2021 IL App (1st) 191942-U

No. 1-19-1942 

Order filed May 19, 2021 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JOEL F. HANDLER,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TAMARA SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

No. 19 M1 103303

Honorable 

Mary Kathleen McHugh, 

Judge presiding. 

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment. 

 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff where, based on the 

record on appeal, we have no basis to disturb the judgment. We also deny plaintiff’s 

motion to dismiss this appeal. 

¶ 2 Tamara Smith hired attorney Joel F. Handler to represent her in an employment matter

against the Board of Education of Thornton Township High School District 205. After Handler 

filed a charge of discrimination against District 205 with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) on Smith’s behalf, the parties reached a resolution during a mediation. While 
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that resolution was being memorialized into a written settlement agreement, Smith disagreed with 

the portion of the settlement amount that Handler claimed he was entitled to as attorney fees. 

Before Smith signed the settlement agreement with District 205, she sent Handler an e-mail stating 

that she was firing him and then, she completed the settlement on her own. Smith subsequently 

directed District 205 to send Handler an amount of attorney fees that she thought they had agreed 

upon. Handler disagreed with the amount, believing that he was owed more based upon their 

engagement agreement, and sued Smith for breach of contract. The case went to trial where the 

circuit court found in Handler’s favor. 

¶ 3 Smith now appeals the circuit court’s judgment, contending that: (1) the court erred in 

allowing Handler to sue for breach of contract based upon their engagement agreement rather than 

under the doctrine of quantum meruit; and (2) Handler’s attorney fees were excessive. Initially, 

we deny a motion to dismiss this appeal filed by Handler that was taken with the case, and for the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In July 2018, Smith signed an engagement agreement for Handler to represent her in the 

prosecution of an employment-related claim against District 205. As part of the agreement, they 

agreed that Handler would be paid $500 per hour while the matter was pending before the EEOC. 

If the matter could not be resolved before the EEOC, they agreed that the agreement would convert 

to a contingency-fee arrangement following the filing of a complaint in federal court. In such a 

scenario, Handler would receive 40 percent of any sum obtained by settlement, suit or otherwise, 

but that Smith would be responsible for whatever attorney fees and costs had been incurred before 

the conversion. They further agreed that, in the event Handler was awarded statutory attorney fees, 

Smith would receive a credit against the amount she owed him commensurate with the amount of 
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statutory attorney fees. Additionally, Smith agreed to pay Handler’s reasonable costs in connection 

with his representation of her. 

¶ 6 Following the execution of their agreement, Handler filed a charge of discrimination

against District 205 with the EEOC on Smith’s behalf. Thereafter, Handler sent Smith his first 

invoice, which detailed his time spent working on her case in July 2018 and amounted to three 

hours of work and a total of $1500 in services. Smith paid $1475 of the first invoice. In a second 

invoice for services rendered in August 2018, Handler billed Smith $1400, which included $1375 

in services that month plus the $25 outstanding from the first invoice. 

¶ 7 On September 28, 2018, Smith and Handler executed an amended engagement agreement, 

whereby the hourly-fee arrangement was superseded by a contingency-fee arrangement. Under 

this new arrangement, Smith agreed to pay Handler 40 percent of any sum obtained by lawsuit, 

settlement or otherwise. In addition to this amount, however, Smith agreed to pay Handler his 

outstanding balance of $1400 for legal services rendered under their prior hourly-fee arrangement. 

The amended engagement agreement also contained a clause that stated, if Smith requested 

Handler withdraw as her attorney prior to the resolution of her claim by suit, settlement or 

otherwise, she agreed to pay him $500 per hour, or his then-customary hourly rate, “for the time 

which he has spent in connection with [her] claim, or forty percent (40%) of the amount being 

offered by” District 205 “at the time of [the] request to withdraw, whichever is greater.” 

¶ 8 On November 5, 2018, Handler conducted a mediation with District 205’s attorney and an 

EEOC mediator, which resulted in the parties reaching a resolution. Following the mediation, the 

EEOC mediator wrote both Handler and District 205’s attorney congratulating them for “reaching 

a resolution” and observing that it was her “understanding *** that the parties will be entering into 

a separate agreement with language drafted and agreed upon by you.” The mediator asked them to 
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reach out if they needed help completing the “settlement paperwork” and stated that Handler 

should execute a withdrawal of charge form “in conjunction with the separate agreement.” A week 

later, Smith signed a request to withdraw her charge of discrimination against District 205. 

¶ 9 As part of the settlement agreement, which was titled a “Release and Waiver of Claims,”

District 205 agreed to pay Smith a sum of $15,000 in exchange for, among other things, Smith 

withdrawing her charge of discrimination and promising not to otherwise sue. On November 15, 

2018, Handler sent Smith a settlement statement to review that showed $6000 of that $15,000 (or 

40 percent) was assigned to Handler as attorney fees under their contingency-fee agreement, $1400 

was assigned to Handler for the past due attorney fees under the hourly-fee agreement and $2.87 

went to reimburse Handler for costs. The remaining $7597.13 was assigned to Smith. 

¶ 10 In response to being sent the settlement statement, Smith e-mailed Handler and indicated 

that they agreed to his attorney fees being only $5150 at the mediation. This number was calculated 

by Smith by taking 40 percent of $15,000 minus $850, an amount she claimed she already paid

him. Smith added that Handler “cannot double dip. It was either the 40 [percent] compensation or 

paid hourly.” Smith asserted that she would not sign a settlement where Handler received $7000 

and reiterated that he was owed $5150, which “was part of the reason I agreed to the settlement.” 

Handler replied and remarked that Smith’s representations were “inaccurate” and ignored their 

amended engagement agreement. In response to Handler’s e-mail, Smith asserted: “You said if 

there was a settlement you would get forty and if there was no settlement you would be owed a 

hourly wage for whatever you did.” Smith added that she was unemployed and never would have 

agreed to an arrangement where Handler received that amount. Smith further stated: “You 

reassured me when I asked you it didn’t mean both when I signed it.” Finally, Smith remarked that 

if Handler could not “take what we agreed on [$]5150 your [sic] fired.”
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¶ 11 Subsequently, Handler responded and noted that the amended engagement agreement was 

“crystal clear” that Smith would reimburse him $1400 for the outstanding balance for legal 

services rendered under their prior hourly-fee agreement and then he would be entitled to 40 

percent of any resolution of her case by suit or settlement. While Smith and Handler were arguing 

over his attorney fees, Handler was also revising the settlement agreement with District 205’s 

attorney and Smith, so that the settlement could be voted on by District 205 on November 19, 

2018. In one e-mail between the attorneys, District 205’s attorney indicated that the settlement 

agreement had “not been vetted” by District 205 yet and it would be once he and Handler had “an 

understanding.” One revision was in a recital, where it originally stated that Smith had filed a 

charge of discrimination against District 205 in the Illinois Department of Human Rights and 

Handler requested that recital changed to the EEOC. Handler also requested a modification to the 

language surrounding Smith’s $15,000 settlement payment. In Smith’s various responses to 

Handler, she also raised disagreements about the language of some clauses of the settlement, 

including that she wanted the right to sue individual employees of District 205. Ultimately, on 

November 16, 2018, she e-mailed Handler and fired him.

¶ 12 Afterward, Smith e-mailed District 205’s attorney and the EEOC mediator informing them 

that she had fired Handler and to direct all correspondences to her. Additionally, Smith attached a 

letter that included modifications to her settlement agreement, which included that only $5150 

would be payable to Handler for his representation of her. Smith eventually signed a settlement 

agreement with District 205 that included that division of monies, and a check for $5150 was sent 

to Handler from the treasurer of District 205. 
No. 1-19-1942 

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¶ 13 In December 2018, after receiving the check, Handler e-mailed Smith informing her that 

$5150 was not the amount she owed him and demanded $2252.87 more, which he alleged was

owed to him based on their amended engagement agreement. 

¶ 14 In February 2019, Handler sued Smith for the allegedly owed attorney fees. In the 

complaint, Handler alleged that, two months after he began representing Smith, she informed him 

that she could not afford his hourly rate and requested that their engagement agreement be 

converted into a contingency-fee agreement. Following the execution of their amended 

engagement agreement, the complaint stated that Handler negotiated a settlement during a 

mediation before the EEOC with District 205 that Smith had approved. However, following the 

settlement agreement, the complaint alleged that Smith fired Handler, went to District 205’s

attorney and unilaterally modified the settlement agreement “whereby Handler would receive a 

lesser amount than what was agreed pursuant to Smith’s amended engagement agreement.” 

Handler asserted that he performed all of his responsibilities under their agreement and despite his 

demands for payment, Smith had refused to pay him. Handler accordingly requested judgment 

against Smith in the amount of $2252.87 plus costs and prejudgment interest. Handler attached to 

his complaint their initial engagement agreement, their amended engagement agreement and a 

billing statement that showed a balance owed by Smith of $1400. In Handler’s civil action cover 

sheet, he indicated that his lawsuit was a breach of contract case. 

¶ 15 In April 2019, Smith appeared pro se and denied the allegations against her. After the 

parties’ first court appearance, the circuit court set the case for trial. A trial eventually occurred in 

August 2019, where Smith represented herself. After the trial, the court found in favor of Handler 
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for a judgment of $2327.97 plus $466.44 in costs.1 Smith filed a pro se notice of appeal, but 

subsequently obtained private counsel on appeal.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 A. Handler’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 18 At the outset, before addressing Smith’s contentions on appeal, we must address a motion 

to dismiss that Handler filed in this court, which we took with the case. In the motion, Handler 

argues that, because there was no transcript of the trial proceedings in this case and Smith failed 

to present a bystander’s report of the trial, this court cannot properly review the circuit court’s 

judgment. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017) discusses reports of proceedings 

from the circuit court. The preferred form of a report of proceeding is a verbatim transcript of the 

proceeding. See id. However, “[i]f no verbatim transcript of the evidence of proceedings is 

obtainable the appellant may prepare a proposed report of proceedings,” i.e., a bystander’s report

“from the best available sources, including recollection.” Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. 

July 1, 2017). Rule 323(c) further provides the procedure the appellant must undertake if she 

chooses to rely on a bystander’s report. Id. 

¶ 19 It is well established that “an appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete 

record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 

391 (1984). This court may dismiss an appeal for the appellant’s failure to file a report of 

proceedings in accordance with Rule 323. Rosenblatt v. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 70 Ill. 

App. 3d 1039, 1042 (1979). But more commonly, the appellant’s failure to provide a report of 

proceedings has “been regarded as merely depriving a reviewing court of a basis for reaching 

1 There is no report of proceedings from the trial. However, the parties did stipulate to including 

the exhibits that were introduced at trial in the record on appeal. 
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issues whose merits depend on matters thus omitted, such as issues of sufficiency of evidence 

[citation] or relating to conduct of a hearing.” Id. To this end, where the appellant has failed to 

present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings, “it will be presumed that the order 

entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch, 

99 Ill. 2d at 392. And any doubts that arise from the incompleteness of the record must be resolved 

against the appellant. Id. While we do not believe that Smith’s failure to provide a report of 

proceeding of the trial in compliance with Rule 323 warrants the dismissal of her appeal, we will 

review her contentions on appeal under the well-established principles of Foutch. Consequently, 

we deny Handler’s motion to dismiss and address the merits of Smith’s appeal. 

¶ 20 B. Smith’s Appeal

¶ 21 1. Breach of Contract or Quantum Meruit

¶ 22 Smith first contends that the circuit court erred in allowing Handler to proceed on a breach 

of contract theory after he had been terminated because once she fired him, he was limited to a 

recovery under a theory of quantum meruit, not a recovery based on their amended engagement 

agreement. 

¶ 23 Under Illinois law, a client may terminate her attorney’s services at any time with or 

without cause. In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (1991). A “client’s right to discharge 

[her] attorney at will is not a breach of contract but a term of the contract implied by law because 

of the special relationship between attorney and client and that it would be anomalous and unjust 

to hold a client liable in damages for exercising that implied right.” Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western 

Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 229-30 (1979). Once a client fires her attorney, an engagement agreement 

that provided for a contingency fee ceases to exist. In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 40. 
No. 1-19-1942 

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¶ 24 For example, in Rhoades, an injured railroad worker hired a law firm to represent him in a 

personal injury lawsuit against his employer, and they agreed to a 25 percent contingency fee. Id.

at 220-21. The next day, the worker decided not to file the lawsuit, but nevertheless, the law firm 

filed the lawsuit and sent the employer a notice of an attorney’s lien. Id. at 221. Later, the law firm 

dismissed the case at the worker’s request, and he settled the claim with his employer on his own. 

Id. at 221-22. Upon learning of the settlement, the law firm filed a petition to adjudicate its lien 

and obtain attorney fees, which the circuit court awarded in accordance with the law firm’s 

contingency-fee agreement. Id. at 222. The case reached our supreme court, where one of the issues 

was whether a discharged law firm could still collect its full contingency fee. Id. at 226. Our 

supreme court held that the law firm could not collect its full contingency fee but rather was 

"entitled to be paid on a quantum meruit basis a reasonable fee for services rendered before 

discharge.” Id. at 230. 

¶ 25 And so, following a discharge, “a lawyer is not entitled to the full amount of fees agreed to 

between the lawyer and the client in contract. Instead, the lawyer is only entitled to be compensated 

on a quantum meruit basis for the legal services which the lawyer actually performed on the client’s 

behalf.” In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d 269, 293 (1995). The doctrine of quantum meruit allows the circuit 

court to award an attorney “ ‘as much as he deserves’ ” for representing a client. Lee v. Ingalls 

Memorial Hospital, 232 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478 (1992) (quoting Van C. Argiris & Co. v. FMC Corp., 

144 Ill. App. 3d 750, 753 (1986)). And as much as the attorney deserves is the reasonable value of 

his services during the representation of his client. In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 41. 

Among the factors the court should consider when awarding attorney fees under quantum meruit 

are: 
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“ ‘the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and the 

difficulty of the questions at issue, the amount and importance of the subject matter, 

the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the case, the time and 

labor required, the usual and customary fee in the community, and the benefit 

resulting to the client.’ ” Id. at 44 (quoting Mireles v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. 

Corp., 154 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551 (1987)).

¶ 26 As such, the doctrine of quantum meruit applies when an attorney has been discharged by 

his client prior to the resolution of the case. In re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d at 293. On the other hand, once 

an attorney represents his client through the resolution of a case, the alleged entitlement to attorney 

fees becomes one of breach of contract based upon the parties’ engagement agreement. See Todd 

W. Musburger, Ltd. v. Meier, 394 Ill. App. 3d 781, 793 (2009) (“As the trial court recognized, 

plaintiff law firm could only pursue an action for quantum meruit (and could not pursue a cause 

of action for breach of contract) because it was representing defendant on a contingent basis and 

was discharged in the midst of that representation.”).

¶ 27 In the present case, Handler brought a breach of contract lawsuit. And thus, under this 

theory, there is an implicit assumption that Handler represented Smith through the conclusion of 

her case because otherwise, quantum meruit would be the appropriate theory of recovery. See In 

re Smith, 168 Ill. 2d at 293. Because we do not have any report of proceedings from the trial, we 

have no idea what occurred during the trial except for the exhibits that were introduced. 

Furthermore, when the circuit court found in favor of Handler for $2327.97 plus costs, we have no 

idea the reasoning behind this judgment.

¶ 28 What we do know is that, in Handler’s complaint, he requested a judgment of $2252.87 

plus costs and prejudgment interest. And in an exhibit from the trial, Handler provided a 
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calculation for prejudgment interest using five percent as the interest rate and eight months as the 

length of time, though using $2252.57, which resulted in $75.10 of prejudgment interest. $75.10 

added to $2252.87 equals $2327.97. Thus, the circuit court awarded Handler the amount he 

requested from his complaint plus the prejudgment interest calculated in his exhibit. And we know 

that the amount requested in Handler’s complaint was the difference between what Handler 

claimed he was owed under the amended engagement agreement ($1400 from the preexisting 

balance plus $6000—40 percent of the settlement agreement—plus $2.87 in various costs) and the 

$5150 that Smith had directed to Handler for his services. Stated otherwise, the circuit court 

awarded Handler exactly what he was owed under the amended engagement agreement. Thus, 

based on Handler’s complaint, the exhibits he entered into evidence at trial and the circuit court’s 

judgment, it appears as if the court found for him based on breach of contract principles. 

¶ 29 But to reiterate, breach of contract is the appropriate theory of recovery if Handler had 

represented Smith through the completion of her case. Yet it is arguable that this assumption is 

incorrect given that Smith discharged Handler before District 205 actually vetted and voted on the 

agreement. While District’s 205’s vote may have been perfunctory, it is certainly within the realm 

of possibility that it could have voted against the settlement. Moreover, based on the exhibits from 

trial, the mediation between the parties resulted in a “resolution,” which the mediator noted would 

have to be memorialized by “a separate agreement with language drafted by and agreed upon you.”

In other words, it appears from the mediator’s statements that the parties contemplated a formal 

written agreement.

¶ 30 While based on the exhibits from trial, it is unclear if this mediation resolution was oral or 

in writing, such resolutions may be binding. Oral settlement agreements can be binding if there 

was an offer, acceptance and a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the terms of the 
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agreement. Condon & Cook, L.L.C. v. Mavrakis, 2016 IL App (1st) 151923, ¶ 56. Moreover, “if 

the parties agree that a formal document will be prepared only as a memorialization of the oral 

agreement, the bargain is binding even though the document has not been executed.” Ceres Illinois, 

Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 133, 143 (1986). Similarly, “[t]he fact that parties 

contemplate that a formal agreement will eventually be executed does not necessarily render prior 

agreements mere negotiations, where it is clear that the ultimate contract will be substantially based 

upon the same terms as the previous document.” Chicago Investment Corp. v. Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d 

120, 127 (1985). But, on the other hand, even if the critical terms of a contract have been agreed 

to, “ ‘if the clear intent of the parties is that neither will be legally bound until the execution and 

delivery of a formal agreement, then no contract comes into existence until such execution and 

delivery.’ ” Ceres, 114 Ill. 2d at 143-44 (quoting Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ceco Corp., 92 Ill.

App. 3d 58, 69 (1980)). In other words, “[i]f the parties construe the execution of a formal 

agreement as a condition precedent, then no contract arises unless and until that formal agreement 

is executed.” Dolins, 107 Ill. 2d at 127. 

¶ 31 Turning back to Smith’s contention on appeal, in which she contends that Handler could 

only recover under quantum meruit principles, this argument inherently presumes that she fired 

Handler prior to the completion of her case, as this is the only way quantum meruit would be 

Handler’s appropriate theory of recovery. Given that District 205 had yet to vote on the settlement 

when Smith discharged Handler and the question of whether the mediation resolution itself was 

binding, it is questionable, if not doubtful, that Handler did indeed represent Smith through the 

completion of her case. But critically fatal to Smith’s contention on appeal is that she never raised 

these arguments before the circuit court, as it appears from the limited record that Smith acquiesced 

that this was a breach of contract case from the time she filed her answer until she filed her notice 
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of appeal. Breach of contract and quantum meruit are two distinct causes of action, and in the 

present case, the proper procedure for Smith would have been to file a motion to dismiss based on 

breach of contract being an inappropriate theory of recovery. See Meier, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 785-

86, 93. She cannot for the first time on appeal essentially attempt to have Handler’s breach of 

contract cause of action dismissed for being an inappropriate theory of recovery.

¶ 32 “It is well settled that issues not raised in the trial court are deemed [forfeited] and may not 

be raised for the first time on appeal.” Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). 

A defendant cannot “change [her] theory on appeal” because it “would ‘not only weaken the 

adversarial process and our system of appellate jurisdiction’ [citation], but would likely prejudice 

the plaintiff, since he may have been able to present evidence to discredit the theory had it been 

raised in the evidence presentation stage, that is to say, in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Daniels v. 

Anderson, 162 Ill. 2d 47, 59 (1994)). Simply, there is no evidence that Smith ever raised an 

argument in the circuit court that Handler was only entitled to attorney fees under the quantum 

meruit doctrine, a doctrine that is heavily fact-intensive, involves weighing several factors and 

ultimately relies on the broad discretion of the circuit court. See In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 

2d at 43-44. Because Smith failed to raise the doctrine of quantum meruit in the circuit court, she 

cannot raise the doctrine for the first time on appeal. See In re Trusts of Strange ex rel. Whitney, 

324 Ill. App. 3d 37, 44 (2001) (not addressing an argument based on quantum meruit where 

“[n]othing in the record indicates that [the appellants] raised the issue of quantum meruit in the 

trial court”). Although we acknowledge that Smith represented herself below, there are no special 

rules regarding forfeiture for pro se litigants. Shakari v. Illinois Department of Financial and 

Professional Regulation, 2018 IL App (1st) 170285, ¶ 34. 
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¶ 33 Still, Smith highlights Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) and argues that, under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366 (Feb. 1, 1994), this court has the discretion to overlook her 

forfeiture because application of the doctrine would be unjust. However, in Hux, when our supreme 

court discussed various supreme court rules and the forfeiture doctrine, it also remarked: “There 

are limitations. ‘(A)n appellate court should not, and will not, consider different theories or new 

questions, if proof might have been offered to refute or overcome them had they been presented at 

the trial.’ ” Hux, 38 Ill. 2d at 225 (quoting Rentways, Inc. v. O’Neill Milk and Cream Co., 308 N.Y.

342 (1955)). The limitation discussed in Hex is exactly the situation in this case where we are 

being asked to consider a new theory of defense without that theory being presented to the circuit 

court for first review. We therefore cannot excuse Smith’s failure to raise the issue of quantum of 

meruit in the circuit court and consequently, we have no basis to disturb the circuit court’s finding 

in favor of Handler for $2327.97. 

¶ 34 With that being said, assuming arguendo that quantum meruit would have been the proper 

theory of recovery for Handler based on the facts of this case, the result of this case likely would 

not have changed. While the amended engagement agreement would have ceased to exist if Smith 

terminated Handler prior to the case’s resolution (see In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 40), 

even under the doctrine of quantum meruit, the reasonable value of an attorney’s services may be 

the full contract fee. In Rhoades, 78 Ill. 2d at 230, although our supreme court found the attorney 

was not entitled to the full contract fee, it observed that a discharged attorney could recover his 

full contract fee “in cases in which an attorney who has done much work is fired immediately 

before a settlement is reached” because “the factors involved in determining a reasonable fee 

would justify a finding that the entire contract fee is the reasonable value of services rendered.” 
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¶ 35 To this end, in Wegner v. Arnold, 305 Ill. App. 3d 689, 691 (1999), a decedent’s wife hired 

an attorney to represent her in filing a wrongful death and survival action against the driver of the 

vehicle that killed her husband for a 33 percent contingency fee. The litigation proceeded, and the 

attorney performed more than 50 hours on the case over an 18-month period. Id. at 695. However, 

the wife fired the attorney, and hired new attorneys in his stead. Id. at 691. Two days before she 

fired her attorney, the defendant’s attorney had recommended to the defendant’s insurer that it 

offer $100,000 to settle the case. Id. at 691-92. Two and a half months after the wife fired her 

initial attorney, the defendant’s attorney made a formal offer of $100,000 to the successor attorneys 

to settle the case, and the case settled. Id. at 692. In connection with the litigation over the attorney 

fees, the defendant’s attorney filed an affidavit averring that his offer to settle was based on “the 

pleadings, investigation, discovery, and depositions” that occurred while the initial attorney

represented the wife. Id. The initial attorney filed a petition for attorney fees based on his 

contingency-fee agreement, but the circuit court only allowed him to collect $7000 based on an 

hourly rate. Id. at 693.

¶ 36 On appeal, this court analyzed the case under quantum meruit principles and found that the 

initial attorney was entitled to nearly his full contract fee because his work of filing pleadings, 

investigating the case and performing discovery was what led to the settlement offer that the client 

ultimately accepted. Id. at 695. We reasoned that the initial attorney’s “efforts obtained the 

maximum gross benefit available to the client” and it would be patently unfair to deprive him of 

his nearly full contract fee where “the result obtained was entirely due to his efforts.” Id. Relying 

on the language of Rhoades, we observed that “the present case presents the precise type of 

situation contemplated” where “the reasonable value of services rendered would be the entire 

contract fee.” Id. at 694. In reaching this result, this court remanded the case to the circuit court to 
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award the initial attorney his full contract fee minus an amount that the successor attorneys 

deserved under quantum meruit principles for their limited work at the end of the case. Id. at 697. 

¶ 37 Given the precedent of Rhoades and Wegner, if the circuit court viewed this case under 

quantum meruit principles, it would have likely found that Handler was entitled to his full contract 

fee anyway because Smith discharged him just prior to signing the settlement agreement and the 

agreement itself was reached entirely due to his efforts. 

¶ 38 2. Excessive and Unreasonable Attorney Fees

¶ 39 Additionally, Smith contends that, when combining the $5150 payment from Smith, the 

judgment from this case and Smith’s payment to Handler from his first invoice, Handler’s overall 

fees in this case were excessive and unreasonable under Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of 

Professional Conduct (eff. Jan. 1, 2010).

¶ 40 Under Rule 1.5(a), “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” Id. Rule 1.5(a) then lists various factors 

to be considered in determining whether a fee is reasonable. Id. However, Smith never raised the 

issue of Handler’s fees being excessive in the circuit court. As just discussed, even though Smith 

represented herself below, “[i]t is well settled that issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited 

and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Rogers, 2016 IL 

App (2d) 150712, ¶ 72. Furthermore, Smith posits that Illinois courts have the power to regulate 

the collection of attorney fees and highlights In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507 (1989) and In re Holz, 

125 Ill. 2d 546 (1988). However, those cases are from our supreme court and relate to attorney fee 

issues in cases originating from the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary 

Commission filing complaints against attorneys. None of those cases involved appellate courts 
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reviewing the reasonableness of attorney fees for the first time on appeal. In re Gerard and In re 

Holz are therefore inapposite and consequently, Smith has forfeited this contention on appeal.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and 

deny Handler’s motion to dismiss. 

¶ 43 Affirmed; motion to dismiss denied.