# EUR-Lex - 52012PC0507 - EN

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# 52012PC0507

**Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China /* COM/2012/0507 final - 2012/0241 (NLE) */**

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

Context of the proposal

|| Grounds for and objectives of the proposal This proposal concerns the implementation of a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters (‘the WTO enabling Regulation’). On 28 July 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO ('DSB') adopted the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report as modified by the Appellate Body Report on the case ‘European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China' DS 397 (‘Reports’). The Reports relate to Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China that followed from the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 of 21 December 2005 ('the basic Regulation')

|| General context This proposal is made pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 on the measures that may be taken by the European Union following reports adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters.

|| Existing provisions in the area of the proposal Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China.

|| Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the Union Not applicable.

Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment

|| Consultation of interested parties

|| Interested parties concerned by the implementation have already had the possibility to defend their interests during disclosure, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation.

|| Collection and use of expertise

|| There was no need for external expertise.

|| Impact assessment This proposal is the result of the implementation of a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters (‘the WTO enabling Regulation’). The basic Regulation does not provide for a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed.

Legal elements of the proposal

|| Summary of the proposed action The Council by Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China. Following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body the definitive findings of the original investigation have been reassessed based on information collected in the original investigation and information collected after the publication of the Notice of initiation. The aspects of the definitive Regulation found to be inconsistent by the DSB Reports have been corrected and the proposed actions will put in conformity the Council Regulation No 91/2009 with the DSB recommendations and rulings. It is therefore proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009.

|| Legal basis Article 233 of the Treaty establishing the European Community Council Regulation (EC) No 1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on the measures that may be taken by the Community following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters.

|| Subsidiarity principle The proposal falls under the exclusive competence of the Union. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply.

|| Proportionality principle The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons:

|| The form of action is described in the aforementioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision.

|| Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Community, national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable.

|| Choice of instruments

|| Proposed instruments: regulation.

|| Other means would not be adequate for the following reason(s). The basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options.

Budgetary implication

|| The proposal has no implications for the Union budget.

2012/0241 (NLE)

Proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

amending Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26
January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron
or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
1515/2001 of 23 July 2001 on the measures that may be taken by the Community
following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy matters[1]
(‘the WTO enabling Regulation’), in particular Article 1 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal submitted by
the European Commission after consultation of the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

A. MEASURES IN FORCE

(1)       The Council by Regulation
(EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on
imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic
of China[2] ('the definitive Regulation').

B.
REPORTS ADOPTED BY THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY OF THE WTO

(2)       On 28 July 2011, the
Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') of the World Trade Organization ('WTO') adopted
the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report as modified by the Appellate
Body Report in the dispute ‘European Communities — Definitive Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China'[3] (‘Reports’). In these Reports,
it was found, inter alia, that the EU acted inconsistently with:

–
Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement with respect to Article 9(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European
Community (the EU basic AD Regulation) as applied in the investigation on the
imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic
of China (the fasteners investigation);

–
Articles 6.4, 6.2 and 2.4 of the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to certain aspects of the dumping determination
in the fasteners investigation;

–
Article 4.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement
with respect to the definition of the Union industry in the fasteners
investigation;

–
Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement with respect to the consideration of the volume of dumped imports in
the fasteners investigation;

–
Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the of the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the causation analysis in the fasteners
investigation; and

–
Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement with respect to the treatment of confidential information in the
fasteners investigation.

C. PROCEDURE

(3)       On 6 March 2012, pursuant
to the WTO enabling Regulation, a review was initiated by the publication of a
Notice[4]
in the Official Journal of the European Union ('the Notice of Initiation'). The
European Commission informed parties to the investigation which led to
Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 ("the original investigation") of the
review and of the manner in which the findings of the Reports in regard to the
definitive Regulation was intended to be taken into account.

D.
PRODUCT CONCERNED

(4)       The product concerned is
certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood
screws (excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts
with heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws
turned from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank
thickness not exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway
track construction material), and washers, originating in the People's Republic
of China (referred to as 'fasteners' or 'product concerned').

(5)       The product concerned is
currently falling within CN codes 7318 12 90, 7318 14 91, 7318 14 99, 7318 15
59, 7318 15 69, 7318 15 81, 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex
7318 22 00.

(6)       The Reports do not affect
the findings set out in Recitals (40) to (57) of the definitive Regulation
concerning the product concerned and the like product.

E.
REVISED FINDINGS BASED ON THE REPORTS

(7)       As indicated in the Notice
of Initiation, the Commission reassessed the definitive findings of the
original investigation by taking account of the recommendations and rulings of
the DSB. This reassessment was based on information collected in the original
investigation and information collected after the publication of the Notice.

(8)       The original investigation
of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 October 2006 to 30 September
2007 ('investigation period' or 'IP'). With respect to the parameters relevant
in the context of the injury assessment, data covering the period from 1
January 2003 to the end of the investigation period were analysed ('period
considered').

(9)       This Regulation seeks to
correct the aspects of the definitive Regulation found to be inconsistent by
the DSB in the Reports it adopted and bring into conformity the definitive
Regulation with the DSB recommendations and rulings.

1.           Individual Treatment:
application of Article 9(5) in the definitive Regulation

(10)     This section sets out the
reassessed findings of the original investigation regarding the following
recommendations and rulings of the Reports that the EU acted inconsistently
with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to
Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation as applied in the fasteners original
investigation.

(11)     As
mentioned in recitals (81) and (84) of the definitive Regulation, all of the
five sampled exporting producers as well as three individually examined exporting
producers which claimed individual treatment ("IT") were found to
meet all the requirements to be granted IT in accordance with Article 9(5) of
the basic Regulation. As stated in recitals (62)
and (78) of the definitive Regulation, four exporting producers originally part
of the sample, as well as one company granted individual examination were
considered as non-cooperating companies, since they submitted information not
consistent with the evidence in the course of the investigation.

(12)     In the light of the
recommendations regarding Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation contained in the
Reports, the Commission invited exporting producers in the People's Republic of
China to come forward and provide the
necessary information to review their current situation if their exports to the
European Union are currently subject to the anti-dumping measures in force on
imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic
of China; and they considered themselves to have been
discouraged from cooperating and requesting IT in the original investigation
because of the administrative burden entailed by, or because they considered
that they did not meet all the criteria in, Article 9(5) of the basic
Regulation.

(13)     The Commission invited
those producers to declare whether they considered themselves to have been
discouraged from cooperating and requesting IT in the original investigation
because of the administrative burden entailed by, or because they considered
that they did not meet all the criteria in Article 9(5) of the basic
Regulation. Those interested parties were invited to come forward within 30
days following the publication of the Notice of Initiation and to provide the
following two elements of information:

–
whether they considered themselves to have been
discouraged from cooperating and requesting IT at the time of the initiation of
the initial investigation; and

–
provide information on export quantities to the
European Union and export prices covering the IP used in the original investigation

(14)     Some exporting producers in
the PRC expressed concerns regarding the implementing procedure of the DSB
Reports laid down in the Notice of Initiation. They underlined in particular
that they considered the deadlines published to be too short. They claimed that
an undue administrative burden had been placed on exporting producers, having a
dissuasive effect and preventing them from receiving individual treatment.

(15)     The
concern expressed by those exporting producers was considered to be not founded.
The Commission considered this deadline appropriate in view of the
administrative burden and the small amount of information requested. The Notice of Initiation explained that
a review of the current situation of an exporting producer would be considered
once an application was received including the following information:

–
a simple statement that the exporting producer
considers to have been discouraged and therefore had not cooperated and
requested IT; and

–
very basic figures showing that it exported the
product concerned to the EU during the original investigation period.

(16)     The sole purpose of
requesting this information was to allow the Commission to identify those
exporting producers that would have been in a position to cooperate and request
IT during the original investigation but considered themselves to have been
discouraged from doing so. A deadline of 30 days was considered to be
appropriate to reply to a request for a simple statement and very basic figures
and cannot be regarded as imposing a disproportionate administrative burden.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and a Chinese exporting producer argued that by
requesting the information mentioned in recital (15) above, the Commission
imposed conditions on Chinese exporting producers, although IT should be
granted as rule pursuant to Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement. This approach was contrary to the recommendations of the DSB reports
and these parties invited the Commission to contact Chinese exporting producers
ex officio and indicate they will be granted IT. In this respect, the
Commission considers that, by publishing the Notice of Initiation which was
sent to all known Chinese exporting producers and their trade association and
national authorities, the Commission has contacted all Chinese exporting
producers inviting them to come forward within 30 days, should they have
exported during the original investigation period and not made themselves known
during the original investigation. This latter question should not be
considered as a "condition" in the sense of a "test" as
presented by the said parties, but rather as a statement of fact showing that
they were actually concerned by the original investigation. Finally, it should
be noted that questions related to exported products are requested for the
purpose of verifying whether the sample originally chose needed to be amended
and are not related to the issue of IT. This claim was therefore rejected.

(17)     Of the 15 companies that
came forward following the publication of the Notice of Initiation and made
enquiries within the deadline:

–
Ten companies were exporting producers that had
already come forward and cooperated with the original investigation. This
showed that they had not been discouraged from cooperating and requesting IT in
the original investigation and their situation could therefore not be
re-examined in the context of the current review; One of these ten companies
which requested a review of its current duties was invited to submit a review
request to the Commission pursuant to Article 11.3 of the basic regulation;

–
One company was a new exporting producer (i.e.
it had not exported to the EU during the original investigation). This company
was therefore not in a position to cooperate and request IT in the original
investigation for that reason. It was informed of the procedures for claiming
New Exporting Producer Treatment pursuant to Article 2 of the definitive
Regulation;

–
Two were considered not to be exporting
producers but trading companies so they were informed that they were not
concerned by this review;

–
Two exporting producers stated that they
complied with the criteria and requested that their situation be examined.
However, one of these companies subsequently withdrew its application.

(18)     The companies having made
enquiries were given the opportunity to comment on the information provided to
them.

(19)     The exporting producer
stating that it complied with the criteria and requesting that its situation be
examined was found to fall within the criteria laid down in point 1 of the
Notice of Initiation. This exporting producer also requested individual
examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation claiming that if it
would not have been discouraged from cooperating during the original
investigation it would have requested such treatment. Taking into account that
during the original investigation, all of the exporting producers who had made
such a request were individually examined, for reasons of equal treatment, its
request was accepted.

(20)     A Notice was published on 6
June 2012[5]
announcing the review of the current situation for this exporting producer,
Bulten Fasteners (China) Co., Ltd ('BFC'). The exported quantities of this
exporting producer during the IP amounted to less than 0.4% of the total
exports from the PRC during the IP. In view of this, the Commission considered
that there was no need to modify the original sample of exporting producers. A
questionnaire was sent to the exporting producer in the PRC and its related
companies in the EU involved in the resale of the product concerned during the
original IP.

(21)     The Commission sought and
verified all the information deemed necessary for a determination of dumping
and carried out verifications at the premises of the following related companies:

–
Bulten Sweden AB, Göteborg, Sweden

–
Bulten GMBH, Bergkamen, Germany

(22)     The Commission concluded
that BFC should be granted IT in accordance with the recommendations concerning
Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation in the DSB reports.

2.           Certain aspect of the
dumping determination in the fasteners investigations

(23)     This section sets out the
reassessed findings of the original investigation regarding the following
recommendations and rulings of the Reports that the EU acted inconsistently
with Articles 6.4, 6.2 and 2.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect
to certain aspects of the dumping determination in the fasteners original
investigation.

(24)     In the context of the open
dialogue held with some Chinese exporting producers and the Chamber of
Commerce, more detailed information regarding the product characteristics of
the products sold by the Indian cooperating producer was provided to the
parties in order to address the recommendations of the WTO DSB regarding
Articles 6.4, 6.2 and 2.4 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, as mentioned from
recitals (28) until (53) above. This information covered in particular the
product characteristics which were found to be pertinent in the determination
of the normal value and that were used in the comparison with the product
concerned, i.e. the fact that the Indian domestic sales have been divided into
'standard' sales and 'special' sales and the strength class of each transaction
has been identified. A normal value per kg was then calculated for each strength
class as identified in the PCN table.

(25)     The Commission concentrated
on two crucial elements of comparison, namely strength class and standard
versus special fasteners, as indicated in recitals (48) to (50) of the
definitive Regulation. The distinction between special vs. standard was added
as a new element of comparison during the investigation and the strength class
was used as the other main comparison criterion as submitted by most of the
Chinese exporting producers themselves during the original investigation.

(26)     As mentioned in recital
(56) of the definitive Regulation, standard fasteners produced in the analogue
country could be compared with the fasteners exported to the EU by the sampled
PRC producers as they were found to have the same basic physical and technical
characteristics as products exported from the PRC.

(27)     The normal value was
expressed ex-works, adjusted to take account of the price effect of the quality
control step performed by the Indian producer which was not performed in China. The result was therefore two lists of normal values in Chinese Yuan (CNY) per kg by
strength class, one for standard fasteners and one for special fasteners.

2.1.        Information
disclosure note of 30 May 2012

(28)     On
30 May 2012 additional information was disclosed to all interested parties
regarding the product types used for the purposes of comparing normal value and
export price. As stated in the Notice of Initiation, more precise information
regarding the product characteristics which were found to be pertinent in the
determination of the normal value was provided to all interested parties.

(29)     The content of the
information disclosure note related to the normal value which was determined
based on the prices of the product concerned sold on the domestic market by the
Indian cooperating producer. According to Article 2(7)(a) of the basic
Regulation, normal value for the exporting producers not granted MET had to be
established on the basis of the prices or constructed value in an analogue
country. Two Indian producers agreed to cooperate by replying to a
questionnaire. The data submitted in their questionnaire replies were verified
at the premises of these two companies. However, only one of the companies
provided sufficiently detailed data to be used as a basis for establishing
normal value.

(30)     As mentioned in recital
(90) of the definitive Regulation, "a number of importers and exporters
questioned the appropriateness of using the data from the latter Indian
producer on the grounds that i) the quantity produced and sold in the Indian
domestic market by this producer would allegedly not be representative of the
quantity exported from the PRC to the Community and ii) this Indian producer
has alleged commercial links with one of the Community producers supporting the
complaint. In this respect, it should be noted that i) the sales volume of the
Indian producer were considered sufficiently representative to allow for the
establishment of reliable normal ,values and ii) the fact that the analogue
country producer has links to a Community producer supporting the complaint
does not make the choice of that analogue country unreasonable. It was also
noted that these links were established after the IP. Given the above and the
absence of cooperation from other third country producers, the choice of India as analogue country was considered reasonable".

(31)     Given
the conditions of competition and openness of the Indian market, and the fact
that the cooperating Indian producer sold product types comparable to those
exported by the PRC exporting producers, it was concluded that India was a suitable market economy third country
within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation.

(32)     The
information disclosure note stated that the data regarding domestic sales
covered the investigation period but without the Product Control Number
('PCN'). The Indian producer, however, was able to identify the strength class
of the fastener sold, and also whether that fastener was 'standard' or
'special' as defined in the definitive Regulation. The need to distinguish
between standard and special fasteners had not been identified at the start of
the investigation when the PCN had been created.

(33)     However, the Commission
noted that this distinction affected price comparability and therefore this
data was requested from the Indian producer and was provided. Indian domestic
sales were therefore divided into 'standard' sales and 'special' sales and then
the strength class of each transaction was identified. A normal value per kg was
calculated for each strength class as originally identified in the PCN table.

(34)     The
remaining characteristics of the original PCN were not used, not only because
the Indian producer was not able to provide the data at this level of detail,
but also for the following reasons:

–
Diameter and length were not considered relevant
because the analysis was performed on the basis of weight, thus automatically
taking into account any differences resulting from different diameter or length
of the fastener.

–
There was no indication that there were any
differences in terms of chrome on coating or coating in general - in essence an
indicator of galvanisation - between the Indian producer’s products and Chinese
fasteners.

–
In respect of the only other remaining PCN element,
the CN code, it was considered that it would not be a reliable indicator since
the Chinese or Indian authorities do not distinguish between the 10 CN codes
used to define the product concerned as do the EU authorities.

(35)     The Commission therefore concentrated
on two crucial differences between products: strength class, on the one hand;
and standard v. special fasteners, which is an indicator of customer
differences and quality differences, on the other hand.

(36)     The normal value was
expressed ex-works, minus an adjustment to remove the price effect of the
quality control performed by the Indian producer which was not performed in China. The result was therefore two lists of normal values in Chinese Yuan (CNY) per kg by
strength class, one for standard fasteners and one for special fasteners.

(37)     The Commission informed all
interested parties that the normal value could not be disclosed as it concerns
the confidential price of a single Indian producer on the domestic market.
However, interested parties were informed that the 'standard' normal value for
a 8.8 strength class fastener ('G' in the PCN table), which is a standard type
commonly exported by Chinese producers, was calculated in the range of 9 to 12
CNY per kg ex-works.

2.2.        Comments received to the
information disclosure note of 30 May 2012

(38)     One importer and four
exporting producers alleged that the time given to parties to comment on the
additional information (10 days) was too short. However, the Commission
considers that the above mentioned time limit was appropriate, given that the
information provided was only a supplement to that already disclosed in the
definitive Regulation, at the end of the original investigation. The time
granted to examine and comment on this additional information was therefore
considered reasonable.

(39)     Some parties alleged that
the Commission had stated that it did not have any new information regarding
the physical characteristics other than strength class of the products used for
the determination of the normal value. That claim should be rejected. At that
stage of the review, the Commission was merely providing additional
clarification about how normal value had been established in the original
investigation. It is important to emphasise that "strength" had been
identified as one of the relevant characteristics by the Chinese exporting
producers. However, this did not imply that the Commission did not have any
information regarding other physical characteristics.

(40)     The
same parties claimed that the Commission stated, during hearings, in regard to
possible adjustments to be made for the purpose of comparison between export
prices and the normal value that a preference would be given for adjusting on
the basis of a price analysis rather than a cost analysis. In fact the
Commission clarified that according to Article 2(10) of the Basic Regulation, a
comparison should be made with due account taken of differences which affect
price comparability and not to cost differences.

(41)     Subsequently,
these parties repeated their claim that adjustments should be made to take into
account the differences in cost of production such as differences in efficiency
of consumption of the raw material; differences in wire rod consumption; in
electricity consumption, in self-generated electricity, in productivity per
employee, in reasonable profit level and in differences related to tooling. As
stated above, Article 2(10) of the Basic Regulation is referring to price and
not cost. There was no evidence adduced by these parties that the alleged
differences in cost translated into differences in prices. In investigations
concerning economies in transition such as China, an analogue country is used when warranted
to prevent account being taken of prices and costs in non-market economy
countries which are not the normal result of market forces. Thus, for the
purpose of establishing the normal value, a surrogate of the costs and prices
of producers in functioning market economies is used. Therefore, these claims
for adjustments taking into account the differences in cost of production are
rejected.

(42)     These
parties further argued that the additional information provided on 30 May 2012
regarding the characteristics of the products sold by the Indian producer was
incomplete insofar as information regarding the following issues was allegedly
missing: differences related to type of fastener; coating and use of chrome;
diameter and length; traceability; ISO 9000; unit of defective rate; and other
aspects of hardness, bending, strength, impact toughness and other friction
coefficients. They sought clarification regarding the reasons why the remaining
characteristics of the original PCN were not deemed relevant. These issues were explained in two information disclosure notes
respectively sent on 5 July and put in the file for inspection by interested
parties on 11 July 2012.

2.3.        Information
disclosure note of 5 July 2012

(43)     Following the request of
additional information made by the parties as mentioned in recital (42) above,
a second information disclosure note was sent to all interested parties on 5
July 2012. In this note, the following additional information was provided:

–
A table showing the ranges of the price levels
of the normal values calculated by strength class for standard fasteners sold
on the Indian domestic market, to independent customers, by the sole Indian
cooperating producer. It was also specified that the vast majority of exports
by the Chinese producers fall under strength class G;

–
An in-depth analysis of the data in India showed that standard fasteners sold on the domestic market were electroplated corresponding
to the PCN Code "A". Therefore, the Commission proposed to compare
the normal value with coating type A for exported models.

–
Following a manual analysis of the Indian
domestic price data, information on diameter and length were extracted from the
text string of sales coding used by the Indian producer. To allow for a
comparison with the exports of the Chinese companies, this data was summarised
into ranges to distinguish between the main product dimensions:

Indicator || Diameter || Length

Small || M4 to M10 || 0 to 100 mm

Medium || M12 to M20 || 100 to 200 mm

Large || M22 to M30 || 200 to 300 mm

–
The Commission therefore proposed to use this
data to further refine the normal value and calculate dumping margins on this
basis. Where exported fasteners did not fall into these ranges they would not
be used in the dumping calculation. This affected only a very small amount of
exports.

–
The Commission provided for reference the
proposed revised PCN:

Indicator || Description || PCN

Standard/Special || Standard fastener || S

|| Special fastener || P

Strength class || 3.6 || A

|| 4.6 || B

|| 4.8 || C

|| 5.6 || D

|| 5.8 || E

|| 6.8 || F

|| 8.8 || G

|| 9.8 || H

|| 10.9 || I

|| 12.9 || J

Coating || Electroplated coating || A

Diameter || M4 to M10 || S

|| M12 to M20 || M

|| M22 to M30 || L

Length || 0 to 100 mm || S

|| 101 to 200 mm || M

|| 201 to 300 mm || L

–
The Commission provided an overview of the
dumping margins modified as per the proposal listed in the information
disclosure note, noting that these revised anti-dumping margins would not be
automatically the anti-dumping duties, which would be subject to the lesser
duty rule.

–
Finally, new Tables 22, 23, 32, 33 and 34 of one
EU producer were provided in reply to the comments made by some interested
parties that the additional information provided with the information
disclosure note of 30 May 2012 was incomplete, insofar as some elements in
those Tables were missing or not properly summarised.

2.4.        Comments to the information
disclosure note of 5 July 2012

(44)     Some parties requested
additional information on the price level of the normal value. As mentioned in
recital (82) below, the price level could not be disclosed to interested
parties as it is confidential information concerning the prices of a single
analogue producer. However, a non-confidential version of the
normal value by strength class for standard fasteners was disclosed on 5 July
2012 to those Chinese exporting producers who requested such further
information and was also placed in the file for inspection by interested parties.
In this note, the Commission provided a table showing the ranges of the price
levels of the normal values calculated by strength class for standard fasteners
sold on the Indian domestic market, to independent customers, by the sole
Indian cooperating producer.

(45)     Some parties also argued
that the Commission informed them during a hearing held on 26 June 2012 that
the Indian domestic sales were of two types of coating "A" and
"B" according to the PCN table used in the original investigation. This
allegation is not founded. The Commission informed the said parties that at
that stage of the review it was examining the types of coating used by the
Indian producer on standard fasteners. During a subsequent hearing held on 3
July 2012 and by means of an information note placed on 11 July 2012 in the
file for inspection by interested parties, all parties were informed that the
Indian producer was using coating "A" for the production of standard
fasteners.

(46)     During a hearing held on 11
July 2012, the same parties asked the Commission to explain how the split of
the normal value between special and standard fasteners by the Indian producer
had been carried out. The Commission indicated that it had been done on the
basis of the names of the customers. However, as evidenced by the minutes
produced by the Hearing Officer for DG Trade, the Commission stated before the
end of the hearing that it would have to clarify this issue, which it did in a
further note for information of 13 July 2012 that was sent to the parties which
participated in the hearing and was placed in the non confidential file for
consultation by all interested parties. The statement made by the said parties
according to which the Commission stated that "the split of the normal
value between special and standard fasteners was carried out inter alia on the
basis of the names of the customers" is therefore incomplete as more
information regarding this issue has been provided as mentioned in the recital
below.

(47)     On
the difference between standard and special fasteners, the Commission's note of
13 July 2012 explained that "it cannot be excluded that the automotive
industry also uses standard fasteners for certain applications". Some
parties argued that the Commission considered that automotive fasteners could
also have been regarded as standard. Such allegation is unfounded. As is
clearly explained in that note, the Commission's statement was made in the
absence of a customer list from the Indian producer. However, as established in
the original investigation and further explained in recital 2.7 below, for
quality and commercial reasons, automotive producers always order fasteners
which are custom designed in order to comply with that industry's ISO
requirements. Therefore, all fasteners destined for the automotive sector that
are considered as "special" products by fasteners producers,
including in India, according to information found on the websites of Indian
automotive manufacturers. Since the Indian producer clearly defined as "special
fasteners" all parts manufactured to a custom design, the Commission
considers that standard fasteners destined to the automotive industry were not
included in the list of standard fasteners provided during the original
investigation.

(48)     The Chinese Chamber of Commerce
and a Chinese exporting producer made similar claims as above regarding the
possible inclusion of fasteners destined to the automotive sector in the normal
value and, in addition, alleged that automotive fasteners which are not made
according to a specific customer design still have to go through a special
quality control or have to respect traceability requirements making them more
expensive and should normally be considered as special fasteners. They claimed
that the Commission's findings according to which fasteners used for high-end
applications but not manufactured according to user's drawings had nevertheless
been considered as special fasteners were baseless, and thereby the Commission
acted inconsistently with Article 2.10 of the basic Regulation by breaching the
principle of a fair comparison. Furthermore, they considered that the
Commission’s findings based on the split made by the Indian producer had not
been subject to an on-spot verification visit. In the light of the above, they
requested the Commission to review the distinction between standard and special
fasteners and if not possible, to revert to a different normal value data set.

(49)     The
reasoning of the Commission regarding the distinction between standard and
special fasteners is already addressed in recital (47) above. With regard to
the claim concerning the absence of verification of the split made by the
Indian producer, the Commission verified the sales listing through a number of
"walk-through" tests (i.e. in-depth verification of a sample of sales
transactions included in the sales listing in order to verify its accuracy) as
per standard verification practices. In addition, the subsequent split of that
sales listing provided by the Indian producer was checked against an average
price level of the split as explained in the said note. Therefore, the
allegation that the Commission took at face value the data provided by the
Indian producer is not founded.

(50)     In addition, the criteria
used by the Indian producer to define special fasteners, i.e. according to
customer drawing as mentioned in recital (47) above, provides sufficient
assurance of the reliability of the data. In the original investigation the
Commission already made an adjustment to the normal value to take into account
quality control steps applied by the Indian producer which were not found for
Chinese sampled producers. Under these circumstances, the Commission does not
consider it necessary to resort to another normal value data set as suggested
by the parties concerned. Finally, as mentioned in recital (89) of the
definitive Regulation despite the efforts of the Commission no other producers
from any possible analogue country offered to cooperate in the proceeding.

(51)     Regarding the use of the
data of the Indian analogue country producer for the determination of the
normal value, the Association of European Distributors (EFDA) claimed that such
technique was not appropriate given that its product range, production volume,
customer profile, distribution method and market position were not comparable
to the situation of the Chinese exporting producers. In addition, it claimed
that the Chinese prices were low because they reflected the benefits of high
volume production of standard products since they are specialised and efficient
producers. Moreover, it requested more detailed information regarding the
Indian producer's prices and production volume of standard fasteners. Finally,
EFDA submitted Eurostat data to support their allegations that a comparison
regarding export prices from the PRC and India for two specific CN codes would
show that the Indian exports of these products were less than 4% of the PRC
exports and that India was not a credible supplier of these products for export
markets.

(52)     As regards the appropriateness
of the choice of the Indian analogue country producer, reference is made to the
last part of recital (49) above. In relation to the general claim that Chinese
export prices reflected the benefits of high volume production, these claims
were not substantiated or quantified in a meaningful manner that could assist
in the analysis being carried out at that stage of the review. As regards the
request for additional information regarding the Indian producer's data,
reference is made to the recital (82) regarding confidentiality. With regard to
the claim that the exports from India were not comparable to those from the PRC
during the IP and after the IP, for the determination of the normal value, it
is the Indian domestic prices which are considered to be relevant according to
the basic Regulation and not the Indian export prices. Therefore, these claims
from EFDA were unfounded.

(53)     Regarding
the issue of the coating applied by the Indian producer, the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and a Chinese exporting producer expressed doubts and requested the
Commission to explain how the confidential information offered conclusive proof
that the Indian producer only sold electro-plated fasteners on its domestic
market. During the verification, the Indian producer provided evidence that
allowed the Commission to conclude that standard fasteners sold domestically
were electroplated, corresponding to the coating type "A" of the
original PCN. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the
evidence in the file is sufficient to conclude that standard fasteners sold on
the domestic market were electroplated. In this respect, an adjustment was made
for difference in chrome, as mentioned in recital (81) below.

2.5.        Further information
requested after the information disclosure note of 5 July 2012

(54)     Some
exporting producers requested further clarifications and information in order
to be able to make a possible request for adjustments to their own dumping
margin as established in the original investigation, based on the following
considerations:

(a)
characteristics of the "product types"
used (CN codes, strength class, standard vs special parts) for the
determination of the normal value;

(b)
further information regarding characteristics of
the products sold by the Indian producer used for the determination of the
normal value;

(c)
clarification regarding the reasons why the
remaining characteristics of the original PCN were not used; and

(d)
adjustments to be made for difference in
physical characteristics.

(55)     Regarding point a) above,
as mentioned in the information note provided on 30 May 2012, the strength
class of the fasteners sold by the Indian cooperating producer was the
indicator of strength contained in the PCN used in the questionnaire sent to
all parties. The strength class was identified by using the same relevant
element of the PCN by the Indian producer on the sales listings verified during
the on-spot verification visit.

(56)     The distinction between
special and standard fasteners was explained in recital (54) of the definitive
Regulation. 'Special' fasteners are those manufactured to a customer drawing.
'Standard' fasteners are those manufactured for stock and not to the
specifications of a particular customer. The need to differentiate between
standard and special fasteners produced by the Indian cooperating producer had
been fully recognised and as mentioned in recitals (51) and (54) of the
definitive Regulation, the comparison between the export price and the normal
value for the sampled Chinese exporting producers was made between fasteners of
the "standard" type.

(57)     With regard to issues
raised under point b), for confidentiality reasons, it is not possible to
disclose the exact types of model of screws and bolts sold by the Indian
producer. However, as indicated above, the comparison was made on a weight
basis within the same category standard or special and within the same strength
class set out in the PCN.

(58)     Again in regard to issues
raised under point b), several interested parties requested more information on
coating. The original investigation data was further analysed and this showed
that the product sold as 'standard' on the Indian domestic market had a basic
coating i.e. electroplating. This information was provided in hearings
requested by interested parties and was redisclosed to the interested parties
that had requested this information and was also placed in the file for
inspection by interested parties.

(59)     Two sampled exporting
producers requested more information regarding adjustments for the use of
chrome in coating. The sales data provided by the Indian cooperating producer
were further analysed which led to an adjustment in the normal value for
difference in chrome as explained in recital (81) below. The same two exporting
producers requested more clarification as to how the profitability was
determined for the domestic sales of the Indian cooperating producer; whether
the production costs had been reported on a PCN basis or whether average costs
had been used; and whether the normal value included sales to any related
companies.

(60)     All relevant information
regarding the normal value were mentioned in Recital (94) of the definitive
Regulation. It is also specified that only domestic sales to unrelated
companies were used.

(61)     These two exporting
producers later argued that they had serious doubts about whether the
profitability and the representativity tests were carried out in a correct way.
More specifically with regard to the representativity test, these exporting
producers doubted that the quantities of the domestic sales of the Indian
producer were above 5% of their export sales per the revised product groups. In
regard to the representativity test it was found that in cases where the 5%
test was not met for a particular product type, domestic sales were nonetheless
found to be of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper comparison. With
regard to the profitability test, it is confirmed that this was carried out on
a product type basis.

(62)     With regard to the issues
raised under point c) above i.e. why the full PCN was not used to compare
normal value to export price, it became clear during the investigation that the
full PCN would not be a reliable indicator. Firstly, because neither the
Chinese nor the Indian authorities distinguish between the 10 CN codes used to
define the product concerned as do the EU authorities. Secondly, as explained
in recital (48) of the definitive Regulation, a number of parties claimed that
fasteners produced by the Chinese exporting producers were standard products
(mainly ranging between 4.8 and 8.8 class of resistance), which had no special
characteristics regarding raw material, resistance, coating, or
certification/safety related aspects; which were destined for lower-end
applications (non professional use and general distribution) as opposed to
high-end applications; and did not meet strict requirements of specific
end-users such as the automotive, chemical or aerospace industry.

(63)     With
regard to the issues raised under point d) above, elements of "traceability",
ISO standard 9000, unit of defective rate and other criteria such as
"hardness, bending, strength, impact toughness, friction coefficient"
which were raised by two other exporting producers could not be accepted, as
the companies concerned have not shown how these elements affect the price
comparability between the normal value and export price.

(64)     In the absence of any
specific information with regard to the lack of comparability as claimed in
addition to the recommendations which had been made by the interested parties
in the original investigation, and given the limited amount of further
information available regarding other technical characteristics such as
coating, it was concluded in the original investigation that the main factors
and differences highlighted by the interested parties themselves, in particular
standard vs special and strength class constituted a sufficient basis on which
to base the comparison between the normal value and export prices.

2.6.        Further disclosure of
information concerning the normal value on 11 July 2012

(65)     On 11 July 2012 the
Commission further disclosed the reclassification of the normal value as
described above and its proposed recalculation of the dumping margins on the
basis explained above and requested comments.

(66)     As mentioned in recital (32)
above, the Indian producer provided in its original submission a domestic sales
listing ('DMSAL'), without PCNs. The only identifier of each sale was an Item
Code, which was an internal code for each product, and a product description
text string, for example:

M8X1.25X16 FLANGE SCREW

(67)     As explained in recitals
(48) to (57) of the definitive Regulation, the Indian company provided a split
of its domestic sales between standard and special fasteners using the
distinction mentioned in recital (77). As a result the DMSAL was submitted as
two files, 'Standard DMSAL' and 'Special DMSAL'. Those sales that could not be
identified as either Standard or Special were excluded from further calculation
of the normal value.

(68)     During the investigation it
also became clear that the strength class of the fastener would be needed to
establish the normal value. The Indian company identified the strength class
per line of the 'Standard DMSAL' and 'Special DMSAL' files and these were
submitted with a column labelled 'Grade' with the strength class indicated, for
example:

DESCRIPTION || GRADE

M8X1.25X16 FLANGE SCREW || 8.8

(69)     The original normal value
was calculated on this basis, using the split into standard/special and the strength
class, as set out in the first disclosure of the implementation review on 30
May 2012.

(70)     As
mentioned in recital (54), some exporting producers requested further
clarifications making reference to the lack of comparison on the basis of
coating, diameter and length of the fastener and argued that this might have an
effect on the level of the normal value originally calculated.

(71)     In the absence of the PCN,
the description text string of each transaction (after grouping together
transactions with the same description text) was analysed to extract the
diameter and length of the fastener sold. Taking the example above, M8 =
diameter, and 16 = length. In this case therefore, this describes a screw with
a diameter of 8mm and a length of 16mm. The 1.25 refers to the thread pitch,
which was not used to classify the product concerned.

(72)     The PCN used by the Chinese
exporting producers reports this data slightly differently. The screw above
would have reported '080016' for diameter and length.

(73)     To ensure matching between
the normal value and the export price, the Commission ranged the diameter and
length into three equal bands, as set out in the second disclosure letter of 5
July 2012:

Indicator || Diameter || Length

Small || M4 to M10 || 0 to 100 mm

Medium || M12 to M20 || 100 to 200 mm

Large || M22 to M30 || 200 to 300 mm

(74)     A small number of sales of
the Indian producer fell outside these ranges and were not used to calculate
the normal value. The screw described above would therefore be reported with
the revised PCN 'GSS' = strength class 8.8; small diameter; small length.

(75)     It was clear from the
example above that the product description text string does not include any
information on the coating used by the Indian domestic producer. The
investigation file was therefore checked for any evidence of the type of
coating, if any, used by the Indian producer for their sales of standard
fasteners on their domestic market. Confidential evidence in the file, verified
at the premises of the Indian producer, showed the use of electroplating (PCN
type A) on standard fasteners on the domestic market and this was disclosed to
all parties on 5 July 2012.

2.7.        Comments
to the information disclosure note of 11 July 2012

(76)     Several exporting producers
responded to the above disclosure. As requested by those exporting producers, a
hearing, chaired by the Hearing Officer for DG Trade, was held to continue the
dialogue with the Commission and discuss the points raised by them. In
particular the exporting producers raised the following issues:

(a)
The methodology by which the Indian producer had
split its domestic sales into standard and special;

(b)
In the event that some fasteners sold to the
automotive industry were considered as standard fasteners, an "important
adjustment" would be warranted;

(c)
Adjustments to the normal value under Article
2(10)(b) for the indirect taxes incurred on the import of wire rod into India;

(d)
The presence of Chrome VI in the coating of the
standard fasteners;

(e)
The methodology followed by the Commission where
there was no matching domestic sale for a particular export transaction; and

(f)
Disclosure of the product codes of the Indian
producer’s domestic sales

(77)     In
regard to point (a) above, the Indian producer split its domestic sales into
standard and special by considering that fasteners manufactured to a customer
drawing were special fasteners, whilst other sales are standard fasteners, i.e.
not made to any specific or customer drawing.

(78)     In
regard to point (b) above and as mentioned in a note for the file dated 13 July
2012 sent to the said interested parties following the hearing held on 11 July,
the Commission confirmed that in the absence of the customer names as mentioned
above, the Commission refers to recital (47) above. In addition, the Commission
notes that, according to the European association of fastener producers, "in
Europe, when a Customer - particularly in the Automotive Sector - does order a
fastener product manufactured in accordance with a drawing, but which is as
well fully in accordance with international standards (ISO, EN, DIN, AFNOR,
UNI), this product is in any case considered by the Fasteners Producer as
"special" product and consequently identified - within the internal
classification of the Company - as "special ... this is the
"modus operandi" of all of Fasteners Producers worldwide and also in
India". The Commission is thus confident that standard fasteners
destined to the automotive industry were not included in the list of standard
fasteners provided during the original investigation findings. Therefore, this
claim was rejected.

(79)     In
regard to point (c) above, in a hearing, exporting producers raised the issue
of an adjustment under Article 2(10)(b) of the basic Regulation, to take
account of the duties on importation of wire rod into India which are included
in the normal value, but not on the export price from China. Chinese sampled
companies during the original investigation purchased wire rod manufactured in China.

(80)     The
raw material imported by the Indian producer was subject to the basic customs
duty (5% of assessable value) and the Customs Education Cess (3% of the basic
customs duty value plus the CVD amount). However, according to Article 2(10)(b)
of the basic Regulation, such an adjustment for indirect taxes is claimable if the
import charges borne by the like product and by material physically
incorporated therein, when intended for consumption on the domestic market
would not be collected or would be refunded when the like product is exported
to the European Union. In the absence of a claim and evidence that exports from
the above-mentioned exporting producers to the EU would benefit from a
non-collection or refund of import charges on imports of raw materials (wire
rod), the claim must be rejected. Furthermore, such an adjustment is not
normally available when the exporting producer concerned, as is the case in
this review, sources all its raw materials from domestic suppliers incurring
therefore no import charge.

(81)     In
regard to point (d) above, evidence on the original investigation file showed
that the standard coating on the standard fasteners sold on the Indian domestic
market contained Chrome Cr3, and therefore this matched to the PCN definition
of no Chrome VI added to the coating. Dumping margins were therefore recalculated
taking the most expensive chrome coating type on the export side, without an
export price adjustment. Two exporting producers argued that the information on
coating concerned the present situation rather than the situation in the IP.
This is incorrect. Verified evidence was obtained during the verification in
the course of the original investigation showing that all standard fasteners
sold domestically in India
were electroplated during the original IP.

(82)     In
regard to point (e) above, it is confirmed that dumping margins were calculated
on the basis that where there was no matching domestic sale, the export
transaction would be excluded from the dumping calculation. Some parties argued
that there was no basis to exclude certain export transactions in calculating
the dumping margin. However, for all the sampled Chinese exporting producer
significant matching between the domestic sales and exports sales was found so
as to arrive at a fair representation of the sales made by the different
parties.

(83)     In regard to point (f)
above, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and a Chinese exporter claimed that the
Indian producer did not give good cause for not allowing the Commission to
disclose specific information regarding the product codes of its domestic sales.
The Commission provided as much information as possible, while respecting the
confidentiality rules, through a number of notes for the file, information note
made available to all interested parties and hearings granted to the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce and to all Chinese exporters who requested them. In regard
to the request for disclosure of the Indian producer's product codes, the
disclosure of this information will allow the other parties to calculate with a
reasonable accuracy the domestic prices of the Indian producer, which should be
avoided on the ground of protection of business confidential information.
Failure to protect confidential information could leave the Commission to
possible claims for damages and discourage companies in analogue countries
whose cooperation is voluntary from cooperating in investigations. This request
was therefore rejected.

2.8.        Adjustments made to the
methodology used in the definitive Regulation in the calculation of normal
value

(84)     In view of the
representations made by Chinese exporting producers in this review as to the
definition of product types in the calculation of the normal value from India
arguing that in addition to the distinction between standard vs special and
strength class, the elements of diameter, length and the coating were important
and the hearings and dialogue which ensued in the presence of the Hearing
Officer, the data of the Indian producer was re-examined.

(85)     Following this
re-examination, the Commission was able to identify the diameter and the length
of the fasteners sold on the Indian domestic market. To allow a fair comparison
between these fasteners and those exported from the PRC, both the diameter and
length were ranged and a normal value calculated for each range. This was explained
in detail in two information notes dated 5 and 11 July 2012 which were made
available to all interested parties. By summarising into ranges to distinguish
between the main product dimensions sold by the Indian producer, this
methodology allowed for a fair comparison with the exports of the Chinese
companies as requested by interested parties. Subsequently, two exporting
producers argued that they did not have complete information, claiming that the
classification was obscure and inappropriate and, therefore, did not have
sufficient information to claim an adjustment for physical differences.
However, beyond these general statements these two exporting producers did not
provide any valid alternative suggestion nor substantive evidence. The claim
was therefore dismissed.

(86)     EFDA claimed that using
diameter and length did not reflect reality and suggested an alternative which
related the two criteria in order in their view to avoid leaving out some
products, without however substantiating this alternative approach. The
classification proposed by the Commission did not exclude any product types
(all diameter and length possible combinations were covered) and thus this
claim could not be further examined.

(87)     All of the standard
fasteners sold were found to be electroplated and so the normal value was
calculated on a coating basis corresponding to the PCN code 'A'. Where a
sampled Chinese exporting producer did not export fasteners with coating type
A, the nearest coating type was used without any export price adjustment.

(88)     The strength class data,
and the split between standard and special, remained unchanged.

(89)     Two exporting producers
requested the intervention of the Hearing Officer for DG Trade to examine the
confidential data of the Indian analogue producer and provide assurances
regarding the confidential nature of its domestic sales, as well as on the
question of coating of standard fasteners, the presence of chrome on coating
and on the extraction of information regarding length and diameter for standard
fasteners. The Hearing Officer, after examining the confidential data of the
Indian analogue producer clarified the questions posed by the two exporting
producers. The report of the Hearing Officer was placed in the file for
inspection by interested parties.

(90)     Despite the above-mentioned
additional information, clarifications, hearings and dialogue held, some
parties continued to claim that they lacked information to allow them to make
requests for adjustments to ensure a fair comparison. The Commission provided
extensive information to the parties on the product groups used in establishing
normal value, as required by the Appellate Body.[6] In
addition, over an extended period of time running from 30 May 2012 until 19
July 2012, the Commission provided information and replied to all questions
raised by all parties. Furthermore, an additional period of 20 days was granted
to all parties to comment on the final disclosure.

(91)     The same parties argued
that, contrary to the Appellate Body Report, the Commission refused to disclose
information on the specific products of the Indian producer that were used in
establishing the normal value without showing good cause. Article 6.5 of the ADA stipulates that information which is confidential or is provided on a confidential
basis shall be treated as such by the investigating authorities. In this case,
the Indian producer provided information on product types sold on the domestic
market on a confidential basis and the company has renewed its request for confidential
treatment addressed to the Commission, stating that it continues to consider
that information as strictly confidential as referred to in recital (82). These
parties also claimed that the Commission failed to provide a meaningful
non-confidential summary of the information provided by the Indian producer as
required by the Reports. However, in the continuing dialogue process and as
mentioned in the recitals above, the Commission disclosed all relevant
information within the limits of confidentiality to the interested parties
relating to the Indian producer so that they could defend their interest.

2.9.        Determination of normal
value for the exporting producers in the PRC, Normal
value, Export prices, comparison

(92)     Normal
value was calculated and compared to the export price as set out above.
Adjustments to the export price were made to remove the price difference where
Chrome VI was added to the coating on the fasteners concerned. A comparison
between the two was made on an ex-works basis, as in the original
investigation.

2.10.      Claims for adjustments based
on the product characteristics

(93)     One exporting producer
claimed an adjustment under Article 2(10)(a) of the basic regulation for
physical differences in the various types (hexagon screws, wood screws, bolts,
etc.) of the product concerned. Since the exporting producer concerned does
not, for reasons of confidentiality, have access to the full normal value data,
the company relied on its own export prices to demonstrate the extent to which
prices vary for each type of fastener.

(94)     In the original
investigation the comparison between normal value and export price was made by
distinguishing between standard and special types of fasteners, as stated in
recital (102) of the definitive Regulation, and also by identifying strength
class. The full product control numbers (PCNs) were not used in this case given
that the producer in the analogue country did not provide information
categorised on the basis of the PCNs as requested. One of the elements of the
original PCN aimed at identifying the different types of fastener according to
which CN code they fell under. Given that this information was not provided by
the Indian producer, this element could not be used in making the comparison in
the original investigation.

(95)     The
information provided by the exporting producer indicated that there may be
grounds to adjust for differences in the various types of fasteners. However,
the methodology suggested was not considered appropriate, given that the
company did not provide precise product type information according to CN code,
as explained in recital (34), as had originally been requested. As an
alternative, an examination was made of the differences in prices of the Union
industry on the Union market to determine whether price differences existed
between the different types of fasteners. The information provided by the Union
industry had been provided in full by PCN as originally requested. This
examination confirmed that prices on the EU market varied depending on the type
of fastener. On this basis, it was considered appropriate to adjust the normal
values to reflect these differences. As a basis for adjustment, the average
price of sales by the Union industry on the Union market was valued as "1"
with all individual types being given their own individual value depending on
their price relationship to the average price. These values were then applied
to the normal value used in the comparison with each type exported by the
exporting producer.

(96)     As
these adjustments were made on the basis of the market value of the differences
in physical characteristics on the EU market, it was considered appropriate to
make similar adjustments in the calculation of the dumping margins of all
exporting producers.

(97)     Following the publication
of the General Disclosure document the CCME and a Chinese exporter argued that
the Commission was still violating of Articles 2.4, 6.2 and 6.4 of the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement by not providing timely information on the basis of which
the export price and normal value was compared and invited the Commission to
disclose comprehensive information on the normal value product types used in
order to meet its obligation to provide the opportunities to the Chinese
exporting producers to ensure the defence of their interest, present their case
on a fully informed basis and ensure a fair comparison between export prices
and the normal value. The said parties therefore requested the Commission to re-examine
the following:

(a)
Full disclosure of the normal value product
types;

(b)
Ensure that standard fasteners produced by the
Chinese exporting producers are not compared to fasteners manufactured by the
analogue producer for use in high-end applications;

(c)
Provide evidence on how to substantiate requests
for adjustments;

(d)
Provide information on how certain adjustments
were made; and

(e)
The obligation of the EU not to disregard any
export transactions.

(98)     With regard to point a), in
the light of the information made available through the information notes dated
30 May 2012, 11 July 2012, 13 July 2012, the General Disclosure document sent
on 31 July 2012 and in particular recitals (77) until (96) and the hearings
held in the course of the consultation process, it is considered that all
information which could be disclosed within the limits of the requirements
regarding confidentiality has been provided to interested parties.

(99)     With regard to point b)
regarding the need to ensure that standard fasteners produced by the Chinese
exporting producers are not compared to fasteners manufactured by the analogue
producer for use in high-end applications, this aspect has been addressed in
recital (78) above. In the absence of any new evidence, and faced with mere
allegations by the said parties about the possible presence of fasteners
destined to high end applications other than the automotive industry, the
Commission considers that the information available in the file is sufficiently
reliable to ensure that only standard fasteners were used for the determination
of the normal value used for the comparison with the export prices of the said
Chinese exporter.

(100)   With regard to point c) and
the allegations according to which the Commission failed to provide information
on how Chinese exporting producers could substantiate requests for adjustments
regarding elements of "traceability", ISO standard 9000, unit of
defective rate and other criteria such as "hardness, bending, strength,
impact toughness, friction coefficient" (see recital (63) above) and
duties on the importation costs (see recitals (79) and (80) above), the
Commission notes the following. Firstly, it is recalled that these elements
have been raised by the parties without providing any further details. During a
hearing held by the Hearing Officer on 11 July 2012, the Commission invited the
parties to provide additional information regarding the above-mentioned issues,
but no additional information was provided. With regard to the request for
adjustments on export prices to take into account the duties on the importation
of wire rod into India and, in general, cheaper access to raw materials for
Chinese exporting producers, the Commission explained in detail in recital (80)
the reason why this adjustment could not be accepted. Moreover, as set out in
recital (63) of the original Regulation, the cost of the major raw material –
steel wire rod – did not substantially reflect market values. It was found that
the prices of the steel wire rods charged on the domestic market were
significantly lower than those charged on other markets. Therefore, these
distorted prices cannot be used as a basis for adjustment as requested by the
said parties. In these circumstances, the Commission fails to see which
additional information, in the view of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the
exporting producer, could be provided to further substantiate these two
requests for adjustments.

(101)   With regard to point d) it
is recalled that information regarding the "normal value types of the EU
producers and their price levels, as well as the impact of the resulting
adjustments on the normal value types of the analogue producer" are
confidential and cannot be disclosed. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce and one
Chinese exporting producer requested further clarifications on how the
adjustments for the price difference of coating has been done. However, as
indicated in recital (92) above, it should be noted that in the specific
disclosure document, the Commission indicated which exported product types have
been adjusted, thus allowing the parties concerned to understand how the
adjustment was made.

(102)   With regard to point e) and
the alleged need to take into account all comparable export transactions in the
dumping calculation in order to ensure a fair price comparison pursuant to
Article 2.4.2 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Commission notes that it
is precisely following the request and suggestions made by the said parties,
that the normal value used for the determination of dumping margins was
adjusted. The methodology used was explained in recitals (93) to (96) above and
the reasons for expressing the amount of dumping found as a percentage of those
export transactions used in calculating the amount of dumping outlined in
recitals (107) and (108) below are in full compliance with Article 2.4.2 of the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, which refers to comparable export transactions. In
this case, all comparable transactions (by product types) have been used for
the comparison. Therefore, it was reasonable to express the amount of dumping
found as a percentage of those export transactions used in calculating the
amount of dumping.

(103)   Following the general
disclosure, two Chinese exporting producers reiterated that adjustments should
be made for alleged differences in efficiency of consumption of the raw
material and easier access to raw material, more efficient electricity
consumption and lower productivity per employee. It is recalled that none of
the Chinese exporting producers received MET in the original investigation and
their cost structure cannot be considered as reflecting market values that can
be used as a basis for adjustments in particular with regard to access to raw
materials. In addition, it should be noted that the production processes
existing in the PRC were found to be comparable to the Indian producer's and
the alleged differences were found to be very minor. In this case, the Indian
producer was found to be competing with many other producers on the Indian
domestic market, it is considered that its prices were fully reflecting the
situation in the domestic market. As mentioned in recital (41) above, a
surrogate of the costs and prices of producers in functioning market economies had
to be used for the purpose of establishing the normal value.

(104)   The same two Chinese exporting producers argued that
in summarising the data on diameter and length into ranges, the Commission
should not refer to ranges but use the actual figures for length and diameter
to carry out the comparison. Firstly, as mentioned in recital (70) above, the Commission
agreed following a hearing held on 26th June 2012 with the same
parties to range the diameter and length in order to take into account the
impact of the physical characteristics on prices. The said parties themselves indicated
some possible ranges, the Commission however, indicated during the hearing that
these proposed ranges should be revised in order to ensure the matching of all
exported types to closely resembling types of the Indian producer. Secondly,
the said parties stated in a presentation made during a hearing held on July 3,
2012 as an example, that the diameter would have a small impact in terms of
unit consumption of raw material. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

2.11.      Dumping margins

(105)   The
dumping margins were established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted
average normal value with a weighted average export price.

(106)   The definitive dumping
margin, expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at the Union border,
duty unpaid, for the exporting producer subject to this review is the
following:

Bulten Fasteners (China) Co., Ltd || 0.0%

(107)   The revised definitive
dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF import price at the Union
border, duty unpaid, are as follows:

Exporting producer in the PRC || Existing dumping margin || Revised dumping margin

Biao Wu Tensile Fasteners Co., Ltd. || 69.9% || 43.4%

Kunshan Chenghe Standard Components Co., Ltd. || 93.2% || 63.7%

Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co., Ltd. || 74.5% || 64.3%

Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co., Ltd. || 105.3% || 69.7%

Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Changshu British Shanghai International Fastener Co., Ltd. || 63.1% || 38.3%

CELO Suzhou Precision Fasteners Co., Ltd || 0% || 0%

Golden Horse (Dong Guan) Metal Manufactory Co., Ltd || 26.5% || 22.9%

Yantai Agrati Fasteners Co., Ltd || 0% || 0%

Cooperating exporting producers not selected to form part of the sample || 78.1% || 54.1%

All other companies || 115.4% || 74.1%

(108)   One exporting producer
argued that in calculating its dumping margin, the total amount of dumping
found should be expressed as a percentage of the total CIF value of all export
transactions and not as a percentage of those export transactions used in
calculating the amount of dumping. To do otherwise would, in this company's
opinion, amount to a presumption of dumping for those export transactions not
used in the dumping determination.

(109)   A comparison between export
price and normal value was made on a weighted average basis only for those
types exported by the Chinese exporting producer for which a matching type was
produced and sold by the Indian producer. This was considered to be the most
reliable basis for establishing the level of dumping, if any, of this exporting
producer; to attempt to match all other exported types to closely resembling
types of the Indian producer would have resulted in inaccurate findings. On
this basis, it is correct to express the amount of dumping found as a
percentage of those export transactions used in calculating the amount of
dumping – this finding is considered to be representative for all types
exported. The same approach was used in calculating the dumping margins of the
other exporting producers.

3.           Definition of the Union
industry

(110)   As indicated in the Notice
of Initiation, the Commission reassessed the definition of the Union industry,
in order to take into account the recommendations of the DSB Reports,
suggesting that the EU had acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the WTO
Anti-Dumping Agreement by excluding from the Union industry definition those
producers unwilling to be included in the sample and by considering that the
threshold of 25% enshrined in Article 4.1 of the basic Regulation automatically
represented a "major proportion" of the total Union production of the
product concerned. In paragraph 430 of the report of the Appellate Body issued
on 15 July 2011, it is acknowledged that the "fragmented nature of the
fasteners industry, however, might have permitted such a low proportion due to
the impacticability of obtaining more information, provided that the process
with which the Commission defined the industry did not give rise to a material
risk of distortion. [...] by limiting the domestic industry definition to those
producers willing to be part of the sample, the Commission excluded
producers that provided relevant information." (emphasis added).
It is these latter producers which are now being included into the definition
of Union industry.

(111)   In the original
investigation it was found that the production of the Union producers that
agreed to be included in the sample and fully cooperated in the original
investigation represented 27,0 % of the total production of the product
concerned in the Union. It was therefore considered that these companies
constituted the Union industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of
the basic Regulation.

(112)   Following
the conclusions of the DSB Reports and based on all valid submissions received
from all EU producers who had come forward within the deadline laid down in
paragraph 6. (b) (i) of the Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding
concerning imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the
People's Republic of China ([7]), and regardless of whether they indicated that they were prepared
to be part of the sample, the Commission recalculated that the Union industry
actually represented 36,3% of the total production of the product concerned in
the Union in 2006.

(113)   Having reviewed the
definition of the Union industry, the Commission ascertained whether the
percentage of production of fasteners of that industry out of the total
estimated production represented a major proportion in the sense of Article 4.1
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

(114)   As
mentioned in recital (112) of the definitive Regulation, the investigation
established that the like product is manufactured by a high number of producers
in the Union, estimated at
over 300 mostly small and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs") but
including a few larger companies or groups of companies. At the time of
initiation of the original investigation, the Commission contacted each of
these known producers and asked them to participate in the investigation and
provide certain information on their operations. Neither the Notice of
Initiation published upon initiation of the original investigation nor the
cover letter sent on the day of initiation to all known EU producers, made
reference to the fact that the information submitted by EU producers who did
not wish to cooperate would be disregarded.

(115)   As
mentioned, most of the EU fasteners producers are small, if not, micro
enterprises (family businesses) that typically have limited resources including
financial and personnel resources, are not members of national or EU
associations which could represent them during the investigation and, as is
often the case for SMEs, have no resources to engage specialised trade lawyers
and accountants. Small companies also have strong concerns with regard to the
protection of their confidential data in the course of such investigations,
which they consider as vital. Nevertheless, a good number of producers came
forward (63 EU producers in total) and provided the required information. It
should be noted that these producers consisted of both SMEs and larger
companies which were spread throughout the EU. In light of the foregoing, in
view of the specific circumstance of this case, these producers, which
represented 36,3% of the total production of the product concerned in the EU,
can be considered to constitute a major proportion of the total Union industry
and consequently within the meaning of Article 4.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Furthermore, as mentioned, since all the
largest known producers in the EU came forward upon initiation, within the
deadline laid down in the original Notice of Initiation, the selected sample in
the original investigation can be considered as representative, even after the
inclusion of a further 18 EU producers in the definition of the Union industry.

(116)   The Chinese Chamber of
Commerce argued that the Commission could not limit itself to use the data
received from the EU producers that came forward within the deadline mentioned
in recital (112) above as certain EU producers may have chosen not to manifest
themselves since they were not willing to form part of the sample and therefore
knew that their response would be disregarded. The association of Chinese
exporters requested the Commission "to start the whole selection
process anew and contact all EU producers without referring to the fact that
the producers must be willing to form part of the sample"[8]. However, in the light of the
above, it was considered, that there was no need to reopen the process of
selecting a final sample, as the largest known EU producers came forward at
initiation stage. Following the disclosure, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce
reiterated that it could not be excluded that a large number of producers
simply did not respond to the sampling questionnaire “precisely because they
know that their unwillingness to form part of the sample would automatically
result in their exclusion from the domestic industry”. It should be noted
that the same arguments has been put forward by Chinese exporting producers and
European importers during the original investigation who were arguing against
the existence of standing. As explained in recital (26) of the definitive
regulation, the Commission contacted a significant number of Union producers
after the initiation of the proceeding and only a few of them replied. It
should be noted that no reference was made to their possible inclusion or not
in the final sampling. In fact, the possible selection of Union producers in
the final sample was irrelevant in their decision to come forward during the
proceeding, as their decision was motivated by other factors as those
highlighted in recital (115) above. Therefore, the request addressed to the
Commission that the Commission should conduct the injury assessment anew was
rejected.

4.           Situation of the Union
industry

(117)   Following the Reports, the
injury findings established in the original investigation were re-examined at
the level of the Union industry as defined according to recital (114) above,
for trends concerning production, production capacity, capacity utilisation,
sales, unit prices, market share, employment and productivity i.e. from the information
collected with regard to the 6 sampled producers and the further 57 producers
now forming part of the Union industry. With respect to other injury factors
found for the sampled EU industry, since information regarding stocks,
profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, ability to raise
capital and wages were obtained from the verified questionnaire responses of
the 6 sampled producers, the findings are therefore confirmed in the review.

4.1.        Production, production
capacity and capacity utilisation

(118)   The evolution of production,
production capacity and capacity utilisation for the Union industry based on
the whole information available (see recital (112) was the following:

Total Union Industry || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || IP

Production in volume (MT) || 489,993 || 524,571 || 493,924 || 519,880 || 537,877

Index || 100 || 107 || 100 || 106 || 110

Production Capacity (MT) || 859,766 || 881,454 || 902,741 || 919,485 || 944,817

Index || 100 || 102 || 105 || 107 || 110

Capacity utilisation (%) || 57% || 60% || 55% || 57% || 57%

(119)   Despite the significant increase
in demand of 29% between 2004 and the IP, the Union industry’s production
volume fluctuated throughout the period considered and was 9% higher in the IP
compared to 2003 to be compared with 6% in the original investigation i.e.
still significantly lower than the increase in demand of 29%.

(120)   With regard to production
capacity and capacity utilisation, the conclusions reached in the original
investigation, albeit on a different set of data, were confirmed (see recitals
(130) until (133) of the definitive regulation.

4.2.        Sales, market share, growth
and average unit prices in the Union

(121)   The figures below represent
the Union industry’s sales to independent customers in the Union based (in
volume and value) on the whole information available:

Total Union industry || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || IP

Sales of the Union industry in the Union (000 €) || 990,540 || 1,050,039 || 1,102,684 || 1,198,794 || 1,289,940

Index || 100 || 106 || 111 || 121 || 130

Sales of the Union industry in the Union (MT) || 445,769 || 494,307 || 468,892 || 506,752 || 507,750

Index || 100 || 111 || 105 || 114 || 114

Unit selling price of the Union industry in the Union (€/MT) || 2,222 || 2,124 || 2,351 || 2,365 || 2,540

Index || 100 || 96 || 106 || 106 || 114

Market share of Union Industry in (MT) || N/A || 28% || 27% || 24% || 22%

Index || N/A || 100 || 96 || 86 || 80

(122)   The revised data reported in
the above table confirms the findings outlined in the recital (137) until (140)
of the definitive regulation insofar as all the injury trends are confirmed.
Union industry's sales volumes increased by 14% during the period considered,
instead of 12% found in the original investigation and by 30% in value, instead
of 21%. Trends are in fact found to be very similar as in the original
investigation. The same drop in sales volumes between 2004 and 2005 confirms
the conclusion mentioned in recital (139) of the definitive regulation that the
Union industry was unable to take advantage of the increase in Union
consumption and thus the market share of the Union producers declined by 20% in
less than three years.

4.3.        Employment and productivity

(123)   The
evolution of employment and productivity in the Union industry was as follows:

Total Union industry || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || IP

Number of employees || 7,530 || 8,340 || 8,559 || 8,549 || 8,581

Index || 100 || 111 || 114 || 114 || 114

Productivity (MT/employee) || 65 || 63 || 58 || 61 || 63

Index || 100 || 97 || 89 || 93 || 96

4.4.        Conclusion on injury

(124)   In
the light of the above, the conclusions mentioned in recitals (153) to (161) of
the definitive regulation were confirmed.

5.           Volume of dumped imports

(125)   As indicated in the Notice
of Initiation, the Commission took into account the conclusions of the DSB
Reports suggesting that the EU acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2
of the of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the consideration of
the volume of dumped imports in the fasteners original investigation.

(126)   Consequently, the Commission
re-examined its injury assessment in light of the fact that some exporting
producers were found not to be dumping in the IP. It is recalled that in the
original investigation, two Chinese exporting producers were not dumping. As
mentioned in recital (105) above, one further exporting producer was found not
to be dumping in this review. The total import volume from these three
exporting producers accounted for only between 0.01% and 0.40% of total imports
of the product concerned from the PRC in the IP. The injury analysis regarding
the evolution of imports from the PRC which has been carried out on the basis
of the volume of dumped imports excluding the non-dumped imports shows
insignificant changes in the trends described in recital (121) of the
definitive regulation.

Source : Eurostat || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || IP

Import volumes from PRC (MT) || 216,085 || 295,227 || 387,783 || 485,435 || 577,811

Index || 100 || 137 || 179 || 225 || 267

Market share PRC || N/A || 17% || 22% || 23% || 25%

6.           Causation – export
performance of the Union industry

(127)   As indicated in the Notice
of Initiation, the Commission reassessed its causation analysis in order to
take into account the conclusions of the Reports suggesting that the EU acted
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement by
taking into account the overall export statistical data reported by EUROSTAT
instead of the EU industry's specific export performance.

(128)   The export performance of
the Union industry was analysed in recital (175) of the definitive Regulation.
It was found that exports to third countries represented only 11% of the total
Union industry’s production of the like product in 2006. However, as pointed
out in the DSB Reports, the data used related to exports of all producers in
the Union was based on Eurostat data and not to exports of the Union industry.
Following the DSB Reports, the Commission reassessed its causation analysis by
examining whether the export performance of the newly defined Union industry
could have been a factor of the injury suffered. It was found that exports to
third countries represented only 3,7% of the newly defined Union industry's
production of the like product in the IP, rather than 11% as mentioned in
recital (175) of the definitive Regulation. These exports increased by about 4%
between 2003 and the IP. Furthermore, these exports were consistently made at
prices significantly above sales prices on the Union market.

Total Union industry || 2003 || 2004 || 2005 || 2006 || IP

Union Exports to the Rest of the World for the PC (MT) || 19,599 || 23,613 || 21,098 || 20,967 || 20,400

Index || 100 || 120 || 108 || 107 || 104

Union Exports to the Rest of the World for the PC (000 EUR) || 47,261 || 55,657 || 52,958 || 58,831 || 55,477

Index || 100 || 118 || 112 || 124 || 117

Unit Price: (EURO/MT): || 2,411 || 2,357 || 2,510 || 2,806 || 2,719

(129)   It can thus be concluded
that the export performance to third countries of the Union industry was not a
source of material injury. Furthermore, the final conclusion as stated in
recital (184) of the definitive Regulation that the dumped imports originating
in the PRC have caused material injury to the Union industry within the meaning
of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation is confirmed.

7.           Treatment of confidential
information

(130)   As indicated in the Notice
of Initiation, the Commission undertook to reassess the conclusions based on
the rulings of the Reports suggesting that the EU acted inconsistently with
Articles 6.5 and 6.5.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the
treatment of confidential information.

(131)   Following the Reports, the
Commission invited the two relevant Union producers to provide appropriate
statements of the reasons why confidential information was not susceptible of
non-confidential summary. The two producers provided additional information in
a non-confidential manner or, if certain information was not susceptible of
summary, they stated why that was the case. The information so provided by
these producers was sent to all interested parties. One association
representing European Union importers argued that the information provided by
the two Union producers was incomprehensible and would not allow cross-checking
with data publically available on EUROSTAT. In regard to this argument, it is
noted that given that the information provided by these two producers is
company-specific information, it is unlikely that any public sources exist
which would allow for cross-checking.

(132)   The Chinese Chamber of
Commerce and EFDA argued that the additional information provided was
incomplete insofar as some elements in Tables 22, 23 and 32 to 34 were still
missing and therefore not in accordance with the way the DSB findings should
have been applied. No other comments were received following the disclosure of
this additional non-confidential information. Since Tables 32 to 34 contain
details of the sales and the costs incurred by the company concerned, this
information which is by nature confidential was summarised as to provide some
information regarding its content, without disclosing confidential information.
The other information mentioned as missing in the Table 22 (types of raw
materials supplied and volumes of raw material purchased), Table 23 (only
indexed figures of pre-tax profit margin are provided and no separate figures
for sales inside the EU and outside), was resubmitted by the Union company
concerned in order to allow a good undertanding of the information and the
response was added to the file for inspection by interested parties. In
conclusion, it is considered that that the recommendations of the Reports on
this matter were fully complied with.

(133)   In addition, EFDA claimed
that Table 24 provided by the Union producer did not allow the conclusion that
this company had suffered significant injury as it showed steady increases in
profit, utilisation and output. However, the Commission made once again the
injury assessment including data for the six sampled EU producers and concluded
that material injury was suffered as confirmed in recital (124) above. The
claim is therefore unfounded

(134)   Finally, as mentioned in
point 6. of the Notice of Initiation, following the finding regarding Article
6.5 and 6.5.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to the treatment
of confidential information, on 30 May 2012, the Commission disclosed the
Eurostat data on total EU production of fasteners as originally presented.

8.           Other recommendations and
rulings

(135)   As mentioned in the Notice,
the Commission undertook to consider comments by parties in the fasteners
investigation who claim to have been adversely affected by the disclosure of
findings with regard to market economy treatment or with respect to any other
DSB recommendations or rulings. The Commission granted IT to one company in
accordance with the recommendations concerning Article 9(5) of the basic
Regulation in the DSB reports.

F. DISCLOSURE

(136)   All parties were informed of
the above-mentioned findings. They were also granted a period to submit
comments and claims subsequent to disclosure. Several comments were received
following disclosure.

(137)   It follows from the above
that the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain iron or steel
fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China imposed by Regulation
(EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 should be maintained and that imports from
Bulten Fasteners China should be made subject to a duty of 0%.

G. CONCLUSION

(138)   On
the basis of the above reassessment, it is concluded
that the injurious dumping determined in the original investigation is
confirmed. However, one exporting producer was granted IT in accordance with
the recommendations concerning Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation in the DSB
reports. Therefore, Article 1(2) of the definitive regulation should be amended
accordingly. The same article should also be amended to take account of the
revised anti-dumping duties calculated for some of the companies listed in the
table in Article 1(2) of the definitive Regulation as below:

Exporting producer in the PRC || Dumping margin || Injury margin || Definitive measures

Biao Wu Tensile Fasteners Co., Ltd. || 43.4% || 99.9% || 43.4%

Kunshan Chenghe Standard Components Co., Ltd. || 63.7% || 79.5% || 63.7%

Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co., Ltd. || 64.3% || 64.4% || 64.3%

Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co., Ltd. || 69.7% || 78.3% || 69.7%

Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Changshu British Shanghai International Fastener Co., Ltd. || 38.3% || 65.3% || 38.3%

CELO Suzhou Precision Fasteners Co., Ltd || 0.0% || 0.3% || 0.0%

Golden Horse (Dong Guan) Metal Manufactory Co., Ltd || 22.9% || 133.2% || 22.9%

Yantai Agrati Fasteners Co., Ltd || 0.0% || 0.0% || 0.0%

Cooperating exporting producers not selected to form part of the sample || 54.1% || 77.5% || 54.1%

All other companies || 74.1% || 85.0% || 74.1%

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The table including the rates of the
definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier
price, before duty, of the products manufactured by the companies listed in
Article 1(2) of Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 is replaced by the following table:

Company || Duty (%) || TARIC additional code

Biao Wu Tensile Fasteners Co., Ltd., Shanghai || 43.4% || A924

CELO Suzhou Precision Fasteners Co., Ltd., Suzhou || 0.0% || A918

Changshu City Standard Parts Factory and Changshu British Shanghai International Fastener Co., Ltd., Changshu || 38.3% || A919

Golden Horse (Dong Guan) Metal Manufactory Co., Ltd., Dongguan City || 22.9% || A920

Kunshan Chenghe Standard Components Co., Ltd., Kunshan || 63.7% || A921

Ningbo Jinding Fastener Co., Ltd., Ningbo City || 64.3% || A922

Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co., Ltd. Jiangshan Town || 69.7% || A923

Yantai Agrati Fasteners Co., Ltd., Yantai || 0.0% || A925

Bulten Fasteners (China) Co., Ltd., Beijing || 0.0% || A997

Companies listed in Annex I || 54.1% || A928

All other companies || 74.1% || A999

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of
its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For
the Council

The
President

[1]               OJ L 201, 26.7.2001, p. 10.

[2]               OJ L 29, 31.1.2009, p. 1.

[3]               WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, AB-2011-2,
WT/DS397/AB/R, 15 July 2011. WTO, Report of the Panel, WT/DS397/R, 3 December
2010.

[4]               OJ C 66, 6.3.2012, p. 29

[5]               OJ C 160, 6.6.2012, p. 19

[6]               Appellate Body Report: Para. 512 which states that
"Article 2(4) obliges investigation authorities ... at a minimum to inform
parties of the product groups used for purposes of the price comparison"

[7]               OJ C 267/31,
9.11.2007, p. 31

[8]               "Review of the Anti-Dumping Measures in Force on
Imports of Fasteners Originating in the PRC Hearing", Hearing organised by
the Hearing Officer with the Chinese Fasteners Industry Association (CCME), 11
July 2012