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STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR 

THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 20, 2014 

Serial No. 113–72 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

VACANCY

VACANCY

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana, Vice Chair 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (Ex Officio) 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

RYAN CONSAUL, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of South Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency ..................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Ron Barber, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Stewart A. Baker, Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President and Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Mr. Henry H. Willis, Director, Rand Homeland Security and Defense Center, 

The Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 19 

Ms. Elaine C. Duke, Former Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Stewart A. Baker ............................ 41 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Stewart A. 

Baker ..................................................................................................................... 41 

Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Frank J. Cilluffo ............................. 42 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Frank J. Cilluffo .. 42 

Questions From Chairman Jeff Duncan for Henry H. Willis .............................. 43 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Henry H. Willis ... 43 

Questions From Honorable Jeff Duncan for Elaine C. Duke ............................... 44 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Elaine C. Duke .... 45 

(1) 

STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON PRIORITIES FOR THE QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND 

SECURITY REVIEW 

Friday, June 20, 2014 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT

EFFICIENCY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Duncan, Hudson, Barber, and Payne. 

Mr. DUNCAN. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to 

order. The purpose of this hearing today is to receive testimony 

from National security stakeholders on their recommendations for 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Our homeland security faces a significant test. From the influx 

of illegal aliens, including 60,000 unaccompanied children over the 

last year—and what we see going on even today in the Southwest 

is alarming—to terrorist threats from Syrian foreign fighters and 

al-Qaeda-affiliated groups wreaking havoc on the Middle East, and 

the continued cyber attacks by China and others, this administration has failed to provide a comprehensive strategic vision to secure 

our Nation. 

Mandated by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Department 

of Homeland Security, or DHS, is required to conduct a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, every 4 years. 

The purpose of the QHSR is for DHS to assess the state of our 

Nation’s homeland security and determine what steps, if any, are 

needed to shift, or enhance, our strategic focus. The QHSR is 

meant to outline DHS’s mission, and the Department’s vision and 

strategy to effectively implement its mission. While the report was 

released only hours before this hearing, it was due no later than 

December 31, 2013. As a result, it is 6 months late. Although I understand part of the delay was due to the need for Secretary Johnson to review the report, we need a cohesive strategy to combat the 

threats that we face. 

Until we have a focused, achievable, and affordable strategy that 

addresses these threats, this administration is failing its duty to 

lead. Because of the lengthy delay, this Quadrennial Homeland Se-
2 

curity Review was also unable to guide the President’s fiscal year 

2015 budget request. With our country over $17 trillion in debt, 

and almost $18 trillion today, it is imperative that we make wise 

and well-informed decisions when it comes to the budget. Unfortunately, without the timely issuance of the QHSR, DHS lacked the 

strategy necessary to help prioritize and spend taxpayer dollars 

wisely. 

In November 2013, the committee sent a letter to Acting Secretary Beers recommending that the QHSR focus on areas such as 

border security, cybersecurity, terrorist threats, preparedness, 

transportation security, and management effectiveness. While the 

QHSR mentions most of these areas of interest, it does not address 

these threats posed by other nation-states such as Iran, China, and 

Russia. This is a major omission for a document intended to guide 

how we secure the homeland. Its failure to mention Departmental 

management is also a major weakness. 

Year after year, DHS is ranked at or near the bottom of Federal 

agencies in many public-sector agency performance rankings. For 

this Department to be efficient and effective, proper management 

must be a priority. Highlighting climate change as a homeland security issue and not nation-state threats—as I mentioned earlier, 

Iran, China, Russia—or the management of the Department makes 

no sense and it raises questions about the usefulness of this strategy—climate change. However, most concerning in reviewing the 

QHSR is that there seems to be a lack of aligning resources with 

strategic priorities. 

In the 9/11 Commission Act, it requires DHS to identify the 

budget plan required to provide sufficient resources to successfully 

execute the full range of missions called for in the National homeland security strategy. While the QHSR briefly mentions budget 

drivers in general, it does not link specific mission areas to the actual budget. The Government Accountability Office reported, after 

the release of the first QHSR, that there was a lack of input from 

9 Federal stakeholders. For this document to be truly effective 

there must be interagency, State, local, and private-sector consultation. 

In viewing the list of stakeholder participation, it seems DHS increased their stakeholder outreach. But it also notes direct engagement with the Executive Office of the President. DHS’s strategy 

should be objective and fact-based, and I sincerely hope that there 

was no political influence in the development of this document. The 

production of this report should not solely be a box-checking exercise for the Department. The Nation desperately needs a strategic 

vision to secure our homeland. Time will tell if this document 

meets that need. I look forward to hearing the testimony from our 

stakeholders and hearing their perspectives on the latest QHSR. 

With that, I will now recognize the Ranking Minority Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentleman from Arizona, my friend, Mr. 

Barber, for any statement he may have. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the 

witnesses for being with us today. 

The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or 

QHSR, is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines the 
3 

long-term risk, strategy, and priorities for homeland security across 

our Nation. 

Unfortunately, as the Chairman pointed out, the Department did 

not release its report until yesterday, despite the statutory mandate that it be delivered no later than December 31, 2013. I am 

very disappointed that it was released late. It makes it hard to conduct a meaningful hearing with so short a time to study the review. But I am pleased that the report is finally in our hands, and 

that it includes specific strategic priorities for the Department for 

the next 4 years. 

It is now encumbent upon the Department, in coordination with 

its Federal, State, and local partners and other stakeholders, to 

carry out these strategies in an effort to keep our country secure. 

And, I might add, to make sure that we have a way of tracking 

progress, which has been sorely lacking in the Department in so 

many areas. 

For the QHSR to be truly effective, a truly effective guide—one 

that ensures that all Department components are working towards 

the same goals—it is absolutely critical that the strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR actually become programs, 

policies, and budget requirements. 

Although the Department is required by law to be included, 

missing from the QHSR is an assessment of the organizational 

alignment of the Department with a National homeland security 

strategy, including the Department’s organizational structure, 

management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resource systems, procurement systems, and a physical and technical 

infrastructure. These missing elements make it difficult to determine whether the Department has the required capabilities to 

achieve the goals established in the QHSR and its ability to link 

its policies to planning, budget, and execution. 

It is also essential that the Department do more to engage stakeholders. I represent 1 of 9 Southwest Border districts. The people 

who live and work, have businesses, go to school along that border 

should have a right to have a say in how the Department develops 

its strategies and carries them out. I still—I am waiting to see an 

active and robust effort to engage those stakeholders. I would add, 

the personnel, the boots on the ground have to have their voice to 

make sure that they are helping to form strategies and priorities 

for the future. 

It is a sad commentary—and the Chairman also pointed this 

out—that when there is a review, National review, of all Federal 

agencies, DHS has consistently fallen very low. In fact, typically 19 

out of 19 agencies studied. Then when you look inside the Department, within the Department that—looking at morale of employees, the CBP—Customs and Border Protection ranks lowest of all 

the employees of the Department. These must be addressed, these 

issues must be addressed, and should become a priority for the Department going forward. Morale is essential to effective personnel 

activities. 

The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS 

Acquisition, Accountability, and Efficiency Act, which passed the 

House earlier this morning. This bipartisan bill will, I believe, 
4 

bring transparency, accountability, and consistency to the Department’s acquisition processes, which have been sorely lacking. 

We have had some outrageous examples of how acquisitions have 

gone wrong. The effective and efficient acquisition of technology 

goods and services will be vital in the Department’s ability to implement the strategic approaches defined in the QHSR. 

As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management Efficiency Subcommittee, I will be joining with my colleagues on both 

sides of the aisle in monitoring the Department’s implementation 

of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR to ultimately determine its worth. Improving the importance of DHS programs, activities, and initiatives is clearly a bipartisan process, a bipartisan priority. This committee has shown that time and time again. 

But while the Department is not here today to address our specific questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these very important stakeholders and former Department employees to testify 

today. Their insights into the QHSR and the Department’s plan 

forward should serve as a valuable contribution to our oversight, 

and I look forward to hearing from each of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Barber follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER RON BARBER

JUNE 20, 2014 

The purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, is to conduct a comprehensive assessment that outlines the long-term risks, strategy, and 

priorities for homeland security across the Nation. 

Unfortunately, the Department did not release the QHSR until yesterday; despite 

the statutory mandate that it be delivered no later than December 31, 2013. While 

I am disappointed it was released late, I am pleased to see that the report includes 

very specific strategic priorities for the Department for the next 4 years. 

It is now incumbent upon the Department, in coordination with its Federal, State, 

and local partners and other stakeholders, to carry out these strategies in an effort 

to keep our country secure. For the QHSR to be a truly effective guide, one that 

ensures all Department components are working toward the same goals, it is critical 

that the strategies the Department has put on paper in the QHSR actually become 

programs, policies, and budget requirements. 

Although required by law to be included, missing from the QHSR is an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the National homeland security strategy, including the Department’s organizational structure, management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, and physical and technical infrastructure. 

These missing elements make it difficult to determine whether the Department 

has the required capabilities to achieve the goals established in the QHSR and its 

ability to link its policies to planning, budget, and execution. 

The Chairman and I recently co-sponsored H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, which passed the House earlier this month. This bipartisan bill will bring transparency, accountability, and consistency to the Department’s acquisitions process. The effective and efficient acquisition of technology, 

goods, and services will be vital in the Department’s ability to implement the strategic approaches defined in the QHSR. 

As Ranking Member of the Oversight and Management Efficiency Subcommittee, 

I look forward to monitoring the Department’s implementation of the strategic priorities laid out in the QHSR to ultimately determine its worth. 

While the Department is not here today to address our specific questions, I do appreciate the willingness of these very important stakeholders and former Department employees to testify today. 

Their insight into the QHSR and the Department’s plan forward should serve as 

a valuable contribution to our oversight. I look forward to hearing from each of you. 
5 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements 

may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 20, 2014 

Pursuant to the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

of 2007, every 4 years, the Department of Homeland Security (Department) must 

outline its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security in the form of a 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR, which was to be submitted to 

Congress in December 2009, and every 4 years thereafter. 

This is a model that has proven to be helpful for the Department of Defense and 

it was anticipated that the Department, and the Nation as a whole, would equally 

benefit from the Department of Homeland Security’s effort. 

The first QHSR was not timely received and did not satisfy the requirements set 

forth in the statute defining what it must contain. It did, however, serve as a framework for the second QHSR, which should have been submitted to Congress by December 31, 2013. 

Unfortunately, once again, the report was late. The first QHSR was submitted almost 2 months past the statutory deadline; this latest version is almost 6 months 

overdue. 

I appreciate the need for the Department to align the QHSR with the President’s 

budget request, which is released in March and that the transition in Departmental 

leadership also impacted the time line, but, the Department must do better. 

Moreover, one of the fundamental purposes of the QHSR is to inform the budget 

and as a result the budget should align with the priorities set forth in the document. 

Building on this foundation as well, are the programs and policies that are implemented, which should also align with the strategies laid out in the QHSR. 

For example, although I appreciate the Department’s emphasis on improving our 

biosurveillance capabilities, it is unclear whether and how its strategy will align 

with Federal efforts coordinated by the White House. 

The administration released the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 

2012, and an implementation plan was due 120 days later. To date, the implementation plan has not been released, and the Department has not been able to tell the 

committee when the implementation plan will be released or what its role will be. 

Accordingly, I will be interested in learning more about the degree to which portions of the QHSR related to biosurveillance were written in coordination with the 

implementation plan for the National Strategy for Biosurveillance and whether and 

how the Department’s role will change when that document is ultimately released. 

Likewise, there is an entire section devoted to immigration. Yet, unless and until 

we pass Comprehensive Immigration Reform, our system will remain broken. I look 

forward to monitoring how the Department will carry out these and other priorities 

set forth in the document. 

Furthermore, the QHSR process does not and should exist in a vacuum. The 

homeland security enterprise consists of Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, 

in addition to the private sector. 

I therefore look forward to hearing from the stakeholders present at today’s hearing to ascertain how those outside of Government were included in the process and 

to obtain their perspective on what the Department has identified as our Nation’s 

priorities over the next 4 years. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of 

witnesses before us today on this topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written statement will appear in the 

record. I will introduce each of you first, and then recognize you individually for your testimony. 

Our first witness today it Mr. Stewart Baker. He is a partner in 

the law office of Steptoe & Johnson in Washington, DC. Mr. Baker 

formerly served as the first assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, Mr. Baker led a staff 

of 250 people and was responsible for Department-wide policy analysis as well as the Department’s international affairs strategic 
6 

planning and relationships with law enforcement and public advisory committees. 

The second witness, Mr. Frank Cilluffo is an assistant vice president at the George Washington University, where he is the director 

of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. The institute is a nonpartisan think tank that focuses on counterterrorism and counterradicalization efforts, cyber threats and deterrence in the nexus between crime and terrorism. He also joined the faculty at George 

Washington University in 2003 from the White House, where he 

served as special assistant to the President for homeland security. 

Dr. Henry Willis is the director of the Rand Homeland Security 

and Defense Center, and a professor at the Pardee Rand Graduate 

School. Dr. Willis has applied risk analysis tools to resource allocation and risk-management decisions in the area of public health 

and emergency preparedness, homeland and National security policy, energy and environmental policy, and transportation planning. 

Dr. Willis’ recent research involved assessing the cost and benefits 

of terrorism security measures like the Western Hemisphere Travel 

Initiative and evaluating the impact of public health emergency 

preparedness grant programs. 

The Honorable Elaine Duke is the former under secretary for 

management at the Department of Homeland Security, a position 

she held from 2008 until 2010. As the under secretary, she was responsible for the management of the Department’s $47 billion 

budget, acted as the Department’s chief acquisition officer, and led 

DHS’s $17 billion acquisition program. Prior to her appointment as 

under secretary, Ms. Duke served in a number of positions at the 

Department, including deputy under secretary for management, 

chief procurement officer, deputy assistant administrator of acquisitions at the Transportation Security Administration. 

So I thank all of you for being here today. I look forward to delving into this topic. 

I will now recognize Mr. Baker for your testimony, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member 

Barber. It is really a pleasure to be here. I vividly remember 

launching the first QHSR in the waning days of the Bush administration with a meeting that included outside stakeholders, such as 

Randy Beers when he was in private life. 

Effective management of the Department, achieving its goals, 

protecting us from terrorism and the other goals that have been set 

here is not a partisan exercise. Everyone wants the Department to 

be well-managed and effective in achieving its goals. 

So I am pleased to talk about the second QHSR. There are several things that I think are praiseworthy about it. It clearly is now 

an institutionalized part of the Department’s planning, and that is 

important. The QDR has been a valuable planning and management tool for the Defense Department, and the QHSR, if it continues to improve, can be the same for the Department of Homeland Security. 
7 

It stresses, the second report, the continuity of the objectives that 

the Department has. They have not significantly changed at the 

top level. I do not think they would significantly change under a 

different party or a different President. These are the goals that 

DHS is set up to achieve. 

In addition, I would say that this report is better than the last. 

It is, in particular, a very thoughtful addressing of the challenges 

of terrorism, particularly nuclear, biological, and deserves to be 

praised for looking hard and making some difficult choices with respect to how to carry out the counterterrorism mission. 

That said, there are certainly areas where significant improvement is required. It is always a temptation in producing reports, 

particularly reports that have been required by Congress, to move 

from looking out the windshield and using this tool to guide the 

Department to just looking in the review mirror and telling us 

what you see behind the Department. 

That is easier because it is really—it is more of a speech than 

a decision-making process. There are elements of speechifying in 

this QHSR. If you look at the QDR and the Secretary’s letter, the 

first sentence talks about the tough choices that the QDR makes. 

I don’t see as many tough choices being made in this QHSR. It is 

a little bit more a description of a strategy. Until that strategy actually bites and produces tough budget decisions, it is not easy to 

say that it is really a strategy. I think more needs to be done in 

translating the QHSR into actual budget decisions. 

There is also, frankly, a temptation on the part of other agencies 

or other stakeholders to say, well, if you are writing a speech be 

sure to name-check me. Or maybe I would like to have a turf fight. 

Since you have to get this out, I will hold it up until you give me 

some turf concessions. There is some reason to believe that this 

may have happened with the Department of Justice demanding 

name checks for all of its roles in areas where its legislative or 

statutory authority is a little dubious. That is unfortunate; the idea 

that a DHS strategy would be held hostage by other agencies 

strikes me as inappropriate. 

More specifically, I would say the things that I found disappointing about the content of the report—I thought the cyber discussion was only adequate, not particularly strategic. The advertisement for immigration reform, we understand that that is a legislative proposal that the administration feels very strongly about. 

But we don’t know whether it will pass, and it is hard to plan for 

something that has such a questionable future on the Hill. Introducing it into the QHSR is open to some question, particularly because I don’t think the report acknowledges just how tough a management challenge that will be. It will be an enormous management challenge. 

The Department should be planning for that challenge because 

of the possibility that we will get significant reforms. I did not see 

as much discussion of that challenge as was appropriate. Finally, 

I could not agree more with the remarks of both Congressmen 

about the deleterious effects of delay here. That makes it hard for 

this to have an impact. If it doesn’t have an impact it is just a 

speech. It needs, the Department needs, more centralized management for sure. 
8 

This could be an enormously valuable tool as part of a strengthening of overall management. I would certainly support anything 

that achieved that goal. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEWART A. BAKER

JUNE 20, 2014 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, Members of the subcommittee, I am 

honored to testify before you today about the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). During my time as assistant secretary for policy at DHS, I was involved in launching the QHSR, as well as what 

was then known as the Office of Strategic Plans. As you can imagine I am a strong 

supporter of coordinated strategic planning in general, and of the QHSR in particular. 

Our goal in starting the QHSR was to create a mechanism for the Secretary to 

articulate a unified set of strategies and priorities for protecting U.S. homeland security. We believed that by forcing ourselves to think strategically about the range 

of threats to the Nation and the tools available to the Department, we could create 

a unified set of priorities that could guide the components of the Department without the need for constant personal attention from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. We also hoped that doing so would make for a better budget process, one 

in which some of the goals and trade-offs had already been clarified, so that budgeting was a matter of matching limited resources to an agreed set of priorities. We 

hoped, in short, that some of the hard choices then driven by annual budget exercises could be made with a longer perspective across all parts of the Department. 

Since its inception, DHS has suffered from a lack of unity between its components. In many ways this is unsurprising. As you all know, the Department was 

created from the combination of several different entities, most of which brought 

with them a fully formed set of ideas about how to best go about protecting the Nation. Reconciling these diverse missions into something resembling a coherent set 

of policy goals was always going to be a challenge, even under the best of circumstances. The Department has benefited tremendously over the years from strong 

leadership, and when the Secretary brought personal focus to the task, the Department responded with unity and focus. But without that personal involvement it has 

been hard to maintain mission unity among the Department’s components. 

Unity has only grown more important in an era of evolving threats. The original 

impetus for creating DHS was to better coordinate the various entities responsible 

for protecting the Nation against terrorism. In certain ways this reorganization has 

been tremendously successful. America’s enemies have been unable to replicate the 

destruction of 9/11 within the United States, and DHS deserves great credit for the 

role it has played in thwarting many post-9/11 plots. But terrorism today is a more 

dynamic threat than it was 10 or 15 years ago. The advances in communications 

technology since 2001 alone have fundamentally altered the ability of terrorists to 

recruit, both inside and outside of the United States, as well as to coordinate attacks. This is not to mention, of course, the many other threats beyond terrorism 

that the Department must guard against. Some of these threats are new or evolving. For instance, our increasing reliance on network technology has made us more 

vulnerable to cyber attacks. A hacker can today cause a level of damage from his 

living room that would have been inconceivable as recently as 10 years ago. Others 

are as old as the planet, as Hurricane Katrina reminded us nearly 10 years ago. 

The QHSR is thus a mechanism for DHS to think carefully about the full range 

of threats it faces, and to prioritize them accordingly. In a world of unlimited resources this would be less important. But that is not the world we live in. We have 

settled into an extended period of austerity for the Department, and cuts to its 

budget remain a real possibility in the immediate future. Given that DHS cannot 

treat every threat equally, it is therefore even more imperative that the Secretary 

be able to prioritize threats and coordinate the Department’s resources accordingly. 

This is what we hoped the QHSR would facilitate. 

GRADING THE 2014 QHSR

DHS issued the first QHSR in 2010. The final product was, in my opinion, a good 

first statement of the Department’s priorities. Having analyzed the range of shortand long-term threats to the United States in light of the Department’s responsibilities, it synthesized these priorities into five core missions: Counterterrorism, border 

security, immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and resilience to natural disasters 
9 

and attacks. I imagine you are all familiar with the previous report so I will not 

spend much time discussing its details, other than to say that it was, in my mind, 

an effective articulation of where the Department’s overarching focus should be. 

Thankfully, substantial progress has been made since the inaugural QHSR. The 

second report is better, more detailed and far-reaching in scope. It maintains the 

previous QHSR’s five core DHS missions essentially unchanged, but it goes significantly further in analyzing the dynamic risks and challenges we face within these 

core areas. It is a more detailed statement of the principles that should guide individual decision making within the core framework. And it is a more comprehensive 

forecast of potential future threats to our homeland. 

This is not to say that the report is perfect. From my perspective, it is not clear 

that areas like cybersecurity or nuclear terrorism were approached with the same 

level of care as other forms of terrorism. With respect to cybersecurity, the 2014 

QHSR has little new to say about the need to recruit and develop a skilled cybersecurity workforce, for instance. It also does not appropriately prioritize the importance of protecting critical U.S. infrastructure from espionage. To be sure, there are 

parts of the QHSR that need work. Nonetheless, on balance the report is an improvement over its predecessor. 

These improvements are not surprising to me, since this year’s report has benefited from a consolidated Strategic Planning and Risk Analysis department (SPAR). 

As I am sure you are aware, DHS combined the Offices of Strategic Plans and Risk 

Management in 2012 into a single group. This was a good idea; the combination has 

resulted in a more methodical, efficient analysis of the relevant data. The 2014 

QHSR is also the result of substantially more cooperation between DHS and stakeholders, both public and private. Accordingly, it is a more complete description of 

the broad range of threats we face in the United States, based on a wider range 

of perspectives. 

The quality of this year’s report is surely the product of the tremendous professionals in the Department. This begins with Secretary Jeh Johnson’s stewardship. 

It is clear that Secretary Johnson sees the value of strategic planning for the Department. Although still relatively new to DHS, he wasted no time in quickly making the QHSR his own, apparently redrafting portions of it to better bring them into 

alignment with his vision. The result is a clear statement of his and the Department’s priorities. 

More generally, I have been pleased to see that Secretary Johnson is also committed to unifying the Department’s components into something, in his words, greater than the sum of its parts. The ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ memo he sent to the Department’s leadership in April of this year is a good example of his commitment to embrace strategic thinking beyond what is mandated by the QHSR. 

I suppose it didn’t hurt that Secretary Johnson was able to see how much those 

of us involved in starting the QHSR cribbed from the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (‘‘QDR’’). Like DHS, DoD is a group of proud, independent 

components with often divergent traditions and missions. Yet, DoD has often succeeded in fostering a larger sense of unity where DHS has not. Obviously, this is 

due in part to DoD simply having been around longer. DHS is, after all, barely 10 

years old. When DoD was older than that, the Secretary of Defense reportedly asked 

the Navy during the missile crisis how the embargo of Cuba would be carried out; 

he was reportedly told that it would be done in accordance with Navy tradition and 

international law, and that he could retire to his quarters, secure in the knowledge 

that the Navy would call for his advice if and when the Navy thought that was necessary. I am confident that DHS is past that point in its drive for unity. 

And so of course is DOD. We looked to the QDR as an exemplary strategic planning exercise that played an important part in fostering a culture of unity within 

DoD—an influence Secretary Johnson has correctly reinforced. 

I would also be remiss if I did not mention Alan Cohn, assistant secretary for 

strategy, planning, analysis & risk. Assistant Secretary Cohn has led the QHSR 

process for both the 2010 and 2014 editions. His hard work and ability to find consensus is one of the principal reasons the current report is as good as it is. The only 

real credit I can take for the QHSR as it stands today stems from the fact that I 

had the wisdom to hire and then promote Assistant Secretary Cohn. I am happy 

I did—he has made me look brilliant ever since (and he, at least, knows how hard 

that is). Without question, he has turned out to be one of the important career talents for the Department in this area. 
10 

BRINGING THE DEPARTMENT’S BUDGET INTO ALIGNMENT WITH THE QHSR’S STATEMENT

OF PRIORITIES

As I mentioned before, the 2010 QHSR did a fine job stating the Department’s 

priorities. It was less effective, however, at actually linking the budget up with 

these priorities. From the perspective of 2014, we can look back and see clearly that, 

in practice, the allocation of money within the Department did not end up tracking 

the QHSR all that closely. We can chalk that up, perhaps, to the learning curve, 

but we should expect the second QHSR to have a greater influence on funding decisions inside the Department. 

But there are more fundamental issues with the way money is allocated within 

DHS that make it difficult for the Secretary to bring DHS’s budget into alignment 

with his priorities as they are described in the QHSR. These issues need to be addressed if the report is to ever approach the level of efficacy we hoped it would have. 

For an agency like DHS, which is mainly in the business of execution rather than 

oversight, funding is everything. Compare DHS with oversight agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency, whose primary function is writing rules for others 

to follow. While those agencies obviously need to keep the lights on, their ability 

to perform their mandate is less tied to appropriations and more to the legislative 

authority they receive. DHS, in contrast, is far more often in the business of execution rather than oversight. Most of its missions are carried out directly. When you 

cross a border you are met by DHS employees. The same is true if you are lost at 

sea and need rescue, are boarding an airplane, or are caught counterfeiting funds 

or illegally immigrating into the United States. 

How—and how well—DHS does these jobs depends largely on how it allocates its 

budget. Thus, while strategic planning exercises like the QHSR are useful in their 

own right, they can easily become sterile exercises if no one believes they will actually drive budgetary decisions. Make no mistake about it, a statement of the Department’s priorities, no matter how lucid, will ultimately ring hollow if the priorities 

are not honored when budget decisions are made. 

RECOMMENDATIONS MOVING FORWARD

This is not to say that the QHSR should be a holy writ that determines budgetary 

allocations for an entire 4-year period. It should not be, and it will at times be necessary to deviate from the script in order for the Department to be able to effectively 

respond to the dynamic range of challenges it is sure to face. While long-term 

strategizing is vital, so too is making sure that the Secretary and the components 

within DHS can fluidly make decisions to respond to threats as they emerge. The 

QHSR is not a substitute for judgment. Instead, the report is what I would call an 

auto-pilot. It is a mechanism for individuals within DHS to understand how to carry 

out their jobs unless and until they know the Secretary has reconsidered. And it 

is a way to make sure the Secretary can be confident that those within the Department are following his objectives, even when he is not personally overseeing them. 

Finally, one other issue I would like to briefly address is the degree to which the 

Department of Justice has been given a near veto over the QHSR, presumably by 

the Office of Management and Budget. I simply do not understand how it is that 

DHS’s strategic plan can be delayed by an agency that has no skin in the game. 

There is no reason to allow the QHSR to be delayed for so long, particularly at the 

instance of another Cabinet department. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for your testimony. 

I will recognize Frank next. Pronounce your name for me. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. SIH-LU-FO. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you so much. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, and Ranking 

Member Barber, Congressman Payne, thanks for the opportunity to 

join you today. I think you guys hit it out of the park in terms of 

your opening remarks. I think you captured a lot of what a lot of 

us are struggling and thinking about in terms of the QHSR in 
11 

terms of its strengths and in terms of its weaknesses. There is 

nothing I disagree with my good friend and long-time co-conspirator, Stewart Baker. 

But I thought I would maybe pick up on a couple of points that 

haven’t been raised. First, talk a little bit about the threat, and 

then maybe focus on some of the recommendations. 

I think it is important to recognize that the QHSR does come at 

a time of incredibly significant international instability. I think 

there is a feeling that we are in a safe place. The reality is, if you 

were to close your eyes and point to a place on the map, I can tell 

you, or we can tell you, what some of the challenges and concerns 

are. They are varied and they are many, and they come in various 

shapes, sizes, flavors, and forms. 

I think Mr. Duncan, you were spot-on to highlight the growing 

nature of state-sponsored terrorism, which is back. Whether it is 

the government of Iran in support of Hezbollah, or some of the 

Shia militias, or others, others are turning to proxies, as well. If 

you just look at what played out in Crimea vis-a ́-vis Russia, you 

have a role of proxies. You see that in a very strong form vis-a ́-vis 

cyber, where everyone is turning to proxies to do their bidding. In 

terms of the non-state Islamist threat, though, we have got problems on our hands. 

At the end of the day, you have got broad swaths of territory and 

ungoverned spaces that are providing and affording our enemies 

the time and space to plan and execute attacks. Obviously, when 

we look at Iraq in the past couple of days, it is incredibly disconcerting that some of the hard-earned gains both in terms of 

treasure but, more importantly, in terms of lives of our men and 

women in uniform are being rolled back. That is—that is unacceptable. 

Why Yemen, why Iraq, why the Sahel, the Magreb, which are 

broad swaths of territory—why are these concerns? They are 

ungoverned spaces and they are under-governed, where the authority—where nations have been usurped by those that have more 

hostile aims. 

For awhile there, we were applying enough pressure that they 

were spending more time looking over their shoulder and less time 

plotting and executing attacks. This is a big concern, and it does 

have ramifications in terms of our next steps in Afghanistan. 

Moreover, you are seeing advances in technology that have increased the lethality of weapons, targeting systems, and means of 

communication used by terrorists. New and powerful avenues of recruitment and radicalization have opened up, notably through social media. I might note, even in terms of ISIS in Iraq, they now 

are coming out with propaganda very similar to al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine, in English, and clearly targeting, and aimed at, Westerners, including Americans. 

And why is Syria and the foreign fighter flow you are seeing spill 

into Iraq of such concern? We are talking over 70 countries—3,000 

Westerners, including over 70 Americans. At some point they return. What makes Syria unique is that unlike the foreign fighter 

flows we have seen in the past—whether in the AfPak region or in 

Yemen or in Somalia—they were primarily focused on a single diaspora. 
12 

What you are seeing in Syria is flocking from all over the world. 

At some point, you are gonna see new networks. You are gonna see 

Yemenis who have bomb-making experience meeting up with Brits 

who have social media experience. It is these new networks that 

I think are going to be of significant concern. 

Don’t think for a minute that al-Qaeda isn’t doing talent-spotting 

on the battlefield and identifying individuals that they will turn 

back to the West. This is a big concern. That is why foreign fighters, I think, are especially significant. 

In terms of the cyber threat, I do feel this is—when you look at 

the homeland, you can attack the United States without ever stepping foot in the country. At the high end of the threat spectrum, 

we are obviously talking about nation-states: China, Russia, Iran, 

North Korea. Some are engaged primarily in espionage, others are 

engaged in more computer network attack, or attacking our systems. 

Again, the role that proxies play is quite significant here. Because who is behind that clickety-clack of the keyboard? Anonymity; attribution is very difficult to discern in cyber space. So I think 

a lot more there. I think as you start seeing the internet of things, 

where physical and cyber converge, you are going to see new threat 

vectors. I think one thing the Department deserves some credit on 

is recognizing the convergence of physical and cyber threats in the 

QHSR. 

Bottom line on the QHSR, as Stewart said, we don’t—I think we 

are all tired of speeches. At the end of the day, unless the QHSR 

has bite and can be aligned to budget planning and budget processes, which it didn’t do the first go-around, it is merely rhetoric. 

Policy without resources is rhetoric. 

We do have to make tough decisions. In the words of President 

Eisenhower, we actually need security and we need solvency. I 

think that is what we are struggling with here, is the need to be 

able to make some of those tough decisions, get the greatest return 

on our investment, and get the most bang for our buck. Doesn’t do 

that thus far. 

One thing I want to just highlight as I close is, I give you props 

and kudos for passing the acquisition legislation. I think there is 

a lot you can do using that model to keep your oversight functions 

moving, as well, in terms of some of the policy deliberations. We 

do need to elevate the Office of Policy to an under secretary. That 

will give you more oversight function. I think the committee itself 

can play a more significant role with authorization bills that can 

align to some of the budget-making. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to join you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

JUNE 20, 2014 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

The Department of Homeland Security has now completed its second Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and is expected to issue its report to Congress 

on the results of this review shortly. My testimony today will comment on key 
13 

1Quoted from page 403 of H.R. 110–259, House-Senate Conference Report for the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, July 25, 2007. 

issues addressed in a draft version of the report, beginning with general remarks 

and then focusing on what I believe are the two most critical threats facing the 

homeland today: Terrorism threats and cyber-related threats. 

This QHSR comes at a time of significant international instability. Although our 

homeland security posture has improved substantially in the last decade-plus, the 

terrorist threat climate in which the United States finds itself today is in many 

ways reminiscent of that prior to 9/11, sharing a number of similar attributes and 

characteristics. The current climate is also one marked by budget cuts as well as 

the roll-back of hard-earned gains that had been achieved through the investment 

of billions of dollars and, most importantly, the lives of thousands of our men and 

women in uniform. 

Against this background, it is all the more disconcerting to see that in Iraq and 

Syria, terrorist groups have found space and time in which to maneuver, plot, and 

execute attacks; all while U.S. forces prepare to draw down in Afghanistan. In Africa, we see a constellation of active and skilled terrorist groups in the Maghreb and 

Sahel, from Boko Haram in Nigeria, to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

in Yemen, to Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, to Ansar al-Dine in Mali, to al-Shabaab in 

Somalia. At the same time, advances in technology have increased the lethality of 

weapons, targeting systems and means of communications used by terrorists. New 

and powerful avenues of recruitment and radicalization have opened up, notably 

through social media. These tools have in effect shrunk the globe as young, techsavvy, and like-minded extremists are connecting in the dark corners of the web— 

as evidenced by the swell of foreign fighters flocking to Syria. As a result, what happens overseas has significant domestic implications, including with respect to homegrown violent Islamist extremism. 

In addition to the Islamist threat posed by terrorism, the cyber domain is a permissive environment, which is made for plausible deniability, for a wide range of 

U.S. adversaries who need never set foot in this country in order to do us harm. 

Our political, military, and economic secrets including our intellectual property are 

being siphoned out covertly by cyber means, specifically computer network exploitation (CNE). From CNE—to include mapping of our critical infrastructure systems, 

to computer network attack, to cyber crime perpetrated by forces whose capabilities 

have grown to such an extent that some of these criminal groups are now even on 

par with some nation-states’ abilities and capacities, the range of activities and actors with hostile intent is both wide and deep. Nation-states are investing in and 

building up their cyber war capabilities, as well as integrating these capacities into 

their broader war-fighting doctrine and operations. Moreover, nation-states are 

making use of proxies for both physical and cyber attacks. In these regards, China, 

Iran, North Korea, and Russia are of abiding concern. 

The ecosystem of threats facing DHS and the homeland is thus varied and seriously challenging. From physical threats to cyber threats, and the nexus between 

the two, DHS and the Nation must stand ready and prepared for the full gamut 

of these scenarios. We must position ourselves to be as nimble in prevention and 

response as is required to meet whatever variant or form in which the threat of 

today and tomorrow manifests. 

OVERVIEW OF THE QHSR

Congress established the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in law in 2007 

as a mechanism to focus senior leadership attention at DHS on long-term strategic 

issues, enhance the strategic planning processes within the Department, and then 

ultimately to ‘‘strengthen the linkages between strategy and execution’’,1 particularly with respect to the Department’s operational requirements and budget decisions. 

The first QHSR report, released at the end of 2009, played a valuable role with 

respect to defining the strategic priorities of the Department, but did not have a significant impact in terms of implementation. Very few of the initiatives outlined in 

the follow-on ‘‘Bottom-Up Review’’ were ultimately implemented, and the QHSR did 

not appear to have a major impact on successive budget requests within DHS. 

This second QHSR has built on the positive and negative lessons of the first review, and the activities that informed the review have matured in the past 4 years. 

Overall, the strategic framework defined within the report is robust, and reflects 

hard choices about which issues are of greatest priority to the Department. Notably, 

it calls out biological threats as a significant homeland security priority—an area 

that I believe has received insufficient attention by policy makers in the last few 
14 

2See for example Nathan Myhrvold, Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action, The Lawfare Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2—2013 (July 2013 Working Draft) http:// 

fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/strategic-terrorism-myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf. 3Memo available at: http://www.hlswatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DHSUnityOfEffort.pdf. 4 Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘‘Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western Europeans,’’ The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR)—Insight (Dec. 17, 

2013), http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/. 5Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ‘‘Foreign Jihadis Fighting in Syria Pose Risk in West,’’ New 

York Times (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/middleeast/foreignjihadis-fighting-in-syria-pose-risk-in-west.html. 

years, but which is likely to represent the greatest long-run catastrophic terrorist 

threat that we face.2

But the real verdict on this QHSR will come in the months and years ahead. It 

is imperative that this QHSR is used to inform key strategic decisions in the next 

4 years, starting with the fiscal year 2016 budget request to Congress that will be 

released next February. As the primary House authorizing committee for DHS, this 

committee has the opportunity in the next 4 years to hold the Department accountable for implementing the strategic priorities outlined in this review. 

I should note here that it is refreshing that Secretary Johnson and his leadership 

team are taking these strategic issues seriously, particularly with respect to the 

‘‘Unity of Effort’’ initiative that is underway within the Department, as outlined in 

a memorandum by Secretary Johnson sent to his senior leadership team in April 

of this year.3 The issues raised by the Secretary in this memorandum are critical, 

particularly with respect to the integration and effectiveness of policy, management, 

and operational activities within the Department. I would urge the committee to 

consider legislation that strengthens key offices—such as the Office of Policy, which 

has never been authorized in statute—and holds DHS accountable for making 

progress on these ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ objectives, along the lines of what you have already done with the recently-passed legislation on DHS acquisition. I should also 

note that the Homeland Security Policy Institute is forming a task force that will 

take an independent look at these ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ issues, and we look forward to 

engaging further with the committee on this in the months ahead. 

For the remainder of my testimony, I will focus on two of the five top-level homeland security missions defined within the QHSR framework: Preventing terrorism 

and addressing cyber threats. While my remarks center on these two areas, I would 

emphasize that we must also remain focused on other important DHS missions, to 

include emergency preparedness and disaster response, and the task of securing the 

Nation’s borders. 

PREVENTING TERRORISM

The terrorist attacks and atrocities within the past week in Iraq by ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), in Kenya by al-Shabaab, and in Nigeria by Boko 

Haram are stark reminders of the persistent Islamist terrorist threat, not only in 

the region, but also with respect to the threat of attacks against the homeland. They 

are also an example of the increasing fragmentation and diversification of terrorist 

threats; as the introduction to the draft QHSR report notes, ‘‘the terrorist threat is 

increasingly decentralized and may be harder to detect.’’ 

Of particular concern is the foreign fighter threat in Syria, which is now also spilling over into Iraq; indeed, I would argue that the two conflicts are merging into a 

single regional insurgency. In Syria, we have seen the on-going civil war become a 

magnet for foreign fighters from no less than 74 countries around the world.4 Up 

to 3,000 Westerners have traveled to fight in Syria since the conflict began, including more than 70 Americans.5 Disturbingly, the Syrian conflict has given rise to new 

networks and new connections. For example, bomb makers are meeting up with individuals who are well-versed in media, especially social media. Armed with 

Kalashnikovs, laptops, and cell phones, foreign fighters are thus amassing and 

emerging with new and blended skill-sets and expertise, including potentially expertise with chemical weapons. 

Within the past month, we have begun to see examples of the global implications 

of this foreign fighter threat. In late May, a French national and former Syrian foreign fighter committed a terrorist attack at a Jewish museum in Brussels, Belgium, 

killing 4 people. The United Kingdom and Spain both made high-profile arrests of 

individuals recently who had traveled to Syria to fight or who were involved in facilitating such travel. And an American citizen from Florida who was fighting in 

Syria carried out a suicide truck bombing attack in late May. ISIS is now issuing 

English-language propaganda, similar in nature to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
15 

6 Rosen, Armin, ‘‘ISIS is Bragging about its ‘Brazen’ Attack on Mosul in its English Language 

Magazine.’’ Business Insider (June 10, 2014). http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-braggingin-its-english-language-magazine-2014-6. 7Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ‘‘It’s the Ideology, Stupid,’’ The National Interest 

(June 3, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/it%E2%80%99s-the-ideology-stupid8537. 8http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-foreign-policy-essay-it-is-time-to-fund-domesticcounter-radicalization. 

sula’s Inspire magazine.6 These examples are likely to be leading indicators of a direct terrorist threat that the United States and other Western nations will face in 

the months and years ahead. 

Countering the challenge posed by foreign fighters must therefore be a priority 

mission for DHS, and not just conceptually. The Department of Homeland Security 

already plays an important role in one way in mitigating potential threats to the 

homeland from Syrian foreign fighters: Its activities to detect and prevent terrorist 

travel and entry into the United States. It is critical that key activities related to 

terrorist travel—at CBP, TSA, ICE, US–VISIT, and the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis—are maintained and strengthened even in this difficult budget environment for the Department. 

Another key responsibility for DHS (along with the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, the State Department and other agencies) has been less well-developed: Countering the ideologies of violent Islamist extremism (‘‘CVIE’’) that 

radicalize individuals and replenish the ranks of our terrorist adversaries. This is 

the biggest missing dimension of U.S. counterterrorism statecraft to date. The State 

Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is doing some 

good work overseas in this area in foreign languages, but very little is being done 

domestically. A systematic strategic communications effort is needed, aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of our adversaries’ words versus their deeds. The goal is to 

knock terrorist groups off-balance; embarrass their leadership by bringing to light 

their seamy connections to criminal enterprises and drug trafficking organizations; 

and broker infighting among al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and the broader jihadi orbit in 

which they reside—which will damage violent extremists’ capability to propagate 

their message and organize operations.7 Again, it is crucial to link priorities with 

budgets. A former senior White House official, Quintan Wiktorowicz, recognizes as 

much in recent commentary that emphasizes the need for a dedicated CVIE budget: 

‘‘It is Time to Fund Domestic Counter-Radicalization.’’8 The piece makes several 

solid points, including the need to invoke community engagement in this effort. 

While that is part of the equation, however, CVIE also needs to support the pointier 

end of operational counterterrorism efforts, Federally and at the State and local 

level. 

The current conflict in Syria and Iraq is symptomatic of a broader concern: The 

circumstance of ungoverned or under-governed spaces that provide our adversaries 

with the time and space needed to recruit, train, and plot. Instead of being back 

on their heels, looking over their shoulders, our adversaries are benefiting from conditions that provide them with a level of freedom of action that they have not experienced in recent history. Note that ungoverned and under-governed spaces do not 

need be geographically vast in order to facilitate terrorist activity; under-governed 

neighborhoods in large cities in countries such as Pakistan, Kenya, and Nigeria can 

also provide a form of safe haven to terrorist groups. Urban environments also serve 

to limit U.S. military options. To further cement the dilemma, these developments 

are taking place when our intelligence collection platforms are becoming fewer and 

perhaps less effective than in the past, due to the draw-down of American forces 

in Afghanistan and Iraq and due to the damaging revelations of critical U.S. intelligence collection activities in the past year. 

For all of these reasons, the terrorist threat to the homeland is becoming increasingly grave, and it is critical that DHS and its Federal, State, and local partners 

remain focused on detecting and countering these threats in the months and years 

ahead. As threats evolve, DHS also needs to be agile and continuously evaluate the 

effectiveness of its various activities in countering such threats, and invest in new 

tools and capabilities to address emerging threats. This committee can play a significant role in ensuring that the Department does not succumb to inertia and is 

focused on anticipating and addressing such emerging threats. 

CYBERSECURITY

The rapid growth in cyber-related threats in the last few years has led some senior Government officials to assert that cyber threats have now surpassed terrorism 

as the most significant National security threat to the United States. I am not yet 
16 

9 Report available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf. 

prepared to agree with such an assessment, for all of the reasons discussed in the 

previous section; and would argue instead that it is not an either/or proposition— 

that we must be prepared to defend against both types of threats. But it is undoubtedly true that the cyber threats to U.S. National security and economic interests 

have significantly advanced in recent years, and taken on new dimensions, particularly in the area of cyber threats to critical infrastructure. 

The cyber and physical threats to critical infrastructure have been a key focus of 

Executive Branch policy making in the past 2 years, through activities mandated 

by Executive Order 13636 and Presidential Policy Directive 21. These threats are 

also highlighted in the draft QHSR report, which discusses how cyber-physical convergence and interdependence has ‘‘changed the risks to critical infrastructure in 

sectors ranging from energy and transportation to agriculture and health care.’’ 

Vulnerabilities in these sectors could give rise to catastrophic outcomes, especially 

if cascading effects ensue as a result of interdependencies between and among critical sectors. The physical attack last year on the PG&E Metcalf substation is an example of this convergence and interdependence of threats; if that attack had been 

slightly more damaging, it could have had a severe impact on the power grid in Silicon Valley. 

DHS plays a critical role in addressing and mitigating these cyber threats, working with other Federal, State, and local government partners on threats to government networks, and of equal importance, forming strong partnerships with the private sector. These public-private partnerships are critical given that the predominant share of the relevant cyber infrastructure and expertise is located within the 

private sector—in Silicon Valley, and in our key economic sectors, including defense, 

energy, finance, and telecommunications. DHS has made significant progress in 

building its relationships with the private sector on cybersecurity in recent years, 

particularly with respect to its incident response activities at the National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS–CERT). But it still needs to improve, 

particularly with respect to its analytic activities on cyber threats and risks. Currently responsibility for cyber analysis is split between the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the National Protection and Programs Directorate. 

These two parts of DHS need to become better synchronized in their analytic efforts 

and work together to best support critical infrastructure stakeholders in the private 

sector. 

FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The QHSR is an important deliberative process for the Department of Homeland 

Security. Unless we define our priorities clearly and fund them accordingly, we will 

not be optimizing our efforts to address these critical threats to the homeland. 

But such a review cannot simply be an exercise that takes place every 4 years; 

the threats that we face are evolving too rapidly for such widely-spaced reviews. Instead, this process of review and assessment needs to be fully embedded into the 

day-to-day decision-making processes of the Department. One proposal that would 

promote this is the establishment of an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within 

DHS, similar to the office of the same name at the Department of Defense. The 

ONA would produce comprehensive long-term analysis of future homeland threats 

and the capabilities needed to meet those threats. I would urge this committee to 

consider establishing the ONA in law, building on the existing capabilities of the 

Office of Strategy, Planning, Analysis, and Risk within the DHS Office of Policy. 

This is not a new idea, but rather one that Congressman Lee Hamilton and I first 

put forward back in January 2007, in the Homeland Security Advisory Council 

(HSAC) Report of The Future of Terrorism Task Force.9

In closing and as detailed above, I would recommend the following actions for 

your consideration: 

• The ultimate value of the QHSR will be determined by the influence that it has 

on budgets, plans, and operational requirements. This committee can use its 

oversight function to determine whether this is being done. Otherwise, policies 

such as the QHSR are merely empty rhetoric. 

• Introduce and work to pass a set of DHS authorization bills. This is a challenge 

given the fragmented structure of Congressional oversight of DHS, but is worth 

pursuing, and can be done in piece-meal manner to reduce the complications 

caused by this jurisdictional situation. In particular, the committee can authorize the headquarters elements of the Department and update core DHS authorities in the Homeland Security Act. Legislation can also be moved to authorize 
17 

other components of DHS, such as Customs and Border Protection, as Chairman McCaul has recently proposed. 

• To support DHS authorization, the committee should work with the Department to strengthen the annual Future Years Homeland Security Program 

(FYHSP) reports required currently in the Homeland Security Act, so that they 

can be used as a critical source of information for authorization legislation, 

along the lines of the role played by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) 

reports for annual defense authorization legislation. 

• As part of authorization legislation, establish the DHS Office of Policy in law, 

to be led by an under secretary for policy. This idea was originally proposed by 

Secretary Chertoff nearly 9 years ago, but has stalled because of resistance by 

Congressional committees that have secondary jurisdiction over parts of DHS. 

It is time to elevate and strengthen the Office of Policy by the finally establishing it in law, a step that will also give Congress greater influence over its 

priorities and functions. 

• Establish an Office of Net Assessment (ONA) within DHS to provide the Secretary with comprehensive analysis of future threats and U.S. capabilities to 

meet those threats. 

• Prioritize the challenge posed by foreign fighters, particularly those fighting in 

Syria and Iraq. In part this means maintaining and strengthening key DHS activities related to terrorist travel, even in this difficult budget environment. It 

also means placing greater priority and increasing funding for programs and activities intended to counter violent Islamist extremism. 

• Better synchronize I&A and NPPD in terms of their cyber analytic activities 

and private-sector stakeholder outreach. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward 

to trying to answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. Very refreshing. I think you 

are right. The acquisition bill gives us at least some oversight and 

gives us some leverage. One thing I will say about Chairman 

McCaul, with the authorization bill that where we finally authorize 

the Department, I think is the right thing to do, as well. So I thank 

you for that. 

The Chairman will now recognize Dr. Willis for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HENRY H. WILLIS, DIRECTOR, RAND HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE CENTER, THE RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. WILLIS. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

Barber, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify at this hearing. 

Yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security released the 

second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Converging trends 

of the evolving threats, increasingly constrained budgets and new 

leadership make now an opportune time for DHS to prioritize the 

Department’s goals and ensure its programs are best aligned to 

meet them. 

Today, I will highlight three important ways Congress and DHS 

could work together to build on the results of this second quadrennial review. First, align DHS budgets with Department strategic 

guidance. Second, establish more effective oversight of DHS programs. Third, seek ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 

of the DHS by leveraging Department of Defense capabilities. 

Regarding my first point, aligning budgets with strategic guidance and risk management will make the Department more effective. The analysis behind the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review provides a basis for reasoned discussion of risk management 

priorities. Secretary Johnson has proposed new initiatives that 

could build on this progress. 
18 

Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS leadership, Security 

Johnson proposed three initiatives: A Department leadership 

forum, Departmental management processes to review and implement joint requirements and oversight, an enhancement of headquarters strategy for planning and analysis capabilities. I encourage Congress to consider supporting each of these initiatives. 

Second, establishing effective oversight of programs will make 

the Department more efficient. Several GAO studies point out 

cases where effectiveness of DHS is either poor or undocumented, 

costs are uncontrolled, or oversight is lacking. While the Department continues to remedy these situations, there remains plenty of 

room for improvement. 

For example, a Rand paper published last year included a number of recommendations that could improve acquisition at DHS, including ensuring every major acquisition program has an approved 

acquisition program baseline document; not delegating decisionmaking authority for components until key planning requirements 

are met; conducting careful analysis of cost or schedule breaches to 

improve further acquisitions; and establishing more professional 

development opportunities for DHS acquisition officials. 

Congress has already helped DHS with these types of problems, 

through passing the H.R. 4228, and can continue to help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding initiatives that allow 

DHS headquarters to implement recommendations like these. 

Finally, the homeland security enterprise will be stronger if DHS 

seeks ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging 

DOD capabilities. The department of—many of the priorities identified in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review require a 

whole-of-Government approach. Disaster management, border security, cybersecurity are just a few examples. The Department of Defense has also recognized the importance of these missions and the 

opportunity for collaboration. 

For example, defending the homeland was identified as the first 

pillar of National security in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. There are many ways DOD capabilities may be used to support DHS missions. Examples include leveraging DOD technology 

demonstrations, learning from DOD experiences with cloud computing, and using DOD technologies to improve land, air, and maritime demand awareness. 

However, before implementing any of these or other solutions, 

Congress, DHS, and DOD should together ensure that the full acquisition and sustainment costs are known. That any transfer of 

technology has been coordinated with existing DHS acquisition 

strategies. That the use of DOD capabilities reflects the desired use 

of the military and civilian missions. That it is clear which organizations should bear the costs of these technologies and that, then, 

budgets reflect that. 

In closing, we all certainly want more effective protection from 

terrorism, better preparedness for disasters, and more resilient 

communities. The multiplicity and complexity of current homeland 

security threats, uncertainty surrounding what new threats could 

emerge or how known threats might evolve, and constraints in 

budget make it difficult to achieve these goals. 
19 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT412.html. 3Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, Department of Homeland Security, February 2010. 

However, if DHS is to overcome these challenges three things are 

required. Strategy focus to direct resources where they are most 

needed, strong oversight to assure that resources are used effectively and, finally, cooperation across Government to improve efficiency. 

Again, Chairman Duncan and Ranking Member Barber and 

Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

before you today on this very important opportunity for DHS. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Willis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY H. WILLIS 1 2

JUNE 20, 2014 

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify at this hearing. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon release its report on the 

second Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The convergence of several 

trends makes this an opportune moment for the Department to step back and assess 

what are the most pressing current and emerging homeland security challenges and 

decide how they should be addressed. Let me briefly mention five such trends: 

• First, onset of terrorism fatigue—When DHS celebrated its 10-year anniversary, 

some questioned whether law enforcement and domestic security operations had 

become too focused on terrorism at the cost of addressing other public safety 

issues such as drug violence, public health, or crime. 

• Second, persistence of terrorism as a real threat—The Boston Marathon bombing reminded us that attacks can happen anywhere, anytime. Destabilization of 

governments that followed the Arab Spring raises the prospect of new safe havens for terrorism emerging. The recent al-Qaeda summit held in April by Nasir 

al-Wuhayshi in Yemen demonstrates that al-Qaeda continues to pursue global 

jihad. 

• Third, increasing threats from natural disasters—The effects of Super Storm 

Sandy emphasized the consequences for coastal communities of the combined 

impacts of continued population growth and sea-level rise, and the need for incorporating planning for community and infrastructure resilience into economic 

development. 

• Fourth, cyber threats outpacing cyber defense—Last month’s indictment of five 

officers in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army for stealing information from 

six U.S. firms, along with revelations of Operation Olympic Games, reveal the 

scope of cyber crime and potential for malicious cyber attacks against critical 

infrastructure. 

• Fifth, increasingly constrained Government budgets—Federal, State, local, and 

Tribal governments have fewer resources to address this expanding list of concerns. 

In short, when Secretary Johnson took the reins at DHS, he stepped into a deeply 

uncertain, utterly complex, and continuously dynamic environment with more constraints on the resources at his disposal. These converging trends, combined with 

new leadership and new guidance expected to arise from the QHSR, make now an 

opportune time for DHS to prioritize the Departmen’s goals and assure its programs 

are best aligned to achieve them. 

The first QHSR brought DHS together to develop a collective list of all missions 

for components across the Department.3 Though comprehensive—the list spanned 
20 

4 Cass R. Sunstein (2003). Terrorism and Probability Neglect. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26:2/3 121–136. 5For example see, W. J. Burns (2007) Risk Perception: A Review, CREATE Report, May 22, 

2007. 6 Russell Lundberg (2013) Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk 

Ranking Methodology. RGSD–319, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 

issues of terrorism, border control, immigration, cyber space, disaster management, 

and governance—the first review did not set priorities. 

The second QHSR will now set the stage for improving both the effectiveness and 

efficiency of DHS. The review includes a strategic assessment of the current and 

emerging homeland security threats, focused analysis on selected priority topics, 

and guidance on management priorities for the Department. I’d like to highlight 

three important ways Congress and DHS could work together to build on the second 

QHSR: 

• First, improve the linkages between budgets of DHS’s component agencies and 

strategic directions of the Department as a whole on risk management; 

• Second, establish more effective oversight of programs once initiated; 

• Third, seek ways to improve effectiveness and efficiency by leveraging Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities, especially for Defense Support of Civilian 

Authorities. 

IMPROVE LINKAGES BETWEEN BUDGETS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS ON RISK

MANAGEMENT

The Homeland Security Strategic Environment Assessment marks a significant 

accomplishment for DHS and reflects well the trends that are changing the homeland security landscape. The review covers persistent threats to the Nation from 

problems such as smuggling, illegal migration, and maritime safety. It also addresses catastrophic events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, pandemics, and terrorism. 

The strategic environment assessment describes all of these events in a common 

way, allowing for the first time an informed discussion of priorities based on risk. 

Knowing the facts about homeland security risks is important because the public’s 

fear of terrorism and disasters can be out of alignment with the risks the events 

pose. The unpredictability of terrorism, individuals’ uncertainty about how to protect themselves, and the realization that attacks are purposeful and not random all 

contribute to increased fear about terrorism.4 As an example of how fear can affect 

behavior, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo (the Beltway Snipers) paralyzed communities and closed schools as the public and Government officials tried 

to understand what was happening and how to protect themselves. Fear of terrorism is further magnified by evocative images of suicide bombings that are replayed on TV and the internet. 

Fear of terrorism matters. Numerous studies—many supported by the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate—demonstrate that even if other hazards threaten the same number of lives or economic activity, people are more concerned about 

terrorism events than other events, support spending more for terrorism security, 

and are willing to cede more liberties in the name of terrorism security.5 However, 

in reality, all terrorist events do not pose the same risks as other hazards. 

When assessed side-by-side, there are many disasters, accidents, and crimes that 

have historically threatened more lives, caused more economic damage, and led to 

more societal disruption than terrorism. When presented with this evidence, people 

with different and competing interests often can agree on what problems are most 

serious and make judgments that are consistent with what is known about risks.6

The analysis behind the QHSR will provide a basis for this type of reasoned discussion of risk management priorities. Secretary Johnson has proposed new initiatives that will build on the current progress. Specifically, in a memorandum to DHS 

leadership in April, Secretary Johnson proposed three initiatives: 

• First, a Departmental Leadership Forum for the ‘‘most senior 

leadership . . . to gather regularly . . . in an environment of trust, and openly place on the table issues, arguments, and disagreements concerning [DHS’s] 

most challenging issues.’’ This forum could provide means for coordinated implementation of leadership guidance and management initiatives. 

• Second, the establishment of Departmental management processes to review 

and implement processes to develop joint requirements for programs across 

DHS and improve oversight of programs once implemented. 
21 

7Secretary Jeh Johnson (2014). Strengthening Departmental Unity. Memorandum for DHS 

Leadership, April 22, 2014. 8GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help 

Meet Mission Needs, Washington, DC, GAO–12–833, September 18, 2012. 9GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS Oversight of Major Acquisitions and Efforts 

to Match Resources to Needs. GAO–13–846T, September 10, 2013. 10 Jeffrey A. Drezner and Andrew R. Morral (2013). Reducing the Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland Security. PE–105, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 

CA. 

• Third, the enhancement of headquarters strategy, planning, and analytic capability to build and maintain the organizations required to support the leadership and management initiatives being proposed.7

I urge Congress to consider supporting each of these important initiatives. 

ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF PROGRAMS ONCE INITIATED

DHS programs are notorious for lacking appropriate oversight. Several Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies point out cases where effectiveness of 

DHS programs is either poor or undocumented, costs are uncontrolled, or oversight 

is lacking. While the Department has made progress and continues to remedy these 

situations, plenty of room for improvement remains. 

A review by GAO in 2011 suggested that more than half of the 77 major acquisitions programs at DHS are over budget or behind schedule.8 In July 2013, DHS reported that 63 percent of its acquisitions programs had cost growth, and one-third 

of these programs had cost growth over 10 percent.9

A RAND paper published last year, Reducing the Cost and Risk of Major Acquisitions at the Department of Homeland Security, included a number of recommendations that could be expected to improve acquisition management at DHS based on 

experience with acquisition management in other contexts.10 For example: 

• Every major acquisition program should have an approved acquisition program 

baseline document defining milestones and requirements to which programs are 

held accountable for demonstrating their readiness before progressing to new 

phases. 

• Decision-making authority, given to the DHS Office of Management, should not 

be delegated to components until key planning requirements are met. 

• Careful analysis of acquisition cost or schedule breaches should be conducted 

to help the Department identify root causes for these failures and incorporate 

lessons to improve future acquisitions. 

• The Department should establish mechanisms for more professional development opportunities for DHS acquisition officials. 

Congress can help DHS improve oversight by reinforcing and funding initiatives 

that allow DHS headquarters to implement recommendations like these. And in 

fact, this committee has already proposed legislation, H.R. 4228, the DHS Acquisition Accountability and Efficiency Act, to improve acquisition management. Cooperation between Congress and DHS on improving oversight should continue. 

SEEK WAYS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY BY LEVERAGING DOD

CAPABILITIES

Many DHS priorities require a whole-of-Government approach. 

• Disaster management and pandemic preparedness to improve community resilience requires cooperation among FEMA, DHHS, DoD, HUD, local response organizations, private firms, and NGOs. 

• Border security requires coordination of Federal and local law enforcement 

agencies across several bureaucratic and geographic jurisdictions to counter 

smuggling networks that span several continents. 

• Cybersecurity must protect Government and private systems from both Statesponsored and criminally-aligned threat networks, potentially using capabilities 

that exist in several departments, while balancing dynamic norms for privacy. 

At the same time DHS is deciding how best to address these challenges, the Department of Defense is scaling back use of its assets in theater operations (making 

them potentially available for other uses) and the Federal Government as a whole 

is wrestling with the realities of reduced budgets. The confluence of these events 

creates potential opportunities to identify ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of homeland security, especially in the areas of disaster management and 

border security. 

The Department of Defense has also recognized the importance of these missions 

and the opportunity for collaboration. Defending the homeland was identified as the 
22 

11Daniel Gonzales, Sarah Harting, Jason Mastbaum, Carolyn Wong (2104). Improving Interagency Information Sharing Using Technology Demonstrations: The Legal Basis for Using New 

Sensor Technologies for Counterdrug Operations Along the U.S. Border. RR–551–OSD, RAND 

Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 12 Isaac R. Porche III, Bradley Wilson, Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, Shane Tierney, Evan 

Saltzman (2104). Data Flood Helping the Navy Address the Rising Tide of Sensor Information. 

RR–315–NAVY, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 13Scott Savitz, Irv Blickstein, Peter Buryk, et al. (2014). U.S. Navy Employment Options for 

Unmanned Surface Vehicles. RR–384–NAVY, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 

first pillar of National security in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. Defense 

Support for Civilian Authorities remains a critical responsibility. 

Motivated by this synergy, RAND studies have identified several opportunities 

worth consideration: 

• On-going DoD technology demonstration efforts could be leveraged to provide 

additional support to on-going DHS operations.11

• Information sharing among local law enforcement and response agencies and 

Federal agencies could be improved using DoD lessons about how to design and 

operate cloud networks to improve both disaster management and border security.12

• Advanced Navy platforms and surveillance technologies could improve maritime 

domain awareness for counter-narcotic operations.13

These are just a few of the many ways DoD capabilities might be used to support 

DHS missions. However, before implementing any of them, Congress, DHS, and 

DoD should work together to: 

• Demonstrate how the new uses improve capability, and estimate the associated 

acquisition and sustainment costs. 

• Coordinate transfer and use of DoD systems with existing DHS acquisition 

strategies. 

• Ensure use of DoD capabilities for homeland security missions is consistent 

with existing legal authorities and policies and reflects the desired use of the 

military in civilian operations. 

• Review policies associated with using DoD capabilities for homeland security 

missions and address any policies that should be streamlined or reinforced. 

• Clarify which organizations should bear the costs of operating the technologies 

and adjust budgets accordingly. 

MAKING THE NATION SAFER AND MORE RESILIENT

The second QHSR should reflect continued maturation of governance at DHS and 

provide a stepping-off point for further improvements. We all certainly want more 

effective protection from terrorism, better preparation for disasters, and more resilient communities. The multiplicity and complexity of current homeland security 

threats, uncertainty surrounding what new threats could emerge or how known 

trends might evolve, and constraints on budgets, make achieving these goals difficult. If DHS is to overcome all of these challenges, three things will be required: 

Strategic focus to direct resources where they are most needed, strong oversight to 

assure that resources are used effectively, and finally, cooperation across Government to improve efficiency. 

Again, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on this very important opportunity for DHS. I look forward to taking your questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Dr. Willis. 

The Chairman will now recognize Ms. Duke for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. DUKE. Good morning, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

Barber, and Members of the committee. I appreciate being here, 

and thank you for your efforts in overseeing the Department with 

the goal of improving mission effectiveness. To my fellow panel 

members, who have already covered most of the key points of the 

hearing this morning. 
23 

I do agree with both of you in your opening statements that the 

improvement of the management of DHS is key and essential to delivering the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review mission stats. 

I do support H.R. 4228 and its effects to improve management. I 

would like to state that in addition to being bipartisan, it also, in 

a large part, is policy-agnostic. It will succeed despite policy 

changes and changes in the threat environment. So to do this is 

really an investment of our future of homeland security. 

In the statements announcing this hearing, the Chairman mentioned that DHS must prioritize and make trade-offs on how to 

best keep us safe. Having a focused and affordable and achievable 

strategy is critical to reining in DHS’s massive bureaucracy. I 

would like to focus my comments this morning on the piece of that 

statement about being achievable. I do believe that the efforts we 

have talked about here in terms of building the management and 

the operational infrastructure is essential to achieving this QHSR 

and future policy and strategy initiatives. 

In setting up the legislation to require the QHSR, the lawmakers 

recognized this. They mandated that the QHSR include an assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the 

National homeland security strategy and mission areas. That is 

really where the challenge lies. The management infrastructure, 

including the right people with the right policy, processes, allocation of resources and systems under united leadership, empowered 

with the data and analytics to make sound operational decisions. 

One sentence, a lot of work and a lot of effort. 

This is necessary, though—however, to transform the QHSR 

from a policy document into the living reality actually used to more 

effectively deliver the homeland security mission to our Nation. 

In the first years of DHS, we put the building blocks of management into place. Those building blocks included developing a budget process, developing a program and analysis PA&E capability, developing an acquisition system, logistics, and human capital. The 

challenge to achieving the QHSR mission objectives is to first continuing maturing those building blocks that were initially put in 

place during the first years of the Department. More importantly, 

integrating those building blocks into a system. 

The integrated model has to have policy- and strategy-informing 

capabilities, which will be followed by requirements driving into 

programming and budgeting, acquisition, and life-cycle management of the individual programs in the entire mission. Strategy has 

to be analytical, integrated, focused, and collaborative. 

I would like to point out, as Dr. Willis did, that Secretary Johnson’s strengthening Department Unity of Effort memo dated April 

22, 2014 outlines a strategy to accomplish this. That memo is 

packed with processes not only for policy, but for management, that 

I believe, if executed, would be key to further maturing the Department in the areas of management and supporting the policy of the 

QHSR. 

Several key tenets are in that memo. One is the senior leadership engagement, not only at the headquarters level but with the 

component, on a regular both strategic and tactical basis. That is 

essential to driving forward the Unity of Effort memo and accomplishing the QHSR. 
24 

Second, the system must recognize the interfaces and interdependencies of the individual pieces of the management system 

from policy through execution and sustainment, as I said earlier. 

The imperative for a sound system also includes having the interdependencies of mission, as the QHSR shows. 

Moving forward to more of a risk-based approach must ensure 

that both the policy and the execution of the policies are interrelated and show those dependencies that, as we move towards a 

risk-based approach, we actually recognize the risk appropriately. 

It is critical that this initiative be carried through by the Department and sustained so that we can deliver that mission set to our 

country. The framework will continue to drive the Department towards maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR cannot be achieved effectively and efficiently, and it does become just another policy document on the shelf. 

I thank the committee for this opportunity and look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Duke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE

Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Barber, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. Though I retired from Federal 

service, I still have a passion for the homeland security mission, and remain committed to the success of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I thank you 

for your efforts in overseeing the Department with the goal of improving mission 

effectiveness. 

DHS completed its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) in 2010. 

Soon, it will issue the second QHSR, legislatively mandated by Section 707 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. It is important that the QSHR be 

sound in terms of strategy and missions. Based on my experience with the first 

QHSR, DHS is spending considerable planning effort on updating the strategy and 

missions. It is updating the five basic homeland security missions: 

• Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, 

• Secure and Manage Our Borders, 

• Enforce and Administer our Immigration Laws, 

• Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace, 

• Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience, 

and ensuring the Department has the right mission set and strategy. I am certain 

my colleagues on this panel will provide that policy stakeholder perspective. 

However with my background and experience, most recently as the DHS under 

secretary for management, I’d like to provide the execution perspective, on behalf 

of the stakeholders responsible for developing the management infrastructure that 

turns the strategy and policy of the QHSR into successful mission operations. 

Therefore, I am focusing my comments today on that lesser discussed, but in my 

opinion an equally or more important aspect, of the QHSR. The Chairman, in his 

comments announcing this hearing stated that ‘‘DHS must prioritize and make 

tradeoffs on how best to keep us safe. Having a focused, affordable, and achievable 

strategy is critical to reining in DHS’s massive bureaucracy.’’ Mr. Duncan’s point 

that the strategy must be achievable is the critical issue, in my opinion. And the 

strategy is only achievable if DHS continues to build the management and operational infrastructure to execute it effectively and efficiently. 

Lawmakers recognized that fact when legislating that DHS must complete a 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. They mandated that the QHSR include an 

assessment of the organizational alignment of the Department with the National 

homeland security strategy and mission areas. 

The QHSR is to include recommendations not only regarding the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security, but also guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the Department. It 

must review and assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Department for 

executing the process of turning the requirements developed in the Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review into an acquisition strategy and expenditure plan within 

the Department. Additionally, it is to identify the budget plan required to provide 
25 

sufficient resources to successfully execute the full range of missions called for in 

the review. 

This is where the challenges lie. The management infrastructure, including the 

right policy, people, process, allocation of resources, and systems; under united leadership empowered with the data and analytics to make sound operational decisions. 

This is necessary to transform the QHSR from a document to a living reality, actually used to more effectively deliver homeland security to our Nation. 

In the first 10 years of DHS, we put building blocks of the management structure 

into place to enable DHS to deliver the homeland security strategy and mission. 

Those building blocks included a budget process, program analysis and evaluation, 

acquisition, logistics, and human capital. The challenge to successfully achieving the 

QHSR is to continue maturing those building blocks. And even more importantly, 

integrating the building blocks into a system. In an integrated model, policy and 

strategy inform capabilities, followed by requirements, driving into the programming and budgeting processes, and acquisition and life-cycle management. Strategy 

must be analytical and integrated, focused, and collaborative. The strategic guidance 

must drive a joint capabilities-based analysis that identifies gaps and overlaps, analyzes alternatives to close those gaps and eliminate the overlaps, and develops requirements to fill them. And to ensure the capabilities are effectively delivered, 

there must be coordinated operational planning with scenarios against the DHS 

strategy. All aspects of the system must be driven by the most senior DHS leadership at both headquarters and the operating components, and executed with optimum unity. And it must be continually monitored against goals to ensure stated objectives are met. 

DHS Secretary Johnson’s direction to continue maturing this system is set for in 

his ‘‘Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort’’ memo dated April 22, 3014. This 

memo outlines the further development of DHS planning, management, and operations to deliver the DHS missions enumerated in the QHSR. It describes an integrated model designed to ensure that strategic and analytically-based decisions optimize mission performance. 

Several key tenants of the Secretary’s Unity of Effort are critical to successful implementation of the QHSR. The establishment of regular meetings and engagement 

by the Secretary, deputy secretary, and operating component head leaders is critical 

to the Unity initiative. It must provide unified leadership that results in the optimum allocation of resources, while improving the management process for planning 

and investments. It must develop planning, programs, budgets, acquisition, that are 

currently effective, and also sustainable throughout the life cycle of the program and 

mission. 

This system must recognize interfaces and interdependencies and be based on 

good data and sound analytics. That will position DHS headquarters and operating 

component leadership to make the right decisions to execute the QHSR missions 

and strategies. DHS must have the infrastructure in place, then it can execute the 

evolving homeland security mission to be updated in the QHSR; it can achieve the 

strategy. 

The imperative for a unified, sound system is even stronger as DHS moves away 

from a one-size-fits-all security approach to a risk-based security model. A riskbased approach to security must be intelligence driven with complete situational 

awareness from integrated data. This requires Unity of Effort. The ability to perform effective case management and data-driven risk analysis is essential to the 

risk-based appraoch, and that data must be timely and accurate, and part of a unified effort. 

It is critical that once the QHSR is finalized, the initiative to strengthen delivery 

of the mission set is continued. The framework outlined in the memo must be 

brought to maturity. Otherwise, the QHSR cannot be achieved effectively and becomes just another policy document in the library. 

Again I thank the committee for this opportunity, and look forward to answering 

your questions today. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank you for that, and thank you for all 

the opening statements. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. Before 

I get started, I just want to give sort of a shout-out to one of my 

staff members who has helped this committee as a shared employee. Rebecca Ulrich will get her master’s degree today from the 

Naval War College. We are proud of her and she has helped the 
26 

committee on both sides. We thank her for her hard work and congratulate her for her master’s degree. 

I come from the private sector, and in business we did a 5-year 

plan. I think that is important to set focus for the company, to 

steer the ship in a certain direction and try to put pieces in place 

to make your vision and your goals. So whether it is sales goals or 

performance goals or income goals, return on investment issues to 

make those happen. So I hope this plan isn’t just eyewash for 

America. I hope it is not done just to meet a requirement of the 

United States Congress. I hope it is actually a vision for the Department going forward. 

I think that is the intent of Congress when they passed this, is 

to make DHS actually stop and focus on: What are the strategic 

threats to this country, where do we need to place our resources, 

where do we need to spend our money, and what do we need to do 

to ensure America is safe? So I hope that that is what has taken 

place. 

I do want to point out that in the strategic priorities for homeland security it says this: ‘‘Continue to evolve immigration policies 

and processes in order to respond to new trends in illegal migration 

and further align our enforcement policies with our goal of sound 

law enforcement practice that prioritizes public safety.’’ 

In case you haven’t noticed, we have a crisis situation on our 

Southern Border today. Regardless of how you feel about immigration reform in this country, you cannot sit idly by and watch this 

blatant invasion of our Southern Border and our rule of law by 

folks that are illegal crossing this country. 

Chain migration is a real thing. If the children enter this country, what happens with their families? Do they also come at a later 

day? I am concerned that we have CBP officers changing diapers 

and warming formula for these children. This is a humanitarian 

crisis, and I am very sympathetic to the humanitarian aspect of 

this. 

But I am also very cognizant of the fact that OTMs—other than 

Mexicans—a DHS term that says anyone other than a Mexico or 

nationality person that crosses in this country is an OTM. These 

are Guatemalans and El Salvadorians and Hondurans. I get that. 

But I am worried about the Asian, the Middle Eastern, and the African folks that are coming into this country and could possibly 

cross our Southern Border while we have CBP officers warming 

formula. What would they come here for? Would they come here to 

seek a job? Possibly. 

But we see what is going on in North Africa, and we talked 

about the foreign fighters in Syria. I am concerned that there are 

real threats that could possibly exploit this situation and enter my 

country, the sovereign Nation of the United States of America 

across our Southern Border because we are looking somewhere 

else, and we are dealing with something else. 

I am going to let my blood pressure calm down for just a second. 

Think about the world that we are living in today. We have got our 

border situation I just talked about. We have got Iraq and ISIS. We 

have got Syria and foreign fighters. We talked about foreign fighters a minute ago, and I appreciate that. 
27 

We went overseas to actually look at this issue. While we were 

there, a foreign fighter came from Syria, came from the battlefield. 

He was European, he was battle-hardened, he was radicalized. He 

came to Belgium and he shot up a Jewish museum where four or 

five people were killed, while we were there. The French got lucky 

and caught him at a bus stop. 

He was in an open border Schengen area. With a visa waiver 

program, could that European nationality have flown into the 

United States? Because he didn’t have to go to the consulate or the 

embassy to get a visa. He could have gotten on an airplane. If he 

wasn’t on a terrorist watch list or a no-fly list, guess what? He flies 

into the United States of America to do what? This is a real issue 

with foreign fighters that are getting battle-hardened in Syria and 

now Iraq. 

We have got Iran continually to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Russia, the Crimea and Ukraine, Hezbollah, Hamas, what 

we see with the kidnapping of Israeli children by the Palestinian 

folks. 

We see Boko Haram in Libya and North Africa. What is going 

on in Egypt and the Sinai. China, the South China Sea, threatening Japan. Cybersecurity. China, Russia, North Korea. I could go 

on and on and on. There are a lot of problems going on in the 

world. That is why I think it is so important that DHS has a very, 

very, very clear message and plan in this report. So I will ask the 

witnesses a question. 

Frank, the QHSR, by statute, is supposed to not only be a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the 

Nation. It is also supposed to include recommendations regarding 

the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation for homeland security. Part of long-term strategic planning requires anticipating 

future threats and events. So I ask you this: Is planning for unseen 

changes in the Western Hemisphere, such as in Mexico or Central 

America resulting in mass migration an issue that should be addressed in a National strategy? Was this issue adequately addressed in the newly-released QHSR? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, I think you do hit an important 

question. At the end of the day, smuggling is smuggling is smuggling is smuggling; whether it is drugs, whether it is people, 

whether it is weapons they are gonna use the same route. So this 

is a significant area for the Department. I don’t think it was addressed in as much detail as the threat warrants. Because at the 

end of the day, you are looking at the convergence of cartels meeting up with other actors. Obviously, that is a primary concern for 

not only border security but, as you mentioned, some of the P&R 

issues. The terror travel issues, more strategically where CBP, 

ICE, VISIT, TSA, and others play a significant role. 

I do think that the Department has made yeoman’s progress in 

some of the terror travel-related issues. But to your point, it doesn’t 

have to be via air. It can come through any kind of mode that the 

adversary chooses. 

So bottom line, I think that clearly that is a National security 

challenge. It is not just a—it does affect our National security, and 

something that warrants, I think, greater attention, going forward. 

Let me just underscore one thing. We can’t wait 4 years for strate-
28 

gies. What we need to be able to do is identify what the goals are, 

what the objectives are in a long-term planning kind of sense. 

But you need a Department that is agile. I recommended an office of net assessment, along the lines of what DOD has, to be able 

to align some of these efforts. That has played a significant role in 

protecting our country from a defense perspective. I think DHS 

would be well-served if it had something that was nimble, agile, 

and doesn’t have to wait 4 years to put together a strategy, when 

the world changes so dramatically overnight. So we need to get to 

where we have the long-term goals, but we also need to get out tactics that are much quicker and much more rapid. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree with you. I think it should be a very fluid 

process. I am concerned that—and I had this conversation with 

staff this morning—that DHS was created, brought 22 different 

components together. Have we created such a large agency—the 

third-largest in the Government—that it can’t respond in that fluid 

manner? Responding to crisis as they come up, or needs, shifting 

assets, as needed. So I appreciate your saying that. We are gonna 

have several rounds of questions, I hope. 

With this, I will yield back—I will yield over to Mr. Barber for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a very important discussion, especially as we are talking about the ability of 

the Department to be quick in response to emerging risks and 

problems. The drug cartels are very nimble. Their strategies 

change by the day, by the hour, by the week depending upon what 

they see us doing and where they see weaknesses in our border security structure. 

Mr. Baker, I would like to pursue this a little bit with you if I 

could. As you know, one of the QHSR strategic priorities is for the 

Department to adopt a risk segmentation approach to securing and 

managing the flows of people and goods into the United States. 

Last week, the House Committee on Homeland Security unanimously approved an authorization bill for CBP. In that discussion, 

I offered an amendment which was adopted by the committee requiring the commissioner of CBP to, within 6 months, develop and 

implement credible ways to measure border security and its effectiveness and its use of resources and allocations. 

We have, for way too long, had a lack of credibility of the information provided by the Department as to how it is doing. We have 

actually provided billions of dollars over the life of this Department, and we have way too little accountability. 

Two years ago, the Department moved to adopt a risk-based 

strategy for securing the borders. When the GAO, at the request 

of the Ranking Member and myself, looked at that it found a plan 

that was absent goals, absent measurements, no way to determine 

progress. The people that I represent have incredible information 

about the risks and the changing strategies of the cartels. I call the 

cartels narcoterrorists because I think it is a much more apt description of their goals and their practices. 

There is no doubt that we have made some improvements in securing the border. But I can tell you this. That where I live, the 

people I represent, they still are not safe in their homes, still don’t 
29 

feel that the Department has been quick enough. So how do we 

move in this direction? 

So, Mr. Baker, I want to ask you, as someone who has worked 

in the Department, what steps you believe the Department can 

take not just to talk about risk assessment and moving resources 

in accordance with that, but how it can actually affect that and 

begin to have better credibility with the stakeholders who live and 

work across the border? 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Representative Barber. I am deeply familiar with this. Since I left the Department, I have worked closely 

with ranchers in exactly that area; very remote areas, where they 

are at risk every day from smugglers of drugs or people. They 

genuinely feel under siege. The—coming up with a measurement or 

a single measurement for success on the border and achievement 

of secure borders I think is almost impossible to do. Partly because 

while we can get a general sense, it is almost impossible to turn 

any of those measures into something that is the be-all and endall. 

If you ask people today how many—like if you ask Border Patrol 

Agents how many people crossed the border or how many got away, 

how many did you catch, they will give you a pretty good estimate. 

But if you started making their bonuses depend on achieving those 

numbers, you would not be able to rely on those numbers for very 

long. My concern is, many of these numbers are subject, and ought 

to be subject, to exercise of judgment. 

The other problem that we are seeing today is, you can have a 

breakdown overnight if conditions change. I am quite struck by the 

fact that the crisis that we are facing now on the border is, in 

many ways, almost exactly the same crisis that I saw when I 

showed up in 2005 when we had people that were called, other 

than Mexicans, showing up and saying please give me the permiso 

and show me the way to the bus station. Because there was no way 

to return them—you couldn’t return them to Mexico because Mexico wouldn’t take them—and we did not have enough beds to put 

them into detention before they could be deported, we had to release them. 

Everybody was coming in greater and greater numbers when 

they realized that the worst thing that would happen to them is 

they would be given a date to show up, in 6 months, for a hearing. 

That is happening again. I think it would be worthwhile to look at 

the response that the Department took to that problem in 2005 and 

2006, when we dramatically increased our ability to put people into 

detention and shrank, dramatically, the time it took to send them 

back home. So that they started to deliver the message, oh, you can 

take that long trip across Mexico but you will be back here in 2 

weeks once you cross the border. 

If they believe that they will be allowed to stay in the United 

States indefinitely they will keep coming, and we will spend all our 

time just rounding them up and giving them permisos. Meanwhile, 

the drug cartels have already realized if they can send 250 people 

across the border who all have to be fingerprinted and sent to detention, as soon as the Border Patrol is engaged in that they can 

begin sending their backpackers across with the drugs. 
30 

So I think this is a genuine crisis. It is a crisis of planning and 

management for the Department that needs to be addressed quite 

promptly or we will have serious, serious problems on the border. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have run 

out of time. I will yield back, and hope for questions in the second 

round. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from Arizona. Mr. Baker, 

thank you for that, as well. Just a side comment. I think Mexico 

needs to be appealed to by this administration. It is their Southern 

Border with Guatemala that these folks are transiting, as well. 

They could be stopped there. Historically, Mexico has had a very, 

very strong policy of border crossings right there. But apparently, 

something—somewhere along the way something is not being done. 

Whether it is on the Guatemala and Mexico border, or whether it 

is on our border. 

So I yield to the gentleman, for 5 minutes, from North Carolina, 

Mr. Hudson. 

Mr. HUDSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank all the witnesses for 

your time here today. I thank the Chairman for having this hearing. This is really important. 

Mr. Baker, I want to start with you. In your written testimony, 

you addressed the delay of the QHSR by the Department of Justice 

and the near-veto power that Justice enjoys over this Department 

of Homeland Security product. In your time as assistant secretary 

for policy, did DOJ or any other Federal department enjoy this type 

of veto power? Are there any other departments—like Justice or 

Defense or State—that have to obtain this kind of outside approval 

before they present their quadrennial report? 

Mr. BAKER. If you let other agencies do that to you they will do 

it. When I first arrived at the—and we were standing up the Department’s policy office, I handed out buttons that had the words 

‘‘lunch money’’ and a big bar through it like a no-parking sign to 

say we were not gonna be giving our lunch money to other departments anymore. Maybe we should revive that. The Justice Department’s effort to extract turf concessions from a document that 

needs to be released I think does not—what—it is not in the best 

traditions of the Department. But you have to resist or other departments will do that to you. 

Mr. HUDSON. I appreciate that. I am just very concerned about 

that type of process, and I think there needs to be an independent 

report. Obviously, you know, departments can work together on 

issues and concern and cross-jurisdiction. But to have a report like 

this delayed, and to have another Department with near-veto 

power, I think that is a real mistake. So I appreciate—— 

Mr. BAKER. If I could tell one quick story? We had a very similar 

exercise like this when we were talking about nuclear terrorism. 

Where the FBI said, hey, we are in charge, we will do everything. 

Shortly thereafter we actually had an incident where a ship was 

coming with a cargo that had alarmed for plutonium. It turns out 

that it was not plutonium, but we thought seriously we had to send 

a helicopter out to investigate. We turned to the FBI and said, well, 

you said you were in charge. You got helicopters. They said, you 
31 

know, actually we don’t know how to land a helicopter on a ship. 

Could the Coast Guard do it for us? 

That is the difference between writing the speech where you say 

I am in charge, and actually carrying out the effort. Where the people who can do it end up with the responsibility. We need—the 

more we focus on what we are actually doing as opposed to the 

speech parts of this, the more likely we will have realistic assignments of responsibility. 

Mr. HUDSON. Well, I think that is important. Because the American people expect us to keep them safe. If we are fighting over turf 

and, you know, whose helicopter are we gonna use, you know, that 

is a mistake. I think the American people have a right to be outraged and certainly, we have concerns here in Congress. We will 

continue to work on these issues. So I appreciate you highlighting 

that. 

Shifting gears a little bit, Mr. Cilluffo, at the time of the last 

QHSR, ISIS was a weakened al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. It has since 

become a major force, first in the on-going Syrian conflict and, 

more recently, in Iraq where it has taken on several key areas and 

is directly fighting with the government. 

Sort-of building on the theme that the Chairman raised, you 

know, did the QHSR mention this type of threat? If not, is ISIS a 

potential failure of the state of Iraq, and are other nation-states a 

potential threat that DHS or QHSR should include in a National 

homeland security strategy? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. That is—I think that is an excellent question. It 

comes to what I think is one of these interagency challenges and 

dilemmas. Because you can’t look at this as a home game or an 

away game alone. I would argue that we have neglected some our 

away game activities in recent years. Which has provided the time 

and space for our enemies to exploit. But I would also argue that 

you have got to look at it as being inextricably interwoven. Here 

is where I think you have some of that breakdown. 

I think the Department does deserve credit in terms of the work 

it has done vis-a ́-vis terror travel. They have actually made significant progress. But as the Chairman had mentioned, you have also 

got foreign fighters by the thousands. In addition to the incident 

in Belgium, there was a big arrest yesterday with TATP in France 

where you do have a—and Syria connection. You do have a number 

of foreign fighters that can come to Europe and then go elsewhere. 

I mean, obviously, when you look at the highest concern in terms 

of threat, it is probably on European soil right now. 

But that also does bode significantly for the United States. The 

reason we did—we have done a number of studies on foreign fighters in 2009, 2010. The reason we did that was this particular case 

where the system was blinking very red in the United States. A fellow by the name of Najibullah Zazi, he had initially went over to 

Afghanistan to join up with the Taliban. He was intercepted by alQaeda, said you are of much greater value because you are familiar 

with the United States, you can move in the United States. We are 

gonna turn you around and you are gonna start targeting U.S. targets. 

In this case, he was going after the subways in New York. We 

had a couple of mix-ups in terms of being able to get there before 
32 

the balloon went up, but we did and we did it successfully. So it 

is this foreign fighter. It is these individuals that can be identified, 

intercepted, and turned around. That is a big problem. When you 

look at ISIS today, I think what is most unique is that you have 

got young folks who are meeting who had never met before. So 

when we looked at AQAP in Yemen, they are largely people who 

had familiarity with Yemeni society. 

When you look at Somalia, it was largely American, first-, second-generation of Somali descent. When you looked at AfPak, same 

sort of situation, southeast Asian. What makes this different is, 

they are coming from everywhere. These are new networks. So you 

have got very significant, concerning bomb skills coming out of 

Yemen, for example, now meeting with others who are savvy in social media or other terrorist tactics that we need to be concerned 

about. 

So bottom line, I don’t think we will ever be able to predict the 

future, since the end of the Cold War threat forecasting has made, 

is some cases, astrology look respectable. 

But I would also suggest that, in the words of Mark Twain, 

whereas history may not repeat itself it does tend to rhyme. I am 

not sure we are learning all of our lessons that we have learned 

the hard way. I think it is up to all of us to make sure that we 

try to push back as much as we can. 

Mr. HUDSON. Very well put. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired so I will yield back to you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. 

Talking about some of those issues, we just saw about 20 Somalians leave Minnesota to travel. Whether they are going to Syria 

or Somalia, but they are going to be jihadists. You know, do they 

come back to the country? These are folks that had legal permanent status here. 

So I apologize earlier if I came across as angry, talking about the 

Southern Border. But you know what? By golly, I am angry. I am 

angry because I am an American and I believe in the sovereignty 

of our Nation. I am very chagrined—more than chagrined, angered—by what I see going on right now. 

Ms. Duke, I want to shift gears to you. DHS is the third-largest 

Federal department, and they have got a vast mission. The Department has number of agencies, departments, directorates, offices, 

and programs. There are offices involved with the intelligence community. Others conduct research and development within the Federal Protective Service. They serve as uniform Federal building security. We got CBP and ICE that strive to protect this Nation’s border, among other missions. 

So given the size of DHS and its broad responsibility and it is 

vast and, at times, contradictory missions, is it appropriate to expect a QHSR of approximately 100 pages to provide an accurate, 

comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy for 

the Nation? 

Ms. DUKE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think when you use the term 

‘‘comprehensive,’’ no. I think the QHSR really is a start document, 

setting forth the missions in very broad categories. I think they are 

noncontroversial in large part because they are so broad. It is a 
33 

motherhood and apple pie, I think everybody agrees. I think the 

key is gonna be moving that forward. 

I do think there is unity of mission. I think the mission set of 

the various components of DHS does overlap more than it is being 

executed today. Not completely. 

I think that moving forward in joint requirements and joint capabilities is key for two reasons. One is the efficiency, the dollars 

spent. Second is the effectiveness. I believe DHS was created to be 

a more effective deliverer of homeland security, and that integration of the mission is key to moving that forward. I think we will 

see a better alignment if we move towards those joint requirements 

and capabilities. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, speaking along that, it is sort-of silent on 

management issues. So how concerned shall we be that it is sortof silent on those issues, and what management infrastructure 

needs to be put in place to effectively implement a DHS strategy? 

Ms. DUKE. It is—— 

Mr. DUNCAN. We talked about acquisition reform earlier, so we 

have covered that. But any other things. 

Ms. DUKE. It is silent. I think No. 1 from a management is the 

unity of the leadership and the regular engagement of senior leadership, both at headquarters and the components, in running the 

Department. By running the Department, it is a 250,000-person 

bureaucracy, and it needs to be run effectively. I think that is key. 

That is a tenet through the senior leadership council and the deputies group of the current Secretary’s initiative. I think it is gonna 

be difficult to carry through on that because of schedules, but it 

has to happen. That will drive down the unity at a low level. 

The second is the joint requirements and capabilities, both from 

a technology perspective and moving towards less platforms, less 

technology. You know, how many airframes do we need, those type 

of issues. Then also moving towards joint operations. That is going 

to be difficult. It needs to be tackled, but you are not gonna get 

that without the unity of the leadership dedicated towards that 

joint-ness. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Thank you for that. 

I want to ask Dr. Willis, in this current budgetary environment 

that we experience, we deal with every day up here on the Hill, 

what are some specific examples of how DHS could operate more 

efficiently with less? For example, are there any areas or components that could be reduced without threatening the homeland security mission? 

Mr. WILLIS. I think the answer to this comes back to—picking up 

some of what Ms. Duke said—on joint-ness. We need to start looking at the different mission areas that the Department has to work 

on. Take them as a problem to be solved, not a component to do 

work. If we start looking at it that way, I think some of the places 

where there may be ways to improve, both effectiveness or increased efficiency could emerge. I think border security is one of 

those. 

We already have something like that for drug control. We have 

something called The Interdiction Committee, where ONDCP, 

Coast Guard and all—and others come together to figure out how 
34 

are we gonna jointly use our assets together? We could use something like that on immigration, as well. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you. 

Mr. Cilluffo, am I off-base when I talk about my concern over 

OTMs, people of Middle Eastern, Asian, African descent, transiting 

somehow to South America, Western Hemisphere and making their 

way across our Southern Border? I preface that by saying we saw 

the Quds Force operative called on the Southern Border, trying to 

come into this country using a Mexican drug cartel operative who 

happened to be a DEA agent. Trying to come across through some 

sort of drug nexus, cartel nexus, to come to this city to assassinate 

the ambassador from Saudi Arabia. 

That is a real example. But am I exacerbating that with a concern that foreign fighters may try to come, that Hezbollah is trying 

to come into the Western Hemisphere more, that Iran is continuing 

to send operatives into this hemisphere? That there is a possibility 

that with a porous border like with have that they could actually 

transit into the United States? Is this a concern we should have, 

or am I off-base? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. You know, I actually testified on this issue before 

the subcommittee when Mr. McCaul was chairing it. I do feel that 

is a legitimate concern. Obviously, when you look at the numbers 

it is a small number business. But the reality is, is terrorism is a 

small numbers business. Small numbers can cause mass harm. So 

I do think it is a significant concern. I do think that our authorities 

at CBP and elsewhere are aware of this in DEA. But smuggling is 

smuggling. 

I don’t care what it is. If they are getting in, they are gonna get 

in. I used to tell a very bad joke. If you want to smuggle in a tactical nuclear weapon just wrap it in a bale of marijuana. Because 

we are not doing all that well in terms of some of our drug enforcement. Now I think it has improved. I think the likelihood would 

be a little more significant if you were to bring in someone that 

looks entirely different. I am not meaning to be pejorative, but that 

is the way it would work. 

I think some of the cartels wouldn’t necessarily risk bringing in 

someone if they have a sense that this is a real bad actor. But then 

again, you are assuming that this is a monolithic enterprise and 

it is not. It is decentralized. So I think the bottom line here is, is 

it is a concern. It is not a big numbers business. But again, small 

numbers can cause mass harm here, and I think that is what is 

important. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. If I could just underscore one thing. Because I do 

think the Department, and Secretary Johnson, in particular deserve some credit for that Unity of Effort memo. That really was 

powerful. If you do get to the joint-ness, he came from the Department of Defense, where you had joint planning, where you have a 

structure between OSD and the combatant commanders through 

various means. The Department, I think at Homeland Security, 

you don’t really have a sense of what the office of the Secretary is. 

Elevate policy to an under secretary role. Get a joint operations 

planning kind of effort, a J–3 in the military sense. Get the under 

secretary for intelligence and analysis to be a true J–2 or an intel-
35 

ligence function more along the lines of the way that relates to the 

under secretary of defense of intelligence in DOD. I think there are 

some opportunities. I think the Secretary seems to be moving in 

the right direction. Is it captured in the QHSR? Not really, but I 

think if you align those two entities there is some opportunity 

there. I think Congress can keep their feet to the fire to make that 

happen. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that. I will say that Secretary Johnson came and met with at least Republican Members of this committee yesterday for at least an hour. He was very engaging, and 

I am impressed. I would say I am a Jeh Johnson fan, and I think 

he is the right guy at the right time. We need to make sure he has 

got the right tools and the ability to do his job, given the immense 

challenges, all the list of things that—and that was just a partial 

list that I read earlier. 

The last thing I will say before I turn it over to Mr. Barber is, 

I grew up in the Cold War, where we were nation-state versus nation-state. We were tracking tank and artillery movements and 

troop movements and posturing and positioning of troops. It is a 

different world today, where we are tracking individuals. If you 

think about that, we are trying to track single individuals who 

could commit an act of terror. 

Fly an airplane into a tower or commit a Boston-style bombing 

that still terrorizes this country and caused tremendous moral and 

morality and harm to this country. So it is a different world and 

the challenges are immense. When we talk about the foreign fighters and other things we have mentioned today, it really raises the 

hair on the back of my neck. 

So with that, I will turn it over to Mr. Barber for another line 

of questioning. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk a little bit about the morale issue. Because I think it is a central problem that the Department is facing as it is trying to carry out its 

mission. It will be, I think, a real problem in implementing the 

QHSR. Secretary Johnson came to this committee and made it real 

clear that this was going to be one his priorities: To improve employee morale. It is rightly a top priority for him. It is for us. 

Because improving employee morale means improving the effectiveness of the Department. A demoralized workforce cannot carry 

out a mission effectively. Let me be very specific about one area of 

concern that is very real to me and the people I represent. That 

is the work that is being done by the Border Patrol and the Customs Agents at our ports of entry. 

The Border Patrol Agents, every single day, work in the most 

rugged environments on the border in the Southwest that you 

could imagine. Around the next bend, around the next canyon could 

be armed cartel members. We have had incidents, of course, where 

our agents have been harmed in those circumstances. They are 

very courageous people. I think they are really doing their best, 

under very difficult circumstances, to do their job. 

The Customs Agents who work at the ports of entry also face 

dangers and frustration because we have tourists, we have fresh 

produce trucks, we have products that are made in the United 

States, shipped to Mexico for assembly, and brought back that wait 
36 

in long lines—21⁄2 hours is not unusual—at our ports of entry. That 

is also demoralizing—it has a demoralizing impact on those employees. 

So I guess my question really is, for those of you were within the 

Department at one time—and, Dr. Willis, can you describe from 

your experience and from your base of knowledge, what is it the 

Department is going to have to do to increase morale, particularly 

in the area I have talked about? Because without improved morale, 

as the Secretary has made a priority, we are simply not gonna get 

a better Department. 

So let me start, if I could, with Dr. Willis, and then the other 

panelists perhaps can make their comments, as well. 

Mr. WILLIS. I think this is a very important problem. It is not 

just the component you called out. If you look across morale, across 

the Department, the numbers are not where you would like to see 

them. The basic approaches to this come out of basic management, 

right? We need to give people a clear focus on what we are gonna 

do, and then we need to give them the tools to do it. I saw some 

things in the acquisition bill that were helping that, providing 

workforce training. 

In the case of the Border Patrol that you were talking about, in 

addition to facing hostile threats there has also been news about 

concern about use of force guidance. So these are two in tension. 

So we need to give them the training in policies to help them be 

able to do their job effectively. So I think those two things are key, 

and then I will ask my other panelists to help. But—— 

Mr. BARBER. Ms. Duke, could you respond? 

Ms. DUKE. Yes. Well, up until the very end of my career I was 

a career civil servant. I will say, after spending a long time in the 

Department of Homeland Security they are some of the most passionate civil servants that I have ever encountered in my 28-year 

career. I commend them. I thank you for asking questions about 

them. 

I think, first of all, that passion could be turned into better morale, No. 1, by engagement. They have got to be engaged and valued. In terms of they know what needs to be done, and both their 

operations and their opinions and their vision has to be considered 

as we develop strategies. 

It cannot be top-down. It has to be bilateral in terms of those 

boots on the ground know what needs to happen. Combine that 

with the senior leadership perspective, and have an engaged workforce. 

I think second, in the Department of Homeland Security I think 

that civil servants—it is one of the few, if not the only Department 

where it is okay to criticize civil servants without merit in terms 

of just general their mission and their population. I think that 

leadership has to support their members and speak positively of 

them both internally and externally, where it is warranted. 

Make sure that the politics around homeland security are imposed on those mid- and junior-level civil servants. That the politics is managed by the politicians and the leadership in terms of 

supporting the day-to-day mission. That they are enabled and supported and valued for accomplishing that mission despite the swirl 

around the political issues. 
37 

Mr. BARBER. Before we go to other witnesses, I just want to comment on what you said, Ms. Duke. I absolutely believe that engaging the people who are on the ground is one of the most important 

things that any organization can do, not just the Department of 

Homeland Security. That simply is not happening to the degree it 

needs to. 

I think there is a fresh wind in the Department. The Secretary, 

I think, is really committed to improving morale, to transparency 

and accountability. He has already taken action that shows that he 

really means it. 

But let me just cite an example. It has been a while since I have 

talked about this, but it illustrates the point. When the SBInet 

project was launched several years ago, the contract with Boeing 

specifically prohibited agents on the ground from advising or commenting on how this project would go forward. I can’t believe that 

that happened. It did, the project basically failed as a result, I 

think, of lack of input. I would also add, and reiterate what I said 

earlier, not just input from the agents and the Customs Agents on 

the ground, but also the people who live and work on the border. 

I get information from the ranchers, from the businesspeople, 

from the people in the cities that is, without doubt, some of the 

best information you could have about what is really going on. 

So I couldn’t agree with you more. Obviously, management has 

to lead. But it can’t lead unless it listens to the people it is leading. 

So Mr. Baker, Mr. Cilluffo, could you also comment on this issue, 

please? 

Mr. BAKER. Sure. Clarity of mission and support for the mission 

is crucial. Knowing that what you are doing when you get up every 

day is something that is valued by the country and by your leadership is the critical start. Part of that is a responsibility of Americans. You know, the most likely Federal employee any American is 

going to interact with in his ordinary life is a DHS employee. It 

won’t surprise you that Americans are pretty quick to criticize and 

make it personal. 

Really, we should be a little bit better as human beings about 

recognizing that the people we are dealing with are carrying out 

an important mission, even if it occasionally inconveniences us at 

the border, in the airport. We should all thank them more often 

than we do. 

Finally, and this is a little odd and I will say it because it was 

my experience at DHS. Sometimes a key to improving morale is to 

identify the people who are not doing the job and get rid of them. 

Nothing makes the people who are doing the job feel more valued 

than the recognition by management that some people are not and 

actually disciplining or removing them from the workforce. It is a 

real drag on morale if you believe that you don’t actually have to 

do the job to keep the job. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Just very finally briefly, because I think it was 

covered exceedingly well by my fellow witnesses. But keep in mind, 

it is also part of the mission. They can never shut down. It is exhausting. We know, when you are dealing with law enforcement 

you know when you arrest someone and your prosecute someone. 

When you are overseas you kind of know when you have gained 
38 

territory. Their mission is disproving double negatives. They can 

never shut down. 

So you have got an exhaustion factor that I think plays in there. 

Because you only recognize when something goes wrong in terms 

of the Department’s mission. That is what we will all focus on. 

So do we need to improve our abilities to lessen the likelihood 

of things going wrong? Absolutely. But we need to also find ways 

to reward some of the good work that has been done. Part of that, 

I would suggest, it may be psychic income, it may be not in the 

same way we think, but visits. I don’t know. When I was at the 

White House, President Bush would sit down and meet with my 

staff, who were then at the NAC—what is now the headquarters 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

I could be wrong, but I am not sure how many times the President has visited DHS. Members of Congress can do more. Just go 

to the hall, start meeting with the folks. It sounds trivial, but it 

actually means a lot. 

Then ultimately, to your point, get to the boots on ground because that is where the action is. I would argue State and local. 

Homeland security is not a Federal issue alone, it is really about 

enabling some of our partners at the State and local level. I think 

there is a lot that can be done there. 

So part of it is politics, and I don’t mean in a Republican or a 

Demo kind of sense. But there is the need to be able to know that 

the work they are doing is appreciated. There is the need to recognize that you only realize when something goes wrong that we can 

maybe try to get out there when we do have some successes along 

those lines. Get out there, kick the tires. 

Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just close with this comment. I couldn’t 

agree more with all of you about what you say we need to do to 

improve morale. As simple as saying ‘‘thank you.’’ I have often 

traveled through some of our interior checkpoints because they are 

in my district. Without fail, I never identify myself. I say to the 

agent, ‘‘Thank you for your service.’’ They have this shocked look 

on their face. It is like no one ever says that. I mean, it is a tough 

job, and I think we need to be thankful. 

Also, we need to continue to reinforce what the Secretary is 

doing to improve accountability and transparency. When he came 

here and he said he was going to be more transparent, he followed 

through by releasing, for the first time, the use of force policy. Controversial decision, the right decision in my mind. 

He then released information about investigations involving 

agents. Again, controversial, but the right decision. The public has 

a right to know what is going on in this Department. The more it 

knows, I believe the more balanced it will be in praising the good 

things, of which there are many, and being clear about the things 

that don’t work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank you panelists for reminding us that it is a 24/7/365 day job to protect this 

country. It can be exhausting. I can only imagine what our CBP 

and Immigration and Customs Enforcement and USCIS and all the 

other groups that are dealing with some of the issues that we 
39 

talked about this morning are going through. So I want to just 

thank them for their service, on the record, here today. From Jeh 

Johnson all the way down to the guy that is standing at the border. 

And thank them. You know, Americans get frustrated when they 

go through the screening at the airport. I have been there. I will 

be there in a little while. I will look at the number of TSA agents, 

and wonder why things can’t go quicker. Why we can’t do things 

in a different manner. 

But I have got to temper my frustration, and understand that 

they are protecting this Nation, they are keeping me safe. I agree 

with Mr. Barber. I try to tell them, when I go through the airport, 

thank you for your service, thank you for what you are doing to 

keep us safe. 

I would encourage all Americans to remember that patience is 

the new sign of patriotism. Because we, as a Nation, need to be 

safe. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony 

and the Members for their questions today. I thought it was very 

informative and insightful. The Members of the subcommittee may 

have some additional questions for the panelists, and we ask that 

you respond to those in writing. 

So without objection, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:54 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(41) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR STEWART A. BAKER

Question 1. What are the potential resource implications for the Department of 

Homeland Security from implanting priorities in the latest Quadrennial Homeland 

Security Review Report? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. In an era of likely flat budgets, to what extent will the Department 

of Homeland Security need to reduce funding in some mission areas to free up resources to implement priority areas such as biological threats and cybersecurity? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR STEWART A. BAKER

Question 1. Mr. Baker, policy has been organizationally challenged since the inception of DHS; in hindsight, what lessons or best practices do you have for management of the policy process and maturing the policy organization at the Department 

so that it ultimately produces actionable reports, guidance, and policy, as opposed 

to ‘‘think tank’’ policies and guidance? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its ‘‘management systems, budget and accounting 

systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.’’ This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public 

document expose the country to risk? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 

years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first 

QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political 

party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new 

administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress 

reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year 

as the Presidential election? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget 

request? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security 

environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there 

be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not 

made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 7. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous 

cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR, envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, 

its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices 

across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a 

lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a 

consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And 
42 

do you believe that consolidating DHS’s physical infrastructure supports the Secretary’s Unity of Effort? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Question 1. To what extent did DHS provide a clear strategy for securing cyberspace in the QHSR? Did the QHSR provide an opportunity to guide a coordinated 

cybersecurity effort across Federal departments or did it remain a DHS-focused 

strategy? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Given the increasing prevalence of nation-state-supported cyber attacks and espionage, such as the recently indicted members of an elite Chinese military unit who targeted U.S. networks for the Chinese government, should the Departments of State and/or Defense have more of a role in cyber protection? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its ‘‘management systems, budget and accounting 

systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.’’ This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public 

document expose the country to risk? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 

years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first 

QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political 

party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new 

administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress 

reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year 

as the Presidential election? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget 

request? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security 

environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there 

be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not 

made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 6. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous 

cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, 

its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices 

across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a 

lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a 

consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And 

do you believe that consolidating DHS’s physical infrastructure supports the Secretary’s Unity of Effort? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
43 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT412z1.html. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JEFF DUNCAN FOR HENRY H. WILLIS 1 2

Question 1a. Components, such as TSA and CBP, are ultimately responsible for 

implementing DHS’s strategic plan. While the QHSR developed a strategic framework, it remains unclear to what extent these efforts are impacting specific programs and operations at the component level. 

Do you know of any component-level programs or operations that have changed, 

or been cancelled or initiated as a result of the prior QHSR or the current QHSR? 

Question 1b. To what extent have/will components adjust their own strategies to 

be in line with the QHSR? 

Answer. One of the results of the first QHSR was the recognition of the importance of having a valid National risk assessment. The methods for National risk assessment developed through the first QHSR were then applied in this second QHSR. 

However, as I stated in my testimony, the next challenge for DHS is to connect the 

strategic planning based on this assessment to decisions about budgets and program 

priorities. To this end, it is important that the Department complete the steps outlined in the Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo that can implement budget processes 

and build the analytic capability that will allow components to adjust their own 

strategies and programs to be in line with the guidance in the second QHSR. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR HENRY H. WILLIS

Question 1. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its ‘‘management systems, budget and accounting 

systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.’’ This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public 

document expose the country to risk? 

Answer. I am not aware of the reasons why the Department decided not to address issues related to management more explicitly or in greater detail. I do not believe that doing so in a public document would have exposed the country to greater 

risk. 

Question 2. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 

years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first 

QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political 

party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new 

administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress 

reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year 

as the Presidential election? 

Answer. As indicated in this question, both the first and second QHSRs were required to be completed as new leadership stepped into DHS. This timing led to 

delays in the release of the reports and limited the utility of the reports to the Department leadership Congress as a tool for strategic planning and budgeting. The 

QHSR would be better timed if it were initiated when new leadership came aboard 

(rather than completed at that time) and was developed and released in coordination with the President’s budget request, so that it could serve as strategic guidance 

for that request. 

Question 3. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget 

request? 

Answer. To reiterate a few points made in my written testimony and in the responses to questions above, there are two steps that could be taken to mature the 

QHSR process so that it will bear a relationship to the budget request. First, the 

Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo identifies steps to implement budget processes and 

build analytic capability to connect budget decision making to the strategic guidance 

in the QHSR. Second, the QHSR would be a more effective strategic planning tool 
44 

if it were scheduled to be initiated when new leadership comes on board at the Department and it was developed and released in coordination with the budget request. 

Question 4. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security 

environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there 

be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements? 

Answer. The statutory requirement for a QHSR reinforces the importance of strategic planning for DHS and the stated requirements are appropriate for such a review and remain relevant. 

Question 5. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not 

made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent? 

Answer. I am supportive of greater transparency for the analysis and information 

to support strategic planning for homeland security. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 

DHS at countering terrorism, managing risks from disasters, and facilitating trade 

and travel depends on the ability of State and local governments, private companies, 

and non-government organizations to contribute to making the Nation safer, more 

secure, and more prosperous. When these organizations have more information, they 

are in a better position to offer solutions. 

Question 6. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous 

cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, 

its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices 

across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a 

lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a 

consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And 

do you believe that consolidating DHS’s physical infrastructure supports the Secretary’s Unity of Effort? 

Answer. As mentioned in my testimony, the Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo includes several steps that can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department. I believe that close cooperation between the Secretary and Congress will 

greatly improve DHS’s ability to implement these initiatives. I have not examined 

how consolidation of headquarters at St. Elizabeths would affect management of 

DHS. However, to the extent a convincing case can be made that a consolidated 

headquarters would improve management, it would deserve support by Congress. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE JEFF DUNCAN FOR ELAINE C. DUKE

Question 1a. In your written testimony, you discuss the Secretary’s ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ and the necessity of meetings and engagement by the Secretary, deputy secretary, and the component heads. 

After 11 years of a Department more resembling a collection of independent components, how critical is Unity of Effort in protecting the Nation’s homeland? 

Answer. The Unity of Effort is very critical to effectively executing the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission to protect the Nation’s homeland. The 

Unity of Effort will improve the effectiveness of mission operations. It will serve to 

close gaps in mission scope and delivery. It will position DHS to execute the missions of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) more seamlessly, with 

better communications, and with integrated roles and responsibilities. It will position DHS to better understand the touch points between the components’ unique 

missions and manage those integration points for better mission execution. 

Additionally, the Unity of Effort will improve the efficiency of DHS. It will drive 

efficient allocation of resources by eliminating redundancies in systems, services, 

and aligning missions. It will help position the business functions to more cohesively 

support mission execution in leadership, resource allocation, policy and governance, 

and performance measurement. 

Question 1b. What are the challenges to focusing the various component efforts 

on a unified DHS strategy versus an individual component approach? 

Answer. The challenges to focusing the various component efforts on a unified 

DSH strategy versus an individual component approach start with trust. Each component is passionate about its mission, and fears that joining with the other components may hinder its ability to meet its mission. That is one reason why the leadership councils formed under the Unity of Effort are so crucial. Trust must start with 

the most senior leaders. An additional challenge to a unified strategy is developing 

an optimal balance between constancy and flexibility. DHS must develop a unified, 

constant infrastructure to be efficient and consistent in delivery services and mission. Yet, it must maintain the flexibility to adapt to an evolving threat and be nimble and addressing the threats. 
45 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR ELAINE C. DUKE

Question 1. Ms. Duke, a section on Maturing Management was not included in 

the 2009 QHSR. To some extent; however, it was included in the subsequent Bottom-up Review. The current QHSR likewise did not include the requisite assessment 

of the Department’s management functions. As you know, many aspects of the Department management functions remain on the Government Accountability Office 

High-Risk List and continue to pose a challenge for DHS. What should we, as Congress, look to for management issues from the QHSR since there will not be another 

Bottom-up Review? Should Congress consider mandating a ‘‘Bottom-up Review’’ 

process that could be released on a quarterly basis as a companion to the QHSR? 

Answer. I believe continued oversight on the implementation of the Unity of Effort 

would yield more positive maturation and integration of management functions than 

another Bottom-Up Review. DHS has matured to the level that it has a relatively 

comprehensive understanding of the ‘‘as is’’, related to its missions and how they 

are accomplished. The next step to maturity is the optimal unity of both management and mission delivery. I stress optimal because either maximizing or minimizing unity will not serve DHS or our Nation well. Rather than another look at 

the relatively consistent mission set, I recommend concentrating continued oversight 

on development and implementation of the Unity of Effort initiatives set for by Secretary Johnson, since they will provide the sustained progress toward executing the 

QHSR missions. 

Question 2. The QHSR specifically tasks the Department with assessing its organizational structure, including its ‘‘management systems, budget and accounting 

systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and technical infrastructure.’’ This was not included in the QHSR. Please expand on why you believe the Department did not include these elements. Would doing so in a public 

document expose the country to risk? 

Answer. I do not know why DHS did not include the QHSR requirement to assess 

its organizational structure, including its ‘‘management systems, budget and accounting systems, human resources systems, procurement systems, physical and 

technical infrastructure’’ in the recent QHSR. DHS’s efforts to date regarding this 

segment of the QHSR requirement are discussed at least in part in part in its reports to the General Accountability Office related to its High-Risk report on Management Integration. The management system is further defined in Secretary Johnson’s Unity of Effort memo. The Unity of Effort, as proposed, will align mission and 

management into a more cohesive, integrated system. If executed, I believe it would 

improve our Nation’s homeland security. 

Question 3. The 9/11 Act requires the Department to conduct the QHSR every 4 

years, consistent with the Presidential election. During the preparation of the first 

QHSR, the Department was simultaneously going through the process of an administration and political party change. This time, the administration and political 

party stayed the same. As a result, the Department has had an opportunity to prepare a QHSR during two different election outcomes. How could each outcome—new 

administration and party and same—affect the QHSR process and should Congress 

reconsider the timing to the QHSR so that it does not occur during the same year 

as the Presidential election? 

Answer. I believe that the majority of the DHS mission, at the strategic level, is 

not political. If you look at the mission sets in the recent QHSR, I think both new 

and old administrations and parties would believe they are the key missions, and 

the core of homeland security. There may be some political disparity when it comes 

to more detailed execution of those mission sets. For example, immigration enforcement, screening technologies and privacy implications, and border technology all 

may be executed differently depending on the administration and party in control 

of Congress. But I do think that there is danger in aligning DHS’s main mission 

set to political events. The need to protect the homeland is a continuous, fairly constant requirement. I suggest a potential way to move forward would be to allow the 

QHSR to stay strategic and relatively politically neutral, done every 4 years, to provide the constancy of purpose to DHS. And then require a DHS strategic planning 

document, which provides more content on how those missions will be executed, at 

key events such as a new administration, or on a set periodic basis. 

Question 4. The purpose of the QHSR is to inform the budget. How could the Department mature the QHSR process so it will bear some relationship to the budget 

request? 

Answer. DHS could mature the QHSR so it would bear relationship to the budget 

request by including a section on the management of DHS, as currently required 

by the QSHR legislation. There is a danger in managing mission and management 

separately. Management only exists to enable mission, and mission can be most ef-
46 

fectively delivered with good management. They are two pieces of a single puzzle, 

and setting a strategy for them individually sub-optimizes both. My recommendation is that in a future QHSR or similar document, the two are addressed simultaneously, with the mission outlining the ‘‘what’’ DHS will do, and the management 

section outlining the ‘‘how’’ DHS will do it, in terms of resource allocation (dollars 

and people), process, system, jointness, metrics, etc. I do believe the Secretary’s 

Unity of Effort plan does address the QHSR requirement on management, and 

would ultimately ensure resources are appropriately, effectively, and efficiently 

aligned to mission priorities. 

Question 5. When examining the statutory requirements for what should be included in the QHSR, with the evolution of time and the changing homeland security 

environment, are these still the best requirements, in your opinion, or should there 

be any legislative additions or deletions to the requirements? 

Answer. I think the current QHSR language is comprehensive and appropriately 

strategic. I do not think the language of the mandate needs to be modified, only the 

actual report needs to be regularly updated (as required every 4 years) to adapt to 

the changing homeland security environment and threats. 

Question 6. Many of the documents submitted to DHS by stakeholders were not 

made public. In your opinion could the process have been more open and transparent? 

Answer. I believe DHS, and any department, should have some ability to go 

through some level of deliberations within itself. This is necessary for open and honest communications in the deliberative process. One way the process could be more 

transparent, if that is necessary, is to include a summary discussion of some of the 

trade-offs and alternatives, as part of the final report supporting documentation. 

This provides an open and transparent look at alternatives and decisions that had 

to be made, while appropriately protecting the deliberative process. 

Question 7. The Secretary’s Unity of Effort memo, in addition to the numerous 

cross-cutting strategies laid out in the QHSR envisions a unified cohesive DHS; yet, 

its component agencies and high-level officials remain spread out in various offices 

across the National Capital Region. And yet, from some Members, there remains a 

lack of support for the consolidated headquarters at St. Elizabeths. How would a 

consolidated headquarters assist the Department in carrying out its mission? And 

do you believe that consolidating DHS’s physical infrastructure supports the Secretary’s Unity of Effort? 

Answer. The geographic dispersion of DHS’s components throughout the NCR 

does hinder the speed at which DHS can build its unity. The lack of consolidated 

headquarters is detrimental for several reasons, most importantly the fact that DHS 

does not have a joint operations center from which the Secretary can run incident 

response in conjunction with his component heads. The multiple, independent component operations centers fuel autonomous operations and hinders jointness. Additionally, the lack of consolidated headquarters hinders DHS’s ability to build a unified culture. Informal communications and professional relationship-building is difficult, and without the personal connections, trust, understanding, and cohesiveness 

are more difficult to establish. I do understand the investment for St. Elizabeths is 

substantial, and know that in the current budget situation funding the headquarters is of great concern for many parties. I think that the unity can be established with the current environment, but do think that it will take longer and may 

not be as complete of a unification as DHS would experience with a consolidated 

headquarters. 

Æ