In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-2608

IN THE MATTER OF:

CITY OF CHICAGO

Petitioner.

____________

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the

United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

____________

SUBMITTED AUGUST 1, 2007—DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2007

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and

EVANS, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Prince Foryoh has filed

many frivolous civil suits. Most have been pursued

in forma pauperis, a status granted on the basis of representations that both a district judge and this court have

concluded were designed to mislead. After losing these

suits, Foryoh failed to pay the costs awarded against him.

Judicial patience has limits, and earlier this year this

court directed Foryoh to pay what he owes, if he wishes to

continue litigating. We reproduce here the order in Foryoh

v. Banas, No. 06-3416 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). Although

that order was non-precedential under Circuit Rule 32.1,

we now give it precedential status and include it to avoid

any need for readers to consult multiple documents. Here

is the text of that order:
2 No. 07-2608

After he was convicted of harassment by telephone, see 135 ILCS 135/101, Prince Foryoh filed

this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the officer

who arrested him, contending that the officer

lacked probable cause and employed excessive

force. The district court initially permitted Foryoh

to proceed in forma pauperis but later revoked

that permission and dismissed the suit under

28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(A) after concluding that

Foryoh’s financial affidavit was false.

In another of Foryoh’s suits, his mother gave

testimony to the effect that she provides about

90% of his support—including meals, car, college

tuition, textbooks, and housing. Foryoh concedes

that his mother has provided (and continues to

provide) financial support but insists that she is

extending loans rather than making gifts. That is

not how his mother characterized things, but like

the district judge we need not resolve this intrafamilial dispute. Foryoh did not report the value of

these “loans” on his affidavit and other filings. In

response to a question whether he had received

more than $200 from any source in the preceding

year, Foryoh neglected to mention his mother’s

assistance. So his application for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis had a material omission and

may well have been perjurious.

Foryoh must pay the full filing and docket fees for

both the complaint in the district court and the

appeal taken to this court. Moreover, by attempting to deceive the district court he has forfeited the

privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in any

case until he had paid, in full, all outstanding fees

and costs for all of his lawsuits. (There are several

others.) See Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967 (7th

Cir. 2007). Finally, for the reasons given in Camp-
No. 07-2608 3

bell, we will enter an order under Support Systems

International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir.

1995), to remain in force until all fees and costs,

from all of Foryoh’s federal suits, have been paid.

In any application to this court to have the Mack

order lifted, Foryoh must provide (under oath) a

complete list of all of his federal suits and proof

that all of his financial obligations with respect to

these suits have been met.

Our reference to “another of Foryoh’s suits” was to

Foryoh v. DeJesus, No. 05 C 2341 (N.D. Ill.), where the

falsehoods came to light during discovery after the district judge had allowed Foryoh to proceed in forma

pauperis and had recruited counsel to represent him.

When the deceit was discovered, the district judge revoked

forma pauperis status but allowed Foryoh to continue

litigating after he paid the filing fee. At the time of our

decision in Banas, Foryoh had yet another suit pending,

in which he has never paid the filing fee. Foryoh v. Kelly,

No. 06 C 1226 (N.D. Ill.).

Our formal order issued on April 4 and reads:

On April 3, 2007, this court ordered Prince Foryoh

to pay fees and costs from all of his federal suits.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the clerks of all

federal courts in this circuit are directed to return

unfiled any papers submitted either directly or

indirectly by or on behalf of Prince Foryoh in this

or any of his pending cases in this court or district

courts unless and until he pays in full all fees

and costs from all of his federal suits. See Support

Systems Int’l Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam). In any application to this

court to have this order lifted, Foryoh must provide (under oath) a complete list of all of his

federal suits and proof that all of his financial
4 No. 07-2608

obligations with respect to these suits have been

met. In accordance with our decision in Mack,

exceptions to this filing bar are made for criminal

cases and for applications for writs of habeas

corpus. See id. at 186-87.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Prince Foryoh is

authorized to submit to this court, no earlier than

two years from the date of this order, a motion to

modify or rescind this order.

Defendants in DeJesus and Kelly asked the district

judges to dismiss these suits unless Foryoh paid the

necessary fees and had this court lift the Mack order. The

judges referred the subject to the court’s Executive Committee, which concluded that Foryoh is entitled to continue litigating his pending suits notwithstanding our

order. This led the City of Chicago, on behalf of the

defendants (as its employees), to request clarification, and

on July 11, 2007, we issued the following order:

On April 4, 2007, this court issued an order directing the clerks of every court within this circuit to

return, unfiled, papers tendered by Prince Foryoh

in all civil litigation, until he has satisfied all

unpaid filing fees and sanctions. See Foryoh v.

Banas, No. 06-3416, relying on Support Systems

International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir.

1995), and Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967 (7th

Cir. 2007).

The City of Chicago, which represents not only

Banas but also the defendants in other cases that

Foryoh has filed, has asked us to “clarify” the

order. No clarification is necessary. The order as

written applies to all cases now pending or that

Foryoh seeks to file in the future. The goal of the

order is to prevent Foryoh from conducting any

litigation until all fees and sanctions in all of his
No. 07-2608 5

suits have been collected. If there are good reasons

to do otherwise, then the order should be modified—and on application to this court, rather than

by a district judge.

The City represents that, notwithstanding our

order, district judges are allowing Foryoh to

conduct litigation that was on file when our order

was issued. The City believes that this contradicts

our order. This argument is in the nature of a

request for mandamus. The “request for clarification” therefore will be docketed as a petition for

a writ of mandamus.

Foryoh is given 14 days to show cause why a writ

of mandamus should not issue. (The clerk is

authorized to accept this response notwithstanding

the order of April 4, 2007.) The district judges

involved are invited to respond on the same schedule, if they so desire. See Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)(4).

These responses may include, if Foryoh or the

district judges think it appropriate, a request that

this court modify the order of April 4, 2007. Counsel for the City of Chicago then will have 7 days

to reply.

Both Foryoh and the Executive Committee have filed their

responses, and Chicago has filed a reply.

The Executive Committee informs us that the explication provided by our order of July 11 will lead it to stay

proceedings in Foryoh’s pending cases, but it asks us to

modify the order for two reasons: First, the Executive

Committee is concerned that our order of April 4 creates

“due process concerns"; second, the Executive Committee believes that a lengthy stay in Foryoh’s suits will

prejudice the defendants, who may be called on to litigate

several years in the future. For his part, Foryoh contends

that the City has not met the high burden of showing an
6 No. 07-2608

entitlement to mandamus, because the district judges

might choose to ignore the Executive Committee’s earlier

directive in favor of the view articulated by our order of

July 11. Foryoh also asks for a modification of the April 4

order to allow him to continue litigating without paying

accumulated filing fees and costs.

We see no need to modify our order’s main components.

Foryoh has filed frivolous suits and attempted to defraud

both the judiciary and his opponents. The remedy we

prescribed—that Foryoh pay accumulated filing fees and

costs, plus any sanctions that may have been imposed

in earlier suits, as a condition of further litigation—is a

modest one. We did not impose a new monetary sanction,

let alone one beyond Foryoh’s means. All we required is

that Foryoh meet the financial obligations that he has

incurred by virtue of his past litigation.

Orders of the kind we entered are consistent with the

Constitution. See In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702 (7th Cir.

1996). Foryoh is bound in personam by the adverse

decision in Banas. The due process clause entitles every

litigant to a full and fair opportunity to be heard; it does

not entitle anyone to be heard on the same question

over and over. The law of preclusion (res judicata and

collateral estoppel) rests on the proposition that once is

enough. Foryoh litigated and lost in Banas on two questions: (a) whether he had tried to deceive the federal

judiciary through misleading requests to proceed in forma

pauperis; and (b) the consequence of that deceit. He is

not entitled to continue litigating other suits without

paying the filing fees and costs required by our order of

April 4, 2007.

As for potential prejudice to the defendants from indefinite delay: We don’t understand why delay should ensue.

Foryoh must meet the normal schedule for civil litigation. If he fails to do so because his refusal to pay accumu-
No. 07-2608 7

lated filing fees and costs means that our order of April 4

remains in effect, then his suits must be dismissed for

want of prosecution. Defendants are entitled to judgment

with prejudice in their favor.

There is one respect on which our order of April 4 may

be ambiguous. The reference to an application after two

years means that Foryoh may ask for the order to be

modified or lifted after that time even if, despite his best

efforts, he has been unable to pay in full—because, for

example, his mother has stopped supporting him and he

has no other income. Once he has paid what he owes,

however, Foryoh is entitled to have the order lifted

immediately. That’s how Mack orders are supposed to

work. A Mack order bans litigation until whatever is due

(sanctions or unpaid filing fees) has been paid; the twoyear clause is designed to afford the litigant an opportunity for another look if there is a good reason—one other

than obstinacy or a desire to file another frivolous

suit—for nonpayment.

So the order is modified to provide that it may be lifted

immediately on full payment but otherwise is reaffirmed.

Given the Executive Committee’s promise to follow this

court’s guidance, we need not issue a formal writ of

mandamus.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-29-07