GOT£NKOPF: 85 

Klctskaya: 50,52 

Klintsy: 159 

Klisura: 371 , 377 

Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von : 100, 

116, '30, 137 , 15~ , 158-60, 191-92 

commands Army Group Center, 1941 : 98 

conducts retreat to PANTHER position: 167-70 

conferences on ZITADELLE: 129,137 

confrontation with Hitler, 3 September 1943: 

,63 

declares stand·and-fight order futile: 160 

on decline of troop quality: 215 

injured and replaced: 192 

on occupation policy: 123-24 

proposes withdrawal, winter 1943 : 117 

protests retreat from Orel salient: 139-4' 

Kobyl'shchina: 196 

Koch, Erich : 340 

Koenigsberg : 256, 403, 419, 428, 430-3 1, 432, 438, 

445, 460, 461 , 470 

Koenigswusterhausen: 477, 478 

Koeslin: 459 

K olbug: 459, 460 

Kolberg: 459, 460 

Koller, Generalobersl Karl: 476 

Kollontay. Madame Alexandra M.: 268 

Kolomyya: 287 

Kolosyoki: 102 

Kolosyoki Ni ckel Works : 399. 399n 

Komarno : 386, 433.435 . 436, 439, 454,455 

Komarovka: 236, 237 

Komrat: 351 

Konev, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Ivan S. : 227. 

244, 275 

Konev, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Ivan S.-

Continued 

assessment: 227 , 502 

537 

and attack toward Moravska Ostrava : 465-66 

and attack to Neisse: 440.442, 443-44 

and defense of Kursk: 135 

and liberation of Kharkov : 151 

minion in Berlin offensive: 47 J 

operations in Berlin offensive: 474. 476, 479 

opinion on attack across Oder: 439 

and spring offensive, 1941 : 277.280. 283-84 

stops on Neisse: -u.8 

and summer offensive. 1944: 332,333. 34', 342 

and thrust to Krivoi Rog: 181-84 

and Vistula-Oder operations: 419. 423, 425. 428 

KORMORAN: 309 

Korosten: 186,187, 189, 218,220, 221-22,244 

Korsun' Shevchenkovskiy, Battle of: 226n, 231. See 

also Cherkassy. 

Korten, General der Flieger Guenther: 212-13 

Koszeg: 454, 455 

Kotelnikovo : 54. 55,58. 59, 60,61 , 72 

Kotka: 267 

Kovel': 219, 246, 247, 273, 275, 277. 278, 313, 318, 

319, 330-32 

Kragujevac : 375 

Krakow : 341 , 414. 419, 421 , 422. 423, 424 

Kralj evo : 375. 377.3 78. 382 

Kraslava : 327 

Krasnaya Rive·r: 86, 127 

Krasnoarmeyskoye: 91, 94 

Krasnograd: 94. 96 

Krasnogvardeysk: 255, 256 

Krasnoye Selo: 253 

Krebs, General der Infanterie Hans 

appointed acting Chief of Staff, OKH: 464 

character: 464-65 

and defense of Berlin: 473, 476. 477,478,480. 

483. 488 

negotiations with Russians : 493 

suicide : 494 

Kremenchug: 97, 169, '71 , 18, 

Kremenskaya: 41 

Kremmen: 492 

Kriunfestigkeit : 215 

Krivoi Rag: 144, 181-84, 188, 189, 216, 221,238-

40, 242, 244. 273 

Kromy : 140 

Krosigk, Graf Lutz Schwerin von: 497 

Krukenberg, SS·Brigadefuehrer Gustav 488 

Krystynopol: 332 

Kuban : 118, 143. S ee also GOTENKOPF. 

Kuberle River: 74 

Kuechler, Generalfeldmarschall Georg von: 101 

and Demyansk pocket: 112-13 

and Hitler: 250, 257. 261 

and Nevel gap : 199, 200, 203-05, 207, 211 

relieved: 257 
538 

Kuechler, Generalfeldmarschall Georg \100-

Continued 

a nd retreat from Leningrad: 221 , 249,250,25 ' , 

253-57 

Kuestrin : 425. 428, 444. 4450, 463,464,47',473 

KUOELBLITZ : 115 

Kulm: 426 

Kumsky: 64 

Kuparsaari : 2g8 

Kupyansk: 86, 12 7 

Kurische Nehrung: 430 

Kursk: 17.18,85. 97.113, 117. 124, 126, 128, ' 33-

35, 137. 158-59. See also ZITAD£LLE. 

Ku tersel'ka: 299 

Ku toa: 4'9 

Kuty: 346 

Kuznetsov, Ceneral Ley tenant V. I. : 68n 

Ladoga, Lake: 9, 101 , 102, t II , I nz, '57.248, '253, 

298,299,302 

Lakatos, Col. Gen. Geza: 357-58, 363 

Lakselv : 396, 401 

Lammers, Hans: 120 

Lan road : 399 

Landsberg: 445n 

Lanz, General cler Gebirgstruppen Hubert: 86, 89-

90 

Larisa: 377 

Lascar, Ceneral M ihail: 54. 54" 

Lasch , General der I nfanterie Otto: 4 70 

La tvia: 249, 262, 407n. See also Courland. 

Lauenhurg: 492 

Lavansaari Island: 262 

League of German Officers: 149, 31 I, 339, 345 

Leeb, Generalfeldmanchall Wilhelm von : 9, 14 

Lehnin Forest: 491 

Leipzig: 467 

Lend-lease, to USSR: 146, 'l41, 275,501 

Leningrad : 4,7, 9,12. 15,23,3 1,32, 33.101,102, 

109. 111 - 12, 118,124-26, 197. 203, 210.248-

49. 2S0, 418 

Lepel: 304, 308 

Leuhus: H2 

Lida: 326,327 

Lieb, Generalleutnant Theobald: 233. 236-37 

Liehenwalde: 491-92 

Lieherose: 480 

Liegnitz: 442, 4S7 

Liepaja: 328 

Lindemann, Generaloherst Georg: 2So-S3. 256, 

257, 2S8, 2S9, 26" 266, 326 

Linz: 467 

Lisichansk: 84. 86 

Liski: 8 , 

List, Genera lfeldmarschall Wilhelm : 3-4, 17 

Lisyanka : 232-37 

Lithuania: 249, 262 

LITH UANIA position: 326-27 , 329, 333 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Litsa River: 102,397,399 

Livny: 84 

Lobanok, Col. Vladimir: 308, 309 

Lodeynoye Pole: 302 

Lodz: 4'9, 424 

Loehr, Generaloberst Alexander: 365,37',373-74, 

37S, 377, 497 

Loetzen: 430, 431 

Loewenberg: 473 

Logistics, German. See also Air strength , German; 

Armor strength, German ; Artillery strength, 

German ; Railroads; Roads; individual items 

by name. 

materiel strength: 9. '7-18,32, 50-S2, 76n, '44-

45.178. 251, 3 15,350. 417. 471-72 

shortages 

ammunition: 17. 39. 46, 62. 76, 76n, 78, 

156-57. 189, 193.229.241.380,433.435. 

445, 446, 449. 459. 472, 4 73. 481 , 492 , 

49B 

clothing: 14. 15.290 

food: 62.69,70, 75,78, 290,385,433,448 

gasoline: 19,39,53.57,64,70-7 1,76, 76n, 

193, 229, 232 , 32 1. 355, 4 12. 433, 437, 

446, 449.459. 4 72.473,498 

motor vehicles : 199.377.411-12 

weapons: 53,242, 276, 'l77, 435 

supply operations by air: 18,57.58,59,61,62, 

64, 68-69. 70. 7 ' , 73. 75, 77. 78. 87. 92-93. 

103. 187,205.2 13. 23 1-32,281, 433, 435, 48S 

supply operations, ground: 55,64,74, 140, 'lOS. 

210,218- 19,228,23 1,233.249,343,39 1,396• 

399.400 

supply operations by sea: 293,405 

supply system: 5, 214. 215 

war production: 119, 120-21,311-12,411-12, 

425. 4 7' , 499-500 

Logistics, Soviet. See also Air strength, Soviet ; 

Armor strength , Soviet ; Artillery strength, 

Soviet; Railroads; Roads; individual items by 

name. 

materiel superiority: 29.32,34, S0-5:i1, 760.1 44-

45, 177-78,228, :il4', 298, 3'4-'5, 350, 465. 

470, 471-72,500 

shortages 

ammunition: 380,445 

food: 144 

gasoli ne: 96, 339 

supply operations by a ir : 85, 103. 307, 308, 309 

supply operations, ground: 46, 11 I. liS. 166, 'lOS, 

24:i1 , 303. 34' , 362, 419-:il0, 445.452 

supply operations by sea: 109 

supply system: '47-48,275,304 

war production: 27,34, 37, II I , 500 

Loimola Lake: 299 

Lokot: 3Hn 

Loukhi: 102,268 

Lowe r Silesia: 442, 443, 444 
INDEX 

Loyev: 18g 

Lozovaya: 94, 96 

Lublin: :2 '9, 246, 3'3, 330, 333. 336, 337, 341 , 42 I 

Luchesa River : 106, 107, 31B 

Ludwigslust: 495 

Luebeck: 483.492 , 495 

Luettwitz, General def Panzertruppen Smilo Freiherr von: 423 

Lufthansa: g88 

Luftwaffe: 135-36,424. Su also Air Force, German. 

Luga: 256, 257. 259,260,26, 

Luga River: 249.256,257.259.260,267 

Lufe!: 268 

Lule!-Narvik railroad: 396 

Luostari: 399. 400 

Lutezh: 184. 185 

Lutsk: 246,247.276,278, 31g 

Lutto: 401 

Lutto Valley : 401 

L'vo\!: 21g, '246, 280, 288, 31g. 330,332-33.336, 

337 

L'vov-Odessa railroad: 273 

Lyngen Fiord: 396 

Lyngen position: 396,401 

Lysogory River: 421 

Maaselka Front: 102,299.302 

M acedonia: 365.370,37 1, 373.375.378 

Machine guns, Soviet: J -47 

M ackensen, Generaloberst Eberhard von: 86, 9~, 

94,96, 165,175,177,181-84,188 

Madona: 403, 406 

Magdeburg : 473, 479 

Magnuszew : 339,341 , 342,416,418,419,420,421 

Maikop: 19, 82 

Malin: 189 

Malinovskiy, General Armii Rodion 85, ~40 , 

241 

and advance to Vienna : 455 

and Budapest encirclement: 380,383,384 

and operations in Hungary: 359, 360, 361-62, 

364,379, 437,453 

and spring offensive, 1944: 275,277,282,290 

and summer offensive, 1943 : 166 

and summer offensive, 1944: 350,354,355 

Mamai Hill: 42-43, 78 

Manganese mines: 238, 358 

Manich Canal: 75,84 

Mannerheim, Marshal Carl: 9 

and German embargo, April 1944: 270 

and German withdrawal: 394 

loss of confidence in Germans: 2 1 0-1 I, 267 

as President of Finland: 387-88, 390 

reaction to Stalingrad: 109 

refusal to stage offensive: ~71 

and Soviet 1944 offensive: 298-99,3°0-3°1 ,3°3 

on Soviet performance in 1939 war: 26 

539 

Manpower, German: 19-21 , 213-16,339-40, 340n, 

412 

control: 119-~0 

problems: 19-21 , 213-16,339-40, 340n, 412 

Manpower, Soviet: 4,500 

Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich von 

assessment: 56-57.212 

commands Army Group Don: 55-56 

commands Eleventh Army: 101 

and defense of Dnepr line: 177, 181-82, 183, 

184, 186, 187-89 

dismissed: 286 

and Hitler: 56, 91-92, 138, 160, 163-64. 165, 

168-69, '77, 186, 212, ~65 . ~86, ~88 

ideas on strategy: 163,217 

and recapture of Kharkov: 91-g~, 94, 96, 97 

and retreat to Dnepr: '49, 151, 15~ -53, 154-57, 

161-64, 165, 166, 168, 169 

and spring campa ign, '944: 273-77, ~78. 280-

81 , 284, 266,286 

and Stalingrad: 58, 59. 6~, 63, 64, 66-69, 70-75 

and winter campaign, 94~-43: 8~-84 , 85, 86-87 

and winter campaign, I 943-44: ~18-2~, ~23-25 J 

2~7 , ~26, ~31-32 , 233-34, 237-38, ~42 , 244, 

246, 247 

and ZITADELLE: 124, 128, 129, 133. 137-38 

Manteuffel, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von: 

460, 484. 487 , 488n, 491 , 496 

MARGARETHE: ~08 , 287-68 

Mariampol : 336, 339, 340 

Marina Gorka: 322,324,325 

Marlupol: 97 

Marxism: 503-04 

Maslennikov, General Armii 1. I.: 403 

Masurian Lakes: 419, 430, 431 

Materiel. See Logistics, German; Logistics, Soviet. 

Matra M ountains: 381 

Mecklenburg : 485 

Melitopol : 97, 154, 165, 178-79 

Memel : 328,336, 407, 408, 430 

Memel Ri ver: 4~8 

Memorial Day (Heldengedenktag) address: 15 

Merefa: 90, 152 

Meretskov, General Polkovnik Kirill A.: 251, ~53 , 

259. ~63 , ~64, 302 

Merlya River: 15~, 156 

Metsovon Pass: 377 

Mga : '57. 197 

Michael, King: 352,353 

Middle East. as German objective: 3 

Mihailovic, Colonel Draia: 367 

Mikkeli : ~99. 30 1 

Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw: 34 ' 

Milch, Ceneralfeldmarschall Erhard: 76-77 

Military Districts, Soviet. See also Fronts, Soviet. 

Baltic Special: ~8 , 28n 

Kievan Special: 28, ~8n 

Leningrad : 28. 28n 
540 

Military Districts, Soviet-Continued 

OdeHa: 28, 28n 

Western Special : 28, 28n 

Military reforms, Soviet: 26-27.35-36 

Millerovo : 68, 73. 75 

Mine fields, Soviet: 135. 447.452 

Minsk: 9. II, 304. 309. 318, 319. 322, 323, 324. 

32 5.3'26 

Mishkova River: 64. 69. 71 

MiskoJc: 359.361-62,381,383 

Mitau.East position: 404 

Mitrovica: 375 

Mius River: 3',57. 86, 87-89. go, 92, IS8, '43. ,6. 

Mlawa: 429 

Model, Generalfeldmarschall Walter 

assessments: 138-39. 159. 258, 265-66, 324 

commands Army Group Center: 324 

commands Army Group North: 257 

commands Army Group South: 265 

commands Western Theater: 343 

and defense of Dnepr bridgehead: 193. Ig6 

as Manstein's successor: 2HZ, 257. 266 

and retreat to PANTHER position: 266 

and S child und Schwert theory: !l:58-59,313-14, 

3'5 

and spring campaign, 1944: 273 

and summer campaign, 1943 : 15, 159, 16o, 167 

and summer campaign, 1944: 324, 326-29, 333, 

336-37, 338--39, 340-42 

and ZITAOELLE : 129, 136, 141 

Modlin: 416, 420,422,423 

Mogilev : 318,320,322.323 

Mogilev.Podol'skiy: 279,280,281,284.285 

Mohacs: 364,382 

Moldau River: 498 

Moldavia : 347 

Molodmaya River: 166 

Molodechno: 309,318,325.326 

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 24. 269 

Montenegro: 365 

Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. : 492 , 

495. 496 

Mor: 453 

Morale 

German: 13,91, 118, 119, 167, 174, 200, 237-38, 

342-43. 345. 4 13. 438, 448, 453. 454. 455. 

479n 

Hungarian : 363-64 

Rumanian : 59n. 290-91 , 348. 350, 351 

Soviet: 24,32,33,41,104.113 

Morava River: 376,456 

Moravian basin: 466 

Moravian Gate: 463 

Moravska Ostrava: 442, 459. 463, 465. 466 

Morozovsk: 69, 70, 71, 73, 74 

Moscow: 4, 7. 9.12-13. 14. 15,31.32-34.37,98, 

113. 115. 269,3 '1 , 461 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Moscow Conference, October 1944: 372 

Moscow Line: 298. 302 

Mosh River: 96-97 

Mostar: 377 

Motor vehicles. Su Logistics, German; Logistics, 

Soviet. 

Mud: 14°.205, 225.227. 228.229,231 ,232.233. 

235,240,241-42.256,265,273.275.281,447 

Mueggel Lake: 478 

Mueller, General der Infanterie Friedrich : 432 

Muencheberg : 475. 476 

Muhu: 407 

Munich conference, '943: 129 

Muonio: 396,401 

Muresul line : 362 

Muresul River: 355. 356-57.358,359 

Murmansk: , 102. 109 

Munnansk (K irov) Railroad: 9, 13. 18, 101 . 102 

Muskau: 471.474 

Mussolini. Benito: 121-22, 139 

Nagybajom: 455 

Nagykanizsa: 382,412,439,450,455 

Nalibocka Forest: 318, 326 

Namslau: 424, 425 

Narew River: 341 , 416. 418, 428 

Narva: 257.262-65,268,387,403,405 

Narva River: 154, 209.249,262-63 

Narvik: 396 

National Free Germany Committee: 149 

National Socialist Leadership Conference : 256-57 

National Socialist leadership discussions: 335 

Nauen : 48 1 

Navy, German: 10, 109,293.294-95. 327.391 ,394. 

404--05, 460 

Navy, Soviet: 13. 118. 262,268 

Nazi·Soviet pact : 24.25 

Nehrung : 461 

Neisse River: 443, 444. 448. 457. 465, 466, 467 , 

47 1. 474 

Neman River: 325. 326, 327. 328, 333. 338, 409, 

4.8 

Neu Roofen: 480, 483. 492 

Neubrandenburg: 484.487. 491 , 492 

Neusiedler Lake : 455 

Neustrelitz: 471 , 487, 491 

Neva River: I II 

Nevayazha River: 339 

Nevel: 154, 189, 197-98, '99-200, 201 -02 , 203, 

205.264. 277. 

Nevel gap: 197- 207,210.2 11 ,248.249, 253 

Nezhin: 167. 168 

Nickel: 102 , 210, 329. 391, 396. 400. See also 

K olosyoki Nickel Works. 

Nida River: 421 

Nikolaev: ,8' , 182,282,289 

NIKOLAUS: 195- 96 
INDEX 

Nikopol: 178, 179, 183. 184. 186, I 88-8g. 221 , 

238-40, 242,244 

Ni5: 370,371,372,373.375,377 

Nizhne Chirskaya: 57 

NKVD: 29. 103 

NKVD 0 .0 ., 307 

Nagar Steppe: 178, t 84. ,86 

NORDLICHT: 395-403 

Normandy landings: 31 '2 

North Africa: 53,61 , 109.119. HII, 1'29. ' 30, 27'2, 

50 3 

Northern Defense Area: 399 

Northern Theater: 6 

Norway: 5. 6, 1'26, '2og, 396, 4' 0 

Novaya Kalitva: 66,68,8, 

Novgorod.: 251 , 253. 254, '259 

Novgorod~Severskiy: 165 

Novo Odessa: '28'2, 28g 

Novocherkauk: 77.86 

Novograd Volynskiy: 244 

Novo-Moskovsk: 91. 94 

Novorossisk: 118 

Novosokol'niki: 108, 198--99. '201, '204-05. '207. '259 

Navy Bug : '278,28'2 

Nowo Miasto: 429 

Nyiregyhaza: 364. 380 

Oberkommando des Hetres (OKH ). Set also 

Hitler, Adolf. 

assessment of Manstein: 56 

Chiefs of Staff: 3. 4, 21, 87, 163 , 335. 464, 481 

command functions terminated: 481 

in command structure: 3.4.5, 12, 13.21, 163, 

48 , 

communications measures in last months of war: 

42 3n 

and defense ol Berlin: 461 

Eastern Intelligence Branch estimates: 4, 47,48, 

49, 105-06. 143-44. 213-14,3 ' 3.3 15,457 

headquarters at Rastenburg : 10 

headquarters at Vinnitsa: 3 

headquarters at Zossen: 410 

Hitler becomes Commander in Chief. OK H: ' 3 

involvement in 20 J uly 1944 plot: 335 

OKW·OKH rivalry: 5, 21 -2 2, 132, 163, 182, 

21 7,280,288,3 10 

Operations Branch: 30-3 ' . 112- ' 3, 168, 182. 

186, 328,337.351,360, 423 

Operations Branch leaves Berlin: 477 

Organizational Branch: 20. 105 

responsibility for Eastern Front: 6, 12 , 21-22, 

74. 105. 163,247, 422,42 3 

and Vlasov movement: 123 

Oberkommando du Kriegsma rine (OKM ): 10, 

268, 293 

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL): 9 

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW ): 13, log. 

209,449 

Oberkommando der Wehrma cht (OKW )-

Continued 

541 

Armed Forces Operations Staff: 3,5,21,131-32. 

27 2,477 

and Balkans: 368,369. :370, 371, 3711, 375 

Chief, OKW: 3,5 

command responsibilities: 6, 21 , 481 

created: 5 

and defense of Berlin : 461,481 , 485-86, 4911 

and Finland: 209,210, 267,268, 2g8, 3011,387. 

395-96 

functions: 5, 111,163 

as Hitler's personal staff: 3,5, to, 111,163 

and Hungary: 1108,287,353 

last days of wa r : 492, 498 

leaves Bedin: 480 

and manpower procurement: 215-17 

OKW·OKH rivalry : 5. 111-22, 1311 , 163, 182, 

2'7, 280. 288, 310 

and surrende r: 498 . 

and Vlasov movement: 1113 

Oder-Neisse line : 442, 462,463, 471 

Oder River: 416, 418, 419, 420,421 , 423, 425, 4116, 

428, 438, 439, 442, 444, 447.459. 460, 461 . 

465,469, 471,474, 476, 479. 480, 482-83, 503 

Odessa: 1185.289-90 

Oil. production ol: 312.412 

Oil fields : 3. 4, '7, 18, 19, 37.82, 179,1159. 312. 

329. 353,354-55,382,412, 439. 450, 454-55. 

456 

Oitoz Pass: 355.356 

OKH. See Oberkommando des Heeres. 

OKL. See Oberkommando der Luftwaffe. 

OKM. See Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine . 

OKW. See Oberkommando der Wehrma cht. 

Olomouc: 456, 465 

OJonets, Isthmus of: 302 

Olympus, Mount : 370 

Onega, Lake: 102 

Opava: 466, 467 

Operations Orders: 21 - 22. See also Fuehrer Direc· 

tives. 

I: 22, 58n 

2: 72, 73 

3 ' 86 

4 : 9 1 

5: 124-26,1311 

6: BIB 

8: 323 

Oppeln: 424, 442, 465 

Oradea: 360,361,362 

Oranienbaum: 100- 101 , 221 , 480, 483 , 484, 485, 

488, 492 

Oranienhaum pocket: 197 

Orel: 32, 49, 96, 117. 128, 135, 137,139, 140,14' , 

144, 146, 148, 151 , 152 

Orel-Kursk railroad: 135 

Orel River: 94 
542 

Orsha: 154,207.311, 31B, 3 19, 320, 323 

Ortelsburg: 430 

Dskol River: 127 

Oslikovskiy, General Ley tenant N. S.: 31 8n 

Osobyi Otdel: g07 

Ostrov : 249,327,328 

Osttruppen: 203 

Otsekin: 165 

Oulu: 102,394,395 

Paasikivi. Dr. Juho K. :167-68, 269. 270 

Paemu: 405 

Pancevo: 375 

Panevezhis: 333,337,338 

Panje wagons: 24',275.280,28, 

Pan'shirskiy: 52 

PANTHER : n7-28 

PANTHER position 

and Army Group Center: 165.167-68, 16g, '70, 

17' , 18g. '95. 197 

and Army Group North: 209, 2tO, 211, 221, 249. 

255, 259,260,262-63 

construction in Army Group North zone: 249 

decision to build: 154 

name abolished: 258 

Panzer armies. See undl!r Armies, German. 

Panzer groups: 9. See also under Armies, German . 

Panzer/au st: goo, go I 

Panurjaeger: 440 

Panurschru k.: 300.30 1 

Pa.pa: 453. 454 

Parchim : 495 

Partisan operations. See also Antipartisan operations. German. 

German: 246 

Soviet: 30.103-05, '13-' 5. '4' , 195. 198, 199. 

202-03,246,26,.264.303-09,3'5-16 

Yugoslav: 367.3 72,375,377.382 

Palrai: 373 

Paulus, Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich: , 80, 449 

assessment: 56-57 

on breakout from Stalingrad : 70 

Hitler's comment on: 79 

at Stalingrad: 53,57-58, 58n, 72. 73. 76, 77-78 

and summer offensive, 1942 : 39, 43-45 

surrender: 79 

Pavelic. Dr. Ante: 122,365 

Pavlograd: 9' ,94, ,65, ,66 

Peace terms, Soviet-Finnish: 269-70 

Pechenga : 210, 267,268,269,270,390,39',396, 

399, 400 

Pechenga Bay: 399 

Pees: 382 

Peipus, Lake: 209. 249, 260, 261, 262, 263, 335. 

343, 403, 404,405 

Perekop, Isthmus of: 178, '79. 180, 186, 291 

Pereyaslav: '7' 

Personnel Office, German Army: 21 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Pervomaysk: 277 

Pest: 435, 436 

Petrov, General Polkovnik Ivan Y.: 342 

Petrovskoye: 96 

Petrozavodsk: 302 

Pfeffer-Wildenbruch. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Karl 

von: 385, 436, 449 

Photoreconnaissance. German: 48 

PiJica River: 422,423. 424 

Pi lis Mountains: 435 

Pil'kallen: 429 

pjllau: 432 , 460 

Pitomnik: 76 

Ploen: 485, 493 

Ploe,ti: 353. 354-55 

"Pocket psychosis": 453 

Poland: 42' , 439 

Polish Committee of Nation=tl Liberation: 341 

Polish government-in-exile: 34' 

Polish Home Army: 340, 344 

Polotsk: 204,206,304,308,3 14,318,3'9,324,326 

Poltava: 93,97, 15 1, 154,156, 157 

Pomerania: 428.438.440, 442, 445. 456, 459 

Ponoma renko, General Ley tenant Pantileimon K . 

30 3-0 4 

Popov; General Ley tenant Markian M .: 86, 136, 

139. 202 

Porkala: 390 

Poros Lake: 302 

Posen: 423-24 

Potemkinskaya: 72 

Potsdam: 479.481 , 482,483, 491 , 496 

Potsdam Conference: 390n 

Poznan: 424, 425 , 426. 427 , 443 

Praga: 340, 344 

Prague: 465. 469 

Predeal Pass: 355. 356, 359 

Pregel River: 4'9, 429, 430 

Prenzlau: 444n, 483. 484, 485. 486 

Prilep: 371 

Primkenau: 442 

Prinz Eugen: 343 

PRINZ EUO£N position: 332 

Pripyat Marshes: 6, 9. 191 , '93, 195. 223 . 244,273, 

275,3 13,3 18 

Pripyat River: 170, 171,184, 191 ,3 19 

Prisoners of war 

German: 329,449 

Russian: II , 18, 20,3 1,40, l OS, 122, 123, 131, 

138,203,269 

Production. See Logistics, German; Logistics, Soviet. 

Prolyetarskaya: 75 

Pronya River: 17' 

Propaganda 

German: 122-24, 131, '32 , 148-49. 459. 460, 

5°3 

Soviet: 172 , 308, 420 

Propaganda Ministry, German: 459 
INDEX 

Propoysk : 195 

Proskurov: ~19, !Z73 , 275. 276, 277. !Z78, 279, 280 

Prut River: 274.285.287,291, 3'9, 323. 346, 350, 

35 1, 35 2 , 353. 354-

Przemysl: 337 

P,e! River: 137.164. 167 

Pskov : 154. 199.249. !l61, 262, 264. 265. 335. 387 

Pskov Lake: 154,249,261,262,264,335, 342 

Psychological warfare. See Propaganda, German; 

Propaganda, Soviet. 

Ptich'; 319 

Puck: 460 

Pudasyarvi: 395 

Pulawy : 337.341,419, 420, 421 

Pwhkin: 255-56 

Pustoshka: 1104. 264. lI6S 

Pyatikhatka: 181 

Queiss River: 442 

Raab River: 454. 455 

Radio teams, German: 423" 

Radom : 341,419 

Radomsko : 419. 422,423 

Radomyshl': 18g 

Raeder, Grossadmiral Erich : 10, log 

Railroad Station No. I, Stalingrad: 42,78 

Railroads: 6, 9. '3. 18,66,72, 101,102,167.176, 

218-19.220.~40, ~46. ~73,~80, ~84 , ~90. g08. 

36~.36~370.396. 411 4~O 39. 443 446 

Ramsay. Dr. Henrik: J09. 121.301 

Randow Swamp: 483 

Raseynyay : 407 

Rasputilsy: 6 

Rastenburg: 10.87. 410 

Rathenow: 49~ 

Ratibor : 4'i5,466 

RATWEEX: 372 

Raus, General der Panzertruppen Erhard : 220, 2U, 

343. 460 

Rava Russkaya : 332 

Razdelnaya: 289 

Reetz : 459 

Refugees: 424-25 

Regensburg: 467 

REGE NSCHAUER: 309 

Regiment, German, 194th Grenadier: 79 

Reichs Chancellory : 422, 462, 493 

Reichstag: 15. 488, 492 

Reichsstrasse 50 : 396, 397. 400. 40 I 

Reims: 496 

Reinefarth, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Heinz: 344. 464. 

465 

Reinha rdt, Generaloberst Hans: 115.345 

commands Army Group Center: 343 

commands Third Panzer Army: I 13 

and defense of East Prussia : 428-32 

and defense of Vitebsk: ~06 

relieved: 432 

543 

Reinhardt, Generaloberst Hans-Continued 

and summer campaign, 1944: 3'l3-~4, 333, 340, 

343,40 5 

Reitsch, Hanna : 484.49° 

Rendulic, Generaloberst Lothar 

assessment: 432-33 

commands Army Group North (Courland): 4'22, 

460, 463 

commands Army Group North (East Prussia ) : 

43°,438 

commands Army Group South (Ostmark): 455. 

497 

commands Twentieth Mountain Army : 389, 390, 

393, 394-95, 399-401 

Reparatioru. Finni.h : 267, ~70, 390-91, 390n 

Replacement Army (German): 105.427.449 

Retchitsa: 193. 195 

Reuter. General Ley tenant M . A. : 85 

Reval : 394 

Reymann, Generalleutnant Hellmuth : 462. 472,477 

Rhine River: 438, 456, 467 

Ribbentrop, Joachim von: 121 . 12~ , 300-301, 389 

Richthofcn, Gencraloberst Wolfram von: 61,69.93 

Riga : 249. 264,324,327, 328,329.336, 339.342, 

343.388, 4°3-04.4°5, 4°6. 4°7, 4°8 

Riga. Gulf of: 199. 339, 405. 408 

Ristikent : 401 

River crossings: 66,84,97,169. 170;-J I, 127, 181, 

184-85, 225. 235,236-37, 259, ~79, 281. 283-

84,285.290,337.341,345,353.376,425. See 

also Bridges; individual rivers by name. 

Roads. Russian: 6,140,240. 244 

Rocket projectors, Soviet: 27, 34 

R ockets, German: 120-2 I, 300 

Rogatchev: 3 15,318,319 

Rokossovskiy, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza K onstantin K . 

and Berlin: 471,485 

and defense of Kursk: 133, 135, 136 

and operations in Dnepr line: 191 , 193, 195 

and Stalingrad : 43. 76 

and summer offensive, 1943: IS9i 164, 165, 170, 

19 1 

and summer offensive, 1944: 318.321, 32S, 330, 

337,338,344 

and winter offensive, 1945 : 419. 424,440,445, 

448, 459, 460 

ROLLBAHN position: 253-56 

Romintener Heide: 409. 429 

Roosevelt, Franklin D .: 267.269,272,469.474, S02 

Roslavl': 141 , IS8 

Ross River: 224. 231,233 

Rossono Rayon: 202.3°4 

Rossosh'·Millerovo railroad: 72 

Rostock: 493 

Rostov: 18,19.31,39. 47.48, 66,73.74,77,81, 82, 

85. 86. 168 

Rovaniemi: 268, 394, 395. 396 
544 

Ravno: ~23. 224. 244,246,247,277 

Rozan : 3«.416,419.429 

Rudel, Maj. Hans: 343 

Ruebel, Generalleutnant Karl: 400 

Ruh" 467 

Rumania: 313 

attitude toward the war: 122,208, 348--50, 367 

German military intervention in : 'J08,272 

relations with Hungary: 17.357 

surrender: 352-53. 369. 389 

and Treaty of Vienna : 352 

Rumanian Army: 353. See also Armies, Rumanian; 

Corps, Rumanian; Divisions, Rumanian. 

Rumanian forces 

assessment : 590 

and the Crimea : 179.293.294-

Hath's opinion of: 44-

morale: 590, 2gG-9I , 348, 350, 351 

(or Operation BARBAROSSA: 9 

for Operation BLAV: 17, Ig", 39 

in Stalingrad: 69. 106 

strength on Eastern Front, summer 1943 : 144-

Rundstedt, General£eldmanchall Gerd von: 9. 14. 

3 11 

Russian Army of Liberation: 123.413.413" 

Russian National Committee: 123 

Rwsian people, German policy toward: t 22-24. See 

also Antipartisan operations, German. 

Rybatchiy Peninsula: 102,399 

Rylsk: 133 

Ryti, Risto: 109, 2og. 21erll, 301.387.388 

Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement: 387,388,389 

Rzhev: 14,98, 106-07, 116 

Saaremaa: 407-08 

Sabac: 377 

Sagan: 442 

Sahy, 383-84 

St. Poelten: 456 

Sairala : 387 

Sajo River: 381 

Sal River: 73,74 

Salla: 102,394 

Salmi: 302 

Salonika : 365,370.371,377 

Salak: 72, 74 

Samara River: 91,92,94 

Samland: 446, 461 

Samland Group : 445 

Samland Peninsula: 430, 432. 445 

Samro Lake: 259-60,261 

San River: 333,336,337.339,34' 

Sandomierz: 343 

Sapun Heights: 294 

Sarajevo: 377 

Saratov: 133 

SarvizCanal: 437. 452, 453 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Saucken, General der Panzertruppen Dietrich von: 

460 

Sava River: 372,376,377.378 

S-Bahn defense ring: 462,48' , 488 

Schienenwolf (rail wolf): 328-29 

SCHILD UND SCHWERT: 315 

Schild und Schwert theory: 258-59,261.313-14 

Schippenbeil : 432 

Schirwindt: 409 

Schlou Klessheim: 121-22,287 

Schlossberg : 340 

Schluesselburg: 101, III 

Schmidt, Generalmajor Arthur: 64--65 

Schmidt. General der Panzertruppen Rudolf: 115 

Schmundt. Generalmajor Rudolf: 21. 21 t. 265, 

31 f, 345 

Schneidemuehl: 444 

Schoerner, Generalfeldmanchall Ferdinand 

command methods: 342-43.346,423.427 

Commander in Chief, Army: 493 

commands Army Group A (Center): 422 

commands Army Group A (South Ukraine): 286 

commands Army Group North: 336 

and the Crimea: 291-93 

and defense of Baltic States: 404-05. 408 

and defense of Berlin: 473, 474. 475, 476, .79. 

.83.485.486,490 

and defense of Oder line: 423. 425,427-28.44°, 

H' 

escape and arrest of: 498 

personality: 238 

and surrender: 497,498 

visit to Finland: 387-88 

and winter campaign, 1944: 238-4u, 242-43. 

'44 

Schultz, General der Infanterie Friedrich Wilhelm: 

46,-66 

Schulz. Generalmajor Friedrich: 64 

SCHUTZWALL position: 401 

Schwedt: 438,442,470.471,476 

Schwerin: 495 

Schwerpunktbildun,: 145 

Schwielow Lake: 49' , 492 

Scorched-earth policy, German: 164, '71-72,401, 

463.47' 

Scorched-earth policy, Soviet: 30 

Scutari: 377 

SDB position: 158, 159.160 

Second front. See Allied forces, and second frortt. 

Security divisions, German: 85n 

Seelow: 4".475 

Seelow Heights: 473, 47, 

Segewold position: 404. 406 

Self-Government Area Lokot: 344n 

Senna: 304.308,318, 32er21 

Serafimovich: 39,41,48,55 

Serbia: 365,367.372,374 

Serd River: 281, !l:8!1: 
INDEX 

Serock: 344,4 16, 419. 429 

Sevastopol: 18,291 - 95 

Scvsk: 159 

Scydlitz-Kurzbach, General der Artillerie Walter 

von: 58, s8n, 59, 149. 310-1 I , 339 

Seym River: 158 

SHAEF. Set! Supreme H eadquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. 

Shaulyay: 329.336,338,34' ,342,343, 406,4°7 

Shepetovka: !21g, 2!Z!Z , 223. 224. 246, 247, 27 3. 275. 

276 

Shimsk: 264 

Sholokhovo: 242 

Shortages. See Logistics, German; Logistics, Soviet. 

ShpoJa: 228 

Sibiu: 355. 356 

Sicily : '37 

Siedlcc: 336,337.339 

Sieradz: 425 

SILBERSTRElf: ' go-3', 148 

Silesia: 456. See also Lower Silesia; Upper Silesia. 

Simferopol: 291, 293 

Sinel'nikovo: 9' , ,65. ,66 

Sio Canal : 452 

Siret Ri ver: 346, 350, 353, 354 

Sivash River: 186,291 

Ski troops, Soviet: 263 

Skibotten: ::268,396,401 

Skoplje: 370,37 1,373,377.378,382 

Skorzeny, SS Col. Otto : 363,456, 464 

Slavyansk: 86, 94, 96 

Slovakia: 122,208,3 13,359 

Slovakian forces: 19n 

Slovenia: 365 

Sluch River: 224 

Slutsk': 256,3 18,3 19.323,324,325 

Smersh: 307 

Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell: 498 

Smolensk: 9, 31,47.98,158, ' 59,- 167, 168, ' 70 

Smolensk Manifesto : 123, 148 

Soerve Peninsula: 408 

Sofiya : 373 

Sokol ovskiy, General Polk ovnik Vasili D . 136, ' 39, 

471, 474-75. 478, 493 

SO NN EN WENDE : 445- 4H 

Sopot: 460 

Sopron: 453 

Southeaste rn Thea ter :355,365-78, 412n, 437 , 498 

Southeastern Theate r Command: 287 

Sovetskiy: 57 

Soviet-Finnish War. Su Winter War, '939- 40. 

Soviet-Japanese ope rati ons: 26 

Sozh River : 171, ' 9 1-92 

Spandau: 481 

Spanish Civil War: 26 

Spanish forces: 19n, 208, 248. Su also Divisions, 

Spanish ; Spanish Legion. 

Spanish Legion: 248,265 

545 

Spas-Demensk: 141 

Speer, Dr. Albert: 119, 120,129,133.396,463,472 

Sponheimer, General der Infanterie Otto: 259,262, 

264, 265 

Spree River: 475-76, 480 

SS (SchutzslaDel) forces: 262,288,439,450,453, 

454, 464, 481 , 492 

Stalin, J oseph V.: 23.25-26,29.68, 122 , 163,380, 

474 announcement on summer offensive, 1943: 15' 

becomes Commander in Chief of Soviet Armed 

Forces: 30 

and Berlin offensive: 439-4°,463,467, 473 

co-ordination with Allied forces: 467-69 

and Finnish armistice: 390 

and German surrender: 493 

orders taking of Pskov: 264 

and origins of the war: 24-25 

powers: 24, 29, 30 

and Soviet strategy : 502 

speechof3July 1941 : 53n 

and start of winter offensive, 1945: 420 

at Tehran Conference: 267,269 

and the Warsaw uprising: 341 

Stalin Line: 28 

Stalingrad: ' 35, 145. 153 ,228,277,290,293.385. 

449 

German advance on: 37,46 

German airlift for: 58,59, 6' .75 

German forces: 69. 76 

German intelligence predictions: 47-49 

last days : 78-go 

losses at: 79 

significance of: Bo, IBo . 23B, 345-46, 454. 503 

Soviet forces: 50 

Soviet tactics: 52 

strategic value of: 37 

total forces committed: 37 

weather: 70,72,76 

Stalino: 87, 93, 162 

Stallupoenen: 429 

Stanisla~: 2BB, 330, 332, 333 

Staraya Oskol: 133 

Staraya Russa: 248.259,264 

Stargard: 438, 445-48. 456. 457. 459 

5taritza: 257 

Staro Constantinov: 276 

State Defense Committee, Soviet: 29. 30, 314 

State Department, U.S.: 12 1. 267 

Sta uka or the Supreme Command: 175.271 

and Be rlin : 475 

created: 30 

and defense of Kursk: 139 

and Dnepr line : IB4, 191 , 196 

field command through representa tives: 36 

and Nevel gap: 199,206, 1107 

and operations against East Prussia: 409, 445 
546 

Sta vka of the Supreme Command- Continued 

and operations in Hungary: 359, 361-62 , 381, 

449. 450, 452, 454-

and Orel salient: '41 

plans for a final offensive: 419-20 

and Rzhev salient: 106 

and Stalingrad: 39, 43. 50 

and summer offensive, 1943: '44, 151 , 15 7.158, 

164. 167 , '70 

and summer offensive, '944: 3 11 , 313. 314.315. 

316. 326, 329. 344-45 

and Vistula-Oder operation: 423. 440, 442 , 456 

and winte r offensive, '941-42: 32-33 

and winter offensive, '942-43: 66,76, 85. 97 

and winter offensive, 1943-44: 225-26,22 7, 275 

Sta vka (Staff) of the High Command of the Soviet 

Armed Forces: 29 

St~jt!rma,k: 426 

Steinau : 440 

Steiner, SS-Oberstgruppenfuehrer Felix : 447. 448, 

477-78. 479. 480, 483,484, 485, 486,491 

Stemmermann, General der Artillerie Wilhelm: 

232-36 

SteUin: 440, 460, 476, 479, 483, 485 

Stettner Ritter von Grabenhofen, Generalleutnant 

Walter: 376-77,378 

Stockholm: 268, 269 

Stolbtsy : 325 

Strategic 'objectives, German. See War aims, German. 

Strategy, Allied: 372 

Strategy, German: 4, 6-7, 119, 121-22, 163,2 16-

17 ,220-21,272-73,309- 11 ,3 12 ,367-68,411, 

450, 500, 501. See (llso Fuehrer Directives : 

Hitler, Adolf, as a strategist; Operations 

Orders. 

Strategy, Soviet: 23-24, 25,30-31 , 32 , 34,1 45-46, 

2g6, 3 16-18, 419, 444, 470-71 , 472-73, 502, 

504. See (llso Sta IJk(l of the Supreme Command. 

Strecker, General der Infante rie Karl : 79 

Strimon River: 371 

Student, Generalobe rst Kurt: 491 , 495 

STURMBOCK position: 401 

Strunga line: 291 

Strypa River: 282 

Stukas: 135. 263, 300. 343 

Slyr River: 247 

Submachine guns, Soviet: 147 

Submarines, German: 111 , 268, 396 

Submarines, Soviet: 408 

Sudeten Mountains: 442 , 459, 465,473 

Sukhinichi: 47,49, g8, 100, 139 

Sumy: 156,157 

Suo Lake: 302 

Suomussalmi: 393. 394 

Supply. See Logistics, German ; Logistics, Soviet. 

Supreme Command, Soviet: I g5. Su also St(l vka of 

the Supreme Command. 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

Supreme H eadquarters, Allied Expeditionary 

Force: 420, 496- 97 

Surazh Rayon: I 15 

Suursaari: 268, 394, 40g 

Svatovo: 127 

Svir front: 299, 30'2 

Svir Ri ver : 102 , 302 

Sweden: 111 , 119, 1'26, 'log, 349, 389, 391, 395-96. 

397, 403 

Swinemuende: 484, 485 

Syem River: 160 

Szalasi, Ferenc : 363, 385 

Szeged: 360 

Szekesfehervar: 383. 384. 433, 435, 436, 437, 439. 

453 

Szekler Strip: 35'2 . 358 

Szolnok: 364, g80 

Szombathely: 454, 455 

Sztojay, Field Marsha l D oeme: 287.357 

Tactics, German: g, 15, '28, 93. 94, 119, 133 , 139, 

145. ,81 . 186-87. Ig3, 199, '206, 216, 243, 258, 

277.280-81 , 287 , 316, 320-21,364, 445. 484. 

See also Encirclement operations, Ge rman ; 

Hitler. Adolf, tactical conceptions. 

Tactics. Soviet: 32,33.36. 48,52-53.54, III , '45-

46. 147-48. 149-51 , 157, 160. 196, 199. 200, 

227, 240, 241 , 242, 275. 2g8, 32 I , 388. See (llso 

Encirclement operations, Soviet. 

Taganrog: 162 

Taganrog. Gulf of: '43 

Taipali: 298 

Tallinn: 405 

Taman: 81,82, 92. S ee also GOTENKOPI". 

Taman Peninsula: 72, 81 , 82,92. 171 

Tana Fiord: 401 

Tank armies, Soviet. assessment of: 501 -02 

Tank producti on, German: 21 , 120, ,29, 41 I 

Tank produc ti on, Sovie t: 27, 29. 34, 129 

Tank strength, Su Armor strength. 

Tanks, British: 146 

Tanks, German: 9, 136, 216, 228, 242 , 296, 30 1. 

30g, 3 13. See also Armor, German use of; 

Armor strength , German. 

Ferdinands: 130, 137 

Mark IV : 129 

Panther : 120 

Panzer II : 89 

Panzer I II : 50, 52 

Panzer IV : 120 

Tiger: 20-21, 6g , 72, 74-7.'). 120, 129, 203, 233 , 

263,383 

Tanks, Soviet: 228,241 . See also Armor, Sovie t use 

of; Armor strength, Soviet. 

KV: 27, 29 

T 34 (Stalin ): 27 , 29.34. 120, 146,393 

Tanks, U.s.: 146 

TANNE OST : 268,391 ,394 
INDEX 

TANNE WEST: 26B,39' 

Targu Neamt: 291,354 

Targul Frumos: 346, 350, 35 1 

Tarne t: 400 

Tartu : 403, 405 

Tatar Pass: '288 

Tatsinskaya: 69.7°,7',77 

Taunus Mountains : 4' 0 

T edde r, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. : 4'20 

Tehran Conference: 267. 269, '27'2 , '296, 36, 

Telecommunications system, German: 64 

Templin : 487 

T crn opol: '2lg, '2'21 , '246, '247. '27 3, 275, '276, '1.77. 

'278, '279. '286, '288, 313 

Thorn (T orun ): 426-27 

Thrace: 365.369 

Through Road IV : '240 

Tiergarten: 463. 483 

Tiflis: ,8 

Tikhvin: '4. 3 1,3'2 

Tilsit : 341 ,34'2, 407. 4°8-°9 

Tim River: 84-

Timisoara: 371,373.37. 

Timoshenko, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Seman K .: 

29, 30, 35°,36'2 . 449 

Tippelskirch, General def Inranterie Kurt von: 3'21, 

3'23, 485, 49 1 , 496 

Tiraspol: 285, '286, '189. 346, 350-.5 1, 3.5~ 

Tiso, Msgr. J oseph : I~ ~ 

Tisza River : 3.59, 360, 36 , 364, 37.5, 377, 378, 379, 

380 

Tito (Josip Broz ): 367, 37~, 374 

Titovka River: 399 

Tiulenev, General Armii I. V.: 8.5 

T olbukhin, General Polkovnik F. 1.: 160,166,177-

78, 3.50-.5 1, 354, 3.59, 374, 378, 38 1-83, 384, 

437, 4.5 2,453, 455 

Tolva Lake: 299 

T orchin: 332 

T orgau: 482 

T orni o: 393,395 

T oropets: 47, 48,98, 100. 101 , 104, 107, 113, 115, 

198, 202 

T orun: 42 7 

Training, Soviet: 26-27 

TRAJAN position: 35 1 

Transnistria: 284 

Transylvania: 352, 352n, 357 

Transyh'anian Alps: 354,3.5.5 . 360 

Trench warfare: 248 

Troop strength, German: 7--9, 17, 19, 19n, 31-3~, 

34, 34n, 44-45, 50-52 , 69, 102, 144-45, 15 1-

52,162, 174. 177. 188, 191 , 197,213-14, 234. 

251 , 258, 293.3 11 - 12,315. 328, 33~. 333, 369-

70, 399, 412- 13, 412n, 416-17. 421 , 4.57n, 471 -

72 

Troop strength, Soviet: 28-29, 31-32, 34, 50--52, 

50n, 76, '44-45 , 15'-52, 16~ , 177-78, 188, 

547 

Troop strength, Soviet- Continued 

'91 , 197 , 214, ~51 , 270, 300. 311 , 3'4- 15, 328, 

332, 333. 35O-51,416-17.416n, 421 . 457 , 470, 

47 1-72 

Trucks, American-built : 24' , 275 

Trucks, German: 2~9 , 241-42 , 359,411-12 

Tsimla Rive r : 37-38,39 

Tsymlyanskaya: 39.72.73 

Tukums: 343. 403-04 

Tukums-Riga corridor: 403-04. 405, 406 

Tula: 13,33 

Tuloksa: 302 

Tunisia: 119,129, 130 

Turkey: 154, 156, 220, 221, 293. 339. 339n, 348, 

367,368,370 

Turnu Rom Pass: 35!;' 356, 359 

Turnu Severin : 355.356,371 , 373.374. 375 

U da River: 90 

Udalevka: 195 

Uecker River: 485 

Ukhta: 267,268 

Ukmerge: 328 

Ukraine: 12 , 104. 144, 164. 172-73,503 

Ukrainians, "booty" : ~79 . 28, 

Uksu River: 299, 3°2 

U-line : 299. 302 

Ulla River: 321 

Uman : 222, 225, 234. 273. '1.77 

Unconvenlional warfare. See Partisan operations. 

United States. See also Allied forces. 

lend-lease assistance to USSR: 50' 

and Rumania : 352 

and Warsaw uprising : 344-45 

Unruh, General der Infanterie Walter von: 20,215 

Upper Silesia : 339. 416, 419, 421 , 423. 424,425. 

427, 438,440,465.467 

U .S. Department of State: 121 , 267 

Ushach River : 304 

Ushachi Partisan Republic: 308-09 

Usta!i Movement: 365 

Uzhgorod: 359. 362 

V-2 rockets: 120 

Vac: 383 

Valga: 403. 406 

Vali River : 436, 437 

Valmiera: 403. 406 

Valpovo: 450 

Valuyki: '29 

Vammelsuu: 298 

Varanger Peninsula : 401 

Varazdin: 456 

Varpalota: 453 

Vasilevskiy, General Polkovnik Aleksander M .: 36, 

40,50, 68, 68n, 84-85, '35. '57,240, 316-18. 

4°3,4°4, 4°6, 445. 47°. 501-02 

Valra Dornei: 358 
548 

Vatu tin, General Ley tenant N. F.: 50, 68, 68n, 7', 

85.8,. 133. '35, 136, I!)I . 154. 156, ,S4-8S, 

187. '93.218, 2!:1:2, 224. !l!l6 

Ve1encze Lake: 383,384.385,435,436,45°,452 

Velika Plana : 376 

Velikaya River: 328 

Velikiye Luki: g8, IDa, 101 , 107-09. 113. 19B, 202 

VeJizh: g8, 116 

Vette! Mountains: 433. 450, 453 

Vertyachiy: 52 

Veszprem : <4-53 

Vetka: 192 

Vidlitsa: 302 

Vienna: 416, 437,439.448, 449, 450-56, 469 

Vienna. Treaty of: 287. 352 

Vietinghoff genanot Scheel, Generaloberst Hein· 

rich-Gottfried von: 438-39.460, 464 

Viliya River : 31B 

Vilkavishkis: 340,34',342,343 

Vil'oyu!: 326, 3!.i17 

Vinnitsa: 3. 162,2 18,221 ,225,229, '1.77, 279 

Visegrad: 377.382 

Vistula delta : 432, 461 

Vistula River: 316,333.336,337.339.34',416, 

419.421 , 422.424. 425-27.428, 429,430,438, 

467,503 

Vitebsk: " 5, 154, 189, 205, 206, 207, 250, 264, 

3°4,311,318,319-20,321 

Vitebsk Corridor : 115 

Vlasov, General Andrei: 122-24, 413, 413n 

Vltava River: 498 

Volchansk : 127 

Volga River: 18, 37, 44, 46.70 

Volgograd: 37. Set also Stalingrad. 

Volkhov River: 101 , 221,248 

Volksdeutsche units: 200 

V olkssturm: 413. 426, 432, 462, 481 

Vormann, General der Panzertruppen Nikolaus 

von: 324 

Voronezh: 17, 18. 39, 66, 81 , 84 

Voronov, General Polkovnik Nikolai N. : 76, 141, 

157-58 

Voroponovo Station : 78 

Voroshilov, Marshal Sove tskogo Soyuza Klimenti 

I., 30.35-36 

Voroshilovgrad: 66.73, 81,84.86 

Vorskla River: 157, 164, 167 

Vorhjaerv: 403,404, 405.406 

Voyskovoye: 183 

Voznesensk: 284 

Vukovar: 375.378 

Vulcan Pass: 355.356 

Vuoksi River: 298.299,300,301,303 

Vuosalmi: 302,303 

Vyaz'ma: 31 

Vyborg: 298,299,300, 301 

Vyborg Bay : 302 

Vyborg-Vuoksi line : 298.299,300 

STALINGRAD TO BERLIN 

WaDen-SS : 144, 213.3 12 , 498 

Wagons. Set Panje wagons. 

War aims, German: 3. 4. IS. 123.500 

War games, German : 418 

War Ministry, German: 5 

War production, German. Set Logistics, German ; 

Logistics, Soviet. 

Warsaw: 313.33&,337.338, 344. 388, 419, 421, 

422,503 

captured by Soviets: 4!.i13 

uprising: 340-41,344. 344n 

Wartenburg: 43!.i1 

Warthe River: 4!.i15 , 455 

Weapons, German, new types of: 20-21, 74, 120-

!.ill , 130, 413, 414. See also Antitank weapons, 

German ; Rockets. German. 

Weapons. Soviet, new types of: 27, 129, 147. Set 

also Antitank weapons. Soviet; Rocket projectors, Soviet. 

Weather: 6, 13. 14.31,37,46,48,53,62,69-70, 

72, 84, 93, 96, 107, 135, 136, 139, 140, 189. 

199, 205, 218, 224, 225. 227, 228. 229, 231, 

232, 233. 238, 240, 247. 265, 273, 275, 281, 

282, !.iISg, 374. 383, 384. 403. 420, 424. 427, 

429,435.440.445,450-5 1.452 

Weh,kre;s III: 461-62 

Wehrmacht/uehrungsstab (WFSt): 3, S 

Wehrmachtsge/olge: 369 

Wehrmachtsloch: u3 

Weichs, Generalreldmarschall Maximilian von: 18. 

.49. 58,81,87.89,365.367,368-7°,371-78, 

381- 82,425 

Weidling, General der Artillerie Helmuth: 480, 

481 , 483, 490, 49!.i1 . 494 

Weiss, General der Infanterie Walter: 167, 191 . 

193-95, 196, 314,444. 460 

Wenck, General der Panzertruppen Walter: 446-

47. 4460. 459. 464. 479. 480, 481 , 488, 490, 

49',492.496 

Wenden position: 404.4°6 

Werneuchen: 477,478 

WERWOLF: 3 

Wesermuende : 483 

West Prussia: 438, 440, 444 

Western Powers. Set Allied forces. 

Western Theater Command: 439 

Wiener Neustadt: 455 

Wieprz River: 337 

Wilhelmshaven: I 19, 483 

Winter. General der Gebirgstruppen August : 477. 

493 

Winter Relief, 1942: 44 

Winter War, 1939-40: 24.26, 109, ~98 , 388 

WINTEROEWITTER: 61-65, 68 

Wismar: 495 

Wittenberg : 471,484 

Wittenberge: 495 
INDEX 

Woehler, General def I nfanterie Otto: '53, 156-57 , 

168, 227, 2'28, 233 , 284- 85, 291,384-85, 435 , 

436, 439. 448, 449, 453, 454. 455 WOLl'- SSCHANZE: 10 

Wolomin: 399, 34-0 

WOTAN position: '53- 54. 165 , 166, 169, '71, '78, 

189, 4-7 2 

Wrangel, General Pe ter Nikolayevich: 48 

Wriezen: 474, 475 

Valta Conference: 421,439 

Yampal': 273. '279, 265 

Yanis Lake: 302 

Yaroslavl': 133 

Yasnogorodka: 184-, 185 

Ye!'nya: [4',158, '59. 164-

Yeremenko, General Polkovnik Andrei I.: 23, 4-0 , 

170, 197 . 200- 201 , 204. 206, 207.403, 406 

Yesman': 159 

Youth divisions: 491 

Yugoslavia: 365- 67 . 369, 372, 377. 411 

Zagreb: 382 

Zakharov, General :\rmii Matvei V. : 318, 323 

Zalacgcrszeg: 454 

Zalivskiy: 63 

Zaporozhye: 66, 9' , 92, 93, 127 , '54-. 165, 111 , 

'74-77 

Zaritsa River: 78 

Zbruch River: 281 

Zchden: 428 

Zehdenick: 487 , 491 - 92 

Zcitzler. Generaloberst Kurt 

appointed Chief of Staff, OKH: 4, 21 

assessment: 5 

attempts to resign: 329 

and the Crimea: 179, ,81 , 291, 293, 294 

and defense of Dnepr line: Ifl6, '93-94 

Zeitzler, Generaloberst Kurt-Continued 

dismissed: 335 

and Guderian: 311 

and Operation ZITAOELLE: 129-30 

rivalry with OKW: 2 1, 310 

and spring campaign, 1944: 278, 285, 288 

and Stalingrad: 58, 63, 73-74 

and summer campaign, '943: '53. 157 

549 

and summer campaign, 1944: 313, 315. 323,329 

and winter campaign, 1942- 43: 81 , 91 . 112,116 

and winter campaign, '943-44: 221 , 244. 250-

51 , 253 , 254- 56,257.262,266 

·Zhitomir: 186-88,189. 2 18,220,222 

Zhlobin: 314, 319 

Zhmerinka: !Z18-19. 224. 225. 244, 279 

Zhukov, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Georgi K . 

assessment: 501-02 

and Berlin: 439- 40. 448, 460, 463, 470, 471,473, 

475 

and defense of Kursk: 135 

and defense of Moscow : :3 I 

and spring offensive, 1944: 275, 276, 278. 280, 

28' , 287 

and Stalingrad: 50, 68-69, 69n 

and summer campaign , 1942: 36 

and summcr offensive, 1943: 157 

and summe r offensive, 1944: :3 '5, :3 I 6 

and Vistula-Oder offensive: 4'9, 423, 428, 444 

and winter offensive, 194 1-42: 31 - 32 

and winter offensivc, 1942-43: 85 

and winter offensive, '943-44: 226-27, 228 

Zhukovka: 167 

Zistersdorf: 456 

ZITi\DELI..E: 124- 42 , '43, 148, 20g, 212 , 3 '3. 450, 

50 3 

Zittau: 473 

Zmi)'cv: '54, 157 

Zossen : 410. 422 , 476, 477 

-0 U S GOVEANMENT PAINTING OFFICE: 485-890