RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2021-CA-0928-ME

KEN LAWON FLINTROY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE BRYAN D. GATEWOOD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-D-500694-002

KARINA DEJESUS GALLEGOSESPARZA APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Ken Lawon Flintroy (“Flintroy”) appeals from a domestic 

violence order (“DVO”) entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court. Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

On March 22, 2021, Karina DeJesus Gallegos-Esparza (“GallegosEsparza”) filed a domestic violence petition in Jefferson Circuit Court seeking an 
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emergency protective order (“EPO”) against Flintroy. The court denied the request 

for an EPO and issued a summons and set the matter for a hearing. Flintroy and 

Gallegos-Esparza both appeared pro se at the hearing and testified. In addition, 

Gallegos-Esparza adopted the statements in her petition as her testimony. 

According to the petition, on March 9, 2021, Flintroy was attempting 

to exchange the parties’ child following visitation when he realized GallegosEsparza was not at home. After leaving the child with her mother, Flintroy sat 

outside Gallegos-Esparza’s home to wait for her to arrive. He later called her, 

telling her that he had seen her return and had followed her friend home. Flintroy 

began to threaten Gallegos-Esparza saying that he knew where she lived and 

“watch and see.” The petition further alleged that Flintroy shows up at her house 

on non-visitation days demanding to know where she has been and is “extremely 

aggressive and physically intimidating with his body [and] hand gestures[.]” 

Gallegos-Esparza claimed she is afraid of him and that his behavior had recently 

“escalated in aggression.”

At the hearing, Gallegos-Esparza added that although Flintroy has not 

threatened to harm her directly yet, he has told her that he is not going to let her go, 

and that she is his, even though they have been separated for a year. Flintroy 

denied these allegations, stating that he had never threatened Gallegos-Esparza or 

been physical with her. Following the evidence, the trial court issued a six-month 
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DVO against Flintroy, restraining him from contacting Gallegos-Esparza. Flintroy 

then moved to alter, amend, or vacate the DVO, arguing he was denied a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard and the finding that domestic violence had 

occurred was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court denied the 

motion and this appeal followed. 

The standard of review for factual determinations in a DVO is 

whether the family court’s finding of domestic violence was clearly erroneous. 

Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. App. 2010) (citations omitted). 

“Findings are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence.” 

Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted). We review the entry of a DVO for abuse of 

discretion. McKinney v. McKinney, 257 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Ky. App. 2008). “The

test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, 

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. 

Flintroy first argues the trial court’s finding of domestic violence was 

not supported by substantial evidence and the entry of the DVO was an abuse of 

discretion. We disagree. Following a hearing, a court may issue a DVO if it “finds 

by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred 

and may again occur[.]” KRS1 403.740(1). “Domestic violence and abuse” means 

“[p]hysical injury, serious physical injury, stalking, sexual abuse, strangulation, 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical 

injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family members or members 

of an unmarried couple[.]” KRS 403.720(2)(a). “The preponderance of the 

evidence standard is satisfied when sufficient evidence establishes the alleged 

victim was more likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” 

Caudill, 318 S.W.3d at 114. 

Although unclear from the record, the trial court’s finding of domestic 

violence appears to be based either upon fear of imminent physical injury or 

stalking, as there was no evidence of actual physical injury. On its docket order, 

the trial court found “[Flintroy] is verbally aggressive with [Gallegos-Esparza]. He 

blows up her phone – [she] blocks him – he blows up her mother’s phone 

re[garding] visitation w[ith] child. She feels threatened by his yelling [and]

screaming [and] backing up to her[.]” However, we may affirm a lower court for 

any reason supported by the record. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 

814 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991). In a case with almost identical facts, a 

panel of this Court affirmed the entry of a DVO, finding there was substantial 

evidence appellant’s conduct caused appellee to fear imminent physical injury. 

In Hohman v. Dery, 371 S.W.3d 780 (Ky. App. 2012), Dery filed a 

DVO petition, alleging that Hohman, the father of her child, followed her current 

boyfriend as he left her house, drove up and down her boyfriend’s street, and
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contacted her several times a day via phone using derogatory language. The 

petition further alleged that Hohman became aggressive when discussing visitation 

with the child, causing her to fear for her safety. At a hearing, Dery testified that 

she felt threatened when they met to discuss the child because Hohman clenched 

his fists, gritted his teeth, and yelled at her. Dery described Hohman as “scary” 

and unable to control his emotions. She stated she was afraid his behavior would 

escalate “to the next level.”

Following the hearing, the trial court entered a one-year DVO. On 

appeal, this Court ruled the trial court’s finding of domestic violence was 

supported by substantial evidence, noting the court, as factfinder, was in the best 

position to judge the evidence: 

Despite [Hohman]’s assertions to the contrary, [Dery]

specifically testified she felt threatened when he clenched 

his fists and yelled at her through gritted teeth. [Dery]

explained that she believed [Hohman] was unable to 

control his emotions and that she feared his aggressive 

confrontations would escalate ‘to the next level.’ . . .

We reiterate that the family court is in the best 

position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and 

weigh the evidence presented. . . . Based on the record, 

we conclude the evidence presented was sufficient for the 

court to reasonably infer that [Hohman]’s conduct caused 

[Dery] to fear imminent physical injury; accordingly, the 

court’s finding of domestic violence was not clearly 

erroneous.

Id. at 782-83. 
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Similarly, here, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to 

reasonably infer that Flintroy’s conduct caused Gallegos-Esparza to fear imminent 

physical injury. The petition alleged that Flintroy is “extremely aggressive and 

physically intimidating with his body [and] hand gestures,” that Gallegos-Esparza 

is afraid of him, and that his behavior had recently “escalated in aggression.” 

Gallegos-Esparza sought the protective order so that Flintroy “doesn’t end up 

physically hurting [her].” 

Additionally, there was sufficient evidence of stalking to support a 

finding of domestic violence. 

[F]or an individual to be granted [a DVO] for stalking, he 

or she must at a minimum prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that, an individual intentionally engaged in 

two or more acts directed at the victim that seriously 

alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed the victim, 

that served no legitimate purpose, and would have caused 

a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress, 

and that these acts may occur again. Additionally, the 

individual must prove that there was an implicit or 

explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in 

reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or 

death.

Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Ky. App. 2017) (citations omitted) 

(giving grounds for IPO for stalking).2 “The addition of stalking as a basis for 

2 Because “stalking” is a recent addition to the definition of domestic violence and undefined in 

the related statutes, it is appropriate to borrow the definition of “stalking” contained in the 

similar interpersonal protection order statutes. See Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ky. 
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domestic violence expands on what conduct can constitute domestic violence.

Whereas before a victim would have to establish a fear of imminent physical injury

. . . [stalking only requires] the victim being placed in reasonable fear of physical 

injury.” Kiser v. Kiser, No. 2018-CA-000812-ME, 2019 WL 169204, at *5 (Ky. 

App. Jan. 11, 2019).

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Here, there was evidence that on March 9, 2021, Flintroy waited 

outside of Gallegos-Esparza’s home for her to return and then sat watching her 

home, calling her an hour later, saying that he knew where she lived and “watch 

and see.” This intimidating act served no legitimate purpose as he had already 

dropped the child off, and reasonably caused Gallegos-Esparza substantial mental 

distress, and to reasonably fear physical violence. Gallegos-Esparza claimed that 

“it terrifies me to know that he’s just sitting outside the street of my house 

watching[,]” and, as noted above, she filed the DVO petition so that he “doesn’t 

end up physically hurting [her].” Additionally, Flintroy shows up at her house on 

non-visitation days demanding to know where she is, repeatedly texts her about 

seeing their daughter, and is always making threats. 

App. 2017) (“It appears the purpose and intent behind, and the interpretation of, the DVO 

statutes are almost identical to that of the IPO statutes.”); KRS 456.010(8).

3 Kiser is an unpublished opinion which we cite not as authority but for its persuasive value 

under Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure 41(A).
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We note that “Kentucky courts have liberally construed our [domestic 

violence statutes] in order to afford relief.” Boone v. Boone, 501 S.W.3d 434, 440 

(Ky. App. 2016). “KRS 403.715(1) mandates that the domestic violence statutes 

be interpreted to ‘[a]llow victims to obtain effective, short-term protection against 

further wrongful conduct in order that their lives may be as secure and as 

uninterrupted as possible[.]’” Id. As such, we conclude the trial court’s finding of 

domestic violence, either due to stalking or fear of imminent physical injury, was 

not clearly erroneous.

Finally, Flintroy argues he was denied due process because he was not 

allowed to cross-examine Gallegos-Esparza. Following his testimony at the 

hearing, Flintroy attempted to ask Gallegos-Esparza a question. He began, “so, 

I’m asking you Karina, and you know, as much as I love both of y’all still, I 

just – ” and the trial court stopped him, saying, “Mr. Flintroy you do not get to ask 

her direct questions. I’m sorry, you do not get to do that regarding this. We are 

here today to determine if I am going to enter a domestic violence order or 

not . . . .” Flintroy argues the trial court cut off his opportunity to question 

Gallegos-Esparza and therefore he was not given a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard. We disagree. 

“Due process requires, at the minimum, that each party be given a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Lynch v. Lynch, 737 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Ky. 
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App. 1987) (citations omitted). “[A] party has a meaningful opportunity to be 

heard where the trial court allows each party to present evidence and give sworn 

testimony before making a decision.” Holt v. Holt, 458 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. 

App. 2015) (citation omitted). Here, both parties were allowed to present evidence 

and give sworn testimony before the trial court made its decision. They were given 

similar amounts of time and the court asked questions of each. 

While Flintroy claims he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine 

Gallegos-Esparza, in fact, he attempted to make an impassioned plea to GallegosEsparza and the trial court, within its discretion, disallowed such. Perry v. 

Commonwealth, 390 S.W.3d 122, 130-31 (Ky. 2012) (“The scope of crossexamination may be reasonably limited when courts are concerned with preventing 

harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or questioning that is cumulative or 

only marginally relevant.”). Flintroy has not alleged any specific question he was 

prevented from asking and he was given the same process as Gallegos-Esparza, 

who asked no questions of him. We find no error. 

ALL CONCUR. 
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Zack McKee

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Amy E. Oliver

Shelbyville, Kentucky