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RECORD OF EX PARTE CONTACT

IDENTIFICATION OF NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (NPRM) DOCKETS:

AD Docket Number Directorate 

Identifier

Date published in 

the Federal Register

Date comment 

period closed

Affected airplane 

models

FAA-2013-1071 2013-NM-204-AD January 10, 2014 February 24, 2014 The Boeing 

Company Model 777 

airplanes

FAA-2014-0126 2013-NM-236-AD March 5, 2014 April 21, 2014 The Boeing 

Company Model 757 

airplanes

FAA-2014-0127 2013-NM-237-AD March 5, 2014 April 21, 2014 The Boeing 

Company Model 767 

airplanes

FAA-2014-0194 2014-NM-022-AD April 14, 2014 May 29, 2014 The Boeing 

Company Model 

737NG airplanes

FAA-2014-0773 2014-NM-068-AD November 17, 2014 January 2, 2015 The Boeing 

Company Model 

787-8 airplanes

TYPE OF CONTACT: Teleconference

DATE AND TIME OF TELECONFERENCE: Wednesday, January 21, 2015; 1300

NAMES OF ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN CONTACT, INCLUDING TITLES AND AFFILIATION:

FAA participants:

Jeff Duven, Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) Manager, ANM-100

Dionne Palermo, TAD AFS Liaison PM, ANM-106

Douglas Anderson, Deputy Chief Counsel, ANM-7

Chris Glover, FAA Counsel, ANM-7

Rebel Nichols, Senior Aerospace Engineer, ANM-140S

Ross Landes, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) Manager, ANM-100S

Scott Fung, Branch Manager, ANM-140S

Rose Opland, AD Program Manager, ANM-114

Steve Douglas, Flight Standards Service, Maintenance Division Manager, ANM-300
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Industry participants:

Bob Ireland, Airlines for America (A4A)

Mark Lopez, A4A

Ed Walton, United Parcel Service (UPS)

Mike Arata, United Airlines

Kent Horton, Southwest Airlines

Mark Molin, FedEx

Ray Carroll, FedEx

Larry Slate, The Boeing Company

Jon Oberdick, American Airlines

Joe Nolan, Alaska Airlines

Gregg Brown, Southwest Airlines

Doug Hill, Airbus

Valentino Venier, Airbus

TOPIC(S) DISCUSSED:

Background: The purpose of the teleconference was to provide an opportunity for A4A/operators to clarify to 

the FAA the operational impacts to operators related to the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) listed 

above. The NPRMs were prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 

replacement. The NPRMs propose to require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new 

airworthiness limitations. The FAA proposed these NPRMs to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel 

shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of 

certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.

FAA Discussion: 

Mr. Duven opened the discussion by explaining that the TAD takes issues raised by industry seriously. He said 

the TAD appreciates industry raising the issues now, rather than waiting until after the final rules are issued. He 

indicated that, when necessary, this is the best way of approaching such concerns. 

Ms. Palermo reviewed the agenda for the teleconference. The purpose of the teleconference is to provide an 

opportunity for the FAA to hear concerns from industry regarding the NPRMs identified previously so the FAA 

can move forward appropriately. The FAA is in a listening mode and will request clarification as necessary. 

Ms. Palermo explained the ground rules for the teleconference, and clarified that the FAA cannot discuss any

potential changes that might be made to any ADs.

Mr. Glover explained the concept of ex parte (one-sided) communications, as discussed in Chapter 3 of the AD 

Manual, FAA Order 8040.1C. He explained what the chapter means in the context of this meeting. Since we 

have not yet published final rules for the ADs in question, this discussion is considered an ex parte 

communication. Ex parte discussions after the comment period has closed are “strongly discouraged” under 

DOT policy (14 CFR Part 11, App. 1), and we are limited to seeking clarification of comments to the NPRMs 

that have been published. In these cases, the FAA can ask for more information regarding specific comments to 

the public docket. Discussions must be limited to those comments.
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Mr. Glover noted that a record of the discussion must be made available in the AD dockets for all ADs that 

address the identified issue so the public has a fair view of this discussion before the FAA makes its final 

determination. Therefore, the minutes of this teleconference will be posted in the associated online AD dockets 

in the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) to provide notice to industry. The FAA will consider all 

comments given today along with other comments that have been received in response to the NPRMs. If there 

is any substantive change to the ADs because of this meeting, the FAA might consider reopening the comment 

periods.

Mr. Landes provided the context for the discussion, including a brief overview of the NPRMs to be discussed. 

He explained the general process the TAD uses for all ADs that address operational or maintenance issues, 

including involvement of flight test pilots, maintenance inspectors, Flight Standards (Aircraft Evaluation Group) 

offices, and the Certificate Management Offices (CMOs) that oversee air carriers. If any ADs contain issues in 

question, the FAA has pilots that will fly on air carriers (as part of the surveillance of CMOs) and evaluate any

required operational checks. Mr. Landes added that the TAD “does the right homework” in advance of issuing

NPRMs for comment to ensure operational impacts are considered.

Industry Discussion:

Mr. Ireland said that the overarching concern for the teleconference is the accomplishment of checks by pilots 

versus maintenance personnel, as well as timing and potential impacts of a finding in the operational 

environment. 

Mr. Horton, on behalf of Southwest Airlines, said that the NPRMs predominately involve equipment 

malfunction checks and stated the airline’s preference is that a maintenance technician accomplish the AD, 

rather than a pilot; however, the timing of the required checks drives this. He emphasized that the check 

interval must be safely demonstrated. He noted that 10 days would be a viable interval to keep the actions in the 

maintenance realm. Anything less (e.g., 7 days) would require the airline to find alternatives and involve 

flightcrews, which would be their second preference for ensuring compliance..

Mr. Arata, on behalf of United Airlines, also expressed concern about the check interval. He stated that the 

airline wants to know—from a safety and risk assessment—what drove the interval. Mr. Arata noted the high 

impact on operations. He requested clarification regarding the term “calendar days.” That is, does this term 

mean once a day for an airplane in operation, i.e., once per “operational day?” Or does the calendar day count 

even if an airplane is undergoing maintenance, for example? The requirement does not appear to provide 

flexibility for different situations. Mr. Arata said the airline interprets “calendar day” to mean a day when the 

airplane is in operation. He indicated that, if the interval remains at a daily check, the involvement of 

flightcrews would be necessary. However, if it is changed to a more reasonable interval, they can make it a 

maintenance check. Additionally, the availability of the valve is a concern. 

Mr. Duven asked if, as part of Safety Management System (SMS) or other internal procedures, airlines have 

done a risk assessment. He noted there is not much detail or data provided in the comments to the NPRMs, so it 

is unclear how the conclusions were reached and it is more meaningful to have that information in these 

situations. Mr. Horton stated Southwest Airlines did not do a risk assessment, but could take an action and 

provide the information to the FAA. 
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Mr. Arata added that no SMS assessment was done with regard to the technical aspects of the motor-operated 

valve (MOV). He stated that the airline relies on the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for this 

assessment. The airline does the compliance planning. They assess the technician’s availability and 

accessibility to do the checks. Mr. Arata also stated that they assessed the various scenarios and determined an

end-of-day checklist to be the lowest risk scenario to maintain compliance.

Mr. Duven asked for clarification concerning reliance on an OEM’s assessment – i.e., does Boeing give the 

airline an assessment, and did Boeing share the work the FAA did with them? Also, what degree of information

is given to operators if they are depending on others to do the assessment for them? Mr. Arata said Boeing’s 

engagement with United Airlines has been around logistical aspects to retrofit the fleet. A risk assessment done 

by Boeing has not been shared. The airline trusts the safety review process at Boeing and the FAA and does not 

expect it to be shared with them. 

Mr. Oberdick, on behalf of American Airlines, noted that he has the same comments concerning daily checks of 

the 737, 757, and 767 fleets. He raised a concern about the ability to obtain approvals of alternative methods of 

compliance (AMOCs). The airline wants to retrofit quickly but also wants to avoid any compliance issue. They

first want to be sure the -76 (part) will be an approved terminating action before they spend several million 

dollars on it.

Mr. Duven asked if there were any additional clarifying comments about AMOCs. Mr. Nichols said these 

concerns will be considered and addressed in responses to comments in the final rules.

Mr. Duven wrapped up the discussion by stating the TAD will consider all comments and, if we find that 

adjustments are necessary, changes will be explained in the final rules. Mr. Duven also noted that the TAD 

works hard with Boeing on safety assessments, and sometimes Boeing and the FAA reach different positions. 

Mr. Duven suggested that sometime in a future A4A meeting, an “after action” review could be held to share 

information regarding our respective safety processes. This would provide a broader awareness of those 

processes (disconnected from these particular AD actions). He noted that in light of maturing safety processes, 

people operate with assumptions that may no longer be correct. We need to figure out how we can build better 

understanding of safety processes, considerations, steps taken, etc. A4A took this suggestion as an action for a 

future agenda.

COMMITMENTS MADE BY FAA/DOT PERSONNEL:

Ms. Palermo closed the meeting with an outline of the next steps:

- FAA will post the minutes of the teleconference in summary form into the AD dockets of affected proposed 

rules.

- FAA will notify A4A when the minutes are posted.

- FAA will proceed with evaluating the comments received today.

- FAA will notify A4A when the first final rule is issued.

Were any documents discussed? ( X ) YES (attach copies or reference) ( ) No
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Links: 

(1) Notices of proposed rulemaking: Click here and enter the FAA docket number listed above: 

http://www.regulations.gov. 

(2) Chapter 3, Ex parte, from the AD Manual, 8040.1C: Click here and enter 8040.1C: 

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgOrders.nsf/MainFrame?OpenFrameset. 

PREPARED BY: Ms. Rose Opland, FAA DATE: January 21, 2015

THIS FORM IS TO BE PLACED IN THE PUBLIC DOCKETS

FOR THE SUBJECT RULEMAKING ACTIONS.