IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

May 24, 2016 Session

PENNY ARVIDSON RICHARDS v. NEIL KINGSLAND RICHARDS

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sullivan County

No. K0038722(B) R. Jerry Beck, Judge1

No. E2015-00758-COA-R3-CV-FILED-SEPTEMBER 26, 2016

In this divorce action, Penny Arvidson Richards (Wife) argues that the trial court’s 

judgment granting her a divorce and incorporating the parties’ marital dissolution 

agreement (MDA) should be set aside. Among other things, Wife alleges that she signed 

the MDA under duress and/or while she lacked the requisite mental capacity to do so. 

The trial court ruled that Wife failed to prove her defenses to the enforcement of the 

MDA. Wife appeals. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.

FRIERSON, II, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined. 

Sarah E. Larkin,2Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Penny Arvidson Richards.

R. Wayne Culbertson, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Neil Kingsland Richards.

OPINION

I.

Wife filed her complaint for divorce on February 4, 2013. On May 13, 2013, her 

first attorney, Shelburne Ferguson, Jr., filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court 

granted that motion on May 24, 2013. A trial date of November 7, 2013 was set by order 

 

1

Sitting by interchange. 

2 Attorney Sarah E. Larkin filed a motion to withdraw as Wife’s counsel after filing a 

brief and reply brief and orally arguing on Wife’s behalf. We granted her motion on August 18, 

2016. Apparently, Wife is now proceeding pro se. 
2

entered September 6, 2013. On October 28, 2013, Wife filed a motion for continuance, 

citing the death of her second attorney, Michael LaGuardia. The trial court granted the 

motion over the objection of Neil Kingsland Richards (Husband). The case was reset. 

The new trial date was set for January 9, 2014. 

On January 10, 2014, Wife filed another motion to continue, alleging that her 

“medical condition, multiple sclerosis, has worsened drastically,” that “discovery still has 

not been completed,” and “the parties have not been to mediation.” The trial court 

granted the continuance over Husband’s objection, and again reset the case for trial, this 

time to April 2, 2014. On March 26, 2014, Wife filed her third motion to continue, again 

citing her medical condition. On April 1, 2014, the trial court granted the motion of 

attorney Gregory W. Francisco to withdraw as Wife’s counsel. On April 30, 2014, the 

trial court granted the motion of Jerrold L. Becker, Wife’s fourth attorney, to withdraw as 

her counsel. On June 9, 2014, the trial court entered an order stating, “after numerous 

counsel being involved, the number of continuances and other issues that this matter will 

remain on the docket and the same will be tried on July 2, 2014.” 

On June 27, 2014, Wife, then represented by Thomas C. Jessee, again moved for a 

continuance, arguing that her new attorney had just been retained and “will not have 

adequate time to prepare for trial.” On July 17, 2014, the trial court entered an order 

stating,

Based on argument of counsel the Court finds it is appropriate 

to continue this matter, Mr. Jessee having just been retained 

last week.

The parties in consultation with the Court agreed the trial 

would be held on August 5, 2014 at 9:00 AM in Bristol. It is 

the Court’s intention to try that case on that date. Because of 

the age of the case no continuances will be granted for any 

reason other than severe illness. [Wife] is admonished not to 

discharge her attorney unless she is prepared to try the case 

herself on August 5, 2014.

On August 12, 2014, the trial court ordered the parties to mediation and set a trial date of 

September 4, 2014. The mediation occurred on September 4, 2014. The parties reached

an agreement at mediation. They signed the MDA, which consists of two handwritten 

pages and two attachments listing and valuing the parties’ property. The MDA provides 

that Husband will pay non-modifiable alimony to Wife in the amount of $1,000 per 

month for 48 months. Attachment II to the MDA values the marital assets awarded to 

Husband at $550,091.27, and those to Wife at $507,983.21. 
3

Wife mailed a pro se, ex parte letter on October 29, 2014, to the trial court. Her 

letter is captioned “letter of protest at lack of advocacy and preparation.” In it, she listed 

numerous grievances regarding the litigation and her representation, among other things. 

Wife’s letter states, “my attorney . . . prepared NO documents on my behalf prior to 

mediation and the[n] FORCED ME TO SIGN an untenable agreement blocking my path 

when I asked to be excused from the mediation session.” (Capitalization in original.) 

Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted Wife another continuance in an order stating the 

following:

[Husband] filed a motion to enforce the mediated agreement 

between the parties. The matter was set for October 31, 2014 

at 9:00 A.M. Counsel for [Wife] has requested a short 

continuance while [counsel] continues to work through issues 

concerning the settlement. [Husband’s] counsel strenuously 

objects to any continuance.

Based on the argument of counsel,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this matter is continued until 

Wednesday, November 5, 2014[.]

At the beginning of the November 5, 2014 hearing, Wife’s counsel orally moved 

for a continuance on the ground that Wife was at a doctor’s office for an appointment and 

unable to be present at court. Wife presented no doctor’s report or other communication

about her medical condition, and her attorney stated that Wife had simply texted him to 

tell him she couldn’t be present because of the doctor’s appointment. The trial court 

painstakingly reviewed the procedural history of the case, and stated as follows:

Now, this has been an unusual case for this Court to hear. I 

don’t think I’ve had anything near this chain of circumstances 

we’ve experienced in this case but I am convinced beyond ‒ I 

think in this case beyond a preponderance but up to a clear

and convincing proof that the wife, Mrs. Richards, has done 

about everything she can do to delay the end of this case[.]

* * *

Now, I recognize she’s ill. I learned that early on in these 

proceedings, but I – I previously set a drop dead date in this 

case and I think she would have full understanding of what 
4

that meant, it’s going to go to trial, which I relented and 

didn’t force that to a[n] issue in a ‒ when a prior ‒ another 

lawyer was involved in the case other than Mr. Jessee. And it 

seems strange to the Court that Mrs. Richards, the wife, 

knowing of the problems with this case would go all the way 

to Nashville without obtaining some type of medical report.

Following the trial court’s comment, the case proceeded forward the same day. 

It is clear from the transcript that the trial court took seriously the allegations in 

Wife’s ex parte letter. The court expressed concern that the crime of false imprisonment 

might have been committed by Wife’s attorney during the mediation. On its own accord, 

the trial court called and briefly examined the mediator, Douglas S. Tweed. Mr. Tweed 

said that he did not witness any conduct by attorney Jessee that he would “determine to 

be a false imprisonment or a forced remainder” as alleged in Wife’s letter.3 

Husband moved to withdraw his counterclaim and stipulated that Wife was 

entitled to a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court reviewed 

and approved the MDA. The judgment, entered December 5, 2014, grants Wife a divorce 

based on Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct and incorporates the MDA. 

Wife moved to alter or amend the judgment, arguing, among other things, that

[t]he plaintiff would show that given her current medical and 

mental condition she became so distraught during the 

mediation that she felt threatened and did not have a clear 

understanding of the terms of the [MDA]. She believes there 

was undue pressure for her to execute the agreement which 

was not in her best interest and she believes that her medical 

condition was worse than she realized during the time period 

 

3 Attorney Jessee also stated to the court,

In front of everyone I asked [Wife] to please not leave until we ‒ 

we were circulating the agreement. She said she needed to leave to 

let a contractor in. From my observation she could have walked 

out and left. I didn’t physically keep her or block her from going. 

She waited and – and signed the agreement.

Because this statement was made by Mr. Jessee as an officer of the court, and not under oath, the 

trial court said that it would not consider it in deciding any issue which might have otherwise

been impacted by it.
5

and that she was not physically or mentally capable of 

executing such an important agreement.

In early February 2015, the trial court entered a consent order substituting Wife’s 

sixth attorney, Jason A. Creech, for Mr. Jessee. Around the same time, Wife moved for a 

continuance of the hearing on her motion to alter or amend, saying her counsel “cannot 

be prepared and ready for trial on such short notice.” A hearing took place on February 

4, 2015. Wife testified that, on the day she went to mediation and signed the MDA, “I 

was suffering from a lack of being able to make clear judgment calls.” She further stated 

that Husband had threatened her with “information regarding pornographic materials that 

he was going to use and post against me,” and that her then-attorney, Jessee, pressured 

her and refused to allow her to leave until she signed the MDA. The parties presented 

proof regarding several marital assets that were not specifically addressed by the MDA ‒ 

a retirement pension from Husband’s former employer, two such pensions from Wife’s 

former employment, and savings bonds in the amount of approximately $3,200. The trial 

court ruled that each party would receive 50% of the value of these assets. The court also 

reviewed the MDA. It reiterated its finding that the terms were fair and equitable. 

Regarding Wife’s defenses to the enforcement of the MDA, i.e., duress and mental 

capacity, the trial court specifically found Wife not credible, and credited the testimony 

of Husband. The trial court denied Wife’s motion to alter or amend the divorce 

judgment. Wife timely filed a notice of appeal.

II.

Wife raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether the divorce and property settlement should be set 

aside because the trial court granted the divorce on the ground 

of inappropriate marital conduct without hearing proof of the 

facts alleged in support of this ground. 

2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Wife did not 

establish that she signed the MDA under duress or without 

the requisite mental capacity. 

3. Whether the MDA should be set aside because it does not 

make adequate and sufficient provision for the equitable 

settlement of property rights between the parties.

4. Whether the trial court’s refusal to grant continuances prior 

to the November 5, 2014, and February 4, 2015, hearings was 
6

an abuse of discretion requiring the divorce judgment to be 

set aside.

III.

Our review of this non-jury case is de novo upon the record of the proceedings 

below with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s factual findings, a 

presumption we must honor unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). “When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially 

where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable 

deference must be accorded to the trial court’s factual findings.” Collins v. Howmet 

Corp., 970 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tenn. 1998) (citation omitted). We review the trial court’s 

conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Oakes v. Oakes, 235 

S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted).

IV.

A.

Wife argues that the trial court erred in granting her a divorce based on Husband’s 

inappropriate marital conduct without hearing proof pertaining to that ground, citing 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-114 (2014), which provides:

If the defendant admits the facts charged in the . . . petition 

and relied upon as the ground for a divorce, . . . the court 

shall, nevertheless, before decreeing a divorce, except a 

divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, hear 

proof of the facts alleged as aforementioned, and either 

dismiss the . . . petition or grant a divorce, as the justice of the 

case may require.

Wife relies upon a pair of cases where this Court vacated a divorce judgment because the 

trial court did not follow this statute. Stutz v. Stutz, No. E2004-01399-COA-R3-CV, 

2005 WL 2016828 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Aug. 23, 2005); Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152 

S.W.3d 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In both opinions, however, we indicated that a trial 

court may grant a divorce upon stipulated grounds without hearing proof. Stutz, 2005 

WL 2016828, at *1 (“the trial court erred in granting a divorce to the parties in the 

absence of a stipulation to or proof of grounds for divorce”); Hyneman, 152 S.W.3d at 

550 (“absent a mutual stipulation agreed upon by the parties, pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated §§ 36-4-114 and 36-4-129, the trial court must conduct a hearing prior to 
7

entering a final decree of divorce”). This rule is in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 

36-4-129, which provides that 

(a) In all actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony or 

legal separation the parties may stipulate as to grounds and/or 

defenses.

(b) The court may, upon stipulation to or proof of any ground 

of divorce pursuant to § 36-4-101, grant a divorce to the party 

who was less at fault or, if either or both parties are entitled to 

a divorce or if a divorce is to be granted on the grounds of 

irreconcilable differences, declare the parties to be divorced, 

rather than awarding a divorce to either party alone.

Wife argues that there was no stipulation in this case. The transcript of the divorce 

hearing belies this argument:

[Husband’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor, he moves to

withdraw his counterclaim and stipulates that [Wife] is 

entitled to divorce under the statutory ground of inappropriate 

marital conduct and that she should be granted the divorce.

The Court: I want to make some more findings. Now, when 

Mr. Jessee ‒ I’m asking this as a question of the attorneys. 

Would he have a right to cross examine Mr. Richards, the 

husband?

[Husband’s counsel]: He has a right to, Judge, but . . . he’s 

admitting he’s at fault. I mean, what else could we . . .

The Court: Would you have any questions of Mr. Richards, 

the husband?

[Wife’s counsel]: Would I? Well, I ‒ I ‒ he’s – he’s admitted 

to ‒ entitled to a divorce. If we’re taking up the order of 

protection and ‒ and/or restraining order I have . . .

The Court: I’m not going to hear the order of protection. I’ll 

make a further finding on that later.
8

[Wife’s counsel]: If he’s stipulated she’s entitled to an 

inappropriate marital conduct then I don’t know that I’d have 

any additional questions about it.

(Emphasis added.) The trial court later stated, without objection, that “I award the 

divorce to the wife on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and on stipulation of 

[Husband].” As can be seen from the transcript, the trial court gave Wife’s counsel the 

opportunity to present proof, and counsel declined, recognizing the stipulation to 

inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court did not err in granting Wife a divorce on 

the ground of inappropriate marital conduct.

B.

Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding that she did not establish duress or 

lack of mental capacity as a defense to the enforcement of the MDA. The Supreme Court 

addressed a similar contention in Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 498-500 (Tenn. 

2006), and provided the following guidance:

We have previously held that a marital dissolution agreement 

is a contract and as such generally is subject to the rules 

governing construction of contracts. . . . These types of 

agreements consistently have been found to be valid and 

enforceable contracts between the parties. 

Additionally, settlement agreements made during or in 

contemplation of litigation are enforceable as contracts.

* * *

Husband . . . alleged that he was under duress at the time he 

signed the agreement because Wife threatened to remove the 

children from this state. . . .

Duress is defined as “ ‘a condition of mind produced by the 

improper external pressure or influence that practically 

destroys the free agency of a party, and causes him to do and 

act or make a contract not of his own volition, but under such 

wrongful external pressure.’ ” Rainey v. Rainey, 795 S.W.2d 

139, 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Simpson v. Harper, 

21 Tenn. App. 431, 111 S.W.2d 882, 886 (1937)). When 

such pressure exists “is a question to be determined by the 
9

age, sex, intelligence, experience and force of will of the 

party, the nature of the act, and all the attendant facts and 

circumstances.” Id. (quoting 10 Tenn. Jur. Duress and Undue 

Influence § 3 at 112 (1983)).

(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) As further explained by this Court,

“Duress” is an unlawful restraint, intimidation or compulsion 

of another to such an extent and degree as to induce such 

other person to do or perform some act which he is not legally 

bound to do, contrary to his will and inclination. The alleged 

coercive event must be of such severity, either threatened, 

impending or actually inflicted, so as to overcome the mind 

and will of a person of ordinary firmness. To constitute 

duress, the danger must not only exist, but must be shown to 

have actually operated upon the mind, and to have constituted 

the controlling motive for the performance of the act sought 

to be avoided. 

Green v. YMCA of Memphis, No. W2014-02190-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 6736705, at *4 

(Tenn. Ct. App., filed Nov. 4, 2015) (quoting Cummings Inc. v. Dorgan, 320 S.W.3d 

316, 331–32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)). “The burden of proof lies with the party asserting 

duress.” Id.

Wife testified at the February 4, 2014 hearing regarding her duress claim as 

follows:

Q. Were there any threats or allegations or any statements by 

your husband that you took as a threat?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did he say to you that you took in a threatening, 

menacing, or otherwise improper fashion?

A. My husband told me that he had information regarding 

pornographic materials that he was going to use and post 

against me that he had received from individuals outside of 

our circle of friends, in addition to the already numerous

pictures and things that had been posted of me on the Internet

already.
10

* * *

Q. Did you feel that if you did not sign the agreement there 

would be consequences to you in light of that information?

A. . . . Yes, sir, I did because Mr. Jessee physically blocked 

my exit from the door and said, “You are not leaving here 

until this is signed.”

* * *

Q. You testified your husband said something to you that you 

found very unsettling?

A. Yes.

Q. And you felt that there’d be consequences?

A. Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q. But a fair question is, well, you had legal counsel there?

A. Uh-huh (affirmative).

Q. So if you had legal counsel why do you still feel that there 

was undue pressure?

A. I stood up and asked to leave.

Q. And . . .

A. Three times.

Q. Did you feel that you had the free will ability to leave. . .

A. No.

Q. . . . the mediation?

A. I did not. There were four men there.
11

* * *

A. That is my signature, sir, on that contract and I was forced 

to sign it.

Q. Now, you’re ‒ so you’re saying Mr. Jessee forced you to 

sign that contract?

A. Yes, sir.

Husband denied that he had threatened Wife. Both Husband and the mediator, Douglas 

Tweed, testified that Wife had not been forced to remain at the mediation. The trial court 

explicitly found Wife’s testimony not credible and credited Husband’s testimony, stating, 

I do not credit the testimony of Mrs. Richards in regards to 

her alleged understanding of what occurred at the mediation 

agreement. I flat out don’t do that. I don’t think any 

reasonable trier of fact could find her to be credible under all 

the circumstances I tried to describe here today.

The issue of duress in this case hinges on credibility and “considerable deference 

must be accorded to the trial court’s factual findings.” Collins, 970 S.W.2d at 943. 

Mindful of the trial court’s decision on credibility, we conclude that the evidence does 

not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings on Wife’s “duress” defenses to 

enforcement of the MDA.

Regarding the defense of mental incapacity, we have observed:

An adult is presumed competent, and the party attempting to 

invalidate a contract based on the theory of mental incapacity 

bears the “burden of proving that one or both of the 

contracting parties were mentally incompetent when the 

contract was formed.” [Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. 

Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)].

Specifically, persons seeking to show incapacity must prove 

either “(1) they are unable to understand in a reasonable 

manner the nature and consequences of the transaction or (2) 

they are unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the 

transaction and the other party has reason to know of their 

condition.” Id. “It is not enough to prove that a person was 
12

depressed or had senile dementia; [rather], to prove mental 

incapacity, the person with the burden of proof must 

establish, in light of all the surrounding facts and 

circumstances, that the cognitive impairment or disease 

rendered the contracting party incompetent. . . .” Id.

Mitchell v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 349 S.W.3d 492, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2008). “[I]t is rare indeed for a court to find that a contract is unenforceable based on the 

unsound emotional state of a contracting party. The party seeking to avoid a contract on 

this basis must show that he or she had no reasonable perception or understanding of the 

nature or terms of the contract.” Beem v. Beem, No. W2009-00800-COA-R3-CV, 2010 

WL 1687782, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 28, 2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The only evidence supporting Wife’s assertion that she was mentally incompetent 

at the time of the mediation is Wife’s own testimony. There is no medical proof in the 

record regarding Wife’s physical or mental condition. Wife testified that she suffers from 

post-traumatic stress disorder, multiple sclerosis, and “cognitive dysfunction.” Regarding 

her alleged cognitive dysfunction at the time of the mediation, Wife testified:

A. At that particular point in time I was suffering from a lack 

of being able to make clear judgment calls.

Q. How so?

A. I was suffering from ‒ I had not been able to sleep, I had 

been traumatized, and I was not having the ability to make 

clear decisions at that point.

This testimony – in two relatively short answers – is the sum total of the evidence Wife 

presented regarding her mental incapacity. Husband testified that, during the mediation,

Wife appeared alert, lucid, responsive, aware of what was going on, and “able to 

communicate very well.” When Wife was asked on cross-examination whether she 

considered herself to be intelligent, she responded, “as intelligent as you, sir.” The trial 

court noted its own observations of Wife over the course of several hearings, stating that 

it found her lucid, intelligent, responsive, and that “she knew what she was doing, that 

she was working with her lawyer.” We hold that the evidence does not preponderate 

against the trial court’s judgment Wife did not establish mental incapacity as a defense to 

the enforcement of the MDA.
13

C.

Wife asserts that the MDA should be set aside because it is inequitable. It is well 

established that “[t]rial courts are afforded wide discretion in equitably dividing marital 

property.” Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tenn. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“Appellate courts generally defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is inconsistent with 

the factors in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36–4–121(c)4or the evidence 

preponderates against the trial court’s ruling.” Id. at 785-86 (footnote added). We 

 

4

In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant 

factors including:

(1) The duration of the marriage;

(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, 

employability, earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and 

financial needs of each of the parties;

(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the 

education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

(4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of 

capital assets and income;

(5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, 

preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the 

marital or separate property, including the contribution of a party 

to the marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the 

contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given 

the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;

(B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets 

means wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property 

available for equitable distributions and which are made for a 

purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint 

for divorce or legal separation has been filed.

(6) The value of the separate property of each party;

(7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the 

division of property is to become effective;

(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the 

reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably 

foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

(10) The amount of social security benefits available to each 

spouse; and

(11) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities 

between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c).
14

review the trial court’s approval and incorporation of the MDA, mindful that it is a 

settlement agreement negotiated and freely executed by both parties, who each had the 

benefit of counsel. 

In her brief, Wife argues that the handwritten MDA is inequitable because, 

“[p]rimarily, it is illegible.” It is not illegible. The trial court stated that it read the 

agreement, as have we. The trial court also heard counsel summarize and discuss its 

terms. As already noted, it provides for $550.091.27 in marital assets to Husband, and 

$507,983.21 to Wife. The marital assets not explicitly mentioned in the MDA and its 

attachments, reflecting several relatively small pensions and about $3,200 in savings 

bonds, were divided equally by the trial court. Husband agreed to pay alimony of $1,000 

per month for 48 months. He will be 67 years old when the four-year alimony obligation 

ends. Wife has received disability payments since 2005 in the approximate amount of 

$5,000 per month. Husband’s income is not established by the record, although 

statements of counsel to the court at the hearing suggest it may be in the neighborhood of 

$160,000 per year. Both parties are relatively well educated: Wife has an undergraduate 

degree in marketing and economics and a master’s degree in business. She worked as a 

hospital administrator, among other things, before her health declined. Wife testified that 

she is able to drive an automobile, take care of her house, pay her bills, and to get along 

in society “somewhat with help.” 

The trial court reviewed the terms of the MDA and found them to be equitable. 

The evidence does not preponderate against the equity in the division decreed by the trial 

court. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pertaining to the division of the 

parties’ marital property. 

D.

Finally, Wife argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant her a continuance before 

the hearings on November 5, 2014, and February 4, 2015, was an abuse of discretion and 

prejudicial error. “The granting or denial of a motion for a continuance lies in the sound 

discretion of the court[, and t]he ruling on the motion will not be disturbed unless the 

record clearly shows abuse of discretion and prejudice to the party seeking a 

continuance.” Blake v. Plus Mark, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tenn. 1997) (citation 

omitted). We hold that the procedural history in this case, as set forth by us in section I 

of this opinion, provides a complete answer to Wife’s contention. The trial court granted 

Wife numerous continuances over Husband’s objection before finally deciding it was 

time to end this case. The record fully supports the trial court’s finding that Wife “has 

done about everything she can do to delay the end of this case.” At the conclusion of the 

February 4, 2014, hearing, the trial court said:
15

I think if the record isn’t clear on anything ‒ I mean what an 

appellate court might do with this is I think the Court’s bent 

over backwards to ensure [Wife] had her day in court.

We agree. The trial court demonstrated admirable patience in dealing with Wife’s 

dilatory tactics, and did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant her a further 

continuance.

V.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the 

appellant, Penny Arvidson Richards. The case is remanded for enforcement of the trial 

court’s judgment and collection of costs assessed below.

_______________________________

 CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE