### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE February 11, 2016 Session

TAMBRA JO SWONGER v. JAMES HENRY SWONGER

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County
No s

. 128217, 129498 Gregory S. McMillan , Judge

No. E2015

- 01130

- COA

- R3

- CV

- FILED

- APRIL 28, 2016

This appeal arises from a default judgment entered in a divorce action, wherein the wife was granted

, inter alia

, a permanent order of protection against the husband. The husband sought to have the permanent order of protection provision contained i n the parties‟ divorce decree set aside, asserting that the statutory scheme pertaining to orders of protection did not provide authority for entry of a permanent, open

- ended order of protection. The trial court entered an order denying relief to the husb and and affirming its entry of a permanent order of protection. Husband timely appealed. Determining that the trial court was without statutory authority to enter a permanent order of protection with no time limitation, we vacate that portion of the tria l court‟s order. We reinstate the court‟s temporary injunction prohibiting the husband from “harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing” the wife . W e remand to the trial court for entry of a written order containing findings of fact and conclusions o f law constituting grounds for a permanent injunction , if granted, and for satisfaction of any other requirements pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65 regarding injunctions.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgment of the Circuit Court Vacated in Part, Affirmed in Part ; Case Remanded

T HOMAS R. F RIERSON

, II, J. , delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. M ICHAEL S WINEY
, C.J., and J OHN W. M C C LARTY

, J. , joined.

Lin Phillips

, Knoxville

, Tennessee, for the appellant

, James Henry Swonger.

Robert Downs, Legal Aid Society of East Tennessee

, Knoxville , Tennessee, for the appellee

, Tambra Jo Swonger.2 OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, James Henry Swonger (“Husband”) appeals the trial court‟s order modifying an existing one

- year order of protection against Husband to a permanent order on behalf of the petitioner, Tambra Jo Swonger (“Wife”). The parties were married at the
time Wife filed a petition for an order of protection on June 4, 2013. In her petition, Wife alleged years of abuse on the part of Husband, as well as a specific incident of abuse occurring on May 21, 2013, which caused Wife to be hospitalized for sev eral days with grave injuries

.

The trial court granted an ex parte order of protection on June 6, 2013. The court subsequently entered two bridging ex parte orders of protection on June 20, 2013, and July 25, 2013, respectively. On August 1, 2013, th e court entered an agreed one

- year order of protection, restraining Husband from any contact with Wife. Husband was also ordered to attend forty

- five weekly meetings of the Domestic Violence Intervention Group and to obtain a substance abuse assessment.

On September 25, 2013, the trial court issued a notice of attachment against Husband for noncompliance with the order of protection. Husband appeared before Magistrate Brenda Lindsay

- McDaniel on October 24, 2013, submitting an affidavit of indigency. Fi nding Husband to be indigent, the magistrate appointed Husband‟s current counsel to represent Husband on that same date . The magistrate set the case for hearing on the contempt charge and compliance review on October 28, 2013. I t is undisputed
that durin g the October 28, 2013 hearing, Husband was personally served with a complaint for divorce, which Wife had filed that day under a new docket number. Although Husband‟s counsel was present for the compliance hearing, counsel was apparently not served with the complaint.

In her complaint, Wife requested a divorce based up on the ground of inappropriate
marital conduct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36

- 4

- 101(a)(11). She also requested that the court modify the existing one

- year order of protection to a permanent o rder of protection. Husband did not file an answer to the complaint. On January 9, 2014, Wife filed a motion for default judgment and a notice of hearing, serving both up on Husband at the Knox County Detention Center, where he was incarcerated

. Meanwhil e, r egarding the question of Husband‟s compliance with the order of protection, the court entered a n o rder on January 16, 2014, stating: “[Husband] has been in continuous incarceration and is expected to remain such indefinitely and has been unable to com ply with the order and compliance will be reviewed on 4/1/ 2 014.”3

Following a hearing conducted on January 22, 2014, the trial court entered an “Order of Permanency of Order of Protection,” modifying the one

- year order of protection to a permanent one wi th no expiration date

. A judgment of default was also entered on that date, in which the court noted that Husband had failed to enter an appearance or defend himself in the divorce action. The court subsequently granted Wife
a divorce v i a final decree en tered February 5, 2014, upon the ground of inappropriate
marital conduct. In the final decree, the court again stated that “Wife‟s Order of Protection in Knox County, Fourth Circuit Court, Docket No. 13

- 128217 is made permanent.” No appeal was filed from this decree.

On March 11, 2014, the trial court entered a second order regarding compliance with the order of protection , stating, inter alia , “[Husband] has been in continuous incarceration and has been bound by the grand jury . . . . His compliance will be
review ed on 9/9/14.” On January 21, 2015, Husband, acting through counsel, filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55.02 motion to dismiss the permanent order of protection. Wife filed a “Memorandum of Authorities” in response on February 9, 20 15. Husband subsequently responded with a memorandum on February 12, 2015.

The trial court entered an order on May 20, 2015, denying Husband‟s motion to dismiss and reaffirming entry of a permanent order of protection within the divorce judgment. Husba nd timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Husband presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated slightly:

1. Whether the trial court erred by interpreting Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36

- 3

- 603(a) as relieving the court of time constraints imposed on orders of protection p ursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated §§ 36

- 3

- 60 5 and

- 608

.

2. Whether the trial court erred by perman ently extending the order of protection upon insufficient evidence.

3. Whether the trial court erred by decli ning to overturn the permanent order of protection due to a lack of notice to Husband‟s counsel of
record.4 III. Standard of Review

Husband s eeks review of the trial court‟s entry of a default judgment against him, which provided

, inter alia , that the one

- year order of protection entered against Husband in a separate action would be modified to a permanent order of protection with no expiration date. Regarding review of a default judgment, this Court has previously
elucidated that “ motions to set a side default judgments are addressed to the trial court‟s
discretion. ” State ex rel. Jones v. Looper , 86 S.W.3d 189, 193

- 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Our Supreme Court has addressed the proper scope of review for an abuse of discretion
as follows:

Discret ionary decisions must take the applicable law and the relevant
facts into account. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga

– Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008); Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to guide the particular discretionary decision. State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007). A court abuses its
discretion w hen it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence. State v. Ostein

, 293 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Tenn. 2009); Konvalinka v. Chattanooga

– Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d at 358; Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d [22,] 42 [(Tenn. 2005)]

.

To avoid result

- oriented decisions or seemingly irreconcilable precedents, reviewing cou rts should review a lower court‟ s discretionary decision to determine (1) whether the factual basis for the decision is properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the lower court properly identified an d applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and (3) whether the lower court ‟ s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions. Flautt & Mann v. Council of Memphis, 285 S.W.3d 856, 872

- 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting BIF, a Div. of Gen. Signal Controls, Inc. v. Service Constr. Co.,
No. 87

- 136

- II, 1988 WL 72409, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1988) (No
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed)). When call ed upon to review a lower court‟ s discretionary deci sion, the reviewing court should review the underlying factual findings using the preponderance of the evidence
standard contained in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) and should review the lower5

court ‟ s legal determinations de novo without any presumption of

correct ness. Johnson v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2004); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d [203,] 212 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)]

.

Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher , 312 S.W.3d 515, 524

- 25 (Tenn. 2010)

. T his Court has further explaine d that “[t] rial courts should grant relief whenever any reasonable doubt exists concerning whether the default judgment should be set aside. ” Nelson v. Simpson , 826 S.W.2d 483, 485

- 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

IV. Propriety of Default Judgment Granting Permanent Order of Protection

Husband asserts that the trial court erred in granting a default divorce judgment
modif ying the existing one

- year order of protection by extending it indefinitely. Motions seeking to set aside a default judgment are controlled by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55.02, which provides:

For good cause shown the court may set aside a judgment by default in
accordance with Rule 60.02.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 provides for relief “upon such terms as a re just” from final judgments, orders, or proceedings based on the following grounds:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of a n adverse party; (3) the judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Husband contends that the provision contained within the default judgment indefinitely extend ing the existing order of protection was void because the trial court

was cons trained to grant only th os e remedies available pursuant to Ten nessee Code Annotated § § 36

- 3

- 601, et seq ., the statute s concerning orders of protection

. Therefore, according to Husband, an order of pro tection must be issued for a definite time per iod not to exceed one year (or five or ten years if violations are proven). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36

- 3

- 605 and

- 608. Wife posits, however, that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 603 allows for an order of protection to be extended indefinitely if a divorce action is
filed. We agree with Husband.6

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 603 provides :

(a) If an order of protection is ordered by a court and either the petitioner or respond ent files a complaint for divorce, the order of protection shall
remain in effect until the court in which the divorce action lies modifies or
dissolves the order.

(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a petitioner from requesting relief
under this section in a divorce action.

The trial court relied in part upon this statutory section in its order denying Husband‟s motion seeking to set aside the permanent order of protection. The court specifically held that “[u]nder Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 603 , Plaintiff was not limited to seeking a modification of the one year order of protection within the order of protection matter.”
The court further stated in pertinent part :

[T]his Court was not provided with any authority that would establish th at a divorce court, exercising jurisdiction over a pending order of protection case, is so limited as Plaintiff asserts. Rule 65.07 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that “[i]n domestic relations cases restraining orders or i njunctions may be issued upon such terms and conditions and remain in force for such time as shall seem just and proper to the judge to whom application therefor is made, . . . .”

In this case, the divorce court and the court hearing the Order of
Protect ion were one and the same. The Court heard testimony in both matters [and] was authorized based upon the proof heard, to make the Order of Protection between the parties permanent as prayed for within the Complaint for Divorce. See, Thomas R. Jones, Jr. v. Heather L. Rusch
Jones , 2007 Tenn. App. Lexis 452 at *6,7.

(Paragraph number ing omitted.)

Based upon our thorough review of the entire statutory scheme regarding orders of protection, however, we disagree with the trial court‟s analysis. As our Supr eme Court has previously explained regarding issues involving statutory construction:

Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewable on a de novo basis without any presumption of correctness. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000); Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co.,7

970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998). When dealing with statutory interpretation, well

- defined precepts apply. Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening or restri cting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if t he obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating
the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts a re consistent and reasonable.” Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of Chattanooga

, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner , 295 S.W.3d 610, 6 13

- 14 (Tenn. 2009)

. Construing the statutory scheme concerning orders of protection so that its component parts “ are consistent and
reasonable ” and avoiding an interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another ,” see id . at 614, we determine that no authority provid es for the issuance of a permanent, open

- ended order of protection.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 601, et seq

. , provides the statutory framework pertaining to orders of protection . This statutory scheme contains sections mandating that a definite time frame be specified for such orders. For example, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 60 5 provides that upon the filing of a petition, an ex parte order of protection may be issued immediately (for good c ause shown). The statute fur t her provides:

(b) Within fifteen (15) days of service of such order on the respondent under this part, a hearing shall be held, at which time the court shall either dissolve any ex parte order that has been issued, or shall, if the petitioner8

has proved the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, extend the order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year , unless a further hearing on the
continua tion of such order is requested by the respondent or the petitioner; in which case, on proper showing of cause, such order may be continued for a further definite period of one (1) year , after which time a further hearing must be held for any subsequent on e

- year period . Any ex parte order of protection shall be in effect until the time of the hearing, and, if the hearing is held within fifteen (15) days of service of such order, the ex parte order shall continue in effect until the entry of any subsequent o rder of protection issued pursuant to § 36

- 3

- 609. If no ex parte order of protection has been issued as of the time of the hearing, and the petitioner has proven the allegation of domestic abuse, stalking or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidenc e, the court may, at that time, issue an order of protection for a definite period of time, not to exceed one (1) year

.

* * *

(d) Within the time the order of protection is in effect, any court of competent jurisdiction may modify the order of pr otection , either upon the
court‟ s own motion or upon motion of the petitioner. If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36

- 3

- 612, and is found to be in violation of the order, the court may extend the order of pro tection up to five (5) years . If a respondent is properly served and afforded the opportunity for a hearing pursuant to § 36

- 3

- 612, and is found to be in a second or subsequent violation of the order, the court may extend the order of protection up to ten (10) years . No new petition is required to be filed in order for a court to modify an order or extend an order pursuant to this subsection (d).

Tenn. Code Ann

. § 36

- 3

- 605 (emphasis added)

. Pursuant to this Court‟s construction of

t his statutory section

, at a hearing following entry of an ex parte order of protection, a
trial court has only two options: (1) to dissolve the ex parte order of protection; or (2) to

exten d the order of protection for a definite period not to exceed one year

. See Merriman
v. M erriman , No. E2010

- 00013

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2010 WL 3767116 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010)

.

Likewise

, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 60 8 provides:

(a) All orders of protection shall be effective for a fixed period of time, not to exceed one (1) year.9

(b) The court may modify its order at any time upon subsequent motion filed by either party together with an affidavit showing a change in
circumstances sufficient to warrant the modification.

(Emphasis added.) This Court has also construed this statut ory section to mean that an order of protection is effective “ for a determinate period of time. ” See Aibangbee v. Aibangbee , No. M2005

- 02598

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2007 WL 1202409 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2007)

.

We emphasize that “ w hen a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Our obligation is simply to enforce the written language. ” In re Estate of Tanner , 295 S.W.3d at 613 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, a statute
should be construed so that its component parts “are consistent and reasonable

, ” avoiding an interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act repugnant to another

. ” See id . at 614 . Therefore, we cannot conclude, as Wife suggests,
that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 603 is not subject to the time

- period restrictions
set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36

- 3

- 60 5 and

- 608. Based upon these statutory provision s, we conclude that the trial court lacked statutory authority to issue a permanent, open

- ended order of protect ion in this case. 1

The trial court also relied upon Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65 .07 as authority for its ability to issue a permanent order of protection for an indefinite time period . Rule 65 concerns injunctive relief in general, setting forth the requisites for obtaining such relief and the parameters of restraining orders and injunctions. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.07 provides:

The provisions of this Rule shall be subject to any contrary statutory provisions governing restraining orders or injunctions. In domestic relations cases, restraining orders or injunctions may be issued upon such terms and conditions and remain in force for such time as shall seem just and proper to the judge to whom application therefor is made, and the

p rovisions of this Rule shall be followed only insofar as deemed appropriate by such judge.

1 We note that the trial court relied upon this Court‟s opinion in Jones v. Rusch

- Jones , No. E2006

- 01998

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2007 WL 2067758 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2007), as authority for the issuance of a permanent order of protection. In the Jones opinion, however, no issue was raised regarding whether the statutory scheme provided authority for such action by the trial court

. We therefore determine that the
Jones opinion is not controlling in the case at bar.10

With regard to the construction of such rules, our Supreme Court has explained:

Interpretation of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, whic h we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Lacy v. Cox, 152 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tenn. 2004). The rules of statutory construction guide our interpretation of these rules. Thomas v. Oldfield, 279 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that “[a]lt hough the rules of civil procedure are not statutes, the same rules of statutory construction apply”). Our primary interpretive objectiv e is to effectuate the drafters‟ intent without broadening or restricting the intended scope of the rule. See
Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). We achieve this objective by examining the text, and if the language is unambiguous, we simply apply the plain meaning of the words used. Garrison v. Bickford, 377 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tenn. 2012). Our duty is to en force the rule as
written. See Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn. 2008).

Fair v. Cochran , 418 S.W.3d 542, 544 (Tenn. 2013)

. T he plain language of Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 65.07 provides that “[t] he provisions of this Rule shall be subject to any contrary statutory provisions governing res training orders or injunctions.” Therefore, by its own terms, Rule 65.07 is subordinate to the above statutory scheme establishing the time periods of orders of protection. 2 As such, the trial court erred in relying on Rule 65.07 as authori zing the issu ance of an order of protection without
consideration of the time restraints set forth in the statute.

Based upon the foregoing authority, we conclude that the permanent and unlimited order of protection issued by the trial court exceeded the authority granted by Tennessee
Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 6 01, et seq . We note, however, that Wife also requested in her divorce complaint that the trial court issue an injunction restraining both parties from

, inter alia

, “harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing the other . . . .” The trial court granted s uch an injunction on a temporary basis upon the filing of the complaint pursuant

to T ennessee Code Ann otated § 36

- 4

- 106, which prov ides that such injunction can be modified by the court. Because Wife sought a permanent order of protection in her complaint, which remedy is outside the authority granted by the order of protection statute, we will construe her request as one for a perma nent injunction pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See, e.g., Willcutts v. Willcutts , No. W2002

-

2 We note also that the “Tennessee R ules of Civil Procedure . . . are „laws‟ of this state, in full force and effect, until such time as they are superseded by legislative enactment or inconsistent rules promulgated by this Court and adopted by the General Assembly.” State v. Hodges , 815 S. W.2d 151, 155 (Tenn. 1991).11

02636

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2004 WL 404497 at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2004). We therefore reverse the trial court‟s grant of a permanent order of protection as void, such remedy being unavailable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36

- 3

- 601, et seq

. We modify the provision contained in the final decree to instead grant a n injun ction to Wife,
which restrains Husband from “harassing, threatening, assaulti ng, or abusing ” Wife. 3 We affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all other respects.

We note , however, that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65.04 requires that a
court “set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action as required by Rule 52.01” when modifying a temporary injunction. Such findings
and conclusions were not set out in the trial court‟s order in this case. As we have previously explained, when a trial court‟ s order fails to meet the requirements of Rule 52.01, “ the appropriate reme dy is to „vacate the trial court‟ s judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions of law.‟ ” See Hardin
v. Hardin

, No. W2012

- 00273

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2012 WL 6727533 at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2012) (quoting Lake v. Haynes , No. W2010

- 00294

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2011 WL 2361563 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2011)). We therefore vacate the “permanent”
order of protection granted by the final decree . We reinstate the court‟s temporary injunction prohibiting Husband from “harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing”
Wife. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a written order containing findings o f fact and conclusions of law constituting grounds for a ny permanent injunction and for satisfaction of any other requirements pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65 regarding injunctions

. Based upon this ruling, we determine that the other
issu es raised by Husband regarding the order of protection are pretermitted as moot. 4

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court‟s issuance of a permanent,

open

- ended order of protection. We modify the trial court‟s judgment to r einstate the temporary injunction prohibiting Husband from “harassing, threatening, assaulting, or abusing” Wife. We further remand the case to the trial court for entry of a written order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law constituting grounds for a ny permanent injunction and for satisfaction of any other requirements pursuant to

3 We note that nothing in this opinion would prevent Wife from obtaining an order of protection against Husband, upon a proper showing of proof, in addition to the injunction specified herein. See Wiser v.
Wiser , No. M2010

- 022 22

- COA

- R3

- CV, 2011 WL 4729870 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2011) ( “Orders
of Protection can co

- exist with other injunctive relief granted pursuant to divorce.” ).

4 Inasmuch as the permanent order of protection has been vacated, there is no need to address Husband‟s issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for entry of such an order or whether his appointed counsel in the order of protection matter should hav e been served with the motion seeking permanency. Any injunction granted is pursuant to the divorce action, and no dispute exists regarding whether Husband was properly served with the divorce complaint.12

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 65 regarding injunctions. We affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all other respects. Costs on appeal are assessed against t he appellant, James Henry Swonger.

_________________________________ THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II , JUDGE