Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 21-0296

══════════

Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. and Taylor Woodrow 

Communities-League City, Ltd.,

Petitioners,

v.

Erin Skufca as Next Friend of KSX and KSXX, Minor Children, 

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

PER CURIAM

Litigants who sue based on a contract subject themselves to its 

terms, including any arbitration clause within that contract. In this 

case, Jack and Erin Skufca, along with their minor children, sue Taylor 

Morrison of Texas, Inc., and Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, 

Ltd.,1 for construction defects in their new home. The narrow question 

of pleading that Taylor Morrison presents is whether the children joined 

1 Unless otherwise noted, this opinion will refer to Taylor Morrison and 

Taylor Woodrow together as “Taylor Morrison.” 
2

the breach-of-contract claim in the petition and may therefore be 

compelled to arbitrate along with their parents2 on the basis of directbenefits estoppel. We hold that the Skufcas’ petition, which did not 

distinguish between the parents’ claims and the children’s claims, 

unambiguously reflects the children as joining their parents in asserting 

the breach-of-contract claim and that the children therefore may be 

compelled to arbitrate. 

In September 2016, Jack and Erin Skufca signed a purchase 

agreement with Taylor Woodrow3 to build a home in the Mar Bella 

subdivision of League City, Texas. The purchase agreement includes an 

arbitration provision requiring arbitration of “any and all claims, 

controversies, breaches or disputes by or between the parties hereto” 

that “aris[e] out of or relate[] to this purchase agreement, the property, 

the subdivision or community of which the property is a part, the sale of 

the property by seller, or any transaction related hereto,” whether those 

claims are based in “contract, tort, statute, or equity.” 

The Skufcas allege that less than a year after they moved in, the 

home developed significant mold issues that caused their minor children 

to be continuously ill. In August 2019, the Skufcas sued both Taylor 

Woodrow and Taylor Morrison for construction defects and fraud. Their 

2 The court of appeals addressed the parents’ challenge to the

arbitration agreement in a separate interlocutory appeal that is not before us. 

See Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Skufca, 650 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). 

3 Taylor Woodrow is the party listed as the seller in the purchase 

agreement. However, the record indicates that Taylor Morrison is a limited 

partner of Taylor Woodrow. 
3

petition listed Mr. and Mrs. Skufca as plaintiffs individually, as well as 

Mrs. Skufca as next friend of the couple’s two minor children. The 

Skufcas asserted a number of claims, including breach of implied 

warranties, negligent construction, fraud in a real-estate transaction, 

breach of contract, violation of the Residential Construction Liability 

Act, quantum meruit, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act. Though at times the Skufcas’ petition used both 

“Plaintiff” in the singular and “Plaintiffs” in the plural, the petition does

not differentiate between the parents and the children when asserting 

each cause of action. 

After the Skufcas filed suit, Taylor Morrison moved to abate the 

proceedings and compel arbitration of all the claims based on the 

arbitration provision in the parents’ purchase agreement. The trial 

court denied the motion to compel as it pertained to the children. Taylor 

Morrison appealed that order. The court of appeals affirmed, holding

that the children are not third-party beneficiaries of the purchase 

agreement and that direct-benefits estoppel does not apply. ___ S.W.3d 

___, 2020 WL 5823287, at *5-9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 1, 

2020). 

The question before us is whether the Skufca children joined the 

breach-of-contract claim such that they must arbitrate along with their 

parents even though they did not sign the purchase agreement.4 “[A] 

litigant who sues based on a contract subjects him or herself to the 

contract’s terms.” In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 755 (Tex. 

4 Taylor Morrison does not seek review of the court of appeals’ thirdparty-beneficiary holding. 
4

2001). If any one of the children’s claims is based on the parents’ 

purchase agreement, then the children must arbitrate all claims that 

fall under the scope of the purchase agreement’s arbitration clause. See 

In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tex. 2005). 

The Skufcas’ petition demonstrates that the children sued based 

on their parents’ purchase agreement. The caption of the petition lists 

all four individuals—Mr. and Mrs. Skufca individually, and Mrs. Skufca

as next friend of the two children—as plaintiffs. None of their causes of 

action distinguishes between the parents and the children. For 

example, in the breach-of-contract claim, the Skufcas state:

• “Plaintiffs had a valid, enforceable contract in place, issued by 

Defendant. The Plaintiffs were the beneficiary [sic] of the 

contract.”

• “The Plaintiffs fully performed their contractual obligations by 

paying for the service of the construction of their home.”

• “The actions by Defendant and their designated agents 

constitute a material breach of Defendant’s contract with the 

Plaintiffs. As a result of this breach of contract, the Plaintiffs 

have suffered the damages that are described in this petition, 

the producing cause of which are Defendants’ actions.”

By contrast, in the damages section of their petition, the Skufcas 

do specify which individuals are included in a particular use of the term 

“Plaintiffs”: “Plaintiffs (Mrs. Skufca and the two minors, KSX and KSXX 

specifically) have suffered physical injury and illness.” The fact that the 

Skufcas do not similarly specify that only certain family members are 

included in their breach-of-contract claim provides further evidence that 

the claim’s use of “Plaintiffs” includes all four plaintiffs.
5

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned 

that “a holistic review of the pleading” indicates that “the petition is 

insufficiently specific to conclude that the children are joining their 

parents’ breach of contract cause of action.” 2020 WL 5823287, at *7. 

The court of appeals noted that the petition’s factual allegations 

concerning the children focus on personal injuries suffered from mold 

exposure. Id. at *6. Moreover, the breach-of-contract cause of action is 

premised on allegations that could only come from the parents, and 

“[t]he children had no legal basis to sue for breach of the contract.” Id.

at *7. In the view of the court of appeals, this context supports “reading 

‘Plaintiffs’ as limited to the children’s parents, suing in their individual 

capacities.” Id.5 

We disagree. The Skufcas’ petition does not distinguish between 

individual family members in asserting the family’s claims, but that 

does not lead to the outcome that the court of appeals reached. Our 

decision in FirstMerit Bank helps explain why. In that case, the parents 

purchased a mobile home for their adult daughter and her husband. 52 

S.W.3d at 752. The parents’ financing agreement included an 

arbitration clause. Id. Though the daughter and her husband were not 

signatories to the contract, the “original petition ma[de] no distinction 

between the parents’ claims and the [daughter and son-in-law’s] claims.” 

Id. at 755-56. Because the daughter and son-in-law “fully joined” the 

5 The court of appeals employed similar reasoning to determine that the 

children also did not join the claims for statutory fraud in a real-estate 

transaction or breach of implied warranties. 2020 WL 5823287, at *7.
6

parents’ contract claims, id. at 755, they “subjected themselves to the 

contract’s terms, including the Arbitration Addendum,” id. at 756. 

Any factual distinctions between this case and FirstMerit Bank

are immaterial to the question of whether direct-benefits estoppel 

applies based on the children’s asserted contract claims. If anything, 

the children’s status as minors who necessarily lived in the family home 

with their parents makes today’s outcome even easier to reach. What 

matters, though, is the central common point: the Skufcas’ petition does

not differentiate between the parents’ and the children’s causes of 

action. By the petition’s own terms, the children fully joined the breachof-contract claim.6

The breach-of-contract claim includes allegations that Taylor 

Morrison failed to “perform[] the services that were contracted” and did 

not “honor[] the warranty issued at the time of issuance.” Because these 

claims “must be determined by reference” to the purchase agreement, 

they satisfy direct-benefits estoppel. Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132. 

6 A minor’s own contract is generally “voidable at the election of the 

minor.” Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 

1973); but see Johnson v. Newberry, 267 S.W. 476, 478 (Tex. Comm’n App. 

1924, judgm’t adopted) (noting that for contracts for necessaries such as 

housing, minors are still liable for the reasonable value of the benefits 

received). But even for a voidable contract, a minor may not “enforce portions 

that are favorable to him and at the same time disaffirm other provisions that 

he finds burdensome.” Dairyland Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d at 158. 

Minors may not “retain the benefits of a contract while repudiating its 

obligations.” Id. 
7

The children thus sued based on the contract and are subject to its 

terms, including the arbitration clause.7 

We note, however, that our decision does not mean that the 

children may avoid arbitration simply by amending the petition to allege 

only tort or other noncontractual claims. While this case most clearly 

presents the pleading issue for our review, direct-benefits estoppel also 

applies when a nonsignatory seeks direct benefits from the contract 

outside of litigation. See id. at 132-35. Because the Skufca children 

lived with their parents in the home at issue and sued for factually 

intertwined construction-defect claims, that basis for direct-benefits 

estoppel serves as an additional reason to compel arbitration here. See 

Taylor Morrison of Tex., Inc. v. Ha, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Jan. 27, 2023). 

Therefore, without hearing oral argument, we grant the petition 

for review, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand to 

the trial court to issue an order consistent with this opinion and for 

further appropriate proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1. 

OPINION DELIVERED: January 27, 2023

7 Because the children’s breach-of-contract claim alone suffices for 

direct-benefits estoppel and thus to compel the children to arbitrate all their 

claims pursuant to the arbitration clause, we do not address whether their

implied-warranty or statutory-fraud claims are also based in contract such 

that those claims would independently trigger direct-benefits estoppel.