AFS-16-1825-E

Exemption No. 16098

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

GRYPHON AIR, LLC Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-5943

for an exemption from § 91.1605

of Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations

DENIAL OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated November 9, 2015, Mr. Earl D. Gibbs, President/CEO of Gryphon 

Holdings, LLC, d.b.a. Gryphon Airlines (Gryphon), petitioned the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) on behalf of Gryphon for an exemption from § 91.1605, Special 

Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 77 – Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Baghdad 

(ORBB) Flight Information Region of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The 

proposed exemption, if granted, would allow Gryphon to conduct flight operations with 

aircraft operated by Gryphon and flown by airmen employed by Gryphon to and from 

Baghdad, Balad, Basrah, Erbil, Najaf, Sulaymaniyah, Taji, and Tallil, Iraq to and from points 

outside of Iraq in order to provide medical air evacuation (MEDEVAC) services and VIP 

charter flights.

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.1605 prescribes, in its pertinent part, that no person may conduct flight 

operations in the Baghdad (ORBB) flight information region (FIR) unless such flights are 

conducted under a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement with a department, agency, or 

instrumentality of the United States (U.S.) Government (or under a subcontract between the 

prime contractor of the department, agency, or instrumentality, and the person subject to 

§ 91.1605), with the approval of the FAA, or under an exemption issued by the FAA. This

rule applies to all U.S. air carriers and U.S. commercial operators; all persons exercising the 

privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except such persons operating U.S.-
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registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and all operators of aircraft registered in the United 

States, except where the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier. 

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

Gryphon proposes to conduct MEDEVAC and VIP charter flights between points 

outside of Iraq and the above-mentioned points in Iraq under 14 CFR part 135, using a U.S.-

registered Beechcraft Hawker 800A aircraft operated by Gryphon and flown by airmen 

employed by Gryphon. According to the petitioner, the aircraft would be used to provide

MEDEVAC services and VIP charter flights. Among those to whom Gryphon expects to 

provide MEDEVAC services are medical companies and insurance companies that serve 

employees of contractors and U.S. agencies in Iraq. The petitioner anticipates that those flight 

operations would be conducted to and from Iraq, on the average, twice per week, although the 

frequency of operations could differ. 

Gryphon states it would provide an equivalent level of safety for its flight operations in 

Iraq through several methods. The petitioner would minimize its exposure to attack through 

special crew training and operating procedures (i.e., unpredictable arrival and departure times, 

night operations, circling approaches, minimizing cabin lighting, and other means). Gryphon 

would also obtain security services and intelligence information from reliable sources within 

Iraq and provide enhanced security briefings to its crews by means of direct personal contact, 

mobile phones and onboard satellite phones. Gryphon has stated that it is a member of the 

Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) and will be receiving daily 

security notices for the areas into which it will operate. Gryphon has also applied for 

memebership in the Department of State’s Aviation Security Working Group. According to

the petitioner, Gryphon will also ensure continuous monitoring of aircraft and provide

frequently updated security briefings to aircraft during these flight operations. 

The petitioner points out that Gryphon’s management personnel safely operated an 

average of 10 large-jet passenger flights per week into Iraq (for a non-U.S. operator using nonU.S.-certified airmen) beginning in 2007. According to the petitioner, these flights were 

flown with the approval of the military or the Iraqi Civil Aviation Agency and were conducted 

without incident.

The petitioner contends that certain characteristics of its operations will help safeguard 

those flights from threats. According to the petitioner, due to the small size of the aircraft, it 

will be an extremely difficult target for potential attackers to visually acquire. Gryphon also 

states that its operations will be unscheduled, unpredictable, and nearly impossibly to detect. 

In the case of MEDEVAC flights, the petitioner argues, their short-fused nature increases their 

unpredictability.

The petitioner states that this is an urgent request for exemption, because currently,

U.S. citizens working in Iraq are often MEDEVAC’d on aircraft which are not equipped with

an air ambulance stretcher system, and patients are frequently boarded through over-wing 

emergency exits. The petitioner contends that this practice is unsafe due to slipping and 

tripping hazards for the litter bearers that risk further injury to patients. Gryphon explains that 
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its U.S.-registered Beechcraft Hawker 800A is equipped with a boarding system which was 

specifically designed to safely board stretcher-bound patients onto the aircraft. Further, 

Gryphon points out that its aircraft is also equipped with a proper patient restraint and harness 

system, which would keep the patient in place in the event of a rapid deceleration. The 

petitioner argues that granting this exemption would be in the public interest, because it would 

allow for safe boarding and transporting of stretcher-bound patients out of Iraq, using 

Gryphon’s professionally engineered and installed stretcher boarding system and its FAAsupplemental-type-certificated air ambulance med-bed. Gryphon also contends that its 

services will benefit the public and the U.S. Government by providing an FAA-regulated and 

Fly America Act-compliant product to travelers into or out of Iraq. Gryphon states that other 

operators utilizing inferior equipment and procedures are regularly flying today in the 

Baghdad FIR without incident and that Gryphon’s operations would be very low profile.

Mr. Michiel Van den Berg, General Manager, Assistance Services – Dubai & 

Moscow, International SOS filed a letter supporting Gryphon’s petition. Mr. Van den Berg 

states that International SOS and its subsidiary RMSI collectively provide a comprehensive 

range of medical services globally, including medical evacuations in Iraq. According to Mr. 

Van den Berg, the beneficiaries of these services include the staff of leading multinational oil 

and gas organizations and various governmental organizations, such as the U.S. Department 

of Defense, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, the United Nations and the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Mr. Van den Burg indicates that the 

lack of reliable air ambulance transport has occasionally led to delays, which has placed 

patients’ lives at risk and their medical recovery in jeopardy. Consequently, RMSI has 

contracted with Gryphon, members of which had previously owned and operated a South 

African airline that successfully provided public charter services between Kuwait, Iraq, Dubai, 

and Afghanistan from 2007 to 2014 to improve the quality of air ambulance services for 

RMSI and SOS International clients in Iraq.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for 

Federal Register publication because any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental 

to Gryphon.

The FAA’s analysis is as follows:

In reviewing the petitioner’s request, the FAA focused on the threat environment for 

the proposed flights and the FAA's responsibility for the safety of U.S. operators, U.S. airmen, 

and U.S.-registered civil aircraft. Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 77 was 

initially put into place in October 1996 to address potential hazards to U.S. civil aviation from 

the then Government of Iraq . On November 13, 2003, the FAA determined that certain 

limited overflights of Iraq could be conducted safely following a change in government in 

Iraq, subject to the permission of appropriate authorities in Iraq and in accordance with the 

conditions established by those authorities. Accordingly, the FAA amended SFAR No. 77 to 

permit overflights of Iraq above flight level (FL) 200. That amendment also allowed aircraft 

departing from countries adjacent to Iraq to operate at altitudes below FL 200 within Iraq to 
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the extent necessary to permit a climb above FL 200 if the climb performance of the aircraft 

would not permit operation above FL 200 prior to entering Iraqi airspace.

Effective January 7, 2013, the FAA further amended SFAR No. 77, § 91.1605, to 

allow U.S. civil flight operations between points outside Iraq and the Erbil (ORER) and 

Sulaymaniyah (ORSU) International Airports by persons previously prohibited from

conducting such operations, based on results of evaluations of the airports. Both ORER and 

ORSU had supported non-U.S. air carrier operations for a number of years without incident. 

Based largely on the initiation of those operations and improvements in the operational 

environment, the FAA determined that flights by U.S. operators could be conducted safely to 

those two airports under certain conditions. Therefore, the FAA amended SFAR No. 77, 

§ 91.1605, to allow certain flights within the territory and airspace of Iraq north of 34 degrees 

30 minutes North latitude below FL 200 to and from ORER or ORSU, with certain conditions 

and limitations.

However, by July 31, 2014, the operational environment for U.S. civil aviation in Iraq 

had significantly changed. The resurgence of militant groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq 

and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their 

ongoing combat operations against the Iraqi government and its allies, had led to an increased 

threat to U.S. civil aviation in Iraq. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant had acquired weapons 

from captured Iraqi and Syrian stocks and recruited former military personnel to operate those 

weapons. In addition, ISIL had shot down Iraqi rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft that were

flying at low altitudes and acquired man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and other 

anti-aircraft weapons that provided the capability to target aircraft at higher altitudes. As a 

result, the FAA determined that ISIL posed an increased threat to U.S. civil aviation operating 

in Iraqi airspace at or below FL 300. On July 31, 2014, the FAA issued a NOTAM that 

prohibited U.S. civil flight operations in the territory and airspace of Iraq at or below FL 300. 

The July 31, 2014, NOTAM increased restrictions on operations in the territory and 

airspace of Iraq beyond the restrictions then contained in SFAR No. 77, § 91.1605, which 

remained in effect. The following operations which had been permitted under SFAR No. 77, 

§ 91.1605, were prohibited by the NOTAM: 

(1) Overflights of Iraq above FL 200 but at or below FL 300; 

(2) Operations at or below FL 300 by flights departing from countries adjacent to Iraq 

whose climb performance would not permit operations above FL 300 prior to entering 

Iraqi airspace; and 

(3) Flights within the territory of Iraq north of 34 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude 

originating from or destined to areas outside of Iraq to or from Erbil (ORER) or 

Sulaymaniyah (ORSU).

Less than a month later, on August 7, 2014, President Obama announced that he had 

authorized targeted airstrikes against militants associated with ISIL. On August 8, 2014, U.S. 

forces conducted airstrikes and, on the same day, the FAA issued a NOTAM that prohibited 
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U.S. civil flight operations in the Baghdad (ORBB) FIR at all altitudes due to the hazardous 

situation created by the armed conflict between militants associated with ISIL and the Iraqi 

security forces and their allies. The August 8, 2014, NOTAM superseded the July 31, 2014,

NOTAM. 

On May 11, 2015, an amendment to SFAR No. 77, § 91.1605, revised the rule to 

incorporate the flight prohibitions set forth in the August 8, 2014 NOTAM.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and other anti-government and anti-U.S. militant 

groups continue to be present in Iraq, and there is ongoing fighting in various areas of central, 

western, and northern Iraq. As a result of the continuing conflict and uncertain security 

environment, there is a potential for ISIL or other militant groups to conduct anti-aircraft 

activities throughout Iraq, to include southern Iraq. Various anti-government and anti-U.S. 

militant groups, including ISIL, have used anti-aircraft weapons to fire at Iraqi military 

aircraft, some of which have reportedly been shot down, during the course of the fighting. 

There have also been occasional reports of civilian aircraft being fired on while at low altitude 

over Iraq. Attacks against aircraft in flight and targeting Iraqi airports can occur with little or 

no warning. 

In considering a petition for exemption from a flight prohibition SFAR, the FAA 

evaluates whether granting the requested exemption would provide a level of safety at least 

equal to that provided by the relevant flight prohibition SFAR, not whether the petitioner’s 

operations, if authorized by the FAA, would be safer than services that non-U.S. operators 

may provide. In this instance, the relevant flight prohibition SFAR is SFAR No. 77, which 

applies to the Baghdad (ORBB) FIR and covers the entire country of Iraq. The petitioner has 

described the proposed operations and identified steps that the petitioner would take to 

minimize risks to the proposed operations. These steps include: (1) special crew training and 

operating procedures to minimize exposure to attack; (2) obtaining security and intelligence 

information from sources that the petitioner considers reliable within Iraq; (3) providing 

enhanced security briefings to its crew by means of direct personal contact, mobile phones, 

and onboard satellite phone equipment; (4) continuous monitoring of the aircraft; and (5) 

providing frequently updated security briefings to the aircraft during actual Iraq flight 

operations. However, Gryphon has provided very little detail to the FAA about the content of 

its special crew training and operational procedures and its process and procedures for 

providing enhanced security briefings to its crew, for continuous monitoring of the aircraft, 

and for providing frequently updated security briefings to the aircraft during actual flight 

operations in Iraq. The petitioner also has not clearly identified to the FAA its proposed 

sources of security and intelligence information in Iraq. Consequently, the petitioner has not 

demonstrated how it would achieve a level of safety at least equal that provided by SFAR

No. 77.

It is unclear from the petitioner’s submission and Mr. Van den Berg’s letter of support 

whether some of petitioner’s proposed operations would be properly addressed under the 

request for approval process rather than the exemption process. The FAA grants, when 

appropriate, approvals to authorize flight operations conducted under contracts, grants or 

cooperative agreements with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities (or 
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under subcontracts with the prime contractors of any of the foregoing U.S. Government 

entities) that would otherwise be prohibited by a flight prohibition SFAR. The approval 

process for SFAR No. 77 is described in the final rule that the FAA published on May 11, 

2015, entitled “Prohibition Against Certain Flights Within the Baghdad (ORBB) Flight 

Information Region (FIR) (80 FR 26822). The sponsoring U.S. Government entity itself must 

request approval directly from the FAA on behalf of the person subject to the SFAR with 

whom the sponsoring U.S. Government entity has a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement 

or with whom its prime contractor has a subcontract. 

The FAA’s Decision

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption would not be in the 

public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 

and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, the petition of Gryphon Air, LLC for an 

exemption from 14 CFR § 91.1605 is hereby denied. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on March 25, 2016.

/s/

John S. Duncan

Director, Flight Standards Service
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Project No.: AFS-16-1825-E

Project Officer: _______________

ARM-101:KJones:4/11/2016:Doc# 58218

ARM-1/100/104:Program Office AFS-200

MR. EARL D. GIBBS

PRESIDENT/CEO

GRYPHON HOLDINGS, LLC D.B.A. GRYPHON AIRLINES

393 EAST RIVERSIDE DRIVE, SUITE 3C

SAINT GEORGE, UT 84790