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IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: FROM EXTENSION

TO FINAL AGREEMENT?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 29, 2014

Serial No. 113–201

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 5

The Honorable David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 

Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury ................................................. 14

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Wendy R. Sherman: Prepared statement .................................... 8

The Honorable David S. Cohen: Prepared statement ........................................... 16

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 60

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 61

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IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS: FROM 

EXTENSION TO FINAL AGREEMENT? 

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. 

This afternoon we assess the past 6 months of nuclear diplomacy 

with Iran and ask if a viable agreement is achievable by November 

24th. 

The administration, along with the United Kingdom, France, 

Russia, China, and Germany, has been seeking to negotiate a longterm comprehensive solution to Iran’s nuclear program since last 

fall. With these negotiations, Iran has agreed to limit its nuclear 

program in return for some sanctions relief. Should a final agreement be reached, it would permit Iran to maintain a mutually defined enrichment program and be treated like any other nonnuclear 

weapons state party to the nonproliferation treaty. 

At the outset of these negotiations, the administration aggressively pushed back on Congressional attempts to give our negotiators more leverage with added sanctions to go into force should 

negotiations fail. The legislation that Ranking Member Engel and 

I authored and, frankly, was passed with 400 votes out of the 

House of Representatives would have given Iran’s leadership a 

choice between compromise and economic collapse. We will never 

know if that prospect would have made a difference over the past 

6 months. But we do know that talks haven’t accomplished much 

to date without this pressure. Indeed, just days before the recent 

deadline, the Iranian foreign minister was offering an Iranian 

freeze of its current 19,000 centrifuges for several years. Is the status quo the best Iran is offering after 6 months of negotiations, a 

status quo, by the way, that has Iran enriching more uranium? 

The committee has continued its intense focus on Iran, holding 

a series of hearings. And, among the challenges, nonproliferation 

specialists told us that, even if the number of Iran’s centrifuges 

were drastically cut to 4,000, Iran would still have a breakout capacity of just 3 months. Of course, Iran’s Supreme Leader is pushing for some 190,000 centrifuges. 

2

Experts stressed that an effective verification regime would require measures that go well beyond those in the standard safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. 

Former U.S. and IAEA officials noted that failing to understand 

the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program would 

make it impossible to verify that Iran’s nuclear program is completely peaceful in nature. It took 17 years for the IAEA to conclude that South Africa’s nuclear program was entirely peaceful, 

and that was with the cooperation of its new government. Iran is 

mightily resisting this critical transparency. 

Former Secretary of State Clinton warned this weekend that any 

enrichment inside Iran will trigger an arms race in the Middle 

East. Also, many don’t realize that any limits placed on Iran’s nuclear program as part of the comprehensive solution will expire. In 

this respect, the final agreement is just another interim step with 

the real final step being the treatment of Iran as any other nonnuclear weapon NPT state. That means no sanctions, no restrictions on procurement of nuclear items, and certainly no restrictions 

on the number of centrifuges it can spin or the level to which it 

may enrich uranium. With such status, Iran could enrich on an industrial scale, claiming the desire to sell enriched uranium on the 

international market, as does France. Iran could also enrich uranium to levels near the weapons grade, claiming the desire to 

power a nuclear navy. That is what Brazil is doing. 

Of course, Iran isn’t France or Brazil. That was evident when the 

committee examined Iran’s behavior across the board. 

We heard from one former Iranian political protester and former 

prisoner that at least 750 people have been executed in Iran without due process in the past year. 

Today Iran’s work—work of the regime is on full display, as hundreds of rockets and missiles have rained down on southern Israel, 

from 2,500 in total. It is Iran that provides the weapons, provides 

funding, provides training to Hamas and other Palestinian terror 

groups. As one former intelligence official testified, ‘‘Iran’s nuclear 

program is just the tip of a revolutionary spear that extends across 

the world and threatens key U.S. interests.’’

Ambassador Sherman, you have your work cut out for you. I am 

not sure how we reach an agreement that advances U.S. national 

security, given Iran’s deep commitment to an extremely dangerous 

nuclear program. But one thing is clear. Come November there will 

be additional sanctions if there is no deal that is struck. 

But as the administration charts its course, I trust that you will 

be in close touch with this committee. That is especially important, 

given the significant changes to our Iran sanctions policy that are 

to be considered. 

And, as you know, Mr. Engel and I recently sent a letter to the 

President signed by 342 of our colleagues expecting such close coordination. America is stronger when we work together. 

And I now recognize the ranking member for any opening comments he may have. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this important hearing. 

Let me thank our witnesses for appearing today, Ambassador 

Sherman, Under Secretary Cohen. We have met with you many 

3

times, and America thanks you for the good work both of you have 

done and continue to do. 

After 6 months of talks between the P5+1 and Iran under the 

Joint Plan of Action, the parties have agreed to an extension for 

4 months. I support this extension, but not indefinitely. 

Over the next 4 months, Iran will continue to abide by all the 

restrictions in the JPOA and undertake two new commitments. 

First, converting its 20 percent enriched uranium oxide into nuclear fuel rods—these rods are very difficult to convert back into a 

form that could be used for a nuclear weapon. Secondly, diluting 

its up to 2 percent stockpile. In exchange, Iran will have access to 

an additional 2.8 billion in frozen assets. 

The JPOA has led to some positive outcomes. Iran’s economy continues to feel the pressure of international sanctions. Limitations 

on enrichment have lengthened the period of time to Iran’s nuclear 

breakout point. 

If the United States and our allies think there may be a light at 

the end of the tunnel, then it is worth pursuing this track for a little bit longer. But, as we move forward, I am reminded of what 

Secretary Kerry said at the start of the process: ‘‘No deal is better 

than a bad deal.’’

What was true 6 months ago is true now. So today I hope we can 

take a hard look at some of the remaining concerns. No deal is better than a bad deal. I hope, though, that we will all agree on what 

a bad deal is and what is good deal is. 

First, I want to reiterate my disappointment that Iran has been 

allowed to continue enriching under the JPOA. Especially after negotiating the nuclear gold standard deal with the United Arab 

Emirates, Iran doesn’t seem like the best candidate for even a civil 

nuclear program. I am curious what we would need to see from the 

Iranians in order for them to prove that their nuclear program is 

exclusively peaceful. 

In addition, the JPOA deals with declared facilities. What concerns me more is the possibility that there are undeclared facilities. 

We all know that Iran excels in keeping its nuclear program under 

a cloak of secrecy. 

They built their Fordow Enrichment Facility into the side of a 

mountain. So while Iran has given the IAEA access to their declared facilities, I worry that there are other facilities that we don’t 

know about. They have done it before, and they could do it again. 

Looking down the line, I am also concerned about what Iran 

could get in return for a comprehensive deal. Iran currently has 

over a $100 billion in frozen assets abroad and that doesn’t even 

include the money that Iran could make if oil sanctions were lifted 

and business life were to return to normal. Money could still be 

used to finance Iran’s destabilizing activities across the region, 

even if sanctions relief were to come in phases. 

You know, you look at the Israeli-Gaza war, the Israeli-Hamas 

war right now and—Hamas being a terrorist organization, they 

have gotten nearly all of their weapons and missiles from Iran. So 

it is not only a matter of Iran’s nuclear problems, it is a matter 

that Iran continues to be the largest supporter of terrorism around 

the world. 

4

Iran continues to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing support to Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran continues to prop up 

the murderous Assad regime and continues to oppress its own people. We will need assurances that sanctions relief doesn’t just mean 

funneling more money into the hands of terrorists. 

I would be delighted if the Iranians agreed to a deal that foreclosed any pathway to a nuclear bomb. But just as President 

Obama put the chance of success at 50/50, I too remain skeptical. 

We can’t afford a bad deal that will threaten our allies and our interests, and we must be prepared to walk away, if necessary. And 

if negotiations go south, we must be prepared to level additional 

sanctions to squeeze Iran’s economy. Iran must understand that all 

their actions have consequences. 

As the chairman just pointed out, the bill that both of us authored passed with over 400 votes—or 400 votes, the entire House, 

and passed unanimously out of this committee. All Democrats and 

all Republicans voted for the bill. The Congress feels very, very 

strongly that sanctions should be right there so that Iran will understand what it faces if it doesn’t negotiate in good faith. 

And, of course, when we look at the bottom line for these negotiations, we want to see the timetable pushed back so it will take Iran 

a longer time to have breakout in producing a bomb. Obviously, 

that is something that we are all concerned with and must be ironclad into the negotiations—into the final agreement. 

So, Mr. Chairman, let me say this. There is no difference between Democrats and Republicans on this issue. We understand 

that Iran is a bad player. We understand that Iran doesn’t negotiate in good faith. And we understand that Iran must understand 

that all options remain on the table and that those are not mere 

words, that those words have teeth. 

If the Iranians believe all options are on the table, perhaps they 

will begin to negotiate in good faith. If they really don’t believe 

that, there is little incentiveness for them to negotiate in good 

faith. 

So, again, I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look 

forward to their testimony. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

This afternoon we are pleased to be joined by senior representatives from the Department of State and the Department of Treasury. 

It is good to have Under Secretary Wendy Sherman with us. And 

she has held numerous positions throughout the years in the Department of State, and Ambassador Sherman served as vice chair 

of the Albright Stonebridge Group prior to that. 

David Cohen is the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary. He 

is focused on fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism. And prior to his Senate confirmation in 2011, he served as 

the assistant secretary for terrorist financing. And he practiced law 

prior to that in Washington. 

So we welcome you back. And, without objection, your full prepared statements will be made part of the record. 

And members here will have 5 calendar days to submit statements or questions or extraneous material for the record. 

And, of course, we will begin with Ambassador Wendy Sherman. 

5

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WENDY R. SHERMAN, 

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, 

Ranking Member Engel, and distinguished members of the committee. 

I am very pleased to be here this afternoon along with Under 

Secretary Cohen to discuss the status of negotiations related to 

Iran’s nuclear program. You have my written statement; so, I will 

summarize some key points. 

Mr. Chairman and members, our goal all—of our goal is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The diplomatic process 

in which we are currently engaged was designed to achieve that 

goal peacefully and durably. 

We have a basic metric for a good agreement, one that cuts off 

all of Iran’s potential paths to a nuclear weapon, the plutonium 

path with the current Arak reactor, the path through the underground facility at Fordow, the path through swift breakout at the 

Natanz enrichment plant, and the path that would occur in secret, 

which we will deal with through intrusive monitoring and transparency measures. 

And we will tie our sanctions relief to Iran’s performance, only 

providing relief to Iran after it has taken verifiable steps as part 

of a comprehensive agreement and maintain the capacity to tighten 

the pressure if Iran fails to comply. 

I cannot tell you today that our diplomacy will succeed because 

I am not sure that it will. I can tell you that, in the past 6 months, 

we have made significant and steady progress. We have exchanged 

ideas, narrowed gaps on key issues, and identified areas where 

more hard work is required. 

For instance, we have had productive discussions about how to 

reduce the dangers posed by the facilities at Iraq and Fordow, 

about the protocols necessary for transparency, and about the disposition of Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium. 

No issues have been neglected, but none have been finally decided, because nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. And, on 

some, we still have substantial differences, including the overall 

question of enrichment capacity. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there is some limit to how detailed 

I can be in this open session and still preserve the leverage we 

need in support of the goal we seek. However, the bottom line is 

that all serious obstacles remain. We have been moving in the right 

direction. 

For that reason, roughly 2 weeks ago, the parties to the negotiation agreed to extend our deliberations for 4 additional months. We 

agreed to this extension because we had seen significant progress 

in the negotiating room and because we can see a path forward, 

however difficult, to get to a comprehensive plan of action. 

We will use this time to continue working toward that comprehensive plan for ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear 

weapon and that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. 

I note that a year ago Iran’s nuclear program was growing and 

becoming more dangerous with each passing day. That is no longer 

6

the case. Last November, as the first step in this negotiation, we 

reached consensus on a Joint Plan of Action. 

In return for limited and targeted sanctions relief, Iran agree to 

freeze and even roll back key elements of its nuclear activities. In 

fact, the JPOA has temporarily blocked each of the paths Iran 

would need to go down to build a nuclear weapon. 

Many observers openly doubted whether Iran would keep its 

commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. But according to the 

IAEA, Iran has done what it promised to do during these past 6 

months. The result is a nuclear program that is more constrained, 

more transparent, and better understood than it was a year ago, 

a program that has been frozen for the first time in almost a decade. 

Meanwhile, as Under Secretary Cohen will make clear, sanctions 

relief for Iran will remain limited to amounts that will do little, if 

anything, to heal Iran’s deep-seated economic problems. Over the 

next 4 months, the valuable safeguards that freeze Iran’s nuclear 

program will remain in place as we strive to negotiate a comprehensive and longer-term plan. 

I will be blunt and say that we will never rely on words alone 

when it comes to Iran. We have and we will insist that commitments be monitored and verified and that the terms of access and 

inspection be thoroughly spelled out. Our goal is to structure an 

agreement that would make any attempt to break out so visible 

and so time-consuming that Iran would either be deterred from trying or stopped before it could succeed. 

Speaking more generally, I want to emphasize that engagement 

on one issue does not require and will not lead to silence on others. 

The United States will not hesitate to express its views and to put 

pressure on Iran when that is warranted, whether in relation to 

the government’s abysmal human rights record, its support for terrorism, its hostility toward Israel, its defense of political prisoners, 

journalists, and American citizens. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on this issue, we 

are united in our goals. We are determined that Iran not obtain a 

nuclear weapon. It is only because of the leverage, created by the 

executive and legislative branches of this government, by our allies 

and partners and by the United Nations Security Council, that 

Iran has come to the negotiating table in what we believe to be a 

serious way. 

But we all know that sanctions are a means, not an end. We are 

now in the process of determining whether the end we seek can be 

achieved through a diplomatic process. That effort is worthwhile 

because a positive outcome would be preferable to any alternative. 

A comprehensive agreement would ease anxiety and enhance stability throughout the Middle East. It would reduce the likelihood 

of a regional nuclear arms race. It would eliminate the potential 

threat of nuclear blackmail. It would contribute to the security of 

Israel and our partners throughout the region. And it would make 

our own citizens safer. 

Between now and November, we will continue our pursuit of 

these welcome ends, and it is with those high purposes in mind 

that I respectfully ask your continued support. 

7

Thank you, once again, for the opportunity to be here. And I will 

be pleased to respond to questions in as much detail as I possibly 

can in this open session. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sherman follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Sherman. 

We go now to Mr. Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID S. COHEN, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR TERRORISM AND FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member 

Engel, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for 

your invitation to appear before you today alongside my colleague, 

Ambassador Sherman, to discuss the extended Joint Plan of Action. 

I will focus my oral testimony this afternoon on our efforts to 

maintain intense pressure on Iran to help achieve a successful outcome in the negotiations over its nuclear program and the evermounting pressure that Iran will continue to face during the extended Joint Plan of Action period as the P5+1 seeks the comprehensive and long-term resolution to the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. 

When we announced the Joint Plan last November, we said that 

we did not expect the relief package in the Joint Plan of Action to 

materially improve the Iranian economy. And it hasn’t. The depths 

of Iran’s economic distress, distress that resulted, in large measure, 

from the collaborative efforts of Congress, the administration, and 

our international partners, dwarf the limited relief in the Joint 

Plan of Action. 

And so today, as we start to implement the extended Joint Plan 

of Action, Iran remains in a deep economic hole. The value of Iran’s 

currency, the rial, has declined by about 7 percent since the Joint 

Plan of Action was announced last November. 

Since 2011, Iran has lost about $120 billion in oil revenues. It 

lost $20 billion in revenues in the first 6 months of the Joint Plan 

of Action and stands to lose an additional $15 billion in oil revenues during the next 4 months alone. And Iran’s economy today is 

25 percent smaller than it would have been had it remained on its 

pre-2011 growth trajectory. 

Now, when we entered into the Joint Plan of Action, some predicted that our sanctions regime would crumble, and some also argued that Iran’s economy would rebound dramatically. Neither occurred. The fact is, as we enter the 4-month extension of the Joint 

Plan, our sanction regime remains robust and Iran’s economy continues to struggle. And we remain confident that 4 months from 

now our sanctions will continue to bite and Iran’s economy will remain under great stress. 

The $3 billion to $4 billion worth of relief that the extended Joint 

Plan of Action may provide Iran pales in comparison to what Iran 

needs to dig itself out of its deep economic hole. And we expect that 

firms will continue to shun Iran, as was the case during the first 

6 months of the Joint Plan of Action. Firms have good reason to 

remain reluctant about doing business in Iran. 

The overwhelming majority of our sanctions remain in place. 

Iran continues to be cut off from the international financial system 

and is largely unable to attract foreign investments. 

Iran is still shut out of the United States, the world’s largest and 

most vibrant economy, and precluded from transacting in the dollar. 

15

And our sweeping set of nearly 680 Iran-related sanctions designations, developed in concert with partners around the world, remains in place. 

Throughout the Joint Plan of Action period, we have also vigorously enforced our sanctions, recognizing the essential role that financial pressure played in the lead-up to and now during the Joint 

Plan of Action, and how important maintaining that pressure will 

continue to be during this extended JPOA period. 

Indeed, since the joint plan was negotiated, we have imposed 

sanctions on more than 60 entities and individuals around the 

world for evading U.S. sanctions against Iran, aiding Iranian nuclear and missile proliferation, supporting terrorism, and for abusing human rights. 

Throughout this short-term extension of the Joint Plan of Action, 

I can assure you that we will continue to make certain through 

word and deed that banks, businesses, brokers, and others around 

the world understand that Iran is not open for business and Iran 

will not be open for business unless and until it assures the international community of the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. 

While this 4-month extension will provide additional time and 

space for the negotiations to proceed, it will not change the basic 

fact that Iran’s sanctions-induced economic distress has not receded. 

And over the next 4 months, my colleagues and I within Treasury and throughout the administration will continue to echo President Obama’s clear message, namely, that we will come down like 

a ton of bricks on those who seek to evade our sanctions. That will 

help provide our negotiators leverage as we explore the possibility 

of a comprehensive and long-term resolution to the international 

community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. 

I am happy to answer any questions the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you. 

I had a couple of questions, and one I was going to start with 

is this sunset clause. I am very concerned about the way this 

clause would work. 

Once this agreement expires, Iran’s nuclear program would be 

treated just like Japan’s or just like Germany’s. With such status, 

it would be very easy for Iran to produce material for many nuclear 

weapons. 

One witness we had before this committee characterized this provision as ‘‘converting Iran from a nuclear pariah,’’ in his words, ‘‘to 

a nuclear partner, a giant get-out-of-jail-free card for Iran,’’ in his 

words. 

Do you dispute this characterization? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe that any comprehensive agreement with Iran must have 

an extremely long duration. It has been decades that the international community has had concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. 

The United States had a public National Intelligence Estimate 

that said, until 2003, Iran was attempting to build a nuclear weapon and had such a program. We have maintained our concerns 

about Iran’s program even since 2003, and that is the whole reason 

for this negotiation. 

So I believe that any comprehensive agreement must have a very 

long duration before Iran would, in fact, meet the standards required under the U.N. Security Council resolutions to be treated as 

a nonnuclear weapons NPT state. 

Along that road, they would be the subject of quite intrusive 

monitoring, transparency, and verification measures carried out by 

the IAEA. During that time, they would have, if they end up with 

an indigenous enrichment program, very small, very limited, to 

practical needs, very focused on intrusive monitoring, to ensure 

that there were no covert operations. Their issues concerning possible military dimensions would have to be addressed. Their research and development would have to be constrained in quite significant ways. 

So we would, in essence, be slowing down their ability to get to 

that kind of industrial-scale capacity that the Supreme Leader 

spoke of in his aspirational speech. 

Mr. ROYCE. And the Ayatollah—his views may evolve over time, 

but he just called again for the end of Israel. And I saw that, on 

Friday, they orchestrated and the government printed out these 

‘‘Death to Israel’’ placards and ‘‘Death to America’’ placards. 

And from—converging in nine different parts of the city, you had 

this group meet at the city center. 700 towns and cities. The government orchestrated this rally—‘‘Death to Israel’’ rally. 

So, clearly, we are up against an attitude here that is pretty pronounced. And you have heard me comment before about some of 

the Ayatollah’s statements about the ICBM ballistic missiles. 

A central component of a nuclear program is that delivery capability. He is talking about mass-producing these, the basic duty of 

every military man to be involved in this. 

22

Will a long-term agreement include limitations on their ballistic 

missile production? And will it include robust monitoring and 

verification on that front? 

And why did the interim agreement not explicitly require Iran to 

follow U.N. Security Council resolutions to stop its effort to develop 

a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, which, as we know, they are 

testing? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. What we have said in this negotiation 

and what is under discussion is that Iran must address all the provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

And, in 1929, there is a specific reference to any kind of delivery 

mechanism, long-range ballistic missile, for delivery of nuclear 

weapons. And so that has to be addressed in some way in this 

agreement. And it is under discussion, but not yet resolved. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

I am going to forgo the rest of my time. We are going to hold everybody to 5 minutes and get down to some of our junior members 

for their questioning. 

Mr. Engel, you are next. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What do we estimate the time for Iran for achieve breakout now? 

And what would we consider a good deal? How far would we have 

to push them back to have this considered a good deal? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I think, Mr. Engel, that it would be best 

to discuss breakout times with the intelligence community in a 

classified briefing. 

But I will tell you that most analysts out in the public say that 

right now Iran’s breakout time is about 2 months. And, by that, I 

mean how much time, if they decided to go for it, they could 

produce enough highly enriched uranium for one nuclear weapon. 

There are two paths to a nuclear weapon in terms of fissile material, which I know you well know. But for all members, one is highly enriched uranium. That is Natanz and Fordow. And one is plutonium. That is the current configuration of the Arak reactor. And 

we want to stop and block both of those pathways as well as the 

covert pathway. 

I have said publicly that we believe that we need to go many 

months beyond that to achieve the kind of assurance that we are 

looking for that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. ENGEL. We voted on an agreement with the United Arab 

Emirates, which for a long time was considered the gold standard 

in civil nuclear cooperation, in which we agreed to allow them to 

have nuclear power for peaceful purposes in exchange for not enriching on their soil. 

If we are indeed going to have an agreement with Iran which allows them to enrich on their soil, how can we ever get countries 

that come after Iran to agree to an agreement—a one-two-three 

agreement similar to the one that the UAE agreed to? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. This is obviously an area of concern, as 

you point out, Congressman. We have discussed this with UAE and 

many other countries, in fact. 

But what we are looking at here, if we are able to achieve a comprehensive agreement—and, as I said, I don’t know whether we 

will or not because Iran has to make some very difficult decisions, 

23

and I am not sure whether they will or not—is that it will be a 

very small, highly constrained, intrusively monitored program. 

And they will have years of that kind of intrusive monitoring. I 

don’t think that is a road that will be attractive to anyone else to 

go down, but it is something on which we are having continuing 

conversations. 

We believe, quite frankly, as you know, that Iran would be better 

off without any enrichment program. You can get fuel on the open 

market. They have argued, in fact, that they should be able to fuel 

Bushehr, which the Russians currently fuel and have made a guarantee for life. We believe that Russia should continue to fuel 

Bushehr and Iran has no need to do so. 

So anything that ends up in this agreement, if it does, on the enrichment side will be very small, very limited to a practical need, 

intrusively monitored, and not a path that we think will be attractive to anyone else. 

Mr. ENGEL. You mentioned that Iran has been keeping some of 

its promises and has shown some flexibility, but in terms of the 

question of their enrichment capacity, there has been less flexibility. 

Can you elaborate on that at all? Or, if you can’t, what would 

make us think that they would suddenly see the light and have 

some flexibility? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, what I would say is that we have 

said that their current capacity has to be severely limited and that 

where their program would begin in any agreement would have to 

be much smaller than what they currently have. 

We are approaching this in quite a holistic way. We are looking 

at all the ways in which Iranian enrichment capacity could be misused. Any arrangement in which we reach will be designed to address any problem that might come along the way. 

So we will look at capacity. We will look at advanced centrifuges, 

which could increase their capacity over time. We will deal with 

R&D. We will deal with their separate work units, which is the 

measure of the energy in their production. We will deal with stockpiles. We will deal with facilities. We will deal with the monitoring 

quite intrusively. 

And any arrangement that we might get to an agreement on will 

ensure that, if we close the front door, that Iran cannot enter 

through a back door. It is very complicated. It is highly technical. 

Some of my colleagues who are part of our expert team sit behind me. Quite frankly, it is a whole-of-government effort. The Department of Energy has been a tremendous partner, as have our 

labs, to make sure that, should we get to an agreement, we know 

exactly what we are getting down to the finest technical detail. 

Mr. ENGEL. Under Secretary Cohen, let me just ask you a very 

quick question. 

The sanctions relief would be based on a phased system, including waivers. Will the Iranians, do you believe, accept a deal that 

relies on waivers, not permanent relief? And how would you think 

that Congress—anticipate Congress’ involvement in this? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I am not going to venture a guess on 

whether the Iranians will accept a deal based on waivers. Perhaps 

Under Secretary Sherman wants to address that. 

24

In terms of Congress’ role, as you say, the notion for a comprehensive deal is one where whatever relief is offered to Iran is 

phased in over time and is tied to Iran taking verifiable steps along 

the way. 

It is very important that we maintain pressure during the course 

of that period so that, initially, what we have is sanctions that are 

suspended, not lifted, and then eventually, perhaps, move to lifting 

the sanctions. 

But in the near term, the notion would be that we would suspend 

sanctions through the exercise of our authorities. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I would just reiterate what the chairman said before. Our 

letter to the President signed by three-quarters of Congress, we feel 

very strongly that Congress must be involved. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

We go now to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairman of the Middle East 

Subcommittee and a leader on Iran sanctions efforts. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Sherman, last year, before this committee, you testified that, ‘‘The ultimate goal of any negotiations is that Iran come 

into full compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions.’’

Those Security Council resolutions demanded that Iran suspend 

all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and that Iran 

ratify and implement the IAEA’s additional protocols to strengthen 

safeguard measures. 

This morning, in front of the Senate Foreign Relations, you said 

that the administration’s preference is that Iran not have enrichment capabilities but then conceded that President Obama and 

your team have admitted that there is likely going to be an enrichment program. 

Has Iran come into compliance with the U.N. Security Council 

resolutions, including the implementation of the additional protocols? Will it be in compliance when a comprehensive agreement is 

reached? If they don’t, have U.S. negotiators failed to meet our 

goal, as you stated it was last year? 

You also said that this was also about verification, monitoring, 

and assurances to the international community. Of course, this is 

all based on the assumption that Iran has fully disclosed its program, a program that it kept covert for 2 decades, and that it is 

what will likely be proven to be the fatal and faulty assumption in 

these talks. 

DOD has assessed earlier this year that the U.S. isn’t able to detect or locate undeclared or covert nuclear activities. 

So how confident can we be that this regime, that has operated 

a covert nuclear program for decades, that has ignored U.N. Security Council resolutions, that has openly bragged about deceiving 

the West while in nuclear negotiations, has declared all of its facilities, activities, and programs to us, specifically its suspected military programs? 

And would any potential comprehensive agreement encompass 

anything that may be disclosed or detected after an agreement is 

signed or are we just dealing with these very specific facilities? 

25

As part of the extension agreement, we have agreed to another $2.8 billion in sanctions relief for Iran as well as allowing Iran to 

continue to export oil at a restricted level. 

And at our subcommittee hearing last month with Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Diplomacy, Amos Hochstein, I had asked 

him about reports that Iran was sending hundreds of thousands of 

barrels of oil to Assad to keep that thug and his war running; yet 

we are not counting this against Iran’s restricted levels. 

We were all shocked to hear that we don’t count that against 

Iran’s limits because Syria isn’t actually paying for the oil. And you 

repeated that this morning in the Senate. 

But what I had suggested to Mr. Hochstein was that this issue 

was bigger than just Iran sending soil to Assad and us not counting 

it for the JPOA. It goes to the heart of our policies as they relate 

to Iran and Syria, and it is about our U.S. national security interests. 

How much is Iran sending? How do we allow this to continue 

while we still negotiate a comprehensive agreement? How do we 

justify allowing Iran to send oil to Assad to keep his brutal regime 

afloat? And what else is Iran sending that we are ignoring? And 

if this were against the terms and Iran was caught in violation, 

who is in charge and what mechanism do we have to enforce the 

terms? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Indeed, all of the U.N. Security Council resolutions will have to 

be addressed if we are to get to a comprehensive agreement. 

Indeed, Iran would have to agree to the additional protocol—and 

I believe that they will—as well as modified code 3.1 and, in addition, specific enhanced monitoring and verification mechanisms 

that will be attached to each of the elements as they get agreed to 

in a comprehensive agreement. 

Part of the reason for the additional protocol and for enhanced 

monitoring even beyond that is to deal with the covert path, to 

make sure that there aren’t undeclared facilities. 

And, in fact, one of the things the IAEA does after a country 

signs onto the additional protocol—and it takes some time to do—

is to create what is called the broader conclusions that, in fact, 

there are no undeclared sites. 

That will take the IAEA some time to do. And some of our sanctions relief will be tied to reaching that benchmark, among other 

benchmarks, as we put together a comprehensive agreement. So we 

are quite concerned to make sure that we cut off the covert pathway. 

There is no way, 100 percent, to ensure that any country in the 

world doesn’t have a covert site. But what we can do is put the 

mechanisms in place to do two things: One, detect it if it’s happening, and, two, stop it before it can become a problem to us and 

to our national security. 

In terms of the $2.8 billion, let me make one comment and then 

let Under Secretary Cohen mention this. 

The 4-month extension was really just a continuation of the 

JPOA. And, as such, the prorated amount for those 4 months is 

$2.8 billion in their restricted funds. It is not U.S. taxpayer money. 

It is restricted money that is frozen in accounts that Iran has that 

26

they will now have access to. So it was simply a straight piece of 

arithmetic. 

However, because we have such great concerns, we did get Iran 

to agree to take two additional steps that go beyond the JPOA. 

That is to take some of their 20 percent oxidized enriched uranium, 

which was part of the JPOA, and take 25 kilograms of it, which 

is about the amount they can get done during this 4-month period, 

and turn them into metal plates for the Tehran research reactor, 

which make it virtually impossible for that to be converted back 

into enriched uranium. 

And we got them to agree to dilute all of their up to 2 percent 

enriched uranium stockpile, which is over 3 metric tons of up to 2 

percent enriched uranium. So these are two important steps that 

we got in addition to this as well. 

As for Syria, I will be glad to come back to that in someone else’s 

question. 

Chairman ROYCE. Very good. Very good. 

We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman, ranking member of the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. I will start with some comments, 

and I will ask our witnesses to respond for the record as they 

would like to these comments. 

Iran’s economy may not have grown as fast as China’s since 

2011. Mr. Cohen pointed out that it would be 25 percent smaller 

if it had kept growing at that rate. 

Keep in mind—it is 2011—that we in Congress passed the banking sanctions over the objection of the administration, and that 

point correlates with the decline in the growth of the Iranian economy. 

But the Iranian economy doesn’t have to grow at China’s rate in 

order to avoid regime endangerment. The fact is their economy is 

growing at 2 percent now. In America, we call that a recovery, not 

a regime endangerment. 

As the—I believe, the chairman brought up, we have this sunset 

clause so that, even if you are able to negotiate for really good controls, they all fade away in a decade and, at that point, Iran becomes unsanctioned and unlimited. Not sure that is a good deal. 

Mr. Cohen, you have talked about coming down like a ton of 

bricks. I think you need more bricks. 

In the first half of 2013, we had 83 companies sanctioned. Since 

Rouhani’s election, when the Iranians went from Ahmadinejad, 

who was honest enough to tell us what he was thinking, to 

Rouhani, who is very sneaky, we have had only 61, which means 

we have been going at one-quarter the rate, half the companies 

sanctioned in double the amount of time. 

Now, I don’t think we are going to negotiate a good enough deal, 

not because Ambassador Sherman is a bad negotiator, but because 

I don’t think you have enough leverage. We should pass sanctions 

now that go into effect in January or February. 

And I know that Secretary Kerry is reported in the press to have 

thought that that was a good idea, but needed to check with the 

White House. He checked with the White House, and then the reports in the press was that he never said it to begin with. In any 

case, you need that additional leverage. 

27

The other additional leverage you need is for Israel not to just 

have 2,000- to 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs, but the truly 

massive 30,000-pound bombs and the B–52s, which we have in our 

boneyard necessary to deliver them. 

I am not saying you make that transfer immediately, but you 

begin efforts toward that transfer and I think you will see a much 

better response between now and November. 

All options need to be on the table. And, frankly, the military option comes more out of Jerusalem than it comes out of Washington. 

I want to pick up on Mr. Engel’s comments about how Congress 

needs to be involved. 

Mr. Cohen, is it your interpretation of existing law that the administration, without Congress, can use the power we have given 

you to waive individual transactions and, instead, waive whole 

classes of transactions? Do you need Congress or can you just 

stretch the existing law so as to give the Iranians the ability to operate sanction-free? Mr. Cohen? 

This is a legal interpretation question. 

Mr. COHEN. And let me answer that question in two parts. First 

of all, I am not a lawyer—at least not a practicing lawyer. So I will 

defer on the legal interpretation to those who are charged with——

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. What is the position of the administration on the amount of power it has? 

Mr. COHEN. The position of the administration is, as we look forward, in a comprehensive agreement, if one is to be had, to involve 

Congress in every step of the way, close consultation——

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. Look, you are going to talk to us 

all we want. Let’s say we say ‘‘no’’ to this deal. 

Are you going to be able to implement it anyway by stretching 

the statutes and using your case-by-case waiver to make blanket 

waivers that deliver to the Iranians? And do you realize, and do 

the Iranians realize, that the next President my be elected on a 

platform of no more waivers? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I am reluctant to predict what the position might be in a circumstance where Congress has expressed 

disapproval for an agreement. 

I can tell you that, under the existing legislation, the way we are 

approaching this is that we can proceed in close consultation with 

Congress to suspend and waive certain provisions of law——

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. ‘‘Consultation’’ means we will tell 

you ‘‘no’’ and you will do it anyway. Let’s say we say ‘‘no’’ in every 

meeting and every vote on the floor. 

Are you going to do it anyway or do you have the right to do it 

anyway. 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I am not in a position to answer that 

question. 

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. In other words, the imperial presidency grows further. 

Finally—and I realize I am out of time—we were told with the 

original deal that, once you take uranium and make it uranium 

oxide, it was effectively neutralized. And we gave the Iranians $4.2 

billion for that. 

28

Now we are being told that oxidizing the uranium does not neutralize it, but it will be really neutralized if we give them another 

$2.8 billion to turn it into fuel. 

The fact is I don’t think it is neutralized either way, but we are 

paying for it twice and they still have it in their hand. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, if I may, we did not give 

Iran $4.2 billion and now $2.8 billion to dilute or to oxidize their 

stockpile. That was part of an entire package. 

And that package is a list of about 15 or 20 commitments that 

Iran made, including stopping enriching up to 20 percent enriched 

uranium, diluting and oxidizing that stockpile. 

It did, indeed, because they don’t have the conversion facilities 

to turn it back, put it in a state that made it quite difficult, if not 

impossible, for them to enrich it to highly enriched uranium. 

But, that said, we did not pay $4.2 billion for just one item. It 

was for an entire package of items that the IAEA has said they 

have, in fact, carried out. 

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. Well, we are paying twice, whatever the amount is. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. We need to go to Mr. Smith of New Jersey, chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human 

Rights, and International Organizations. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

very timely and important hearing. 

And welcome to our witnesses. 

Let me ask you a couple of questions beginning first with: What 

happens at midnight, November 25th, if there is no agreement? 

How firm is the 25th deadline? Are you contemplating scenarios if 

that deadline slips? 

Secondly, has the gap between the two sides on centrifuges actually widened with Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei’s recent statements that Tehran needs 190,000 centrifuges over the long term 

and that the P5+1 objectives, as he put it, are not realistic? 

Khamenei has also characterized the requirement that, as part 

of a final agreement, Iran end its ballistic missile program as ‘‘stupid, idiotic expectation’’ on our part. 

Thirdly, let me ask you—Khamenei, on Reuters—it is on the wire 

right now—has called Israel a rabid dog and has urged more arms 

to Hamas. 

Now, are the Iranians in a better position to provide arms to 

Hamas as a result of the easing of the sanctions, especially the $2.8 

billion that they will get as a result of the July 18th extension? 

And, finally, number 4, if I could, Andrew Natsios testified here 

at my subcommittee on North Korea, and we were talking about 

human rights and the ever-deteriorating situation in North Korea. 

He made a very important point. And, as you know, he is a very 

accomplished diplomat, having been U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, 

head of USAID in the past, and now he is working on behalf of 

human rights in North Korea. 

He said de-linking human rights with the Six-Party Talks was 

a colossal mistake because, when the collapse of those talks happened, certainly the deterioration that we have seen on human 

29

rights just continued. There was no stoppage. There was nothing 

that was gained during those talks. 

I and many others have urged that human rights be integrated 

with the talks on the nuclear issue with Iran and especially now 

with Abedini. Yesterday was the 2-year anniversary, July 28th, of 

Pastor Abedini being brought to prison, and his enduring of torture 

began on that day. 

Hekmati, Levinson, and now a Washington Post reporter that we 

are all very concerned about. You mentioned it, Madam Ambassador. Jason Rezaian continues to be a concern. We don’t know 

much about him. 

Since negotiations began and extensions in monies have been 

given to Iran by way of an easement on their sanctions, have 

human rights in Iran improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, I want to bear witness, Congressman, to your leadership on human rights issues. You have been a long-standing leader 

in that regard for many years, all the way back to when I worked 

up here on Capitol Hill, which, looking at my hair, was quite some 

time ago. So I know of your passion and I share it, as does this 

administration. 

As I said in my opening remarks—and let me elaborate—where 

Iran’s human rights record is concerned, where—its acts of terrorism and instability, it is putting Israel’s security at risk on a 

daily basis. And certainly many of the original rockets that Hamas 

had came from Iran. They now make many of their rockets, if not 

most of them, themselves. But there is no doubt Iran played a part. 

We condemn Hamas’ actions of raining rockets down on Israel. 

We condemn Iran’s support for state-sponsored terrorism for acts 

of human rights. Indeed, our own human rights report, our own religious freedom report, shows that, indeed, there have been summary executions in Iran. And there is no doubt. 

I have met with all of the families—Pastor Abedini, Amir 

Hekmati, Christine Levinson—and I spend—every time that I meet 

with the Iranians, I have a session separately on Americans of concern to us and certainly have added the journalist to that list. 

There is absolutely no reason for such detentions whatsoever, and 

they do nothing, of course, to help create a climate that would 

make a nuclear negotiation successful. 

As to the Supreme Leader’s comments about 190,000 SWU, or 

centrifuges, this doesn’t help the negotiation climate either. I realize that he said this was aspirational and nothing that would happen today. 

But there is no question right now Iran has 9,000 centrifuges 

that are enriching, another 10,000 that are installed. We believe 

that, if there is an enrichment program, it needs to be a fraction 

of that. 

Mr. SMITH. What happens if that deadline slips? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. What I said this morning—and I know 

this will get asked by many—our intention is that November 24th 

is the end of this negotiation. It could have gone for 6 months. We 

decided only to do 4. We don’t want to talk for talk’s sake. 

That said, I try to be very straightforward with Members of Congress. I think that kind of clarity is important. I know from negoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Oct 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072914\88915 SHIRL
30

tiations, you know from your own negotiations up here on the Hill, 

you never know where things are going to turn out. So I cannot tell 

you for an absolute certainty on the 24th we will end, but that is 

certainly our intention. 

Mr. ROYCE. So we go now to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ms. Sherman, I believe your career began here on the Hill 

on the Senate side. I hope my friend Ileana——

Ambassador SHERMAN. On the House side. On the House side, 

Mr. Connally. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I never worked in the United States Senate. I only worked in the House. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh. All right. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I did help elect a congresswoman——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mikulski. 

Ambassador SHERMAN [continuing]. To the United States Senate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. All right. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I never worked in the Senate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, she sends the best over there. All right. 

Thank you so much for being here and correcting the record. 

I was listening to my friend from California, Mr. Sherman, and 

I must say I am a little fearful that we may be making perfect be 

the enemy of the good and—especially when we talk about a military response from Israel as if that is the only solution. 

I am sure my friend didn’t mean that. But when we talk about 

30,000-pound bunker busters——

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. And taking airplanes out the boneyard to deliver them, that certainly sounds like we favor a military 

option before we have completed the diplomatic process. 

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of course. 

Mr. SHERMAN OF CALIFORNIA. Just for the record, I said no actual transfer, just begin the process until after November.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. I appreciate my friend. Thank you. 

But I would just caution that we are in the middle of a diplomatic process and, if Congress decides to intervene that way, it 

sends a clear signal that we have given up on the diplomatic process. And at least this Member of Congress—and I believe there are 

others—is not quite ready to make that judgment just yet. 

Ambassador Sherman, in your opinion, is Iran sincere in the negotiation process to stand down with respect to the development of 

its nuclear weapons? 

And you are going to have to be real succinct, but having come 

from the House, I know you know how to do that. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, I believe Iran has come to 

these negotiations seriously. I believe they intend to get to a comprehensive agreement. But I do not yet know whether they can 

take the decisions they must to reach a comprehensive agreement 

to which we would agree. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Have you—you cited the IAEA. 

Is there any evidence of the Iranians having cheated on the 

Phase 1 interim agreement? 

31

Ambassador SHERMAN. The IAEA says they have completely 

complied with their obligations, as have the P5+1. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do we sense tension or disagreement or even 

game-playing between the Supreme Leader and the new President 

Rouhani? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. You know, I think I would ask in a closed 

session for our intelligence community to give you their assessment 

of what the internal dynamics of——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am only referring to public statements. I have 

seen public statements that seem to contradict each other. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I have seen those public statements as 

well, but I think it is very hard for us to know what happens in 

such an opaque system. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So we don’t know, really——

Ambassador SHERMAN. I don’t think we actually know. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Have sanctions degraded because of the 

interim agreement—Phase 1 interim agreement? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I don’t believe they have at all. And I 

defer to Under Secretary Cohen on that. 

Mr. COHEN. I agree with Under Secretary Sherman. I don’t think 

we have seen the sanctions architecture degrade at all in the 

course of the——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think that is really important testimony because we have heard members assert otherwise. 

And it is really important for the administration, if that is true, 

Mr. Cohen, to be crystal clear and to have documentary evidence 

to counter it. Because, otherwise, it gets out there unchallenged, 

that somehow the sanctions have just all gone away and we are letting them off easy and Iran can now return to happy days again 

because they have just extended this agreement, and we have been 

played for fools. 

Mr. COHEN. The sanctions architecture, which includes our financial sanctions, our banking sanctions, our oil sanctions, as well as 

a host of other ancillary sanctions, that are not suspended in a 

Joint Plan of Action, haven’t been carried forward into the extended Joint Plan of Action, remain in place. 

We have been enforcing them. And what we have seen in the 

marketplace is not that the sanctions architecture is crumbling, but 

it is holding firm. We have seen—and I am sure members of this 

committee are aware of trade delegations and others who have 

gone to Iran and sort of tested the waters. 

But what we have not seen are deals getting consummated, of 

people taking actions to defy the sanctions or to test our willingness to enforce. And, in fact, where we have seen actions that violate the sanctions we have responded. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good. 

Final question, Ambassador Sherman. Why the extension? Why 

couldn’t we consummate the final deal or the next phase in the 

deadline we set for ourselves and the Iranians? And would you address, in answering that, are they just playing for time? Because 

that is the other implied and sometimes explicit criticism, they are 

just playing for time here while they proceed with their development. 

32

Ambassador SHERMAN. I understand that concern, and we don’t 

want talk for talk’s sake. As I said, we could have gone for all 6 

months. We thought that was not useful. They would wait until 

month 5. 

We think, quite frankly, with the U.N. General Assembly meeting in September and people convening in New York, it will create 

a fulcrum for some of the decisions that need to get taken here. 

As to why we didn’t get there in 6 months, this is a highly technical agreement. I rely on all of these fine experts and many, many 

more because all of the devil is in the details. And each commitment that is made has to be detailed in quite extensive annexes, 

and it just takes an enormous amount of time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

We now go to Steve Chabot of Ohio, chairman of the Asia Subcommittee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Madam Ambassador, first of all, let me just make this point. I 

think some would argue that it is logical to assume that, if we were 

unable to reach an agreement in the first 6 months, that it is not 

very likely that we are going to be able to reach an agreement just 

giving us 4 more months. 

Would you comment on that. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I can understand that because it is hard 

when you are not inside the room to know whether, in fact, there 

is any reality to the extension. 

Secretary Kerry came to Vienna, as did some of the other foreign 

ministers, had very extensive and quite direct conversations with 

Foreign Minister Zarif and all of the members of the Iranian team. 

So he could assess for himself whether there was any ‘‘there’’ there. 

He had gotten daily reports, as had the President, of what was occurring in the negotiation. 

And, in fact, we were making tangible progress on some of the 

key elements on how to deal with Iraq; how to deal with Fordow, 

that it not be an enrichment facility, which was agreed to; what 

kind of transparency measures; the additional protocol, as I mentioned, in 3.1; what should happen at Natanz; what should—some 

of the other transparency measures should be. 

We have other issues we still have to resolve, and we obviously 

have a gap that is significant on enrichment capacity. But the trajectory was in the right direction. The talks were quite detailed, 

quite specific, and, really, so he——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Let me cut you off there, if I can. 

Ambassador SHERMAN [continuing]. Go back and make some political decisions. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Former Secretary of State and maybe future President, Hillary 

Clinton, was recently quoted as saying something along the lines 

that no deal is better than a bad deal. I think Prime Minister 

Netanyahu and others have made basically the same point. 

Would you agree with that comment? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I would. The President of the United 

States has made that statement——

Mr. CHABOT. He said the same thing, too. 

Ambassador SHERMAN [continuing]. As has Secretary Kerry. 

33

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Let me ask you this: Would you describe the 

deal that we are ultimately likely to end up with here, if there is 

a deal reached—I think a lot of people are skeptical for good reason 

that any good deal would ever be reached—but that the deal will 

be closer to Iran continuing or having a nuclear capability with inspections or dismantle and remove? What do you think it is more 

likely that we will come up with? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I don’t know the answer to that question, 

Congressman, because this agreement is not about any one element. It is how all the elements come together in a package that 

cut off all of the pathways to a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would we agree with something less than dismantle and remove? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We will only agree to an agreement that 

cuts off all of the pathways to a nuclear weapon. We will only agree 

to an agreement that assures us that Iran will not obtain a nuclear 

weapon. There are many ways to get there. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Well, let me go back again one more time. 

As far as that specific terminology, dismantle and remove, are 

you suggesting that something less than that would be acceptable 

to this administration? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, with all due respect, we 

would have to talk about each element of the program and what 

of that you would want to see dismantled, what of that you would 

want to see removed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. 

The U.S. has committed to refrain from further reductions of 

Iran’s crude oil exports. However, China has been consistently violating the limit. 

What efforts has the U.S. made to curb China’s Iranian oil imports? And will there be any repercussions for China exceeding the 

acceptable limit over the last 6 months? And is the administration 

working to place sanctions on China if the limits are again exceeded over the next 4 months? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, what we told the Congress 

and what we set out to do in the Joint Plan of Action was to set 

an aggregate range of 1 billion to 1.1 billion barrels per day of the 

five remaining countries plus a small amount to Taiwan that is 

still allowed to be imported from Iran. We believe in looking at the 

data that we will meet that aggregate. 

In terms of China, there have been some months where they 

have stayed pretty much at where we had hoped they would be and 

some months they have gone a little up and some months they 

have gone a little bit down. 

President Obama has had direct conversations with President Xi 

about keeping the sanctions in place and China, particularly since 

they are a member of the P5+1 negotiating group, keep to the commitments that we made in the Joint Plan of Action. 

Secretary Kerry raised this himself during the strategic and economic dialogue just a couple of weeks ago. I have raised it constantly with my interlocutors. 

China has made a commitment to keep to an average rein—these 

tend to fluctuate up and down over the months—that will be in 

keeping with the commitments that were made in the Joint Plan 

34

of Action. Obviously, if that does not occur, we will have to decide 

how to address it. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

My time has expired. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Deutch of Florida, ranking member of the Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to Under Secretary Sherman and Cohen for appearing today. We do appreciate your willingness to consult with Congress in the weeks leading up to the July 20th extension. We appreciate you being here as well. 

Mr. Smith referred to the case of Hekmati, Abedini, and 

Levinson. Today marks 2,699 days that Bob Levinson has not been 

with his family, and I want to raise it because, as the negotiations 

started and then an extension came, he remains still in captivity. 

I appreciate your efforts, Ambassador Sherman. I know you raise 

this issue every time, and I encourage you to continue doing so on 

behalf of my constituent, Bob Levinson, and his family. 

Now, at the outset of these negotiations, we heard a lot from our 

partners in the region about concerns about the P5+1 sitting down 

with Iran. And when the JPOA was announced, we heard again 

that our allies were unhappy that the interim deal may have 

blindsided them. 

And, Secretary Sherman, I know that you spent a lot of time 

traveling throughout the region to try to allay those concerns. 

Now, this weekend we heard similar complaints after Secretary 

Kerry met with Turkey and Qatar on a potential cease fire in Gaza. 

And I understand the need to work with those who can exert leverage on Hamas, but to do it without including Israel, the PA, and 

other regional partners can give those partners a reason for concern. Now, taken together, these two instances raise some concerns. 

And I want to put aside this weekend’s back-and-forth about 

cease-fire offers and the details. But I would like to focus on what 

my constituents reach out to me about, what they want, which is 

the same thing that our allies want, which is the same thing that 

Congress wants and it is the same thing the world expects, and 

that is clarity on these issues. 

In the case of Gaza, that means being unmistakably clear and 

without reservation why Israel has taken the action that it has 

taken. The footage of civilians that have been killed is horrific, and 

we mourn the loss of any innocent life. 

But we have to recognize the threat that Israeli faces, why they 

are responding, why, if you believe in human rights, you must condemn Hamas’ use of civilians as human shields, and why any 

cease-fire agreement must include the issue of tunnels, destruction 

of the tunnels, and the demilitarization of Gaza. And anything that 

detracts from that clarity, in word or in deed, in statement or in 

video, can invite questions. Clarity avoids those questions. 

Likewise, in these negotiations with Iran, the clarity that we are 

looking for is to remind people that this is not just about getting 

to a deal with Iran. It is a reminder that seven times the United 

Nations said no enrichment for Iran. That went for years. 

35

The IAEA and others have pointed to military dimensions of 

Iran’s program when Iran continues to be the largest sponsor of 

terrorism, including Iran’s claims just this weekend that it is responsible for helping to build Hamas’ rockets, that the United 

States remains committed to these core principles in negotiations—

stopping Iran’s nuclear program—because, ultimately, Iran with a 

nuclear weapon capability is the biggest threat to international security. 

It is not just about making a deal, as I said. And I commend you 

for all that you have said already to make that clear. It is about 

a historic opportunity and obligation that we have to stop Iran 

from acquiring nuclear weapons. Our national security interest is 

at stake. Everyone is just looking for clarity. 

The countries that raise concerns about the current crisis in 

Gaza are the same countries that are most concerned about Iran 

with a nuclear weapons capability: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the 

Gulf States. 

And let me be clear. I am not questioning the United States’ 

commitment to stopping a nuclear-armed Iran. I am not questioning the United States’ commitment to Israel. As Ambassador 

Rice reminded the world yesterday, there is one thing that you 

never have to worry about. That is America’s support for the State 

of Israel. 

But I am simply raising perceptions that sometimes arise to ensure that perceptions never become reality. This hearing gives 

you—gives us the opportunity to provide the world with that clarity 

on the issue of Iran. 

Now, with all of that said, I would ask the question just about 

the military dimensions of the program. There are lots of issues 

that remain to be in—remain to be resolved, including what Iran 

did at Parchin. 

And the question is: Will Iran have to come clean on its past activities in order for the P5+1 to reach a final agreement with Iran? 

And, if not, how do we have a baseline to know how close Iran ever 

is to achieving that military capability? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Let me say with absolute clarity what Ambassador Dermer, 

Israel’s Ambassador to the United States, said. And that is that he 

knows that there is no better friend to Israel than the United 

States, that any of the attacks that have been made in any of the 

newspapers on Secretary Kerry are ‘‘completely,’’ to use his words, 

‘‘unwarranted.’’ And Ambassador Dermer said he was speaking on 

behalf of the Prime Minister of Israel. 

I and all of my colleagues and the President of the United States 

and Ambassador Rice are immensely proud of Secretary Kerry. He 

went to the Middle East and he went to the region because he believes wholeheartedly in the need to do everything he possibly can 

as Secretary of State on behalf of the President and the interests 

of our country to protect the security of the Israel, to stop the rockets from raining down on Israel, to allow Israel to make sure that 

no tunnels can come into the State of Israel with terrorists and 

kidnappers and people who would do harm. 

And the Secretary obviously saw that there were civilian deaths 

that were happening all over the place, and there is not a person 

36

in this room who, as you said yourself, is not just heartbroken to 

watch children die, to watch people die, in any country anywhere 

in the world, in any territory anywhere in the world. 

But the Secretary of State’s commitment to Israel’s security, the 

President of the United States’ commitment to Israel’s security, my 

commitment to Israel’s security, could not be stronger. 

While I was in Vienna, I consulted on a regular basis with both 

the National Security Advisor and the Minister for Intelligence in 

Israel and will continue to do so, as I also consult with Gulf partners, with partners in Europe, with Australians, with everyone 

throughout the world, but, most particularly, because we understand, from Israel’s perspective, Iran’s actions are existential for 

them. And we do understand and appreciate that. 

Where the Iran negotiation is concerned, we have only one objective, and that is that Iran not obtain a nuclear weapon. The President of the United States got a Nobel Peace Prize because he believed that this world should not have nuclear weapons. 

And he was going to make that a commitment of his administration, and he has done that at every turn, which is why we are engaged in this negotiation as well. As he said, we may not see that 

in certainly my lifetime—perhaps yours, Congressman, but not in 

mine—but it is an effort that we all must make to keep our country 

secure. 

So I thank you for offering this moment of clarity. I don’t think 

there should be any doubt whatsoever about it. 

Mr. ROYCE. We go now to Mike McCaul of Texas, chairman of the 

Committee on Homeland Security. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Ambassador, thank you so much for being here today. I certainly don’t envy your position, and it must be a very challenging 

job, to say the least, and we wish you the best. 

I have always had some fundamental concerns about the 

premise, in general, and that is that we could ever negotiate with 

the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah, in good faith to give up his nuclear weapons program. 

Call me a skeptic, but I think we have to have a healthy amount 

of skepticism going into this process, as I am sure you do. They are 

a state-sponsor of terrorism. 

The right to enrich uranium violates six U.N. Security Council 

resolutions. The Ayatollah is now demanding, I think, 190,000 centrifuges. That is 10 times the number that Tehran currently possesses. I don’t understand that. 

We don’t address the military dimensions with respect to ICBM 

capabilities, which we have been told they could have by the year 

2015. And so I just have several concerns. 

I mean, I think—I asked Secretary Kerry this question. I mean, 

I think, fundamentally, what you want is for them to give up their 

enrichment program altogether and then we could provide that to 

them if it is truly a peaceful nuclear program. 

What are the chances of that? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

I agree that the best road for Iran, from our perspective, is that 

they have no enrichment program whatsoever. They will never get 

rid of their capability because they have already mastered the nuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Oct 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072914\88915 SHIRL
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clear fuel cycle and, once someone has learned how to do something, you can’t sort of take it out of their brain. 

So, quite frankly, even if we, you know, took military action, got 

rid of all of their facilities, dismantled everything, got rid of everything, they could rebuild it again because they know how to do so. 

So what we have to do is figure out a way to ensure that they 

have no pathway to a nuclear weapon, so no way to get highly enriched uranium to then turn it into a bomb and then put it on a 

delivery mechanism and deliver it, no way to have a plutonium 

pathway, no way to have a covert facility. And that is what we are 

attempting to do here. 

Part of that is, indeed, addressing the possible military dimensions of their program, to have access by the IAEA to those sites 

where we want to make sure there aren’t undeclared facilities. All 

of that will have to be part of this agreement. 

And, finally, you are right to be skeptical. I am skeptical. The 

President is skeptical. He has said 50/50. The Secretary has said, 

others have said, as was mentioned earlier, no deal is better than 

a bad deal. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I certainly agree with that. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. That is what we are trying to do here. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I think everyone agrees with that assumption. 

I don’t see—there is not one single centrifuge dismantled, not 1 

single kilogram of enriched uranium being stopped, and they—

nothing to dismantle the heavy-water reactor, which a former administration official called it a plutonium bomb factory. 

This question has been asked twice, and I don’t know—well, 

there are two questions I have in the limited time I have. 

One is: I know you want to be optimistic. But if November comes 

and goes and there is no agreement, what will this administration 

do? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. This administration will have had ongoing consultations with the United States Congress, with our partners around the world, and we will all make the best judgment we 

can about what we need to do next. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that sanctions would 

be certainly appropriate, the ones that we passed out of the House. 

And then the second one: What assurances—we have lifted, in 

terms of the sanctions, between $6 billion to $7 billion in frozen assets, and the extension of this negotiation frees up another $2.8 billion. 

What assurances do we have that this freed-up money is not 

going to fund the rockets that Hamas is firing into Israel? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, Iran, as others have noted, is the 

leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world today and has been 

for quite some time. It has supported Hezbollah. It has supported 

Hamas. It did so long before we entered into the negotiations that 

led to the Joint Plan of Action. It has continued to do so. 

The funds that are being made available to Iran in the course of 

the Joint Plan of Action, now in the extended Joint Plan of Action—their assets—there are no safe harbors regarding that 

money. The sanctions that we have, the efforts that we have, to 

disrupt Iran’s provision of material support to Hezbollah, to 

Hamas, remain as intense as ever. 

38

And so we will not ease off one iota in trying to ensure that Iran 

does not——

Mr. MCCAUL. So none of the money freed up by the lifting of 

sanctions are going to fund rockets to go into Israel? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I cannot give you that guarantee. 

What I can guarantee you, however, is that we will do everything 

in our power to disrupt Iran’s support for terrorism around the 

world and continue to do so. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I hope we all know what we are dealing with here. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Brian Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last year, when Hassan Rouhani was running for President, he 

was one of six candidates. He was viewed as the reform candidate. 

He ran against the policies that created for Iran international isolation. He ran against the policies that impose sanctions on Iran. 

And he won, and he won with over 50 percent of the vote, meaning that there would be no runoff. And the only way he could have 

done that is with the support of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 

Khamenei. 

Khamenei used to say that, you know, ‘‘The sanctions don’t hurt 

Iran. They make us stronger. They make us self-sufficient.’’ Well, 

last year Khamenei was saying that the sanctions are brutal. He 

characterized them as economic warfare. 

And when you look at sanctions, what you are trying to do is impose economic sanctions toward having a psychological impact. And 

last July the Iranian economy was a mess. 

You had 45 percent inflation, meaning that whatever you had 

prior to—or whatever you purchased prior to the inflation surge 

you were paying double within a couple of months. 

The Iranian currency had lost half of its value. Iranian officials 

were pointing fingers not at the United States, but at each other, 

as to who was to blame for all of this. You couldn’t get chickens 

during Ramadan because there was no money to buy chicken feed. 

And then the International Monetary Fund said in February 

2014 in a report that the temporary agreement to ease sanctions 

have helped to stabilize the American economy. It seems as though 

we took away our own leverage. We took away our own leverage 

when we had the Iranians on the run. 

When you look at the context of this negotiation with the P5+1, 

we want to reduce Iran’s centrifuges, which are the machines that 

mix at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium, to weapons grade 

while Iran currently has 19,000, up from 163 10 years ago, to 

50,000. 

You know, I don’t know that we got a good deal here. By weakening the sanctions, albeit temporarily, albeit a small percentage 

overall, it seems like the Iranians are moving and are committed 

to moving an entirely different direction. You have next-generation 

centrifuges. You have knowledge that you can’t destroy. 

I mean, they have tremendous leverage here, and the leverage 

that we have, seemingly, given the deplorable economic conditions 

in Iran last summer, we gave into in a process where it seems as 

though the two sides aren’t maybe in agreement, but not even narVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Oct 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072914\88915 SHIRL
39

rowing the differences. They are going two entirely different directions. 

I would ask you to comment. 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, the Iranian economy is still a mess. 

The rial is still highly devalued. It has lost value during the course 

of the Joint Plan of Action. 

Iran’s inflation is still among the highest, if not the highest, in 

the world. It still does not have access to almost all of its foreign 

reserves. Its economy, as I noted in my oral testimony, is 25 percent smaller today than it would have been had we not imposed the 

sanctions that you spoke of. 

The Joint Plan of Action did not fix the Iranian economy, won’t 

fix the Iranian economy, and there is no sense in which—looking 

out over the next 4 months, that Iran will be, you know, at the end 

of this period, I think thinking that their economy has rebounded. 

The pressure that comes from the sanctions, sanctions developed 

with Congress, with the administration, with our partners around 

the world, remains quite robust, and the impact on Iran’s economy 

continues to bite. That provides leverage to our negotiating team 

to try and pursue the comprehensive agreement. 

And, with that, I will turn it over to Under Secretary Sherman 

to follow up. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, the Joint Plan of Action for 

the first time in a decade froze Iran’s nuclear program and rolled 

it back in specific ways. 

Iran halted all of its near 20 percent enriched uranium and halted, disabled, the configuration of centrifuge cascades that they 

have been using to produce it. They have diluted and oxidized that 

stockpile of 20 percent. 

They have not enriched uranium in roughly half of the installed 

centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of the installed centrifuges at Fordow, including all next-generation centrifuges. 

They have limited centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines. So they cannot stockpile centrifuges during these months, including these 4 months of an extension. 

They have not constructed any additional facilities. They have 

not gone beyond its current enrichment R&D practices, as described in the IAEA report of November 14, 2013. 

They have not proceeded in any way, shape, or form on the Arak 

reactor. It is frozen in place. They have halted the production and 

additional testing of fuel for the Arak reactor. 

They have not installed any additional components at Arak. They 

have not transferred fuel or heavy water at the Arak reactor site. 

They have not constructed a facility capable of reprocessing and, 

without reprocessing, Iran cannot separate plutonium from spent 

fuel. 

And I could go on and on. Those are the highlights of what came 

out of the Joint Plan of Action. For the first time in a decade we 

are in a better place than we were. 

We have much further to go, and I don’t know if we will get 

there, but it was a worthwhile thing to freeze their program. 

Mr. ROYCE. The gentleman is out of time. 

And so we have to go to Mr. Tom Cotton of Arkansas. 

40

Mr. COTTON. And I would simply say that perhaps we would be 

in an even better place if we had not relaxed the sanctions in November, but increased them, as this committee attempted to do last 

summer, followed by House action, or perhaps if we had taken a 

different course in 2009 during the green movement, but that is 

neither here nor there. 

Some of you may know the parable of the frog and the scorpion. 

The frog is at the river. The scorpion approaches him and asks for 

a ride across the river. 

And the frog says to the scorpion, ‘‘But you will sting me and kill 

me.’’

The scorpion says, ‘‘I would not do that because then we would 

both drown.’’

And the frog says, ‘‘That is a good point.’’

So the frog gives the scorpion a ride across the river, and halfway across the scorpion stings the frog. 

And the frog looks to the scorpion and says, ‘‘Why did you sting 

me? Now we will both drown.’’

And the scorpion said, ‘‘Because it’s my nature.’’

The problem here is not the nature of the weapon, but it is the 

nature of the Iranian regime. They continue to be the world’s number one sponsor of state terrorism, whether it is Hezbollah or 

Hamas, that not just attacks our allies, like Israel, but tries to 

launch attacks on the United States, assassinating Ambassadors, if 

they could have executed their plan of friendly countries in restaurants just a few miles from here, or killing soldiers with whom 

I served in Iraq in 2006 by importing fighters and bombs and other 

material. 

I am deeply skeptical, as are my colleagues here on this committee, that any of this will ever change, no matter how skillful our 

negotiations, unless the regime in Iran changes. It has been like 

this for over 30 years. And, unfortunately, I think it will continue 

to be like this until the people of Iran have a legitimate, democratic 

representative government. 

Now, all that said, there are issues related to Iran besides this 

nuclear negotiation, such as their meddling in Iraq or their support 

for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, their ongoing support for Hezbollah 

and Hamas. 

One of our negotiating partners, Russia, has ongoing issues as 

well, such as their invasion of Ukraine and supplying thugs that 

shot down the civilian airliner and their support for the Bashar alAssad regime in Syria. 

So I would like your brief assessment on whether they bring 

those issues to the negotiating table on this and, if so, how. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

So far, everyone has been focused on what goes on in the negotiating room around this comprehensive Plan of Action or the possibility of a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action. 

And although we were in Vienna at the time of the horrific 

events in Ukraine, my Russian colleague, Sergei Ryabkov, who is 

a long-time professional diplomat in Russia, stayed very focused on 

what could be done to try to move this comprehensive negotiation 

forward. 

41

I cannot tell you that all of these issues won’t come into the room 

at some point, and it certainly does create strains around the margin. We are all human beings. And that was just beyond deplorable 

and shocking and, you know, we were all just completely stunned 

at what was occurring. 

Similarly, I think that what is happening in Iraq with ISIL, or 

ISIS, if one looks at it in Syria, is something of concern and, in that 

instance, ironically, Iran is probably as interested as we are in getting rid of ISIL. 

But it is not something on which we make common calls because 

there are so many other areas in which we have vast and 

unbridgeable disagreements in terms of their state sponsorship of 

terrorism, their human rights record, and what they do to foment 

instability around the world and, as you say, their relationship 

with Iraq is a long and complicated one. 

And I thank you for your service to our country not only here, 

but in Iraq, in what is now a very difficult circumstance for that 

country. 

So right now everyone stays focused. It is a constructive, serious 

negotiation. I hope it remains that way, but I can’t tell you for sure 

that it will. The world is a pretty complicated place at the moment. 

Mr. COTTON. Well, thank you. 

Again, I remain deeply skeptical of the Joint Plan of Action, but 

I do wish you the best of success that we can reach an agreement 

that completely eliminates Iran’s nuclear weapons program and ancillary programs not just for our sake, but for the sake of peace and 

safety around the world. 

Mr. ROYCE. We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank 

you very much for bringing this item before us once again and, 

also, the ranking member. 

As you know, I have been very skeptical of this process from the 

beginning. I think that we are negotiating with a regime that has 

no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons program. It only 

wants to go dormant for a few years, then restart. And, so far, everything that they have done confirms that, in my mind. They 

haven’t destroyed their centrifuges. They haven’t given up enrichment, even though they can buy the fuel, as you know, on the open 

market. 

And I don’t think they want to in any way bar themselves from 

having a nuclear program. I think they are trying to figure out a 

way to get around the world. The world has spoken through the 

U.N. that they shouldn’t have enrichment, they shouldn’t have 

those capabilities. And, in this process, I think they are trying to 

earn that. 

I also have to say that I remember 1979, when the regime came 

into power. That is 35 years ago. I think that they are trying to 

wait us out. I think that they want a—we call it a final agreement, 

a long-term agreement. The reality is I think they only want the 

shortest time possible, not one that bars them forever. 

So I have been very, very skeptical. I thought that the better way 

was to continue to ratchet down the sanctions. And I have to say 

again kudos to the administration. This is the first administration 

that took the sanctions seriously, for God’s sake. Before we hadn’t 

42

and, thank God, this administration did. But then we let them off 

the hook when I think we should have ratcheted it down. And so 

here we are now. 

I also remember very clearly saying I thought that they were 

going to skip the 6 months, that it was going to slide, and it has 

slid. And, again, I hear today that it won’t slide—more likely, it 

won’t slide. It could slide. 

But, so far, everything that they have done has confirmed, in my 

mind, they don’t really want to stop their nuclear program. They 

just want to waste some time. 

Convince me that that is not the case. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, the only thing that will 

convince you is what will convince me and what will convince the 

administration and our country, and that is if Iran takes the steps 

that it must to ensure that all of its pathways to a nuclear weapon 

are cut off and that their program is exclusively peaceful. 

And that means a comprehensive agreement that, as a package, 

accomplishes those metrics. And I don’t know whether we will get 

there or not. But the only way I will be convinced is if Iran takes 

the difficult decisions that it must to do exactly that. 

Mr. VARGAS. But two of the most important pathways is enrichment. I mean, enrichment is a way, obviously, to get a weapon. We 

are allowing them, it sounds like—and, again, I don’t know this, 

but it seems to me that we haven’t said they will have absolutely 

no enrichment. We haven’t said that. That is a pathway. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. It is a pathway. But what we are talking 

about, if we get to this comprehensive agreement, would be an incredibly small and limited enrichment program under intrusive 

monitoring such that they would not have a pathway to highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. If we cannot do that, then 

we will not have a comprehensive agreement. 

Mr. VARGAS. The second pathway that I believe is very dangerous is the issue of time. If this final agreement is 5, 7, 10, even 

20, years—it was 35 years ago when they came into power. I mean, 

I still think they will have the same desire. 

I mean, I don’t think that their nature is going to change. I kind 

of believe in that same issue of this frog and the scorpion. I think 

that they do want to sting. I don’t think their nature is going to 

change. 

And what can you tell us—if you can’t tell us in open session, 

I understand. But what can you tell us about the duration? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Duration is a critical element and, in our 

view, it has to be quite a long time for the very reason you said. 

It has been decades that the international community has had no 

confidence in what Iran is doing. 

And so it is going to take a considerable period of time for us to 

gain that assurance and that confidence. And I am happy to discuss specific numbers with you in a closed session. Certainly double 

digits. 

Mr. VARGAS. Okay. I look forward to that, because that is a great 

concern of mine. 

And, lastly, I guess I would say this, that I really appreciate the 

statement that you gave about Israel. And many of us who are devote Christians have a very strong feeling for the State of Israel 

43

and its people and an unequivocal statement of support for Israel. 

Especially during this time it was very important. I appreciate it. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. George Holding of North 

Carolina. 

Thank you, Mr. Vargas. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Cohen, you mentioned in your testimony that additional 

sanctions relief under the extension of the interim agreement includes keeping Iran’s crude oil exports to current purchasers at 

current average levels. 

So if you could just answer succinctly, have Iran’s crude oil buyers kept their purchases or acquisitions of Iranian crude oil to December 2013 levels at present? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, the best information that we have, 

which is current to within the beginning of July—so we don’t have 

the last 20 days of the Joint Plan of Action period—indicates that 

the aggregate amount of oil going to the five purchasers of Iranian 

oil is within the limits that we set out in the Joint Plan of Action 

of the 1 million to 1.1 million barrels per day. 

Mr. HOLDING. So is that at the levels of December 2013? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOLDING. And do you agree with that, Ambassador Sherman? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Yes. Within that range, yes. 

Mr. HOLDING. All right. The administration has committed to 

comprehensively lifting nuclear-related sanctions as part of the 

final P5+1 agreement with Tehran. 

So my question, Ambassador Sherman, to you: What sanctions in 

the current law specifically, which provisions of the current law, 

does the administration consider nuclear related? And why? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, as I think you know—because you have asked this question—our laws are very complicated, 

and several of our laws cover a number of things all in the same 

law. 

We believe that there is a way to address the portions of the laws 

that relate to nuclear-related sanctions, and I am very glad to have 

our staff come up to sit with you or your staff and brief you in detail law by law what we are thinking about. 

I would prefer not to do that in an open session because how we 

are thinking about suspending and then, ultimately, if Iran complies with all of the things that they would need to comply with, 

coming to you to lift those sanctions, is part of our negotiations. 

And so I would rather discuss that in a closed setting than in an 

open setting. 

Mr. HOLDING. I appreciate that. 

You know, many of these sanctions that are imposed are for 

things including, you know, not only, you know, their nuclear program, but for all the other bad acts. 

I mean sanctions aimed at preventing Iranian banks involved in 

proliferation, terrorism, money laundering, any other activities, you 

know, the state-sponsored terrorism, you know, ballistic missile 

programs. It is a myriad of things, and the sanctions are all intertwined. 

44

And so, even if you come to an agreement, you know, on the nuclear program, you know, it doesn’t ameliorate—or, you know, it 

doesn’t alleviate nor does it come close to ameliorating the fact that 

Iran is quite a bad actor, and these sanctions have other purposes 

as well. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Absolutely. And we believe there is a way 

to proceed forward so that our sanctions enforcement on terrorism, 

on human rights, on other issues not covered by a comprehensive 

agreement, should we get to one, remain in place. And we are 

happy to come up and delineate that in the best way we possibly 

can. 

Mr. HOLDING. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Holding. 

We are now going to go to Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again 

for calling this hearing, for you and the ranking member for staying vigilant in all you have done to make sure that we do all we 

can to make sure Iran cannot acquire—not just acquire a nuclear 

weapon, that they cannot acquire the capacity or capability. 

I want to thank the witnesses for coming here today and sharing 

their perspectives. 

As you have heard today, there is a—on both sides of the aisle 

a lot of skepticism. I think there is great concern about the negotiations from the start, great concerns about the sanctions relief provided to Iran, and the path that we are headed down. 

It is imperative—and I will repeat myself because I think it 

bears repeating—that Iran cannot be allowed to have the capability 

to get a nuclear weapon. 

Ambassador Sherman, you have used the language in your written testimony and in some of the answers that we want to cut the 

paths for Iran’s nuclear programs. My concern is it is not just that 

we cut the path, but that we close that path and eliminate it permanently. 

Can you tell me the distinction here. Because they have cut the 

pathways, for example, to cascades on the centrifuges, but there 

are still 19,000 installed centrifuges. That path may be cut, but it 

is not closed. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Yes. I think we are talking pretty much 

about the same thing, Congressman. I do want to make a distinction, though—and it is hard for all of us to have all of the detail 

on all of this, particularly in this open session. 

We can never get rid of Iran’s capability. They have already mastered the nuclear fuel cycle. They can’t unlearn it. As I said previously, we could destroy every facility they have and they could 

reconstitute them all. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But with all due respect, that is know-how, and 

know-how is one piece. Capability and having the assets in place 

is a different thing. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Correct. So their centrifuge capacity can 

be attacked in a myriad of ways. Their centrifuges, their facilities, 

their stockpiles, how they are installed, how they are taken apart 

or not taken apart—all of those are elements of a package that 

would give us the confidence that, in fact, they did not have a pathVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Oct 09, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\072914\88915 SHIRL
45

way to highly enriched uranium where Natanz and Fordow are 

concerned, that they would not have a pathway to plutonium where 

Arak is concerned. There are a number of ways to get to that metric. That is the metric that matters. And I think we are in agreement. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I know that some of these details like the 

specifics on Arak and specifics at Fordow would have to be in a 

closed session. I would like to have that closed session as soon as 

possible. 

Let me take it another direction. We are looking at November 

24th, not that far away at this point——

Ambassador SHERMAN. No. 

Mr. SCHNEIDE [continuing]. 3 months, 4 months. 

What are you telling Iran in the negotiations will happen if we 

don’t have a satisfactory negotiated settlement by November 24th? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Iran is quite well aware that all of our 

options and the world’s options are on the table. Iran is quite well 

aware that, if we cannot get to a comprehensive agreement, that 

they will likely face even more sanctions than they are currently 

facing and that——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But are we making clear the magnitude of those 

sanctions? We can’t go back to the sanctions regime of November 

24, 2013. It has to be orders of magnitude greater than what we 

had, even greater than what we passed last summer. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. They are very well aware. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. What do you think they believe? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I think they believe that, if we do that, 

they have a lot of things they can do in return. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Do you think that they believe we actually will 

raise the sanctions, that we have the capacity? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Oh, I think——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. What do they think our partners believe? And 

what do our partners believe will happen? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. There is no doubt in my mind that Iran 

understands the power and prerogatives of the United States Congress, the actions that you have taken, and the actions that you 

would take. 

And if, in fact, we could not reach a comprehensive agreement 

and we are sure that we cannot reach a comprehensive agreement, 

we have stated publicly as an administration that we would expect 

there to be more sanctions. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Would the administration support Congress taking action and stating very clearly in a resolution or in a law that, 

if there is not an agreement by November 24th, these are the sanctions they will face, so there is no doubt. That clarity that my colleague talked about earlier is so important. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We actually do not support such action, 

Congressman, and the reason is very simple. We believe that, if 

this comprehensive agreement does not work, it should be because 

Iran cannot make the commitments that it needs to. 

We don’t want there to be any other basis, any other excuse. We 

don’t want them to say, ‘‘We couldn’t get there because Congress, 

you know, pushed our hardliners to the wall,’’ whatever kind of 

narrative they put on the table. 

46

We want it to be crystal clear to the world that we tried diplomacy as far as we could take it and Iran could not do what it needed to do. Because, if we do that, then the entire world will stay together in the enforcement not only of the existing sanctions, but 

sanctions to come. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, I am out of time. But let me just close by 

saying I disagree, respectfully, but I think we need to be clear. And 

I think, if we do tell Iran what their options are so there is no 

doubt, we have a better chance of getting to a successful resolution 

on negotiations. 

And let me also say that that successful resolution can’t be for 

a few years. It shouldn’t even be measured in years. It should be 

measured in generations. Because, as you said, it is an existential 

threat not just for Israeli, but for many countries around the region, and a threat to the world. Thank you. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. HOLDING [presiding]. Thank you. 

Go next to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber. Recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WEBER. Ambassador Sherman, do you consider all of those 

involved in these negotiations reasonable people? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. That is a hard question to answer. 

I believe that everybody who sits around this negotiating table 

is serious. I think they want to try to achieve a comprehensive 

agreement. But it is hard to use the word ‘‘reasonable’’ for all of 

the actions that are occurring in this world. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you consider me reasonable? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I don’t know you, but I am sure you are. 

Mr. WEBER. How about do you consider yourself reasonable? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I hope so. My husband and my daughter 

may not from time to time. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it reasonable for terrorists to strap on themselves 

dynamite and go blow up innocent women and children? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it reasonable for terrorists to have 12-year-old 

kids strapped-on dynamite and go blown up——

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. WEBER. Is that a blatant disregard for human life? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course. 

Mr. WEBER. Is it reasonable for Iran—the leadership of Iran to 

espouse the need for the complete destruction of Israel? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course not. And, as I said in my opening statement, where it comes to the destruction of Israel, which 

they have espoused, the human rights abuses, the summary executions that take place, the detention of journalists and American 

citizens, their disregard for human rights, the fomenting of instability around the world, none of this is reasonable, of course, Congressman. 

Mr. WEBER. See if you agree with this following statement: You 

cannot reason someone out of a position that they didn’t use reason 

to get into. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. You know——

Mr. WEBER. That is ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no.’’

47

Ambassador SHERMAN. It is actually not, with all due respect, 

Congressman. I don’t think their positions are reasonable, and I 

don’t think they have come——

Mr. WEBER. You have——

Ambassador SHERMAN. Let me finish. 

I don’t think their positions are reasonable in any regard on all 

of those scores——

Mr. WEBER. I am talking about killing women and children and 

the complete destruction of Israel. 

You don’t think that is an unreasonable position? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. WEBER. And so we can’t—you think we can reason them out 

of that position, do you? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Let me ask you: Is it reasonable, as reasonable people—let’s just assume for argument’s sake that we on our 

side are reasonable. That may be a stretch for some of us, but let’s 

just assume that it is. I am talking about me. 

Is it reasonable to assume that Iran, with a blatant disregard for 

life, will continue to mislead us and the international community 

at every step of the way, at every chance they get, in order to concentrate on destroying Israel and, I might add, the United States? 

Is that reasonable to assume? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, our negotiation with Iran 

is not based on trust. 

Mr. WEBER. It is not based on reason. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. It is not based on trust. It is not based 

on the reason in way that you are describing it. It is based on understanding that, if they want the economy they want in the future, if they want to end their isolation in the world, if they want 

to rejoin the community of nations, then they have to take specific 

steps that will be monitored and verified to give the international 

community——

Mr. WEBER. Then, under that scenario, is it reasonable to assume that, if they get the economy that they want, that they will 

cease to seek the destruction of Israel? Is that reasonable? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. What I can say to you, Congressman, is 

that the United States of America under this President, I believe 

under any President of the United States, will do whatever we 

need to do to ensure the security of Israel in the Middle East. It 

is a solemn responsibility that I think we all feel. 

Mr. WEBER. I am going to ask you one more time. 

Do you believe that you can reason people out of a position that 

they did not use reason to get into? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, I think what you are trying to lead me to is how can we sit down with Iran and have this 

negotiation and expect that we will get to any good end. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. HOLDING. The gentleman yields back. 

We now go to the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. Meeks is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for 

facilitating this important hearing. 

48

Let me just state at the outset that I supported the interim 

agreement that allowed the Joint Plan of Action to move forward, 

but I also support the extension that would allow the negotiations 

to continue. 

Many critics have said that these negotiations are risky, we can’t 

trust Iran, and we didn’t get enough in the interim agreement. 

Well, you know what. Many of those things in some way are true. 

Many of those things in some ways are true. 

And I believe strongly that it is even—but more risky—it would 

be more risky for us if we did not negotiate. We would be worse 

off without concessions gained in the interim agreement. Much 

work remains. No question about it. And there are certainly many 

political pitfalls. 

But taking on one of our Nation’s largest foreign policy and security issues could never be easy. No one said this would be easy. No 

one said there would be no risks. There has to be. In any foreign 

policy, there are risks. There are dangers. But to not sit down, the 

risk is even greater to all of us. 

Six months have gone by, and I consider the framework where 

we are—I consider it a success—a multilateral success achieved in 

close collaboration with our allies, which I believe is extremely important. 

Because if you look at sanctions, we have had sanctions on Iran 

for a long time on a unilateral basis. That did not cripple their 

economy. That did not hurt their economy. 

Their economy began to hurt and we crippled them when we 

were able do it collectively with our allies. And that is why the 

P5+1 is together, because that is the only way that we could inflict 

the kind of sanctions that would hurt their economy. 

If that goes away and the United States is doing it only by themselves, that is not going to bring down the Iranian economy. That 

is not going to be successful. That is not going to cause the kind 

of hurt that people are talking about. 

It is only going to happen if we do it collectively. And I think 

where the administration should take strong credit is that they 

were able to get this coalition together to implement these sanctions and keep them together. 

And the biggest threat to Iran is knowing that we are together 

because, if they could divide us, they would. They would. That 

would be to their benefit. They could then resume their economy 

and say, ‘‘Forget the United States by themselves.’’

What makes the sanctions work is that they are multilateral 

sanctions with our allies. Tremendously important. Nobody just 

says you automatically trust when you get into these negotiations. 

So I think that we have to utilize and take advantage of everything. And I would say, in short, that better access that we now 

have to Iran’s nuclear facilities is a huge plus for us. I wouldn’t 

want them running around without us having any access to their 

facilities. 

Its dilution of medium-enriched uranium is a huge plus for us. 

We want them out there in the blind or we don’t want to be working with our allies, you know, let them run around. That puts us 

all in danger. 

49

Now, I don’t trust—you know, they say—I think—but I think 

that we have got to do the hard work. It is easy to go the other 

way. You know, we say—talk about kids all the time that, you 

know, it is easier to fight than try to at least negotiate something. 

If you have to fight, then you will. I know that is how I was 

raised. If I had to fight, I will. But, first, let’s try and—and we 

have got something, a leverage. Talk about losing leverage? We 

would lose the leverage that we currently have in Iran if we lose 

our partners. That is part of what our leverage is. 

So I didn’t mean to go off on that tangent, but I just felt that 

that was just important to say. 

In regards to—and I am out of time. So I don’t even have time 

for a question because you wouldn’t have any time to answer it. 

But I would love to have a closed-door session so that we can have 

more talk. 

But I just want to say I thank the administration for keeping us 

together, keeping the world together. It is not—so it can be all of 

us together—not just the United States against Iran, but all of us 

together—to try to make sure that we force them to conform. We 

will see what the results will be. We don’t know. But we have got 

to try. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HOLDING. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here, and thank you for your service 

to your country. And sometimes I am sure it is not always fun to 

be sitting where you are sitting. 

I am also sure that some of the things I am going to ask you and 

say probably have already been done. And so I apologize for beating a dead horse if, in fact, that is what I do. 

Just to respond to my colleague on the other side of the aisle, the 

point is made that if—you know, we can’t do this by ourselves, we 

have to bring our allies with us. And I agree with that, that it exists in what we see in Ukraine and other places. 

But I would just remind folks that we have the lead on this. And 

when the United States entered some pretty strict and pretty tough 

sanctions against Iran, the rest of the world followed. When we decided that we were going to do an interim agreement, the rest of 

the world follows. We are uniquely capable in terms of who we are 

to be able to lead the world to this. 

So, you know, this idea that, if we don’t extend another 6 

months, the coalition is going to fall apart, maybe that is true. I 

don’t think it is. But if it is true, it is probably because we entered 

this interim agreement in the first place. 

And I will mention that I remember, as I am sure others have 

said, that 6 months ago, you know, we were told, ‘‘Just trust us on 

this. We are going to have this interim agreement, and we are 

going to get where we need to be. You are going to be really proud 

of the result. And if you aren’t, we are going to be the first ones 

back here asking for tougher sanctions and to re-implement the 

sanctions.’’

50

I promise you I could have told you 6 months ago we would be 

right here where we are, looking for another extension. It is like 

we are repeating itself. 

I worry about the message to our allies in Korea, to the United 

Arab Emirates, who are asking for the right to enrich and we say, 

‘‘Well, look, we are committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 

We are committed to a nuclear-free Middle East,’’ but, yet, we will 

give this. I mean, the final agreement is going to have some enrichment. We know that. We are going to give this to our worst enemy. 

So the message we send is, ‘‘If you are the worst enemy of the 

United States, you can pretty much do what you want with agreement. If you are our best friend, we are going to keep our thumb 

on you and control what we want.’’

Let me just ask, Ambassador, what are we going to be able to 

solve in 6 months that we haven’t been able to in the first 6? So 

there are these gaps that still exist between the two countries in 

terms of what we want in the final agreement. 

If we couldn’t get them there in 6 months, what’s the next 6 months going to do, especially after getting $2.8 billion released 

into their economy to buy their continued cooperation, which I 

think is bad negotiating, but whatever. 

What is another 6 months going to do that we couldn’t do in the 

first 6? I don’t think it is a lack of time. It is something else. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

Let me make a couple points. 

First of all, I agree that the United States of America is uniquely 

positioned on most things in the world and, because we have the 

finest military in the world, we bear and, in particular, both—burden and opportunity in the world to lead. 

That is not always an easy thing to do, and it is best done when 

we can do it collectively so that the world shares some of the burden, both in cost and treasure and in our people. 

In the case of sanctions, Under Secretary Cohen may want to 

comment as well. 

But, quite frankly, the European Union sanctions were also quite 

critical to the collective effort here, as were the U.N. Security 

Council sanctions. It was all of them coming together that really 

created the collective that was necessary to really bring Iran to the 

table. 

Mr. KINZINGER. If I might interrupt, I agree. But I believe the 

interim agreement broke that bond we had and it kind of was the 

hole in the dam now to where, if we want to go back to where we 

were, it is going to be very difficult. Maybe I am wrong, but it 

seems to me that way. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, I’ll let—why don’t you——

Mr. KINZINGER. And if you could be really quick because I have 

another——

Ambassador SHERMAN. Then I will come back to the other points 

you made. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. Very quickly, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, it is just the contrary. The fact that 

we have proceeded with our close partners in both imposing sanctions on Iran and in agreeing in the Joint Plan of Action to the 

very limited, very targeted, sanctions relief that we agreed to I 

51

think makes it all the more likely that, if Iran is not prepared to 

take the steps it needs to take to get a comprehensive agreement, 

we will have our partners with us not just to reinstate, but to ramp 

up. 

Mr. KINZINGER. But why couldn’t we have tested that now? I 

mean, it has been 6 months. Now is the time when we say the 

sanctions are back on. And now all of a sudden Iran gets religion 

and says, ‘‘Okay. You know what. Whoa, whoa, who. The places we 

are apart we want to be with you because you did that.’’

One last thing. And I apologize. Deterrence is will plus capability. I think we have the capability to deter. Right now I think 

what is in question is the will, and that is important for the negotiations. 

Last question: How important is it to the administration that a 

final nuclear agreement with Iran restricts Iran’s ballistic missile 

program? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. So couple of points to what you have said. 

We are going to negotiate for 4 additional months, not 6. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We decided not to do all 6. We don’t want 

to talk just for talk’s sake. 

November 24th was 1 year from when the Joint Plan of Action 

was negotiated. So we decided to make that the time and to actually use the fact that many players will be in New York for the 

U.N. General Assembly as to fulcrum to try to move this along at 

a rapid rate. 

We would not have agreed to an extension if we didn’t believe 

we had made tangible progress and we did not see a path to a——

Mr. KINZINGER. And I don’t mean to interrupt, but I am over my 

time. 

Just how important is the restriction of ballistic missiles? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We have said that the U.N. Security 

Council resolutions must be addressed. And in that it says that 

somehow we must address long-range ballistic missiles capable of 

carrying nuclear warheads. 

So it is not ballistic missiles, per se. It is about when a missile 

is combined with a nuclear warhead. That is the issue here. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. 

Yield back. 

Mr. HOLDING. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

We go now to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry. Recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Sherman, are you familiar with the CRS report that 

cites substantial information regarding the collaborative programs 

with Iran and Syria and North Korea aimed at producing nuclear 

weapons? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I am not familiar with that specific report. But I have certainly seen reports about potential collaboration. 

Mr. PERRY. So, then, you would agree that there has been collaboration with North Korea and——

52

Ambassador SHERMAN. I would agree I have seen those reports. 

And I think any future discussion of that probably should take 

place in a closed session. 

Mr. PERRY. Fine. 

Based on that, how—if that were true, and getting away from 

the closed-session stuff, how does this current arrangement ensure 

compliance such that Iran doesn’t just comply with an agreement 

on their own soil while outsourcing to North Korea various components and then assembling back in Iran or what have you? How 

does this address that? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We agree that that issue of what they are 

doing, what they are trying do, whether they do it by themselves 

or with others, is all part of ensuring that they do not have a pathway to a nuclear weapon. 

So I would agree with you that, in some way or other, in a comprehensive agreement that issue has to be under discussion as 

well. 

Mr. PERRY. It has to be or it is—it is part of it now? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. It is and it has to be. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Would you—how would you characterize the 

outcome of your negotiations with North Korea? Would you characterize them as a success? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. We could spend an entire day discussing 

those negotiations. 

Mr. PERRY. Sure. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I think we will never know. 

What I will say is, during the Clinton administration, Congressman, not 1 additional ounce of plutonium was produced and the 

only plutonium that existed for nuclear weapons took place before 

President Clinton ever became President. And during his entire administration, not 1 additional ounce of plutonium was created. 

Mr. PERRY. That is fine. But we are where we are now. 

And I am reading some of your comments where you recommended that the only way the U.S. could deal with North Korea’s disputed programs and prevent—and it is important to use 

the word ‘‘prevent’’—you did—prevent them from achieving a nuclear capability was through diplomacy. 

So that having been said—you were the lead negotiator, right, 

2001? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I was the Special Envoy. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. 

So based on that, I mean, the goals as I understand them, were 

to bring North Korea back into NPT compliance and freeze their 

nuclear weapons program, which is—permanently, which is essentially prevention. But, yet, in 2003, as we all know, they declared 

that they had nuclear weapons. 

So based on the close relationship currently with Iran and North 

Korea and the negotiations you personally led, knowing that you 

are leading negotiations now with Iran and that Korea, you know, 

announced in 2003 that they had nuclear weapons, when our job, 

your job, was to prevent them from getting them, most Americans 

throughout the course of that saw it as appeasement. I think most 

Americans see what is currently happening as appeasement. I 

think most Americans would agree, if they are educated about 

53

what the history is and what happened, that we failed. North 

Korea has nuclear weapons, as far as we know. 

I mean, why should Americans consider these negotiations to be 

anything but appeasement and have any confidence that this is 

going to end up any different than North Korea? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Congressman, as I said, we could spend an entire 

day discussing what happened in North Korea and at what point 

and for what reasons North Korea, in fact, did obtain a nuclear 

weapon. That did not occur on President Clinton’s watch when I 

was responsible for that negotiation. 

That said, this is an entirely different situation. The only metric 

should be whether, in fact, the pathways to a nuclear weapon are 

closed off to Iran, including the potential for a covert program such 

that we would know either in time to stop it or to deter it, as well 

as their current uranium enrichment and plutonium pathways to 

a nuclear weapon. 

And you will be able to judge that on its own merits should we 

get to a comprehensive agreement. And, as I have said, I don’t 

know that we will. 

Mr. PERRY. Listen, I appreciate your passion for it, and I appreciate the verbiage, this pathway and cutting off their pathways and 

so on and so forth. 

But it seems to me we were doing the same thing with North 

Korea. And pathway or not, at the end of the day—you know, we 

hear this, ‘‘Well, let’s not make the perfect the enemy of the good.’’ 

But at the end of the day, North Korea has got nuclear weapons 

and we can’t do a darn thing about it. And when Iran gets them, 

we don’t have many options then either. 

There can be—there is no way—there is no place for failure here. 

And I am afraid that, once we look back in hindsight and say, 

‘‘Well, we tried this’’ and, ‘‘We thought that,’’ it is going to be too 

darn late when they have got them and we have got a nuclear 

arms race going in the Middle East. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Congressman, I appreciate the concern. 

I will say this: Sanctions did not stop Iran’s nuclear program. 

Sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table. But they continue 

to build their nuclear program even with all the sanctions in place. 

Mr. HOLDING. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We have a few more members here to ask questions. We have 

votes approaching quickly on the floor. I understand our witnesses 

need to leave no later than 4:30. 

So, with that, I will recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

Clawson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CLAWSON. I will be brief. 

Thank you for coming and thank you for your service. You clearly understand the details of what is going on here, and I appreciate 

what you all are—what you all are doing. And I know it is not 

easy. 

Barring military force, it seems to me the success in these negotiations depends on leverage, not reasonableness. And leverage in 

my world is always dependent on money. Money creates leverage. 

54

Tell me a little bit whether you think the extension of these talks 

gives the Iranians a chance to break the international coalition 

with respect to economic sanctions that really creates our leverage. 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, I don’t believe so. Quite the contrary. 

I think the fact that we are giving negotiations an honest effort 

and exploring the possibility of a comprehensive agreement with 

our partners helps to hold together the international coalition that 

put very significant economic pressure on Iran and continues to put 

very significant economic pressure on Iran, and that creates the leverage that you speak of. 

And that is critically important to the potential success of these 

negotiations that we hold that international sanctions coalition together. And we are doing so. And it is held together throughout the 

course of this Joint Plan of Action. And, as I said in response to 

a question earlier, we do not see any indication of our sanctions architecture weakening. 

Mr. CLAWSON. And folks like Russia or China that don’t—aren’t 

normally part of our coalitions, do they create holes in the fence 

that let the cattle out? 

Mr. COHEN. The short answer to that question is ‘‘no.’’

Mr. CLAWSON. Really? 

Mr. COHEN. In the work that we have done on imposing sanctions on Iran: I am not going to sugarcoat and say everything has 

been absolutely perfect. 

But with respect to Russia and China and our other partners 

around the world, the sanctions have held together very well. 

There—you know, there are reports of, you know, this potential 

Russia deal with Iran and all the rest. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Right. Right. 

Mr. COHEN. That has not been consummated. We have been very 

clear with the Russians that we would regard any follow-through 

on that deal as being inimical to the negotiations, and it has not—

it has not come to fruition. 

So I think what we have seen with all of our P5+1 partners, as 

well as many others around the world—the Japanese, the Australians, the South Koreans, the others—is a cohesive effort to put 

real pressure on Iran. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Good. 

Well, I have read that even some of our European friends continue to trade with Iran. And I see you smiling. And so it has always kind of struck me as making your life a lot more difficult if 

you want to create leverage when our own—when our very friends 

continue to trade with the people that we are trying to—to—to put 

a little leverage on. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, Congressman, our sanctions on Iran are not a 

complete trade embargo. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Correct. 

Mr. COHEN. There is some trade that is permissible with 

Iran——

Mr. CLAWSON. Right. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. And not for the United States——

Mr. CLAWSON. Right. 

55

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. But for others around the world. And 

we have obviously seen that continued trade over the course of the 

years. 

That does not mean, however, that the sanctions that we have 

put in place that are extraordinarily powerful, that go after Iran’s 

oil sales, go after its access to the institutional financial system, 

have, as you say, holes in the fence. Those sanctions are staying. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Okay. Good. I always wondered how it worked 

when so much of the world was not part of the official coalition. 

The last point that I make today is I am guessing as part of a 

final deal, if you look down the road, Ambassador, 5 years from 

now and we have an optimistic outcome, that part of that optimistic outcome would be safety for Israel and that Iran would sign 

up. 

So, in other words, the final deal wouldn’t be no nukes, but everything else is okay, but, rather, we would have fences of defense 

for our most important ally in the region, of course, Israel. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. As I have said, all of the sanctions that 

go to their acts of terrorism, their human rights abuses, their fomenting instability around the world, will remain in place and our 

commitment to Israel’s security will continue. 

What I think it is important for all of us to remember—and I remind myself of this every day—is the reason that we are doing this 

is because, as unstable as the Middle East is today, an Iran with 

a nuclear weapon would be truly horrific and would really change 

the entire strategic framework of the Middle East in ways that 

none of us can even imagine or want to imagine. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Walking away is not an option. I understand. 

And I thank both of you for your service. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. HOLDING. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Now turn to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis. Recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

In terms of—Ambassador Sherman, you talked about how it 

would be very bad if Iran had a nuclear weapon. 

How does the administration view Iran’s posture? 

We have had a hearing recently where one witness was trying 

to apprise how—the Israelis’ view, and he said there is a significant number, maybe not a majority, who believe, ‘‘Well, you know, 

maybe they actually could be contained with a nuclear weapon.’’

And then I—I look at people like Bernard Lewis, the historian, 

who said, ‘‘Look, given the viewpoint and ideology of the mullahs 

who run the country, mutually assured destruction is not something that is—that scares them. It actually would induce them to 

want to develop weapons and even use them,’’ thinking, ‘‘Hey, if we 

can inflict more damage to Israel or to United States, we will deal 

with millions of our own people being killed.’’

So does the administration believe that Iran with a nuclear 

weapon and an apocalyptic ideology—that a mutually assured destruction scenario would not apply? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. The administration believes that Iran 

cannot be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon, period. 

56

Mr. DESANTIS. And is one of the reasons for that because of the 

world view that they bring to the table with a nuclear weapon? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. It is the world view that they bring to the 

nuclear—we don’t believe anybody else needs to have a nuclear 

weapon, period, in the world. 

And certainly, given some of the other things that Iran does in 

the world that many members have discussed today, Iran with a 

nuclear weapon would allow them to project further power into the 

region, would be a deterrent to others in the region, and would confer on them a place in the world that they should not have. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So since the administration has been dealing with 

Iran about this issue—I am going to guess it has been months and 

months now—has there been any change in Iran’s sponsorship of 

terrorism worldwide? 

Ambassador SHERMAN. I would want to have our intelligence 

community give you their assessment. But from an outsider’s point 

of view who isn’t an intelligence analyst, I would say that they 

have not stopped. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I guess—I understand—I have talked with 

folks who have been involved in arms deals who say, ‘‘Look, we 

don’t deal with these side issues. We just try to focus on that. It 

is tough enough.’’

And I understand that generally, and I understand that—why 

you would deal with that with the Soviet Union or some of the 

other countries that we have done. 

But given that Iran—they are fomenting jihad with Hezbollah 

and Syria and Iraq now, and, of course, they are one of the main 

suppliers of the missiles in the Gaza Strip to Hamas. Don’t we 

need to put terrorism and their terrorist activities on the table? 

I mean, I think it is really difficult to see how we would have 

a successful agreement where we didn’t believe they would be able 

to have a nuclear weapon, but somehow they would continue on fomenting jihad the way that they are doing. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Well, I understand the impulse to want 

to do that. Quite frankly, it would be an overwhelming negotiation 

that would make this all even more difficult than it already is. 

The reason that we are focused first and foremost on them not 

obtaining a nuclear weapon is for the reasons I said. Their ability 

to, in fact, do more with their state sponsorship of terrorism would 

be much greater if they indeed had a nuclear weapon. 

So we believe that first and foremost what must come off the 

field is their ability to gain a nuclear weapon. And we have—will 

not for one moment stop all of our other efforts in all of the other 

areas in which we have profound disagreement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

I think that, for me—as I look at it, I think, initially, it was a 

mistake to let off on the sanctions. I think that Iran—a regime like 

that, they are going to respond to strength. 

And my fear is that, by giving them more time, you know, they 

see that as, ‘‘Well, gee, you know, we got this time,’’ you know, 

‘‘They don’t want to put the screws to us yet.’’

And so I think stronger sanctions combined with—I mean, I 

think that they have to fear that there could potentially be a use 

57

of force, whether it is by us, whether it is by the Israelis or whatnot. 

And, if not, I just don’t think that they are going to have an incentive to really want to disarm and not create—and not acquire 

nuclear weapons. 

But I appreciate you guys for being here. 

And I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. HOLDING. Gentleman yields back. 

Recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we are getting 

to the end; so, I will get to my questions. 

Under the terms of the July 18th extension, the United States 

and its negotiating partners will further release sanctions and give 

Iran access to the $2.8 billion in blocked assets. 

In return, Iran’s main obligation will be to keep observing the interim agreement and to convert 25 kilograms of 20 percent highly 

enriched uranium from an oxidized form into fuel and directly usable research nuclear reactor by November 24, if that is correct. 

I would like to know from you—is—did U.S. get—officials get any 

assurances from the Iranian Government that they will not use 

any of the 2.8 in new sanctions relief either, A, to support international terrorism from other state sponsors, like the Assad regime, to advance the nuclear ballistic missile or advance conventional weapons program of Iran or any other state or to violate the 

Iranian people’s human rights? 

Mr. COHEN. Congressman, as has been discussed in this hearing, 

Iran is involved in a whole variety of destabilizing activity, including some of the activities you just described. They have been engaged in that activity for years now and have used their increasingly constrained funds to continue to pursue those objectives. 

There is no reason to believe that the funds that they will be provided access to under this Joint Plan of Action will go to the activity and no reason to believe that it necessarily won’t. I can’t guarantee you that either way. 

What I can tell you, though, is that our sanctions and our efforts 

to disrupt Iran’s support to Hezbollah, support to Hamas, violation 

of human rights, will continue unabated during this period. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, the only thing that concerns me there—and 

I was going to a different question at this point. 

But the defeatist—and I understand you are looking and you are 

being a realist. You know, I may call it defeatist-sounding. But if 

we basically say that, ‘‘Well, Iran may. They may not. They have 

been doing this for years,’’ then shouldn’t there have been at least 

some discussion about, ‘‘Okay. If you do this. You thought sanctions 

were bad last time. Get ready’’? 

I mean, I—there is a lot of us—I am not going to go into this—

there is many on this committee and many on this Hill that believe 

that this was just a total disaster to start with. Okay? 

And now we are just basically saying, ‘‘Well, they have been 

doing it for a long time. They have not been doing it for a long 

time. We got the same kind of commitments last time.’’

Frankly, especially from the folks in my district, they just don’t 

buy the line anymore. The corporate line is just not real good. And 

58

the tone of your voice not being—and I agree with you, I mean, in 

a realist kind of sense. 

But what bothers me is we don’t seem to have a hammer on the 

other side to say, ‘‘Look, you know, this has got to happen’’ because 

most of us believe it is just going to be—it is funneled to different 

directions to start with. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, with all due respect, Congressman, there is 

nothing defeatist about it. We have been very actively engaged in 

disrupting and attempting to disrupt Iran’s support for terrorism 

around the world for years now, and we are continuing to do so. 

We do it through our sanctions designations. We do it through 

our work with our partners. We, as I am sure you know, worked 

to intercept the Klos C, which was a vessel going from Iran to support the—support Hamas with weapons. 

There is nothing at all defeatist in our approach to countering 

Iran’s support for terrorism around the world. The funds that Iran 

is getting access to I cannot guarantee you will not go to this activity. And I would not presume to tell you something that I could not 

in good conscience tell you is the truth. 

But I will tell you that we will continue to work as hard as we 

possibly can and we will, in fact, redouble our efforts to ensure that 

Iran’s support for terrorism around the world is something that we 

take—we take action against. 

Mr. COLLINS. Part of the issue of the repeal—or at least giving 

some of the blocked assets was to spurt growth in the Iranian economy and just for, basically, their basic needs, not their terroristic 

nature. 

Has there been any reports or things that you have seen that the 

Iranian economy is growing? And, if so, what could be attributable 

to the unblocked assets? 

Mr. COHEN. There are—we watch very closely how the Iranian 

economy is performing. As I am sure you know, it has contracted 

quite substantially in the last several years. 

There has been, since the Rouhani administration has come into 

power in Iran, better management of their economy. And some of 

the decline that we have seen in the past has begun to moderate. 

But Iran’s economy is still in very significant distress. 

And the funds that are made available to the Iranians under the 

Joint Plan of Action, the $2.8 billion in this extension period and 

the $4.2 billion from the original period, do not in any respect suffice to jump-start the Iranian economy. The Iranian economy—the 

whole of the Iranian economy is so great that those funds do not 

move the needle on their economy. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. HOLDING. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

We appreciate very much the time and work of our witnesses 

today. I know the committee—I speak for all of the committee—

looks forward to consulting closely with you in the 4 months ahead 

on these critical and difficult issues. 

Ambassador SHERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HOLDING. The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, 4:32 at p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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