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67–118 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–222 

CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS: HOW READY IS 

FEMA FOR THE NEXT BIG DISASTER? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 17, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Associate Staff Director and Chief Council for Homeland 

Security Preparedness and Response 

JASON T. BARNOSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ELYSE F. GREENWALD, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy 

CHRISTOPHER J. KEACH, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 5 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 22 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 25 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 39 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 42 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 45 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ....................................................... 6 

Hon. Richard L. Skinner, Former Inspector General of the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 10 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 15 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Fugate, Hon. W. Craig: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Jenkins, William O. Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89 

Skinner, Hon. Richard L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

APPENDIX 

Chart titled ‘‘Scorecare for Selected FEMA Preparedness Areas,’’ submitted 

by Senator Lieberman ......................................................................................... 41 

Letter to President Obama, dated March 17, 2011, submitted by Senator 

Landrieu ................................................................................................................ 47 

Report titled ‘‘FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster— 

An Update,’’ Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 

September 2010 .................................................................................................... 103 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Fugate ........................................................................................................ 185 

(1) 

CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS: HOW READY 

IS FEMA FOR THE NEXT BIG DISASTER? 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Landrieu, Collins, and 

Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I thank 

everyone for their patience. As you know, we had two votes on the 

floor, so we delayed the start of the hearing. I welcome everyone. 

We convened this hearing, which had been long planned, long 

scheduled on the ability of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) to respond to a major catastrophe against the compelling backdrop of the tragically catastrophic events unfolding in 

Japan, an earthquake and tsunami in rapid succession that have 

already resulted in twice as many deaths as al-Qaeda’s attack on 

America on September 11, 2001. And, of course, no one believes 

that the deaths and the finding of the dead is over yet. 

The earthquake and tsunami have also caused fires and explosions at nuclear power plants that could have nightmarish consequences for Japan and perhaps other countries as well. Japan 

has been considered the gold standard of earthquake preparedness 

because they have had repeated experience with earthquakes, but 

this earthquake registered 9.0 on the Richter scale. 

When I say that, I remember that the great San Francisco earthquake of 1906 was apparently 7.6 on the Richter scale, so you can 

imagine the consequences here. The waves of disaster set off by 

this earthquake in Japan have exceeded the country’s extraordinary preparations. So the events of the past week in Japan lend 

a sense of urgency to our hearing today as we ask: How well prepared is America for a catastrophe, perhaps one equal to that occurring now in Japan? 

Our Committee called its 2006 report about FEMA’s response to 

Hurricane Katrina, ‘‘A Nation Still Unprepared,’’ and we were then 

unprepared. And that lack of preparedness shook the confidence of 

the American people who naturally asked why their government 

2 

1The report referenced by Senator Lieberman can be found in the Appendix on page 103. 

could not help some of their fellow citizens when they needed it the 

most. 

This Committee’s extensive investigation into the failure of all 

levels of government to prepare for and respond effectively to Hurricane Katrina found a long and troubling list of problems, not 

least of which was that FEMA, in our opinion, was not and never 

had been capable of responding to a catastrophe like Hurricane 

Katrina. And I learned that when it comes to emergency preparedness and response, two words that I thought meant the same do 

not: Disaster and catastrophe. 

Preparedness for most disasters, which FEMA was and certainly 

is capable of, is different from preparedness for catastrophes like 

Hurricane Katrina. After our investigation, the Committee drafted 

and Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Our aim was to rebuild FEMA into a stronger, 

more capable agency. Five years later, I am convinced that FEMA 

has, in fact, become stronger and more capable. 

But is it strong enough to respond adequately if a catastrophe 

like the one currently in Japan struck the United States? I think 

that is the question we want to ask our witnesses today. 

Last September, then-Inspector General (IG) of the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), Richard Skinner, released a report on 

FEMA’s transformation since Hurricane Katrina. Mr. Skinner has 

since retired from public service after a long and distinguished career, but he is fortunately back with us to testify today. His report 

concluded last September that FEMA has made some form of 

progress in almost all areas where reform was needed, but that 

FEMA’s management, to speak broadly, still needed improvement.1

While today’s hearing is focused on FEMA, I think it is important to say that response to and recovery from a disaster or a catastrophe in the United States is the responsibility of a lot of other 

agencies and other people besides FEMA. Other Federal agencies, 

State and local government, the private sector, and, in fact, in 

some sense, every affected American have roles to play. And many 

of them also need to improve their capabilities. 

On a positive note, just recently, the Departments of Defense and 

Homeland Security, and the congressionally-mandated Council of 

Governors recently signed off on a very important plan establishing 

clear rules for when both National Guard and military forces can 

jointly respond after a disaster. This means that in a large disaster 

or catastrophe we will have the ability to call on the resources of 

the Department of Defense in a more timely and effective manner. 

Five years after Hurricane Katrina, again I conclude, we are better prepared for a catastrophe than we have ever been. But the 

epic disaster in Japan reminds us that FEMA must continue to improve as both old and new threats loom, some from nature like the 

earthquake and tsunami, others from human enemies like the one 

we faced on September 11, 2001. I know Administrator Fugate and 

the dedicated public servants with whom he works at FEMA will 

continue to chart a successful path forward. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

3 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The earthquake 

and tsunami that struck Japan last week destroyed entire communities, killed thousands of people, and caused the release of radiation at nuclear power plants. Our thoughts are with the Japanese 

people and with the rescuers and responders, including units from 

our own country. This horrific natural disaster reminds us that we 

need to do our best to prepare for the unpredictable, and that is 

the focus of today’s hearing. 

In the past year, we have witnessed three disasters involving the 

development and use of emergency resources. The proper word 

probably is catastrophes, as the Chairman has said. First, the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig last spring led to economic and environmental damages that have yet to be completely 

tallied. A West Virginia coal mine explosion killed 29 people in August and was the worst in decades. And now there is uncertainty 

and fear in Japan about the amounts of radiation emitted from nuclear power plants in the area hit by the tsunami. 

In addition to the humanitarian crisis, the aftermath of the 

earthquake has raised concerns about the safety of nuclear power 

at a time when it is being revisited as an alternative to fossil fuels 

and as a means of lowering greenhouse gas emissions. Regardless 

of whether a disaster strikes our energy supply or another sector 

of our economy or part of our Nation, we need to be prepared. 

We do not know when the next disaster will hit. We do know 

that the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that within the next 30 

years, the probability is 94 percent chance that an earthquake of 

7.0 magnitude, or greater, will occur in California. We know that 

inevitably there will be hurricanes, floods, and tornados, and we 

recognize that a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction in a large city would certainly strain our capabilities. 

Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how wellequipped the United States is for any catastrophic disaster regardless of the cause. What is the level of our preparedness to protect 

important energy sources? What are we learning from the nuclear 

accidents in Japan and the Gulf Coast oil spill in the past year? 

How well are we prepared for a major earthquake in this country? 

Do we have the communication and medical systems necessary to 

respond to the explosion of a dirty bomb? 

More than 4 years ago, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act which the Chairman and I authored. That bill was designed to take the hard-learned lessons of 

Hurricane Katrina and bring about improvements in our Nation’s 

overall emergency preparedness and response systems. 

Our law has indeed improved FEMA’s disaster response capabilities. From major floods to wildfires, we have witnessed improvements throughout the country. In Maine, I saw firsthand this 

progress in FEMA’s responses to the Patriot’s Day storm of 2007, 

the spring 2008 floods in Aroostook County, and other disasters 

since then. 

FEMA certainly has become a more effective, better led agency 

during the past 4 years. But nevertheless, questions remain about 

our ability to handle a mega-disaster. I also have serious concerns 

about FEMA’s stewardship of Federal funds. One of those hardVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

1The chart referenced by Senator Collins appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

learned lessons from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was that 

FEMA’s assistance programs were highly vulnerable to fraud and 

improper payments. 

Our Committee, with the assistance of the IG and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), documented more than a billion 

dollars in misspent funds. In some cases, these taxpayer dollars 

were literally gambled away. Funds were also spent on liquor, bail 

bonds, and diamond engagement rings. FEMA also paid millions of 

dollars for housing assistance to hundreds of applicants who apparently resided in State and Federal prisons. 

While victims certainly should receive prompt, appropriate relief, 

FEMA needs to strike that careful balance between expediting relief and ensuring that criminals do not defraud the system, and 

that means having strong internal controls. 

Unfortunately, safeguarding taxpayer dollars remains an area in 

which FEMA has yet to achieve success. A December 2010 report 

by the Inspector General revealed that FEMA had stopped attempting to recover improper disaster assistance payments made 

after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and subsequent disasters. 

The IG identified approximately 160,000 applicants that had received improper disaster assistance payments totaling more than 

$643 million. Even more disturbing, FEMA’s efforts to recoup these 

improper payments ended in 2007 after a court found that its recovery procedures were inadequate. More than 3 years later, a new 

process for recovering these payments has only been initiated this 

week. 

I do want to point out some bright spots in the September 2010 

DHS Inspector General’s report. In particular, the IG found that 

FEMA had made substantial progress, and we see it on the chart,1

in improving emergency communications. Ensuring that first responders can communicate during a disaster is vital. Indeed, when 

communications failed after September 11, 2001, and during Hurricane Katrina, it cost lives. 

The IG also highlights the effectiveness of the regional emergency communications working groups in each of the 10 FEMA regions. Since I pushed very hard for this reform, I am very pleased 

to see the progress that has been made. This October will mark the 

5th anniversary of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. By that time, I hope that FEMA will have made significant progress in improving our Nation’s preparedness for the next 

catastrophe. 

Finally I want to join the Chairman in thanking former Inspector 

General Skinner for his extraordinary service, not just to the department, but throughout his career to our country. He has certainly been a valuable asset as our Committee conducted its investigations and oversights of the department, and I am grateful for 

his aggressive approach to combating waste, fraud, and abuse, and 

helping to improve the management of programs at DHS. So, Mr. 

Skinner, thank you for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

5 

1The letter to President Obama referenced by Senator Landrieu appears in the Appendix on 

page 47. 

Senator Landrieu, you have been so involved in these matters regarding FEMA, obviously, ever since Hurricane Katrina, would you 

like to make an opening statement? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Collins. I really appreciate it because I have to get back 

to the floor. I am managing a bill on the floor and unable to stay 

for the remainder of the hearing, so I really appreciate it and I will 

try to be very brief, but there are a few important things that I 

would like to share. 

First of all, I think the calling of this hearing is very important 

and I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member. Their attention 

after the Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike disasters, and 

many other disasters, has been important to all of us as we have 

tried to recover along the Gulf Coast and in other States and communities. Your efforts have really strengthened FEMA’s response 

capabilities. 

But I do want to point to a couple of things that I am concerned 

about. Looking at the situation, Mr. Chairman, in Japan reminds 

us again that disasters of large magnitudes, catastrophic disasters, 

can and will occur. What concerns me is right now in this Congress, there are efforts to significantly reduce funding for the Department of Homeland Security to cover an existing shortfall in 

FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). 

It does not make any sense to me that the House of Representatives would cut funding from these important programs, $1.5 billion in additional funding is needed just to meet the cost of eligible 

projects for this year, and the House has proposed that we pay for 

these projects from past disasters by using money that we are supposed to be using to prepare for future disasters. 

I have sent a letter to the President.1 I thank the Chairman for 

signing this letter and would ask the other Members of this Committee to review it, if you could, because we are going to find ourselves back in the same position we were before Hurricane Katrina 

struck, which is under-funding our preparedness for future disasters and not being ready when it happens. 

In addition, the House Continuing Resolution (CR) is cutting $68 

million for FEMA Management and Administration including information technology (IT). To Senator Collins’ point, this is exactly the 

money that is necessary for FEMA to keep up their computer software and reporting mechanisms to cut down on fraud and abuse. 

So on one hand, we are asking them to come down hard on fraud 

and abuse; on the other hand, we are taking away their money that 

enables them to do that. That is not right, and it is not fair. 

In addition, it is projected that the FEMA Disaster Relief Fund 

is going to run out of money 3 months before the fiscal year ends. 

This happened last year, and, Mr. Chairman, if we do not weigh 

in with the Administration and with our colleagues on both sides 

of the aisle, it is going to happen again. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fugate appears in the Appendix on page 49. 

The only final thing I will say—and I am looking forward to 

reading the details of the report—is that there is some encouraging 

news and mostly because you and Senator Collins have done such 

a good job of staying on point. I am proud that as a Subcommittee 

chairman, I held literally dozens of hearings in 4 years on this 

exact subject, and hopefully, some of the hearings that we held contributed to some of the improvements we will hear about today. 

But on the issue of fraud and abuse—and I know that Senator 

Collins is very concerned about this and I am, too. But on behalf 

of many people on the Gulf Coast, I have to state for the record 

that some people are being accused of fraud because they could not 

provide the title to their home or insurance documents. 

In floods and in earthquakes, documents are lost. Some people 

are being accused of fraud because they could not provide free and 

clear title to their home. It has been in generations for years. They 

simply do not have a clear title after several generations. 

There are some accused of receiving duplicate payments just because there is a mixup or omission of names like junior instead of 

senior or senior instead of junior or boulevard, drive, or highway 

as opposed to what it is supposed to be, or other data entry errors. 

So I know that fraud is a serious issue. I join Senator Jeff Sessions and others in clamping down, raising the fines, increasing the 

penalties for people that would try to game the system. It is particularly horrible, I think, for people to try to game a system in the 

middle of a disaster. I mean, really, their penalties should significantly be higher in that regard and they are. But we have to be 

careful calling some of these mis-classifications fraud when they 

really are not in my definition of fraud. 

And finally, when we go to collect this money back, particularly, 

Senator Collins, I just want to say that I hope that the money we 

put into collecting these funds back are cost-effective, because some 

of these payments were $1,000 or $2,000 and there are hundreds 

of thousands of people that we may have to track down. I know letters went out this week for 5,500. But let us just be careful that 

when we seek to get the money back, it is a good expenditure of 

taxpayer dollars and not just throwing good money after bad. 

I am going to submit the rest to the record. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Landrieu, both for coming off the floor while you are managing the Small Business bill, 

but also for your leadership of the Subcommittee, and we will continue to try to carry forward with your assistance. Thank you. 

Let us go to the witnesses. Again, I thank you for being here, all 

three of you, and we will begin with the Hon. Craig Fugate, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency at the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security. Good afternoon. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE,1 ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, and Senator Landrieu. I am going to try to go through my oral 

7 

statement here and give more time for questions because I think 

this is really a better setting for the questions that you have in response, but I just want to give a summary. 

We have been looking at this since I have been at FEMA, from 

the standpoint of planning and what do we do in a catastrophic disaster response. As you pointed out, we respond to a lot of disasters. 

We implement the Stafford Act to provide assistance, but that is 

not the same thing as when it is a response that requires a coordinated Federal agency where we actually have a lot of different resources that have to go very quickly to an area where we may not 

have a lot of information. 

And so looking at the backdrop of what has happened in Japan, 

and again, I cannot even imagine what my counterparts are doing, 

how they are standing up to this because, again, this is what we 

are in the business for. It is the most challenging thing you can 

deal with. So not only the losses, but our counterparts, knowing 

what they are going through now and the challenges they are facing, and trying to step back from that and go, ‘‘What if it happened 

here and what would we do?’’ And so, the thrust of my comments 

will be from that approach. 

As you know, the lead for our international response is the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID). We are in a support role. Two of the teams that have gone to Japan to assist in 

search and rescue are the Urban Search and Rescue Teams that, 

again, are authorized as part of FEMA. There are 28 teams, two 

of which are dual supported by both us and USAID, that are designated for the international response. These are the teams that 

have been to Haiti, Christchurch, and now are in Japan. 

We also stand by to assist the USAID, but Japan is a very industrialized country with many resources, so many of the things that 

we could offer have not been needed, although we stay in support 

of that. But the events there remind us that disasters, as you point 

out, do not always give us warning, do not always follow a season, 

and often do not happen where we have expected to have the worst 

impacts. 

So for that reason, a term we use at FEMA is, we cannot plan 

for easy. We have to plan for real. We cannot look at what we are 

merely capable of. We have to look at what the impacts could be 

to our communities and then determine how we meet those needs 

and change those outcomes. 

We put a lot of emphasis on the first 72 hours. We think this is 

a key area. We saw this in Hurricane Katrina. We have seen it in 

other disasters. If aid is not reaching the people that need it, if we 

are not safe and secure, if we are not able to do the search and 

rescue, if we cannot get the commodities there quickly enough, it 

becomes extremely difficult to change the outcome for those survivors. 

And so, from this you actually changed some of the provisions of 

the Stafford Act when you amended the Homeland Security Act 

with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act that 

very clearly stated it was the intent of Congress that we would not 

merely operate in a pool system waiting for a request for help or 

waiting for the situation to develop; that FEMA and the Federal 

family could begin mobilizing and moving resources when we deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

mine that something has happened or think it is about to happen, 

even prior to a formal request from a governor. 

We have used that provision numerous times since I have been 

at FEMA from the American Samoa tsunami to the flooding in 

Tennessee to, most recently, the tsunami warnings that were 

issued for Hawaii and the West Coast, in moving and pre-positioning supplies as you have directed us to do in these situations. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Just talk a little bit more about that because I think it will be interesting to people who are listening or 

watching on TV. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, previously, and this is one of the findings and 

concerns you raised during Hurricane Katrina, it was not always 

clear if FEMA could begin moving resources, particularly in 

tasking our Federal family in moving supplies such as food, generators, cots, and blankets, prior to a request from a governor. 

And in looking at that, you clarified that under the Stafford Act, 

at the direction of the President, FEMA could activate and use the 

DRF to begin sending missions to our various Federal agencies as 

well as deploying resources. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Before anything happened. 

Mr. FUGATE. Before anything happened. So when the tsunami 

warning centers in Hawaii and in Alaska began issuing tsunami 

warnings—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Last weekend. 

Mr. FUGATE. Last weekend, last Friday. Actually, I got my call 

about two o’clock in the morning. And this event occurred a little 

after midnight our time. Our Region 9 office, which covers the Pacific, was already stood up. We made a decision that we would 

stand up fully FEMA’s support to the West Coast and to the islands and territories. We began moving supplies out of our logistics 

centers, which you have also authorized and provided additional 

funding so we have more supplies on hand. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you got the logistics centers disbursed 

around the country? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. They are strategically located around the 

country so that we are closer to the areas that we need assistance. 

We have a facility at Moffett Field in California, and we began the 

process of getting supplies loaded up. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. What kinds of supplies? 

Mr. FUGATE. In this case, we thought the primary event would 

be destruction along the coast, people being displaced, people possibly being in shelters. And so we have a distribution center in 

Guam, a distribution center in Hawaii, and then the distribution 

center we activated on the West Coast to begin moving shelf-stable 

food. 

But also one of the things that came out of the Commission on 

Children and Disasters, we know if we just send the shelf-stable 

meals but we do not send infant formula or baby food, that it is 

not addressing the need of children. So we have actually built that 

into our capability now and began moving supplies closer to the 

California coast where historically they have mapped their greatest 

risk from tsunamis, just like we do for hurricanes and map the 

coastal areas. 

9 

Along the West Coast, they have actually mapped those areas at 

greatest risk for tsunamis, so we know where the population areas 

would be and what relative risk we could have. What we did not 

know was how big the wave would be. But given the magnitude of 

the earthquake, the size of it was one that suggested that you 

could see as much as a two-meter, or almost six-foot tsunami. 

And again, this is not like a wave breaking on a beach. As you 

saw the videos in Japan, you get that idea of a six-foot wall of 

water that is literally rushing in and flowing in and not going out 

and how devastating that could be. We also had our folks in Hawaii that went into the Governor’s emergency operations center in 

Hawaii, as he was activating and evacuating his coast, and had our 

supplies ready to go there. 

So this process really comes back to, in the critical moments 

when we think that there may be an event—we had this triggering 

event. We knew a major earthquake had occurred, so we knew the 

tsunami risk was there. We had the forecast, but we did not know 

what the impact was going to be. We began moving these supplies 

based upon what we projected, what we call our maximum of maximum—what is the worst case impact we would see along our 

coast—and began moving for that. 

Again, it is a process that says that we have to understand and 

be in close contact with our warning centers, we have to be in close 

contact with our State partners, we have to be communicating 

across the Federal family, and we are doing this as a team. This 

just is not FEMA doing stuff. We are talking to Admiral James 

Winnefeld at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in case we 

are going to need more resources there. We are talking to our State 

counterparts, anything they are concerned about, anything they 

need to adjust. 

And so, this process really comes back to, I think, the heart of 

what you tried to get to in the Post-Katrina Reform Act, is FEMA 

had to be more agile, be able to build a better team, recognizing 

there is a lot more capacity and capabilities out there than just 

what we bring, but we have to move much faster in these events. 

But as Senator Collins points out, we also have to declare, when 

are we stable and when do we need to engage the safeties to make 

sure we are not just spending money or doing things that are no 

longer necessary. So we define outcomes that we want to achieve 

in this initial response such as life safety and life sustaining activities. 

I think this goes back to one of the heart of the issues. When we 

cannot do that, we oftentimes defaulted back to the monetary assistance programs because we could not get enough supplies in to 

meet the basic needs, and found ourselves with not many options. 

So part of this is really working in partnership with also the private sector because this is the other thing we never really did. We 

always came up with what I call a government-centered response 

to disasters and we never realized that before that disaster happened, in every community, there were grocery stores, hardware 

stores, gas stations, pharmacies, and we would oftentimes plan our 

response irregardless of what they were doing. 

We now have representatives of the private sector actually part 

of the FEMA team in our Response Center here in Washington 

10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

helping us coordinate with them so that we do not compete with 

the private sector. We go where they are not, where they have the 

difficulties or they have destruction so that we can focus our response on those areas of heaviest devastation, but also in those 

unique populations, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and I know 

that Senator Collins has talked about this before. 

We talk about this as it is one of our responsibilities, but I want 

to make sure people understand why we tell people to be prepared. 

There are going to be heavily-impacted areas that should not have 

to compete with those of us who could have been prepared and 

should have been ready. They should not get in line behind us. 

Those people that do not have the resources, that do not have the 

ability to do these things should not get in line behind us because 

we did not get ready. This is a shared responsibility. 

In these types of catastrophic disasters, government needs to 

focus on the safety and security, the search and rescue, and the 

most vulnerable populations, working with the rest of the team including our volunteer organizations and our businesses. But it is 

important that the public recognizes the ability that they can prepare so that those first critical days, they are not competing with 

the most vulnerable, heaviest-impacted populations, is key to our 

success. 

And so, as we talk about, are we prepared for a catastrophic disaster, we have made, I think, significant improvements with the 

tools we have. We have much work to be done. And as the IG has 

pointed out, there are many of what we would look at inside the 

procedural controls and processes that still need strengthening to 

ensure that not only can we be rapid and fast, like I say, we want 

to be fast, we want speed. We do not want haste where we have 

waste and abuse to the system. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Administrator Fugate. That is a 

very good beginning. We look forward to the question and answer 

period. 

Richard Skinner, thanks so much for returning to Capitol Hill 

once more. It is your report of last September of FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, An Update, that led us to 

plan this hearing a long time ago. It comes, obviously, in the immediate context of the tragedy in Japan, so it is just inevitable that 

we will be looking at the report based on what is happening there 

now. But it is a great piece of work, typical of the high standards 

that you reached throughout your career in public service, and we 

welcome your testimony on the report now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD L. SKINNER,1 FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. SKINNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Collins. It is a pleasure to be here again this afternoon. I do not 

really feel like I have retired yet, as I have been spending a considerable amount of time actually preparing for this hearing. But it 

is my pleasure and honor to be here. I cannot agree with you more. 

The tragic events that are unfolding today in Japan are a stark reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

minder of how important catastrophic preparedness is. It can and 

will happen here. It is just a matter of when. 

If you asked me if we, as a Nation, are better prepared than we 

were 20 years ago, 10 years ago, or even 5 years ago, the answer 

to that is yes, of course we are. We have made tremendous strides, 

particularly, Senator Collins, like you pointed out, over the last 4 

years since Hurricane Katrina. But if you ask, are we as prepared 

as we can be or should be, then the answer to that is no, we are 

not. 

While FEMA has made notable progress to improve its preparedness capabilities over the years, it is doing so, at least in my opinion, at a snail’s pace. After 32 years in existence and with the 

many lessons learned from past disasters such as Hurricane Hugo 

back in the late 1980s, and Hurricane Andrew in the early 1990s, 

and, of course, Hurricane Katrina and the Northridge earthquake, 

and the September 11, 2001, attacks, we as a Nation should be 

much better prepared than we are today. 

There does not appear to be, in my opinion, a sense of urgency 

within FEMA to turn words and plans into action. FEMA is an 

agency that always seems, in my opinion, to be an agency that is 

always in a constant state of flux, at least during the 20 years that 

I have been working with them. 

Many of the concerns that the Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG), GAO, and FEMA itself identified after Hurricane Andrew in 

1992, nearly 20 years ago, are the same concerns that the OIG 

identified in its September 2010 update of FEMA’s catastrophic 

disaster preparedness capabilities. 

Over the years, FEMA has created multiple task forces, working 

groups, panels, and councils to develop remedial action plans to address these issues. They produced libraries full of lessons learned, 

draft plans, draft guidelines, and draft documents, many of which 

were shelved or took a back seat to the urgency of its mission demands; that is, to respond to the latest disaster. Consequently, momentum towards finalization and the implementation of key initiatives is either slowed or lost altogether. 

The four issues that I will talk about today that concern me the 

most are one, the failure of FEMA to build a strong management 

support infrastructure to sustain its disaster operations. This includes information technology development and integration, financial management, acquisition management, grants management, 

and human resource management. 

These functions are absolutely critical to the success of FEMA’s 

programs and operations. Yet, whenever there is a major disaster 

or whenever FEMA is required to reduce its budget, these are the 

first activities to be cut, as evidenced by the President’s 2012 budget to Congress and the many budget cuts imposed by Congress 

itself over the years. 

This is short-sighted and in the long term will increase the costs 

of disaster operations and disaster programs. It will also increase 

FEMA’s vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse, and will adversely affect the quality of services to individuals and communities affected by disasters. 

In January of this year, the DHS OIG reported—incidentally, I 

was still the IG at that time—that FEMA’s existing IT systems 

12 

were not integrated, do not meet user needs and are cumbersome 

to operate, and do not provide the IT capabilities needed by users 

to carry out disaster response and recovery operations, in a timely, 

efficient, and effective manner. 

Furthermore, FEMA does not even have a complete documented 

inventory of its system to support disasters, nor does it have a comprehensive IT strategic plan with clearly defined goals for its components. Program and field offices, we found, are continuing to develop IT systems independently of the office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and have been slow to adopt FEMA’s standard 

IT development approach. 

Without modern integrated systems, FEMA is hard-pressed to 

perform at its best, as evidenced by the fraud, waste, and abuse 

that has plagued the agency since its inception. It cannot prepare 

timely and reliable financial reports from which to make informed 

financial management decisions. 

It cannot readily share critical information within its own ranks, 

or with its Federal partners at the Federal, State, and local levels. 

It cannot track its disaster work force, the status of its mission assignments, or work being performed by its contractors and grantees, at least not with any reasonable degree of reliability. 

Until these issues are addressed, FEMA’s programs and taxpayer 

dollars will continue to be vulnerable to fraud, wasteful spending, 

and poor performance, similar to the wasteful spending for 

unneeded travel trailers after Hurricane Katrina or the millions 

paid to ineligible disaster assistance applicants, or the millions 

paid to unscrupulous contractors. 

Granted, FEMA recognizes and is attempting to remedy many of 

these problems and weaknesses, and has actually made some headway, as you can see and have heard from the Administrator today. 

However, does FEMA have the resolve and wherewithal to sustain 

those efforts? 

The ability of FEMA to do so is fragile, not only because of the 

early stage of development that these initiatives are in, but also because of the Nation’s economic environment and the constant disruptions caused by the inordinate number of disasters that FEMA 

must service each year. 

Unless there is a sustained commitment and continuing investment of resources, there is a good chance, if history is to serve as 

an indicator, that we will be talking about these same problems 5 

or 10 years from now. 

The second issue that concerns me is the lack of performance 

standards and metrics to measure the level of disaster preparedness at all levels of government, Federal, State, and local. In July 

1993, 18 years ago, GAO reported that FEMA had neither established performance standards nor developed a program for evaluating Federal, State, and local preparedness for catastrophic disaster response. 

Until that is accomplished, according to GAO, FEMA will not be 

able to judge the Nation’s readiness, nor will it be able to hold 

itself or its State and local partners accountable. In 1998, 13 years 

ago, FEMA claimed to be in the process of developing a methodology for assessing hazard risk and disaster response capabilities. 

Yet, to this day, FEMA has not finalized its methodology, nor has 

13 

it finalized the systems and performance metrics and processes 

necessary to track and measure emergency management capabilities and performance. 

State and local governments have received billions of dollars over 

the past 8 years and are estimated to receive billions more over the 

years to come. However, without a bona fide performance measurement system, it is impossible to determine whether these annual 

investments are actually improving our Nation’s disaster preparedness posture. 

Furthermore, without clear, meaningful performance standards, 

FEMA lacks the tools necessary to make informed funding decisions. In today’s economic climate, it is critical that FEMA concentrate its limited resources on those hazards that pose the greatest risk to the country. 

The third issue that concerns me is the lack of transparency and 

accountability in the use of disaster relief funds and to prevent 

fraud, waste, and abuse of those funds. Literally hundreds and 

hundreds of OIG audits and investigations over the years have 

demonstrated that FEMA programs are extremely vulnerable to 

fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Yet, FEMA still has not developed a robust program to curtail 

fraud, waste, and abuse within its programs. The extent of the 

fraud and abuse that the OIG uncovers every year, year after year 

for the past 20 years, at least since I have been associated with 

FEMA, is unacceptable and it needs to be addressed and it needs 

to be addressed aggressively. 

Unfortunately, there is a long-standing mindset within the 

FEMA rank and file that fraud prevention is the exclusive responsibility of the OIG. Many believe that FEMA’s responsibility is simply to dole out funds to individuals and communities affected by a 

disaster, and it is the OIG’s responsibility to catch those who have 

received those funds through fraudulent means. 

This flawed mindset is costing the American taxpayer millions of 

dollars each and every year. Fraud prevention is a shared responsibility. In 2007, in response to an OIG proposal, FEMA created a 

Fraud Prevention Unit to address the complaints of widespread 

fraudulent activity after four disasters struck Florida in 2004. 

Since then, the unit has been renamed and placed in FEMA’s Office of the Chief Security Officer. Although the concept behind the 

fraud unit is sound, it is under-staffed, under-funded, and lacks the 

latest in fraud prevention technology to be effective. Furthermore, 

organizationally, it is buried in the bowels of the agency with very 

little, if any, visibility within the rank and file. 

Consequently, its utility has not been fully utilized. FEMA needs 

to increase the visibility of the fraud unit, expand its scope of responsibility to include all disaster relief programs nationwide, and 

mandate fraud prevention training for all of its employees. This 

should help strike a balance between providing assistance and ensuring fiscal responsibility. 

A good model that FEMA may want to emulate is the one developed by the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board, 

which was created by Congress in 2009 to promote transparency 

and accountability and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse for nearly $800 billion in economic stimulus recovery programs. Within 9 

14 

months of its creation, the board developed and put into place government-wide systems to provide transparency and accountability 

and to identify and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. 

As a result of that initiative, fraud, waste, and abuse of economic 

stimulus funds have been kept to an absolute minimum. There is 

no reason why a small agency such as FEMA cannot do the same. 

We as taxpayers deserve to know that our tax dollars are not being 

wasted or spent on fraudulent activities. To that end, I believe that 

FEMA should review and incorporate many of the precedent-setting measures used by the Recovery Board in order to ensure proper stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

Finally, I am concerned about the diminished emphasis being 

placed on community outreach and awareness to improve hazard 

mitigation strategies and projects and outcomes. Mitigation is considered the cornerstone of emergency management. It attempts to 

prevent hazards from developing into disasters or to reduce the effects of disasters when they do occur. 

In the late 1990s, FEMA launched an aggressive community outreach and awareness campaign to educate the public about the importance of mitigation and to create a network of mitigation partners, both in the public and private sectors, to collaborate on the 

development and implementation of risk-based, all hazards mitigation strategies and projects. 

In fact, this campaign was the impetus for the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. Unfortunately, this initiative lost its momentum 

due to the change in administrations and the tragic events of September 11, 2001. America’s attention turned to fighting and preventing terrorism and mitigation faded into the background as an 

emergency management priority. As a result, FEMA is now struggling to coordinate the mitigation efforts of its stakeholders and develop a national hazard mitigation strategy. 

To lessen the impact of a catastrophic disaster, mitigation needs 

to be elevated again as a top emergency management priority. And 

FEMA needs to relaunch its campaign to educate the public and its 

mitigation partners about the importance of developing and implementing mitigation strategies and programs. 

In conclusion, notwithstanding the many initiatives underway, 

many of them very good, I remain concerned about FEMA’s capability and resolve to sustain an effective and efficient catastrophic 

disaster preparedness strategy and program. 

FEMA’s increased involvement in routine disasters, coupled with 

the recent economic downturn and the impact that it is having on 

government budgets at all levels, could easily derail the many initiatives currently underway, which is unfortunate. In this day and 

age, it is more important than ever that FEMA be prepared to assist State and local governments. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, that concludes my 

statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Skinner. That was direct, as 

we expect from you. Maybe I would call it the tough love that we 

expect from a great inspector general. When we get to the questions, I will ask Mr. Fugate if he wants to respond. 

15 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears in the Appendix on page 89. 

Our final witness is William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, known and loved as GAO. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR.,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JENKINS. Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss 

FEMA’s efforts to measure and assess national capabilities to respond to a catastrophic disaster. So some of my comments will echo 

those of Mr. Skinner. 

The horrifying and heart-wrenching photos and videos from 

Japan vividly illustrate one of the key characteristics of a catastrophic disaster. The response capabilities of the affected areas are 

almost immediately overwhelmed, and substantial outside assistance is quickly needed. Effective response requires the resources 

and coordinated action of a wide array of government and non-governmental entities. The Hurricane Katrina response drew on resources from almost every State in the lower 48. 

Basically preparing for disasters requires identifying what needs 

to be done, by whom, and how well it should be done. More specifically, this includes identifying: One, the nature of the risks faced 

in specific geographic areas; two, the types and scale of the potential disaster consequences arising from these risks; three, the desired outcomes in addressing these consequences; four, the capabilities needed to achieve the desired outcomes; five, who should fund, 

develop, and maintain specific needed capabilities; and six, metrics 

for assessing the extent to which needed capabilities are available 

for deployment. 

Detailed operational plans are the blueprint for who should do 

what and how the activities of the many players will be managed 

and coordinated. Training to perform assigned roles and capabilities should be coupled with exercises to test and assess the operational plan and identify areas of strength and gaps that need to 

be addressed. 

The Federal Government has provided more than $34 billion to 

States, localities, and some non-governmental organizations to enhance their capabilities to protect, prevent, respond, and recover 

from major disasters. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act gave FEMA responsibility for leading the Nation in developing a national preparedness system, developing measures of 

desire capabilities, and assessing those capabilities and the resources needed to achieve them. 

This is a complex and daunting task. As Mr. Fugate notes in 

many public presentations, it is a task that FEMA may lead, but 

whose success requires the effective partnership of numerous government and non-governmental entities, as well as the American 

public. 

In September 2010, the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Task 

Force on Preparedness reported there was no agreed-upon method 

of assessing disaster preparedness or the extent to which Federal 

16 

grants have enhanced disaster capabilities and preparedness. They 

suggested a 3-year time line with associated annual tasks for developing capability metrics. 

FEMA has initiated a number of efforts over the years to develop 

a method of defining and measuring preparedness. FEMA has 

characterized most of the assessment methodologies it has developed as guidance or tools that non-Federal entities can choose to 

use or not. One result of this approach is that available data are 

largely self-reported, difficult to validate, and not necessarily comparable across reporting jurisdictions and entities, thus making it 

difficult to get a picture of national preparedness. 

Each of the efforts to date has partially advanced the ability to 

define and measure disaster preparedness. However, they have not 

been integrated into a comprehensive approach with metrics that 

enables FEMA and its partners to assess national preparedness as 

envisioned by the Post-Katrina Act. 

Until it does have an integrated approach, FEMA will not have 

a basis to operationalize and implement an assessment of disaster 

preparedness across the Nation, nor will it be able to effectively 

target grant resources to the areas of greatest need and potential 

benefit. It is essential that there be a useful, reliable way of comparing capability levels across entities and jurisdictions with catastrophic response roles and responsibilities. 

FEMA has embarked on a new initiative called Whole of Community which incorporates 13 core response capabilities with an emphasis on stabilizing a catastrophic disaster’s effect in the first 72 

hours. This approach will be tested in the National Level Exercise 

this year using a major earthquake on the New Madrid fault. This 

new effort is in its early stages, and it is too early to assess its success. 

Whatever approach is eventually used, it is essential that there 

be a defined end state we want to achieve; a reliable means of assessing where we are in our ability to achieve that end state; that 

roles and responsibilities are clear; and that we rigorously test and 

periodically re-evaluate the assumptions on which disaster planning is based. 

According to news accounts, Japan experienced a significantly 

bigger earthquake and tsunami than the one for which it had 

planned and prepared for the geographic area hit by the disaster. 

It has faced the cumulative effects of three quickly succeeding disasters, any one of which would have been considered a major disaster. 

All disasters represent opportunities for learning and assessment, and this one is no different. A careful assessment of the Japanese experience can be useful to our own future disaster planning 

and preparation. That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I 

would be pleased to respond to questions you or the Ranking Member may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Jenkins. It was a 

very helpful statement. We will do 7-minute rounds at the beginning. 

Administrator Fugate, I want to give you a chance to at least 

begin a response to the testimonies of Mr. Skinner and Mr. Jenkins. I want to offer you also the opportunity to file a written reVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17 

sponse for the Committee’s record because we want to get to other 

questions. But I thought you should have a chance, particularly on 

the various elements of management, to respond to what Mr. Skinner said. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Much of what is in 

the IG’s report we are not disagreeing with, but I think, again, that 

is not to say that we are not taking steps, we are. And to say it 

is not a priority, I would beg to differ. The results may not be there 

yet in the IG’s report. But I will give you an example, Mr. Chairman, and again, we will respond in writing. 

But I will give you a sense of when I got to FEMA, the Disaster 

Relief Fund was basically a piggy bank that was used, oftentimes, 

in ways that it was not intented for. We found ourselves funding 

positions that were not directly tied to disasters. It was oftentimes 

used as, if something was not going right, we would go look at the 

DRF when it was not a disaster. 

One of our first steps was to identify all the positions that were 

no longer doing primary disaster work, that were still being funded, particularly from the Hurricane Katrina era, that had become 

something that you had already funded in positions. We worked 

with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and staff to 

eliminate all the positions that were being funded out of DRF and 

move them into our budgets. We had a 2-year transition period, 

and we were successful in doing that. 

The other thing we looked at was the cost of administering disasters. In many cases, we were setting up and mobilizing large numbers of folks to administer disasters, and we asked the question, 

Can we do this without necessarily setting up a facility? So we introduced and had built upon a concept that was already there, 

what we call a virtual joint field office. Instead of going out and 

setting up an office, can we work this from the region and avoid 

that cost? It does not slow down our response and recovery, but it 

does reduce the overall cost of how we administer the disaster 

itself. 

For fraud and waste, we have been working to make sure that 

we have the acquisition staff we need. A large percentage of our 

acquisition staff are contractors doing those conversions over and 

getting them certified; requiring that not only those people that, by 

law, are required to have ethics training do, but require all FEMA 

employees to take ethics training annually. As was pointed out, 

this was a huge issue in the response in Hurricane Katrina, not 

having a strong acquisition force and people that can go out and 

utilize contracts that were already bid appropriately that we could 

use in a disaster. And if we do have to do acquisition, having the 

acquisition specialist to go in the field to support the joint field office. These are things we had not done before that we are implementing. 

Again, I think many of these things we take to heart. Our implementation of it is not as swift as you would like or as the IG would 

like, but I think these are areas we are moving forward. 

A big part of this was getting the staff hired, getting them 

trained, and as the IG has pointed out, both in his reports and his 

testimony, is maintaining and getting staff trained and in those poVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18 

sitions so that as we deal with disasters, we are not always pulling 

from staff that are responsible for the day-to-day management. 

And again, as part of that was looking at our management structure and putting a higher priority on these backbone systems that 

are required to do the day-to-day business, but also support disaster response. 

So while I will not disagree with the findings of the IG, I would 

state that it is not a lack of effort, but those results may not be 

necessarily showing up yet as we continue to work to build that capability. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will continue to monitor, obviously, 

and after some period of time come back and do another oversight 

hearing, hopefully not in the shadow of a catastrophic disaster 

somewhere in the world. 

Let me go to some questions that come off of what is happening 

in Japan now. To state the obvious to you, FEMA is not responsible 

for the safety of the operation of nuclear power plants. That is the 

purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). FEMA has 

responsibility, along with other entities, for being prepared to respond to an accident at a nuclear power plant, the effect of weather, earthquakes, or a terrorist attack on the nuclear power plant. 

I am interested, since we have all, unfortunately, learned a lot 

about types of nuclear reactors, whether the plans for a response 

that you have are affected by the particular designs of nuclear 

power plants, or whether that gets to a level of detail and nuance 

that is hard for you to get to. In other words, whether you evaluate 

the resiliency of a particular nuclear power plant as you plan a preparedness strategy for an event at that plant. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, this goes back to the findings from 

Three Mile Island that required, at that time, the new FEMA that 

was created in the reorganization that President Carter signed; 

that under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s regulations, 

FEMA was responsible for administering what is called the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, which was to work with 

local and State governments. 

In this particular program, the determination as to what level we 

prepared to is based upon those regulations that were established 

by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission based upon the findings 

after Three Mile Island. They are not specific to the reactor. They 

are specific to the regulations, and the regulations require that 

planning for individuals is based upon a 10-mile planning zone 

around the facilities with an additional 50-mile emergency planning zone for what is determined to be ingestion or the possibility 

of food pathway risk. 

These plans and the exercises that are done and required to be 

certified for those plants are conducted on a recurring basis against 

the standards in the regulations. So it would be something where 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would make determinations as 

to modifications to the distances or actions taken. 

Our job is to make sure that we work as a team with local and 

State government, that they can execute those protective measures, 

which may include evacuation, decontamination of vehicles traveling through the area, sheltering, the warning systems, and other 

19 

protective actions that local and State officials would take in the 

event that an accident occurred. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So let me ask you the baseline question, 

maybe the circumstance is answered, but if a combination of events 

like the ones that have occurred in Japan occurred here in the 

United States, would FEMA be prepared to respond? 

Mr. FUGATE. Given what we are seeing there, it would go, I 

think, far beyond what we currently have in our Radiological 

Emergency Preparedness Program. But fortunately, we built a lot 

of capability within the National Guard, within the Department of 

Defense, but also within the local hazardous material teams that 

have received these grant fundings, particularly when we look at 

the threat of improvised nuclear devices or radiological dispersal 

devices. 

So with the civil support teams that have been built within the 

National Guard or the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) capabilities that NORTHCOM 

has to respond in support of these teams, we have, I think, for this 

type of event—again, we would not speak to the reactor. That 

would be really the lead of the NRC. But if there were consequences off sites, the ability to monitor that is a team effort, the 

ability to do the decontamination and support the evacuations, I 

think there is a lot more capability that even goes beyond what we 

have in our commercial reactor safety programs that could be 

brought to bear, mainly because of the additional preparedness we 

do for improvised devices or dispersal devices. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is an important answer, and I 

hope people who are listening find it reassuring. One is, we live in 

a world with a lot of risks. But the capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack involving a radiological device or, at worst, a nuclear 

weapon here in the United States, those capabilities also, obviously, can be brought to bear in the case of an accident or a natural 

disaster such as the one we are watching in Japan now, which already is, but may have significant radiological consequences. 

I think it is very important to state that since September 11, 

2001, and, of course, intensely since Hurricane Katrina, we have 

developed extra capacities that FEMA can bring to bear, particularly within the Defense Department on, as you say, the response 

teams and the National Guards, which are right there and will 

probably be the first responders—apart from local law enforcement—on the site. 

And second, very specialized skills in specialized units that are 

stood up at the national level within the Defense Department, to 

come in and deal with the radiological consequences of such an 

event. I guess my question is, have I got it right? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. It is what we call a multi-layer, all-hazard 

approach that many of these teams that were originally designed 

for commercial nuclear power plants actually give locals the capability to respond to other threats. And conversely, the funds and 

the building of the teams to respond to the threat of a dispersal 

device gives us more capability to respond to any event that could 

occur as an accident. 

So in the area of all-hazard, this is one of the things we really 

try to emphasize, when we build these capabilities, oftentimes we 

20 

are building them against known threats or in the case of terrorism. But the ability to use them for those things that you did 

not expect, or were greater than what your plans were for, really 

come back to the heart of what we are trying to get to, is planning 

for these likely maximum events and realize that it really takes the 

ability to leverage all of our resources, not necessarily as originally 

planned, but how they could be utilized as part of the team if we 

saw this type of event. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And again, just finally—and then I will 

yield, I am over my time—under Northern Command, which is a 

command of our military which has responsibility now for Homeland Security, we have these two units, 4,500 people in each one, 

one active duty, one reserve, that are specially trained to respond 

to events of this kind and to get there as quickly as possible, certainly within the 72-hour window that you have talked about. 

Thanks, Administrator. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator, you have pointed out that the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission would be the lead agency if the United States were to 

experience the kind of accident or level of damage at a commercial 

nuclear reactor that is occurring now in Japan. But FEMA, under 

the national planning scenarios, is responsible for the operational 

planning under a number of scenarios, one of which is a major 

earthquake, another is a nuclear attack, and another is essentially 

a dirty bomb. 

Has FEMA completed the operational planning for those 15 scenarios that clearly outlines the roles and responsibilities of all of 

your partners? In other words, is it really clear who is responsible 

for what if, God forbid, we had the kind of multiple catastrophe 

that Japan is experiencing right now? 

Mr. FUGATE. In looking at the 15 planning scenarios, and I think 

we are collapsing some of this down into what are the things that 

we respond to that are similar and what are the unique authorities 

that are different across those? 

And this comes back to, when we are doing the all-hazard planning and looking at the catastrophic, we are actually looking at an 

improvised nuclear device, the earthquake scenarios, particularly 

in California, and the Category 5 hurricanes, and looking at the 

possible total number of casualties, the impacts, and response to 

support that, and then going back through the authorities of which 

Federal agencies would have different pieces of that. 

One of the things that you will note is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as a regulatory agency, is responsible for the 

power plants. But if an event occurs outside of that that is not a 

regulated facility, it is actually the Department of Energy that has 

the lead on the radiological response. 

And so, it is our ability to go through these and look at and deconflict where we have the authorities, make sure they are clear, 

and part of this is through the exercises that we do to look at this. 

We, most recently, conducted exercises looking at nuclear power 

plants and looking at whose authorities are there and what we 

would operate under. 

So as we go through these scenarios, that is what we are doing. 

The status of that, I will go back and submit that in writing beVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

cause each one of those scenarios has various components that are 

being completed or have been completed for the planning scenarios. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Skinner and Mr. Jenkins, are the roles and 

responsibilities clear, in your judgment, under the 15 disaster scenarios that should be operational planning is not yet completed for? 

I mean, I am sort of answering my own question because if it is 

not completed, it is unlikely to be clear. But what is your assessment? I will start with you, Mr. Skinner. 

Mr. SKINNER. First, I would like to say that we have not done 

a study to determine the clarity of the individual roles. But during 

the course of our work, we were able to determine that the responsibilities are becoming clearer, and this is a direct result, I think, 

of the confusion that we witnessed after Hurricane Katrina. People 

sat down in the room and started more clearly defining who is on 

first, who has the operational responsibilities, and who is in 

charge. 

So in that regard, after Hurricane Katrina, we feel comfortable 

that the clarity of the roles are becoming clearer. But again, a lot 

of these things are not complete. So we are really trying to use a 

crystal ball to predict how is it going to play out in the future. 

But with regards to earthquakes that Administrator Fugate referred to, and as well as nuclear detonation and major hurricanes, 

Category 5 hurricanes, as a result of that work, we feel that the 

roles are relatively clear. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Jenkins, do you agree? 

Mr. JENKINS. Yes, I do agree with that. I think there has definitely been progress made, but I think one of the issues that we 

are concerned about is, until you get these plans completed, one of 

the things that is important for State, local, or other officials that 

are involved, it is the totality of the roles and responsibilities that 

we have across these scenarios, and then what are the capabilities 

we need to be able to carry out those roles and responsibilities effectively. 

So it is really important to know the totality of that so you know, 

this is what I am responsible for, these are the kind of capabilities 

I need to build. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Skinner, you put out a report in December 

that revealed that FEMA had stopped attempting to recover improper disaster assistance payments that were made after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and you identified approximately 160,000 

applicants that have received improper payments totaling more 

than $643 million. 

Is this in addition to the improper uses of the $2,000 debit cards 

that were given out in the wake of Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. SKINNER. Yes, it is. Also, it does not include those cases of 

fraudulent activity that we investigated. I would like to make clear 

something that Senator Landrieu made reference to, that is, simply 

because you have filed an incomplete application or have unclear 

data on your application, does not automatically put you in a bucket as a fraudulent applicant. It puts you in a bucket as a potential 

ineligible applicant. 

Senator COLLINS. And there is a difference. 

Mr. SKINNER. There is a very big difference. 

Senator COLLINS. Absolutely. 

22 

Mr. SKINNER. And I would like to make that clarification. 

Senator COLLINS. I am pleased that you did because I was going 

to ask you that very question. I want to ask you a series of questions about that, but since my time on this round is almost expired, 

I will wait for the next round. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Senator Brown, welcome. Thanks for being here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. I would not miss it. I do not think I have, actually, so happy to be here, obviously. I appreciate you holding this 

hearing. 

A report published in a Boston paper indicates that the Bay 

State Nuclear Power Plant is the second highest in the Nation for 

the potential of suffering core damage from an earthquake. Are any 

of you familiar with that report at all? 

Mr. JENKINS. No, I am not. 

Mr. SKINNER. No. 

Senator BROWN. No? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I think I am familiar with 

the—is this the ranking of the power plant? 

Senator BROWN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. Was this the one done by the NRC that went back 

and re-ranked the probability of the events? 

Senator BROWN. Yes. 

Mr. FUGATE. I have seen that report, sir. 

Senator BROWN. So in light of that, they were number two apparently. Have there been any efforts by any of you at all to reach out 

and make sure that we are squared away? 

Mr. FUGATE. Senator, what is going on inside of the plant and 

the regulatory part of that is the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But around each one of the licensed nuclear 

power plants, FEMA supports State and local governments to do 

the exercises that they do for certification and exercises and drills 

for those plants. 

The report is from the NRC, but what we do at FEMA and have 

been doing prior to this report is based upon the regulatory guidance and requirements to do the exercises and the things we exercise against. That is an ongoing program. So I am not sure what 

the NRC, with this report, what, if anything, would change from 

that regarding the plant. 

Senator BROWN. So if I wanted to find that out, I would have to 

reach out to them? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. We will do that. 

Also, let me just backtrack for a second. God forbid anything like 

this happens, so I will just take this particular plant. It is near the 

ocean, very similar situation, apparently is No. 2 at risk in the 

country. How confident are you that if something like this happens 

in the United States, that you will have the ability—and I understand, apparently, from some of the testimony and what I have 

read is, apparently you guys are in charge in terms of implementing. You are the go-to people now. Is that accurate in terms 

of dictating who does what and who is in charge? 

23 

Is it an ongoing plan that is developing? 

Mr. FUGATE. In response to a nuclear power plant, inside of the 

facility is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Outside of the plant is actually the local and State responders with 

FEMA supporting them. And if you had a scenario that resulted in 

a release, the most important thing to occur would be to successfully evacuate people away from that plant. 

Those are the type of things that the exercise plans work on. 

These are the things that local and State officials train against. 

And our role at the Federal Government would be to support them 

with additional resources, if required, in the event that an evacuation had to take place. 

But those are the things that I think, from the standpoint of your 

questions—if you would like, Senators, to have our staff reach out 

with the State and give your staff an update on what those plans 

are so you can take a look at that and get a better idea what—— 

Senator BROWN. Yes, that would be great because I am concerned about who is in charge. Listening and doing, some of the 

work on it, I have a great concern. It is like the left hand—very 

similar to a Hurricane Katrina situation. There is going to be a lot 

of breakdowns. I know there has been a lot of improvement. I want 

to, obviously, make that well-known. 

But now we are getting to the point where we always seem to 

be reactionary instead of, obviously, keeping ahead of the ball 

game. 

I do not want to take the thunder from Senator Collins’s comments about the $643 million and the difference between fraudulent and ineligible, and I am just going to make a statement, which 

is, I find it amazing that we just give away millions and millions 

of dollars with really no accountability. 

And if, in fact, we have improperly paid somebody, that we go 

after it. We get a collection agency, we go after it, we get our 

money, give them a third, collect whatever we have to do. I was 

in a Medicare/Medicaid hearing the other day, and they were talking about $76 billion that were just given out, whether it is 

through ineligible or fraudulent. But the bottom line is, there is a 

breakdown somewhere and being one of the newer people here, still 

over a year away, I am just flabbergasted at the amount of just— 

it is a million here, a million there. We are fighting for millions. 

My State could use millions, whether it is Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) money, Head Start programs, 

or the fishing industry. 

I have to run to another hearing, but I would love to hear, like 

Senator Collins, where is the money, is it coming back, and why 

did they give up? So I do not want to take away from that, but I 

do have time for one or two more questions. 

When you talk about the all-hazard approach, and I think it is 

an extension of what I was just asking, and if you could maybe follow up again with my office and how we can do it offline. With everything that is happening, and I have been following it, what happened in Japan, like everybody else. It is just so devastating. I cannot imagine that there is going to be one agency in Massachusetts 

who would just say, ‘‘OK, you go here, you go here.’’ 

24 

So I am really concerned, not only in Massachusetts but throughout the country if something like this happens. I am not confident 

yet, and I am hopeful that someone can give me the information 

to make sure that we all know what to do. Is it evacuation? Is it 

command and control? Is it military? I think it is a combination of 

everything. Can you shed any light on my thoughts? 

Mr. FUGATE. In the time we have, I can start and then I would 

like to have an opportunity, Senator Brown—— 

Senator BROWN. Well, we can do that, because I do not want to 

take Senator Akaka’s time. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, I just want to make this one point. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think you are asking an important question so I would urge Administrator Fugate to give you a response. 

Mr. FUGATE. In many of our disasters, and we always start with 

who is going to be the closest responders no matter how big the 

disaster, it is always the local responders. And in some cases, as 

we saw in this, they can be destroyed in the disaster itself. We saw 

this in Hurricane Katrina, we saw this in the tsunami. The next 

layer is the governor and their team, including the un-impacted 

communities and the National Guard responding. And then the 

next level is the Federal Government. 

I think one of the things that is a little bit different that this 

Committee saw was the fact that previously FEMA would have to 

wait for somebody to call for help before we could begin mobilizing 

the Federal resources, including the Department of Defense. This 

Committee changed the law so that no longer do we have to wait 

until a State is overwhelmed. But even if there is the appearance 

that they may need that help, we can start mobilizing resources. 

But one of the key things is it is done as a coordinated effort 

with the local officials, the governor and their team, and then the 

President’s team as directed under the Homeland Security Act and 

the Stafford Act to coordinate Federal assistance so that governors 

do not have to go shopping the Federal agencies to figure out who 

is coming or who does what. 

I think this is the one thing this Committee really focused on 

after Hurricane Katrina was, you had to make sure that the governor, who is then responsible for coordinating the response in 

their State, has that one place that is going to coordinate on behalf 

of the President, all the Federal resources including the Department of Defense, in their disaster. 

Senator BROWN. I would love to talk to you about this some 

more, maybe someone from your staff, we can connect. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Brown. 

Administrator, am I not right that once a year, FEMA and the 

NRC, and perhaps local officials, go through a dry run about a disaster at every nuclear plant in the country? Is that right? 

Mr. FUGATE. It is actually a little bit more than that. We do a 

formal, evaluated exercise where we actually grade the operator 

and the local governments and State governments, and every 2 

years they actually have to be certified and any deficiencies or 

areas requiring correction have to be addressed. 

25 

They perform about four drills a year. Those could be anything 

from a decontamination exercise where we are actually taking vehicles and how you would wash them down and monitor, or the 

warning systems, or other parts of the plan. 

And generally, they also have practice exercises built into that 

cycle. So rather than just every 2 years you do one exercise, there 

is a series of drills and exercises, and then the evaluated exercise 

is where they are actually graded on their ability to perform those 

functions. 

Again, it is done against those regulatory functions that say, you 

have to warn the population in this amount of time from the time 

the event escalates. You have to be able to shelter and evacuate the 

populations within these time frames. You have to be able to do all 

these things against a population at risk. So it is actually based on 

who lives there, what is that population? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. And it is adjusted to that particular community and 

that local and State government response. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So in the case the power plant in Massachusetts, there is a plan if something should happen? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would imagine if you went to the local phone 

books, you could actually find a map. This is generally how we do 

stuff, get the information out so people know if you live inside of 

that zone, that this may be an evacuation zone. You will generally 

find that you have outdoor warning systems, sirens, or telephone 

notification systems that are enhancing our emergency alert system tied to that area. 

You will find that the local responders have a lot more equipment for radiological monitoring and detection than you would normally find. These are kind of the things, again, because these are 

point-specific hazards, that we plan against and you exercise 

against. They are very well-known to the local officials and the 

State officials who do that planning. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Akaka, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. Thank you for holding this hearing. I also want to extend my thank you to the witnesses for being here today. 

I would like to recognize FEMA, particularly Region 9 Administrator Nancy Ward, for collaborating extensively with Hawaii’s civil 

defense and joint catastrophic planning. She does a great job. My 

home State of Hawaii and the Pacific territories face unique challenges, as you know very well, because of their remote locations 

and a limited logistics base in Hawaii. There is still much for us 

to do, and I am glad that we are having this hearing. 

Administrator Fugate, as you know, States rely on neighboring 

States to provide critical assistance in the event of a disaster. However, Hawaii is over 2,000 miles from the mainland, so other States 

may not be able to provide timely support. FEMA has a disaster 

supply warehouse in west Oahu and one in Guam. Should a major 

disaster strike Hawaii, either damaging the warehouse or overwhelming our supplies, what plans does FEMA have to quickly resupply Hawaii? 

26 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, thank you for that question, Senator, and also 

I have to thank the State of Hawaii and the Hawaiian National 

Guard who helped us respond to American Samoa when the tsunami hit there. The challenges, again as we know in the Pacific, 

the distances, require us to both leverage what we have in the 

FEMA warehouses, but also our local coordination with Pacific 

Command (PACOM), and their resources. 

When Nancy Ward, as you pointed out, one of our regional administrators, starts to talk with her counterparts there in Hawaii 

or in the territories in the event that we see something coming— 

again, we know the distances, we know we cannot wait—we are oftentimes starting to look at how we will start to ship or fly resources in. 

This is the close coordination that we have, both with our ability 

to charter aircraft, but also work with the Department of Defense 

for those most critical supplies. As you remember in American 

Samoa, one of the key issues the governor had was for generators, 

and he could not wait for them to come by barge because he had 

to get his critical systems back up. So we were able to task, initially, DOD and later contractors, to fly those generators in there. 

So again, it goes back to the authorities this Committee has vested. When we know we have these tremendous distances, we oftentimes have to make decisions before we have requests or before we 

have all the information to start moving, particularly in the most 

critical life saving supplies because we will not have time to make 

up. 

So those are the continency plans, again as in Guam and in Hawaii. We base those supplies on the time it would take to ship supplies, but recognize that if they are impacted, we would actually be 

flying supplies as soon as airfields were available. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. I agree that coordination relationship with 

the military really makes a difference. Administrator Fugate, as 

was evident in the recent events, Hawaii and Pacific Coast States 

and territories face the greatest tsunami hazard in the United 

States. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) manages Federal tsunami detection and warning efforts, 

and partners with Federal agencies to reduce tsunami risks. 

How is FEMA working with NOAA to coordinate tsunami preparedness and response plans? 

Mr. FUGATE. We work very closely, as they are the subject matter experts on the hazard, and in supporting the States and territories as they map their innundation zones. One of the areas that 

we help them in their tsunami-ready programs is in the warning 

systems. This is an area that we are currently working with the 

governor of American Samoa who did not have a tsunami warning 

system prior to the last event, particularly the outdoor notification 

systems, which we saw work very effectively in Hawaii during this 

last crisis. 

So we continue to work with NOAA as they give us the warnings 

to activate through our national warning systems, was how we 

originally got those calls out to the States and territories that we 

did have a tsunami warning. And then working with the grant programs we provide, for them to build and develop those warning systems. This is the other part of, again, looking at where we are 

27 

making progress with these homeland security funds, is building 

warning systems for these types of events. 

Fortunately, we had a lot more warning in this one, but as we 

saw with American Samoa, you can very often have the earthquake 

occur and the tsunami occur right after that. So the warning piece 

of this, the mapping, and the understanding of those hazards are 

key so that local officials have the information about who and 

where and how far you need to evacuate. Then we need to support 

them through the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 

(IPAWS) and the other warning tools that we have enhancing the 

emergency alert system and outdoor warning systems so we can 

warn that population in time. 

Senator AKAKA. Administrator Fugate, according to census data, 

nearly 25 million adults in the United States do not speak English 

well. FEMA must communicate effectively during disaster response 

and recovery with a large and diverse population of non-English 

speakers. What steps has FEMA taken to make sure that it can do 

so? 

Mr. FUGATE. We continue to look at our populations, and one of 

the concepts that is not new—it is actually, I thought, pretty much 

a reflection of what this Committee was trying to drive at. We 

needed to quit planning for easy and plan for real. 

English does not cut it if I am deaf and hard of hearing and all 

I know is American sign language and all you gave me is closed 

caption and that is not my first language. Or if my primary language and the language that I was born with is not English, and 

in a crisis, I cannot understand what you are trying to tell me to 

do and I do not get the information I need. 

So we work very closely back with our State and local partners 

to look at the languages and the needs and recognize that we have 

to make sure that we are providing information in a way that people need it, not what is convenient to us. So we have worked to provide more and more of our preparedness information in multiple 

languages. 

We have created, in addition to our Ready.gov Web site, a 

Listo.gov, which is a full site in Spanish, as well as ensuring that 

in the various languages in our States where they have identified 

significant populations, that we provide preparedness information 

in those languages, that we have those language skills available to 

back up our registration centers. 

But most importantly, we understand that American sign language is also a language that we have to be able to communicate 

in, and we cannot depend just upon text messaging or text crawls 

to reach that population. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Well, I thank you very much for the work 

that you are doing, and I wish you well. 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. 

The reports that I have seen, Administrator Fugate, indicate that 

as a result of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, there are 

more than 400,000 people who have been forced from their homes 

and they are living in emergency shelters or with relatives. Apparently another 24,000 or 25,000 are stranded. Obviously these are 

28 

the nightmarish memories we have of Hurricane Katrina with people pushed out of their homes and not an adequate system to give 

them shelter. 

I know that FEMA recently signed an agreement with the American Red Cross to co-lead efforts for mass care and sheltering after 

a disaster, including what we call today a catastrophic disaster. 

What will be the capacity in most parts of the country? In other 

words, I know 430,000 is an enormous number, but how many people, under FEMA’s current organization, will we be able to shelter 

who have been made homeless by a catastrophe? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, that, a lot of times, is going to be 

based upon the State and the types of hazards they have. In the 

State of Florida where I came from, we had shelter capacity getting 

up to over 800,000, but we would not expect to use that because 

very rarely would a hurricane produce that big of an evacuation. 

But this is what we are doing. I think this comes back to what 

the IG and GAO have really come back on. When we are trying to 

talk about preparedness, unless we are planning against a number, 

it is hard. It is about how you get traction because everything is 

always localized or state-based. 

So in our strategic plan, when we said we were going to do all 

this stuff, I said, well, put a number against it because I cannot 

measure it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. So we started looking at, if you looked at what we 

call the maximum-maximum, you look at an improvised nuclear device, the most catastrophic thing we could think of in a metropolitan area, if we looked at our worst Category 5 hurricane hitting in 

the most populated areas, if we look at these large earthquakes, 

what are these upper end numbers? 

And we start finding that the numbers actually look, primarily 

at the numbers we are seeing from Japan, we were actually looking 

at these types of numbers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So it would potentially be over 400,000 or 

in that range? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. We have actually looked at, for casualties 

requiring medical assistance, several hundred thousand. This is 

why we were trying to plan our logistics and ability to move to 

those areas. We know we have the risk, but also where we did not 

see it coming, but all of a sudden it is there. For about a millionand-a-half. We need to see if we get enough supplies and provide 

enough capacity. 

And what may happen is you may not be able to shelter people 

in the surrounding areas, because if the devastation is that 

great—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE [continuing]. What you may end up having to do is 

move people to where you could shelter them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. And that is one of the advantages of working with 

the Red Cross and other volunteer organizations, as we saw in 

Hurricane Katrina when we had to actually start moving people 

out of there, is to move them to areas outside of that area and provide that. And then this is, again, in the short-term shelter phase 

29 

of getting people where we are meeting the most basic needs of 

medical care, food, water, and a roof over their heads, until we can 

see what is next. 

Is this some place we can get back to, or in the case we are seeing there, this devastation will not be repaired quickly. You are not 

going to be doing temporary housing there. You are going to have 

to find a longer-term housing solution as people make a decision 

about what is the next step. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So are we prepared now to temporarily 

house that number of people? 

Mr. FUGATE. I think we could say it would not be in any one 

area. We would have to distribute those folks across the country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. But these are the things we are planning against, 

and I think this is where we are looking at. What does it take to 

get there and how do we build that capacity based upon the local 

and State, but where do we fill those gaps? And so, if you go to 

certain parts of the country, yes, they have that capability because 

of the threats they face. But what if it occurs somewhere we were 

not expecting that? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. We do not have a hazard they planned against, but 

we still have to meet that need. So this is where we are trying to 

go on national preparedness, looking at these events, add them up, 

and determining the upper number. Can you move enough supplies 

in to provide emergency food, medical care, and basic sheltering for 

that population? And if you cannot bring it to them, can you take 

them from that area and get them to where they can? This really 

becomes, I think, critical when we are talking about housing. So 

this is what we are planning against, and also looking at the time 

frames to do it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Skinner, did you have a response you 

wanted to offer for that? 

Mr. SKINNER. I agree. FEMA, from the lessons learned in Hurricane Katrina, has actually taken some very positive steps towards 

sheltering and short-term housing—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SKINNER. And they are also experimenting with different 

types of housing. It can be a very complex issue. One of the concerns that we have, what we are witnessing now after Hurricane 

Katrina and as well as the disasters in Florida, is not sheltering 

or short-term housing, but it is long-term housing. And that is an 

issue that I think still needs to be addressed. 

There are still some thorny relationships that have to be built to 

accommodate the population for its long-term housing because 

these things will oftentimes last 2, 3, or 4 years before you can 

move back home. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Thanks. One of the things our 

Committee has done, we feel at various times that we have to ask 

extreme questions, and we have done some hearings and work on 

what our preparedness would be to respond to, as I mentioned earlier, the explosion of a radiological device by a terrorist, or a nuclear weapon. 

30 

And one of the striking conclusions is how people behave in response to that can actually save tens of thousands of lives. In some 

cases, a decision not to run, to evacuate, will save your life. And 

we heard expert testimony that is what particularly critical, and, 

of course, it would be critical in the case of an event at a nuclear 

power plant as well, is public messaging. 

So I wanted to ask you, Administrator Fugate, if you could give 

us kind of a status report about where FEMA is now on effective 

messaging to the public in the case of a radiological incident. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, the first thing people have to understand is that, surprising as it may be and this is what the experts 

told you, a nuclear detonation is actually more survivable than people realize if they know those important steps. 

This was actually done and it got overshadowed by the situation 

in Japan, but we were already scheduled to do this—we did what 

we call a webinar with our Citizen Corps Program with the Department of Energy and their experts to start talking about messaging 

and sheltering in place and working with our Citizen Corps Councils. 

So we did this as part of a webinar to really start bringing up 

these topics that have historically been so difficult to talk about if 

this does happen, these are the things people need to do. So this 

was a webinar that was actually done this week where we brought 

people in, and it allows us to bring people very cost-effectively into 

an environment where we can have subject matter experts briefing 

them. 

But starting this process using our Citizen Corps Councils as the 

locals to start thinking about how you message this locally, what 

is going to be effective—and again, there is actually a book with 

this title, ‘‘How do you Think About the Unthinkable’’—and communicate that in a way that is not based upon fear, but of the actions you could take to survive. 

So we are working with Department of Energy experts. Their national laboratories are really who are the experts in these areas, 

and actually we are conducting this webinar this week on how we 

work with our Citizen Corps Councils and talk about something 

that is very difficult to talk about. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So, that is a work in progress now? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But obviously, you are working on it. I 

presume that you train all the local areas around the country to 

use both existing communication systems, public ones like radio 

and television, but also, obviously, now you use Internet and 

cellphone and the like? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. Again, this is what I really challenged our 

team on, there is this tendency that we make people communicate 

the way we are set up to communicate—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE [continuing]. But not always recognizing that there 

are different tools and the people are not using the same tools we 

are. So how do you start incorporating that in and look at how people communicate versus the way we are prepared to do it? 

So looking at things in social media and other tools. I will give 

you a really short example because I know that you want to ask 

31 

more questions. But we provide information to the public on Web 

pages. Well, most disasters, if I am evacuated in a shelter, do I 

have a computer and a Web page I can get to? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. But I may have a smartphone. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. FUGATE. And we have seen in many of our events, the 

phones are actually working, even in Haiti after the earthquake, 

surprisingly. So we went back and said, ‘‘Let us quit making people 

go to a Web page when, if they are going to be on a mobile phone, 

let us change our delivery. 

So we created a mobile FEMA page—it is www.m.FEMA.gov— 

that works well on a cellphone, because you do not need to see our 

organization charts, you do not need to see any of our pretty pictures and graphs. What you need is the information about what is 

happening. And so, we have been really trying to look at how people are using these tools, what makes sense, how are they going 

to get information, and trying to put it in a way that is useful to 

them, not what was convenient for us. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good work. That is very sensible. Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Skinner, in your testimony you gave us the depressing news 

that fraud and improper payments have plagued FEMA for a very 

long time. I remember when I was Chairman of this Committee 

back in the good old days, that I held a hearing to look at fraud 

after Hurricane Andrew, and we found improper payments. It was 

Senator Bill Nelson who suggested that we have those hearings. 

Then Hurricane Katrina hit and we found just terrible, hundreds 

of millions of dollars in improper payments, fraud, and abuse. It is 

troubling to me that you can go back decades, apparently, and 

there still is a lack of attention to this problem. 

I was thinking about the fact that the President’s budget cuts 

FEMA’s budget, and it cuts it in ways that may actually be harmful because it cuts some IT projects out. But what is even more disturbing to me is perhaps these cuts would not be necessary if we 

had not lost more than a billion dollars over the years in improper 

payments. Certainly that money could be put to better use. 

Could you help guide us on what we should be asking FEMA to 

do? What kind of controls should be put in place so when the next 

catastrophe inevitably hits, we do not see a repetition of widespread fraud, waste, and abuse? You referred to the work that was 

done with the stimulus bill, and I agree with you that the transparency and accountability was much better. But what specifically 

would you recommend be done? 

Mr. SKINNER. I think, first, Administrator Fugate coined it very 

concisely, and that is, FEMA needs to act fast, but not act hastely. 

With regards to their individual assistance programs, there is a 

mindset that FEMA has to have the money out on the street within 

hours. Therefore, FEMA will make a blanket payment and worry 

about the fraud later. Unfortunately, FEMA does not have the resources or the wherewithal to go back and try to recoup payments 

that were improperly distributed. 

32 

With improved internal controls, it may slow the process up a 

few hours, but not days or weeks or, like the old days in Hurricane 

Hugo where it took months to make payments, or Hurricane Andrew, where it took weeks to make payments, or the Northridge 

earthquare, where it took weeks. We can still make timely payments to those that are deserving, that are in need, but at the 

same time be able to offer a screening process and has the internal 

controls and red flags in place to put aside those applications that 

are in question, whether they be just because of poor information 

or because it is a fraudulent application. That is one thing. 

The second thing is, I think, with the public assistance programs, 

we can do a better job there as well with regards to providing better oversight. The Recovery Board, responsible for the oversight of 

close to $800 billion, were able to produce expenditure reports. The 

board requires anyone that is receiving any funds, State or local 

governments, or primary contractor at the sub-grantee level, to report to the Recovery Board. 

The system is already in place. Anyone can use this system. The 

Department of Energy introduced this system years ago and it is 

something, I think, FEMA might want to consider because I believe 

that transparency drives accountability. 

What you do not have is just one IG looking at you. You have 

millions of IGs looking at you, because when the local citizens see 

where the money is going, how it has been spent, then they can 

report that there is something amiss, that the money is not going 

where it should, or that contractors are receiving preferential treatment or are not performing as they should. And that is what drives 

the accountability. 

We can produce that type of reporting after a disaster and train 

the State and locals, it is not difficult. Everyone thought it would 

be. Everyone thought it would drive costs up at State and local 

budgets. It did not. 

The technology today now allows you to take that information 

and transform it into very usable formats that can be manipulated 

to permit your own personal assessments. Reporters may want to 

take the data and manipulate it to determine what type of demographics certain funds are going to. State and local governments 

could take it to see what type of projects we are spending money 

on. Education versus highways or airports, things of that nature. 

It can be manipulated to meet your individual needs. 

At the same time, the Recovery Board developed a screening 

process to assist program managers. When contracts or grants are 

awarded, the board can run them through open-source information 

systems as well as law enforcement information systems, and give 

advise—whether those recipients have associations with anyone 

that may have tried to defraud the government in the past. 

And, as a result, the board is able to stop those grants, those contracts, early on before money was spent. Because once the money 

is spent, it is very difficult to get it back. 

Senator COLLINS. Do you not think there is also a deterrent effect when you announce that there is going to be an aggressive effort to prevent waste, fraud, abuse, mismanagement, and improper 

payments? I think one reason that the Recovery Board was successful, largely, is it was set up from the beginning. It was very 

33 

well publicized. There were Web sites to track spending, and as you 

said, that enlisted the public to help be the eyes and ears. 

But I would also argue that there is a deterrent impact if you 

go after some of the fraud. I know FEMA has argued that it is too 

expensive to go after some of this, ‘‘small dollar fraud’’ that, in a 

cumulative sense, is huge amounts of money. But, in fact, I think 

it is worth the money of going after it because of the message it 

sends that it is not going to be tolerated. 

Mr. SKINNER. Absolutely, and I personally witnessed that after 

Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and after the Northridge earthquake. A good example is in Northridge. Early on, we made somewhere between a dozen to two dozen arrests within the first 2 

weeks after FEMA checks went out. When we made those arrests, 

we publicized them on the radio, on the television, in the newspaper, every media outlet that we could. Within days, $20 million, 

$30 million was voluntarily returned to FEMA. 

I witnessed the same thing after Hurricane Andrew. After we made four arrests, the following day, $11 million was returned to 

FEMA. It does have a deterrent effect. 

Also, a contractor or grantee is less inclined to steal funds because of the transparency that exists. We know where the funds 

are going, we are watching how it is being spent. Those contractors 

or grantees who intend to steal, will oftentimes back off knowing 

that it is just too risky. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Fugate, you have heard what Mr. Skinner 

has said, that it is worth going after this money. I realize you were 

not Administrator at the time of Hurricane Katrina, but, in fact, 

there has been a new process that the Chief Counsel has for recouping improper payments that has been languishing since late 

2008. Yesterday we received word that FEMA is going to start implementing the new process. 

That is a long gap that really sends the wrong message. So I 

guess I am asking for you to give a commitment to put in those 

internal controls. I think it is a false choice between providing the 

money quickly enough and providing it in a way that guards 

against fraud. In today’s world with the technology we have, it is 

not an either/or proposition. So I want to encourage you. I am 

going to ask you, are you going to go after some of these improper 

payments? 

Mr. FUGATE. The answer is yes, particularly those recoupments 

where we know that we had duplication of benefits. And again, if 

it was fraud, I think the IG would agree that since I have been 

there, if I find fraud, I have been pretty aggressive about referring 

it as soon as we know it. And that I also agree that those that have 

done this willfully needed to be treated as fraud. 

But where we have had those that have oftentimes, either a lack 

of information, duplication of benefits, or were not eligible, is to 

seek that reimbursement. We are doing it. I would also like to 

point out that the IG was also correct in that it has got to be speed, 

not haste. So the question is, why are we giving them money? 

What is the need we are having to meet that we are not meeting 

otherwise? 

I think it is not the size of scale to reassure you that it would 

scale up in a catastrophic disaster, but in the floods in Tennessee 

34 

where we believe it was about $100 million—it was bigger than 

this—but the $100 million in assistance in the first 30 days, nobody got a check unless they registered, had their home inspection, 

and they received their funds. 

Again, we were working on speed. We got the inspectors in there. 

Oftentimes, the turn-around time was in several days, so we did 

not create the demand to bypass that system. And we also worked 

very aggressively with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to go into the shelters because these people that 

were in shelters were going to need disaster housing assistance, 

and get them into those Disaster Housing Assistance Programs 

(DHAP). 

It was not to the scale we saw in Hurricane Katrina, but we 

want to have a positive verification that you were actually living 

where you say you were, that we actually had the inspector get 

there, verify the damages, and again, as we go through this and 

look at the recoupments on that disaster, did we drive that error 

rate down through that process and with those controls? 

And the other piece of this is, again in responding, if we can 

achieve the goal of meeting those basic needs and decrease the 

need to default to financial assistance, which generally is a sign 

that you cannot get supplies in, you are not able to get enough critical infrastructure up, and you are not meeting basic needs, so 

what you are going to do is basically give money to people and say, 

‘‘Go figure it out yourself.’’ 

That, I think, comes back to that aggressive response at the front 

end. And then look at the financial assistance, not as the primary 

tool we use, but to help them as we start getting stabilized and 

move into those first steps of recovery. 

Senator COLLINS. And were not those $2,000 debit cards just an 

invitation to improper spending? I mean, look what they were used 

for: Firearms, bail bonds, diamond rings, entertainment. They were 

not used for food, water, medical supplies in far too many cases. 

Should we be giving out $2,000 debit cards with few questions 

asked? You were not there at the time. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. I think the Senator makes the point that— 

again, I think this is something the IG can go back and say in Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, in Loma Prieta, and other cases, if you 

are not meeting the basic needs, and the response that oftentimes 

is the fallback and it does invite a lot of challenges to administer. 

Senator COLLINS. I want to say, here and now, that we are not 

going to give out $2,000 debit cards. 

Mr. FUGATE. We are not doing debit cards anymore, and that 

program went away. But I have to be cautious—an example would 

be the tsunami itself. We may not be able to get in there and do 

home inspections, so we may have to look at other ways to verify 

that people lived there. 

This is where the IG is giving us recommendations to use tools 

like using the type of things you could do if anybody was applying 

for a loan, getting the background information, utility bills, other 

information to verify, versus what has happened before where you 

just go and say, everybody in this ZIP code is going to get assistance. 

35 

So again, as people register, we may not be able to go do an inspection. Are there other ways to minimize the number of people 

applying for assistance by showing us some way that they were in 

that area without necessarily doing a home inspection? But where 

we can, it makes it very, I think, efficient to be able to have an 

inspector go to where you were living, verify it was damaged, it 

was in a disaster. 

I think that is a huge step to reduce the level of fraud. And then 

oftentimes, we will see if it was ineligible or duplication of benefits 

because of insurance, not because we were in such haste we were 

not able to take those steps. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I realize I have gone way over my 

time and I apologize. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. No, not at all. It was important, and the 

answer was no about the debit card program. 

As I look back to Hurricane Katrina, to make a long and complicated story too short, first off, we had an extraordinary natural 

disaster event, as, of course, has happened now in Japan. 

But part of what happened is that all levels of government, including the Federal Government and FEMA, did not act quickly 

and preventably, and as it became clear that was so, particularly 

with the television coverage, everybody became horrified about how 

people were being treated or not taken care of on the Gulf Coast. 

In some sense, the government overreacted and started to kind of 

throw out assistance in a way that was just—it was terribly wasteful and was also inviting fraud. That is just what we got. 

Mr. Skinner, do you want to comment on that at all? 

Mr. SKINNER. I think that is exactly what happened, and it was 

the same thing after Hurricane Andrew because the cavalry was 

slow to arrive—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SKINNER [continuing]. And the best way to treat the situation was to get funds out on the street as fast as possible whether 

you were eligible or not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. And that is where—something you 

said earlier, Mr. Fugate, about getting supplies out there, meeting 

the needs, and once you do that, you do not have to start throwing 

debit cards or money or anything else around. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the other issue for both you and the Ranking 

Member is, because the amount of funds that we provide are really 

not designed to make people whole—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE [continuing]. The less money that we give them, incrementally that takes away from the total amount, because again, 

it comes back to the issue of, if they have lost everything and do 

not have insurance, which is why they are eligible for these funds, 

they do not qualify for a Small Business Administration (SBA) 

loan, you want as much of that money going towards their recovery, not their immediate needs. 

And so again, this also comes back to the preservation of what 

the intention of these funds were. It has never been the intent of 

Congress to make you whole after a disaster. These funds were to 

help you start recovery. And so, if we are putting these funds out 

ahead of time and they are not really getting to that point, it actuVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:42 Jan 30, 2012 Jkt 067118 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\67118.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
36 

ally decreases the ability to support people when they really should 

start now to manage things on their own and being able to use 

these funds to start that recovery process, versus these funds going 

out in the emergency phase. 

And, as the IG has pointed out, if the basic needs are not being 

met and we are in this situation, we go from being fast to a lot of 

haste and then that, in turn, leads to fraud, waste, and the inability to really make sure we are good stewards of the funds. And so, 

we put a high premium on this idea of stabilization and speed to 

support this and drive, then, the next steps of that initial recovery 

with these funds so they are going towards the intended purposes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Do you want to respond to that? I 

want to ask you, Administrator, just one more factual question 

which may be of interest to people watching relating to Japan. 

There has been concern, and I think a certain amount of confusion, about what the potential danger is to the United States from 

the nuclear plant problems in Japan. And particularly, as the 

media has been following it the last few days and the sense that 

the possibility of a meltdown at one of the plants or an explosion, 

if the emission of a large amount of radioactivity goes up, people 

have been worried about the extent to which the West Coast of the 

United States, particularly Hawaii, and obviously Guam and the 

Mariana Islands, are maybe subject to some danger. I wonder if 

you would give us your current sense of what that possibility is. 

Mr. FUGATE. I will refer back to the statement made by the 

Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In looking at all 

these scenarios, they do not see any radiation reaching the United 

States that would be a danger or require protective actions. But in 

anticipation of this, FEMA in support of the Department of Energy—they have a system called RadNet, which is an existing system, that 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, monitors various elements—air, water, and other types of things across the country. 

And so, if we were to detect anything, we may detect things that 

are well below any levels that require action. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. This happened during Chernobyl. But we did not 

currently have any monitors in our territories, particularly Guam 

and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. So we 

were in a support role again. The Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) is in the lead role. They deployed monitors out to augment 

that network they already have, as well as supporting Alaska with 

additional monitors, particularly out in the Aleutian Islands. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. So this is two-part, one, based upon the scenario 

that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not see this reaching 

the U.S. territories or the West Coast. But we also have an active 

monitoring system that EPA expanded to be able to do active monitoring to verify that and provide that information. And the EPA is, 

again, looking at this, not that we think we are going to get something, but we need to be able to answer the question, Well, are you 

testing, are you monitoring, are you sure? 

And so, this was the decision, to send these monitors out to 

Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, as 

37 

well as in the Aleutian Islands where we did not currently have existing monitors. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. As I understand it, we have more than 

100 existing monitors along the West Coast—— 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [continuing]. Measuring radiation. 

Mr. FUGATE. In fact, this is a public Web site that EPA operates, 

that you can go to their Web page and take a look at where these 

sites are and their current activities, what they monitor and the 

purpose and the history of the program. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So I presume that, just trying to be helpful, that people, including on the West Coast, should not yet be taking potassium iodine pills as a preventive of any kind because right 

now there is no risk, and there is some slight risk of side effects 

from those pills for some people? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it, the 

State Department of Health for both the State of Hawaii and for 

the State of California are telling people that this is something 

they should not be doing. There is no indicator to do this. And their 

recommendation is that people not take potassium iodine in this 

event. It is not warranted, and, as you point out, there may be 

other concerns. 

So both of those State health offices are telling people that they 

do not recommend this and that they would not want you to take 

this based upon this event because they do not see where there 

would be any need in this event, and we do have the active monitoring that is taking place now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate those answers. I hope they 

are helpful to people. I thank the three witnesses. Senator Collins 

and I were commenting to each other here that in a sense, we were 

conducting two hearings at once, one on the IG’s report and on the 

management of FEMA, and then the other on what has happened 

in Japan. We tried to bring them together. 

I appreciate the patience of the witnesses as we did that. I appreciate the work of the witnesses. All of your statements, of course, 

will be included in the record in full. We are going to keep the 

record of this hearing open for 15 days for any additional statements you would like to put in the record and any questions that 

our colleagues or we may have of you. 

Senator Collins, do you have anything more? 

Senator COLLINS. No. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much. With that, the 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(39) 

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