J-S54018-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM BOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 25 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0002211-1993

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM RICKY BOYD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 26 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0002209-1993

BEFORE: OTT, J., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2017

William Ricky Boyd (“Boyd”), brings this counseled appeal from the 

order entered December 14, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County, dismissing his sixth petition for relief pursuant to the Post 

____________________________________________

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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. Boyd seeks relief 

from the judgment of sentence of 50 to 100 years’ imprisonment, imposed 

on June 29, 2004. At Criminal Docket Nos. CR-0002209-1993 and CR0002211-1993, a jury found Boyd guilty of one count of criminal conspiracy, 

four counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of violating the Uniforms 

Firearms Act,1stemming from shootings that took place on January 11, 

1991, and January 22, 1991. Boyd contends the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly 

discovered evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

In this Court’s prior memorandum affirming the dismissal of Boyd’s 

first PCRA petition, we set forth the relevant factual background of this case. 

Therefore, there is no need to repeat it here. See Commonwealth v. 

Boyd, 835 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. 2003) (unpublished memorandum, at 1–4),

appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 2004). 

On April 26, 1994, a jury convicted Boyd of the above-stated charges, 

and on June 29, 1994, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 

50 to 100 years’ imprisonment. On June 17, 1996, this Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 

petition for allowance of appeal on January 15, 1997. Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2702, and 6106, respectively.
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Boyd, 679 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 1996), appeal denied, 689 A.2d 230 (Pa. 

1997). 

On March 27, 1997, Boyd filed his first PCRA petition, which was 

dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on September 26, 2000. This 

Court affirmed the PCRA court’s decision on September 4, 2003, and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Boyd’s petition for allowance of appeal 

on August 31, 2004. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 859 A.2d 767 (Pa. 

2004). 

On November 18, 2004, Boyd filed his second PCRA petition, which 

was untimely and unsuccessful. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 938 A.2d 1108 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum).

On January 22, 2010, Boyd filed his third PCRA petition. In this PCRA 

petition, Boyd asserted he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence, specifically, that a non-testifying witness, Terrell Bush, 

had come forward and was willing to testify that Boyd did not commit the 

criminal acts in question. Boyd further asserted that Childress, his 

codefendant at trial, was willing to provide testimony that would exonerate 

him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Boyd’s 

third PCRA petition as untimely. This Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 60 
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A.3d 557 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 67 

A.3d 792 (Pa. 2013). 

On June 18, 2013, Boyd filed his fourth PCRA petition, which failed on 

the basis of untimeliness. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 105 A.3d 41 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (judgment order), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 734 (Pa. 2014). 

On January 7, 2015, Boyd filed a fifth PCRA, which similarly failed as 

untimely. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 125 A.3d 469 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 126 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2015).

On December 3, 2015, Boyd filed this current PCRA petition pro se, 

and a counseled, amended petition was filed on May 18, 2016. In his 

petition, Boyd asserts he is entitled to relief based upon newly discovered 

evidence. Specifically, Boyd attached to his petition the affidavit of Thomas 

Easley, the victim of the January 11, 1991, shooting, who states he lied in 

his trial testimony identifying Boyd as the shooter. On November 3, 2016, 

the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss, stating 

that the petition was time-barred and lacking in merit. After Boyd filed a 

December 2, 2016 response to the Rule 907 notice, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition on December 14, 2016. This consolidated appeal 

followed.2

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2 The PCRA court did not order Boyd to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) notice. The 

PCRA Court entered an order on February 9, 2017, relying on the reasoning 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The sole issue Boyd raises on appeal is framed in his brief, as follows:

Whether this Court should vacate and remand for a hearing 

where the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing Mr. Boyd’s PCRA 

petition without a hearing when (i) genuine issues of material 

fact existed as to the petition’s timelines and the merit of its 

claims and (ii) Mr. Boyd would be entitled to a new trial if the 

facts averred in the petition were, indeed, proven to be true at a 

hearing.

Boyd’s Brief at 4.

“Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether 

the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether 

its conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 

146 A.3d 221, 226 n.9 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

As a threshold issue, we must consider the timeliness of Boyd’s 

petition. A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date the 

underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Here, Boyd’s judgment of sentence 

became final on April 16, 1997, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal from his direct appeal, and 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

set forth in the Rule 907 notice, in support of his decision to dismiss the 

petition.
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he failed to petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 

Court. See U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 13. Therefore, Boyd had until April 16, 1998, 

to file a timely petition. As such, Boyd’s present petition is patently 

untimely.

Nevertheless, an untimely PCRA petition may still be considered if one 

of the three time-for-filing exceptions applies. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition raising a statutory exception must be filed 

“within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Here, Boyd asserts that his petition meets the 

timeliness exception set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) for newly discovered 

facts. 

The newly discovered fact exception requires a petitioner to plead and 

prove that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of 

due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). 

Importantly, there is a distinction between the newly discovered facts 

timeliness exception found in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), and a substantive claim 

for PCRA relief based upon after-discovered evidence, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(2)(vi): 

The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned 

those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 395, 930 A.2d 1264, 
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1271 (2007). Due diligence demands that the petitioner take 

reasonable steps to protect his own interests. Commonwealth 

v. Carr, 2001 PA Super 54, 768 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa.Super. 

2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned 

the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 330-31, 781 A.2d 

94, 98 (2001); Commonwealth v. Monaco, 2010 PA Super 84, 

996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 

607, 20 A.3d 1210 (2011). This rule is strictly enforced. Id. 

Additionally, the focus of this exception “is on the newly 

discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing 

source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. 

Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 596, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (2008) 

(emphasis in original).

The timeliness exception set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) has 

often mistakenly been referred to as the “after-discovered 

evidence” exception. Bennett, supra at 393, 930 A.2d at 1270. 

“This shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the plain 

language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner 

to allege and prove a claim of ‘after-discovered evidence.’” Id. 

Rather, as an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to allege and prove that 

there were facts unknown to him and that he exercised due 

diligence in discovering those facts. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii); Bennett, supra. Once jurisdiction is established, 

a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discoveredevidence claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (explaining 

that to be eligible for relief under PCRA, petitioner must plead 

and prove by preponderance of evidence that conviction or 

sentence resulted from, inter alia, unavailability at time of trial of 

exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available 

and would have changed outcome of trial if it had been 

introduced). In other words, the “new facts” exception at:

[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which must 

be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner must 

establish that: 1) the facts upon which the claim was 

predicated were unknown and 2) could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. If the 

petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then 

the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this 

subsection. 
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Bennett, supra at 395, 930 A.2d at 1272 (internal citations 

omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus, the “new facts” exception 

at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis of 

an underlying after-discovered-evidence claim. Id. at 395, 930 

A.2d at 1271.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176-77 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

emphasis added).

Here, Boyd argues that the affidavit he submitted from Thomas

Easley, the victim of the January 11, 1991, shooting, satisfies the newly 

discovered facts timeliness exception, and that the PCRA court erred in 

dismissing his petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. In the 

affidavit, dated October 29, 2015, Mr. Easley attests:

I recall the night of January 11, 1991, when I was shot. The 

shooting was an “ambush” type situation. I was at the Jeffries

residence. I was shot outside, and it was dark out. I was with an 

individual by the name of Terrell Bush.

When I was questioned by police, I told them that I did not know 

who shot me. That was true. It was dark out, and I could only 

vaguely see the individual who shot me.

Later, in 1993, I identified William R. Boyd as the person who 

shot me. I had been indicted in a separate drug case, and the 

police pushed me to identify Boyd as my shooter. I testified that 

it was Boyd who shot me, but this was based on the information 

I heard the night of the shooting. I did not actually see who shot 

me, and I truthfully did not know if it was Boyd who shot me or 

not.

I also testified that my original statements to the police where I 

said I did not know who shot me, were false. Those statements 

were actually true.

There were no real issues between Boyd and myself during the 

time the shooting occurred.
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It has been over twenty years since this shooting and 

subsequent trial, and it has weighed on my mind and conscience 

that Boyd is incarcerated for something I cannot say that he did. 

I identified him at the trial as the person who shot me, and that 

was wrong.

I recently approached a member of Boyd’s family regarding this 

information. I took the initiative. I want to I am willing to 

testify to this information, should there be a future proceeding.

Boyd’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/18/2016, Exhibit “C” at Exhibit “1”; Boyd’s 

pro se PCRA Petition, 12/3/2015, Exhibit “A”.

Boyd averred that he first became aware that Mr. Easley might have 

information concerning the above-captioned matters on October 9, 2015, 

when he received a letter from his daughter, and that he learned the 

substance of Mr. Easley’s information on November 3, 2015, when he 

received Mr. Easley’s affidavit. Boyd’s pro se PCRA petition, 12/3/2015,

Exhibit “C” (Boyd Affidavit).3 Boyd states “he could not have actual proof of 

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3 Boyd stated in his affidavit:

On October 9, 2015, I receive[d a] letter from daughter which 

stated Tom approach her and express his knowledge of my 

innocence. This occurred the first week of October 2015. On 

November 3, 2015 I received mail from Keri Bozich 

Investigations, which contained Mr. Easley’s affidavit.

Furthermore, Boyd attached to his amended petition witness 

certifications for himself, Mr. Easley, his daughter, and Ms. Bozich. The

witness certification for Ms. Bozich stated:

Ms. Bozich is expected to testify that [Boyd] retained her on or 

about October 25, 2015, and that she located Thomas Easley 

(“Mr. Easley”) on October 27, 2015. She will further testify that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Mr. Easley’s lies at trial and that Mr. Easley was pressured to provide false 

testimony by law enforcement after he received his own significant charges 

until Mr. Easley himself was finally willing to come forward and so admit.” 

Boyd’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/18/2016, at ¶40 (emphasis in original). 

Assuming the present petition, filed on December 3, 2015, meets 

the 60-day requirement of Section 9545(b)(2) because the petition was 

filed within 60 days of when Boyd received the October 9, 2015, letter 

from his daughter, we conclude Boyd is entitled to no relief as he has 

failed to satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requirements of new facts and due 

diligence. 

Here, the unknown “fact” alleged by Boyd is Mr. Easley’s perjury at 

Boyd’s trial. See Boyd’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/18/2016, at ¶33

(“Mr. Boyd recently received information that Mr. Easley, now — more 

than twenty years after testifying against Mr. Boyd — finally admits that 

he lied at Mr. Boyd’s trial.”). However, this “fact” was already known to 

Boyd. Indeed, in support of his third PCRA petition, Boyd attached the 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

she and Mr. Easley met at a notary on October 29, 2015, at 

which time Mr. Easley executed the affidavit attached to this 

certification as Exhibit 1. Ms. Bozich will also explain that she 

mailed the attached affidavit to [Boyd] on either October 29 or 

30, 2015.

Boyd’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/18/2016, Exhibit “F”.
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2009 affidavit of Terrell Bush, who stated, inter alia, “I was aware of the 

lies and perjury of Commonwealth witnesses including but not 

limited to Tom Easley at Mr. Boyd’s trial and admit that I failed to 

come forward until this time.”4, 5 As this Court emphasized in Brown, the 

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4 Boyd’s Amended Petition, 5/18/2016, at ¶35 and Exhibit “D” (Terrell 

Bush Affidavit, dated 12/22/2009, at ¶15); Boyd’s pro se PCRA Petition, 

12/3/2015, at page 17 and Exhibit “E”. 

5 At the evidentiary hearing held on Boyd’s third PCRA petition, Terrell Bush 

testified

that on January 11, 1991, he drove Tom Easley (“Easley”) to the 

residence of Eric Jeffries, and that as he pulled in to the 

driveway, three men emerged from the bushes. One of the 

three men had a gun and began firing at Easley. Bush testified 

that Boyd was neither the man firing the gun nor one of the 

shooter’s two companions. Bush said that the police subpoenaed 

him to testify at Boyd’s trial and that he was in the courtroom 

during the trial, but that he was not called to testify because he 

informed the police that he did not want to be involved. He said 

that he made contact with Boyd’s family in 2010 and 

subsequently provided an affidavit indicating that Boyd was not 

the man who shot Easley on January 11, 1991.

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 60 A.3d 557 [1519 WDA 2011, at 10] (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum, at 10). 

This Court found that Boyd failed to establish his lack of prior 

knowledge about Terrell Bush’s ability to testify regarding his innocence, and 

failed to prove he acted with due diligence. This Court explained Bush “was 

an obvious, available source of information about the events of January 11, 

1991[, in that] Easley testified at trial that Bush drove him to Eric Jeffries’ 

residence and had just gotten out of the car and began to walk up the 

driveway when shots started to fly in Easley’s direction from a gun in Boyd’s 

hand.” Id. [1519 WDA 2011, at 11–12]. We concluded Bush’s affidavit was 

not newly discovered evidence satisfying the timeliness exception of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. [1519 WDA 2011, at 12].
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focus of the newly discovered facts exception “is on the newly discovered 

facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously 

known facts.” Brown, supra, 111 A.3d at 176 (quotations omitted). Here, 

Boyd is proffering a newly willing source for previously known facts.

Furthermore, while Boyd also argues the “new” fact that Mr. Easley 

“only identified Mr. Boyd after being charged with criminal offenses himself 

and receiving pressure from law enforcement,”6 Boyd’s counsel highlighted 

these circumstances to the jury during cross-examination of Mr. Easley. 

Specifically, Boyd’s counsel elicited Mr. Easley’s admissions that he had 

initially told police and the treating physician he did not know who shot 

him, and that he told police Boyd was the perpetrator on November 16, 

1993, when he had a potential, favorable plea agreement for federal drug 

charges he was then facing. See N.T., Vol. I, 4/13-15/1994, at 187, 

191-197, 212-213.

Moreover, even if the facts set forth in Mr. Easley’s affidavit met the 

criteria for being newly discovered facts, Boyd has not established that he 

acted with due diligence in obtaining this affidavit. Boyd’s PCRA petition fails 

to allege any efforts he made to locate or contact Mr. Easley to try to 

convince him to recant, even after he obtained Mr. Bush’s 2009 

affidavit wherein Mr. Bush stated Mr. Easley had lied at trial. See 

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6 Boyd’s Amended Petition, 5/18/2016, at ¶36.
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Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 891 (Pa. Super. 2014) (finding 

Davis established due diligence where “[a]ttached to his amended PCRA 

petition, [Davis] proffered affidavits from several friends and family 

members who claimed that they attempted to locate Watson after [Davis’s] 

trial in order to convince Watson to admit he lied on the stand”); but see

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1217–1218 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(en banc) (rejecting Commonwealth’s argument that Medina could have 

discovered recantation evidence through the exercise of due diligence where

Medina could have had no way to know of the detective’s secret threats that 

led to the child-witness’s testimony), appeal dismissed, 140 a.3d 675 (Pa. 

2016). 

In sum, we conclude that even if Boyd’s present petition meets the 60-

day requirement of Section 9545(b)(2), Boyd has failed to satisfy the newly 

discovered fact exception and, consequently, there is no jurisdiction to 

review this petition on the merits. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

dismissal of the petition without an evidentiary hearing.

Order affirmed.

Judge Moulton joins in this memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2017