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S. HRG. 112–193 

A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN LIGHT OF 

THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON 

JAPANESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

HEARING 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SPECIAL HEARING 

MARCH 30, 2011—WASHINGTON, DC 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=senate&committee=appropriations 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MARK KIRK, Illinois 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. HOUY, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

JON TESTER, Montana 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii (ex officio) 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

Professional Staff 

DOUG CLAPP

ROGER COCKRELL

LELAND COGLIANI

CAROLYN E. APOSTOLOU (Minority) 

TYLER OWENS (Minority) 

TOM CRAIG (Minority) 

LASHAWNDA SMITH (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

MOLLY BARACKMAN-EDER
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Opening Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein ................................................. 1 

Opening Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander ................................................. 3 

Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg .......................................................... 5 

Statement of Hon. Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission .................................................................................................................. 5 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 8 

Statement of Dr. Peter B. Lyons, Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear 

Energy, Department of Energy ........................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 13 

Statement of Dr. Ernest J. Moniz, Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ................................................................................................ 28 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 29 

Fukushima and Directions for U.S. Nuclear Power ............................................. 29 

Cost ........................................................................................................................... 30 

Relicensing ............................................................................................................... 31 

Spent-fuel Management .......................................................................................... 32 

Statement of William Levis, President and Chief Operating Officer, PSEG 

Power ..................................................................................................................... 33 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 35 

U.S. Nuclear Powerplants Are Safe ....................................................................... 36 

Safety is the U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry’s Top Priority .................................. 36 

The U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry Has a Long History of Continuous Learning .......................................................................................................................... 37 

The U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry Has Already Taken Steps in Response 

to Fukushima ....................................................................................................... 38 

Statement of David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of 

Concerned Scientists ............................................................................................ 39 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 41 

Why Fukushima Made Me Stop Worrying and Love Nuclear Power .................. 49 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 50 

Questions Submitted to Dr. Peter B. Lyons .......................................................... 50 

Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu ............................................. 50 

(1) 

A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN LIGHT OF 

THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON 

JAPANESE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Feinstein, Lautenberg, Durbin, Alexander, and 

Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good morning ladies and gentlemen. And 

welcome to the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee’s 

Oversight Hearing of U.S. Nuclear Power Safety in the aftermath 

of the Japanese nuclear disaster. 

First, let me say, on behalf of the subcommittee, that our 

thoughts are with the people of Japan who continue to suffer. I 

spoke to Ambassador Fujisaki Saturday and conveyed my really 

deep sympathy. I think for all of us who have been watching this 

on television, day after day and through the horrors of both the 

earthquake and the tsunami that we want to extend our very best 

to the people of Japan and our deepest sympathy for what is an 

enormous loss. 

The 9.0 earthquake and resulting tsunami occurred 19 days ago. 

As we speak, workers at the Daiichi nuclear site continue their 

work to contain the situation with the reactors and spent-fuel 

pools. They have been called national heroes and so they should be. 

It will be months before we know what happened and why. So 

it is too early to call this a hearing about lessons learned from the 

disaster in Japan. But we do know enough to start asking some 

critical questions about nuclear energy policy in our own country. 

Last week I visited California’s two nuclear power plants with 

representatives from the United States Geological Survey and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant is near the city of San Luis Obispo, it is one of 

the largest employers in the county. Four hundred and twenty-four 

thousand people live within 50 miles. It employs 1,200 people. Further south, nearly 7.4 million people live within 50 miles of the San 

Onofre Nuclear Generating Station near San Clemente. 
2 

I came away from those visits with some good news. I feel much 

better about the safety precautions that are in place at these nuclear plants. I was very impressed with the dedication, the confidence and the professionalism of the large staffs that run these 

facilities and the regulatory agents who guard against risk. 

But we need to reconfirm that these facilities are designed to endure the threats we can foresee and prepared to respond to scenarios we never imagined, that’s why redundant systems, back up 

systems and plans are so important. 

Most significantly, I truly believe we must begin to rethink how 

we manage spent fuel. Spent fuel must remain in pools, and those 

are the pools that the firemen are pouring water into in Japan, for 

at least 5 to 7 years at which time these rods can be moved to 

safer, dry cask storage. However, these pools often become de facto 

long-term storage, with fuel assemblies re-racked, thus increasing 

the heat load of the pools. In California, for instance, fuel removed 

from reactors in 1984 is still cooling in wet, spent-fuel pools. 

This process may have regulatory approval, but I have a hard 

time understanding why the NRC has not mandated a more rapid 

transfer of spent fuel to dry casks. Reports out of Japan indicate 

there were no problems with the dry casks at Daiichi. To me, that 

suggests that we should at least consider a policy that would encourage quicker movement of spent fuel to dry cask storage. 

We must also consider what broader regulatory reforms may be 

necessary, beginning with the review of the United States power 

plant safety. I am very pleased that the NRC will undertake both 

short term and long-term reviews of nuclear plant safety. 

Chairmain Jaczko, I thank you very much for that. This kind of 

self-reassessment is really appropriate. Today, I hope we will get 

a more complete picture of what the NRC intends to do with these 

reviews and how quickly you are likely to act on any new safety 

regulations. 

In addition to NRC’s self-assessment, I think we should take a 

look at some independent analysis of our nuclear power plant safety, with specific attention to threat assessment and the design parameters of our plants. 

Japan has now suffered two earthquakes in the past 4 years that 

were larger than the Japanese thought possible and each devastated a nuclear power plant that was not designed to endure a 

quake of that size. The lesson is that we need to think carefully 

about whether our country has properly estimated the threats to 

our nuclear facilities and designed the facilities to endure them. An 

independent review of the design basis for all U.S. plants, I believe, 

should be a priority. 

The nuclear R&D program currently funds work related to existing plants, future reactor designs and waste issues. The question 

becomes: Do we have the right focus and balance to promote increased safety? 

The spent fuel at Daiichi posed a significant problem, contributing to at least one of the hydrogen explosions. So, what can our 

R&D programs do to address issues of remaining spent-fuel energy 

and hydrogen? 
3 

Funding constraints are already requiring programs to rerank 

R&D priorities. Perhaps the events at Daiichi will also contribute 

to that rethink. 

It is clear that we lack a comprehensive national policy to address the nuclear fuel cycle, including management of nuclear 

waste. Creating more waste without a plan increases our risk and 

exposes taxpayers to more payments from utilities. 

This hearing is not focused on nuclear waste, but I think it is 

hard to look at the other aspects of nuclear power and not recognize our lack of appropriate, permanent, retrievable storage. 

So, we will be exploring these issues today. On our first panel, 

we will hear from Greg Jaczko, the chairman of the NRC. I have 

had the pleasure of meeting with him and look forward to his testimony. We will also hear from Pete Lyons, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at the Department of Energy (DOE). 

Our second panel will include Dr. Ernie Moniz from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) who has a long history in 

this area and is currently serving on the Blue Ribbon Commission 

developing a long-term plan for nuclear waste. We will also hear 

from William Levis, the president and chief operating officer at 

PSEG Power. PSEG operates the same reactor model as those at 

the Daiichi site. Our third witness on the panel is Dave Lochbaum 

from the Union of Concerned Scientists. Mr. Lochbaum has a long 

history inside and outside the nuclear power industry. So we look 

forward to your testimony. 

Let me now turn to my distinguished ranking member, with 

whom it’s a great pleasure to work. We have actually worked together in the prior session on the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Subcommittee. And I think this is our first hearing 

on this subcommittee. 

So, I want you to know I very much look forward to working with 

you in the same way we did on Interior. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAMAR ALEXANDER

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you 

for that and thank you for hosting this hearing in a timely way and 

having the witnesses here whom we ought to be hearing from—people who know what they are talking about and are in charge of the 

safety and usefulness of our nuclear program. 

Those of us who support nuclear power as a part of the mix of 

electricity generation in the United States, and for the world, ought 

to be among the first to ask questions about what can we learn 

from what happened in Japan, about the safety of our own reactors: the 104 commercial reactors that we have in the United 

States; those that are on the drawing board at the NRC; and the 

large number of nuclear reactors in our nuclear Navy which have 

been operating since the 1950s. 

The questions I will be looking forward to hearing more about 

are similar to those that Senator Feinstein mentioned. What kind 

of safety enhancements have been made at our current nuclear 

plants since they have been in operation? How will the safety capabilities of the next generation of reactors improve over reactors that 

are in service not just in the United States, but around the world 

today? What about new technologies? One of the most important 
4 

things that the Federal Government can do about clean energy is 

research. We have the capacity for that. 

I was in Great Britain for 3 days last week and they reminded 

me that we are the ones with the national labs; we are the ones 

with the great research universities. And if any country is going to 

have advanced research in clean energy, it ought to be the United 

States. We could do that for ourselves and for the world. And nuclear power is one area where we could do that. 

The chairman has mentioned one area of advanced research, 

which is improving the way we recycle used nuclear fuel. Another 

would be research on small modular reactors (SMR). Can we build 

125 megawatt reactors or smaller reactors as a part of our future? 

So those are the kinds of questions that I will be looking for in this 

hearing. 

I thank the chairman for reminding us of the scope of the Japanese tragedy. It is important to put the entire event in perspective 

in several ways. One way is to look at the size of the quake and 

the size of the tsunami and the size of the tragedy. There are hundreds of thousands of people, for example, still homeless in Japan. 

And just like California, by its proximity to the Pacific Ocean, Tennessee has an unusual relationship with the people of Japan because over the years we have become the State with the most Japanese manufacturing, and we are home to many Japanese families 

and friends, so we have felt this tragedy even more than we might 

otherwise have. 

Another way to put this tragedy into perspective is to be aware 

of the record of safety in the United States’ nuclear industry. The 

only deaths we have ever had in connection with reactors in the 

United States happened in 1961 at a research reactor, and that 

that kind of reactor isn’t used anymore in our country. The 104 civilian reactors we have in the United States have never produced 

a fatality. The Navy ships that have been powered by nuclear reactors since the 1950s have never resulted in a fatality from a reactor 

accident. 

And while we have heard a lot of comparisons with Three Mile 

Island—the worst nuclear accident we have had in our country, I 

suppose—no one was injured as a result, which many people don’t 

believe when I say it. 

So the nuclear industry has a safety record in the United States 

that is not surpassed by any other form of energy production. We 

unfortunately have coal mines that blow up, gas plants that blow 

up, and oil rigs that spill, all of which are tragedies and we hope 

that we continue a good safety record in our nuclear plants. 

I think it is also important to keep in perspective what our alternatives to nuclear energy are. Every form of energy we have carries 

with it some risk. Again, in listening to those talking in Great Britain this past week, they are going through the same sort of analysis. But they have few alternatives. Forty-five percent of their 

electricity comes from natural gas, which costs twice as much as 

ours does. One-half of their supply comes from Russia, and they 

are not sure that they want to increase that to 80 percent. They 

are closing their coal plants because of their climate change rules. 

And they know that renewables can only provide a fraction of 

intermittent electricity which takes up a lot of space for an island 
5 

that doesn’t have very much space. So their only option is to build 

more nuclear power plants, which is what Great Britain is planning to do. 

And as we look around the world, we see that nuclear power provides 15 percent of the world’s electricity, including 30 percent of 

Japan’s electricity. There are 65 reactors currently under construction worldwide, from Russia and China, to Brazil and Korea; 20 

percent of our electricity in the United States comes from nuclear 

power; 70 percent of our clean electricity—that is sulfur, nitrogen, 

mercury, and carbon-free—comes from nuclear power. So it is hard 

for me to imagine how we have a future in the United States without substantial expansion of nuclear power, especially since some 

coal plants are going to close and some nuclear power plants are 

going to close because they are old. 

So that makes this hearing on what we can learn about safety 

even more important. I thank the chairman for holding the hearing 

and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator, for those excellent comments. 

Senator Lautenberg, welcome. Would you like to make a brief 

statement? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. I’d like to make a longer one, but I 

will make this brief, I think. Just to say, Madam Chairman, this 

not only obviously is timely, but we are pleased to have Mr. Jaczko 

here. I had the chance to meet with him yesterday and I think 

we—the review we had was very productive and I was—I will also 

attest to Mr. Jaczko’s durability, not only his engineering skill, because he came in from Japan and I was—had to speak coming from 

New Jersey, so we welcome you here again, to both witnesses. And 

I look forward to hearing from them. And I thank you, Madam 

Chairman for having the hearing. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Chairman Jaczko and Dr. Lyons, thank you both for being here 

today, you have both been intimately involved with the crisis and 

as Senator Lautenberg said, I understand you just returned, Mr. 

Chairman, from Japan, so we would be most interested in your observations and update on that situation. But, I also want you to be 

looking forward and talk a little bit about the issues the United 

States should consider in learning from this event. 

Your formal statements, gentlemen, will be made part of the 

record, so please summarize, in your oral statement. 

Mr. Chairman, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. JACZKO. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member 

Alexander and Senator Lautenberg. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee 

today to address the response of the NRC to these tragic events 

that you have discussed, in Japan. And as you have mentioned, I 

traveled to Japan over the past weekend and just returned yesterday. And I want to be able to directly convey a message of support 
6 

to our Japanese counterparts. And I had an opportunity to meet 

with senior Japanese Government and TECPO officials and I consulted with the NRC team of experts who are in Japan as part of 

our effort to assist the Japanese response to dealing with the nuclear reactors. And I would note that that is one small part of a 

broader United States effort to provide assistance to the Japanese 

with regard to all of the challenges they are facing as a result of 

this hurricane and tsunami. 

And as many of you have mentioned, I too would like to reiterate 

my condolences and sympathy to all of those who have been affected by the earthquake and the tsunami in Japan. Our hearts go 

out to all of those who have been dealing with the aftermath of 

these natural disasters and we are mindful of the long and difficult 

road they will face in recovering. 

Since Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami 

struck, the NRC’s headquarters operation center has been operating on a 24-hour basis to monitor and analyze events at nuclear 

power plants in Japan. Despite the very high level of support being 

provided by our agency in response to those events, we do continue 

to remain focused on our domestic responsibilities and ultimately 

ensuring the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear reactors. 

In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours and the intensity of efforts, the NRC staff has approached their responsibilities 

with dedication, determination, and professionalism and I am very 

proud of the work that they have done and the work that they have 

done as part of a larger U.S. Government effort. 

On March 11, as you have mentioned, an earthquake hit Japan 

resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors in Japan. The 

tsunami that followed appears to have caused the loss of normal 

and emergency electric power to six units at the Fukushima 

Daiichi site. After this event we began interacting our Japanese 

regulatory counterparts and by the following Monday we had dispatched a total of 11 NRC staff to Japan. 

Now, as our discussion and understanding of the events continued to unfold, at a certain point we gained a limited amount of information that led us to believe that there was a possibility of a 

further degradation in the conditions at the reactor. Based on the 

information that we had, we looked at that situation, relative to 

what we would do here in the United States and we determined 

that if a similar situation were to happen in the United States, we 

would be recommending a larger evacuation out to approximately 

50 miles. And I would stress that that was based on limited information and was a conservative and prudent decision that was 

made. So based on that information we provided a recommendation 

to the United States Government and the ambassador in Japan 

issued a notice to American citizens in Japan to be advised to evacuate or to relocate to 50 miles beyond the plant. 

Here, domestically, we continue to support efforts to monitor at 

nuclear power plants and through the Environmental Protection 

Agency’s system, we continue to monitor radiation levels that 

would be seen in the United States. And I want to stress and repeat that we do not believe that there is any likelihood of levels 

of radiation in the United States that could cause any kind of public health and safety concern. 
7 

Now I want to focus a little bit, with the remainder of my opening remarks, on the reasons we believe we have a strong regulatory 

program here in the United States. Since the beginning of our regulatory program we have emphasized the philosophy of defense in 

depth which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest 

standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation. And it 

really does not rely on any one single layer of protection for public 

health and safety. Designs for every reactor in this country take 

into account site specific factors and include a detailed evaluation 

for natural events, such as earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, 

floods, and tsunamis. There are multiple physical barriers to radiation being released to the public in every reactor design. And additionally, there are diverse and redundant safety systems that are 

required to be maintained in operable condition and frequently 

tested to ensure that the plant is always in a high condition of 

readiness. 

We are, however, a learning organization and we continue to 

take advantage of the best-available information that we have to 

refine and improve our system. And one of the most significant 

changes that we made, after Three Mile Island in 1979, was an expansion of our resident inspector program, which now has at least 

two full-time NRC inspectors at each site where we have the ability 

to have unfettered access to the site at any time. 

We have also developed guidelines for severe accident management to ensure that in the event, all of the things that we think 

are possible to happen, if the event—if something like—if something additionally were to happen, we have these severe accident 

management guidelines in place to ensure that we can deal 

promptly and in a systematic and methodical way with the unique 

safety challenges that may be presented. 

In addition, as a result of the events of September 11, we identified important pieces of equipment that we require licensees to 

have available and in place, as well as new procedures and policies 

to help deal with the very severe type of situation that you are seeing in Japan right now. And our program of continuous improvement will also include lessons learned from the events in Japan. 

We have already begun enhancing inspection activities through 

temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the inspectors in all of our four regional offices. 

We have also issued an information notice to licensees to make 

them aware of activities they should undertake to verify that their 

capabilities to mitigate conditions due to these severe types of accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operation. 

Now, although we are confident about the safety of United States 

nuclear power plants, our agency has a responsibility to the American people to undertake a systematic and methodical review in 

light of the events in Japan. On March 21, the NRC established a 

senior level task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our 

processes and regulations to determine whether improvements to 

our regulatory system are needed and to make recommendations to 

the NRC for its policy direction. This will—the review will basically 

encompass two pieces, there will be a short and then ultimately a 

longer-term review that will incorporate the best-available informa-
8 

tion that we have from Japan. And both of these reports will ultimately be made available to the public. 

So in summary, I believe we have a strong regulatory program 

in place that looks at a wide variety of severe physical and natural 

phenomenon. In addition to that, we have a program in place to account for the things that we may not know today. And ultimately 

we have required all our plants to have equipment and procedures 

in place to deal with these very severe types of accident scenarios, 

in the very unlikely event that we were to see something like this 

develop here in the United States. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

So I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I 

would be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO

Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to address the response of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the recent 

tragic events in Japan. People across the country and around the world who have 

been touched by the magnitude and scale of this disaster are closely following the 

events in Japan and the repercussions in this country and in other countries. 

I traveled to Japan over the past weekend, and just returned yesterday. I wanted 

to convey a message of support and cooperation to our Japanese counterparts there 

and to assess the current situation. I also met with senior Japanese Government 

and TEPCO officials, and consulted with our NRC team of experts who are in Japan 

as part of our assistance effort. 

I would first like to reiterate my condolences to all those who have been affected 

by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Our hearts go out to all who have been 

dealing with the aftermath of these natural disasters, and we are mindful of the 

long and difficult road they will face in recovering. We know that the people of 

Japan are resilient and strong, and we have every confidence that they will come 

through this horrific time and move forward, with resolve, to rebuild their vibrant 

country. Our agency stands together with the people of Japan at this most difficult 

and challenging time. 

The NRC is an independent agency, with approximately 4,000 staff. We play a 

critically important role in protecting the American people and the environment. 

Our agency sets the rules by which commercial nuclear power plants operate, and 

nuclear materials are used in thousands of academic, medical, and industrial settings in the United States. We have at least two resident inspectors who work fulltime at every nuclear plant in the country, and we are proud to have world-class 

scientists, engineers, and professionals representing nearly every discipline. 

Since Friday, March 11, when the earthquake and tsunami struck, the NRC’s 

headquarters 24-hour emergency operations center has been fully activated, with 

staffing augmented to monitor and analyze events at nuclear power plants in Japan. 

At the request of the Japanese Government, and through the United States Agency 

for International Development, the NRC sent a team of its technical experts to provide on-the-ground support, and we have been in continual contact with them. Within the United States, the NRC has been working closely with other Federal agencies 

as part of our Government’s response to the situation. 

During these past several weeks, our staff has remained focused on our essential 

safety and security mission. I want to recognize their tireless efforts and their critical contributions to the United States response to assist Japan. In spite of the 

evolving situation, the long hours, and the intensity of efforts over the past week, 

NRC staff has approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and 

professionalism, and I am incredibly proud of their efforts. The American people 

also can be proud of the commitment and dedication within the Federal workforce, 

which is exemplified by our staff every day. 

The NRC’s primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. Toward that end, we have been very 

closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and li-
9 

censing oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. To date, there has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the 

NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees. 

Our agency has a long history of conservative regulatory decisionmaking. We have 

been intelligently using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, for 

more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we have never stopped 

requiring improvements to plant designs, and modifying our regulatory framework 

as we learn from operating experience. 

Despite the very high level of support being provided by the NRC in response to 

the events in Japan, we continue to remain focused on our domestic responsibilities. 

I’d like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response 

to the events in Japan. I then want to further discuss the reasons for our continuing 

confidence in the safety of the U.S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path 

forward for the NRC in order to learn all the lessons we can, in light of these 

events. 

On Friday, March 11, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more 

than 10 reactors. The ensuing tsunami appears to have caused the loss of normal 

and emergency alternating current power to the six unit Fukushima Daiichi site. 

It is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. 

Units 1, 2, and 3 were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units 4, 5, and 

6 were in previously scheduled outages. 

Shortly after 4 a.m. EDT on Friday, March 11, the NRC Emergency Operations 

Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake and the 

potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the monitoring mode at our Emergency Operations Center, and the NRC’s first concern was possible impacts of the 

tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, 

Alaska, and U.S. territories in the Pacific. We were in communication with licensees 

and NRC resident inspectors at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California, and the radiation control program directors 

for California, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii. 

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to Japan to help at the United States Embassy 

in Tokyo. By Monday, March 14, we had dispatched a total of 11 NRC staff to provide technical support to the American Embassy and the Japanese Government. We 

have subsequently rotated in additional staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team are: 

—to assist the Japanese Government and respond to requests from our Japanese 

regulatory counterparts; and 

—to support the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Government assistance effort. 

On Wednesday, March 16, we collaborated with other U.S. Government agencies 

and decided to advise American citizens to evacuate within a 50-mile range around 

the plant. This decision was a prudent course of action and would be consistent with 

what we would do under similar circumstances in the United States. This evacuation range was predicated on a combination of the information that we had available at the time, which indicated the possibility that reactor cores and spent-fuel 

pools may have been compromised, and hypothetical calculations of the approximate 

activity available for release from one reactor and two spent-fuel pools at a fourreactor site. 

We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have ongoing interaction regarding the Japan situation, including the White House, congressional 

staff, our State regulatory counterparts, a number of other Federal agencies, and 

international regulatory bodies around the world. 

The NRC response in Japan and our emergency operations center continue with 

the dedicated efforts of more than 250 NRC staff on a rotating basis. The entire 

agency is coordinating and working together in response to this event so that we 

can provide assistance to Japan while continuing the vital activities necessary to 

fulfill our domestic responsibilities. 

It is important to note that the U.S. Government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring at nuclear power plants and the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s system has not identified any radiation levels that effect public health and safety in this country. In fact, natural background 

radiation from sources such as rocks, the Sun, and buildings, is 100,000 times more 

than doses attributed to any level that has been detected in the United States to 

date. Therefore, based on current data, we feel confident that there is no reason for 

concern in the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan. 

There are many factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We 

have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a 

philosophy of ‘‘Defense-in-Depth’’, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the 
10 

highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not 

rely on any single layer of protection for public health and safety. Designs for every 

individual reactor in this country take into account site-specific factors and include 

a detailed evaluation for natural events, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site. 

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to 

be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant 

is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any situation. 

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. 

We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including most 

significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons 

learned, we have significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves. 

The NRC has a post-accident sampling system that enables the monitoring of radioactive material release and possible fuel degradation. One of the most significant 

changes after Three Mile Island was an expansion of the Resident Inspector Program, which now has at least two full-time NRC inspectors onsite at each nuclear 

power plant. These inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees’ activities related to nuclear safety and security. 

As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs, we have developed requirements for severe accident management guidelines. These are components and procedures developed to ensure that, in the event all of the above-described precautions failed and a severe accident occurred, the plant would still protect public health and safety. The requirements for severe accident management 

have been in effect for many years and are frequently evaluated by the NRC inspection program. 

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces 

of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a 

plant, the NRC requires licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well 

as new procedures and policies to help deal with a severe situation. 

Our program of continuous improvement, based on operating experience, will now 

include evaluation of the significant events in Japan and what we can learn from 

them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the resident inspectors and the regionbased inspectors in our four regional offices, to look at licensees’ readiness to deal 

with both design-basis accidents and beyond-design-basis accidents. 

We have also issued an information notice to licensees to make them aware of the 

events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged in 

to verify their readiness. It is expected that licensees review the information related 

to their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, to ensure that they are 

in effect and operational. 

During the past 20 years, there have been a number of new rulemakings that 

have enhanced the domestic fleet’s preparedness against some of the problems we 

are seeing in Japan. The ‘‘station blackout’’ rule requires every plant in this country 

to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current 

so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the 

core. 

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design-basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that 

you would see under a design-basis accident. 

With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged 

plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment 

Improvement Program since the late 1980s. This program required installation of 

hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system. 

A final factor that underpins our belief in the ongoing safety of the U.S. fleet is 

the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees’ emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our Federal partner, the Federal Emergency Manage-
11 

ment Administration, these activities include extensive interaction with State and 

local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis. 

Along with our confidence in the safety of United States nuclear power plants, our 

agency has a responsibility to the American people to undertake a systematic and 

methodical review of the safety of our domestic facilities, in light of the natural disaster and the resulting nuclear situation in Japan. 

Examining all available information is an essential part of the effort to analyze 

the event and understand its impact on Japan and its implications for the United 

States. Our focus is always on keeping nuclear plants and radioactive materials in 

this country safe and secure. 

On Monday, March 21, my colleagues at the NRC and I met to review the status 

of the situation in Japan and identify the steps needed to conduct that review. We 

consequently decided to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our processes and regulations to determine whether the agency 

should make additional improvements to our regulatory system, and to make recommendations to the NRC for its policy direction. 

The review will be conducted in both a short-term and a longer-term timeframe. 

The short-term review has already begun, and the task force will brief the NRC at 

30-, 60-, and 90-day intervals, to identify potential or preliminary near-term operational or regulatory issues. The task force then will undertake a longer-term review as soon as NRC has sufficient information from the events in Japan. That 

longer-term review will be completed in 6 months from the beginning of the evaluation. 

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event 

to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that may 

warrant action by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, 

such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons 

learned to nonoperating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input 

from all key stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the NRC within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available. 

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that 

the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there will 

be a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the United States fleet, and we are 

continuing to gather the information necessary to take a longer, more comprehensive and thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on 

these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing 

safety of the American people. 

Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the NRC, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you. I look forward to continuing to work with you to advance the NRC’s important 

safety mission. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Lyons. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER B. LYONS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. LYONS. Thank you. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member 

Alexander and Senator Lautenberg, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to discuss the nuclear accident situation 

in Japan, the DOE’s response and our research, development and 

deployment programs relevant to nuclear safety. 

I will leave discussion of the accident itself to my written testimony and focus now on the DOE’s response and our ongoing RD&D 

programs. 

To assist in the country’s response, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Nuclear Incident Team Operations 

Center was promptly activated and has been continuously staffed 

by both the NNSA and Office of Nuclear Energy personnel since 

the accident. The focus of all DOE activities has been to understand the accident progression and offer advice and assistance to 
12 

Japanese officials who have the direct responsibility to manage the 

accident recovery. 

The DOE has deployed about 40 people and more than 1,700 

pounds of equipment, including NNSA’s aerial measuring system 

(AMS), and a number of consequent management response teams. 

The AMS measures radiological contamination on the ground deposited from transit of any released plumes. The AMS data, taken 

now over a number of days, are consistent with reduced levels of 

radiation compared to earlier measurements and show no evidence 

of significant new releases, between March 19 and March 29. In 

addition, NNSA has been modeling potential transport of radioactive materials released from the plant, utilizing the national atmospheric release advisory capability at the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory. 

As Chairman Jaczko has also stated, we do not believe that the 

radiation released by the plant poses a public health danger in the 

United States, although certainly low levels, trace levels of radioactivity attributable to the accident have been observed here. The Office of Nuclear Energy has established a nuclear energy response 

team to utilize the capabilities of the DOE national laboratories in 

a wide range of analyses. We are also working at the United States 

Embassy in Tokyo, with NRC staff in Japan and in Rockville, 

Maryland and with Japanese agencies and industry. 

DOE and the NRC worked directly with the Institute for Nuclear 

Power Operations (INPO), and the Nuclear Energy Institute to encourage formation of an industry-led assistance team. INPO is now 

leading this industry team deployed both in Japan and at INPO 

headquarters in Atlanta. And in addition, Secretary Chu and White 

House Science and Technology Advisor John Holdren have reached 

out to laboratory directors and other eminent scientists for technical advice. They are in touch with them on a daily basis, as well 

as with an internal team of scientists and engineers to analyze the 

situation, suggest new approaches and evaluate potential solutions. 

Now beyond our response to the accident, the research development and deployment programs of my office are highly relevant to 

future decisions about potential options for nuclear power in the 

United States. Our proposed SMR program will explore designs 

that offer safety advantages through extensive use of passive systems. We are also conducting research and development into hightemperature, gas-reactor designs that offer inherent design safety 

features. Our light water reactor (LWR) sustainability program is 

exploring whether the lifetime of operating reactors can be extended with no compromise in safety. Researching fuel cycles is 

also within my office. 

While we await guidance from the Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s nuclear future, we are conducting research and development into a broad range of options for the Nation’s fuel cycle, with 

careful attention to safety, environmental protection, and nonproliferation. 

Safety of future systems is really the key to all of our programs. 

Selected research areas like fuel claddings that cannot generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that are virtually impossible to melt 

have very obvious relevance. And the new modeling and simulation 

hub which is based at Oak Ridge National Laboratory will provide 
13 

important new capabilities to the nuclear industry, capabilities 

that can be used to assess and improve the safety of existing reactors. 

Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman recently stated that we view nuclear energy as a very important compliment to the overall portfolio 

we are trying to build for a clean energy future. The programs of 

the Office of Nuclear Energy are focused on assuring that the option for safe nuclear power remains open to the Nation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, the earthquake and the resulting tsunami brought 

tremendous devastation on Japan. At the DOE we are making 

every effort to assist the Japanese people in their time of need. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER B. LYONS

Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

nuclear accident situation in Japan and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) response. 

Let me briefly recap our current understanding of events at the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant with its six nuclear reactors, albeit with many gaps in 

our knowledge. When the earthquake on March 11 struck, the three operating reactors (Units 1, 2, and 3) shut down in accordance with operating procedures. Backup 

diesel generators started per procedures to keep the water pumps and instrumentation operational. But when the earthquake-generated tsunami struck, those backup 

power generators were damaged. 

Units 1, 2, and 3 used battery power to continue to run their cooling pumps until 

the batteries were drained or the pumps failed. As the reactor cores heated from 

radioactive decay, steam was produced. The pressure buildup from that steam required venting, which released some radioactive materials. It also lowered the water 

level in the three reactor pressure vessels, reducing the cooling of the core. It appears that all three reactor cores are damaged to unknown extents. Additionally, as 

the fuel rod temperature increased, a reaction took place between the zirconium fuel 

cladding and the water in the pressure vessel, producing hydrogen. This hydrogen 

was vented along with the steam and may have ignited at all three reactors. Substantial explosive damage is visible at Units 1 and 3, presumably from these explosions. An explosion may have damaged the containment structure at Unit 2. Fission 

products have been released through these processes. Once pumper units were 

brought in, seawater cooling was used for many days until fresh water supplies 

were available. 

Water levels at the spent-fuel pools are also of concern with some reports that 

at least one was empty for some time. Depending on the condition of the pools and 

the age of the fuel in the pool, the cladding of the used fuel could ignite. Such a 

zirconium fire would be very difficult to extinguish and could potentially lead to significant releases. Seawater was also used to cool spent-fuel pools, until fresh water 

supplies were obtained. 

Current information suggests that the plants are in a slow recovery from the accident. Long-term cooling of the reactors and pools is essential during this period. A 

massive cleanup operation remains for the future. 

To assist in the United States’ response, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) Operations Center was promptly activated and has been continuously staffed by NNSA and Office of Nuclear Energy personnel since the accident. The focus of all DOE activities, led by the operations center, has been to understand the accident progression and offer advice and assistance 

to the Japanese officials who have the direct responsibility to manage the accident 

recovery. 

The DOE has deployed about 40 people and more than 17,000 pounds of equipment to Japan, including NNSA’s Aerial Measuring System (AMS) and Consequence 

Management Response Teams. The response teams on the ground are utilizing their 

unique skills, expertise, and equipment to help assess, survey, monitor, and sample 

ground areas for radiation. Since arriving in Japan, the AMS team has collected and 
14 

analyzed data gathered from more than 40 hours of flights aboard Department of 

Defense fixed wing and helicopter platforms. Sampling of airborne radiological material, coupled with spectroscopic measurements by the DOE team, have helped to 

determine that virtually all the material studied to date is consistent with releases 

from operating reactors, not the used fuel in the pools from which short-lived radioactive materials have already decayed. 

The AMS measures radiological contamination on the ground deposited from transit of any release plumes. We are sharing the results of these measurements with 

Japanese officials. In addition, AMS data are available on the DOE Web site. 

As of March 19, 2011, all AMS measurements beyond 2.5 miles from the reactor 

were below 30 millirem per hour. Elevated readings have been observed within 

about 25 miles of the Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and a distinctive pattern to the ground deposition is readily observable with an area of higher contamination extending to the northwest of the plant. The AMS was grounded by weather 

for several days and flew again on March 24. The new data are consistent with reduced levels of radiation compared to the earlier measurements and show no evidence of significant new releases between March 19 and 24. 

In addition, the NNSA has been performing in-country and long-distance modeling of potential plume movement using the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The NRC 

supplies the hypothetical source terms for these NARAC calculations. 

The Office of Nuclear Energy has established a Nuclear Energy Response Team 

(NERT). The purpose of this team is threefold: 

—Provide expert analysis on reactor conditions to DOE leadership from reported 

information and investigate discrepancies or conflicting reports. 

—Support the NIT Operations Center with analysis or additional information as 

needed. 

—Coordinate analysis activities at the DOE national laboratories in support of the 

above. 

The NERT consists of eight sub-teams organized by major systems of the reactor 

(e.g., cooling, electrical power, reactor vessel) that meets twice daily. 

The Office of Nuclear Energy has staff in Japan working directly with NRC’s staff 

in Japan and with the Japanese agencies and industry. We also have a representative at the NRC operations center in Rockville. The Office of Nuclear Energy is also 

in contact with the GE-Hitachi command centers. 

DOE and NRC have worked with the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations 

(INPO) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to encourage formation of an industry assistance team. INPO is now leading this industry team, deployed both in 

Japan and at INPO headquarters in Atlanta. Members of the NERT are in regular 

contact with the INPO teams. 

In addition, Secretary Chu and White House Science and Technology Advisor 

John Holdren have jointly set up an informal group of experts on reactor safety and 

accident mitigation from inside and outside the Government. The group has a daily 

teleconference in which the newest information is discussed and the individual 

members convey their thoughts about the most promising approaches to the Secretary and Dr. Holdren. 

Beyond our response to the accident, the research, development, and deployment 

programs of the Office of Nuclear Energy are highly relevant to future decisions 

about the potential options for nuclear power in the United States. Our proposed 

Small Modular Reactor program will explore designs that offer safety advantages 

through extensive use of passive systems. We are also conducting research and development into high-temperature, gas-reactor designs that offer inherent safety features. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program is exploring whether the 

lifetime of operating reactors can be extended with no compromise in safety. 

The Office of Nuclear Energy also performs research on fuel cycles. We are conducting R&D into a broad range of options for the Nation’s fuel cycle with careful 

attention to safety, environmental protection, and nonproliferation. In addition, our 

cross-cutting research into areas like advanced materials and instrumentation is exploring technologies that could enable future safety enhancements, like fuel 

claddings that cannot generate hydrogen in an accident or fuels that are virtually 

impossible to melt. And the new Modeling and Simulation Hub, based at the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory, will provide new capabilities to the nuclear industry, capabilities that can be used to assess and improve the safety of existing reactors. 

I fully concur with the statement made by Deputy Secretary Poneman at a White 

House briefing on March 14 that: ‘‘We view nuclear energy as a very important component to the overall portfolio we are trying to build for a clean energy future.’’ The 

programs of the Office of Nuclear Energy are focused on assuring that the option 

for safe nuclear power remains open to the Nation. 
15 

In conclusion, the earthquake and resulting tsunami have visited tremendous devastation on Japan. Those of us at the DOE are making every effort to assist the 

Japanese people in their time of need. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. And we will proceed 

to the questions. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with you. The ranking member mentioned there are 104 operating nuclear power reactors at 

65 sites in our country. I understand there are 48 dry cask storage 

facilities in the United States. If my numbers are accurate, does 

this mean that there are 17 reactor sites with no dry cask storage 

option? 

Mr. JACZKO. If your numbers are correct there are some sites 

that have not yet gone to dry cask storage. We anticipate, in time, 

that most sites will eventually move in that direction. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So the fuel rods just remain in the spent-fuel 

pools? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. And for those sites that have not gone to 

dry cask storage, they remain in the pools. And these pools are 

very robust structures that are designed to deal with the kinds of 

natural phenomenon that we designed the entire reactor site to. It 

is very thick, reinforced concrete structures, generally about 4- to 

5-feet thick walls with very thick floors, so they provide, we think, 

a very robust protection for the fuel. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me ask this. What are the regulatory requirements relative to spent fuel? They can just sit forever in 

spent-fuel pools? 

Mr. JACZKO. The way our requirements are based is we have requirements about the minimum amount of time that the fuel would 

need to be in the pool. So generally we think about 5 years or so 

is a reasonable timeframe for the fuel to need to be in the pool, 

simply because it is very physically hot, so it—that heat needs to 

dissipate and that needs to happen in the pool itself. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Do you have a maximum time? 

Mr. JACZKO. We don’t have a maximum time, but we do analyze 

the fuel that is in the pool. And if, as new fuel were to be added 

to the pool, that goes through a very rigorous analysis to ensure 

that that can be done safely and securely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So one wouldn’t be surprised, in these plants, 

to see fuel in those spent-fuel pools for decades? 

Mr. JACZKO. That is possible, certainly. Many sites have begun 

to move, as you indicated, their fuel out of the pools into dry cask 

storage. Generally, what the utilities like to do is reserve some 

amount of space in the pool to be able to take the fuel that is in 

the reactor at any time and move that into a pool. So that tends 

to be the condition at which if they lose that ability to have that 

extra space, then they will usually move to dry cask storage to 

store the fuel. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, in the two plants I looked at, with respect to the dry casks, the casks at one plant were standing outside 

and the casks at the other plant were in a water-resistant building. 

Are there any standards for dry cask storage? 

Mr. JACZKO. We—the dry cask storage systems are required to 

be certified by the NRC to, again, meet very rigorous standards for 

dealing with natural phenomenon and as well as ensuring the safe-
16 

ty of the fuel itself. So there are basically two types of systems that 

are generally used, and I think you saw examples of those two 

types at Diablo Canyon and San Onofre. So we have approved 

those and again, they meet our high standards for natural phenomenon, for ensuring that the fuel will stay sufficiently cool and 

that we won’t have any type of nuclear reaction in the fuel itself. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Why aren’t there better standards for spentfuel pools? You have good standards for the reactor, but, it seems 

to me, not for the spent fuel. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the spent-fuel pools are considered safety significant systems. So they meet a lot of the same standards that the 

reactor itself would have to meet. For instance, the spent-fuel pools 

themselves are required to withstand the natural phenomenon like 

earthquakes and tsunamis that could impact the reactor itself. 

They are required—the spent fuel is required to be able to deal 

with these severe accidents. It is also required to be able to deal 

with the possibility of any type of nuclear reaction happening in 

the pool itself. So there are very high standards and they’re very 

comparable to the reactors themselves. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, didn’t Japan have similar standards? 

Yet, the spent-fuel pools could not withstand the tsunami and the 

earthquake. 

Mr. JACZKO. At this point we don’t know exactly what contributed to the situation with the spent-fuel pools in Japan. It’s unclear whether that was a direct result of the earthquake itself or 

whether there was subsequent actions, such as the hydrogen explosions that occurred, that created a more difficult situation with the 

spent-fuel pools. But, I would add, from what we do know right 

now, there are six spent-fuel pools in Japan and we believe with 

a good level of confidence that certainly the spent-fuel pool for unit 

one has operated normally without any particular challenge, the 

unit pool—the unit two pool as well has operated fine. The challenges we’re seeing are really with units 3 and 4. But units 5 and 

6 also were operating in a stable way at this time. So we haven’t 

seen challenges with all the pools in Japan, just a small subset. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Was it cracks in the superstructure of the 

pool itself that caused the two to fail? 

Mr. JACZKO. Right now we don’t know for sure what the situation 

is. We believe it is possible that there was perhaps a leak in the 

unit 3 pool and that perhaps there were some other challenges 

with the unit 4 pool. But again, we don’t know at this point whether that was the result of the earthquake and the tsunami or some 

of the subsequent events that happened. So those are the kinds of 

things we will be looking at as we embark on our short term and 

our longer term to analyze that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Jaczko, continuing the chairman’s comments, most of the problems we read 

and hear about in Japan from the reactors comes basically from the 

inability to cool some of the used fuel rods. Is that right? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think it is—there are really two issues that 

we are looking at. One is ensuring the continued cooling of the re-
17 

actors themselves and then maintaining the cooling in the pool, so 

both of those issues are important. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Cooling—it is a cooling issue? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is a cooling issue for us. 

Senator ALEXANDER. When we talk about storing all the spent 

nuclear fuel in the United States produced in the last 35 years, by 

my mathematics, roughly speaking, it would fit on a single football 

field 20 feet deep. Is that right? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe I have seen estimates like that. I think 

that is approximately correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And today that spent nuclear fuel is stored 

on the site where the nuclear reactor is, according to your rules 

and regulations. How long can that be safely stored there? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, right now the NRC recently affirmed a decision we have made over the years that we call our waste confidence 

decision. And in that decision we look at what the long-term impacts, ultimately the long-term environmental impacts are from 

that spent fuel. And right now we believe that for at least a hundred years that fuel can be stored with very little impacts to health 

and safety or to the environment. 

In addition, as part of that decision the NRC asked the staff at 

the agency to go out and take a look to really see if you are to go 

out 2 or 3 or 400 years if there are any safety issues that could 

arise that would present a challenge to the kind of approach we 

have right now for dealing with spent fuel. 

So right now we believe that this is material that can be stored 

safely and securely in either the spent-fuel pools themselves or in 

dry cask storage. 

Senator ALEXANDER. So what you are saying is that most of the 

reactor problems we have been reading about in Japan have to do 

with the cooling of used nuclear fuel or spent fuel, and that in the 

United States, the amount of material we have produced over the 

last 35 years which is currently stored in pools or dry casks at various sites, would only fill a football field 20-feet deep. 

Mr. JACZKO. Sixty-five sites. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And it is your estimate or the NRC’s estimate that it can be safely stored there for up to 100 years? 

Mr. JACZKO. That is our assessment right now. Yes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Now, I want to compliment the President. 

When he started his administration I was afraid he was going to 

lead us on a national windmill policy instead of a national energy 

policy. But his attitude toward nuclear power, in my opinion, has 

been thoughtful and balanced, including through this crisis. He has 

appointed excellent people to your NRC. Dr. Chu has been a strong 

appointment. He has recommended loan guarantees for the first 

new nuclear plants and more important, or equally important, he 

has a distinguished panel looking at the future of used nuclear 

fuel. 

And I want to ask you to comment on that, you or Mr. Lyons. 

As I understand it, while we can safely store used nuclear fuel 

onsite for 100 years, what the President and others are suggesting 

is that we research a better way to store it. That might include reducing its volume by 70, 80, or 90 percent, making it that much 

smaller, finding ways that plutonium isn’t separated from it, recy-
18 

cling it or using it over and over again. So the bottom line is that 

we are comfortable with being able to store it in its current form 

and location for up to 100 years, but over the next 10 to 20 years 

we will be looking for a better way to recycle and reuse it, and that 

is what we’re hoping to find from the recommendations of the 

President’s commission. 

Am I approximately right in that or what comments would you 

add? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would defer to Secretary Lyons probably— 

he can best answer that question, I think. 

Mr. LYONS. Well, Senator Alexander, as you note, the mission of 

the Blue Ribbon Commission is to explore a wide range of options 

for management of used fuel, the back end of the fuel cycle. And 

certainly at the DOE we are eagerly awaiting their reports and 

their suggestions and guidance. The interim report of that group is 

due by July 29, final report by January of next year. And we anticipate that that will provide important guidance to the range of R&D 

programs that we have at the DOE. 

Now while we are awaiting that report, we do maintain a broad 

spectrum of research ranging from the once through cycle that the 

country has now and understanding how that could be improved or 

sustained, all the way to different options including the reprocessing that you’re describing. And we view our goal as providing a set 

of options to the American people, certainly guided by the output 

of the Blue Ribbon Commission that can lead to a long-term sustainable policy for used fuel management in the country. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank 

you both for your excellent testimony. 

Dr. Jaczko, do we have a better regulatory system than Japan? 

Is there a difference in the two systems? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think every country that has nuclear power 

takes a different approach to dealing with the safety of the reactors 

in their country. I think we have a system that is well-suited to 

dealing with the safety of the reactors in this country. It is a system, as I said, that relies on multiple layers of protection and it 

incorporates a strong basis in technical information. And we have 

a very strong presence of inspectors at the reactor sites. So we 

think that this provides a very strong system to ensure the safety 

of plants in the United States. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We, in our conversation yesterday we discussed a total review of all plants in America and I think that your 

time target was 90 days. Is that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. We are looking at a short-term review in 90 days 

and that will be followed by a much longer-term review as we get 

more detailed information from Japan. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So we can be assured that the problems 

that we saw in Japan will have a review of possibility here in our— 

with our plants here in the country? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. That is the focus of these reviews. 
19 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, the—you know, we have the oldest 

plant, commercial plant in America, built in 1969. The Fukiama 

plants I think were built in 1971. Is that—am I correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Is there any question about age of facility 

that might have—that contributed to the difficulty there? 

Mr. JACZKO. At this point we don’t know what the exact causes 

of the situation in Japan are. But again, if we look at the situation 

for the U.S. reactors, all the reactors that we have that are of a 

similar type have undergone modifications and improvements to 

deal with the kinds of situations that we are seeing in Japan. 

For instance, it has been known, since the late 1980s and early 

1990s that the accumulation of hydrogen presents a significant 

challenge. So the reactors of this type in particular were modified 

to ensure that they could better mitigate or reduce the likelihood 

of that type of hydrogen explosion. So we think we have a program, 

or we have a program that addresses these issues, but we will do 

these comprehensive reviews to ensure that there isn’t any information that we have missed and that can better enhance the safety. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Jaczko, can we say, without fear of 

contradiction that our plants in New Jersey are updated, able to 

deal with any malfunction of the operation there? Because in April 

2009, I am sure you recollect—April 2009, August 2009—we had 

low level tritium leaks. Now tritium is a fairly dangerous material 

and what assurance can I give the people in the surrounding area 

that: we did or did not find any health consequences of the tritium 

leaks; were there examinations called for in the area and did we 

find anything that—within the—those families that there—they 

have to be concerned about? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, with regard to the tritium leaks we believe 

that that is not an acceptable situation for any power reactor in the 

United States to have that kind of a leak. With regard to the Oyster Creek leak, we did not see any indication of any risk to public 

health and safety as a result of those particular leaks. And in fact, 

the facility has made significant modifications to dramatically reduce the likelihood of something like that happening in the future. 

And I would add that those leaks were not in systems that directly affect the ability of the reactor to deal with accidents and errors or to ensure that the reactor itself or the spent-fuel pools continue to function safely and securely. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman and thank 

you again witnesses. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I assume the record will remain open? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It will remain open. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks a lot. And it is an honor to be part of 

our subcommittee. Thank you, Madam Chair and Senator Alexander. 

And so, if my memory serves me, it was—Three Mile Island was 

1979? Is that correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. 
20 

Senator DURBIN. And I would say, for 32 years the nuclear power 

industry has really been stymied, frozen in place with virtually no 

major expansion across the United States in the heels—on the 

heels of that controversy. 

And I am wondering now if the same thing is going to happen 

as a result of Japan. Whether there will be serious questions raised 

about operations and about design and about nuclear waste that 

will once again cause this industry to stop, reflect and probably 

slow down any plans to advance. 

I also understand the economics of energies. I have been told 

that natural gas electric power creation is a much cheaper alternative and obviously safer in many respects. So that seems to be 

the general view of the out—what I see coming as an outgrowth of 

the Japanese tragedy. 

We had a hearing last week in Illinois, because we are so nuclear 

power dependent, one-half of our electricity is generated by the nuclear power, we have 11 generators and 4 of them are exactly the 

same design as Fukushima. And representatives of your agency 

came, as did State and local and private sector and we had a long 

conversation about many things, including the nuclear waste onsite, spent nuclear fuel rods onsite in Illinois, 7,200 tons worth of 

those nuclear—pardon me, spent nuclear fuel rods. 

We talked about many different things and we talked about 

Yucca Mountain. And I recall from my college, the ‘‘Myth of Sisyphus’’ pushing that boulder up the hill and barely getting to the 

top and it rolls back to the bottom. And now we realize that the 

name of that hill is Yucca Mountain. It appears that we keep rolling this boulder up close to the top and never quite reach it. And I don’t know ultimately whether this, I think it is $90 billion 

current estimate of investment in Yucca Mountain will ever take 

place, and if it does it is probably 10 years over the horizon when 

the decision is made. And I have to ask and bring up a question 

which came up at our hearing. What about the situation with reprocessing? There was a time when we took a national position on 

it to try and be an example to the world, not to reprocess and create an opportunity to use plutonium for the development of weapons. But I think what is happening or what I see today is that two 

of our major allies in the world, Britain and France, France in particular, have decided that reprocessing is not only okay, it is a 

great commercial investment and they are receiving the waste from 

other countries and reprocessing it, dramatically reducing the size 

of the remaining radioactive challenge. 

Is that thinking from the Carter administration really appropriate today? Are we not in a world that has accepted reprocessing? 

Shouldn’t we be looking at it ourselves as an alternative to a $90 

billion Yucca Mountain investment that might come online 10 

years from now? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well I, Senator I will briefly answer from the NRC’s 

perspective and Dr. Lyons probably can give you a better answer 

to that question. We are currently doing work to develop an infrastructure to support a reprocessing facility in this country. That activity is at a probably a medium-to-low-level priority in the agency, 

because of what we see from the commercial sector about interest 

in the immediate development or deployment of a reprocessing fa-
21 

cility, but there certainly is discussion right now and perhaps Dr. 

Lyons can provide more information on that. 

Senator DURBIN. Before you go any further, let me stop you. You 

said there is a lack of interest in the commercial sector? Wouldn’t 

this be our Government responsibility? 

Mr. JACZKO. It is certainly possible that it could be a Government responsibility, but it could also be a private sector development of a private reprocessing facility to do that. 

Senator DURBIN. But is it your belief that the private sector in 

nuclear power believes that maintaining these pools across the 

United States is a viable alternative? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, certainly from the agency’s perspective we 

think that that can be done safely and securely. The ultimate decisions about how to manage that spent fuel are really decisions for 

the Federal Government and the private sector itself about how 

long term they want to maintain that. 

For instance, some utilities move more fuel more quickly into dry 

cask storage; others leave it in pools—— 

Senator DURBIN. If I remember the debate on this, the push for 

Yucca Mountain came from the private sector. And the argument 

was, ‘‘We don’t want to be responsible any longer for the spent nuclear fuel rods and the danger associated with them. We want the 

Federal Government to accept the responsibility, we believe it is 

theirs, and build Yucca Mountain.’’ So you are saying when it 

comes to reprocessing though, they are not interested in that development? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think there is some interest right now. I 

would say it is—as with any type of fuel, there is an industry that 

provides fuel for the reactors; there are economic considerations 

that go into whether or not reprocessing is the most effective way 

to provide that fuel. And I think in many ways that is what is driving the commercial side, in terms of their interest in reprocessing 

or no reprocessing. It is a cost issue in many ways right now. 

Senator DURBIN. I am over time, but Dr. Lyons, if you would like 

to respond. 

Mr. LYONS. Well, my response would be very lengthy. You asked 

many, many questions, sir and maybe I can come back to it in subsequent rounds. But, just to answer a few of your questions. You 

started with, ‘‘Will the incidents in Japan impact growth here on 

nuclear power?′′ Personally, I think that the review that the NRC 

will be conducting, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

has announced there will be international reviews where the international community will compare lessons learned, I think all of 

those factors will come together to help understand, and certainly 

for the NRC, to decide whether any regulatory changes are required that may impact the progression of nuclear power in the 

country. 

You alluded to, and I certainly agree, that the very low price of 

natural gas, the absence of any value placed on carbon certainly 

tends to favor approaches to new power like natural gas. And I 

think that impacts any of the clean energy solutions. 

I can launch into a discussion on reprocessing and I’d like to do 

that, but we are way over the time, so I will leave it up to you folks 

as to whether I should proceed. 
22 

Senator DURBIN. This is my first hearing in the subcommittee 

and I don’t want to abuse the privilege. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. This has 

been very interesting. I want to thank you. 

I do want to move on, but I just want to say something. Mr. 

Chairman, you said that spent fuel could be stored safely and securely for 100 years either in spent fuel pools or dry casks. I am 

amazed that storing it in these pools for that period of time, while 

these pools are being racked and reracked now, with more and 

more of them in the pools. You know when the design basis of 

these plants was put into effect a lot of the threats weren’t present. 

You know, we didn’t worry about a terrorist bomb at our nuclear 

power plants as we do today. You have got all these spent fuel 

rods, very hot against some of them that have cooled off somewhat. 

I always thought that dry casks were the best kind of long-term 

storage. And to me 100 years is long-term storage. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, there is—I think this is very much an issue 

that the NRC is going to take a look at again, I think without a 

doubt, as part of this short-term and long-term review. But the information we have right now shows that both of these methodologies are equally safe for a very long period of time. What—obviously if you are getting to 60, 70 years of spent-fuel pool storage, 

that likely would not happen because that long period of time the 

reactor has likely been shut down and undergoing a period of decommissioning. And that would involve taking the fuel out of the 

pools and putting it in dry cask storage. So, in that longer-term 

scenario you would likely see most of the fuel being moved into dry 

cask at that point. 

And as the fuel does get cooler the likelihood of the very severe 

type of accident from a spent fuel gets reduced significantly. The 

concern is that you have a fire essentially and it releases a lot of 

radioactive material from the spent-fuel pools. As the fuel ages, the 

likelihood of that fire reduces dramatically. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But you are adding new rods all the time. 

Mr. JACZKO. As part of the process we have required the licensees, when they add new fuel that they add it in such a way that 

they balance the various—they distribute the hot fuel in such a 

way that it really reduces the likelihood of this type of fire. So 

you—they move and shuffle all of the fuel each time so that you 

always have hot fuel that is surrounded by much cooler fuel to reduce the likelihood of these kinds of challenges. 

But again, as you really play out the much longer term, 60, 70, 

80 years, we would envision that at that point most fuel begins to 

move out of the pools and into dry cask storage. It is—of course the 

hot fuel will always have to spend some amount of time in the 

pools, just to cool off to the point where it can be moved. But again, 

I—this is something that I am very confident we will be looking at 

as part of both the short-term and the long-term review. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Sure. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Did you have anything you want to say or a 

question to ask? 
23 

Senator ALEXANDER. I wonder if Dr. Lyons agrees, from the point 

of view of the DOE, that used nuclear fuel can be safely stored onsite for up to 100 years. 

Mr. LYONS. I was on the NRC when that question was reviewed 

and I was part of the decision that evaluated that information. 

This was before my current job. Yes, I do agree. 

However, just as additional information, through the R&D program at the DOE, we also will be pursuing a program designed to 

understand what may be the lifetime limiting—or the life limiting 

aspects of how long dry casks can be safely used. So that will be 

another contribution to this overall discussion of the longevity of 

dry cask storage. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much gentlemen. This was 

very helpful and we appreciate it. Thank you for being here. 

Oh, I’m sorry. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. I—if I can just do one followup question, because when I raised the issue of reprocessing I thought the chairman’s allusion was to the economics of it. And can any—can either 

of you speak to the economics of reprocessing and deriving some 

sort of fuel source from that and dramatically reducing the waste 

that is left behind, as opposed to the current cost of cooling pools, 

casks and ultimate national repository? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Durbin, if I may. I indicated that we do have 

research programs that span the gamut of different options for the 

back end of the fuel cycle and that certainly includes the reprocessing that you are addressing. In addition, the Blue Ribbon Commission will be providing guidance on this. 

As far as the economics, I have never seen a study that claimed 

that it was less expensive to use reprocessing. There may be other 

reasons why one would want to reprocess, but I am certainly not 

aware of any study which says that reprocessing would be a lowercost option, nor am I aware of any utility in this country that is 

pushing to move toward reprocessing. There certainly are companies for whom that is their product and would be very interested. 

Yes, also you mentioned the situation in France and Japan. Let 

me just note that part of our research is designed to understand 

some of the limitations on particularly the approach that is used 

in Japan, the PUREX approach, which we would not utilize in this 

country from a number of different perspectives, including a nonproliferation concern and including environmental concerns. 

Senator DURBIN. So, if I can for a second, but correct me if I’m 

wrong, I understood, during the debate on Yucca Mountain that it 

was agreed that the ultimate responsibility for storing this nuclear 

waste was to be borne by the government taxpayers. 

Mr. LYONS. That is correct. That is the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 

and the Amendments Act. 

Senator DURBIN. And so when you say that the commercial private sector does not support reprocessing, it would seem to me that 

we ought to be asking, from the taxpayer’s viewpoint, whether that 

is an economic alternative if we are ever to build Yucca Mountain 

and transport the—all the waste in America to that site. 

Mr. LYONS. Well, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act also requires that 

there be a fee levied on all nuclear power use that is intended to 

cover the costs of whatever back end, whatever disposition system 
24 

is to be used. So whatever the costs of that will be, and currently 

there is a one mil per kilowatt hour assessment on nuclear power, 

that is intended to cover the back end. To the extent perhaps additional funds would be required for other back end systems that 

would be passed along. 

Senator DURBIN. My last question, I am sorry Madam Chair, but 

taking the current French approach on reprocessing, are you saying 

that we have done an economic model to compare the cost of reprocessing against the cost of a national repository? 

Mr. LYONS. There have been a number of such models. I certainly can’t characterize all of them quickly, but I am quite sure 

that the majority, if not all of them would say that a repository, 

I am not saying economic, but a repository approach probably is a 

lower cost. But there may be other reasons, and this is part of the 

Blue Ribbon Commission review, there may be other reasons that 

would drive one toward some form of reprocessing. I believe it 

would be different than what is used in France. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could perhaps clarify my reference to 

the economics. The economic comparison that I am referring to is 

the cost of fuel that would come directly from uranium that is 

mined in the ground as opposed to the cost of fuel that would come 

from reprocessed uranium. That is the economic comparison that I 

was referring to. And in that case right now the price of uranium 

generally favors the naturally mined uranium as a source of fuel. 

So that was the economic comparison I was referring to. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I just—Madam Chairman, your indulgence 

please for a question that I have that has puzzled me since you testified at an earlier hearing, Dr. Jaczko. 

The NRC requires evacuation plans only for areas within 10 

miles of a plant, but the United States Government has warned 

Americans in Japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the damaged reactors there and the ships were turned around, I think it 

was at 60 miles. When I asked you at the previous hearing what 

you thought was a safe distance, I think that the response that you 

gave me was 20 miles. Can we clear this up? And why not require 

the same kind of evacuation plan to address the same distance 

here at home? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Senator, this is likely an issue we will be looking at as part of our short-term and long-term reviews, but the 10- 

mile distance in the United States is the distance at which we develop preplanned and prepared evacuation plans. So it is based on 

an event that would happen in a very short period of time for 

which you would not have the ability to develop additional planning for evacuations beyond a certain distance. There is always the 

possibility that if an event were to develop like it has in Japan, 

that additional protective actions could be required beyond 10 

miles. But the requirements we have in place are for those—the 

preplanning that needs to be done so that if you got an event that 

happened and developed very quickly, you wouldn’t have to take 

the time then to develop the evacuation plans, they are already developed and ready to go as soon as that event happens. 
25 

But of course as the events in Japan show, that it was something 

that happened over a course of many, many days before we got to 

the point at which we looked at information that indicated you 

could have to go to a great distance. So far the data coming out 

of the plant continues to show that the safe distance there is approximately 20 miles. 

So there is the work that we do to preplan, which right now we 

believe 10 miles is sufficient. But that is not necessarily the end 

of any protective action. You could take additional action beyond 

that if necessary. 

Mr. LAUTENBERG. We look forward to hearing from you on kind 

of a continuing basis to find out what a good conclusion is that you 

come to. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Graham. Would you like to make 

a statement or ask questions? 

Senator GRAHAM. Just ask questions would be great. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Go right ahead. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. I am honored to be on the subcommittee. 

Mr. Chairman, do you believe the nuclear power industry in the 

United States is well-regulated and generally safe? 

Mr. JACZKO. I certainly, as the chairman of the NRC, believe it 

is well-regulated. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. JACZKO. And we do believe we have a strong program to ensure protection of public health and safety. 

Senator GRAHAM. Would you advise the Congress to continue to 

pursue nuclear power as part of energy production in this country? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, decisions ultimately about what to do with nuclear power really are beyond our, really our responsibility. 

Senator GRAHAM. Just as a citizen, would you like to see America 

have more nuclear power in the future? 

Mr. JACZKO. I, as a citizen, would like to see nuclear power that 

is safe and secure and that is fundamentally my job as chairman 

of the NRC. 

Senator GRAHAM. And do you believe that the nuclear power 

plants that we are talking about constructing in the future are 

more modern and safer? 

Mr. JACZKO. Certainly the plants that are under consideration 

have enhanced design and enhanced safety features that at least 

on—at the design stage and on paper seem to indicate that they 

would have an inherent safety advantage over the existing plants. 

Senator GRAHAM. One of the benefits—— 

Mr. JACZKO. But I want to stress, if I could, that we believe the 

plants that are in existence today do meet our requirements for 

safety and security and the new plants could potentially have some 

additional enhancements over that. 

Senator GRAHAM. It is like new cars have things that old cars 

don’t have, but we still drive older cars. I have an older car and 

I feel safe in it. I will buy a newer car and may be even safer, I 

guess. 

At the end of the day, one of the big impediments—the benefit 

of nuclear power is it creates good jobs, in my view, and it doesn’t 
26 

emit pollutants in the air. Is that your understanding? I wonder if 

it is—— 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, again we—you know, the focus for the agency 

is really to make sure that the nuclear power that is in this country is safe and secure. And we continue to have a program, we 

think, that ensures that. 

Senator GRAHAM. If I called it ‘‘clean energy’’ would you agree? 

Mr. JACZKO. You know, I tend to not like to get into—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I see. 

Mr. JACZKO [continuing]. Discussions about those kind of things. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s talk about spent fuel. Can we talk about 

that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Sure. 

Senator GRAHAM. Because I think—I didn’t hear his question, 

but Senator Durbin is making a point about what should we do 

with spent fuel. I have always been a fan of the French reprocessing system, but quite frankly Secretary Chu has convinced me, and 

I think he is one of the best Secretary of Energy that we have ever 

had since I have been in the Congress. I like him a lot, incredibly 

smart. He has convinced me that if we will be patient, maybe in 

the next decade plus there will be new technologies developed on 

the spent-fuel reprocessing front that would be worth waiting on. 

Do you agree with that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I think again from the NRC perspective—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Lyons. 

Mr. JACZKO [continuing]. We would just want to make sure that 

spent fuel can be stored safely and securely—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Mr. JACZKO [continuing]. Until then. And we think that is the 

case right now. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Mr. Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Let me start, Senator Graham, by heartily agreeing 

with my boss, Secretary Chu. 

Senator GRAHAM. Both of you all are very smart. I like it. 

Mr. LYONS. But we—yes, we are very interested in exploring a 

wide range of options on the back end of the fuel cycle and putting 

it—— 

Senator GRAHAM. So you think it would be beneficial for the 

country not to duplicate the French system right now? 

Mr. LYONS. The French system uses the so-called PUREX process. They have certainly made some improvements in it over the 

years, but we do have some issues related to possible proliferation 

from that cycle as well as environmental issues. We think that 

with research we can do substantially better and that is the research that Secretary Chu is leading, through my office. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is shutting Yucca Mountain down helpful to 

our nuclear waste problem or harmful? 

Mr. LYONS. Let me answer in this way, Senator. I came to the 

Department after the decision had been made and I heartily agreed 

with the Secretary that Yucca Mountain is not a workable solution, 

because I believe that the equation needs both a technical and a 

local support. As a resident of Nevada for many years I saw the 

lack of local support. I do think it is possible, and certainly the 

Blue Ribbon Commission is working toward approaches that may 
27 

not only provide interesting technical options, but I hope can be 

done in ways, like it has been done in many international venues, 

with strong, local support. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Thank you. I think that is the key to 

this is probably local political support more than anything else. 

But we will just move on right quickly to MOX fuel. Can you tell 

us what MOX—did MOX fuel in any way contribute to the disaster 

in Japan? 

Mr. LYONS. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. We have a program to create MOX fuel in 

America that would take plutonium weapons and convert them into 

plowshares; it is called The MOX Program at Savannah River, 

South Carolina. Do you support that? 

Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir. That is not through my program, however, 

yes, I am well aware of the program. And that is through NNSA, 

the defense—— 

Senator GRAHAM. If I could just indulge my colleagues a moment. 

There are 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium that are in 

excess of our defense needs here and the equivalent amount in 

Russia. And these are literally nuclear weapons. And there is a 

process called MOX where you can take the weapon and dilute it 

down and create commercial fuel. You are literally taking a sword 

and turning it into a plowshare. And that program is going on in 

South Carolina at the Savannah River site. 

And I just want to thank the administration for being supportive 

of the program. And there are some things being said in the House 

about the MOX Program I would like to get straight. Again, do you 

believe that producing MOX fuel here in America makes sense, it 

is overall safe and do you recommend we continue to do so? 

Mr. LYONS. Well again sir, when we cross to safety I need to pass 

it back to Greg. I certainly understand the nonproliferation aspects 

of this. And—— 

Senator GRAHAM. It is huge, isn’t it? 

Mr. LYONS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. It is huge. I mean you are literally taking 

weapons grade plutonium off the market and doing something constructive with it. 

Mr. Chairman, do you support the MOX Program? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, we have done very thorough analyses of the 

use of MOX fuel and right now we—all the information we have indicates that it can be used safely. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much. We will proceed to the next 

panel. 

I would ask the witnesses to come forward as quickly as you can 

and staff to change the name cards. 

We will begin with Dr. Moniz of MIT. Thank you, sir, for being 

here. The clock will run in 5-minute allocations. We review your 

written statements so if you could summarize and we can have a 

more informal discussion I think that would be most useful. 

You have heard the prior panel. We would be interested on your 

reactions and reflections. 
28 

STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST J. MONIZ, PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

Dr. MONIZ. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Alexander, 

thanks again—thanks for the opportunity to present and discuss 

some views on the development of nuclear power in the United 

States in the wake of the Fukushima events. 

I must start by emphasizing that my testimony is purely my personal view, not the view of PCAST, the Blue Ribbon Commission 

or MIT. 

Fukushima has reopened the global discussion about the future 

of nuclear power, but we clearly don’t know how this debate will 

end. However, I think some outcomes are a very good bet. The cost 

of doing business at nuclear reactors will go up; the expected relicensing of 40-year-old nuclear plants for another 20 years will face 

additional scrutiny. These plants, like those at Fukushima, rely to 

a large extent on active safety systems rather than the passive 

safety systems built into the new designs. And the third, the options for the entire spent-fuel management system I expect will be 

re-evaluated. 

Let me selectively address a few of these issues. First cost. Currently operating plants would certainly face a very expensive proposition to retrofit if design threats are elevated substantially. This 

calls for a plant-by-plant review, of course including specific circumstances, like seismic. In many cases however, perhaps most, I 

expect the design basis threats are likely to be deemed sufficiently 

conservative and remain unchanged. 

The regulatory decisions about safety requirements can be assisted by application of new capabilities, among them the kind of 

advanced modeling and simulation tools being developed at DOE’s 

first innovation hub at Oak Ridge, and I might say, with major 

MIT engagement. Other types of retrofits could be more easily absorbed into normal operations such as transitioning the silicon-carbide fuel cladding to get higher-safety margins. I believe that the 

slow pace of this indicates, historically, an R&D program poorly 

aligned with strategic priorities, but the DOE current roadmap I 

think is a big step in the right direction. 

Now new nuclear power plants are already challenged, let’s face 

it, by high capital costs and increased costs—capital or operating— 

could tip the balance for many projects, depending on many financing and cost recovery factors. Now reducing the financial risk premium for nuclear power is a major objective of government support 

for first mover plants, principally through the loan guarantee program. Fukushima clearly does not help in this regard. 

An entirely different approach to new plants lies with SMRs and 

these could be a powerful way to address the cost issue by moving 

us from economies of scale to economies of manufacturing. But I do 

want to say, and I am very enthusiastic about these, but I do want 

to say there is a catch-22 that these economies of manufacture can 

only be realized, presumably, if we have a sufficient stream of orders for a greatly winnowed down set of technology options and 

that will be a complex interplay of government and the many proponents of and customers for the currently contending numerous 

SMR designs. 
29 

Prior to Fukushima the administration submitted a budget for 

2012 that would have greatly enhanced the level of activity for 

bringing SMRs to market. I believe that program is modest, but 

sensible and deserves support. 

Second, relicensing decisions of the NRC will almost certainly experience some delay. If the anticipated life extensions are not realized at any appreciable degree, we have to face the issue of replacing potentially tens of thousands of megawatts of nonemitting generation. It is not an immediate problem, because of our natural gas 

situation, but if we want to have those zero emission options for 

2020, it is an immediate challenge to develop them. And I do want 

to emphasize, among those options we must retain next-generation 

nuclear plants with advanced safety systems, including SMRs. 

Third, spent-fuel management, the Fukushima problems with 

spent-fuel pools co-located with reactors will undoubtedly lead to a 

re-evaluation of spent-fuel management strategy. Our reports at 

MIT have advocated, well before this, we should be moving, in any 

case, to consolidated spent-fuel storage. This has many drives, 

among them resolution of the Federal liability issues for not moving spent fuel away from reactors. And I believe that the Congress 

should allow use of the waste fund for development of consolidated 

storage. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

But eventually the spent fuel must go to a repository. My view 

is—my recommendation in the end is that consolidated spent fuel 

dry cask storage be established as soon as possible, as I discussed, 

and that a geological repository be established as soon as possible 

for defense high-level waste and spent fuel. That is, I would argue 

going back, re-evaluating the 1980s decision of commingling defense and civilian waste, separate them. Because I believe, for 

many reasons, we can move much faster toward a defense waste 

repository which would in turn develop tremendous amounts of 

knowledge and experience for an ensuing civilian waste repository. 

Thank you and I look forward to the discussion. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ERNEST J. MONIZ

FUKUSHIMA AND DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR POWER

Chairman Feinstein, Senator Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to present and discuss views on the development of 

nuclear power in the United States in the wake of the Fukushima events. I must 

start by emphasizing that this testimony represents my personal views, not those 

of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, or my home institution, Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT). 

Fukushima has reopened the global discussion about the future of nuclear power. 

Several factors had led many countries to consider expanding their nuclear capacity, 

reversing phaseouts, or initiating new nuclear programs. These factors include a 

very good safety and reliability record for the last decades, increasing concern about 

the risks of climate change, and a concomitant recognition that enormous amounts 

of additional electric generating capacity will be needed without increasing greenhouse gas and other polluting emissions. Exactly how the new debate will end is 

unclear and will remain so for some time, as the events and responses in Japan are 

investigated and fully understood, and as safety systems, operating procedures, regulatory oversight, emergency response plans, design basis threats, and spent-fuel 
30 

management are re-examined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for currently operating United States reactors. 

Nevertheless, some outcomes are a good bet: 

—The cost of doing business at nuclear reactors will go up, reflecting factors as 

diverse as new requirements for onsite spent-fuel management to measures 

needed to address possible elevated design basis threats. 

—The expected relicensing of 40-year-old nuclear plants for another 20 years of 

operation will face additional scrutiny, taking more time than expected. Indeed 

some of the license extensions already granted for more than 60 of the 104 

plants operating in the United States could be revisited. These plants, like 

those at Fukushima, rely to a large extent on active safety systems in case of 

accidents or natural disasters, rather than the passive safety systems built into 

the new designs. 

—Options for the entire spent-fuel management system—onsite storage, consolidated long-term storage, geological disposal—will be re-evaluated. This will be 

based both on what we learn from the Fukushima investigations about the 

spent-fuel behavior under accident conditions to a broader imperative to rationalize our overall SNF management system. 

The consequences of such outcomes could be very significant for nuclear power 

and for the entire energy system. We shall selectively address some of the associated issues. 

COST

Currently operating nuclear plants would face an expensive proposition to retrofit 

if design threats are elevated substantially. On the positive side, nuclear power 

plants have low-operating and fuel costs compared with coal and natural gas plants, 

and the owners might be able to absorb reasonable costs. However, the business decisions would be on a plant-by-plant basis depending on the design basis threat assigned to the plant’s specific circumstances (e.g., seismic). In many cases, perhaps 

most, the design basis threats are likely to be deemed sufficiently conservative and 

remain unchanged. The regulatory decisions about safety requirements can be assisted by application of new capabilities, such as advanced large-scale modeling and 

simulation. The first of DOE’s innovation hubs, located at Oak Ridge (with MIT as 

a major partner) is dedicated to developing related computational tools over the next 

several years. 

Other types of retrofits could be more easily absorbed into normal operations. For 

example, there has long been a discussion of transitioning to silicon-carbide fuel 

cladding in order to gain higher safety margins and other operational benefits as 

well. The cladding can be formed into the same size and shape as zircaloy cladding 

used in currently operating reactors, but has much less reactivity with steam (this 

was the source of the hydrogen in the Fukushima loss-of-coolant situation). But, 

long after this was proposed and investigated, we are still several years from evaluation in commercial reactors, and widespread adoption will take many more years. 

This timetable reflects a history of underfunded R&D programs that have been 

poorly aligned with strategic priorities. Last year’s DOE R&D roadmap is a step in 

the right direction. 

New nuclear power plants are already challenged by high capital costs, and increased capital and operating costs could tip the balance for many projects, depending on many financing and cost recovery factors. The costs are illustrated in the 

table showing levelized electricity costs for new plant construction. This is taken 

from a 2010 MIT report on the Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Today’s natural 

gas prices are in the $4–$5/MBtu range, making natural gas plants much more economical with respect to both capital requirements and levelized electricity cost. 

However, we have been through many significant excursions in natural gas prices 

over the last decade, resulting in caution about committing to only one fuel source. 

The generation portfolio decisions are likely to be different in different parts of the 

country according to the integrated resource planning methodology of public utility 

commissions, the availability of infrastructure, the ability to incorporate costs into 

a rate base, generation portfolio standards, and State/regional carbon dioxide emissions requirements. 
31 

COSTS OF ELECTRIC GENERATION ALTERNATIVES 

[2007 dollars] 

Overnight cost 

($/kW) 

Fuel cost 

($/MBtu) 

Levelized cost of electricity (cents/kW) 

Base case $25/ton-CO2

price 

Same cost of 

capital 

Nuclear ............................................. 4,000 0.67 8.4 8.4 6.6 

Coal .................................................. 2,300 2.60 6.2 8.3 ........................

Gas ................................................... 850 4/7/10 4.2/6.5/8.7 5.1/7.4/9.6 ........................

Modest carbon dioxide emissions charges would make nuclear competitive with 

coal. A major factor is the cost of capital, which hits nuclear power plant construction particularly hard because of the high capital costs and the longer construction 

times that are typically required. Reducing the financing risk premium for nuclear 

power is a major objective of Government support for ‘‘first mover’’ nuclear power 

plants, principally through the loan guarantee program first put in place in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The events of Fukushima clearly do not help in this regard. 

An entirely different approach to new nuclear power plant construction lies with 

small modular reactors (SMRs). This could be a powerful way to address the cost 

issue. SMRs come in a variety of proposed forms, some based on the same underlying light water reactor (LWR) technology that is used in almost all nuclear plants 

today, while others are based on gas- or metal-cooled designs. They range in size 

from 10 to 300 megawatts. None have been through a licensing procedure at the 

NRC, and this is a time consuming process for any new nuclear technology—especially those that are farther away from the NRC’s established experience and procedures. 

A major advantage of SMRs is that their small size compared with LWRs (whose 

size is typically 1,000 megawatts and now going up to 1,600 megawatts) means that 

the total capital cost is more in the $1 billion range rather than a significant multiple of that. Capacity can be built up with smaller bites, and this may lead to more 

favorable financing terms—a major consideration for high capital cost projects that 

take years to license and build. Still, the SMR must come in with a cost that is also 

competitive with LWRs on a unit basis; that is, the cost per installed Megawatt 

must be comparable or less. The LWRs have been driven to larger and larger size 

in order to realize economies of scale. The SMRs may be able to overcome this trend 

by having factory construction of the SMR or at least of its major components, presumably with economies of manufacturing, the ability to train and retain a skilled 

workforce at manufacturing locations, quality assurance, continuous improvement, 

and only fairly simple construction onsite. The catch-22 is that the economies of 

manufacture will presumably be realizable only if there is a sufficiently reliable 

stream of orders to keep the manufacturing lines busy, and this in turn is unlikely 

unless the large number of designs is winnowed down fairly early in the game. 

Reaching the n-th plant for a small number of reactor types is likely to require a 

complex interplay between Government support and proponents of the many contending SMR designs. 

A 2020 SMR option will be available only if we start now, and even then it will 

be tight. Prior to Fukushima, the Obama administration submitted to the Congress 

a proposed 2012 budget that would greatly enhance the level of activity in bringing 

SMRs to market. LWR-based technology options would be advanced toward licensing, and other SMR technologies would be supported for the remaining R&D needed 

to have them follow in the licensing queue. The program is modest, but sensible. 

Obviously the Federal budget deficit makes it difficult to start any new programs, 

but a hiatus in creating new clean energy options—be it nuclear SMRs or renewables or advanced batteries—will have us looking back in 10 years lamenting the 

lack of a technology portfolio needed to meet our energy and environmental needs 

economically or to compete in the global market. 

RELICENSING

Relicensing decisions at the NRC will almost certainly experience some delay. A 

measured approach is appropriate since the NRC is constantly monitoring plant operations and safety margins; the 40 year licensing period does not represent any 

particular milestone with regard to the reactor systems themselves. 

If the anticipated life extensions are not realized to any appreciable degree, we 

will be faced with replacing tens of thousands of Megawatts of nonemitting generation. For the United States, this is not an immediate problem since the end of the 

original 40-year reactor operating periods will not be reached for most plants for a 
32 

while, and we have both substantially underutilized natural gas generation and lots 

of natural gas. Natural gas does have emissions, but far less than coal, and will 

serve as a bridge to a very low emissions future. However, the challenge of developing and demonstrating ‘‘no-emissions’’ options for 2020 and beyond is immediate, 

given the significant timeline from R&D to regulatory approval to market. 

Next-generation nuclear plants with advanced passive safety systems are among 

those options. This includes, but is not limited to, SMRs. The fact remains that nuclear power is the ‘‘emission-free’’ baseload generation technology that is, in principle, scalable without problems of variability and intermittency. Clearly, a rigorous 

design certification and licensing process will be needed to assure public confidence. 

SPENT-FUEL MANAGEMENT

The Fukushima problems with spent-fuel pools co-located with the reactors will 

undoubtedly lead to a re-evaluation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management strategy. There is no need to act precipitously, but the fact is that our overall waste disposal system is fundamentally broken and needs re-examination in any case (as is 

being done by the Blue Ribbon Commission). 

The MIT ‘‘The Future of Nuclear Power’’ report in 2003 and the MIT Future of 

the Nuclear Fuel Cycle summary report in 2010 called for consolidated spent-fuel 

storage (these reports can be accessed at web.mit.edu/mitei). There are many reasons for this quite independent of the Fukushima experience. The 2010 report made 

a recommendation (pg xi): 

‘‘Planning for long-term managed storage of spent nuclear fuel—for about a century—should be an integral part of nuclear fuel cycle design. While managed storage is believed to be safe for these periods, an R&D program should be devoted to 

confirm and extend the safe storage and transport period. 

‘‘The possibility of storage for a century, which is longer than the anticipated operating lifetimes of nuclear reactors, suggests that the United States should move 

toward centralized SNF storage sites—starting with decommissioned reactor sites 

and in support of a long-term SNF management strategy.’’ 

The consolidated storage recommendation has many drivers: 

—The SNF would be stored in dry casks. There is no need for the SNF to be located at the reactor site, as the operational requirements are quite different; for 

example, the reactor needs access to large amounts of cooling water, while the 

SNF storage system does not. 

—Issues such as the Federal liability for not moving SNF from reactor sites would 

be resolved. 

—A degree of opposition to expanding nuclear power would be addressed by moving the fuel to a consolidated secure location, most likely under Federal control 

(this does not rule out privately developed sites under NRC license). 

—While the risks of cascading failures are extremely small, the Fukushima incident showed that the probability is not zero. The spent fuel, which contains considerable radioactivity and needs cooling, would be mostly removed from the reactor site in case of a major accident or natural disaster (the SNF recently removed from the reactor core would still need some cooling time in a pool). 

—‘‘Densification’’ of spent fuel in pools beyond the original design density should 

not be necessary. 

The Congress should allow use of the waste fund for development of consolidated 

storage. 

Eventually, the SNF, or the high-level waste (HLW) that would result from a future decision to reprocess, would need to go to a geological repository. Indeed, the 

intermediate step of consolidated dry-cask storage could be eliminated if a repository were in place to accept the SNF. However, there is still a debate about whether 

SNF is a waste or a valuable energy resource to be harvested by reprocessing. The 

uncertainty has multiple origins. One is that the trajectory of nuclear power deployment is not clear. If nuclear power does not grow, it is unlikely that reprocessing 

will be attractive. However, even if nuclear power does grow, it is not obvious that 

reprocessing is the preferred path; for example, a new generation of recycling reactors might be started with enriched uranium rather than plutonium recovered from 

reprocessing. This uncertainty argues for maintaining options by committing to century-scale consolidated storage for commercial SNF, as recommended above, while 

pursuing geological repository development in parallel. The arduous and time-consuming process needed to establish and utilize one or more geological repositories 

for the growing amount of power reactor SNF calls for renewed commitment even 

as consolidated storage is established. These are core results of the MIT analysis 

of fuel cycle options. 
33 

Going beyond those studies, I suggest that the decision to co-mingle defense and 

civilian nuclear wastes should be revisited. The conditions today are much different 

from when the co-mingling decision was put forward in 1985. In particular, the 

timeline for establishing a commercial spent-fuel repository is evidently much longer 

than anticipated at that time. 

—The defense wastes are small compared with civilian wastes and are essentially 

bounded (there is a small amount of additional SNF each year from the naval 

nuclear propulsion program). 

—Much of the waste is very old and therefore relatively cool. 

—There is no argument about a possible energy value; all agree that it is waste 

to be disposed of, so there is no need to preserve options through longer-term 

storage. 

—There are agreements with the affected States to remove the fuel, and these are 

important for continuing nuclear defense missions at these sites. 

—A separate defense repository, while still subject to NRC licensing, would have 

simpler finances going forward, although a reconciliation would be needed with 

the civilian program that recognized the defense financial contributions to the 

development of Yucca Mountain. 

—Responsibility would reside with the DOE as a Government function to dispose 

of waste generated in an inherently governmental enterprise—the development 

of nuclear weapons. 

—At the same time, a future commercial SNF/HLW repository would not have the 

complication of dealing with national defense HLW and SNF. 

The recommendation is that consolidated SNF dry-cask storage be established as 

soon as possible at one or a few sites for commercial power reactor fuel and that 

a geological repository be established as soon as possible for defense HLW/SNF. A 

commercial repository would be pursued in parallel, but most likely in a longer 

timeframe given the current realities. The defense waste repository would provide 

invaluable knowledge and experience for the civilian waste repository. 

In summary, while it is too early to understand the causes and full implications 

of the Fukushima events, it is not too early to start thinking about the cost, relicensing, and SNF management issues that will inevitably arise and influence the 

future of nuclear power. These deliberations should be carried out in a measured 

way. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to present these views. I look forward to a 

discussion. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Moniz. 

Mr. Levis. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LEVIS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, PSEG POWER 

Mr. LEVIS. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

My name is William Levis; I am the president and chief operating officer of PSEG Power which is a subsidiary of Public Service 

Enterprise Group headquartered in Newark, New Jersey. PSEG 

Power is a merchant generating company and owns approximately 

14,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity. We own 100 percent of the Hope Creek Nuclear Station, 57 percent of the Salem 

Nuclear Station and 50 percent of the Peach Bottom Station. 

I appreciate your invitation to testify at today’s hearing to discuss the status of the U.S. nuclear energy industry and the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident on nuclear energy in the 

United States. I am testifying today on behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear energy industry’s Washington based policy organization. 

My remarks today will cover four points. First, U.S. nuclear 

power plants are safe. Second, safety is the U.S. nuclear energy industry’s top priority. Third, the U.S. nuclear energy industry has 

a long history of continuous learning from operational events; we 

will do the same as a result of the Fukushima event. And fourth, 
34 

the U.S. nuclear energy industry has already taken proactive steps 

to verify and validate our readiness to manage extreme events. We 

took these steps early without waiting for clarity on the sequence 

of failures of Fukushima. 

Regarding the first point, U.S. nuclear power plants are safe. 

They are designed and operated conservatively to manage the maximum credible challenges appropriate to each nuclear plant site. 

U.S. nuclear power plants have also demonstrated their ability to 

maintain safety through extreme conditions, including floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters. 

U.S. nuclear reactors are designed to withstand earthquakes, 

tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, tornados, and other natural events 

equal to the most significant historical event or maximum projected 

event, plus added margin for conservatism without any breach of 

safety systems. 

Regarding the second point, safety is the nuclear energy’s industry’s top priority and complacency about safety performance is not 

tolerated. We know we operate in an unforgiving environment 

where the penalties for mistakes are high and where credibility 

and public confidence, once lost, are difficult to recover. All the 

safety related metrics tracked by industry and the NRC demonstrate high levels of excellence. Forced outage rates, unplanned 

safety system actuations, worker radiation exposures, events with 

safety implications, and lost-time accident rates have all trended 

down year over year for a number of years. 

Regarding the third point, the U.S. nuclear industry routinely incorporates lessons learned from operating experience into its reactor designs and operations. I could point to many, many examples 

of improvements made to the U.S. nuclear power plants over the 

years in response to lessons learned from operational events over 

the last 40 years. Let me just list a few. 

In the 1970s concerns were raised about the ability of Boiling 

Water Mark 1 containments to maintain its design during an event 

where steam is vented to the torus. Subsequently, every United 

States operator with a Mark 1 containment implemented modifications to dissipate energy released to the suppression pool and installed stringent supports to accommodate loads that could be generated. 

In 1988, the NRC concluded that additional Station Blackout 

(SBO), regulatory requirements were justified and issued the Station Blackout Rule to provide further assurance that a loss of both 

offsite and onsite emergency AC power systems would not adversely impact public health and safety. The SBO Rule was based 

on several planned, specific probabilistic safety studies, operating 

experience and reliability, accident sequence, and consequent analysis completed between 1975 and 1988. 

And third, since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, U.S. 

nuclear plant operators identified other beyond design basis 

vulnerabilities. As a result, U.S. nuclear plant designs and operating practices since 9/11 are designed to mitigate severe accident 

scenarios such as aircraft impact, which includes the complete loss 

of offsite power and all onsite emergency power sources and loss of 

large areas of plant. The industry developed additional methods 

and procedures to provide cooling to the reactor and the used fuel 
35 

pool and staged additional equipment at all U.S. nuclear power 

plant sites to ensure that the plants were equipped to deal with extreme events and nuclear plant operation staffs are trained to manage them. 

Regarding the final point, the United States nuclear industry has 

already started an assessment of events in Japan and is taking 

steps to ensure that United States reactors could respond to events 

that may challenge safe operation of the facilities. These actions include: verifying each plant’s capability to manage severe accident 

scenarios developed after 9/11 that I previously described; verifying 

each plant’s capability to manage a total loss of offsite power; 

verifying the capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of 

floods on systems inside and outside the plant and performing walk 

downs and inspections of important equipment needed to respond 

successfully to extreme events like fires and floods. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, it will be some time before we 

understand the precise sequence of what happened at Fukushima, 

before we have a complete analysis of how the reactors performed, 

how equipment and fuel performed, how the operators performed. 

As we learn from this tragic event, however, you can rest assured 

that we will internalize those lessons and incorporate them into 

our designs and training and operating procedures. 

This concludes my oral testimony, Madam Chairman, and I look 

forward to answering questions that the committee may have. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LEVIS

Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Alexander, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

My name is William Levis. I am president and chief operating officer of PSEG 

Power which is a subsidiary of Public Service Enterprise Group, headquartered in 

Newark, New Jersey. PSEG Power is a merchant generating company and owns approximately 14,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity. We own 100 percent 

of the Hope Creek nuclear generating station, 57 percent of the Salem nuclear station, and 50 percent of the Peach Bottom nuclear station. PSEG Power operates 

Salem and Hope Creek; Exelon operates Peach Bottom. Salem consists of two pressurized water reactors; Hope Creek is a single boiling water reactor; the Peach Bottom station has two boiling water reactors. 

I appreciate your invitation to testify at today’s hearing to discuss the status of 

the U.S. nuclear energy industry and the implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident on nuclear energy in the United States. I am testifying today on behalf of 

the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear energy industry’s Washington-based policy organization. NEI members include all companies licensed to operate commercial 

nuclear powerplants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/ 

engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry. 

My remarks will cover four major points: 

First, U.S. nuclear powerplants are safe. 

Second, safety is the U.S. nuclear energy industry’s top priority. 

Third, the U.S. nuclear energy industry has a long history, over several decades, 

of continuous learning from operational events, and we have incorporated lessons 

learned into our nuclear plant designs and our operating practices and training. We 

will do the same as a result of the Fukushima accident. 

And fourth, the U.S. nuclear energy industry has already taken pro-active steps 

to verify and validate our readiness to manage extreme events. We took these steps 

early—without waiting for clarity on the sequence of failures at Fukushima. 

Before I address these four points, however, let me note that the U.S. nuclear energy industry works very hard not to grow complacent about safety. This is not al-
36 

ways easy when our 104 nuclear powerplants are operating well, with an average 

capacity factor above 90 percent for the last 10 years. Similarly, we cannot be complacent about the accident at Fukushima. I cannot tell you at this moment whether 

or not we will discover previously unknown vulnerabilities at America’s nuclear 

powerplants, but I am quite confident that we will learn important lessons from 

Fukushima and identify additional steps we can and will take to further improve 

the margin of safety at our nuclear plants. 

U.S. NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS ARE SAFE

That said, we do believe U.S. nuclear powerplants are safe. They are designed and 

operated conservatively to manage the maximum credible challenges appropriate to 

each nuclear power plant site. U.S. nuclear powerplants have also demonstrated 

their ability to maintain safety through extreme conditions, including floods and 

hurricanes and other natural disasters. 

I can think of no better summary of the status of U.S. nuclear powerplants than 

the one delivered by President Obama to the American people on March 17. Mr. 

Obama said: ‘‘Our nuclear powerplants have undergone exhaustive study, and have 

been declared safe for any number of extreme contingencies. But when we see a crisis like the one in Japan, we have a responsibility to learn from this event, and to 

draw from those lessons.’’ 

We invest heavily in our operating plants to ensure safe, reliable operation. The 

U.S. nuclear energy industry invested approximately $6.5 billion in 2009 in our 104 

operating plants—to replace steam generators, reactor vessel heads and other equipment and in other capital projects. 

U.S. nuclear reactors are designed to withstand earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes and other natural events equal to the most significant historical event or the maximum projected event, plus an added margin for conservatism, without any breach of safety systems. We have many, many examples of U.S. 

nuclear powerplants achieving safe shutdown during extreme events where offsite 

power was lost. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for example, the Waterford nuclear power plant in Louisiana shut down safely, lost all offsite power, and maintained safe shutdown on emergency diesel generators for 31⁄2 days until grid power 

was restored. 

For earthquakes, nuclear plants are designed and constructed to withstand the 

maximum projected earthquake that could occur in its area, with additional margin 

added. Plant earthquake-induced ground motion is developed using a wide range of 

data and review of the impacts of historical earthquakes up to 200 miles away. 

Those earthquakes within 25 miles are studied in great detail. This research is used 

to determine the maximum potential earthquake that could affect the site. Each reactor is built to withstand the respective strongest earthquake; for example, a site 

that features clay over bedrock will respond differently during an earthquake than 

a hard-rock site. 

It is important not to extrapolate earthquake and tsunami data from one location 

of the world to another when evaluating these natural hazards. These catastrophic 

natural events are very region- and location-specific, based on tectonic and geological fault line locations. The Tohoku earthquake that struck the Fukushima nuclear 

power plant occurred on a ‘‘subduction zone,’’ the type of tectonic region that produces earthquakes of the largest magnitude. A subduction zone is a tectonic plate 

boundary where one tectonic plate is pushed under another plate. Subduction zone 

earthquakes are also required to produce the kind of massive tsunami seen in 

Japan. 

In the continental United States, the only subduction zone is the Cascadia 

subduction zone which lies off the coast of northern California, Oregon, and Washington. In an assessment released last week, the California Coastal Commission 

concluded that a ‘‘nuclear emergency such as is occurring in Japan is extremely unlikely at the State’s two operating nuclear powerplants. The combination of strong 

ground motion and massive tsunami that occurred in Japan cannot be generated by 

faults near the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and the Diablo Canyon 

Power Plant.’’ 

SAFETY IS THE U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY’S TOP PRIORITY

This leads to my second point: Safety is the U.S. nuclear energy industry’s top 

priority, and complacence about safety performance is not tolerated. 

We know we operate in an unforgiving environment where the penalties for mistakes are high and where credibility and public confidence, once lost, are difficult 

to recover. 
37 

All of the safety-related metrics tracked by industry and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) demonstrate high levels of excellence. Forced outage rates, unplanned safety system actuations, worker radiation exposures, events with safety 

implications, and lost-time accident rates have all trended down, year over year, for 

a number of years. 

We can have confidence in nuclear plant safety based on those indicators, but we 

should derive even greater confidence from the process that produces those indicators, from the institutions we have created to share best practices, to establish 

standards of excellence and to implement programs that hold us to those standards. 

After the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the nuclear industry created the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). In INPO, the nuclear industry—unique 

among American industries—has established an independent form of self-regulation 

through peer review and peer pressure. In fact, the President’s Oil Spill Commission, in its report on the Deepwater Horizon accident, identified INPO as the model 

for self-regulation by the offshore oil and gas industry. 

INPO is empowered to establish performance objectives and criteria, and nuclear 

operating companies are obligated to implement improvements in response to INPO 

findings and recommendations. At its headquarters in Atlanta, INPO has some 350 

people monitoring nuclear plant operations and management on a daily basis. INPO 

evaluates every U.S. nuclear plant every 2 years, and deploys training teams to provide assistance to companies in specific areas identified as needing improvement 

during an evaluation. 

INPO provides management and leadership development programs, and manages 

the National Academy of Nuclear Training, which conducts formal training and accreditation programs for those responsible for reactor operation and maintenance. 

Among its many activities, INPO maintains an industrywide database called 

Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX)—for —and all companies 

are required to report equipment problems into EPIX. EPIX catalogues equipment 

problems and shows, for example, expected mean time between failures, which allows the industry to schedule predictive and preventive maintenance, replacing 

equipment before it fails, avoiding possible challenges to plant safety. INPO also 

maintains a system called Nuclear Network that allows companies to report and 

share information about operating events, to ensure that an unexpected event at 

one reactor is telegraphed to all, to ensure that an event at one plant is not repeated elsewhere, to ensure high levels of vigilance and readiness. 

It may not be obvious to the outside world, but we have an enormous self-interest 

in safe operations. We preserve and enhance the asset value of our 104 operating 

plants first and foremost by maintaining focus on safety. Safety is the basis for regulatory confidence, and for political and public support of this technology. 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY HAS A LONG HISTORY OF CONTINUOUS LEARNING

My third point: The U.S. industry routinely incorporates lessons learned from operating experience into its reactor designs and operations. U.S. nuclear powerplants 

have implemented numerous plant and procedural improvements over the past 30 

years. Some of these improvements have been designed to mitigate severe natural 

and plant-centered events similar to those experienced at the Fukushima nuclear 

power plant. In addition, the equipment and procedures could be used to mitigate 

other severe abnormal events. The type of events include a complete and sustained 

loss of AC power, a sustained loss of vital cooling water pumps, major fires and explosions that would prevent access to critical equipment, hydrogen control and venting, and loss of multiple safety systems. 

Starting in the 1990s, U.S. nuclear powerplants developed guidelines to manage 

and mitigate these severe events that are beyond the normal design specifications. 

Plants evaluated site-specific vulnerabilities and implemented plant and procedural 

improvements to further improve safety. These severe accident management guidelines were developed in response to probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), which 

identified several high-risk accident sequences. These guidelines provide operators 

and emergency managers with pre-determined strategies to mitigate these events 

The strategies focus on protecting the containment as it assumes the fuel clad and 

reactor cooling system are lost. 

I could point to many, many examples of improvements made to U.S. nuclear powerplants over the years in response to lessons learned from operational events. Let 

me list just a few: 

—In the 1970s, concerns were raised about the ability of the BWR Mark I containment to maintain its design during an event when steam is vented to the torus. 

Subsequently, every U.S. Operator with a Mark I containment implemented 
38 

modifications to dissipate energy released to the suppression pool and stringent 

supports to accommodate loads that could be generated. 

—As a result of the Three Mile Island accident, the industry made significant improvements to control room configuration and operator training. After that accident, which underscored the need for information to be better displayed in control rooms, all U.S. nuclear powerplants installed safety parameter display systems. A safety parameter display system collects and displays critical safety information at a workstation in the control room and other locations in the plant. 

Information on the status of key conditions, such as reactor core cooling, is displayed in a clear format on a computer screen. The information displayed enables the nuclear plant operators to assess plant conditions rapidly and take 

corrective actions. Before the accident at Three Mile Island, many U.S. nuclear 

powerplants trained their operators on generic simulators located offsite. Today, 

every U.S. nuclear reactor has a reactor-specific simulator onsite, with one shift 

of operators always in training. Finally, our current emergency preparedness 

programs grew from the lessons we learned at TMI and we now routinely drill 

with our State and local emergency management agencies to ensure we can appropriately communicate with the public during emergencies. 

—In 1988, the NRC concluded that additional Station Black Out (SBO) regulatory 

requirements were justified and issued the Station Black Out rule (10 CFR 

50.63) to provide further assurance that a loss of both offsite and onsite emergency AC power systems would not adversely affect public health and safety. 

The SBO rule was based on several plant-specific probabilistic safety studies; 

operating experience; and reliability, accident sequence, and consequence analyses completed between 1975 and 1988. 

—Since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, U.S. nuclear plant operators 

identified other beyond-design-basis vulnerabilities. As a result, U.S. nuclear 

plant designs and operating practices since 9/11 are designed to mitigate severe 

accident scenarios such as aircraft impact, which include the complete loss of 

offsite power and all onsite emergency power sources and loss of large areas of 

the plant. The industry developed additional methods and procedures to provide 

cooling to the reactor and the spent-fuel pool, and staged additional equipment 

at all U.S. nuclear power plant sites to ensure that the plants are equipped to 

deal with extreme events and nuclear plant operations staff are trained to manage them. 

THE U.S. NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS IN RESPONSE TO

FUKUSHIMA

The United States nuclear energy industry has already started an assessment of 

the events in Japan and is taking steps to ensure that United States reactors could 

respond to events that may challenge safe operation of the facilities. These actions 

include: 

—Verifying each plant’s capability to manage major challenges, such as aircraft 

impacts and losses of large areas of the plant due to natural events, fires or 

explosions. Specific actions include testing and inspecting equipment required 

to mitigate these events, and verifying that qualifications of operators and support staff required to implement them are current. 

—Verifying each plant’s capability to manage a total loss of offsite power. This 

will require verification that all required materials are adequate and properly 

staged and that procedures are in place, and focusing operator training on these 

extreme events. 

—Verifying the capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of floods on systems 

inside and outside the plant. Specific actions include verifying required materials and equipment are properly located to protect them from flood. 

—Performing walk-downs and inspection of important equipment needed to respond successfully to extreme events like fires and floods. This work will include analysis to identify any potential that equipment functions could be lost 

during seismic events appropriate for the site, and development of strategies to 

mitigate any potential vulnerabilities. 

Until we understand clearly what has occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

powerplants, and any consequences, it is difficult to speculate about the long-term 

impact on the U.S. nuclear energy program. The U.S. nuclear industry, NRC, the 

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the World Association of Nuclear Operators 

and other expert organizations in the United States and around the world will conduct detailed reviews of the accident, identify lessons learned (both in terms of plant 

operation and design), and we will incorporate those lessons learned into the design 

and operation of U.S. nuclear powerplants. When we fully understand the facts sur-
39 

rounding the event in Japan, we will use those insights to make nuclear energy 

even safer. 

In the long-term, we believe that the U.S. nuclear energy enterprise is built on 

a strong foundation: 

—Reactor designs and operating practices that incorporate a defense-in-depth approach and multiple levels of redundant systems; 

—A strong, independent regulatory infrastructure, which includes continuous assessment of every U.S. reactor by the NRC, with independent inspectors permanently onsite and additional oversight from NRC regional offices and headquarters; 

—A transparent regulatory process that provides for public participation in licensing decisions; and 

—A continuing and systematic process to identify lessons learned from operating 

experience and to incorporate those lessons. 

In conclusion, Madam Chairman, let me leave you with a short-term and a longerterm perspective. 

In the short term, all of us involved with the production of electricity from nuclear 

energy in the United States stand in awe of the commitment and determination of 

our colleagues in Japan, as they struggle to bring these crippled reactors to safe 

shutdown. 

In the longer term, it will be some time before we understand the precise sequence of what happened at Fukushima, before we have a complete analysis of how 

the reactor performed, how equipment and fuel performed, how the operators performed. As we learn from this tragic event, however, you may rest assured that we 

will internalize those lessons and incorporate them into our designs and training 

and operating procedures. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Levis. 

Mr. Lochbaum. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY 

PROJECT UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Good morning, Madam Chairman and Ranking 

Member Alexander. I appreciate this opportunity to travel up here 

from Chattanooga, Tennessee to provide my testimony today. 

Among the many challenges workers faced at Fukushima Daiichi 

Nuclear Plant was a need to provide cooling for radiated fuel in 

seven onsite spent-fuel pools. Irradiated fuel is curious material. 

When inside the core of an operating reactor irradiated fuel is so 

hazardous that the plant has an array of emergency systems whose 

sole purpose is to protect the fuel from damage by overheating. 

Some of these emergency systems feature motor-driven pumps, 

while some feature stream-driven pumps. These emergency core 

cooling systems can be powered by the electrical grid, by the emergency diesel generators and in some cases by onsite batteries. The 

diversity and redundancy of these emergency core cooling systems 

provides high, but not absolute, assurance that the irradiated fuel 

will be adequately cooled. If the highly reliable emergency core 

cooling systems fail, the irradiated fuel in the reactor core is encased within strong concrete walls, 4- to 5-feet thick. This structure 

provides additional assurance that the public is protected. 

After being discharged from the reactor core the irradiated fuel 

awaits transfer to a Federal repository which does not exist. The 

United States has spent more than $10 million—$10 billion on a 

proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. DOE faces an 

immense engineering challenge siting a repository because that location must isolate the irradiated fuel from the environment for at 

least 10,000 years into the future or merely 42 times longer than 

we have been in the United States of America. 
40 

Between these two dangerous endpoints irradiated fuel sits in 

temporary spent-fuel pools with almost no protection. For 

unfathomable reasons, irradiated fuel is considered benign after it 

is taken out of the reactor, but before it is placed in a repository. 

Today tens of thousands of irradiated fuel sits in spent-fuel pools 

across America. At many sites near—there is nearly 10 times as 

much irradiated fuel in a spent-fuel pool as in reactor core. These 

pools are not cooled by an array of highly reliable emergency systems, not powered by the grid, diesel generators or batteries. Instead the pools are cooled by one regular system, sometimes backed 

up by one alternate make up system. 

The spent-fuel pools are not housed within robust concrete containment structures designed to protect the public from the radioactivity they contain. Instead the pools are often housed in buildings with sheet metal siding like that in a Sears storage shed. I 

have nothing against the quality of Sears storage sheds, but they 

are not suitable for nuclear waste storage. 

The irrefutable bottom line is that we have utterly failed to proper manage the risk from irradiated fuel stored at our Nation’s nuclear power plants. We can and must do better. 

There are two readily available measures to better manage that 

risk. First, accelerate the transfer of spent fuel from the pools to 

dry cask storage. And second upgrade the emergency procedures 

for spent-fuel pool accidents. Currently, we fill the pools to capacity 

and put the overflow into dry cask. This keeps the pools nearly 

filled with irradiated fuel, maintaining the risk about as high as 

you can achieve. A better strategy would be to reduce the inventory 

of irradiated fuel stored in spent-fuel pools, to only that amount 

discharged from the reactor in the last 5 or 6 years. 

Less irradiated fuels in the pools results in a lower heat load in 

the pools, the lower heat load gives workers more time to recover 

cooling or re-establish the water inventory reducing the likelihood 

of fuel damage. And if fuel is damaged, for whatever reason, having 

less of it in the pools means the radioactive cloud emitted from that 

pool is much, much smaller, posing much less harm to people down 

wind. 

Following the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the reactor 

owner significantly upgraded emergency procedures. Prior to that 

accident the procedures and training relied on the operators diagnosing what had happened and taking steps to mitigate that accident. If the miss—if the operators misdiagnosed the accident, those 

procedures could actually direct them to take the wrong steps for 

the accident they actually faced. The revamped Emergency Procedures Guide, the operators response to abnormally high pressure or 

an unusual low water level, without undue regard for what caused 

those abnormal conditions, this—these upgraded emergency procedures and training are significant improvements over the pre-TMI 

days. 

But, no comparable procedures and training would help the operators respond to spent-fuel pool accidents. It is imperative that 

comparable emergency procedures be provided for spent-fuel pool 

accidents to derive the same safety benefits that we derive from 

improved procedures for reactor core accidents. 

Thank you. 
41 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, I’m certainly not a nuclear expert, you are far more 

so. The first time I’d been in a nuclear plant was this past week. 

I visited the two in California, and spent the whole day doing it. 

What jumps right out at you is the difference between the containment of the core, the location of that spent-fuel pool and the dry 

cask situation. 

Here’s the question. There is a major study, apparently, by Bob 

Alvarez at the Nuclear Policy Institute for Policy Studies on the 

use of dry cask storage at nuclear power plants. He contends that 

dry cask has the potential to reduce the overall risk associated 

with reactor storage of spent fuel. So let me ask each of you, from 

your viewpoint, why does industry practice appear to be to keep the 

spent fuel in pool much longer than the required 5 to 7 years? Why 

wouldn’t they move it aggressively to dry cask? 

Dr. Moniz. 

Dr. MONIZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. First, I think at a 

very high level what I would say is that from the history of our nuclear power program I would say the storage, storage of spent fuel, 

between if you like the reactor and the presumed repository has 

been an afterthought. It has not really been part of our serious policy discussion about fuel cycle design. As a result, I think what one 

sees are in some sense, what may be very logical to a plant operator, operational decisions. So as David said, the dry cask storage 

is viewed more as the overflow when the pool can’t handle any 

more densification. So I think what we need to do is to stand back, 

really ask what is our whole integrated system about storage and 

disposal. And that is exactly what I would call for. In fact, I think 

the move to dry cask is essential, furthermore for a set of reasons, 

I believe we should really start thinking hard about consolidated 

storage, presumably at Federal reservations to solve a host of problems. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I agree with you. 

Mr. Levis. 

Mr. LEVIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And certainly the topic 

of used fuel and how we should dispose of it is I think one worthy 

of significant discussion. And I would not characterize the industry 

having a reluctance of putting used fuel bundles into cask storage; 

I would say one of the impactable items is really a lack of a national strategy and policy on what we are going to do with it. 

And if I could just offer one thought in that particular area, we 

want to limit the number of times we have to handle used fuel and 

so we want to be able to take it out of the pool once, put it into 

cask and have it be able to go where it can go. Not all casks are 

designed for transportation, for example. So if in fact our policy is 

going to be to store it onsite there for a long period of time, we 

want to make sure we have casks that can do that. If our policy 

is to put it in a cask that can be transported, we want to make 

sure it can be in a cask that can do that. 

So, you know, we were essentially planning for what we believe 

the direction of the country was headed. And it is not a reluctance 

to do this; we know how to do it. I would ask, if we want to speed 

that process up, that we consider things like supply chain availability and these sorts of things and making sure we have the, you 
42 

know, the training and qualification for the people that need, you 

know, to do this sort of activity. But, I wouldn’t characterize it as 

reluctance, you know, on our part to do it, but rather lacking what 

the national plan is and how we can develop our plan to match up 

with that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Are you saying you believe, as an operator, 

we would be better off with a Federal policy that essentially set the 

handling of waste? 

That we should have either regional repositories or a national repository? 

Mr. LEVIS. Yes, what I was referring to, Madam Chairman, is 

what is the ultimate disposition of the used fuel, where will it go 

and what the most efficient way to get it there is. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lochbaum. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I would agree with the point that spent-fuel storage onsite was an afterthought. And I as think I agree with the industry position that it has been a shifting thought. The Federal 

Government keeps saying that we will take spent fuel on such and 

such a date and then that date slips by quite a bit. So it is difficult 

to base a decision on how best to store spent fuel onsite when the 

parameters keep shifting year to year. So I think I agree with Bill 

Levis that it has not been reluctance, it has been that shifting paradigm that keeps causing problems. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Dr. Moniz. 

Dr. MONIZ. May I just add a point, because again I totally agree 

with Bill. It is again, it is the absence of a system that allows rational decisions. As Bill mentioned something that is very important, we don’t have a consistent policy on these—literally just on 

things of sizes of casks, which is quite important. 

But, if I may go back, you invited comments on the earlier panel, 

just to comment on the issue of the 100-year storage which Chairman Jaczko mentioned. 

We think that there is a good case to be made for the integrity 

of 100-year storage, but the reality is it is based on extraordinarily 

skimpy database. And this is an example of the kind of R&D priority that we should have been having and I think now is being revived, pre-Fukushima, now it will be even more important. 

And this gets to Bill’s point about handling the fuel. While it 

may be that the fuel can be contained for 100 years, say in dry 

cask storage, but what about when you move it then? Will movement compromise integrity? These are the kinds of issues we need 

to have a system view of. And, I would say this is one of the many 

reasons why I personally favor consolidated storage, because if you 

bring this fuel together and there aren’t any issues you can have, 

at that site, the infrastructure to deal with those problems and the 

spent fuel, if there are any after 80, 90, or 100 years. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Dr. Moniz, if the Nation can’t agree on a 

single repository, what makes you think it can agree on more than 

one for consolidated sites? 

Dr. MONIZ. Thank you, Senator Alexander. First of all, I want to 

stress that the consolidated storage sites I am talking about are 

not necessarily repositories. 
43 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, but they are places where you would 

haul the spent fuel for storage. 

Dr. MONIZ. That is correct, so—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. So you would have the same issues of local 

support, wouldn’t you? 

Dr. MONIZ. Certainly and by the way, and I strongly support the 

idea that we should—we have to find public support in regions to 

move things. Now, I think having a dry cask storage facility is different from a repository. I don’t claim it is easy; I am not 

Pollyannaish about it. It is tough. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Yes, I know. 

Dr. MONIZ. But also, I just inferred, for example, such a location 

would have, for example, a substantial research and testing infrastructure—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. Yes. 

Dr. MONIZ [continuing]. Around the spent fuel, that is the kind 

of design that we need, I believe. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Yes. Would you agree that Dr. Chu’s plan 

and the attitude of others is that we could safely store our used nuclear fuel onsite, while for the next 10 or 20 years we develop aggressive R&D to try and find a better way to use and recycle nuclear fuel? Do you think that is both wise and safe to do? 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. First, I would say that we don’t see any 

large differentiator, technically, on safety or security or costs of distributed storage versus centralized storage. There are other system 

reasons why I prefer the centralized storage. Now—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. But what my question really is, while we do 

the R&D to get to that point—— 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, now on the—— 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. Is it safe to store it onsite? 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, it is. And now on terms of the R&D program, 

in our report last year we put forward exactly that kind of a program. And I should add, it is based upon something that Secretary 

Lyons inferred, that we do not believe that current reprocessing approaches, frankly, have merit, but we need to develop, possibly, 

more-advanced approaches. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I want to ask you two more questions. The 

first is about radiation. We see on television news that trace 

amounts of radiation have been discovered in the United States as 

the result of the Japanese accident, yet testimony in the previous 

panel was we shouldn’t worry about that. Why is that true? 

Dr. MONIZ. Well, I will give a brief answer; maybe David will 

have more specifics on it. The information I have received is that 

the measurements in this country, including in my home State, are 

orders of magnitude below what are considered to be levels of concern. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, is it true that every day we receive 

some radiation naturally from—— 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, sir. In the United States the average citizen received about 300 millirem per year, which is let’s say one-half of 

a CAT scan. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And maybe another 300 from other—— 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, and—— 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. From CAT scans and—— 
44 

Dr. MONIZ. On average, yes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And that it poses no harm for a person to 

receive 500 millirems—— 

Dr. MONIZ. Well, that is getting into an area which I am certainly not an expert. There is a lot of argument going on about socalled linear hypotheses and collective doses to the public. But my 

view is that it seems to be essentially no harm. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Let me conclude with a question that you 

are an expert on. You mentioned the work that MIT and Oak Ridge 

are doing in modeling nuclear power plants. As I understand it, 

that is based upon the supercomputing capacity there and the R&D 

capacity there that this subcommittee and this Congress and this 

President are asked to fund on an annual basis. How important is 

the United States’ ability to be among the leaders in the world in 

supercomputing to such programs as you are working on today to 

help us understand how to keep nuclear power plants safe? 

Dr. MONIZ. A large-scale modeling and simulation applied to 

complex engineered systems is something the DOE, first of all, has 

been a leader in for a long time. It is something the country really 

should lead for very important, I believe, impacts on our manufacturing capability, our regulatory capability, those are the things 

that we are trying to do with this initial hub focused on LWR simulation. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

You heard me ask the chairman about the option of an independent assessment of nuclear safety in our country. Say the National Academy of Science put together an assessment in light of 

what has happened at Daiichi and Daini and compared pressured 

water versus boiling water reactors, spent-fuel pools stored at reactor sites right now forever, because there is no other plan, and 

some in dry casks. Do you believe such an assessment would be a 

good idea? 

Let me begin with you Mr. Lochbaum, what do you think of that 

idea? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Well, an independent assessment is never a bad 

thing, but I think equally important or more important would be— 

the NRC is going to undertake the 90-day review and then a 

longer-term review. And they are going to come up with a lot of lessons learned that will be informed by what the work the IAEA is 

doing and the work that the industry is doing and the work that 

the independent assessment would do. I think it is vitally important for the Senate or the Congress more broadly, to look at the 

results from the NRC’s review, what they have identified and their 

schedule for implementing that. 

If they need more budget in order to make some of those things 

happen on a timelier basis that needs to happen. Because the best 

plan in the world doesn’t really help anybody until it is implemented. So I think the NRC will come up with a good list of things 

to do to make our plants less vulnerable to that kind of thing and 

it is important that they get to the end of that effort as quickly as 

possible. So I think the Congress can help the NRC set its priorities and get there as expeditiously as possible. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 
45 

Mr. Levis. 

Mr. LEVIS. Madam Chairman, the industry will be looking at 

their own assessment of this event, you know, coordinated through 

INPO in concert with the World Association of Nuclear Operators 

and obviously the NRC will do its review independently. You know, 

we are committed to the absolute safety of our plants, we welcome 

any and all assessments and certainly an independent assessment 

would be fine, just to make sure we got it right. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Dr. Moniz. 

Dr. MONIZ. I would agree. I think it is—it would be unrealistic 

to think that we could move forward, frankly, without some kind 

of major assessment and I believe an independent assessment will 

be called for. What that means exactly, independent and who 

would be the independent body, is not entirely clear, in my view. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, would the National Academy of Science 

(NAS) be able to put that kind of body together, which is what they 

generally do when they look at something. 

Dr. MONIZ. Yes, I think the NAS is certainly an option. Sometimes they move more slowly than one would like, but I think if 

they—in my view perhaps with a strong connection to an outstanding technical group, like INPO for example, could be a good 

way of putting together a review. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, anything else, Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. No. I’d like to thank the witnesses for very 

helpful statements that you made and thank the chairman for looking into this. As I said at the beginning, it is very important that 

we talk about nuclear power. You know, nuclear power is such a 

complex mechanical operation that it makes sensational television 

news whenever there is a problem. Even though hundreds of thousands of people in Japan are homeless and a thousand bodies 

washed up on a beach one day, the news most days was about 

what was happening at the nuclear reactors. 

And I think it is important that as a country we simply learn 

how to honestly ask questions and continuously improve what we 

are doing. At the same time, lots of people die every year from the 

pollution from coal plants that isn’t collected in pollution control 

systems and from other forms of energy production. So I think it 

is important that we keep this all in perspective and we recognize 

that the safety record for the generation of nuclear power in the 

United States really couldn’t be better, in terms of harm to people. 

It can always be improved. There are important lessons from Three 

Mile Island, but I have not heard anyone yet contradict my statement that no one was injured at Three Mile Island. 

So this is helpful testimony and I think, Madam Chairman, the 

most important thing we can do is advance the research on used 

nuclear fuel, on SMRs, on any other safety enhancements that 

might be recommended that would continue to help us produce 

large amounts of reliable, low-cost, clean electricity of which I 

think nuclear power is an important component. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you, Senator. 

Of course, I come from a State that is in the ring of fire. The ring 

of fire has had some very big earthquakes around it. One of the 
46 

things I learned from the USGS was that a section of the sea bottom, as large as the State of Maryland, moved in a subduction 

under the plate and that was what launched the tsunami which 

was just amazing for me to hear. I think no one ever thought, in 

the design process, that that kind of thing would happen. 

Let me ask, do each of you have a last thought for us? Anything 

you would like to say and then we will conclude rapidly. 

Mr. Levis. 

Mr. LEVIS. I think the point that you make about what is it that 

we don’t know is obviously something we challenge ourselves with 

every day, which is really the reason why these—some of these procedures that we refer to as severe accident management guides 

were developed, you know, a little over a decade ago, so that we 

could respond, you know, to the consequence of the event, versus 

trying to figure out what the event is. That means if the heat sink 

is lost, what would you do? If you lost emergency AC power what 

would you do? 

So you know, we think—we ask ourselves continually those what 

if questions and what have we missed here. And I am sure there 

will be some significant learning out of here that we can apply to 

our plant designs and operating practices so we can improve the 

safety of our facilities. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you. I was with the CEO 

of Southern California Edison and he said the same thing you did 

that what we know is what we know and we have to challenge people with what we don’t know. I very much agree with that. Dr. 

Moniz or Mr. Lochbaum. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I would just say as the—obviously the event in 

Japan was tragic. Even if there were no lives lost from the radiation that has been released from the damaged cores, that was a 

multi-billion asset that became a multi-billion liability very quickly. 

So we need to, both for the economic cost of that accident, but also 

any human cost, we need to learn as much as we have. If the industry is going to do it, the NRC is going to do it and we—as tragic 

as the accident will be, it would be shame on us if we don’t reap 

the full benefits of lessons learned from that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Dr. Moniz. 

Dr. MONIZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Perhaps I could make a few comments about R&D programs, 

that is obviously something under the direct purview of this subcommittee and you will be considered it. Just a note, that again 

last year we issued a report on the future of the nuclear fuel cycle. 

I just wanted to note some of the areas that we noted for R&D, 

viewing these as real gaps, historically, in the program. 

Life extension for LWRs and technologies, some new technologies 

like fuel, cladding which we mentioned earlier, for safety margins, 

advanced fuel development for a LWR. The modeling and simulation is part of the way of verifying and quantifying uncertainties— 

dry cask storage life extension—other concepts include enhanced 

waste forms for storage and disposal. What I emphasize is that this 

is way before Fukushima, this was last year, that these kinds of 

technologies which are about the work horse of our nuclear fleet, 

LWRs, has been neglected and I believe this should be a very 

strong priority for R&D. 
47 

We did have, in addition to this, something that Senator Alexander referred to, which was also a program for the future possible 

closed fuel cycles that might make sense for reasons of waste management or resource extension. But our view as the number one 

priority, strategic view is if nuclear power is to play an important 

role in the next few decades it is these things we need: the storage 

technologies, the new fuels, the new cladding with better safety 

margins, et cetera. So I would urge, in your consideration of the 

DOE budget, that these be given a lot of attention. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You make a lot of sense. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Madam Chair, may I ask permission to include in the record an article from The Guardian of London on 

Sunday by one of the leading environmentalists in the country 

which is headlined, ‘‘Why Fukushima Made Me Stop Worrying and 

Love Nuclear Power’’. His comment was, ‘‘Atomic energy has just 

been subjected to one of the harshest possible tests and the impact 

on people and the planet has been small. The crisis at Fukushima 

has converted me to the cause of nuclear power.’’ 

Senator ALEXANDER. This is—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Oh my goodness. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, the—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The effect has been small? 

Senator ALEXANDER. Of the reactors. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. On the reactor. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Of the—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But the affect on the country, on the people, 

on the economy, on the sea bed is enormous. 

Senator ALEXANDER. The effect of the reactors. These are his 

comments. But he reviews, in his article, that the disaster would 

weigh more heavily, he said, if there were less harmful alternatives. He goes through all the other ways of producing energy 

and concludes atomic power has to be part of the mix. 

And in any event, this is just one person who is an environmentalist who had that unusual reaction to the disaster. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, we will put it in the record. 

[The information follows:] 

[From the guardian.co.uk, March 21, 2011] 

WHY FUKUSHIMA MADE ME STOP WORRYING AND LOVE NUCLEAR POWER

(By George Monbiot) 

You will not be surprised to hear that the events in Japan have changed my view 

of nuclear power. You will be surprised to hear how they have changed it. As a result of the disaster at Fukushima, I am no longer nuclear-neutral. I now support 

the technology. 

A crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a monster earthquake and a vast tsunami. The electricity supply failed, knocking out the cooling 

system. The reactors began to explode and melt down. The disaster exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-cutting. Yet, as far as we know, no one has yet 

received a lethal dose of radiation. 

Some greens have wildly exaggerated the dangers of radioactive pollution. For a 

clearer view, look at the graphic published by xkcd.com. It shows that the average 

total dose from the Three Mile Island disaster for someone living within 10 miles 

of the plant was 1⁄625 of the maximum yearly amount permitted for U.S. radiation 

workers. This, in turn, is half of the lowest 1-year dose clearly linked to an increased cancer risk, which, in its turn, is 1⁄80 of an invariably fatal exposure. I’m 

not proposing complacency here. I am proposing perspective. 
48 

If other forms of energy production caused no damage, these impacts would weigh 

more heavily. But energy is like medicine: if there are no side-effects, the chances 

are that it doesn’t work. 

Like most greens, I favour a major expansion of renewables. I can also sympathise 

with the complaints of their opponents. It’s not just the onshore windfarms that 

bother people, but also the new grid connections (pylons and power lines). As the 

proportion of renewable electricity on the grid rises, more pumped storage will be 

needed to keep the lights on. That means reservoirs on mountains: they aren’t popular, either. 

The impacts and costs of renewables rise with the proportion of power they supply, as the need for storage and redundancy increases. It may well be the case (I 

have yet to see a comparative study) that up to a certain grid penetration—50 percent or 70 percent, perhaps—renewables have smaller carbon impacts than nuclear, 

while beyond that point, nuclear has smaller impacts than renewables. 

Like others, I have called for renewable power to be used both to replace the electricity produced by fossil fuel and to expand the total supply, displacing the oil used 

for transport and the gas used for heating fuel. Are we also to demand that it replaces current nuclear capacity? The more work we expect renewables to do, the 

greater the impact on the landscape will be, and the tougher the task of public persuasion. 

But expanding the grid to connect people and industry to rich, distant sources of 

ambient energy is also rejected by most of the greens who complained about the blog 

post I wrote last week in which I argued that nuclear remains safer than coal. What 

they want, they tell me, is something quite different: we should power down and 

produce our energy locally. Some have even called for the abandonment of the grid. 

Their bucolic vision sounds lovely, until you read the small print. 

At high latitudes like ours, most small-scale ambient power production is a dead 

loss. Generating solar power in the UK involves a spectacular waste of scarce resources. It’s hopelessly inefficient and poorly matched to the pattern of demand. 

Wind power in populated areas is largely worthless. This is partly because we have 

built our settlements in sheltered places; partly because turbulence caused by the 

buildings interferes with the airflow and chews up the mechanism. Micro-hydropower might work for a farmhouse in Wales, but it’s not much use in Birmingham. 

And how do we drive our textile mills, brick kilns, blast furnaces and electric railways—not to mention advanced industrial processes? Rooftop solar panels? The moment you consider the demands of the whole economy is the moment at which you 

fall out of love with local energy production. A national (or, better still, international) grid is the essential prerequisite for a largely renewable energy supply. 

Some greens go even further: why waste renewable resources by turning them 

into electricity? Why not use them to provide energy directly? To answer this question, look at what happened in Britain before the industrial revolution. 

The damming and weiring of British rivers for watermills was small-scale, renewable, picturesque and devastating. By blocking the rivers and silting up the spawning beds, they helped bring to an end the gigantic runs of migratory fish that were 

once among our great natural spectacles and which fed much of Britain—wiping out 

sturgeon, lampreys and shad, as well as most sea trout and salmon. 

Traction was intimately linked with starvation. The more land that was set aside 

for feeding draft animals for industry and transport, the less was available for feeding humans. It was the 17th-century equivalent of today’s biofuels crisis. The same 

applied to heating fuel. As EA Wrigley points out in his book Energy and the 

English Industrial Revolution, the 11m tonnes of coal mined in England in 1800 

produced as much energy as 11m acres of woodland (one-third of the land surface) 

would have generated. 

Before coal became widely available, wood was used not just for heating homes, 

but also for industrial processes: if half the land surface of Britain had been covered 

with woodland, Wrigley shows, we could have made 1.25m tonnes of bar iron a year 

(a fraction of current consumption) and nothing else. Even with a much lower population than today’s, manufactured goods in the land-based economy were the preserve of the elite. Deep green energy production—decentralized, based on the products of the land—is far more damaging to humanity than nuclear meltdown. 

But the energy source to which most economies will revert if they shut down their 

nuclear plants is not wood, water, wind or sun, but fossil fuel. On every measure 

(climate change, mining impact, local pollution, industrial injury and death, even radioactive discharges) coal is 100 times worse than nuclear power. Thanks to the expansion of shale gas production, the impacts of natural gas are catching up fast. 

Yes, I still loathe the liars who run the nuclear industry. Yes, I would prefer to 

see the entire sector shut down, if there were harmless alternatives. But there are 

no ideal solutions. Every energy technology carries a cost; so does the absence of 
49 

energy technologies. Atomic energy has just been subjected to one of the harshest 

of possible tests, and the impact on people and the planet has been small. The crisis 

at Fukushima has converted me to the cause of nuclear power. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is unusual. 

Your thoughts have been very helpful. I would just ask that if 

you have other thoughts, please communicate them to this subcommittee because Dr. Moniz is right, this R&D program is directly 

under our jurisdiction and we certainly need to consider the things 

that you mentioned and we will. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

At this time I would like to ask the members of the subcommittee to please submit any questions they have for the witnesses for inclusion in the record. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PETER B. LYONS

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Question. Can you please explain what a passive reactor is and why it is or is 

not considered safer than the boiling water or pressurized water reactors? For instance, it is my understanding that high-temperature, gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs) 

that are currently being developed under the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Next 

Generation Nuclear Plant Program have natural safety features that ensure any 

significant radiation could never be released to the public no matter how serious the 

accident. Is this true and would you please describe why these reactors are so safe? 

In addition, what is DOE doing to promote the use of technology that utilizes a passive reactor? 

Answer. The current fleet of reactors utilizes engineered safety features characterized by redundant and diverse systems to deliver cooling water to the reactor core 

and remove heat from the primary containment. The new light water reactor (LWR) 

designs, including small modular reactors, are even safer than the current fleet of 

reactors since they make use of passive safety features that rely on natural forces 

(such as gravity and natural circulation) rather than engineered safety features and 

emergency power supplies. HTGRs move beyond these passive safety features by incorporating additional inherent physical characteristics that enhance safety. These 

features include the use of advanced, coated particle fuel that retains the nuclear 

fission product materials during all design basis and severe accidents. HTGR-coated 

particle fuel operates at lower power densities (approximately 6 watts per cubic centimeter) than typical LWR fuel (60–100 watts per cubic centimeter) so that there 

is a reduced probability of core fuel damage and radioactive fission product releases. 

During severe accidents the HTGR reactor can be cooled passively without the use 

of active heat transfer systems that rely on electrical power, operator actions, or any 

active control systems. Some engineers have referred to these plants as being inherently safe. 

Question. What has and will the NRC do to ensure that our U.S. reactors are safe 

and are prepared for the worst case scenario? 

Answer. The NRC’s efforts to assure safety of commercial nuclear reactors begin 

with the licensing process. Each operating reactor in the United States underwent 

a rigorous design review before receiving a license. The applicants had to satisfy 

NRC safety requirements to assure that the design of the reactors and the associated emergency equipment, such as emergency cooling water pumps, would safely 

respond to a variety of adverse events. 

The NRC also licenses the reactor operators who provide the immediate response 

to any plant event. There are significant training and testing requirements for the 

operators, which include demonstrating knowledge of the appropriate response to 

accidents. In addition, the emergency planning requirements for power reactors are 

based on a spectrum of accidents, including severe accidents. 

On a day-to-day basis, inspections are done by onsite ‘‘resident’’ inspectors and 

visiting inspectors from the NRC’s four regional offices and the NRC’s headquarters. 

These inspections are part of the NRC’s ‘‘Reactor Oversight Process’’ and assess how 
50 

the reactor and utility staff perform in areas such as maintenance, engineering, operations, security, radiation protection, and emergency planning. Through the inspections, the NRC determines whether the licensee is operating in accordance with 

its license and that the plant systems will be capable of performing their safety 

functions in response to an event. 

Following recent events in Japan, the NRC established a senior level task force 

to conduct a methodical and systematic review of NRC processes and regulations to 

determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and make recommendations to the NRC for its policy direction. This 

task force will also identify a framework and topics for a longer-term review and 

assessment. 

In addition, NRC inspectors are assessing licensee activities and actions concerning readiness to respond to an event similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

plant incident. To direct the inspections, the NRC issued a Temporary Instruction 

(TI) on March 23, 2011 to its inspectors. Using this guidance, the NRC’s inspectors 

assessed the licensee’s capability to mitigate conditions that result from ‘‘beyond design basis’’ events typically bounded by security threats, loss of all onsite electricity 

(i.e. ‘‘station blackout’’), and flooding events. On May 13, 2011, the NRC began 

issuing reports to the Nation’s 104 operating nuclear power plants regarding inspections of the plants’ abilities to deal with power losses or damage to large areas of 

a reactor site following extreme events. Our inspectors found all the reactors would 

be kept safe even in the event their regular safety systems were affected by these 

events, although a few plants have to do a better job maintaining the necessary resources and procedures. 

U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors have Emergency Operating Procedures’ 

(EOPs) to direct actions in response to events and plant conditions. In response to 

an industry initiative in the 1990s, the U.S. industry developed Severe Accident 

Management Guidelines’’ (SAMGs) to address situations beyond the EOPs. During 

the NRC’s task force’s deliberations thus far, the importance of SAMGs has been 

highlighted. Thus, the NRC issued on April 29, 2011, a new TI to confirm that the 

SAMGs are available and being maintained, and determine the nature and extent 

of licensee implementation of SAMG training. 

Question. I know that 23 of the United States reactors are a General Electric 

Mark 1 design, the same design as at the Fukushima Daiichi facility in Japan. Yet, 

I believe each of these 23 facilities has been retrofitted and modified to address 

venting and other concerns with this reactor design. Can you please walk me 

through why the modifications were needed at the U.S. facilities? Can you confirm 

that all of these reactors have been modified? Does this make our reactors safer 

than the reactors in Japan? 

Answer. In the 1980s, the NRC staff completed a determination of what actions 

should be taken to reduce the vulnerability of the original Mark I containments to 

severe accident challenges. This work is documented in NRC’s Generic Letter 89– 

16. The Mark I containment has a light-bulb shaped ‘‘drywell’’ in which the reactor 

pressure vessel is located; below the drywell, there is a donut or torus-shaped 

‘‘wetwell’’ partially filled with water (i.e., the ‘‘suppression pool’’). There are pipes 

that connect the drywell to the suppression pool. If there is damage to the reactor 

pressure vessel or piping connected to it, the drywell will fill with steam and the 

resulting pressure will force the steam into the suppression pool. The water in the 

suppression pool will cool and condense the steam, thus reducing the pressure in 

the containment drywell and wetwell. Even before the installation of the hardened 

wetwell vents, the NRC staff recognized that under emergency conditions the plant’s 

operators might vent the wetwell to avoid exceeding the maximum containment 

pressure limits. However, the previous methods of venting used nonpressure retaining pathways, and thus could have made vital areas of the plant inaccessible and 

potentially unsafe during and after venting. Therefore, the NRC directed the staff 

to pursue enhancements to the Mark I containments, and in particular to approve 

installation of a hardened wetwell vent for plants that elect to incorporate this improvement. For the remaining plants, the staff was directed to initiate plant-specific 

backfit analyses for each of the Mark I plants to evaluate the efficacy of requiring 

the installation of hardened wetwell vents. 

Given a scenario of a long-term loss of decay heat removal, the staff found that 

use of reliable containment venting and procedures could reduce the chance of a 

core melt accident by a factor of 10, and that the vent would also reduce the likelihood of a core melt accident during other events like a station blackout. Hardened 

wetwell vents are designed to allow operators to prevent containment failure by controlled reduction of containment pressure during severe accidents. Venting from the 

wetwell allows for significant reduction in the release of radioactive airborne contamination by the scrubbing action of the suppression pool water. The vent was de-
51 

signed to discharge away from the secondary containment building, better supporting subsequent operator actions there. The vent capability was also designed to 

allow release of combustible gas (hydrogen resulting from the reaction of fuel cladding with coolant at elevated temperatures) to prevent containment failure. 

No NRC orders were issued for installing a hardened wetwell vent, and all modifications made were voluntary. Licensees were allowed to justify not installing the 

hard pipe vent based on plant unique configuration and circumstances. All 23 BWR 

Mark I plants either installed the modification described in the generic letter (22 

plants), or justified use of existing plant safety features (1 plant). Installation of the 

vent was designed to improve safety of the plants in the United States. 

Other improvements in these containment and safety systems were also studied 

and implemented from the late 1970s through the 1990s, including the strengthening of the wetwell, inerting of containment during operations to prevent hydrogen 

explosions in the case of a core damage accident, and installing larger suction 

strainers for emergency cooling pumps. 

The NRC does not currently have sufficient information about how venting was, 

or was not, accomplished in Japan, thus we cannot yet provide a comparison between the United States approach to venting and the Japanese approach. 

Question. I am told that in the upcoming year, 2 of the 5 NRC Commissioners 

will be up for replacement. Given the events that have taken place over the past 

month, and the number of U.S. nuclear facilities that will need renewal licenses, 

can you please speak to the importance of having a full panel as the NRC moves 

forward to tackle these issues? 

Answer. Commissioner Ostendorff’s current term will end on June 30, 2011. He 

has been re-nominated by the President for a full-term; that nomination is currently 

with the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee for consideration. Because Commissioner’s terms are staggered, the next term to end is Commissioner 

Svinicki’s at the end of June 2012. The NRC is designed to be a collegial body of 

five responsible for policy formulation, rulemaking, adjudications, and adjudicatory 

orders. The diversity of experience, knowledge, and opinions among the Commissioners strengthens the formulation of agency policy and the execution of our critical 

mission. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Senator FEINSTEIN. So thank you gentlemen, very much, for the 

testimony. It is very helpful. And the hearing is recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., Wednesday, March 30, the hearing 

was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 

subject to the call of the Chair.] 

Æ