United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1475

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Clarence J. Harris

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: December 16, 2022

Filed: February 21, 2023 

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Clarence Harris pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1) pursuant to a written plea agreement. He later 

moved to withdraw his guilty plea when the probation office determined that he had 

three or more prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” 

which qualified him for a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). At 
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sentencing, the district court1 denied Harris’s motion, reasoning that the plea 

agreement expressly stated that Harris may be subject to a mandatory minimum 

sentence under the ACCA and that this would not be grounds for withdrawal of his 

plea. The district court then concluded that Harris’s prior convictions indeed 

qualified him for a 15-year sentence under the ACCA and sentenced him 

accordingly. On appeal, Harris argues that the district court erred by not allowing 

him to withdraw his guilty plea and by finding that his criminal history included 

three ACCA predicate offenses. We affirm.

I.

On July 24, 2019, Harris, a convicted felon, was driving a car in St. Louis, 

Missouri. After police officers saw him fail to stop at a stop sign, they activated 

their lights and sirens and attempted to pull his car over. Harris pulled over, but 

when officers got out of their patrol vehicles to approach him, he sped off. A car 

chase ensued during which Harris swerved in and out of oncoming traffic and drove 

through red lights. Before long, Harris lost control of his car, and the car chase 

became a foot chase. Officers eventually subdued him with a Taser and placed him 

under arrest. A search of his car revealed two loaded handguns on the floorboard of 

the front passenger seat.

Harris was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty. The plea agreement stated that the Government had 

independently investigated whether Harris qualified as an armed career criminal 

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and that neither it nor Harris believed that he was. But the 

agreement also stated that Harris may be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence 

of 15 years’ imprisonment if the district court concluded that he was an armed career 

criminal. Indeed, it provided that Harris “is pleading guilty with full knowledge of 

th[is] possibilit[y],” that he had “discussed th[is] possibilit[y] with counsel,” and that

1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Missouri. 
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he would “not be able to withdraw the guilty plea if the Court determines the 

[ACCA] applies.” During Harris’s plea hearing, the district court reviewed these 

provisions with Harris in depth, explaining, “if it is determined that you are an armed 

career criminal . . . then you’re going to have a higher Total Offense Level” and

“we’re not going to know that until after we determine exactly what your criminal 

record is after completing the presentence report.” Harris confirmed that he 

understood and that he had discussed such possibility with his lawyer. The district 

court then accepted Harris’s plea agreement. 

Prior to sentencing, the probation office issued a final presentence 

investigation report (“PSR”), which determined that three of Harris’s prior Missouri 

convictions—two for discharging a weapon at or from a motor vehicle in violation 

of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(9) and one for resisting felony arrest—were predicate 

violent felonies under the ACCA. Harris objected. He conceded that his resistingarrest conviction and his first unlawful-discharge conviction were ACCA predicates, 

but he insisted that his second unlawful-discharge conviction was not. Harris then 

moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that the Government’s assurance that 

he was not ACCA-eligible had improperly induced him to plead guilty. The district 

court denied his motion and explained that Harris’s argument was contradicted by 

the plain terms of the plea agreement and by Harris’s own representations at his plea 

hearing.

At sentencing, the district court concluded that Harris’s second unlawfuldischarge conviction was a proper ACCA predicate and that Harris therefore 

qualified for a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court then sentenced 

Harris to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum. 

II.

We begin with Harris’s argument that the district court should have permitted 

him to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after the 

court accepts the plea but before it imposes a sentence where he shows a “fair and 
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just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We review 

the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Seys, 27 F.4th 606, 610 (8th Cir. 2022). 

Harris argues that the PSR’s conclusion that he qualified as an armed career 

criminal is a “fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal” because his guilty 

plea was induced by the Government’s representation that it did not believe him to 

be ACCA-eligible. We disagree. Harris’s plea agreement expressly contemplated 

the possibility that the district court might determine him to qualify for an ACCA 

mandatory minimum sentence, and it made clear that this would not create grounds 

for withdrawal. The district court reviewed these provisions of the plea agreement 

with Harris during his plea hearing, emphasizing, “if it is determined that you are an 

armed career criminal . . . then you’re going to have a higher Total Offense Level” 

and “we’re not going to know that until after we determine exactly what your 

criminal record is after completing the presentence report.” The district court also

reiterated that if it turned out that Harris qualified as an armed career criminal, he 

would be subject to a 15-year minimum sentence. Harris unequivocally indicated 

that he understood this possibility, that he had discussed it with his lawyer, and that 

he wished to plead guilty anyway. Given these circumstances, we agree with the 

district court that Harris failed to show any “fair and just reason for requesting the 

withdrawal.” Cf. United States v. Reed, 39 F.4th 1285, 1291, 1293-94 (10th Cir. 

2022) (holding that a defendant was not prejudiced by pleading guilty on the 

erroneous advice of counsel that he was unlikely to be an armed career criminal 

where the defendant was informed in both the plea agreement and plea colloquy 

“that he was potentially subject to ACCA and a mandatory minimum 15 years’ 

imprisonment”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Harris’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

III.

Next, we address the district court’s determination that Harris qualified as an 

armed career criminal. Harris contends that this determination was erroneous 
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because his second unlawful-discharge conviction under Mo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 571.030.1(9) is not a violent felony under the ACCA. Our review is de novo. 

United States v. Clark, 1 F.4th 632, 634 (8th Cir. 2021). 

Under the ACCA, a defendant who is convicted of an offense under § 922(g) 

and has at least three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, 

or both” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 15 years’ 

imprisonment. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a violent felony as “any crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). “Physical force ‘means violent force—that is, force 

capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.’” United States v. 

Schaffer, 818 F.3d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 

U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). Thus, to find that Harris’s second unlawful-discharge 

conviction is an ACCA predicate, we must determine that Mo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 571.030.1(9) contains as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

force capable of causing pain or injury to another. 

Section 571.030.1(9) provides:

A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons, . . . if he or 

she knowingly . . . [d]ischarges or shoots a firearm at or from a motor 

vehicle, as defined in section 301.010, discharges or shoots a firearm at 

any person, or at any other motor vehicle, or at any building or habitable 

structure, unless the person was lawfully acting in self-defense . . . .

Harris concedes that § 571.030.1(9) is divisible, meaning that it “lists elements in 

the alternative, and thereby defines multiple crimes.” See United States v. Libby, 

880 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2018) (brackets omitted). We therefore assume, 

without deciding, that it is divisible and includes four offenses: (1) shooting at 

vehicles; (2) shooting at persons from vehicles; (3) shooting at buildings from 

vehicles; and (4) shooting at vehicles from vehicles. See State v. Barraza, 238 

S.W.3d 187, 191-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although perhaps not a model of 
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draftsmanship, [§ 571.030.1(9)] prohibits shooting at a motor vehicle, from a motor 

vehicle at any other person, building or habitable structure, or from one vehicle at 

another vehicle.”). 

When faced with a divisible statute, we employ the modified categorical 

approach. Libby, 880 F.3d at 1014. Under this approach, we perform “a constrained 

inspection of a limited class of documents” including, as applicable, the indictment, 

jury instructions, plea agreement, and colloquy, to discover “what crime, with what 

elements, a defendant was convicted of.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)); United States v. Irons, 849 

F.3d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The modified categorical approach is used to 

determine which statutory phrase, contained within a statute listing several different 

crimes, covers a prior conviction.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

If the specific offense within § 571.030.1(9) for which Harris was convicted has a 

physical-force element, i.e., if there is no “non-fanciful, non-theoretical manner to 

commit the offense without so much as the threatened use of physical force,” then 

his conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. See United States v. Hamilton, 46 

F.4th 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2022) (brackets omitted).

We therefore consult the indictment to which Harris pleaded guilty. It states: 

The Grand Jurors of the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, charge that 

the defendant . . . committed the class B felony of unlawful use of a 

weapon, punishable upon conviction under . . . [§] 571.030.9, . . . in that 

on 10/29/04, in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, the defendant, 

while within the city limits of the City of St. Louis knowingly shot a 

firearm from a Red Ford Explorer, a motor vehicle, at other persons. 

(emphasis added). 

This language makes clear that Harris pleaded guilty to the § 571.030.1(9) offense 

of shooting at other persons from a motor vehicle. See Barraza, 238 S.W.3d at 191-

92. The final step, then, is to determine whether this offense has a physical-force 

element. We conclude that it does because there is no “non-fanciful, non-theoretical 
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manner” to knowingly shoot at other persons from a motor vehicle “without so much 

as the threatened use of physical force.” See Hamilton, 46 F.4th at 868; see also

United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that a Minnesota 

conviction for recklessly shooting a firearm “at or toward a person” had a physical 

force-element under the ACCA).2

 Accordingly, the district court did not err in 

concluding that Harris qualified for a mandatory minimum of 15 years’ 

imprisonment under the ACCA. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

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2

Although the Supreme Court has since abrogated Fogg by holding that 

offenses resulting from merely reckless conduct are not violent felonies under the 

ACCA, Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1821-22 (2021), 

Harris pleaded guilty to knowingly shooting at other persons from a motor vehicle, 

which easily satisfies the ACCA’s physical-force requirement, see id. at 1826-27.