IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION TWO DENNIS WAY, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v. STATE OF ARIZONA, a body politic; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, a n agency of the STATE OF ARIZONA, Defendants/Appellees

/Cross-Appellants. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2 CA-CV 2002-0131

DEPARTMENT B O P I N I O N

APPEAL FROM THE SUPER IOR COURT OF PIMA C OUNTY Cause No. C20015270 Honorable Ted B. Borek, Ju dge AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART Monroe & Associates, P.C. By Karl MacOmber

Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General By Peter C. Gulatto Tucson Attorneys for Plaintiff/

Appellant/ Cross-Appellee
Phoenix Attorneys for Defendants /Appellees/ Cross-Appellants P E L A N D E R, Presiding Judge.2

¶1 Appellant

Dennis Way appeals from the Pima County Superior Court’s order that modi fie d but otherwise affirmed an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order suspending Way’s driver’s license pursuan t to A.R.S. § 28-1321, Arizona’s implied consent statute. We affirm that part of the superior court’s order upholding the ALJ’s one-year suspen sion of Way’s driver’s license, but vacate the supe rior court’s starting date of July 13, 2001, and reinstate the ALJ’s starting date of August 28, 20 01. BACKGROUND ¶2 Although

the facts are largely un

disputed, we view them in the light most favorable to sustaining the ALJ’s decision. See Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep’t , 203 Ariz. 326, ¶2, 54 P.3d 355, ¶2 (App. 2002). On July 13, 2001, a police officer stopped Way’s

car and, after taking his

driver’s license and con

ducting a preliminary investigation, arrested him fordriving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI). Af ter transpor

ti ng Way to a police substation, an officer read to him admonitions from an “Adm in Per Se/Implied Con

sent Affidavit” form (the form). The adm

onitions essentially informe d Way that Arizona law req uired hi mto successfully perform te

sts of the officer’s cho

ice to determine

the amount of alcohol

or drugs in his body; that failure of the te sts would result in the suspension o f his driver’s license for

at least ninety days; and that refusal to s ubmit to the tests would result in the suspension of his driver’s license for at least one year. Way refused to take a breath test, stating that such a test was “an invasion.” ¶3 DespiteWay’s refusal, police did not issue him a copy of the form on the night of his arrest. That form includes and serves as an order of suspension that notif ies a DUI arrestee of the impending license suspension and of his or her right to reques t a hearing to contest the3

propriety of that suspension. The form also serves as a temporary driver’s permit. The arresting officer eventually served Way with a copy of the form six weeks later, on August 28, 2001. ¶4 Way then

requested a hearing purs uant to § 28-1321(K) to

contest the propriety of his lic ense susp ension. At the hearing, Wa y did not testify but argued tha t § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) requ ired police to issue the form to him when he was arrested an d his license was taken. The officer’s failure to do so, Way further argued, diveste d the Department of Tran sportation (DOT) of jurisdiction and voided its suspension

of his driver’s license. T he ALJ rejected those arg uments andaffirmed t

he August

28 order of suspension, stat ing that the requirements o f § 28- 1321(D)(2) (b) “were eventually complied with, albeit belatedly.” The ALJ f urther found that, “[a]lthough

Mr. Way had surrender

ed his license on July 13th, te chnically hisdriving privileges

werenot suspended at that point. He could have obtained a duplicate license through the [DOT] and lawfully driven.” ¶5 On

review pursuant to §

28-1321(M), the super

ior court agreed with the

ALJ that the officer’s failure to serve the orde r of suspension on Way the nigh t of his arrest did not divest DOT of jurisdiction to suspend Way’s driver’s license. But the court adjusted the term ination date for the suspension, reaso ning as follows: [C]onsidering

[§ 28-1321] as a

whole, its purpose is best served by considering

the language [of

§ 28-1321(D)(2)(b)] as directory. As the statute provides for the suspe nsio n to be effective fiftee n days after 1) service of the

o rder of suspension and 2) surrender of a license, thi s Court concludes that fail ure to provide immediate ly notice of suspension limits the allowable suspension to a ccount for the period [Way] had surrender ed his license and was without a temporary

permit. Thus, this Cou rt con cludes that the ALJ properlyimposed a suspension, exc ept as a matte

r of l aw the suspension

must b e adjusted to account for t he 46-day delay (July 13, 2001, to August 28, 2001) in pro viding notice of the suspension to [Way], the period [W

ay] was without a tempora ry permit.1 Way does not challenge the ALJ’s findin gs that police had reasona ble grounds to believe thathe had been

driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; that police had arrested him for DUI and requeste d that he submit to a breatha lyzer test ; that h e had refused to submit to that test; and that he had un derstood the consequence s of his refusal to submit

to breath testing. SeeA.R.S. § 28-1321(K). 4 ¶6 Way appeals from the super ior court’s ruling, again arguing that DOT lacked jurisdiction

to suspend his license. 1 Way alternatively contends that the ALJ essentially suspended his license for more

thanone year, which DOT may not do, and that the superior court lacked authorityto modify that ruling. The sta te cross-appeals, urg

ing us to reinstate the ALJ’s order because the superior court erred in co ncluding that suspension of Wa y’s license

began on the date he surrendered his driver’s license to police. DISCUSSION A. Interpretation o

f § 28-1321 ¶7 “When

reviewing an ALJ’s decisi on un der the implied consent la w, the superior court is limited to determining whe ther the ALJ’s decision was ‘ arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.’” Caretto v. Arizona Dep’t of T ransp. , 192 Ariz. 297, ¶7, 965 P. 2d 31, ¶7 (App. 1998), quoting Edwards v. Arizona De p’t of Transp./Motor Vehic leDiv. , 176 Ariz. 137, 140, 859 P.2d 760, 763 (App. 1993). “In turn, we review t

he superio r court’s decision ‘to dete rmine whether the record

contains evidence to suppor t the judgment.’” Caretto , 192 Ariz. 297, ¶7, 965 P.2d 31, ¶7, quoting Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Co rp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prods., Inc. , 167 Ariz. 383, 386, 807 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App. 1990). In cases such as this that involve statutory interpretation, however, we are not boun d by the conclusions

of the ALJ or the superior court b ut,5

rather, our review is de novo. See Tornabene , 203 Ariz. 326, ¶12, 54 P.3d 355, ¶12; Forino v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp ., 191 Ariz. 77, 79, 952 P.2d 315, 317 (App. 1997). ¶8 Section

28-1321(A), A.R.S ., provides that any perso n operating a

motor vehicle in this state and arrested for DUI impliedly consents “to a te st or tests of the person’s bloo d, breath, urine or other bodily substanc e for the purpose of dete rmin ing alcohol concentration or drug content.” Subsection s (D) and (F) of the statu te provide, in pertinent par t: D. If a person under arrest re

fuses to submit

to the test designated by the law enforcement agency as provided in subsection A of this section:

. . . . 2. The law enforcement officer directing the

administration of the test shall: (a) Fi le a ce rtified report of the ref usal with the department. (b) On behalf of the department, ser ve an order of sus p ension

on the person that is effective fifteen days after the date the o

rder is served. (c) Require

the immediate surrende

r of any license or permit to drive that is issued by this state and that is in the possession or control of the person.

. . . . (e) If a valid license or permit is surrendered, issue

a temporary

driving permit that is valid for fifteen days. (f) Forward

the certified report

of refusal, a copy of the completed notice of suspe nsion, a copy of

any completed tem porary permit and any driver license or permit taken

into possession

under this section to the department within five days after the issuance of the notice of suspension.6 . . . . F. On receipt of

the certified report of refusal and a c opy of the order of suspension and on the eff ective date stated on the o rder, the department

shall enter the order of suspension on its r ecords unless a written request for a he aring as provided in this section has been filed by the accused person. I f the department rece

ives only the certified report of refusal, the d epartment shall notify the person named in the report in writin g sent by mail that: 1. Fifteen

days after the date of iss

uance of the notice the department

will suspend the person’s licen se or permit, driving privilege or nonresident driving privil ege. 2. The department will provid e an opportunity for a hearing if the person requests ahearing in writing and the request

is received by the depart

ment within fifteen days after the notice is sent. ¶9 As he did below, Way argues that § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) requires a police officer to

servethe order of suspension contemp oraneou sly with a DUI arrestee’s surrender of his or her driver’s license; that this requirement is mandatory; and that, therefo re, an offic er’s failure to complywith that requirement ren ders void all subsequent proc eedings to suspend the

license. Way is correct that if a statutory provision is deemed mand atory, failure to follow it r enders all subsequent

proceedings relating to that provision illegal and void. See Department of Revenue v. Southern Union Gas Co. , 119 Ariz. 512, 513-14, 582 P.2d 158, 159-60 (1978); Forino , 191 Ariz. at 80, 952 P.2d at 318. Conve rsely, if a statutory

provision is interpreted as m erely directory, “the failure to follow it has no inva lidating consequence.” Forino , 191 Ariz. at 80, 952 P.2d at 318; see also Department of Reve nue . ¶10 Section

28-1321(D)(2)(b) sta

tes that an officer “ s hall . . . serve an order of suspension” on a DUI arrestee who refuses to submit to a design ated test. But “use of the word2 In HCZ Construction , on which Way relies, the court emphasized that the legislature had

used “both ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same paragraph o f [the] statute,” A. R.S. § 12-1191(A), thereby supporting an infer ence that “the

Legislature acknowledged the difference and intended each word to carry its ordinary meaning.” 199 Ariz. 361, ¶15, 18 P. 3d 155, ¶15. In contrast, § 28-1321(D) has no such dic hotomy and, therefore , we do not infer that the le gislature necessaril y intend ed to ascribe an ordinary m eaning to the word “shall” in tha t statute. And, unlike HCZ Construction , Way has not cited or furn ished any legislative materials

that support his proffered interpretat

ion of § 28-1321(D)(2)(

b) as mandatory. 7 ‘shall’ does not automatically re nder a statute mandatory .” Forino , 191 Ariz. at 81, 952 P.2d at 319. “Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to disc ern and give effect to

legislative intent.” Hobson v. Mid-Century Ins. C o. , 199 Ariz. 525, ¶8, 19 P.3 d 1241, ¶8 (App. 2001). “To discern the legislature’s intent, we may consider the effect and consequences of alternative construction.” Forino , 191 Ariz. at 80, 952 P.2d at 318. “Language that is mandatory in form may be deemed directory when such construction best s erves the legislative purpo se.” Id .; see also HCZ Constr., Inc. v. First Franklin F

inancial Corp. , 199 Ariz. 361, ¶11, 18 P.3d 155, ¶11 (App. 2001). 2 ¶11 We find the issue presented he re analogous to that in Forino

. In that case, a DUI arrestee had been issued an order of suspension an d timely requested a hear ing on his license suspension. At

that time, the pertinent sta tute provided that the license suspension hearing

“shall” be held no later than “thirty days a fter receipt

of the request” for hear

ing. 1994 Ariz. Sess. La

ws,
c h. 317, § 19. The DOT, however, failed to hold the hearing within thirty d ays of Forino’s request. The court held that the statuto ry language was director

y and, as such, the failu

re to hold the license suspension hearing within the statutory

time period did not divest DOT of jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and ultimately suspend Forino’s driver’s license. Forino , 191 Ariz. at 81, 952 P.2d at 319.3 Courts of other jurisdictions follow this approach as wel l. See Outdoor Resorts/Palm

Springs Owners’

Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage C ontrol Appeals Bd. , 273 Cal. Rptr. 748, 75 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (thirty-day limitation directory, and st atutes or rules establishing time within which decision must be r endered dir ectory “unless a conseque nce or penalty is provided f or failure to do the act within the time commanded”); Meyers v. Ma ul , 671 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N. Y. App. Div. 1998) (failure of state agency to issue determination within thirty days of hearin g as required by statute did not divest agency of jurisdiction because stat ute was directory). 8 ¶12 As in Forino , this case concerns the effect of a de

lay in the civil, administrative license suspension hearing process that might result in an ALJ s ustaining or reversing DOT’s order of suspension. See § 28-1321(L) through (O). Specific ally, at issue here is the e ffect of failing to immediately provide wr itten notice to a DUI arrest ee, who has refused to su bmit to testing, that his or her driver’s lice nse will be suspended and tha t the arrestee has the righ t to request a hearing to contest tha

t susp ension. Forinodealt with the effect of a failure to comply with the statutorily im

posed deadline f

or such a hearing. We f ail to see why, as a matte r of statutoryinterpretation, a delay at the beg inning of the suspension process ma ndates a different result than that reached in Forino

. ¶13 Numerous Arizona cases support the conclusion that mandatory language relating to the timeliness of a heari ng generally should be constr ued as directory and that a ny delays in the process will not invalidate all subseque nt proceedings. 3 See Department of Revenue (four-month delay in tax appeal did not require dismissal); LakeHavasu City v. Arizona Dep ’t of Health Servs. , 202 Ariz. 549, 48 P.3d

499 (A pp. 2002) (four-year delay by director of Depa rtment of Health Services in issuing decision did not void subsequent pr oceedings); Francis v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div. , 192 Ariz. 269, 963P.2d 1092 (App. 1998) (reaffir ming Forino ); Watahomigie v. Arizona Bd. of Water Quality Appeals , 181 Ariz. 20, 887 P.2d 550 (App. 1994)4 Way does not contend that the officer’s fail

ure to issue a temporary d riving permit to

him when he was arrested an

d surrendered his driver’ s license invalidated all further proceedings or rendered DOT’s suspension void. See§ 28-1321(D)(2)(e). In any event, the same reasoning that leads us to construe § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) as directory would also apply to sub section (D)(2)(e). 9 (administrative

regulations gov ernin g contents of notice of app eal not invalid despite failu re to adopt such regulations within statutorily prescribed peri od); Traylor v. Thorneycro ft , 134 Ar iz. 482, 657 P.2d 895 (A p p. 1982) (failure to hold im plied consent hearing within tw enty days of petitioner’s request as required by ag ency rule did

not invalidate license

suspension proceedings). We find those authorities pe rsuasive in this context as we ll. ¶14 Interpreting § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) a

s directory also finds support i n the “general rule” that“if a statute ‘states the time for performance of an official duty, withou t any language denying performance after a specified time , it is directory.’” Forino , 191 Ariz. at 81, 952 P.2d at 319, quoting Watahomigie , 181 Ariz. at 32, 887 P.2d at 562; see also Department of Reve nue , 119 Ariz. at 514, 582 P.2d at 160; Lake Havasu City , 202 Ariz. 549, ¶7, 48 P.3d 499, ¶7; cf. Lavidas

v. Smith , 195 Ariz. 250, ¶¶18, 21, 987 P.2d 212, ¶¶18, 21 (App. 1999) (statute specified that “insubstantial fail ure t o comply” did not affect su bsequent proceedings). Indeed, unlike § 28- 1321(D)( 2)(c), whi ch “[r]equire[s] the im mediate surrender” of t

he driver’s license of a

DUI arrestee who refuses to s u bmit to testing, § 28-1321(D) (2)(b) does not specify when a law enfor cement

officer must serve an

order of suspension on that pe rson. Nor does § 28- 132 1 express alegislative intent to require dismissal of all subsequent proceedings if an officer fails to

servethe order of suspension imm ediately upon a

DUI arrestee’s surrender of his or her driver’s license. 4 In view of those omissions from the statute, an interpretation of § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) as mandatory

rather than directory woul d be inconsistent with prior cas e law and the aforementioned5 We acknowledge that the pertinent statutes, though directory, apparently contemplate that if an officer takes t

he driver’s license of a DUI arrestee who has refused testing, the officer generally should serve the order of su spension and issue

the temporary driving permit at that time, rather than

needlessly delaying the suspension process. See Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep’t , 203 Ariz. 326, ¶15, 54 P.3d 355, ¶15 (App

. 2002) (sanction of licens e suspension forrefusal to submit to test intended to quickly revoke licenses of dang erous driver s). But, dependingon

the circumstances, suc

h a simultaneous exchang e might not be feasible

or advisable if, for example, the arr

estee is substantially impair ed, has been hospitaliz ed, or is otherwise incapacitated. 10 general rule. We must interpret st atutory language in a way th at avoids such incon

si stent or untenable results. See State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247, ¶16, 34 P.3d 356, ¶16 (2001). ¶15 Additionally, to interpret § 28-1321(D)(2)(b) as mandatory would not give effect to the legislative purpose behind the implied consent statute— removal of drunk drivers from the roads. See Campbell v. Superio r Court , 106 Ariz. 542, 546, 479 P.2d 685, 689 (1971); Tornabene , 203 Ariz. 326, ¶15, 54 P. 3d 355, ¶15. A mandatory interpretation would provide a technical basis for avoiding an otherwise proper license suspension. Se e Trayl or , 134 Ariz. at 4 83, 657 P.2d at 896. We thus agree with the superior court that the legislati ve purpose of th e implied consent law is best served by “considering the

lan guage [of § 28-1321(D)(2)(b)] as directory.” Accordingly, we hold that the officer’s failure

to serve an order of suspe nsion on Way contemporaneously

with the surre nde r of his driver’s license did not invalidate all further proceedings or otherwise divest DOT of jurisdiction to s ubsequently suspend his license. 5 B. Duration of Lice

nse Suspension ¶16 In

light of our holding, we next a ddress the issue raised by bot h Way’s appeal and the state’s cross-appeal: whether the one-year suspension of Way’s lice nse started when he surrendered his license on the date of his arrest or, rather, s ix weeks later when he ac tually6 Although neither party raises the

issue, it appears that both the ALJ and the superior court incorrectly

determined the effective

date of suspension of Way’ s driver’s license. As sta ted on the order of suspension, pursuant to A. R.S. § 28-1321(D)( 2)(b), the effectiv

e date of suspension is fifteen days after service of th

e order of suspension. The refore, at the ea rliest, Way’s license would have been suspended either fifteen days after July 13, 2001, assuming the officer had served the order of suspension on Way then, or fifteen da

ys after August 28, 2001, the date Way actually was served. This discrepancy, howeve r, does not affect our

analysis of the issues prese nted. And we do not modify the ALJ’s order because the state does not seek that relief. 11 rece ived the order of suspension. 6 Because resolution of this iss ue also involves statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Tornabene ; Forino

. ¶17 Way contends that because a driver is requir ed to physically possess a driver’s license “at all times when operating a motor vehicle,” A.R.S. § 28-3169(A) , and because failure to do so constitutes a misdeme anor and m

ay subje ct such a person to arrest, see A.R.S. § 28- 1595(B); State v. Bonillas , 197 Ariz. 96, ¶7, 3 P.3d 1016, ¶ 7 (App. 1999), his license was effectively

suspended when he surrend ered it to police the night he was arr ested. Consequently, Way argues, the ALJ was without authority to order Way’s license susp ended for one year fro

m the date he received the or der of suspension because the maximum period DOT m ay s uspen d a person’s driver’s license is one year. Although DOT generally may not suspend a license

for more than one year, see State v. Banicki , 188 Ariz. 114, 116, 933 P .2d 57 1, 573 (App. 199 7), we di sagree with Way’s premise that his license was effective

ly suspended when he surrendered it to the officer on July 13. ¶18 Section

28

- 3001(16), A.R.S., states that “‘[s]uspension’ means that the driver license and driver’s priv

ilege to drive a motor vehic leon the public highways of this sta te are temporarily

withdrawn

during the period of the suspe nsion and until application for reinstatement is m ade .” (Emphasis added.) I n the context of the implied consent statute, a person’s privilege7 In accordance with those applicable statute s, the form itself also informs a DUI arrestee that, “[p]ursuant to ARS [§] 28-1321, your Arizona driv er license/permit . . . is s uspende d effective 15 days from Date Served.”

8 Way asserts that “[t]aking a driver ’s license prevents a person from driving legally.” From a practical, common

sense standpoint, we

agree that a

reasonable person might so believe. Our analysisof the pertinent statutes, h owever, leads us to

conclude that surrender of a driver’s license does not necessarily equa te to a license suspension fo r purposes of § 28-1321. And, as discussed in ¶19, the record does not reflect any prejudice to Way from his having surrendered his driver’s license to the of ficer without also receiv ing a temporary driver pe rmit untillat er. Accordingly, we leave for another day the more difficult issue, not presented here, of what effect any such showing of prejudic e might have on the license suspension process or the sta rting date of the suspension. 12 to drive is withdrawn fifteen days after a law enfor

cement officer serv

es or the DOT issues the writtenorder of suspension. § 28-1321(D)(2)(b), (F)(1), (G)(3), (L). 7 Such written notice is consistent with both A.R.S. § 28-33 06(C), which requires t hat, “[o]n suspending or re voking the license of a person . . . the [DO T] shall notify the licensee in writing,” and with A.R.S . § 28- 3318(A)(1), which states DOT “shall provide written notic e to a person possessing a driver license

. . . of . . .[a] suspension, revocation, cancella tion or disqualification of the license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.” Thus, contrary to Way’s argument, the sta tutes are clear that the surrender of one’s driver’s lic ense, by itself, is not enou gh to constitute a “suspension”; there must also be a withdrawal of the “privilege to

drive a motor vehicle,” § 28-3001(16), which mu st be preceded by a written notice. 8 ¶19 Moreover, we find nosupport in the record for Way’s contention that he “suffered the prejudice of having his driving privileges effec

tively suspended for a per iod of 6 weeks

before the Order of Suspension was finally served upon him.” Cf. Forino , 191 Ariz. at 81, 952 P.2d at 319 (DUI arrestee “had the burden to show prejudice” from delayed license suspension hearing). As the state points out, the rec ord fails to show that Way did not drive during the interim between13

surrender of his license and his rece ipt of thesuspension order. Nor does the record reflect that Way drove without a license durin g that period or was cited or a rrested for

his failure to possess

adriver’s license. Way’ s argument that he would have been subject to a rrest during the forty-six day s i n question merely presents a hypothetical, moot question that we decline to address. See Contempo-Tempe

Mobile Home Owners Ass’n v . Steinert , 144 Ariz. 227, 229, 696 P.2d 1376, 1378 (App. 1985) (“The court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions.”). ¶20 Finally, Way’s reliance on State ex rel. Collins v. Sc ott , 129 Ariz. 588, 589, 633 P.2d 397, 398 (1981), for the p roposition that “the period of revocation [is] to run f rom thedate the license is surrendered,” is misplaced. In that case, a DUI arrestee had surrendered his license

on the same day he had acknowledged receipt o f the order of revocatio

n. Thus, the supreme cou rt did not need toreach the precise question raised here: whether the mere surrender of the driver’s license const itutes a license suspension. Moreover, the statute a t issue and analyzed in Scott , forme r A.R .S. § 28-448, has since been renumbered and a

mended and, thus, was n o longer in effect when Way was arrested in July 2001. SeeA.R.S. § 28-3315; 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 178, § 21. In sum, absent any showing of prejudice, and becau se the statutes are clear that surrender of adriver’s license, by itsel f, does not necessarily

constitute or effectuate a withdrawal of a driver’s privilege to ope rate a motor vehicle, § 28-300 1(16), the superior cour t erred in modifying the duration of W ay’s license suspension.

DISPOSITION ¶21 Forthe foregoing reasons, w e affirm the ALJ’s order suspending Way ’s license for

one year commencing August 28, 2001, but vacate t hat part of the superior court’s ruling that14

ordered Way’s one-year licen se suspension to begin

on July 13, 2001. And, because Way has not prevailed on appeal, we deny his re quest for an award of att

orney’s fees pursuant

to A.R.S. § 12- 348.

____________________________ ___________ JOHN PELANDER, Presiding J udge CONCURRING:

____________________________ ___________ PHILIP G. ESPINOS

A, Chief Judge

____________________________ ___________ WILLIAM E. DRUKE, Judg e (Retired)