UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4653

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL RAMOND KELLY, a/k/a Michael Raymond Kelly,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00054-NCT-1)

Submitted: April 25, 2016 Decided: January 26, 2017

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Terry M.

Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM: 

Michael Ramond Kelly pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court 

sentenced Kelly to a within-Guidelines sentence of 300 months’ 

imprisonment. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court procedurally erred in declining to grant Kelly a 

three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility 

and whether Kelly’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Kelly 

was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he 

did not do so. We ordered supplemental briefing on whether 

Kelly’s North Carolina convictions for assault with a deadly 

weapon inflicting serious injury, assault with a deadly weapon 

with intent to kill, and voluntary manslaughter were properly 

classified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). We affirm.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential 

abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 194-95 (4th 

Cir. 2016). This review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In determining whether a sentence is 
3

procedurally reasonable, we consider, among other factors,

whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. Only after 

determining that a sentence is procedurally reasonable will we 

consider its substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account 

the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Any sentence that is 

within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is 

presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption 

can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 

Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). 

We turn first to the propriety of Kelly’s armed career 

criminal designation. The parties agree that Kelly’s prior 

North Carolina convictions for assault with a deadly weapon with 

intent to kill qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA’s 

force clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). They also agree 

that, because Kelly “has three previous convictions” for this 

offense, “committed on occasions different from one another,” 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), he qualifies as an armed career criminal. 

We deem arguments not raised by the parties waived and limit our 

review to the arguments raised in the parties’ briefs. Wahi v. 

Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 

2009). Accordingly, we express no opinion on the designation of 
4

Kelly’s other prior convictions as violent felonies and will not 

disturb the district court’s decision to sentence Kelly as an 

armed career criminal.

Next, we review the district court’s “acceptance-ofresponsibility determination for clear error.” United States v. 

Burns, 781 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

2872 (2015). Under the Guidelines, a defendant is eligible for 

a two-level reduction if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of 

responsibility for his offense.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual § 3E1.1(a) (2014). And, if his offense level is greater 

than 16, he is eligible for an additional 1-level reduction upon 

the Government’s motion. USSG § 3E1.1(b). When determining 

whether a defendant is deserving of the acceptance of 

responsibility reduction, a court considers, among other 

factors, whether the defendant voluntarily terminated or 

withdrew from criminal conduct or associations. USSG § 3E1.1 

cmt. n.1(B). Moreover, absent extraordinary circumstances, a 

defendant is ineligible for the reduction when he receives an 

enhancement for obstructing justice. USSG §§ 3C1.1, 3E1.1 cmt. 

n.4; see United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 

2010). 

Here, Kelly did not terminate or withdraw from criminal 

conduct or associations after his arrest. Instead, he and his 

fellow inmates brutally attacked the same person who had been 
5

the victim of the shooting that resulted in Kelly’s arrest for 

the instant offense. This assault on a material witness 

resulted in an offense-level enhancement for obstruction of 

justice. Although Kelly insisted that he and the others 

attacked the victim in self-defense, the video footage and an 

email he sent the day after showed that the attack was revengemotivated and that Kelly was not remorseful for his conduct. 

Because the obstruction of justice enhancement was warranted and 

Kelly did not terminate or withdraw from criminal conduct or 

associations, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in 

determining that Kelly did not deserve a downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility. 

We further conclude that Kelly has not rebutted the 

presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively 

reasonable. The court reasonably rejected Kelly’s assertion 

that he is a changed man in light of his long history of using 

firearms to terrorize and injure people and his recent 

orchestration of the revenge-motivated attack on the victim.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Kelly, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Kelly requests that a petition be filed, but
6

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Kelly. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED