J-A01042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAS SANCHEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2229 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0406041-2005

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 4, 2023

Jeremias Sanchez appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel 

has filed an Anders1 brief and an application to withdraw as counsel. Upon

careful review, we affirm the order of the PCRA court and grant counsel’s 

application to withdraw.

____________________________________________

1 Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

apparently in the mistaken belief that an Anders brief is required where 

counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. A 

Turner/Finley no-merit letter, however, is the appropriate filing. See 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). Because an Anders brief 

provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may accept an Anders

brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter. Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866 

A.2d 1009, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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The PCRA court summarized the lengthy background of this case as 

follows:

On July 26, 2005, [Sanchez entered into a negotiated guilty plea]

to two counts of [p]ossession [w]ith [i]ntent to [d]eliver (PWID). 

Pursuant to his negotiated plea, this [c]ourt sentenced Sanchez to 

one year in the intermediate punishment program [(IPP)], which 

included long-term inpatient drug treatment, plus one year [of]

reporting probation. [Sanchez] was ordered to successfully 

complete drug treatment, seek and maintain employment, 

undergo random urinalysis, stay out of trouble with the law, 

perform 20 hours of community service[,] and pay costs and fines.

Shortly thereafter, [Sanchez] absconded from the drug treatment 

program. He appeared before this [c]ourt on January 13, 2006[,]

for his first violation hearing. This [c]ourt found [Sanchez] in 

technical violation and ordered a 90[-]day modification of his IP[P] 

sentence. On March 9, 2006, [Sanchez] was paroled to an 

inpatient drug treatment program[, where h]e once again

absconded[.] He was apprehended more than a year later on April 

30, 2007. This [c]ourt found him in technical violation, revoked 

his IP[P] probation, and sentenced him to 11[]1⁄2 to 23 months[’]

county incarceration plus 3 years [of] reporting probation on each 

charge to run concurrently[.]

On April 1, 2009, [Sanchez] was arrested and charged with PWID 

and criminal conspiracy. He appeared before this [c]ourt on March 

25, 2010[,] and pled guilty to these charges. [Sanchez] was 

recommended to participate in the state [IPP] program[]; 

however, [Sanchez] got into a fight in jail while awaiting state 

[IPP] approval and, as a result, his request to participate was 

denied. On September 17, 2010, this [c]ourt sentenced him to 2 

1⁄2 to 5 years [of] state incarceration[,] plus 5 years[’] reporting 

probation on all three of his cases[,] to run concurrent with one 

another.

[Sanchez] was released on parole on April 6, 2014. On October 

21, 2014, he was arrested in Luzerne County and charged with 

burglary and related charges. He pled guilty . . . and was 

sentenced to 18 to 36 months[’] incarceration.
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On May 9, 2017, [Sanchez] appeared before this [c]ourt for his 

fourth violation hearing[, after which t]his [c]ourt found him in 

direct violation and revoked his probation. [Sanchez] was 

sentenced to another [three] to [six] years [of] state incarceration 

on each case[,] to run consecutively with one another, for an 

aggregate sentence of [six] to [twelve] years[’] incarceration. 

This [c]ourt further ordered that this sentence run consecutive[]

to the burglary sentence he was already serving. [Sanchez] filed 

a pro se motion for reconsideration. The Defender Association of 

Philadelphia also filed a petition to vacate and reconsider 

sentence. On June 16, 2017, the Defender Association filed a 

PCRA petition, alleging [its] own ineffectiveness for failure to file 

a timely notice of appeal as requested by [Sanchez]. PCRA 

counsel was appointed and [Sanchez]’s appellate rights were 

reinstated[,] nunc pro tunc[,] on September 11, 2017. PCRA 

counsel failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days. Instead[,]

he filed [a notice of appeal] more than six months later on March 

12, 2018. On June 1, 2018, the Superior Court quashed [the 

appeal] as untimely.

On September 13, 2018, [Sanchez] filed a second PCRA petition, 

requesting new counsel and reinstatement of his appellate rights. 

New PCRA counsel was appointed and his appellate rights were 

reinstated[,] nunc pro tunc[,] for a second time on January 17, 

2019. PCRA counsel never filed a notice of appeal. On April 11, 

2019, this [c]ourt removed counsel and appointed a new attorney. 

New counsel filed [two] timely notice[s] of appeal on April 25, 

2019.[2] On December 5, 2019, [Sanchez]’s appeal docketed as 

1301 EDA 2019 was dismissed by the Superior Court for counsel’s 

failure to file an appellate brief. This included both docket 

numbers CP-51-CR-0406041-2005[, the above-captioned case,]

and CP-51-CR-0701981-2005. His appellate docket 1300 EDA 

2019 was not included in this dismissal.

On August 21, 2020, [Sanchez] filed a third[, the instant,] PCRA 

petition. New PCRA counsel was appointed and on October 16, 

20[20], counsel filed an amended petition, requesting that 

____________________________________________

2

It appears from the record that Sanchez filed two separate notices of appeal, 

and each notice contained multiple docket numbers. In particular, each notice 

of appeal contained the above-captioned docket number, CP-51-CR-0406041-

2005. These appeals were docketed as 1300 EDA 2019 and 1301 EDA 2019,

respectively. This resulted in the tortured procedural history that follows.
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[Sanchez’s] appellate rights be reinstated[,] nunc pro tunc[,]

again. He argues that his “appellate rights were violated by prior 

counsel [who] failed to file an Anders brief requesting his 

withdrawal before the December 5, 2019 dismissal and also failed 

to notify [Sanchez] of . . . the appellate [d]ismissal.” 

On November 17, 2020, under docket 1300 EDA 2019, which also 

included [CP-51-CR-0406041-2005], the Superior Court affirmed 

[Sanchez]’s VOP sentence. In a footnote, the Superior Court 

noted “[t]he certified record for each trial court docket contains a 

notice of appeal listing both docket numbers. Although Sanchez 

included both trial court docket numbers on his separate appeals, 

this fact no longer requires quashal.” Commonwealth v. 

Sanchez[, 242 A.3d 425, *2 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

omitted) (unpublished memorandum opinion)]. With respect to 

1300 EDA 2019, prior counsel had filed an Anders brief asserting 

“that there were no non-frivolous issues that support an appeal in 

this case because Sanchez would be unable to establish that the 

trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to six to twelve 

years in prison following his latest probation revocations.” [Id. at 

*5].

On July 1, 2021, the Commonwealth filed its Motion to Dismiss 

[Sanchez’s third PCRA petition], arguing that “no relief is due 

because the Superior Court already reviewed and affirmed 

[Sanchez]’s VOP sentence on appeal.” Motion to Dismiss, 

7/1/21[, at 1.] On September 8, 2021, this [c]ourt sent 

[Sanchez] a [n]otice of [i]ntent to [d]ismiss [p]ursuant to 

[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907. [Sanchez] did not respond to this notice. On 

October 7, 2021, this [c]ourt dismissed [Sanchez]’s petition based 

upon lack of merit. On October 25, 2021, [Sanchez] filed a [timely 

n]otice of [a]ppeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/12/22, at 2-5 (unpaginated) (footnote added, some 

citations omitted).

The PCRA court did not order Sanchez to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Sanchez did not file one. 

Subsequently, on January 1, 2022, it became apparent to this Court that 

Sanchez’s newest PCRA counsel, William Joseph Ciancaglini, Esquire, had 
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failed, on two occasions, to file timely docketing statements. See Order, 

1/20/22, at 1. Accordingly, we remanded the matter, retaining jurisdiction 

and directing the PCRA court to determine whether Attorney Ciancaglini had 

abandoned Sanchez.3 Id. On remand, the PCRA court removed Attorney 

Ciancaglini and appointed current PCRA appellate counsel, Matthew Francis 

Sullivan, Esquire. See Order, 3/23/22, at 1. Attorney Sullivan has since filed 

a compliant docketing statement, an Anders brief, and an application to 

withdraw. Sanchez has not retained private counsel or filed a pro se response.

Prior to reviewing the merits of Sanchez’s claim, we must address 

Attorney Sullivan’s motion to withdraw. Where counsel seeks to withdraw 

from PCRA representation, our Supreme Court has stated that independent 

review of the record by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is 

permitted. Such independent review requires proof of: (1) a “no-merit” letter 

by PCRA counsel detailing the nature and extent of his review; (2) a “nomerit” letter by PCRA counsel listing each issue the petitioner wished to have 

reviewed; (3) PCRA counsel’s explanation, in the “no-merit” letter, as to why 

the petitioner’s issues are meritless; (4) independent review of the record by 

the PCRA or appellate court; and (5) agreement by the PCRA or appellate 

court that the petition was meritless. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

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3 By this Court’s count, at least five attorneys have now abandoned Sanchez. 

See Sanchez, 242 A.3d 425 (Table) (Strassburger, J. concurring) (quoting 

Hall of Fame manager Casey Stengel who said of the hapless (40-120) 

expansion 1962 New York Mets, “Can’t anybody here play this game?”). We 

emphasize our disapproval of the deficient representation Sanchez has been 

subjected to prior to this appeal.
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875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 

(Pa. Super. 2012).

In Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),4this 

Court imposed an additional requirement for counsel seeking to withdraw from 

collateral proceedings:

PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must contemporaneously 

serve a copy on the petitioner of counsel’s application to withdraw 

as counsel, and must supply to the petitioner both a copy of the 

“no-merit” letter and a statement advising the petitioner that, in 

the event that the court grants the application of counsel to 

withdraw, he or she has the right to proceed pro se or with the 

assistance of privately[-]retained counsel.

Id. at 614.

Here, counsel has substantially complied with the Turner/Finley and 

Friend requirements. Counsel has detailed the nature and extent of his 

review, served a copy of his petition to withdraw and appellate brief upon 

Sanchez, informed Sanchez of his right to proceed pro se or with privately 

retained counsel, has raised Sanchez’s sole issue in his brief, and explained 

why Sanchez’s claim is meritless. Thus, Attorney Sullivan has substantially 

complied with the procedural requirements for withdrawal, and we now turn 

to an independent review of the record to determine whether Sanchez’s claim 

merits relief.

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4 This Court’s holding Friend was subsequently overruled on other grounds 

by the Supreme Court in Pitts, supra. However, the additional requirement 

that counsel provide copies of the relevant documentation to the petitioner 

remains intact. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 

2011).
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This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported 

by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 

5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). In evaluating a PCRA court’s decision,

our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

at the trial level. Id. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding 

on this Court where the record supports those determinations. Widgins, 29 

A.3d at 820.

Here, Sanchez contends that he was denied his direct appeal rights with 

regard to his case being dismissed at 1301 EDA 2019. Anders Brief, at 10-

12. Sanchez argues that prior counsel’s failure to file an appellate brief, and 

failure to notify Sanchez of the dismissal, constitutes abandonment. Id. at 

13. Thus, Sanchez asserts that, at 1301 EDA 2019, his counsel’s actions 

constituted per se ineffectiveness. Id.

Sanchez’s claim raises a challenge to prior PCRA counsel’s effectiveness. 

Generally, counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the burden of 

demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this test, appellant 

is required to demonstrate that (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked a reasonable strategic basis; and (3) 

but for counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 

of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Rosado, 
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150 A.3d 425, 429-30 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “However, in limited circumstances, including the actual or 

constructive denial of counsel, prejudice may be so plain that the cost of 

litigating the issue of prejudice is unjustified, and a finding of ineffective 

assistance of counsel per se is warranted.” Id. Generally, a failure to file an 

appellate brief is considered per se ineffective assistance of counsel. See 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (holding PCRA 

counsel’s failure to file appellate brief that resulted in dismissal of petitioner’s 

appeal constituted abandonment for purposes of that appeal, an act which 

was per se prejudicial).

As we emphasized supra, we have significant concerns regarding the 

repeated abandonment by counsel that Sanchez has been subjected to 

throughout the life of this case. Nevertheless, we are constrained to affirm. 

Upon review of the record, we conclude that the facts and procedure of this 

case are distinct from those in Bennett. Instantly, Sanchez’s prior PCRA 

counsel for his appeal at 1301 EDA 2019 failed to file an appellate brief, which 

resulted in dismissal of Sanchez’s appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/22, 

at 3-5; see also Sanchez, supra. Additionally, that same PCRA counsel 

failed to communicate said dismissal to Sanchez. See Trial Court Opinion, 

1/12/22, at 4. Ordinarily, such a failure constitutes per se ineffectiveness. 

See Bennett, supra.

However, due to the above-described procedural morass, docket 

number CP-51-CR-0406041-2005 was simultaneously on appeal before this 
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Court at 1300 EDA 2019. See Sanchez, supra. In Sanchez, this Court 

addressed Sanchez’s negotiated plea deal and his subsequent sentence, and 

ultimately affirmed his judgment of sentence.

5

 Id. Because Sanchez’s claim 

has already been addressed by this Court, we cannot conclude that prior PCRA 

counsel’s blatant abandonment at 1301 EDA 2019 rises to the necessary 

prejudice that ordinarily results from the failure to file an appellate brief. 

Moreover, our decision is guided by the “law of the case doctrine,” which states 

that “upon [a] second [or subsequent] appeal, an appellate court may not 

alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by the same 

appellate court[.]” Commonwealth v. Viglione, 842 A.2d 454, 461-62 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). Accordingly, we are constrained to affirm the PCRA court’s 

order, and grant Attorney Sullivan’s application to withdraw.

Order affirmed. Application to withdraw granted. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

____________________________________________

5 We note that in the instant amended PCRA petition on appeal before this 

Court, Sanchez does not specifically state what claims he would raise should 

his direct appeal rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc. See Amended PCRA 

Petition, 10/16/20. However, in his memorandum of law in support of his

amended PCRA petition, he contends that he would challenge the discretionary 

aspects of his VOP sentence. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended 

PCRA Petition, 10/16/20, at 1-3 (unpaginated). This claim was expressly 

addressed—and rejected—in our prior memorandum at 1300 EDA 2019. See 

Sanchez, supra.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023