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304 Nebraska Reports

IN RE INTEREST OF ZOIE H.

Cite as 304 Neb. 868

In re Interest of Zoie H., a child 

under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, 

v. Zoie H. appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed January 24, 2020. No. S-18-1028.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record, and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings.

2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of 

law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.

3. Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. The review of constitutional 

standards is a question of law and is reviewed independently of the trial 

court’s determination.

4. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Waiver. The proper procedure for raising a facial constitutional challenge to a criminal statute is to file a 

motion to quash, and all defects not raised in a motion to quash are 

taken as waived by a defendant pleading the general issue.

5. Constitutional Law: Convictions: Statutes. A defendant is prohibited 

from attempting to circumvent or avoid conviction under a particular 

statute by asserting a constitutional challenge to another, collateral statute which is irrelevant to the prosecution.

6. Criminal Law: Jury Trials. When considering a criminal defendant’s 

right to a jury trial, it is well established that the right does not extend 

to those criminal offenses categorized as petty but attaches only to those 

crimes that are considered serious offenses.

7. Jury Trials: Sentences: Time: Legislature. The right to a jury trial 

attaches when the potential term of incarceration exceeds 6 months or if 

the additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly 

reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a serious one.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

01/31/2020 01:06 AM CST
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8. Juvenile Courts. Juvenile adjudications are civil, not criminal, in 

nature.

9. Juvenile Courts: Weapons. The prohibition on possessing firearms 

in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1204.05 (Cum. Supp. 2018) is not punishment 

imposed for a prior juvenile adjudication.

10. Constitutional Law: Juvenile Courts: Jury Trials. A juvenile court 

proceeding is a civil proceeding, and under the doctrine of parens 

patriae, the constitutional guarantees of a jury trial and the incidents 

thereto are not applicable to a juvenile proceeding.

11. Criminal Law: Evidence. The owner of chattel may testify as to its 

value in a criminal case.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster 

County: Roger J. Heideman, Judge. Affirmed.

Joe Nigro, Lancaster County Public Defender, James G. 

Sieben, and Mark D. Carraher for appellant.

Patrick F. Condon, Lancaster County Attorney, Mary Norrie, 

and Elise Harris, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellee.

Heavican, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, 

and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

Zoie H. appeals from an order of the separate juvenile 

court adjudicating her pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(2) 

(Reissue 2016) for the act of attempted theft by unlawful taking, $5,000 or more. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of September 25, 2018, Heidi Cuca was 

fueling her Lexus at a convenience store in Lincoln, Nebraska. 

While standing outside the Lexus, Cuca observed two young 

females had entered her vehicle and were seated inside—one 

in the driver’s seat and the other in the backseat. The female in 

the driver’s seat was later determined to be Zoie.

It appeared to Cuca that Zoie was trying to start the Lexus, 

but was having trouble getting the engine to turn over. Cuca 

heard the female in the back seat shout, “‘Zoie let’s go.’” So 
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Cuca attempted to retrieve the Lexus keys from inside the 

vehicle and throw them. An altercation ensued, during which 

Zoie shouted, “‘Don’t, let me go. I’m going to take it.’” The 

convenience store manager heard Cuca yelling for help and 

called the 911 emergency dispatch service.

Zoie escaped before police arrived, but someone was able 

to grab Zoie’s arm and hold her long enough for Cuca to take 

a photograph. Cuca provided the photograph to police, who 

eventually located Zoie and contacted her at school a few 

days later.

Sgt. Mike Ripley, an officer with the Lincoln Police 

Department, met with Zoie and her father to conduct a followup investigation. Zoie waived her Miranda rights and 

agreed to an interview. Zoie admitted she made plans to steal 

the Lexus, explaining she “‘just felt like taking the car.’” Zoie 

described how she and a friend entered the Lexus from the 

passenger side while Cuca was fueling up on the other side. 

Zoie also described the altercation that ensued and how she 

eventually escaped.

1. Juvenile Court Proceedings

On October 16, 2018, the State filed an amended supplemental petition in the separate juvenile court of Lancaster 

County. It alleged that on or about September 25, 2018, Zoie 

intentionally engaged in conduct which, under the circumstances as she believed them to be, constituted a substantial 

step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in her commission of the crime of theft by unlawful taking in the amount 

of $5,000 or more. Attempted theft by unlawful taking is a 

Class IIIA felony when the value of the thing involved is 

$5,000 or more.1

Zoie filed a motion to quash the amended supplemental 

petition. Alternatively, she filed a demand for jury trial. Both 

requests were premised on the enactment of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-20l(4)(c), 28-511, and 28-518(1) (Reissue 

2016).
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§ 28-1204.05 (Cum. Supp. 2018), which went into effect on 

July 19, 2018, and provides in pertinent part:

(1) . . . [A] person under the age of twenty-five 

years who knowingly possesses a firearm commits the 

offense of possession of a firearm by a prohibited juvenile 

offender if he or she has previously been adjudicated an 

offender in juvenile court for an act which would constitute a felony or an act which would constitute a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

(2) Possession of a firearm by a prohibited juvenile 

offender is a Class IV felony for a first offense and a 

Class IIIA felony for a second or subsequent offense.

Other portions of the statute exempt members of the armed 

forces and law enforcement2 and establish a procedure for 

those under 25 years of age to request reinstatement of the 

right to possess a firearm.3 Zoie was not charged with violating § 28-1204.05, but her motion to quash alleged that 

adjudication for theft by unlawful taking over $5,000 “would 

subject [her] to criminal prosecution under an unconstitutional 

statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1204.05 (Cum. Supp. 2018).” 

Zoie’s demand for a jury trial was also premised on the 

enactment of § 28-1204.05. Generally speaking, she argued 

that the statute’s restriction on firearm possession amounted 

to a penalty for being adjudicated and thereby rendered the 

adjudication proceedings a “serious criminal case” entitling 

her to a jury trial pursuant to Duncan v. Louisiana4 and State 

v. Wiltshire.

5

After holding a hearing, the juvenile court overruled the 

motion to quash, finding there was no defect on the face of 

2 See § 28-1204.05(3).

3 See § 28-1204.05(4).

4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 

(1968).

5 State v. Wiltshire, 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992), overruled on 

other grounds, State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999).
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the amended supplemental petition. The juvenile court denied 

the demand for jury trial, reasoning that Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-279(1) (Reissue 2016) requires the adjudication portion of 

juvenile court proceedings “shall be conducted before the court 

without a jury, applying the customary rules of evidence in use 

in trials without a jury.” The matter proceeded to an adjudication hearing on the amended supplemental petition.

2. Adjudication Hearing

At the adjudication hearing, the State called three witnesses: 

Cuca, the convenience store manager, and Sergeant Ripley. 

Cuca described the events of September 25, 2018, as set out 

above, and identified Zoie as the female who attempted to steal 

the Lexus. The manager largely confirmed Cuca’s testimony, 

and she too identified Zoie as the female who attempted to 

steal the Lexus. Sergeant Ripley testified about his interview 

with Zoie, including that she received Miranda warnings prior 

to the interview.

Both Cuca and Sergeant Ripley offered testimony about the 

value of the Lexus. Cuca testified that she purchased the 2012 

Lexus RX350 3 years earlier for around $21,000 and that it 

currently had 60,000 miles on it. When Cuca was asked her 

opinion on the value of the Lexus, Zoie objected to the question as speculative. The objection was overruled, and Cuca 

answered that according to Kelley Blue Book, the value of 

her Lexus with 60,000 miles “is around $21,000 list price.” 

There was no motion to strike Cuca’s response and no crossexamination on Cuca’s valuation testimony.

Sergeant Ripley also relied on Kelley Blue Book for his 

valuation testimony. He estimated the “average trade in value” 

of the Lexus was $15,529. He did not contact Cuca to get 

information on the vehicle’s mileage, condition, or accessories. 

Instead, he used the value for a “base model” Lexus in “good” 

condition with 75,000 miles. When asked on cross-examination 

what the value of the Lexus would be if its condition had been 

“poor,” Sergeant Ripley estimated it would still be between 

$10,000 and $12,000. He testified it was unlikely a 2012 
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Lexus in working condition would be worth less than $5,000. 

He based his opinion on his experience investigating car thefts 

and his research into the value of Cuca’s Lexus. There was 

no objection to Sergeant Ripley’s valuation testimony or to 

the admission of the Kelley Blue Book printout showing 

that valuation.

Zoie rested without presenting any evidence. In a journal 

entry and order filed October 23, 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated Zoie on the allegations of the amended supplemental 

petition, finding the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Zoie was a juvenile as described in § 43-247(2).

Zoie timely appealed and filed a petition to bypass that 

included a notice of constitutional question under Neb. Ct. 

R. App. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2014). We granted the petition 

to bypass.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Zoie assigns, restated, that the juvenile court erred by (1) 

overruling her motion to quash, (2) denying her demand for 

jury trial, and (3) finding she committed the act of attempted 

theft by unlawful taking, $5,000 or more, when the State 

failed to meet its burden of proof regarding the value of 

the vehicle.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the 

record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court’s findings.6

[2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which an 

appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.7

[3] The review of constitutional standards is a question 

of law and is reviewed independently of the trial court’s 

determination.8

6 In re Adoption of Micah H., 301 Neb. 437, 918 N.W.2d 834 (2018).

7 See id.

8 State v. Montoya, ante p. 96, 933 N.W.2d 588 (2019).
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IV. ANALYSIS

1. Motion to Quash

[4] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1808 (Reissue 2016) provides, “A 

motion to quash may be made in all cases when there is a 

defect apparent upon the face of the record, including defects 

in the form of the indictment or in the manner in which an 

offense is charged.” We have consistently held that the proper 

procedure for raising a facial constitutional challenge to a 

criminal statute is to file a motion to quash, and all defects not 

raised in a motion to quash are taken as waived by a defendant 

pleading the general issue.9

But here, Zoie’s motion to quash did not challenge the constitutionality of the criminal statute on which she was being 

adjudicated. Instead, her motion to quash raised a facial constitutional challenge to an entirely different statute, § 28-1204.05. 

Zoie sought to quash the amended supplemental petition by 

arguing that adjudication for acts that would constitute theft by 

unlawful taking over $5,000 “would subject [her] to criminal 

prosecution under an unconstitutional statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-1204.05.”

[5] In the criminal context, a defendant is prohibited from 

attempting to circumvent or avoid conviction under a particular 

statute by asserting a constitutional challenge to another, collateral statute which is irrelevant to the prosecution.10 We have 

generally described this as a rule of standing and have applied 

it to motions to quash in a criminal prosecution, reasoning 

that a defendant has standing to challenge only those statutes 

that are relevant to the prosecution.11 We conclude this rule is 

equally applicable to motions to quash filed in juvenile adjudication proceedings.

9 State v. Hibler, 302 Neb. 325, 923 N.W.2d 398 (2019).

10 State v. Harris, 284 Neb. 214, 817 N.W.2d 258 (2012); State v. Cushman, 

256 Neb. 335, 589 N.W.2d 533 (1999).

11 See id.
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Zoie was being adjudicated for acts which would constitute 

felony theft by unlawful taking, and her motion to quash challenged the constitutionality of § 28-1204.05, a statute that was 

collateral to the adjudication, and which would apply, if at all, 

only after an adjudication. Zoie was attempting to avoid adjudication by challenging the constitutionality of a statute that 

was irrelevant to the statutes under which the State was seeking adjudication, and the juvenile court correctly overruled the 

motion to quash.

Given our resolution of this assignment of error, we do not 

reach, in this appeal, any of Zoie’s constitutional challenges to 

§ 28-1204.05.

2. Demand for Jury Trial

In her second assignment of error, Zoie argues that if 

§ 28-1204.05 is constitutional, it effectively transforms a juvenile adjudication for an act which would be a felony or a 

misdemeanor act of domestic violence into a serious criminal 

offense to which the right to a jury trial attaches.

[6,7] When considering a criminal defendant’s right to a 

jury trial, it is well established that the right does not extend 

to those criminal offenses categorized as “‘petty,’” but attaches 

only to those crimes that are considered “serious[]” offenses.12

This court has said that the right to a jury trial attaches when 

the potential term of incarceration exceeds 6 months or if the 

“‘additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the 

maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that 

they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense 

in question is a “serious” one.’”13

Zoie urges us to apply the “serious offense” test to her 

juvenile adjudication, and she asks us to find that the passage of § 28-1204.05 reflects a legislative determination that 

12 See Blanton v. North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 

L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989).

13 Wiltshire, supra note 5, 241 Neb. at 820-21, 491 N.W.2d at 327.
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juvenile adjudications for acts which would constitute a felony 

are serious offenses that must be tried to a jury. Her argument 

is premised on the fundamental assumption that § 28-1204.05 

imposes a criminal penalty for juvenile adjudication. We 

explore that assumption first and reject it. We then consider the 

right to jury trial generally in juvenile court adjudications, and 

we conclude the juvenile court correctly denied Zoie’s demand 

for a jury trial.

(a) § 28-1204.05 Is Not Penalty 

for Juvenile Adjudication

To address Zoie’s argument that § 28-1204.05 transforms 

juvenile adjudications into serious offenses that require a jury 

trial, we first consider whether § 28-1204.05 can fairly be 

characterized as punishing juvenile adjudication at all. The 

answer to this question is key because if § 28-1204.05 is not 

punishment imposed for her juvenile adjudication, then Zoie’s 

argument that § 28-1204.05 transforms the adjudication into a 

serious offense necessarily fails.

[8] In the criminal context, we often analyze such questions using the “‘intent-effects’” test established by the U.S. 

Supreme Court, “which requires an initial determination of 

whether the Legislature intended the statute to be criminal 

or civil [in nature].”14 But juvenile adjudications are civil, 

not criminal, in nature. As we explained in In re Interest of 

Laurance S.:

15

“We have long recognized that a juvenile court proceeding is not a prosecution for crime, but a special proceeding that serves as an ameliorative alternative to a criminal 

prosecution. . . . The purpose of our statutes relating 

to the handling of youthful offenders is the education, 

14 See State v. Payan, 277 Neb. 663, 670, 765 N.W.2d 192, 200 (2009) 

(applying test from Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 

2d 164 (2003)).

15 In re Interest of Laurance S., 274 Neb. 620, 624, 742 N.W.2d 484, 488 

(2007).
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treatment, and rehabilitation of the child, rather than 

retributive punishment. . . . The emphasis on training and 

rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is underscored by 

the declaration that juvenile proceedings are civil, rather 

than criminal, in nature.”

A juvenile adjudication does not result in a conviction and 

sentence; instead, when a juvenile is adjudicated for acts which 

would constitute a felony, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286 (Cum. 

Supp. 2018) sets out the dispositional options available to the 

juvenile court. And even when a disposition is similar to that 

imposed as punishment for a crime, we have not found the 

disposition to be punishment.16 Because juvenile adjudications 

are civil rather than criminal in nature, it is difficult to envision 

any circumstance under which a juvenile disposition could be 

successfully challenged as punishment.

Here, of course, the prohibition on possessing firearms 

contained in § 28-1204.05 is not part of the juvenile code, 

but, rather, it is contained within the statutory provisions 

governing criminal offenses. To answer the question whether 

§ 28-1204.05 is properly characterized as punishment for the 

juvenile adjudication, we find guidance in our holding in State 

v. Peters.

17

In that case, we held that a similar statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 28-1206 (Reissue 1995), which prohibits firearm possession by convicted felons, does not impose punishment for 

the prior felony. We reasoned that although § 28-1206 punished the specific conduct of possessing a firearm after being 

convicted of a felony, it did not increase the punishment for 

the prior felony. In Peters, we recognized that one’s status 

16 See, e.g., In re Interest of Brandon M., 273 Neb. 47, 727 N.W.2d 230 

(2007) (dispositional order of restitution in juvenile court rehabilitative in 

nature and not punishment); In re Interest of A.M.H., 233 Neb. 610, 447 

N.W.2d 40 (1989) (dispositional placement of juvenile in youth training 

center is not punishment, but, rather, is furnishing of protection, care, and 

training by State as substitution for parental authority).

17 State v. Peters, 261 Neb. 416, 622 N.W.2d 918 (2001).
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as a convicted felon made the statutory firearm prohibition 

applicable, but we found the legal consequences for the past 

criminal conduct remain unchanged. Stated differently, the 

statutory prohibition on possessing firearms may be a collateral consequence of a prior felony conviction, but it is not part 

of the punishment imposed for that prior felony conviction. 

We noted that the majority of jurisdictions agree that statutes 

prohibiting felons from possessing firearms “are viewed not 

as further punishment for the underlying felony or felonies, 

but as a future prohibition on a felon’s conduct.”18

[9] Given our holding in Peters that the prohibition on possessing firearms in § 28-1206 is not punishment for the prior 

felony conviction, we likewise hold that the prohibition on 

possessing firearms in § 28-1204.05 is not punishment imposed 

for a prior juvenile adjudication. We therefore reject Zoie’s 

argument that § 28-1204.05 transformed her juvenile adjudication into a serious offense and entitled her to a jury trial. 

And as we explain below, we see no other legal basis on this 

record to support Zoie’s demand for a jury trial in her juvenile 

court adjudication.

(b) No Constitutional Right to Jury 

in Juvenile Adjudications

The U.S. Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania19

held that a jury trial is not constitutionally required in a juvenile court’s adjudicative stage. The plurality opinion discussed 

the Court’s earlier decisions in Kent v. United States,

20 In re 

Gault,

21 and In re Winship22 and reasoned generally that the 

18 Id. at 422, 622 N.W.2d at 924.

19 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 

(1971).

20 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 

(1966).

21 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967).

22 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).
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full spectrum of criminal constitutional rights afforded adults 

has not been imposed on juvenile court proceedings. McKeiver

emphasized, however, that if a state decides to offer jury trials 

in juvenile adjudications that would be its “privilege and not 

its obligation.”23

Post-McKeiver, some states have extended the right to jury 

trial to juvenile adjudications under certain circumstances, 

through either statutes or court decisions.24 But the majority 

have not,25 including Nebraska.

Nebraska’s preeminent case on the issue is the pre-McKeiver

case of DeBacker v. Brainard.26 There, we considered a habeas 

petition challenging the constitutionality of a recently enacted 

statute requiring that juvenile court hearings “shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner, 

applying the customary rules of evidence in use in civil trials 

without a jury in the district courts.”27 The juvenile at issue had 

been adjudicated delinquent for the act of forgery, a felony, and 

23 McKeiver, supra note 19, 402 U.S. at 547.

24 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2357 (Cum. Supp. 2018) (granting juveniles 

right to request jury trial); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 55A (West 

2017) (requiring trial by jury unless waived); In re L.M., 286 Kan. 

460, 186 P.3d 164 (2008) (holding juvenile code lost its parens patriae 

character and concluding juveniles have right to jury trial under Kansas 

Constitution); RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971) (holding state 

constitution guarantees juvenile’s right to jury trial).

25 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-76e (West 2009) (“trial shall be held 

by the court without a jury”); § 43-279; S.D. Codified Laws § 26-7A-30 

(2016) (lists rights of juveniles but does not include right to jury trial); 

In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Iowa 2013) (“[n]either statutory nor 

constitutional provisions guarantee juveniles the right to a jury trial”); 

State v. Burns, 205 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tenn. 2006) (“legislature has 

determined that, while they are still within the juvenile court system, our 

juveniles are to be tried by judges, not juries”); Richard M. v. Superior 

Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971) (jury trial is 

inapplicable in juvenile proceedings).

26 DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968).

27 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-206.03 (Reissue 1968).
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was placed at a boys’ training school. He filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, alleging § 43-206.03 was unconstitutional because it denied him the right to a jury trial. The district 

court rejected the constitutional claim and denied habeas relief. 

On appeal, four members of this court opined that the new statute was unconstitutional because it denied juveniles the right to 

a jury trial for acts that would be felonies if charged as an adult. 

In large part, the majority read the U.S. Supreme Court’s In re 

Gault decision to require such a result. Three judges, however, 

found In re Gault “does not hold or even infer that a jury trial 

is essential to due process in a delinquency case, even where 

the supporting evidence points to criminal conduct on the part 

of the juvenile.”28 Due to the absence of a supermajority under 

Neb. Const. art. V, § 2, this court affirmed the dismissal of the 

habeas petition.29

[10] The following year, a majority of this court again held 

that “a juvenile court proceeding, under the controlling statute 

in the State of Nebraska, is a civil proceeding and under the 

doctrine of parens patriae, the constitutional guarantees of a 

jury trial and the incidents thereto are not applicable to a juvenile proceeding under our statute.”30

Currently, § 43-279(1) provides in part: “The adjudication 

portion of hearings shall be conducted before the court without 

a jury, applying the customary rules of evidence in use in trials 

without a jury.” Zoie does not directly challenge the constitutionality of § 43-279(1), but instead argues that the enactment 

of § 28-1204.05 “elevates felonies alleged in juvenile court to 

‘serious criminal case’ status [so] the constitutional requirement 

of a jury trial right supersedes the language in § 43-279(1).”31

28 DeBacker, supra note 26, 183 Neb. at 477, 161 N.W.2d at 516.

29 See, also, Laurie v. State, 108 Neb. 239, 188 N.W. 110 (1922) (juvenile 

petition does not charge crime and does not entitle juvenile to jury trial).

30 McMullen v. Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 584, 169 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1969). 

See, also, Laurie, supra note 29.

31 Brief for appellant at 45.
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Recognizing that juvenile adjudications are civil in nature, 

and having rejected the premise that § 28-1204.05 imposes a 

penalty for juvenile adjudication, we agree with the juvenile 

court that § 43-279(1) requires a juvenile adjudication hearing 

to be conducted without a jury. Zoie’s second assignment of 

error lacks merit.

3. Burden of Proof Regarding 

Value of Property

In her final assignment of error, Zoie argues that the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient 

to prove the value of the Lexus. The amended supplemental 

petition alleged Zoie committed acts which would constitute 

the Class IIIA felony of attempted theft by unlawful taking, 

$5,000 or more. Under § 28-518(8), value is an essential element of the offense of theft which must be proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

The juvenile court found the State had met its burden of 

proof and adjudicated Zoie under § 43-247(2) as a juvenile 

who committed an act which would constitute a felony under 

the laws of this State. On appeal, Zoie challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the value of the Lexus, and 

we limit our analysis accordingly. After a de novo review of 

the record, we find the State met its burden of proving that the 

Lexus had a value of $5,000 or more.

[11] It has long been the rule in Nebraska that the owner of 

chattel may testify as to its value in a criminal case.32 At the 

adjudication hearing, Cuca testified that her Lexus had a value 

“around $21,000.” The investigating officer testified, based on 

his experience investigating car thefts and his research into 

the value of Cuca’s Lexus, that it had a value of $15,529 if it 

was in good condition. Moreover, he testified it would have 

a value in excess of $10,000 even in poor condition. Zoie 

did not object to this testimony and presented no evidence to 

the contrary.

32 See State v. Holland, 213 Neb. 170, 328 N.W.2d 205 (1982).
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On this record, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of 

the Lexus was $5,000 or more. We therefore conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to adjudicate Zoie under § 43-247(2) 

and that her third assignment of error has no merit.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

order.

Affirmed.