Filed 3/8/ 24 S ankranthi v. El Camino Hospital CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RU T H SANKRA N THI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

EL CAMINO HOSPITAL,

Defendant and Respondent. H049506 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 18CV334546)

Appellant Ruth Sankranthi 1 was terminated from her position at El Camino

Hospital (ECH) . Sankranthi, who was pregnant at the time of her termination , brought an

action against ECH alleging, int er alia, discrimination based on her gender and national

origin, and wrongful termination after she became disabled due to pregnancy. The trial

court granted summary judgment in favor of ECH

. On appeal, Sankranthi argues that triable issues of material fact remained as to the

discrimination, pregnancy disability , retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination

causes of action . She also challenges various evidentiary findings. Finding that

summary judgment was properly granted, we will affi rm the judgment.

1 Sankranthi’s last name was erroneously spelled as “Sankrathi” in the original complaint, and the erroneous caption was used on documents filed in this court

. On our own motion, we have corrected the caption used on appeal an d will use the correct spelling of the appellant’s last name in this opinion.2 I. F ACTS

In October 2016, Jessica Hatala, then an interim manager in the Clinical

Document Improvement (CDI) Department at ECH , interviewed Sankranthi for a CDI

S pecialist position. The position consisted primarily of daily clinical review of records to

ensure accuracy of the records and medical coding, and to communicate with physicians

to obtain missing or conflicting medical record documentation. This is a function of the

hospital ’s Clinica l Quality Department.

Hatala recommended that Sankranthi be hired with a salary of $130,000 per year.

Sankranthi asked for, and Hatala approved, a higher salary of $147,000 per year.

Sankranthi began working in December 2016. Hatala knew tha t Sankranthi identified as

female and that her national origin was Indian. Hatala also hired three other CDI

specialists

, T.B. (who like Sankranthi was a female from India), Y.C. ( an Asian female),

and F.S. 2 (a Black

/Nigerian male).

In the beginning, according to Sankranthi, she and Hatala had a “great” working

relationship. However, Hatala noticed some problems. According to Hatala, Sankranthi

“exhibited significant difficulties in performing her duties as a CDI Specialist as well as
significant professionalism shortcomings.” In particular, Sankranthi did not compose

“clinically valid queries to physicians,” her work resulted in “frequent coding

mismatches,” and staff members complained to Hatala about Sankranthi’s “demeanor and

ma nner of dress.”

On April 10, 2017, Hatala noticed that Sankranthi and another CDI S pecialist

,

C.E.

, a Mexican male, had a large number of cases marked “ ‘in progress,’ ” and as a

result, informed them that they would not receive any new case assignments to provide

them time to complete their cases. A week later, on April 18, 2017, Hatala noted that

they had not completed the tasks, and sent both of them an e

- mail requesting that they

2 F.S. is the father of the child Sankranthi was pregnant with at the time of her
termination.3

complete their assignment by week’s end. She also sent an e

- mail to th e entire CDI team,

chastising them all for being late to a joint meeting with another department and for

unprofessional conduct during the meeting.

On April 20, 2017, Hatala sent an e

- mail to human resources ( HR ) regarding

Sankranthi and C.E. , stating that their performance was not meeting expectations. With

regard to Sankranthi, Hatala noted the following: “general unprofessional behavior,

inappropriate dress and flirtatious behavior, calling her coworker and te lling her to leave

work early and not [to] do more work than [Sankranthi], general lack of participation in

the Claro education, tardiness, generally needing more work and more redirection in her

work, inability to recognize and act on query opportunities that are considered a core part

of our CDI job, and what I can only describe as temper tantrums.” (“Claro” referred to

Claro Health Care Consultants, which provided a two

- week training program to the

CDI’s in April 2017 .) Hatala also noted that “[w]e alr eady had a 1:1 about her attitude,

but I have seen no improvement over the last two weeks.” Hatala asked for guidance on

whether Sankranthi was eligible for a performance improvement plan (PIP) , or if she

could issue a written warning.

In early July 201 7, Sankranthi contacted HR , spoke to HR representative Faridah

Hemani, and complained about Hatala. According to H atala, Sankranthi alleged that

Hatala was “ ‘ targeting ’ ” her by discussing her job performance shortcomings with her

. According to Sankrant hi ’s de position , her complaints about Hatala included: (1) Hatala

told her she dressed like she was going to a club; (2) in front of other people , Hatala said

she was surprised that Sankranthi owned pants; ( 3 ) Hatala waved her hand in front of

Sankranthi’s face and said “ Hello ” at a grou p education meeting ; ( 4 ) Hatala told

Sankranthi and a coworker that they looked cute from behind and that she wanted to take

their picture; and ( 5 ) Hatala repeatedly talked to Sankranthi in a demeaning manner.

On July 11, 2017, Sankranthi met with HR represent at ive Hemani, Catherine

Carson ( Senior Director of Quality and Hatala’s supervisor)

, and Hatala to discuss4

Sankranthi’s concerns. Hatala acknowledged that she could be direct but emphasized to

Sankranthi t hat she needed to dress professionally and reiterated that “coworkers had

complained about [her] demeanor and dress

. . . , including a comment that Ms.

Sankranthi ‘dressed like she was going to the club,’ ” which Hatala had conveyed to

Sankranthi.

A few days later, on July 14, 2017, T.B. approached Hatala regarding concerns she

had about Sankranthi. Later that day , Hatala summarized those concerns in an e

- mail to

HR and Carson

. She reported that T.B. came to her because she felt “uncomfortable”

around Sankranthi. T.B. reported that Sankranthi made multiple negative comments

about Hatala, was not collaborating or talking with another colleague, and encouraged

T.B. not to speak with or engage with that colleague. Hatala concluded by stating “it

appears that [Sankranthi] is creating a toxic environment on the team and is having a

negative effect on at least two members.” Hatala expressed her desire to “bring this o ut

in the open and put an end to it once and for all.”

Hatala summarized her ongoing concerns in a written memo to Sankranthi dated

September 7, 2017

, that document ed her “O ral /V erbal C ounseling ” (hereafter “oral

counseling”) sessions with Sankranthi that day and in April 2017

. The memo noted that

o n April 3 and April 28 , 2017 , Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss performance

concerns , inappropriate work attire, and reports that Sankranthi en couraged another staff

member to leave work when Sankranthi did and “not to send more queries than”

Sankranthi did

. The memo sta ted that Hatala had also received a report that Sankranthi

told a coworker that they had been “ ‘doing too many reviews’ ” and engaged in

“generally negative talk about the department

. ” And f inally, the memo noted that “a staff

member alerted [Hatala] and [her department’s] HR Business Representative, Hemani,

that this department is a ‘toxic environment’ and the stress is impeding their work

performance.”5

On September 7, 2 017 , Hatala also gave Sankranthi a three

- page PIP , detailing

overviews of expected competencies, how to demonstrate that competency, manager

support in each competency, and expected outcomes

. The PIP was in effect for 60 days,

during which time Hatala met with Sankranthi on a weekly basis. In opposition to the

motion, Sankranthi declared that she disagreed that there w ere performance “ issues

needing to be addressed ” but signed the PIP because she was told she had to. She also

declared, based on the team’ s monthly performance reports for June through August

2017, that her performance was “far better than that of average team members

. ”

According to Hatala, Sankranthi’s performance issues persisted into November

2017, and in consultation with HR, Sankranth i’s PIP was extended by 30 days on

November 6, 2017. On November 6, 2017, Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss her

performance issues and extend her PIP. Sankranthi was issued an “ Action Report, ”

which contained her “First Written Warning” for unsatisfactory work performance and

described some of the issues with her work and a letter that repeated and expanded on the

statements in the Action Report. The report and letter explained that Sankranthi had

failed to meet the expectations of the CDI role

, as well as the conditions of her 60

- day

performance improvement plan. The report and letter noted specifically that Sankranthi’s

query response results 3 were “inaccurate this past month, increasing from 5 5 % agree rate

to a 92% agree rate” and t hat Sankranthi had “responded to this finding by reporting that

[she] did not know the correct way to report [her] results.” In the letter, Hatala stat ed that

Sankranthi had asked her to ask their team members how they would interpret the query

responses. Using a sampling of Sankranthi’s cases, Hatala polled the team; they

discussed the responses as a group and “the team unanimously reported that the query

responses from the physicians were all some degree of ‘ disagree, ’ ” which indicated that

3 We understand the “ query response results ” to mean whether the treating physi cian or prac ti tioner essentially agreed or disagreed with the points raised in the CDI specialists’ queries.6

Sankranthi’ s results were not as high as she reported. The letter also stated that Hatala,

three other ECH managers or officers, outside consultants, and others in the Clinical

Quality Department had noted that Sankranthi continued “to be nonparticipatory and

displa y closed, and negative body language in team meetings and education sessions.”

Sankranthi signed both the letter and the report acknowledging receipt but added that she

did not agree with the results and that it was “not an accurate judgment of [her]

perf ormance

. ” A fter the 90

- day PIP period

, and with “focused attention and much

handholding,” Sankranthi was able to “briefly improve and meet the CDI Specialist role’s

minimum requirements.” However, Sankranthi’s perfo rmance declined again, and by

early Mar ch 2018, Hatala “consulted with HR regarding the next steps .

. . including the

possibility of another PIP, or the termination of her employment.”

On March 18, 2018, Hatala met with Sankranthi and informed her that “she

continued to demonstrate a lack of medical knowledge in her queries, that she was failing

to notice mismatches in DRG [ 4 ] codes, and that she was recommending lower

- weighted

DRG ’ s or medical billing codes than those supported by the medical documentation.”

Sankranthi insisted that the quality of her work was not poor because she was meeting

productivity goals. Hatala reiterated that “ quantity does not equate to quality ,” and

requested that Sankranthi formulate a third PIP to improve her job performance.

On March 27, 2018 , in consultation with Carson an d HR, Hatala determined that a

further PIP would not be helpful and decided to terminate Sankranthi’s employment. On

March 2 8 , 2018, Hatala entered the termination into the ECH online portal. Because

Sankranthi was ou t on leave that day, Hatala scheduled a meeting with Sankranthi for the

following day ( March 29, 2018 ) at 3 :00 p.m. to inform Sankranthi of the termination.

4 The initialism “DRG” refers to “ d iagnosis

- related group

, ” a coding system that classifies hospital cases according to groups that are expected to have similar hospital

resource use cost s

. DRG ’ s categorize patients with respect to diagnosis, treatment, and length of hospital stay, among other variables.7

Sankranthi had taken leave on March 28, 2018, for a doctor’s appointment. At the

appointment, h er physician recommended that Sankranthi , who was then five and a half

months pregnant, not work due to her pregnancy and provided her with a note for her

employer

. Sankranthi came into work early on March 29, 201 8

, gave the note to HR , and

requested she be placed on pregnancy disability leave

. HR told Sankranthi of the dates of

her pregnancy disability leave, and Sankranthi thereafter called Hartford Insurance

directly to obtain disability benefits.

That same day, a few minutes before the ir scheduled 3:00 p.m. meeting

,
Sankranthi advised Hatala and Carson that she was not feeling well and left work. HR

representative Hemani therefore sent Sankranthi a letter , dated March 29, 2018, advising

her that her employment had been terminated. The letter stat ed that the “Department had

determined earlier this week that despite two performance improvement plans (the initial

plan and an extension) and ongoing support since that time, you had not been able to

demonstrate or sustain the required level of job performance” and that the meeting

scheduled for that day “was to separate your employment with” ECH.

A second letter from Hatala , dated March 30, 2018

, which was hand

- delivered,

again advised Sankranthi that she had been terminated “for unsatisfactory performance

and failure to meet the requirements of the CDI Specialist role.” The letter summarized

that Sankranthi had received documented oral counseling and a 60

- day performance

improvement plan , which “ highlighted specific areas where immediate improvement was
required

, ” including delivering “compliant and clinically appropriate queries,”

communicating “with others in a collaborative, professional, and respectful manner,” and

co mpleting “daily workload as assigned and requested by your manager (productivity ) .”

The letter noted that on “ November 6, 2018 [ sic ], at the end of 60 days, you were notified8

that you had failed to meet [ the ] expectations of the PIP. ” 5 The letter furthe r noted that,

as a result, Sankranthi was issued a written warning , because her “work remained

inaccurate” and she “continued to remain non

- participatory in meetings and education

sessions.” Accordingly , the PIP was extended 30 days, after which Sankranth i was

notified on December 6, 2017, that she was taken off the PIP because she had met the

minimum requirements of the plan.

The letter then addressed Sankranthi’s performance in the first quarter of 2018

. It

noted three meetings in January, four meetings in February, and four meetings in March,

at which Hatala and Sankranthi discussed individual charts that were examples of the

“poor quality of the work.” The letter also noted that physicians were not agreeing with

Sankranthi’s work, that s he was sending queries that were not supported and

demonstrated a lack of medical knowledge, and that there was significant code

disagreement. Finally, the letter noted that “as we investigated these performance

concerns and your work performance history [ , ] we became aware that you do not hold a

doctorate in medicine (M.D. degree). You had listed a n MD in your employment

application, but you actually hold a MBBS degree (Bachelors [ sic ] in Medicine).” The

letter concluded, “ F or these reasons, it is the de cision of El Camino Hospital to terminate

your employment, effective immediately.”

II. P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

On September 7, 2018, Sank ranthi filed a lawsuit against ECH , asserting eight

causes of action: (1) discrimination based on gender and race/ethnici ty/national origin

(Indian); (2) violation of Pregnancy Disability Leave (PDL) statute; (3) failure to

accommodate ; (4) disability discrimination; (5) retaliation; (6) failure to prevent

discrimination; (7) interference with Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights; and

5 In referring to the events of September, November

, and December 2017, Hatala
refe rred to the year as “2018.” But since the letter was sent in March 2018, that appears to have been a typographical error.9

(8) retaliation for exercising California Family Rights Act (CFRA) leave. ECH answered

the complaint with a general denial and asserted numerous affirmative defenses.

On May 14, 2021, ECH moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative,

summary adjudication. ECH argued that Sankranthi’s gender and national origin cause

of action lacked merit. Even assuming Sankranthi was a member of a protected class and

suffered an adverse employment action, ECH argued she failed to demonstrate a

discriminatory motive in her treatment or termination. Rather, ECH argued that

Sankranthi wa s terminated for unsatisfactory job performance. ECH noted the numerous

documented meetings concerning Sankranthi’s job performance, complaints concerning

her demeanor and behavior at work, the 60

- day PIP which was extended by 30 days, and

th e written doc umentation concerning her failure to meet expectations for the CDI

Specialist role. ECH noted that in response to one of Sankranthi’s queries, a physician

replied that Sankranthi’s query was “ ‘ unintelligible .’ ” In sum, ECH argued that its

decision to t erminate Sankranthi’s employment for performance

- related reasons was well

supported by the record, and that the reasoning could not be dismissed as pretextual.

Additionally, ECH contended that Sankranthi’s disability claim failed because she

could not pr ove that she suffered an adverse employment actio n because of a disability,

especially in light of the fact that her disability was unknown to ECH when it decided to

terminate her employment. ECH emphasized that the decision to terminate Sankranthi’s

empl oyment was made before her request for pregnancy disability leave , which rendered

meritless her pregnancy

- related claims

. Sankranthi opposed the motion for summary judgment. She asserted that she

dressed professionally and behaved appropriately and disagreed with the characterization

of her conduct as negative or nonparticipatory

. She asserted that her performance during

her 60

- day PIP was “excellent” and that she received positive feedback , a nd despite this,

Hatala extended her PIP by 30 days and issued a written warning. Sankranthi referenced

e

- mails from December 2017, February 2018, and March 2018, wherein Hatala10

characterized Sankranthi’s performance positively. Sankranthi argued that as king an

employee to “come up with their own PIPs” violated ECH ’s company policy and asserted

that when the prospect of a third PIP was raised, she was more than five and a half

months pregnant “and her pregnancy was showing.” Sankranthi disagreed that she

misrepresented her medical credentials , asserting that she was forthright about her

“credentials obtained from India.”

On April 19, 2021, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment.

Following the hearing, the court issued a written order gra nting the motion for summary

judgment. As to the discrimination claim (first cause of action), the court determined that

ECH established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for S ankranthi’s termination

, namely her job performance , and that she failed to demonstrate pretext. The court also

found, in the alternative, that Sankranthi failed to establish a prima facie case for

discrimination

. Addressing the pregnancy disability claim (second cause of action ), the court

concluded that ECH did not have knowledge of Sankranthi’s pregnancy until after

making its decision to fire her

. The court noted that the decision to terminate

Sankranthi ’s empl oyment was made on March 27, 2018, two days before Sankranthi

requested pregnancy disability leave on March 29, 2018. Further, the trial court noted

that Hatala was unaware of Sankranthi’s pregnancy when she made the final decision to

terminate her employ ment. Although San kranthi disputed ECH’s evidence, the court

found she failed to offer any evidence in opposition to raise a triable issue of fact to

defeat summary judgment or summary adjudication of this claim

.
As for the causes of action for failure to accommodate (third cause of action),

disability discrimination (fourth cause of action), and retaliation (fifth cause of action),

the court concluded , as with the second cause of action, because ECH terminated

Sankranthi’s employment due to her poor job performance and did so before learning of

her pregnancy, these additional causes of action also failed. Addressing the failure to11

prevent harassment and discrimination claim (sixth cause of action), the court concluded

that the claim failed because Sankr anthi did not allege an underlying cause of action for

harassment, and because she failed to establish any unlawful discrimination by ECH.

Finally, a s for the interference with FMLA rights claim (seventh cause of action)

and CFRA retaliation claim (eighth cause of action) , the court concluded that the claim s

failed because ECH made the decision to terminate Sankranthi’s employment before

receiving notice of her intent to take pregnancy disability leave and terminated her

employment “based on her declining job performance

. ”

On August 20 , 2021, the trial court entered its order granting the motion for

summary judgment, and ECH gave notice of entry of that order on September 3, 2021.

On October 19, 2021, Sankranthi filed a notice of appeal from the order granting

summary judgment , erroneously characterizing it as an appeal from a “ [ j ] udgment after

an order granting a summary judgment motion

. ” Two days later, the trial court enter ed a

judgment of dismissa l based on its order granting summary judgment.

“An appeal lies from the judgment, not from an order granting a summary

judgment motion. ” ( Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc . (2007)

156 Cal.App.4th 11, 14, fn. 1; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(1) .) We construe

Sankranthi’s notice of appeal “as being from the subsequently rendered final judgment”

( Dominguez v. Financial Inde mnity Co . (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 391, fn. 1) and as

having been filed on October 21, 2021, the date the trial court entered the judgment of

dismissal.

III

. D ISCUSSION

On appeal, Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred in granting summary

judg ment because triable issues of material fact remained with respect to her causes of12

action for discrimination, violation of PDL, retaliation, and failure to prevent

discrimination. 6 Sankranthi also challenges certain evidentiary rulings.

A. General Principles Regarding Summary Judgment and Standard of Review

Summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is

no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c) ; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield

Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 ( Aguilar ) .)

T o be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must show by admissible

evidence that the “action has no merit or that there is no defense” thereto. ( Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c , subd. (a)(1).) A defendant moving for summary judgment , like ECH,

meets this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating that one or more elements of the

cause of action cannot be established or that ther e is a complete defense to the claim.

( Id. , subds. (o), (p)(2); Aguilar

, supra , 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849

- 850, 853

- 854.) Once the

defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable

issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar , at p. 850.) Material facts are tho se that relate to the

issues in the case as framed by the pleadings. ( Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)

12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 ( Juge ) .) There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and only if,

the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to fin d the underlying fact in favor of

the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.

( Aguilar , at p. 845 .)

6 In her opening brief, Sankranthi expressly limits the issues on appeal to these
four claims and presents no argument about the tr ial court’s ruling s on her failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, interference with FMLA, and retaliation for exercising rights under CFRA claims

. We therefore conclude that any challenges to th e latter four claims have been forfeited. (See S wain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [appellant forfeited argument by failing to make it in its opening brief]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020 )
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554

- 555 .)13

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same

three

- step analysis the trial court uses. ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th

317, 334 ( Guz ); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24

Cal.4th 945, 972; Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1,

29 ( Zamora ).) We first identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, we determine

whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. If the

moving party has met its initial burden, the final step is to decide whether the opposing

party has demonstrat ed the existence of a triable issue of material fact. ( Zamora , at p. 29,

citing Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 880, 886

- 887.)

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to Sankranthi, as the losing

party in this case, liberally construing her evidence while strictly scrutinizing ECH’s

showing and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in Sankranthi’s favor.

( Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768

- 769; Zamora

, supra , 71

Cal.App.5th at p. 29. ) On appeal, as in the trial court, the “court focuses on finding

issues of fact; it does not resolve them. The court seeks to find contradictions in the

evidence or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence that raise a triable issue of

material fact.” ( Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133,

1143

- 1144 ( Trop ).)

B. Discrimination

In cases alleging employment discrimination, we analyze the trial court ’ s order on

a motion for summary judgment using a three

- step process that is based on the burden

shifting test that was established for trials of employment discrimination claims in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792

. ( Serri v. Santa Clara

Unive rsity (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860 ( Serri )

, citing Guz

, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp.

354

- 355 & Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc

. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 ( Reeves ) .)

This test “reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare,

and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps14

of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that

create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily exp lained.” ( Guz

, at p.

354.) This same test also applies to Sankranthi’s FEHA retaliation claim. ( Cornell v.
Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 942.)

In the trial court

, under the first step of the McDonnell Dougla s framework, the

plaintiff may raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a “prima facie case,”

the components of which vary depending upon the nature of the claim, but typically

require evidence that the plaintiff (1) was a member of a protected cl ass, (2) was
performing competently in the positio n held or was qualified for the position sought

, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other circumstance that

suggests discriminatory motive. ( Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 .) “ ‘ A

satisfactory showing to this effect gives rise to a presumption of discrimination which, if

unanswered by the employer, is mandatory

— it requires judgment for the plaintiff. ’ ”

( I bi d .) U nder the second step of the test, the employer may dispel the p resumption by

articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. “ At that

point the presumption disappears.” ( Id . at pp 860

- 861.) Under the third step, the plaintiff

may attack the employer ’ s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination or offer other

evidence of discriminatory motive. ( Id. at p. 861, citing Guz, supra , 24 Cal.4th at

p. 356.)

The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified on a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication

. ( Serri

, supra , 2 2 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) To obtain

summary adjudication of an employment discrimination c laim

, the employer, as the

moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that

one or more elements of the plaintiff ’ s prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse

employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors. ( Ibid. ) “[I]f

nondiscriminatory, [the employer ’ s] true reasons need not necessarily have been wise or

correct. [Citations.] While the objective soundness of an employer ’ s proffered reasons15

supports their credibility

. . . , the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted

with a motive to discriminate illegally

. Thus, ‘legitimate’ reasons [citation] in this

context are reasons that are fac ially unrelated to prohibited bias , and which, if true,

would thus preclude a finding of discrimination .” ( Guz, supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 358.)

Examples of legitimate reasons include a loss of confidence in an employee or the

employee’s failure to meet per formance standards

. ( Serri

, at p. 861.) “ The employer ’ s
evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than

not that one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were the sole basis for the

adverse employment action.” ( Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical

Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 ( Featherstone ).)

On summary judgment, i f the employer meets its initial burden, “ the burden shifts

to the employee to ‘ demonstrate a triabl e issue by producing substantial evidence that the

employer ’ s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a
discriminatory animus

, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the

employer engaged in intentional di scrimination or other unlawful action. ’ ” ( Serri

, supra ,

226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861 .) “ The plaintiff's evidence must be sufficient to support a

reasonable inference that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the

decision

. [Citations.] Th e stronger the employer ’ s showing of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff's evidence must be in order to create a

reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive. ” ( Featherstone

, supra , 10

Cal.App.5th at p. 1159 .) “ The employee ’ s ‘ subjective beliefs in an employment

discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self

serving declarations. ’ [Citation.] The employee ’ s evidence must relate to the motivation

of the decision makers and prove, by nonspeculative evidence, ‘ an actual causal link

between prohibited motivation and termination. ’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid .)

T he “ great weight of federal and California authority holds that an employer is

entitled to summary judgment if, considering t he employer ’ s innocent explanation for its16

actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the

employe r’ s actual motive was discriminatory.” ( Guz, supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 361,

fn. omitted.) “ It is not sufficient for an employee to make a bare prima facie showing or

to simply deny the credibility of the employer ’ s witnesses or to speculate as to

discriminatory motive. [Citations.] Rather it is incumbent upon the employee to produce

‘ substantial respons ive evidence ’ demonstrating the existence of a material triable

controversy as to pretext or discriminatory animus on the part of the employer. ” ( Serri

,

supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)

3 . Analysis

In seeking summary adjudication of the discriminati on claim, ECH argued both

that i t s decision to terminate Sankranthi was based on legitimate nondiscrim in atory

reasons, and that Sankranthi could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. T he

trial court concluded that Sankranthi did not make the requisite prima facie showing of

discrimination, and in any event, ECH established it terminated her employment based on

poor job performance , and Sankranthi failed to make a showing of pretext

. On appeal,

Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her

discrimination claim because there are disputed factual issues about whether Hatala acted

with discriminatory motive.

We disagree

. ECH met its burden of showing legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for Sankranthi’s firing

. A reason is “legitimate” if it is “facially unrelated to

prohibited bias, and which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.”

( Reid v. Google , I

nc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520

, fn. 2 ( Reid ) .) ECH presented evidence

of concerns about Sankranthi’s performance

— including difficulty composing queries,

coding mismatches, failure to complete her work, and complaints about her demeanor

and manner of dress by both coworkers and her supervisor

— arising in April 2017, early

in her tenure, which resulted in a number of meetings an d an e

- mail to HR regarding

Sankranthi’s performance shortfalls. In July 2017, when Hatala and others met with17

Sankranthi to address Sankranthi’s complaints, Hatala reiterated her concerns about

Sankranthi’s demeanor and failure to dress professionally. ECH presented evidence that

just a few days after that meeting, one of Sankranthi’s coworkers complained that she felt

uncomfortable around Sankranthi and that Sankranthi was not collaborating with others

on the team. In September 2017, Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss job performance

issues, issued a memo document ing oral counseling for inappropriate conduct, and placed

Sankranthi on a 60

- day PIP. Hatala and Sankranthi met frequently during this period to

improve her performance , but Sankranthi was placed on a 30

- day PIP extension

. In

December 2017, Sankranthi’s performa nce improved for a time, which was also

documented by ECH . But by March 2018, performance concerns had reemerged. Hatala

and Sankranthi met on March 18, 2018, to discuss continued concerns regarding

Sankranthi’s work performance and Hatala ultimately mad e the decision to terminate

Sankranthi

. In sum, ECH set forth a detailed and consistent record of documented

concerns about Sankranthi’s job performance, which was more than sufficient to meet its

burden to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action

. And as the trial court noted, this shifted the burden to Sankranthi to present

evidence that ECH’s decision was pretextual or was motivated at least in part by

prohibited discrimination.

Sankranthi did not meet her burden t o demonstrate pretext or discriminatory

animus

. Pretext may be demonstrated by showing “ ‘the proffered reason had no basis in

fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the proffered reason

was insufficient to motivate discha rge. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Hanson v. Lucky

Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 224 .) To meet his or her burden, “ ‘ the

[ employee ] must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,

incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer ’ s proffered legitimate reasons for its

action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “ unworthy of credence, ”

[citation], and hence infer “ that the employer did not act for the [the asserted] non

-18

discriminator y reasons. ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” ( Hersant v. Department of Social

Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997

, 1005 ( Hersant )

, original italics; accord Serri

, supra ,

226 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.)

Sankranthi argues that she made the necessary showing to de monstrate national

origin discrimination based on Hatala’s request that she not nod her head, Hatala’s

comments about her appearance (she looked like she was going to a club and not owning

pants ) , and Hatala’s assertion that she had misrepresented the nature of her medical

education from India

. Sankranthi asserts that Hatala ’s “repeatedly” telling her to “stop

nodding her head,” w as discriminatory “because nodding heads is something Indians are

particularly known to do.” She also as serts that as part of her culture, she generally wears

dresses, and therefore comments about her clothing and appearance and not owning pants

were discriminatory.

These assertions, however, are insufficient to demonstrate pretext. “An issue of

fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by speculation or

conjecture.” ( Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798,

807 ( Horn ) .) Assuming Hatala d id ask Sankranthi not to nod her head, Sankranthi failed

to demonstrate that Hatala did so on the basis of Sankranthi’s national origin. Although

Sankranthi herself interpreted this as a reference to her Indian background, her own

speculation or conjectur e is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact

. ( King v. United

Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 [“[P]laintiff’s subjective beliefs in

an employment discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do

uncorroborated and self

- serving declarations”].)

As for the comments about Sankranthi’s attire, she d id not present evidence that

she wore Indian clothing to work or that she was criticized for wear ing Indian attire.

There wa s evidence that Hatala repeatedly complaine d that Sankranthi dressed

unprofessionally, like she was going to a club , and that Hatala counseled Sankranthi on19

the need to wear clothing that was work appropriate. Nothing in the record support s the

conclusion that the references to the way she dressed related to her Indian origin.

As for the alleged misrepresentation of the nature of her medical degree, Hatala

cited this as one additional ground for her termination in her March 30, 2018, letter

. The

letter referenced only the nature of the degree and did not mention that it was from India.

Sankranthi explained that her medical degree from India was an M.B.B.S., that medical

schools in India do not award M.D. degrees, that the drop

- down list in th e online

application that she used when she applied for the job did not include an M.B.B.S., so she

selected the M.D. option; and that ECH had copies of her degree and certifications.

Nothing in the record suggests that the M.B.B.S. degree is unique to In dia. Given the

evidence that Sankranthi was terminated for repeated performance issues, the fact that the

employer also mentioned alleged misrepresentations regarding the nature of her degree is

not sufficient to demonstrate discrimination based on nation al origin.

Moreover, in our view, assuming as true Hatala’s other statements, this evidence

does not demonstrate a discriminatory animus or motive. While the evidence may have

raised only a weak suspicion of discrimination sufficient to have sustained Sa nkranthi’s

burden of proving a prima facie case, it did not amount to substantial evidence of

discrimination necessary to defeat summary judgment. Indeed, circumstantial evidence

militates against any such inference. “ ‘[W] here the same actor is responsi ble for both

the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a

short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’

[Citation.] ” ( Horn

, supra , 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) If Hata la were biased against

Sankranthi based on her gender or national origin, then presumably she would not have

hired her in the first place

. Although a significant passage of time may attenuate this

“same

- actor presumption” ( id. at p. 810), in this case Hat ala’s concerns about Sankranthi

arose very shortly after she was hired. Thus, the presumption applies with particular

force here because Hatala began documenting the concerns that led to Sankranthi’s20

termination shortly after she hired her. ( West v. Bechtel Corp (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 966,

981.)

Nor is the evidence that Hatala complimented Sankranthi’s work sufficient to

show pretext. It was undisputed that Hatala was dissatisfied with Sankranthi’s work

performance, and that Sankranthi had received oral and written warnings about her job

performance. Hatala also acknowledged providing both positive and negative feedback,

and stated there was a brief period when Sankranthi’s performance improved before it

declined again. In other words, Sankranthi’s evidence in opposition is largely consistent

with ECH’s evidence of poor job performance. Thus, Sankranthi’s evidence of positive

feedback fails to show an inconsistency warranting a presumption of pretext

. Sankranthi also point s to the “substantial evi dence of her good performance,”

ECH’s demand that she create her own PIP in March 2018, and other alleged failures to

follow its own policies regarding discipline, PIP’s, and termination as further evidence of

pretext. To show that an employer ’ s reason fo r termination is pretextual, an employee

“ ‘cannot simply show that the employer ’ s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the

factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not

whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent

, or competent.’ ” ( Hersant

, supra , 57

Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) In our view, these points all go to the question whether ECH

was wi s e or correct or prudent when it disciplined Sankranthi and ultimately terminated

her employment and do not demonstrate unlawful discrimination.

Sankranthi also contends that summary judgment should be reversed based on

“mixed motive.” She acknowledges that the argument was not raised in the trial court but

argues that this court can nonetheless consider the a rgument for the first time on appeal,

citing Husman v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1185. Husman

, however, is inapposite. In that case, the court concluded that the issue was not waived

because the plaintiff had set forth “evidence that discrimination was a substantial

motivating factor for his discharge” and “he provided the trial court with all of the21

elements of a mixed

- motive claim.” ( Id. at pp. 1187

- 1188.) Such is not the case here.

While the evidence in Husman pointed to numerou s decision makers , one of which

clearly “harbored stereotypical views of gay men” ( id. at p. 1191), here Sankranthi can

only point to a single decision maker and weak speculative inferences as to Hatala’s

discriminatory motive. Given that the record lacks a factual basis for a mixed motive

claim, in exercis ing our discretion , we decline to consider this claim for the first time on

appeal.

In a separate section of her brief, Sankranthi argues that there are triable issues as

to sex discrimination. The arguments in this section rely on much of the same evidence

presented in her national origin discrimination and PDL claims. We note that of the five

CDI specialists in her department, two were men and three were women, and that the

ma nagement personnel involved in the decisions to discipline and terminate her (Hatala

and Carson) were both women. Sankranthi does not point to any evidence that she was

treated differently from the men in her department based on sex. Indeed, it appears s he

and C.E. (a male) were treated similarly when they fell behind in their work and were not

assigned new cases to permit them to catch up. And everyone on the staff received the

same e

- mail after they were all late to a meeting. We therefore conclude th at Sankranthi

has not met her burden to demonstrate pretext or discriminatory animus with regard to

her sex discrimination claim.

Sankranthi argues that summary adjudication should not have been granted on her

discrimination claim because ECH’s separate s tatement did not address one of the

theories of liability set forth in her complaint: that she was subject to different terms and

conditions of employment based on her sex and national origin because her work was

subject to a higher level of scrutiny than others in her department. Sankranthi’s

complaint allege d that ECH’s “discrimination took many forms , including but not limited

to being subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and being

terminated

. ” Since ECH’s motion for summary judgm ent assumed that Sankranthi22

suffered an adverse employment action and ECH met its burden of showing that it had

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons supporting its decisions to discipline and terminate

Sankranthi , we perceive no error in failing to addres s the different forms of alleged

adverse employment action separately.

In summary, we conclude that ECH satisfied its burden to show legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason s supporting its decisions to discipline and ultimately terminate

Sankranthi

, and that in response, Sankranthi failed to produce substantial responsive

evidence demonstrating the existence of a material triable controversy as to pretext or
discriminatory animus on the part of ECH, either based on her national origin or that fact

that she is female. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it granted

summary adjudication of Sankranthi’s discrimination claim.

B. PDL Claim

Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred by granting summary adjudication of

her PDL claim because she was terminated after she had already presented a note to HR,

and was already on pregnancy disability leave, as well as the fact that by the time she

requested leave, she was wearing maternity clothes and her pregnancy was visibly

showing.

Ca lifornia ’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) , through the PDL statute

, provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer to refuse to allow

an employee disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition to take a

le ave for a reasonable period of time not to exceed four months and thereafter return to

work.” (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(1).) It is also unlawful for an employer “to

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any r ight

provided under this section.” (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(4).)

Sankranthi’s PDL discrimination claim lacks merit because the hospital decided to

terminate her employment before it knew she was disabled by pregnancy

. ECH

submitted evidence that it decided to terminate Sankranthi’s employment on March 27,23

2018, and entered her termination into the online system on March 2 8 , 2018

. On March

28 , Sankranthi took a day off, went to see her physician

, and was then told to take

pregnancy

- related leave. She first presented the doctor’s note to ECH the following day,

March 29.

Sankranthi challenges this timeline largely by asserting that the evidence

submitted from the online system lacked foundation an d was not properly authenticated

.
Hatala , however, as the person who entered the firing into the online system, had

personal knowledge of the document and the facts contained therein

. “[A] document is

authenticated when sufficient evidence has been produ ced to sustain a finding that the

document is what it purports to be.” ( Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321.)

Here, Hatala declared that she had personal knowledge of the matters contained in her

declaration and that the record of the termina tion was a true and correct copy from the

hospital’s online portal

. Sankranthi’s challenge to the admissibility of ECH’s timeline

evidence is meritless, and that evidence is conclusive with respect to her pregnancy

disability discrimination claim.

Sankr anthi also asserts that her pregnancy was visible prior to her requesting

PDL

. 7 She asserts it is reasonable to presume Hatala knew about her pregnancy based on

her 20

- pound weight gain and because she wore maternity clothes

. “When the pregnancy

is appa rent, or where plaintiff alleges that she has disclosed it to the employer, then a

question of the employer ’ s knowledge would likely preclude summary judgment. If the

pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it to her employer, she

must allege knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie case, evidence from which

7 In her opening brief, S ankranthi challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling excluding her declaration statements that she was visibly pregnant, among other evidentiary objections

. In section E, ante , we conclude that her challenge s to the court’s
various evidentiary rulings are forfeited for failure to provide reasoned argument with citation to authority. However, b ecause Sankra n thi’s declaration statements do not affect
the outcome o f this appeal, here w e assume without deciding, that even if the stateme nts were admissible , Sankra n thi’s pregnancy disability discrimination claim fails.24

a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant.” ( Trop

, supra , 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)

Here, Sankranthi stated in her deposition that she only told the father, F.S. , and her

friend C.E. about her pregnancy, and that they “don’t really disclose personal information

to any others.” Sankranthi confir med she told no one else at the hospital that she was

pregnant prior to requesting pregnancy disability leave. I n addition, Hatala declared that

she was not aware that Sankranthi was pregnant or suffered from any disability when

ECH “finalized the decisio n” to fire her, that Sankranthi had not informed anyone at ECH

that she was pregnant or disabled, and that “no one in management or HR knew that she

was pregnant or disabled until after she submitted her leave request on March 29, 2018. ”

In the absence of any evidence that anyone knew Sankranthi was pregnant, her

speculative assertion that Hatala or HR knew about the pregnancy , when considered with

Hatala’s declaration of no knowledge, is “ ‘ insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact.’ ” ( Tro

p , supra , 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)

Further, even assuming Hatala or management knew Sankranthi was pregnant , it

does not necessarily follow that Hatala or management therefore knew that Sankranthi

would soon be taking pregnancy disability leave , meaning that she would be disabled

based on her pregnancy. Sankranthi cites Trop for the proposition that it may be inferred

that her employer knew about her pregnancy based on her appearance. But Trop

concerned a claim of pregnancy discriminatio n, not a claim based on pregnancy

disability. Whether or not Sankranthi was visibly pregnant is logically irrelevant to her

employer’s knowledge of her pregnancy

- related disability.

For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err when it gran ted summary
adjudication of the PDL claim.

C. Retaliation Claim

Sankranthi argues there are triable issues of fact with respect to her retaliation

claim. In her complaint, s he asserted that she engaged in protected conduct, including25

requesting protected leave time, accommodation for her pregnancy

- related disability, and

otherwise exercising her rights under FEHA. On appeal, she contends that triable issues

remained regarding the disci pline she received after she complained to HR about Hatala’s

conduct toward her. However, these cannot constitute material facts . As framed by the

pleadings (see Juge

, supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 67), Sankranthi’s claim of retaliation

related only to her exercise of her right to pregnancy disability leave and attendant

accommodations , not her complaints to HR about Hatala’s conduct

.
To the extent Sankranthi’s retaliation claim was based on conduct related to her

leave or accommodation request and pregna ncy related disability, we conclude that the

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim. Simply put, because

the hospital established it was unaware of her pregnancy or disability at the time it fired

Sankranthi , it could not have d one so in retaliation for those actions.

D. Failure to Prevent Discrimination

Sankranthi asserts that ECH’s separate statement presented no facts on this issue.

While she concedes a claim for failure to prevent discrimination cannot proceed in the

abs ence of a viable discrimination claim, she argues that if summary adjudication of the

discrimination claim is reversed, this claim should be reversed as well.

Because we find no error in the trial court’s resolution of the discrimination claim,

Sankranthi ’s failure to prevent discrimination claim necessarily fails.

E. Evidentiary Objections

B oth sides filed written objections to the opposing party’s evidence. Sankranthi

also made oral objections at the hearing on the motion. The trial court overruled all of

Sankranthi’s objections, sustained 14 of ECH’s objections

, and overruled ECH’s other

12 objecti ons. On appeal, Sankranthi challenges four of the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings.

According to the weight of authority, appellate courts review a trial court ’ s
evidentiary rulings in a summary judgment proceeding for an abuse of discretion. ( Serri

,26

supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 ; San Francisco Print Media Co. v. The Hearst Corp

. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 952, 962 & fn. 7; but see Reid

, supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 535

[Supreme Court concluded that it need “not decide generally whether a trial court ’ s ruling

on evidentiary objections based on papers alone in summary judgment proceedings are

reviewed for abuse of discretion or reviewed de novo”] & Nazir v. United Air lines, Inc

. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 255, fn. 4 [observing that standard of review is unsettled

and assuming, without deciding, that the abuse of discretion standard applies].) As the

part y challenging the court ’s evidentiary rulings, Sankranthi has th e burden to establish

such an abuse, which we will find only if the trial court ’ s order exceeds the bounds of

reason. ( Serri

, at p. 852.)

Sankranthi challenges the trial court’s order overruling her objection to exhibit J to

Hatala’s declaration, the “p urported computer printout showing the decision to terminate

[Sankranthi] was made prior to the hospital’s knowledge of her pregnancy .

. . .” As we

have discussed the admissibility of this document previously, we will not address it

separately here. San kranthi also challenges the court’s rulings sustaining three of ECH’s

objections to statements in her declaration and excluding those statements

. Sankranthi has failed to establish an abuse of discretion as to any of the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings

. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are presumed correct.

( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “ ‘ To demonstrate error, an
appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and

citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. ’ [Citation.] When a point

is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘ it is deemed to be without

foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court. ’ [Citation.]” ( In r e S.C.

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 ( S.C. ) .)

Here, Sankranthi’s challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are not

supported by any citations to legal authority , and the few citations to the factual record

are threadbare at best. For example, with regard to ECH’s objections Nos. 4 and 16,27

which were based on hearsay

, it is insufficient to argue that the trial court erred in

sustaining these objections without providing any legal analysis or explanation as to why

the statements were not hearsay or why one of the myriad exceptions to the hearsay rule

applies. Without meaningful analysis supported by relevant legal authority, Sankranthi’s

evidentiary arguments have been forfeited. ( S.C.

, supra , 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408 .)

IV. D ISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed._______________________________ Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________ Wilson, J.

______________________________________ Adams, J.*

H049506 Sankranthi v. El Camino Hospital

_____________

____ * Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution