1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-40697

Summary Calendar.

Lloyd HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

May 10, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Texas.

Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lloyd Henderson filed a personal injury suit against the

United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act (the "SAA"), 46

U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988), and the Public Vessels Act (the

"PVA"), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1988). Pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district

court dismissed Henderson's complaint for l ack of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Henderson appeals the district court's dismissal,

and we affirm.

I

Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working

aboard a vessel owned and operated by the United States. On April

8, 1993, Henderson filed a personal injury suit against the United

States under the SAA and PVA. Forty-seven days later, on May 25,

1993, the Attorney General of the United States received by mail a

copy of the complaint. On August 30, 1993, Henderson filed a2

motion for postponement in the district court, in which he claimed

that documents necessary to complete service of process on the

government had been lost in the mail. The district court granted

Henderson's motion, but ordered that he complete se rvice within

fifteen days. The United States Attorney for the district in which

the action was brought was personally served with the complaint on

September 3, 1993, 148 days after Henderson had filed the suit.

The United States moved to dismiss Henderson's suit for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction , arguing that § 742 of the SAA

requires that plaintiffs effect service of process in suits brought

against the government under the SAA "forthwith." The district

court denied the motion without opinion. The United States

subsequently renewed its motion to dismiss, citing United States v.

Holmberg, 19 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 115

S.Ct. 482, 130 L.Ed.2d 395 (1994). The district court dismissed

Henderson's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

Henderson appeals, arguing that (1) the district court granted

him an extension of time in which to effect service of process on

the Government; (2) given the problems he had with the mail, he

completed s ervice of process on the Government reasonably

forthwith; (3) his service on the Attorney General was forthwith

and satisfied the service r equirements of § 742; and (4) the

district court's dismissal of his complaint violated his right to1 We do not address Henderson's due process claim because the

district court dismissed his complaint without prejudice, and

Henderson does not argue that a subsequent suit would be

time-barred.

2 At the time Henderson filed his suit, Rule 4(j) read as

follows:

If a service of the summons and complaint is not made

upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of

the complaint and the party on whose behalf such

service was required cannot show good cause why such

service was not made within that period, the action

shall be dismissed as to that defendant without

prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice

to such party or upon motion.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) (current version at Rule 4(m)). In 1993,

Rule 4(j) was replaced by Rule 4(m), which states that:

If service of the summons and complaint is not made

upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of

the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own

3 due process. 1

II

Service of process on the United States is accomplished by

delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the United States

Attorney for the district in which the action is brought and by

sending a copy of the summons and complaint to the Attorney General

of the United Sta tes. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(i)(1) (previous version at

Rule 4(d)( 4) (1993)); P eters v. United States, 9 F.3d 344, 345

(5th Cir.1993). At the time Henderson filed his suit, service of

process in suits brought under the SAA was governed by two separate

timeliness requirements. Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure required that a plaintiff effect service within 120 days

after filing the suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j) (1993) (current version

at Rule 4(m)). 2 Under § 742 of the SAA, however, a plaintiff thatinitiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss

the action without prejudice as to that defendant or

direct that service be effected within a specified

time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause

for the failure, the court shall extend the time for

service for an appropriate period.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).

3 Section 742 states in pertinent part that:

The libelant shall forthwith serve a copy of his libel

on the United States attorney for such district and

mail a copy thereof by registered mail to the Attorney

General of the United States, and shall file a sworn

return of such service and mailing. Such service and

mailing shall constitute valid service....

4 has brought suit against the United States under the SAA must

effect service of process "forthwith," 46 U.S.C. app. § 742. 3

We review the district court's dismissal of Henderson's

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.

Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir.1994).

A

Henderson argues that because the district court granted him

an extension of time in which to effect service of process on the

Government, he was exempt from § 742's "forthwi th" requirement.

Under Rule 4(j), the district court was required to dismiss a

plaintiff's complaint for failure to meet the 120-day requirement

unless the plaintiff showed "good cause" for its failure. While

the district court did not expressly find that Henderson had shown

"good cause" for being unable to meet the 120-day requirement, the

court did grant him a fifteen-day extension.

In United States v. Holmberg, 19 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied,

--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 482, 130 L.Ed.2d 395 (19 94), we5

addressed the question of whether the forthwith service requirement

in § 742 is procedural and, thus, superseded by the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. We held that the requirement of forthwith

service is a condition of the government's waiver of sovereign

immunity and, therefore, a jurisdictional prerequisite. I d. at

1064-65; a ccord Libby v. United States, 840 F.2d 818 (11th

Cir.1988); Amella v. United States, 732 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.1984);

Battaglia v. United St ates, 303 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert.

dismissed, 371 U.S. 907, 83 S.Ct. 210, 9 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962). But

see Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v. Mon River Towing, Inc., 772

F.2d 62 (3d Cir.1985) (holding forthwith service requirement to be

proce dural). Because § 742's forthwith service requirement is a

jurisdictional prerequisite, it is not su perseded by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and could not have been modified by Rule

4(j). See Holmberg, 19 F.3d at 1064 (holding that Rule 4(j) does

not superseded § 742's forthwith requirement). Thus, the district

c ourt's decision to grant Henderson fifteen additional days in

which to meet the forthwith service requirement of Rule 4(j) did

not affect either the court's sub ject-matter jurisdiction or

Henderson's obligations under § 742.

B

Hender son contends next that, given his problems with the

mail, he completed service of process on the Government reasonably

forthwith, and that the district court's implied find ing that he

showed "good cause" for the delay in service supports his

contention. Henderson also cites as support our statement in6

United States v. Bradley, 428 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.1970), that in the

context of another statute, the term "forthwith" was "deliberately

undefined

... to allow courts to interpr et it in a context of

"reasonableness,' on a case by case basis." I d. at 1015. In

Holmberg, however, we concluded that "under any definition, service

in 103 or 106 days is not forthwith." Holmberg, 19 F.3d at 1065.

Thus, even if we interpret the term in a context of reasonableness,

and even if the district court found that Henderson showed good

cause for the delay, completing service in 148 days is not

forthwith.

C

Lastly, Henderson argues that his service on the A ttorney

General was forthwith and satisfied the service of process

requirements of § 742. He contends that "the purpose of the

[forthwith] requirement is to provide reasonably prompt notice of

the suit to the United States," and that his service on the

Attorney General provided the government with that notice. Under

§ 742, both service of the complaint on the U.S. Attorney and the

mailing of a copy to the Attorney General are required to complete

service of pr ocess on the government. S ee § 742. "The word

"forthwith' applies both to the service of a copy of the complaint

on the United States Attorney and to the mailing of a copy of the

complaint by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United

States." 1 Martin J. Norris, T he Law of Maritime Personal

Injuries, § 8.4 (4th ed. 1990). S ee, e.g., Battaglia v. United

States, 303 F.2d 683, 686 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907,4 In a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal as Unmeritorious, the

Government moved for dismissal of Henderson's appeal pursuant to

Local Rule 42.2, which provides for the dismissal of certain

appeals that this Court finds "frivolous and entirely without

merit." Although we affirm the district court's dismissal of his

complaint, Henderson's appeal was not frivolous.

7 83 S.Ct. 210, 9 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962) (holding that the term

"forthwith" applies to both the service and the mailing). Thus,

while we do not address whether Henderson's service on the Attorney

General was forthwith, we conclude that Henderson's service on the

Attorney Gene ral alone did not satisfy the forthwith service

requirement of § 742.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the Government's motion to

dismiss Henderson's appeal, 4 but AFFIRM the district court's

dismissal of Henderson's complaint.