1

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL 

TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2011
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Task Force on Secure Communities

Chuck Wexler (Chair), Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

Bo Cooper, Partner, Berry Appleman & Leiden L.L.P.

Adrian Garcia, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas 

Douglas Gillespie, Sheriff, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Robert Glaves, Executive Director, The Chicago Bar Foundation

Benjamin Johnson, Executive Director, American Immigration Council

Andrew Lauland, Homeland Security Advisor to Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley

Laura Lichter, Partner, Lichter & Associates, P.C.

David A. Martin, Professor of Law, University of Virginia 

Charles Ramsey, Commissioner of Police, Philadelphia

Lupe Valdez, Sheriff, Dallas County, Texas

Roberto Villaseñor, Chief of Police, Tucson, Arizona

Wendy Wayne, Director, Immigration Impact Unit, Committee for Public Counsel 

Services

Sister Rosemary Welsh, Executive Director, Casa de Misericordia and Director, Mercy 

Ministries Outreach
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Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4

Findings and Recommendations................................................................................9

I. Misunderstandings Regarding the Secure Communities Program 

 and the Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies..............................................................10

II. Perceived Inconsistencies Between Secure Communities’ Stated Goals and Outcomes...16

III. Minor Traffic Offenses and Misdemeanors .......................................................................21

IV. Unintended Consequences of Secure Communities on Community Policing and 

Community Impact ................................................................................................................24

V. The Question of Whether to Suspend Secure Communities..............................................27

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................28

Appendix A: Task Force on Secure Communities: Tasking Document .................................30

Appendix B: Subject Matter Experts.....................................................................................31

Appendix C: Task Force Field Meetings: Information Gathering Sessions............................33
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INTRODUCTION

The Task Force on Secure Communities is a subcommittee of the Homeland Security 

Advisory Council (HSAC) and was created in June 2011 at the request of DHS 

Secretary Janet Napolitano. HSAC, which is comprised of leaders from state and local 

government, first responder agencies, the private sector, and academia, provides 

advice and recommendations to the Secretary on matters related to homeland security. 

The Task Force was asked to consider how Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) may improve the Secure Communities Program, including how to address some 

of the concerns about the program that “relate to [its] impact on community policing and 

the possibility of racial profiling,”1 and “how to best focus on individuals who pose a true 

public safety or national security threat.” 2 In addition, the Task Force was specifically 

charged with making recommendations “on how ICE can adjust the Secure 

Communities program to mitigate potential impacts on community policing practices, 

including whether and how to implement policy regarding the removals of individuals 

charged with, but not convicted of, minor traffic offenses who have no other criminal 

history.”3

The Task Force is a broad-based panel made up of local and state law 

enforcement and homeland security officials, attorneys with expertise in immigration 

practice and criminal law, labor union officials who represent federal immigration 

enforcement workers, academics, social service agency leaders, and others. Task 

Force members donated their time to serve on this panel.

Under Secure Communities, fingerprints of persons arrested by state and local 

law enforcement agencies, which those agencies routinely submit to the FBI for criminal 

justice database checks, are automatically shared with DHS. ICE then checks the local 

arrestee information against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration 

databases. If ICE determines that it has an interest in an individual arrestee, the agency

then determines what enforcement action to take. In most cases, the people 

determined to be of interest to ICE are subject to ICE enforcement action for reasons 

 1 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Task Force on Secure Communities: Tasking (attached as Appendix A to this 

report).

2

From the ICE website (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities, click on “What’s New.” 3

Ibid.4 As of August 2, 2011, Secure Communities has been activated in 1,508 out of an estimated 3,181 

jurisdictions (47%). http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf. It is important to 

note that these numbers do not reflect the total number of participating agencies, because a single 

jurisdiction with a regional jail, for example, may send fingerprints to the FBI based on arrests by 

numerous other law enforcement agencies.
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independent of the arrest or conviction. That is, the check of databases may indicate, 

for example, that the person is removable because he or she entered the country 

without inspection or overstayed a visa. 

DHS officials maintain that Secure Communities is not a program that was 

established solely on the basis of executive branch authority, but rather that it has been 

mandated by Congress in appropriations legislation for DHS and other laws. However, 

several Task Force members noted that whether the program is mandatory is subject to 

different interpretations. DHS cites 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2) and (5), which requires the 

executive branch to develop “an interoperable electronic data system to provide current 

and immediate access to information in databases of Federal law enforcement agencies 

. . . that is relevant to determine . . . the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien . . . . 

[This information] shall be readily and easily accessible . . . to any Federal official 

responsible for determining an alien’s admissibility to or deportability from the United 

States.” Other legislative language focuses specifically on persons who have been 

convicted, with a priority on those guilty of serious crimes. For example, the FY 2010 

DHS appropriations legislation requires ICE to obligate at least $1.5 billion “to identify 

aliens convicted of a crime who may be deportable, and to remove them from the 

United States once they are judged deportable ... [and to] prioritize the identification 

and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime.” 

Secure Communities is not yet a nationwide program. Launched in 2008, Secure 

Communities has been activated in approximately half of jurisdictions nationwide, 

according to ICE.4 DHS plans nationwide activation of Secure Communities by 2013.

To complete its mission, the Task Force met three times in Washington, D.C. and 

held numerous conference calls to discuss issues related to Secure Communities and 

to review several drafts of this report. At its meetings, the Task Force also heard from a 

broad range of subject matter experts, state officials, and other stakeholders via 

conference calls and in-person presentations, and it considered statements submitted to 

the Task Force via a public email mailbox. Many of the experts, community leaders, 

and law enforcement officials who spoke conveyed a variety of strong criticisms of 

Secure Communities. Others were more supportive, seeing the program as an 

 4 As of August 2, 2011, Secure Communities has been activated in 1,508 out of an estimated 3,181 

jurisdictions (47%). http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf. It is important to 

note that these numbers do not reflect the total number of participating agencies, because a single 

jurisdiction with a regional jail, for example, may send fingerprints to the FBI based on arrests by 

numerous other law enforcement agencies.
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appropriate way for DHS to cooperate with local and state law enforcement to carry out 

the Department’s overall priorities. 

The Task Force also convened four information-gathering sessions to solicit 

feedback from individuals who are familiar with the Secure Communities program. 

These sessions were held on August 9, 2011 in Dallas; August 15, 2011 in Los 

Angeles; August 17, 2011 in Chicago; and August 24, 2011 in Arlington, VA. 

Attendance at the sessions ranged from approximately 200 people in Dallas to 300-400 

in Los Angeles and Arlington and over 500 in Chicago. Participants in these public 

hearings represented a wide variety of organizations, including immigrants’ rights 

groups, faith-based organizations, and local government agencies. Other speakers did 

not represent any organizations but spoke of their own experiences with immigration 

enforcement. By a very significant margin, most speakers at these sessions criticized or 

expressed concerns about Secure Communities. Many speakers commented that the 

program is resulting in deportation of persons arrested only for minor offenses as well 

as victims of crime, that such deportations split families apart, and that Secure 

Communities makes people afraid to call their local police when they are victims of or 

witnesses to crime. A few speakers stated that the program has had a positive impact, 

particularly in identifying and removing serious criminals or providing information useful 

to local law enforcement that would not always be available from the FBI database 

alone. For members of the Task Force, the meetings provided an opportunity to see 

how Secure Communities is perceived in some communities. 

The members of the Task Force on Secure Communities have a wide variety of 

perspectives regarding the program, due to their different roles as law enforcement 

officials, immigration lawyers, law professors, and other stakeholders. The Task Force’s 

internal discussions were spirited, but the considerable expertise of Task Force 

members and the diversity of their backgrounds resulted in findings and 

recommendations that the Task Force hopes will receive widespread acceptance and 

support. 

With a few exceptions that are noted, this report reflects a consensus view of the 

Task Force. It should be noted that individual Task Force members see some of the 

issues covered in this report differently. The report is the result of a good deal of “give 

and take” and an effort to find common ground.

While the Task Force was conducting its deliberations, the Obama Administration 

announced two major developments regarding immigration enforcement that have 

implications for Secure Communities. 
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First, on August 5, ICE Director John Morton announced that ICE had decided to 

terminate all existing Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) that it had entered into with the 

states regarding the operation of Secure Communities. In his letter to Governors, Mr. 

Morton said that the MOA had resulted in “substantial confusion” regarding whether a 

state was required to enter into such an agreement in order for Secure Communities to 

operate in that state. “ICE has determined that an MOA is not required to activate or 

operate Secure Communities for any jurisdiction,” Morton wrote. “Once a state or local 

law enforcement agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal government, 

no agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of the federal government 

to share it with another part.”

The second development was that on August 18, DHS and the White House 

announced that the executive branch is undertaking a large-scale review of existing 

deportation caseloads in order to focus resources more effectively on the removal of 

persons who are considered high-priority under DHS guidelines. The goal of the review, 

the White House statement said, will be to strengthen DHS’s ability “to target criminals 

even further by making sure [DHS is] not focusing our resources on deporting people 

who are low priorities for deportation. This includes individuals such as young people 

who were brought to this country as small children, and who know no other home. It 

also includes individuals such as military veterans and the spouses of active-duty 

military personnel. It makes no sense to spend our enforcement resources on these 

low-priority cases when they could be used with more impact on others, including 

individuals who have been convicted of serious crimes.” 5 The Department further 

explained the objectives and operations of the review process on its website: “DHS 

must ensure its immigration enforcement resources are focused on the removal of those 

who constitute our highest priorities, specifically individuals who pose a threat to public 

safety such as criminal aliens and national security threats, as well as repeat 

immigration law violators and recent border entrants. In fact, the expenditure of 

resources on cases that fall outside our enforcement priorities hinders our public safety 

mission by clogging immigration court dockets and diverting resources . . . .”

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Accordingly, DHS, along with the Justice Department, “will be reviewing the 

current deportation caseload to clear out low-priority cases on a case-by-case basis and 

make more room to deport people who have been convicted of crimes or pose a 

 5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizing-public-safety-and-betterfocusing-resources.

6 http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/immigration-enforcement-facts.pdf. 
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security risk,” the White House said. “And they will take steps to keep low-priority cases 

out of the deportation pipeline in the first place.”

Specific findings and recommendations are offered below. There is a 

strong consensus view, within the Task Force and in communities across the 

nation, that it is appropriate for ICE to continue to take enforcement action 

against serious criminal offenders who are subject to deportation. But because 

there are circumstances in which Secure Communities results in the removal of 

persons who are minor offenders or who have never been convicted of a crime, 

and because statements by ICE have left much confusion about the full reach of 

its enforcement priorities, many jurisdictions are concerned about the impact of 

Secure Communities on community policing. We recommend specific steps on 

which there is Task Force consensus that would help build trust in the program. 

Many Task Force members would go further, including recommending 

suspension of the program until major changes are made, or even recommending

termination of what they believe is a fundamentally flawed program. Other 

members believe that reforms are necessary but the program nonetheless must 

continue to function. Those differences of view are reflected in the discussion 

below. 

ICE must recognize that it does not work in a vacuum and that its 

enforcement actions impact other agencies and the relationships with their 

communities in what some may conclude is a negative way. The following pages 

contain recommendations for ICE to revise the program while working with state 

and local police, elected officials, and other stakeholders, taking their concerns 

seriously and working in partnership to find appropriate solutions.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report includes the major findings of the Task Force and its recommendations to 

ICE. Both findings and recommendations are organized into the following categories 

that reflect the primary concerns of implementing Secure Communities:

I. Misunderstandings Regarding the Secure Communities Program and the Role of 

Local Law Enforcement Agencies 

II. Perceived Inconsistencies between Secure Communities’ Stated Goals and 

Outcomes

III. Minor Traffic Offenses and Misdemeanors

IV. Unintended Consequences of Secure Communities on Community Policing and 

Community Impact

V. The Question of Whether to Suspend Secure Communities

Our overall recommendations are:

• ICE must clarify the goals and objectives of the Secure Communities program, as 

well as the parameters and functioning of the program, and accurately relay this 

information to participating jurisdictions, future participating jurisdictions, and the 

communities they serve. Regardless of whether ICE has legal authority to 

operate Secure Communities without local agreement, ICE must work to develop 

good working relationships with states, cities, and communities.

• ICE must improve the transparency of the program.

• There is broad consensus in the nation that persons convicted of serious crimes

who are in the United States illegally should be subject to deportation. ICE must 

build on that consensus by implementing systematic mechanisms to ensure that 

Secure Communities adheres to its stated enforcement objective of prioritizing

those who pose a risk to public safety or national security. 

• ICE should clarify that civil immigration law violators and individuals who are 

convicted of or charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses are not top 
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enforcement priorities unless there are other indicia that they pose a serious risk 

to public safety or national security. 

• DHS must exercise its prosecutorial discretion, in all its immigration enforcement 

endeavors, in line with stated enforcement priorities, and take systematic steps to 

train and monitor field officers and attorneys as they implement Departmental 

policies on prosecutorial discretion.

• DHS must strengthen accountability mechanisms, including remedies for and 

prevention of civil rights and civil liberties violations.

I. Misunderstandings Regarding the Secure Communities 

Program and the Role of Local Law Enforcement 

Agencies 

Findings

1. Confusion about the Secure Communities program – what it is, and what it 

isn’t. There has been much confusion about the Secure Communities program and the 

role of state and local police and sheriffs’ departments, caused in part by brochures and 

other documents issued by DHS in the past that advertised Secure Communities as a 

program designed to remove serious violent offenders from the streets. ICE currently 

describes Secure Communities as “interoperability” between FBI and DHS databases. 

In practice, in activated jurisdictions, when an individual is arrested and booked in a 

police station or jail by a law enforcement agency (prior to any adjudication), his or her 

fingerprints and booking information are sent to the FBI, which shares the fingerprints 

and information with DHS. DHS checks the data against the Automated Biometric 

Identification System (IDENT), which is part of the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status 

Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT), in addition to the other criminal databases 

that are generally checked through the FBI following an arrest. 

If there is a database “hit,” meaning that the arrested person is matched to an 

immigration record in the DHS system, ICE and the law enforcement agency are 

notified. ICE then determines the individual’s immigration status and whether any 

action is necessary or appropriate based on agency priorities. If the person appears to 

have violated the immigration laws, ICE decides whether to issue a detainer for the 

arrested individual. A detainer is a request from ICE to the law enforcement agency to 
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notify ICE before it releases an individual so that ICE has the opportunity to transfer the 

individual to federal custody.7

According to ICE, Secure Communities only entails the sharing of information—

“interoperability”—between local law enforcement, the FBI, and DHS. Any subsequent 

immigration enforcement action that is taken is not part of Secure Communities, but 

instead is the result of an independent determination by ICE Enforcement and Removal 

Operations (ERO). Similarly, any action taken by the local law enforcement agency

prior to booking and submission of fingerprints to the federal databases is not part of

Secure Communities. 

However, much of the criticism of the program relates to enforcement activities before 

and after the information sharing which defines the process. While ICE might distinguish 

between Secure Communities’ “interoperability” function and the subsequent detention 

and/or removal of an individual, the distinction is lost on stakeholders. In reality, most 

believe that Secure Communities is more than simple information sharing between 

databases, and that interoperability is only one of the stages in the process that begins 

with an arresting police agency and ends with ICE enforcement action. 

Secure Communities is commonly perceived as this entire process, which begins with 

an arrest by the local law enforcement agency and ends in deportation. To the 

community at large--especially immigrant communities--local law enforcement agencies 

cooperating with ICE or participating in Secure Communities may be viewed as 

immigration agents, regardless of the actual role they play in the process. Some local 

law enforcement agencies and state government officials are uncomfortable with being 

perceived as a “pass-through” to ICE via Secure Communities.

Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, local police have no choice but to take the first 

step of forwarding arrestees’ fingerprints to the FBI in order to obtain information that is 

critically important for crime-fighting purposes, such as data on outstanding arrest 

warrants in another jurisdiction. The sharing of information between local law 

enforcement agencies and the FBI is essential to effective policing.

2. Secure Communities was presented as a program that targets serious 

criminals, but that has been called into question. Based on what they were told, 

many state and local officials believed they were joining a program targeting serious 

offenders. ICE has stated that it prioritizes the removal of criminal aliens, as well as 

 7 8 CFR 287.7(a) and 8 CFR 287.7(d). Federal law provides that an individual cannot be held on a 

detainer for longer than 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. At the end of the 48 hour period, the 

detainer expires. 
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those who pose a threat to public safety and repeat immigration violators.8 A March 

2011 memo on “Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, 

Detention, and Removal of Aliens” states that “ICE must prioritize the use of its 

enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal resources to ensure that the 

removals the agency does conduct promote the agency' s highest enforcement 

priorities, namely national security, public safety, and border security.”9

 In addition, the 

House Report accompanying the 2010 appropriations bill stated that ICE’s highest 

priority should be the removal of aliens “convicted of serious crimes.”10

Some Secure Communities documents and presentations further state that Secure 

Communities would focus on “the worst of the worst,”11 and “the most dangerous and 

violent offenders.”12 Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) entered into by ICE and various 

state and local jurisdictions state that Secure Communities “is a comprehensive ICE 

initiative that focuses on the identification and removal of aliens who are convicted of a 

serious criminal offense and are subject to removal.” They also state that “ICE will 

employ a risk-based approach to identify aliens charged with or convicted of a serious 

criminal offense and incarcerated in jails and prisons throughout the United States who 

are eligible for removal based on the severity of their offenses.”

However, as will be discussed in detail below, the impact of Secure Communities has 

not been limited to convicted criminals, dangerous and violent offenders, or threats to 

public safety and national security. Moreover, the program has raised real concerns for 

some law enforcement agencies because of the adverse impact it has on community 

policing and the perception that law enforcement agencies are participating in

immigration enforcement. 

3. Early and continuing missteps in launching and expanding Secure 

Communities: Much of the confusion surrounding Secure Communities is due to 

inaccurate or incomplete information presented by ICE to states and localities regarding 

the program. DHS/ICE has acknowledged that a poorly managed rollout of Secure 

 8 From ICE’s Secure Communities website, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/. 9 Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE, on Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities 

for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (March 2, 2011). This memo was originally 

issued on June 30, 2010, then updated and re-issued. It is available at: 

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf. 10 H.R. Report 111-157 (2009). 11 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report 5 (2008). 12 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to 

Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens. January 2010. Available at www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf.
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Communities, coupled with incorrect statements from DHS/ICE representatives and 

unilateral policy changes, has created confusion among state and local government and 

law enforcement officials. This is particularly true of information provided by ICE 

regarding whether the program is mandatory or optional, the program’s goals and 

procedures, and the implementation of the program at the local level. 

4. The Memoranda of Agreement signed by ICE and state identification bureaus 

have created additional confusion: There has been much confusion regarding 

whether state and local jurisdictions have the power to decline, suspend or terminate 

participation in Secure Communities. While the MOAs included a termination and 

modification clause, ICE has not complied with localities’ request to exercise this option. 

Instead, DHS recently changed its position, stating that state and local jurisdictions 

cannot terminate their participation in Secure Communities because it is essentially an 

information-sharing program between two federal agencies (the FBI and DHS). As a 

result, on August 5, 2011, DHS announced that it was unilaterally terminating all of the 

42 previously signed MOAs, on the basis that they are not needed for the operation of 

Secure Communities. However, several Task Force members noted that the legal 

authority on which DHS relies in asserting that the program is mandatory continues to 

be subject to differing interpretations.

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DHS’s current position is that a state or locality may only “opt-out” of whether to receive 

the information from ICE that is generated by the processing of arrestees’ fingerprints 

through DHS's biometric system. Concerns have been raised that the information that 

ICE sends to law enforcement agencies may inappropriately influence the actions of 

local law enforcement officials, who may believe that all persons flagged by ICE are

serious offenders or high-priority cases for ICE. However, even if a law enforcement 

agency chooses not to receive immigration information from ICE, this does not prevent 

the transmission of that individual’s information to the local ICE field office to determine 

whether to take enforcement action. In other words, if a law enforcement agency

chooses to “opt out” of receiving ICE information about arrestees, that decision will have

no impact on ICE’s ability to receive fingerprints, review the information, or take 

enforcement action against an individual. According to the legal interpretation under 

which DHS and the FBI now operate, once a law enforcement agency transmits 

fingerprints and booking information to the FBI for a criminal background check, it does 

not have any ability to halt the transmission of the fingerprints or information to ICE, or 

to prohibit the use of such information by ICE.

 13 Related issues are being addressed in ongoing FOIA litigation. See NDLON et.al. v. ICE et. al, 10 Civ. 

3488 (SAS).
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ICE stated that its August 5 announcement was intended to clarify the role of state and 

local jurisdictions in the operation of Secure Communities. However, jurisdictions may 

perceive this as a significant change in the program rather than merely a clarification of 

existing procedures.

5. Secure Communities is just one of several DHS enforcement programs that 

may be operating in a jurisdiction: Secure Communities is one of several DHS

enforcement and removal programs, including 287(g)14 and the Criminal Alien 

Program,

15 through which ICE partners with law enforcement agencies or operates in 

state and local jails. In some localities, ICE operates Secure Communities and other 

programs simultaneously. In addition, other DHS enforcement programs, including 

those operated by the Border Patrol, often result in placing persons in removal 

proceedings. The general public and local law enforcement agencies may not always be 

aware that DHS is operating these different programs in their communities, and local 

agencies and the public may not fully understand the similarities and differences among 

these programs. Without this full understanding, local officials as well as community 

members are likely to be confused about which of these programs are being used to 

make enforcement and removal decisions by DHS personnel.

When a particular case involving a deportation is highlighted in the media or becomes a 

concern to a community, it may not be clear whether the enforcement actions originated 

with Secure Communities, the 287(g) program, the Criminal Alien Program, the Border 

Patrol, or some other mechanism. In many jurisdictions, the Task Force’s hearings 

revealed, any immigration enforcement action that is seen as disproportionate or 

unwarranted, such as steps to remove a young traffic law violator who has lived 

in this country since infancy, is likely to be attributed to Secure Communities. 

From the standpoint of immigrant communities, the general public, local law 

enforcement executives and other local officials, it does not matter which 

particular DHS program may have resulted in the deportation of a person who is 

apparently innocent of any criminal violations or is a minor offender. This can be

especially true in some immigrant communities, where people may be unaware of any 

distinction between their local police and federal enforcement agents, and where some 

 14 The 287(g) program “allows a state and local law enforcement entity to enter into a partnership with 

ICE, under a joint Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The state or local entity receives delegated 

authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions.” See http://www.ice.gov/287g/.

15 The Criminal Alien Program identifies, processes and removes criminal aliens incarcerated in federal, 

state and local prisons and jails throughout the U.S. See http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/.
15

residents may have come from nations that have a history of undemocratic institutions,

as well as police corruption and oppression.

Recommendations

1. Increase transparency and clarify what the Secure Communities program is 

and how it works. ICE must clarify the parameters and goals of the Secure 

Communities program, as well as the rights and responsibilities of the state and local 

law enforcement agencies that participate in the program (and are expected to provide 

accurate information about implementing the program at the local level).

2. Clarify the role of states and local jurisdictions in Secure Communities. This 

includes a frank and open discussion of any agreements between ICE and the FBI, the 

agreements between states and the FBI, and whether it is technologically possible and 

legally permissible to prevent fingerprints or other information submitted to the FBI from 

being sent to ICE. DHS should clarify the statutory authority it relies upon to assert that 

local participation in Secure Communities is mandatory. DHS should work 

collaboratively with states and local jurisdictions to address their concerns about 

participating in Secure Communities.

3. Increase consistency among immigration enforcement programs: DHS should 

develop consistent principles and procedures so that all immigration enforcement and 

removal programs, particularly those involving state and local law enforcement, are 

implemented consistently across the U.S. This must include enforcement actions taken 

not only by ICE but also by the other immigration components of the Department of 

Homeland Security that have the authority to initiate removal proceedings: Customs and 

Border Protection, and US Citizenship and Immigration Services. The thrust of the 

recommendations in this report should apply not only to Secure Communities, but to all 

DHS enforcement initiatives, including the 287(g) program, the Criminal Alien Program, 

and any other enforcement programs that involve local law enforcement agencies.

4. Work with state and local officials to develop trust in Secure Communities:

Secure Communities has been sharply criticized in some state and local communities in 

recent months, and DHS has announced several new initiatives regarding Secure 

Communities, including policy statements by ICE Director Morton to ICE employees, a 

new system for handling complaints of biased enforcement or misconduct by 

enforcement officials, plans for training of state and local police by DHS regarding 

Secure Communities, and a large-scale review of cases already in the deportation 

“pipeline” to focus on high-priority cases and suspend or close the cases of persons 
16

categorized as low priority for deportation. All of this has created an impression that 

Secure Communities is currently a program in a great deal of flux.

Thus, the Task Force believes that this is a good time for DHS to consider 

several steps aimed at rebuilding trust in Secure Communities, so that it will receive 

stronger support from the public, from the ICE employees who implement it on a daily 

basis, and from the local governments and local officials who are seen, fairly or unfairly, 

as the “gateway” to immigration enforcement. These steps include:

• Devising oversight and management mechanisms to ensure that DHS’s stated 

priorities are adhered to in the field, and that prosecutorial discretion produces 

the appropriate focus on serious offenders, not only in Secure Communities but 

in all DHS enforcement programs; 

• Establishing a more comprehensive system for monitoring the implementation of 

Secure Communities;

• Consolidating existing policy documents into a single document that defines 

Secure Communities and other DHS enforcement programs in clear, 

understandable language aimed at the general public as well as the state, local, 

and federal officials who have a role in implementing Secure Communities; 

• Conducting a nationwide educational campaign, in a number of different 

languages, to bring that information to the public, including the use of radio, 

television, newspapers, and social media used by immigrant communities and 

the general public;

• Providing state and local communities with useful statistics, consistently 

presented, on a monthly basis regarding the persons identified through Secure 

Communities and other DHS enforcement programs who are being subjected to 

removal from the United States or lesser enforcement actions, and the reasons 

why those persons were chosen for enforcement actions.

II. Perceived Inconsistencies Between Secure Communities’

Stated Goals and Outcomes

Findings

1. Secure Communities has resulted in the arrest and deportation of minor 

offenders and non-criminals. Secure Communities has sometimes been presented 
17

as a program intended to focus on “the worst of the worst,”16 and “the most dangerous 

and violent offenders.”17 

The Task Force’s public hearings, other hearings, and news media accounts have 

produced many stories of deportations of persons who had violated no law other than a 

civil immigration violation and who did not apparently fall into ICE’s other categories of 

priorities for enforcement. The apparent “disconnect” between the DHS documents 

describing a tight focus on dangerous criminal offenders and the actual operation of 

Secure Communities has led to criticism of the program and is a key reason for 

opposition to the program in a number of cities, counties, and states.

2. Among some members of state and local law enforcement, as well as the 

general public, there is confusion about how ICE enforces it stated priorities: 

ICE’s most recent and complete statement of its removal priorities is found in a 

memorandum from ICE Director John Morton of March 2, 2011. It sets forth the 

following priorities:

• Priority 1. Aliens who pose a danger to national security or a risk to public 

safety.

Under Priority 1, ICE defines 3 levels of crimes to gauge the risk to public safety 

or national security. The highest priority for enforcement, “Level 1 Offenders,” 

consists of persons who have been convicted of at least one aggravated felony, 

or two or more felonies. “Level 2 Offenders” are those who have been convicted 

of any felony, or three or more misdemeanors. The lowest subcategory within 

this priority for enforcement actions, “Level 3 Offenders,” covers those convicted 

of fewer than three misdemeanors. Furthermore, the March 2 memorandum by 

Director Morton to ICE employees notes that “some misdemeanors are relatively 

minor and do not warrant the same degree of focus as others. ICE agents and 

officers should exercise particular discretion when dealing with minor traffic 

offenses such as driving without a license.”

• Priority 2. Recent illegal entrants

ICE describes this category as persons “who have recently violated immigration 

controls at the border, at ports of entry, or through knowing abuse of the visa and 

visa waiver programs.” ICE’s explanation of Priority 2 is that recent illegal 

entrants deserve a high level of priority “in order to maintain control at the border 

 16 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Fiscal year 2008 Annual Report 5 (2008). 17 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to 

Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens. January 2010. Available at www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf.
18

and ports of entry,” and to avoid a return to the practice known as “catch and 

release.” 

• Priority 3. Aliens who are fugitives or who have otherwise flouted

immigration controls

Fugitives, as the term is used by ICE, are persons who have received a final and 

enforceable order of removal but who did not surrender to ICE for actual removal 

or otherwise depart from the country. ICE elaborates on Priority 3 by listing 

categories of fugitive aliens, in descending order of priority, including: fugitives 

who pose a danger to national security; fugitives who have been convicted of 

violent crimes; fugitives who have convictions for other crimes; etc. This priority 

also covers persons who reenter the country illegally after removal, whether or 

not they are federally prosecuted for that act.

This memorandum was intended as an authoritative statement of ICE’s removal 

priorities by the Director, but it stands in tension with statements in earlier Secure 

Communities documents and MOAs, summarized above, that speak of focusing on 

violent offenders or the “worst of the worst.”

3. Local police practices vary greatly regarding information submitted 

electronically upon booking. Not all law enforcement agencies submit the fingerprints 

of everyone they arrest to the FBI; some jurisdictions have categories of minor offenses 

that result in the issuance of citations or summonses, rather than a full-custody arrest. 

Some observers have questioned why local agencies that are concerned about Secure 

Communities do not simply adjust their own policies, limiting the amount of information 

they send to the FBI regarding persons arrested at the local level for minor offenses. 

Essentially, if these low-priority arrestees’ fingerprints are not sent to the FBI, they could 

not be forwarded to ICE through Secure Communities for immigration enforcement 

purposes. However, a number of law enforcement experts have explained that that is 

not a realistic option. Failing to submit fingerprints would negatively impact crime 

control at the local level, because some individuals arrested for low-level offenses may 

have serious criminal histories or outstanding warrants for serious crimes that would not 

come to the attention of law enforcement officials if their fingerprints and information 

were never sent to the FBI. Thus, withholding fingerprints and forgoing FBI criminal 

background checks would hurt public safety and would subject law enforcement 

agencies to public criticism. The same experts noted that information from immigration 

databases that pertains to identity and past criminal activity and criminal warrants can 

be valuable for public safety and crime control.
19

Recommendations

1. ICE must reaffirm its enforcement priorities and ensure that Secure 

Communities adheres to these stated goals: ICE should reaffirm that the Secure 

Communities program’s highest priority is to identify and remove aliens “who pose a 

danger to national security or a risk to public safety.”

18 Mere fingerprinting by a local 

law enforcement agency is not sufficient indication in itself that a person poses such a 

threat. 

2. “Prosecutorial discretion”: DHS must ensure systematic exercise of 

prosecutorial discretion in all cases by its enforcement personnel. DHS policy is 

clear that agency employees have the authority to determine on a case-by-case basis 

whether or not to initiate a specific enforcement action, even if the person appears to 

have violated federal immigration law. On June 17, 2011 ICE issued two memos 

regarding the use of prosecutorial discretion.19 The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 

Discretion calls on ICE attorneys and employees to “regularly exercise” prosecutorial 

discretion in order to prioritize ICE’s overall enforcement efforts and expend the 

agency’s limited resources on persons who are higher enforcement priorities. It notes 

as generally positive factors that should “prompt particular care and consideration” 

before taking enforcement action: veterans and members of the armed forces, long-time 

lawful permanent residents, minors and the elderly, and individuals present in the 

United States since childhood, among others. Morton’s second memo focuses on 

exercising discretion in cases involving victims, witnesses to crimes, and plaintiffs in 

good faith civil rights lawsuits. In a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid dated 

August 18, 2011, Secretary Napolitano made it clear that the June 17 standards are 

Department-wide priorities “that govern how DHS uses its immigration enforcement 

resources.” That letter went on to describe the launch of an interagency process that 

will “clear out low-priority cases” in the current deportation caseload.

In accordance with the March 2011 Morton memo on agency priorities, the June 

17, 2011 Morton memo on prosecutorial discretion, and the August 18, 2011 

announcement by Secretary Napolitano, DHS should consider the totality of the 

circumstances in reviewing individual cases and in deciding whether to take 

 18 Morton March 2, 2011 memorandum.

19 See John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 

Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (June 17, 2011), 

http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure‐ communities/pdf/prosecutorial‐ discretion‐ memo.pdf; and 

Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure‐ communities/pdf/domestic‐ violence.pdf. 
20

enforcement actions, including whether to issue detainers, take individuals into 

custody, initiate removal proceedings or proceed to deportation.

Another factor that should be taken into consideration is whether an individual is 

indigent and deportable as a result of a guilty plea or conviction for which he or she had 

no appointed counsel. The Task Force heard testimony that immigrants often plead 

guilty to minor offenses without understanding that those guilty pleas may result in 

deportation.

It should be noted that there is nothing unusual about DHS’s use of prosecutorial 

discretion in immigration enforcement. Such discretion is a normal and essential part of 

the everyday activities of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices at the 

local, state, and federal levels across the nation. Exercising prosecutorial discretion, 

case by case, in a systematic and professional way, as envisioned in the June 17, 2011, 

memorandum from Director Morton and the August 18, 2011, letter from Secretary 

Napolitano, does not amount to administrative amnesty. Instead it helps to make sure 

that resources are focused in ways that best promote the overall enforcement mission.

3. DHS must train and support its own personnel in exercising discretion, and 

should consult with the field and ICE’s own subject matter experts in developing 

future policies: The March 2011 and June 17, 2011 Morton memos and the August 

18, 2011, announcement should be the basis for developing training for DHS personnel.

DHS should take additional steps to assure effective implementation in all field offices

with authority to initiate enforcement action, not only for ICE but also for CBP and 

USCIS. DHS should fully engage and coordinate with its personnel to assist in 

operationalizing policies and implementing recommendations and other changes. 

Specifically, DHS should:

• Issue more detailed guidance, checklists or worksheets for use by front-line 

officers in deciding what is appropriate enforcement action, including issuing 

detainers, setting bond, and making similar decisions. This guidance should be 

supported by technology where possible to promote consistency and uniformity

and to reduce time spent on paperwork;

• Develop detailed training for officers and attorneys on the prosecutorial discretion 

process and criteria;

• Establish monitoring and quality control procedures and mechanisms; 

• Take steps to assure that officers and attorneys who reasonably exercise their 

prosecutorial discretion in accordance with agency guidance will be supported by 

their supervisors and DHS leadership if the decision becomes controversial; and
21

• Consult with ICE personnel in the field and other agency subject matter experts 

in developing future policies and guidance.

4. ICE must improve data collection and be more transparent: To promote 

transparency and alleviate confusion, ICE should strengthen the comprehensiveness of 

its data and continue to distribute information that allows the public to track the 

implementation and adherence to the stated goals of Secure Communities, including 

those described in the memos of March 2011 and June 17, 2011 and the August 18, 

2011 letter from Secretary Napolitano to Senate Majority Leader Reid. ICE should 

consider revising the current statistical categories to more accurately capture ICE 

enforcement and removal activity.

ICE should consider expanding to all states the practice it employs in Colorado, 

where a panel of state officials, under the direction of the Governor, crafted an 

agreement to help the state monitor actions under Secure Communities and their 

impact on state priorities under state law. Under the agreement, which ICE accepted, 

ICE provides the state with quarterly reports detailing whether identified individuals have 

been convicted of crimes or are in a noncriminal category of other ICE enforcement 

priorities. ICE also committed to ensuring that illegal immigrants who come to the 

attention of police because they are victims of domestic violence or other crimes will be 

protected.20

III. Minor Traffic Offenses and Misdemeanors

Findings

Secure Communities must be implemented in a way that supports community 

policing and sustains the trust of all elements of the community in working with local law 

enforcement agencies. Immigration enforcement against traffic offenders and others 

arrested only for minor offenses poses the greatest risks of undermining community 

policing. Some members of the Task Force see an equal risk in all misdemeanor-based 

enforcement. In that light, the Task Force carefully considered a variety of issues 

regarding Secure Communities’ treatment of persons arrested for traffic violations or 

 20 “Colorado's pact with ICE becoming national template.” Denver Post, August 13, 2011. 

http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18673491
22

other misdemeanors. Some members believe that fairly extensive restrictions on 

immigration enforcement against such categories are necessary to salvage the integrity 

of the program, while other members are keenly aware of the difficult trade-offs involved 

in the curbing of immigration enforcement against any immigration law violators 

identified through Secure Communities. As there remain differences of view among 

members regarding the full range of changes that should be undertaken, the 

recommendations below include both those that had consensus among the Task Force 

members and one that did not, with the differences noted.

Recommendations:

1. Withhold ICE enforcement action based solely on minor traffic offenses, and 

consider alterations, including conditional detainers, for other minor offenses:

• Absent information that an individual falls into a higher category of enforcement 

priorities set forth in the March 2, 2011 memorandum, or poses a national security or 

public safety risk, ICE should not issue detainers or initiate removal proceedings on 

persons identified through Secure Communities based on arrests for minor traffic 

offenses. Importantly, the category of minor traffic offenses should not include driving 

under the influence, hit-and-run, or reckless driving resulting in injury to persons, or 

other violations that have the potential of causing serious injury or harm to the public.

• ICE should consider extending such treatment to include other minor 

misdemeanors.21

 21 The Task Force’s tasking document, Appendix A to this report, specifically mentions loitering as just one example 

of a minor misdemeanor that is not a traffic offense.

If ICE decides not to accept this recommendation, it should issue 

conditional detainers on persons who are arrested for such misdemeanors. The 

conditional detainer would become fully operational only if the person is actually 

convicted of the offense. (In this sense, it would amount to a “post-conviction 

model.”) Such a policy would discourage minor arrests undertaken only to channel 

noncitizens into the ICE system, when the local jurisdiction has no real intention to 

expend its own prosecutorial and judicial resources on such a case. It would 

therefore reduce the risk of racial profiling or other distortions of standard arrest 

practices followed by arresting or correctional officers. ICE should further consider 

other exercises of prosecutorial discretion for such individuals, such as deferred 

action in accordance with existing memoranda or under the new procedures being 
23

developed to implement the August 18, 2011 announcement of a more systematic 

exercise of prosecutorial discretion.22

• A significant percentage of Task Force members further believe that ICE should 

not issue detainers or initiate removal proceedings on persons identified through 

Secure Communities based on arrests for any misdemeanors that do not pose a 

public safety or national security risk. If ICE does not accept this 

recommendation, those members believe that it should consider issuing 

conditional detainers and other exercises of prosecutorial discretion as discussed 

above. Other Task Force members believe that this proposal goes too far, in 

part because of variations in local laws that can result in significant offenses 

being classified as misdemeanors.

• Several Task Force members are concerned that many individuals are identified 

by Secure Communities for enforcement action based on past civil immigration 

offenses. This means that communities will continue to perceive Secure 

Communities as a program that targets traffic violators or low-level offenders if 

any arrest for even a minor offense may result in deportation. Several other Task 

Force members, however, believe that it is appropriate for ICE to engage in 

enforcement in these circumstances, in accordance with the March 2011 

priorities. 

2. Continue fingerprint checks:

If a law enforcement agency chooses to send the fingerprints of persons arrested for 

minor traffic offenses or minor misdemeanors to the FBI, those fingerprints should 

continue to be checked against immigration databases. The purpose of these checks is 

to reveal aliases and also to identify persons who have prior criminal convictions or 

other factors that indicate the person poses a serious risk to public safety or national 

security, or who come within the higher immigration enforcement priorities, such as 

persons who returned to the United States without permission after a prior removal. 

 22 See memorandum on prosecutorial discretion by ICE’s then principal legal advisor William J. Howard 

on October 24, 2005; Available online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092975/ICE-Guidance-MemoProsecutorial-Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05. 
24

IV. Unintended Consequences of Secure Communities on 

Community Policing and Community Impact

Findings

1. Secure Communities has had unintended local impacts. Secure Communities

and other federal enforcement and removal programs do not operate in a vacuum. In 

many localities, police leaders have said that immigration enforcement policies are

disrupting police-community relationships that are important to public safety and 

national security. Law enforcement experts have stated that the trust that exists 

between police and immigrant communities can take years to develop and can remain 

tenuous despite the hard work of local law enforcement agencies. When communities 

perceive that police are enforcing federal immigration laws, especially if there is a 

perception that such enforcement is targeting minor offenders, that trust is broken in 

some communities, and victims, witnesses and other residents may become fearful of 

reporting crime or approaching the police to exchange information. This may have a 

harmful impact on the ability of the police to build strong relationships with immigrant 

communities and engage in community policing, thereby negatively impacting public 

safety and possibly national security. To the extent that Secure Communities may 

damage community policing, the result can be greater levels of crime. If residents do not 

trust their local police, they are less willing to step forward as witnesses to or victims of 

crime. As a result, some Task Force members believe that decisions by local 

jurisdictions regarding participation in Secure Communities should be honored. 

2. Ensure that protections exist for crime victims and witnesses, and victims of 

domestic violence. Much of the fear within immigrant communities stems from 

concerns that immigrants are putting themselves or their family members in danger of 

deportation if they contact authorities to report crimes as victims or witnesses. The Task 

Force notes that Secure Communities was designed to minimize any such fear, 

because it obtains information only on persons arrested and fingerprinted, not on others 

who may have contact with police. ICE’s June 17 memorandum regarding victims and 

witnesses to crime provides valuable guidance to help reduce the impact of ICE 

enforcement programs on the willingness of crime victims and witnesses to call the 

police and cooperate in criminal investigations. Secure Communities also operates in 

the context of other important protections for victims and witnesses developed in recent 

years through statutes, regulations, and guidance—including the Violence Against 

Women Act, and the provisions for T and U visas for victims of trafficking or criminal 

abuse helping with investigations or prosecutions.
25

3. Make certain that local police receive timely information. It is important for state 

and local law enforcement to continue to be able to identify arrestees and to determine 

their criminal histories by submitting their fingerprints to the FBI. It may also be 

important for state and local law enforcement to receive back from ICE some 

information about the arrestees—for example, information that an arrestee is on a 

terrorist watch list, information on aliases used by the arrestee, or information that may 

be helpful in determining whether the arrestee is a member of a certain gang. However, 

some law enforcement experts indicated that not all types of information about an 

individual’s immigration status are relevant to a law enforcement agency’s mission of 

ensuring public safety. 

4. Current complaint procedures are inadequate. Individuals in jurisdictions with

Secure Communities who feel they have been inappropriately profiled or subjected to 

other civil rights violations or abuse need to be able to report these complaints to the 

proper authorities. In order for ICE’s existing protections to have integrity, community 

members also need to believe that complaints will be taken seriously—that they will be 

investigated within a reasonable timeframe, that any investigation will be transparent, 

and that there will be significant consequences for civil rights violations. The Secure 

Communities complaint procedure requires individuals to file complaints with the DHS 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRCL).

23 However, the complaint procedure 

has not been well publicized, and individuals may not be aware that they were identified 

through the Secure Communities program and may not have access to complaint forms

or the internet. Furthermore, OCRCL’s jurisdiction, authority, and capacity to respond to 

complaints are limited, yielding uncertain results.

Recommendations

1. Secure Communities must be implemented in a way that supports community 

policing and sustains the trust of all elements of the community in working with

local law enforcement agencies. One critical element is ensuring that the program 

adheres to its stated priorities and goals, as discussed above. Another critical element 

is recognizing that the goals of civil immigration enforcement and those of law 

enforcement agencies are not always aligned and may sometimes be contradictory. 

DHS must be flexible in its implementation of any program involving law enforcement 

agencies to minimize the risk that its goals might undermine those of local law 

enforcement or work against community safety.

 23 See June 14, 2011 memo from Margo Schlanger to ICE and CRCL personnel regarding Secure 

Communities complaints. http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/complaintprotocol.pdf.
26

Furthermore, ICE should develop training programs and written materials for law 

enforcement agencies and local communities that explain and clarify the Secure 

Communities and other DHS enforcement programs and the role of law enforcement 

agencies. DHS should enhance its transparency and credibility by strengthening

education and outreach to state and local law enforcement and communities to help 

them better understand all DHS enforcement and removal programs. DHS must also 

be willing to adjust its enforcement programs to minimize the risk that they will adversely 

impact local law enforcement efforts. 

2. Victims and witnesses to crime and victims of domestic violence must not be 

subject to immigration enforcement actions: Every effort must be made to ensure 

that crime victims and witnesses, particularly in domestic violence cases, are protected 

against unwarranted immigration enforcement actions, as outlined in Director Morton’s 

June 17, 2011 memo. DHS should further establish systematic mechanisms to ensure 

that the instructions set forth in the June 17, 2011 prosecutorial discretion memo are 

adhered to by all DHS enforcement personnel. 

3. Tailoring the information provided to local police: In terminating the MOAs on 

August 4, 2011, ICE stated that local jurisdictions still have an option with regard to the 

information they receive back on the basis of the DHS database checks. ICE personnel 

should work closely with participating law enforcement agencies to tailor the immigration 

information it returns to law enforcement agencies to transmit only relevant information. 

Law enforcement agencies will then be able to define the information that they consider 

relevant to their criminal law enforcement objectives. Furthermore, ICE should not send 

law enforcement agencies any immigration database “hit” information on persons who 

are naturalized U.S. citizens.

4. The complaint process must be meaningful and accessible: DHS enforcement 

programs should include a meaningful, confidential, and accessible complaint process 

for individuals who feel they have received unfair treatment. DHS should consider the 

role of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in investigating complaints of improper policing 

tied to Secure Communities. 

5. Remedial measures to prevent abuse: ICE should monitor the impact of 

immigration enforcement policy at the state and local levels, with regard to 

unconstitutional arrests and unlawful detention past 48 hours on expired detainers. ICE 

should enhance mechanisms, including data collection and analysis, for detecting 

inappropriate use of ICE enforcement and removal programs to support or engage in 

biased policing, and should establish effective remedial measures to stop any such 
27

misuses and avoid becoming a conduit for unlawful practices. 

6. ICE should consider establishing, as a pilot initiative in a selected jurisdiction,

an independent, multi-disciplinary panel to review specific cases: ICE should 

consider implementing a process that would allow for an independent, multidisciplinary 

group of law enforcement and community members to routinely review a random 

sampling of cases that were initiated through the Secure Communities program to 

ensure that these cases represent ICE’s stated enforcement priorities. The panel 

should reflect the makeup of its jurisdiction, and panel members should have credibility 

with the stakeholders they represent. This panel should have the authority to initiate 

reviews of any cases that are brought to the panel’s attention that raise questions or 

concerns about how ICE is implementing prosecutorial discretion. The findings from 

these reviews should be made public, and the panel should be able to make specific 

case recommendations to ICE. ICE should report on whether the panel’s 

recommendations were implemented or not. This type of local monitoring could help 

ensure the transparency of Secure Communities and rebuild trust in the program.

V. The Question of Whether to Suspend Secure 

Communities

The Task Force reached agreement on the large majority of issues pertaining to 

Secure Communities. However, there was one significant area in which agreement 

was not reached, namely, whether the Secure Communities program should be 

immediately suspended until DHS has had an opportunity to consider and 

implement reforms, or even terminated. The Task Force was split on this 

question, with roughly half of the members in favor of some degree of 

suspension or termination of Secure Communities, and the other half believing 

that reforms are necessary but that the program out of necessity must continue 

to function.

More specifically, many Task Force members believe that DHS should suspend 

the expansion of Secure Communities to any new jurisdictions until DHS can consider 

the reforms recommended in this report, and implement the recommendations it 

accepts. Those Task Force members believe that it makes little sense to expand a

program that many community leaders and elected officials consider deeply flawed, 

especially as to its impact on community policing and civil rights. In addition, a number 

of Task Force members believe that DHS should suspend immigration enforcement 
28

actions against low-level offenders, pending consideration and/or implementation of 

reforms. Those members believe that by suspending the program, DHS would 

acknowledge that significant reforms must be made, and that until that is accomplished, 

Secure Communities will lack credibility. Finally, some Task Force members believe 

that the credibility of Secure Communities has been so severely damaged that it cannot 

be repaired and therefore should be terminated.

On the other hand, Task Force members who oppose any suspension or 

termination of Secure Communities adhered to a different view, that “DHS needs to fix 

this airplane while it is still flying,” as one member expressed it. A number of members 

noted that DHS has limited resources and must have some strategy for focusing 

immigration enforcement on certain immigration violators. Considering that other 

strategies such as workplace enforcement actions may result in greater levels of 

arbitrariness, Secure Communities offers a way to focus resources on those who have 

run afoul of the criminal justice system, and is thus a sensible approach, those 

members said. Because of the above reasons, and because Secure Communities has 

resulted in the deportation of many dangerous offenders who were in the United States 

illegally, many state and local law enforcement agencies and elected officials support 

Secure Communities. Others agree with the DHS legal position that the informationsharing facilitated by Secure Communities’ interoperability is mandated by Congress, 

and therefore, suspension or termination may be legally impossible. Several members 

noted that there is a risk that any suspension of Secure Communities might result in the 

failure to detain or deport a person who later would commit a serious crime. 

CONCLUSION

Although Secure Communities has resulted in the identification and 

removal of many individuals posing a risk to public safety, serious concerns have 

been raised about the program, including its design, activation, implementation 

and unintended negative impact on local communities. The findings and 

recommendations set forth in this report are intended to identify and remedy 

those concerns. The Task Force believes that ICE must take a more 

comprehensive approach to ensuring that Secure Communities is well 

understood by local law enforcement agencies and communities. In order to 

achieve that, ICE must take a less technical approach to Secure Communities and 

recognize that the entire process – from arrest to deportation – is inherently 

associated with the data sharing component of the program. There is strong 

consensus within the Task Force—and across the nation—that it is important that 

ICE continue to take enforcement action against serious criminal offenders. At 
29

the same time, mixing individuals who have no criminal convictions or who have 

only low-level convictions with serious offenders is having the unintended 

consequence of undercutting the credibility of the entire Secure Communities 

program. The systematic and professional use of prosecutorial discretion is the 

key to regaining public support and to making the best use of limited resources. 

In order for the Secure Communities program to regain public trust and 

confidence, DHS must review these recommendations and reintroduce the 

program in close cooperation with local communities and police leaders.

The Task Force recognizes DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano for taking the 

initiative to form the Task Force, and thanks Mr. Morton and the other DHS officials who 

made presentations to us and provided information we requested. The Task Force 

urges DHS and ICE to continue soliciting views about Secure Communities from a wide 

range of stakeholders, especially from the state and local government officials who play 

a key role in Secure Communities.

We urge DHS and ICE to give serious consideration to these findings and 

develop a plan to implement the recommendations. Specifically, the Task Force 

requests that DHS and ICE prepare a written response to the Task Force that 

addresses the extent to which the recommendations in this report will be implemented, 

and the reasons why specific recommendations may not be acted upon. Moreover, the 

DHS Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) are 

currently engaged in a review of Secure Communities. Their findings will provide 

additional recommendations to ICE and should be carefully considered and 

incorporated into the program. 
30

Appendix A

Homeland Security Advisory Council

Task Force on Secure Communities: Tasking Document

Secure Communities is one of the Department’s most important tools to ensure that the federal 

government’s limited immigration enforcement resources are used in the most effective way 

possible to improve public safety. 

As a matter of policy, Secure Communities should advance U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) priorities, namely protecting public safety and national security, border 

security, and the integrity of the immigration system.

Concerns have been expressed regarding the identification and removal, through Secure 

Communities, of aliens charged with, but not convicted of, minor traffic offenses who have no 

other criminal history or history of immigration violations. Some of these concerns relate to the 

impact on community policing and the possibility of racial profiling. One possible avenue for 

potentially addressing some of these concerns could be a policy that would await conviction 

prior to removal for those charged with low level traffic offenses (excluding driving under the 

influence, hit and run, and other traffic offenses affecting public safety) or other minor 

misdemeanor offenses who have no outstanding orders of removal or history of immigration 

violations. 

The Task Force on Secure Communities (TFSC) will review the extent to which those concerns 

are borne out in the field and provide substantive, actionable recommendations to the Homeland 

Security Advisory Council (HSAC) on how substantive contours of Secure Communities policy 

could be formulated to address valid concerns, including recommendations on policy changes 

and the best procedural way to implement any policy changes.

Specifically, the Task Force will address the following questions:

o How should Secure Communities address those arrested for minor traffic 

offenses?

o What traffic offenses should be considered minor?

o Does the identification of minor traffic offenders through Secure Communities 

influence community policing or the reporting of crimes?

o Are there other misdemeanor offenses such as loitering that should be treated as a 

minor offense?

o How should the implementation of any policy with regard to minor traffic 

offenders or other minor criminal offenders be announced to and coordinated with 

state and local law enforcement agencies?
31

Appendix B

Subject Matter Experts

Name Title, Organization 

Gaby Benitez Tennessee Immigrant & Refugee Rights Coalition

 

Miguel Carpizo Tennessee Immigrant & Refugee Rights Coalition

Alphonso David Deputy Secretary for Civil Rights, Office of the Governor, New 

York

Ed Davis Commissioner, Boston Police

Elizabeth Glazer Deputy Secretary for Public Safety, Office of the Governor, New 

York

Enid Gonzalez Attorney, CASA de Maryland

Seth Grossman Chief of Staff, Office of the General Counsel, DHS

Jon Gurule Acting Chief for the Secure Communities Unit, ICE, DHS

Greg Hamilton Sheriff, Travis County, Texas

Mary Beth Heffernan Secretary of Public Safety and Security, Massachusetts

Aarti Kohli Director of Immigration Policy, Warren Institute, Berkeley School 

of Law

Scott C. Kroeber Commander, Los Angeles Police Department

Gary Mead Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal 

Operations, ICE, DHS

Marc Rapp Acting Assistant Director, Secure Communities Program, ICE, 

DHS

John Morton Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Lynn Neugebauer Supervising Attorney of the Safe Horizon Immigration Law Project

John Sandweg Counselor to the Secretary of Homeland Security
32

Margo Schlanger Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS

John Schomberg Governor’s General Counsel, Illinois

Peter H. Schuck Simeon E. Baldwin Professor Emeritus of Law and Professor 

(Adjunct) of Law at Yale Law School

Donald B. Smith Sheriff, Putnam County, New York 

Jerry Stermer Governor’s Senior Advisor, Illinois

Fred Tsao Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights

Jessica M. Vaughan Director of Policy Studies for the Center for Immigration Studies

Homeland Security Advisory Council Staff

Becca Sharp

Executive Director

Mike Miron

Acting Deputy Executive Director and Designated Federal Official

Interns

Sarah Martin

:

Sarah Weiner

Jack Wisnefske

Police Executive Research forum Staff

Gerard Murphy

Director of Homeland Security

Andrea Luna

Chief of Staff

Craig Fischer

Director of Communications
33

Appendix C

Task Force Field Meetings: Information Gathering Sessions

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Dallas County Community College

Bill J. Priest Campus, Hoblitzelle Auditorium

1402 Corinth Street

Dallas, Texas 75215

6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Monday, August 15, 2011

St. Anne’s Residential Facility

155 North Occidental Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90026

6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

IBEW Hall

600 W. Washington Boulevard

Chicago, Illinois 60661

6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Wednesday, August 24, 2011

George Mason University

Founder’s Hall

3351 Fairfax Drive

Arlington, Virginia 22201

6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.