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S. Hrg. 113–444 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON 

MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 30, 2014 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Acting Staff Director 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Senior Professional Staff Member 

HARLAN C. GEER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

JASON T. BARNOSKY, Senior Professional Staff Member 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER J. BARKLEY, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

DANIEL P. LIPS, Minority Director of Homeland Security 

WILLIAM H.W. MCKENNA, Minority Investigative Counsel 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Coburn ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Ayotte .................................................................................................. 9 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 19 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014 

Hon. I. Charles McCullough III, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; accompanied by Hon. 

John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Richard Serino, Deputy Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector 

General, U.S. Department of Justice; and Hon. David B. Buckley, Inspector 

General, Central Intelligence Agency ................................................................. 4 

APPENDIX 

Prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General ............................................. 21 

(1) 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BOSTON 

MARATHON BOMBINGS: IMPROVING 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Coburn, Johnson, and Ayotte. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CARPER 

Chairman CARPER. The hearing will come to order. 

We want to welcome our witnesses and our other guests here 

this morning. Thank you for coming. Thank you for your preparation for your testimony and for your willingness to respond to our 

questions. 

It has been, as we know, just over a year since the cowardly attack on the Boston Marathon. Today’s hearing is an opportunity for 

us to review what lessons have been learned from the actions and 

events leading up to the attack in order to prevent, to the greatest 

extent possible, a similar incident from ever happening again. 

We do this, in part, to honor the memory of the four people killed 

that day in April of last year as well as the sacrifices that have 

been made by nearly 300 people injured during those attacks. In 

particular, we mourn with friends and families of those killed on 

April 15, 2013, Krystle Marie Campbell, Martin William Richard, 

Lu Lingzi, and for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 

police officer who was slain, Sean Collier, shot by the suspects 3 

days later. 

This is our Committee’s second hearing on the Boston Marathon 

bombing. It is part of our ongoing oversight to understand what 

went right that fateful day and what we can do better. Our first 

hearing focused on preparedness and response and found, by and 

large, that the State of Massachusetts, the city of Boston, and the 

surrounding communities were extremely well trained, coordinated, 

and prepared. In my view, this was due in no small part to the assistance provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

through Federal grants. 

Our focus today is different. We will examine the intelligence collection and information sharing by U.S. agencies with respect to 
2 

the Tsarnaev family both before and after the attack to see what 

lessons we can learn. I often say that everything I do, I know I can 

do better. I think that is true of all of us, and I think it is true 

for most Federal programs. It is also true of counterterrorism activities that we are going to be discussing this morning. 

My sense is that our information sharing systems work well, but 

having said that, I know we can always improve on them. Identifying and deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves and the Tsarnaev 

brothers is extremely challenging, but we need to continue to refine 

our efforts to help identify these types of people before the attack 

and before lives are lost. 

I want to thank our four Inspectors General (IGs), one who is 

brand new on the job. Mr. Roth, it is very nice to see you sitting 

here as a confirmed Inspector General. We want to thank you for 

being with us today. We want to thank your staffs who have 

worked diligently over the past year to complete this report. 

While some of the details of the report can only be discussed in 

the classified portion of today’s hearing, I also want to thank our 

IGs for releasing an unclassified summary of their findings. That 

summary will better inform the American people. I hope it will also 

serve to reassure our citizens that their Federal authorities are 

working tirelessly and learning from what worked and what did 

not, not only in the run-up to the tragedy but also in its aftermath, 

in order to improve our ability to prevent future attacks from occurring. 

I believe there are at least two key findings in the report by our 

Inspectors General. First, the IGs found that Federal agencies generally did share information with one another and they followed 

the appropriate procedures that were put in place after 9/11. 

And, second, the Inspectors General identified a number of adjustments and refinements that should be made to further improve 

our intelligence and information sharing systems. It appears unlikely, however, that any of these changes could have prevented the 

attack. 

Still, I was struck by the passages in the report detailing the fact 

that if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel had received more explicit information from a foreign government about 

Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s apparent interest in committing acts of terror, the FBI would likely have taken additional steps to learn more 

about him and his intentions. I plan to explore this conclusion further today with our witnesses. 

Meanwhile, let me say that I am pleased to learn through this 

report that U.S. security intelligence agencies have already begun 

addressing some of the issues identified in the report and in other 

after-action reports, and the Inspectors General have also put forward two recommendations for further strengthening and improving terrorist-related information sharing practices. We look forward 

to having a discussion about these findings and these recommendations today, and I also look forward to the opportunity to discuss 

the refinements that agencies have already begun making in the 

classified briefing that the Committee will hold with the agencies 

after this hearing. 

Again, we thank you all for joining us and I am pleased to turn 

the microphone over to Dr. Coburn. 
3 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to welcome each of you and tell you, first of 

all, how much we appreciate the important work that you do, the 

independence of what you do, and also to express that we have confidence in you. So, thank you, one, for what you are doing, and two, 

we appreciate the importance of this second eye looking inside the 

agencies. 

The purpose of this morning is not to be a Monday morning 

quarterback, and most of my questions are going to be only asked 

in the classified setting. I think your report raises a lot of questions. I take a little bit different look at it than Senator Carper 

does. And the other thing is, it makes only two very modest recommendations, and I want to probe those as we get into the classified briefing. But, I would highlight a few issues for the public for 

the benefit of this open hearing. 

First is the FBI should review its internal procedures for information sharing and investigations. Sitting on the Senate Intelligence Committee and this Committee gives me additional information that there are some areas there I think we need to discuss, 

and we will do that in the closed hearing. 

Second, I think we did do some information sharing, but I think 

one of the things that is obvious is we could have done better, and 

that is the Intelligence Community as a whole in terms of information sharing. 

And then, finally, one of the things that I think we have a weakness is in terms of sharing information accurately and adequately 

with local law enforcement, and also creating a receptivity to where 

we can get information from them, making it easy for that information to flow. 

So, I want to thank you for your hard work. I look forward to 

the discussion. And, as I stated, most of my questions will be in 

the closed hearing. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thank you, Dr. Coburn. 

I want to welcome Senator Johnson and Senator Ayotte. Thank 

you both very much for being here today and for participating with 

us. 

Some brief introductions, if I could, and then we will turn it over 

to our witnesses. 

Charles McCullough is the Inspector General for the Intelligence 

Community (IC). He is responsible for overseeing the work of a 

number of intelligence agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Welcome. 

John Roth, who was recently confirmed, came here before us not 

that many months ago as a nominee, and we are happy to see you 

confirmed and on the job as the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. As such, his office is responsible for 

overseeing the work of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), among 

other components. 

Michael Horowitz—nice to see you, Mr. Horowitz—is the Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and is responsible 

for overseeing the FBI and other key law enforcement agencies. 
4 

1The prepared joint statement of the Inspectors General appears in the Appendix on page 21. 

And David Buckley, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is a key member of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community. 

I think my notes here say Mr. McCullough will provide an opening statement on behalf of all the IGs. He has been the Inspector 

General for the Intelligence Community, I think, since November 

2011. We thank you again, all, for joining us. We look forward to 

your testimony and for a chance to ask some questions. Please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE I. CHARLES MCCULLOUGH 

III, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH, 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND THE 

HONORABLE DAVID B. BUCKLEY, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY1

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and distinguished Members of the Committee, 

thank you for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to discuss the conclusions of the review we conducted over the last year. 

We share yours and the Committee Members’ deep sympathies 

for the victims and their families. As we know, on April 15, 2013, 

two pressure cooker bombs placed near the finish line of the Boston 

Marathon detonated within seconds of each other, killing three, 

maiming many, and injuring more than 200 people. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officials identified brothers Tamerlan and 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev as primary suspects in the bombings. After an 

extensive search for the suspects, law enforcement officials encountered the brothers in Watertown, Massachusetts. Tamerlan 

Tsarnaev was killed during the encounter, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 

who fled the scene, was apprehended the following day and remains in Federal custody awaiting trial. 

In the days that followed, Members of Congress asked questions 

of the FBI Director, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 

and other Government officials about the handling and sharing of 

information by the U.S. Government concerning Tamerlan 

Tsarnaev prior to the bombings. With the DNI’s support, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 

Homeland Security determined to conduct a coordinated review of 

the handling and sharing of the information available to the U.S. 

Government prior to the Boston Marathon bombings. 

Our review had three objectives. First, to determine the extent 

of the information available to the U.S. Government regarding 

these individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon bombings. Second, whether the sharing of information was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing policies, regulations, and U.S. laws. And, third, wheth-
5 

er there were weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact 

our ability to detect potential threats to national security. 

In order to satisfy these objectives, we looked at three distinct 

areas of scope. First, we examined the information that was known 

to the U.S. Government prior to the bombing. Second, we examined 

any information that existed within the U.S. Government’s reach 

before the bombing, but had not been obtained, accessed, or reviewed until after the bombing. And, third, we examined whether 

U.S. Government officials reasonably could have been expected to 

have known this information existed prior to the bombing. 

For nearly a year, the inspectors, investigators, and auditors of 

our offices combed through thousands of documents and interviewed more than 150 witnesses. Due to the classified subjects and 

detailed accounting of interactions between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, the full results of our review 

are in a classified report that has been submitted to the Congress. 

We also thought it extremely important to publish an unclassified 

summary that we submit for the record. 

Overall, we found no basis to make broad recommendations for 

changes to U.S. Government procedures for information handling 

and sharing because we found the FBI, CIA, DHS, and NCTC generally shared information and correctly followed procedures. We did 

find some specific areas where broader information sharing between agencies may have been required or where broader information sharing in the future should be considered. 

As a result, we made two recommendations to enhance the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) alert procedures and expand the 

FBI’s sharing of threat information with State and local partners. 

However, in this particular case, we found that broader information sharing likely would not have resulted in providing additional 

helpful information to the FBI. 

We also found that given the limited information available to the 

Boston JTTF in March 2011 concerning Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the 

FBI’s decision to open the matter at the assessment level of investigation was an application of the least intrusive method principle 

within its investigative discretion. Because the lead included information about Tsarnaev’s mother, Zubeidat Tsarnaeva, we believe 

the FBI should have given greater consideration to opening an assessment on her. However, given the bulk of the derogatory information in the lead focused on Tamerlan Tsarnaev, we concluded 

that it was within the FBI’s discretion not to open an assessment 

on Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. 

We also concluded that additional investigative steps by the FBI 

would have resulted in a more thorough assessment, including conducting additional database searches, asking questions of Tsarnaev 

and his parents to elicit information about any plans he may have 

had to travel to Russia, as well as interviewing his former 

girlfriend and wife. However, we determined that the additional 

database searches would not have revealed any information that 

was not already known to the FBI agent conducting the assessment. In addition, we found that it is impossible to know what the 

former girlfriend and wife would have told the FBI in 2011, before 

the Boston Marathon bombings, and while Tsarnaev was still alive. 

Therefore, it cannot be known whether these additional interviews 
6 

would have yielded additional information relevant to lead information from the Russian government. 

With respect to post-assessment activities, we believe that 

Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travel to Russia in 2012 was significant and 

warranted further FBI investigative action, although we determined that none was taken. That said, we believe it is impossible 

to know what would have happened had different investigative 

judgments been made prior to the bombings. 

Finally, we concluded that DHS generally followed procedures 

and policies when adjudicating the Tsarnaev family’s immigration 

benefits and screening the family’s travel. 

This review, which was conducted across four separate IG offices, 

is precisely the type of coordinated work that the Congress expected when it created the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum. Collectively, we broke new ground in many areas of cooperation, and as a result, there is today far stronger independent 

oversight of the Intelligence Community. 

On behalf of my fellow Inspectors General, I would like to thank 

the Committee for its continued support and for the opportunity to 

have this important public discussion. We owe it to the Nation and 

especially those victims and families directly affected by the bombings to openly discuss what we have learned in this review. 

Also deserving of our thanks are the agency directors whose support reflects their shared belief in independent and objective analysis. 

Last, I would like to express my gratitude for the men and 

women within our offices who over the past year painstakingly reviewed mountains of data and conducted dozens of interviews. 

Their diligence and objectivity exemplify professionalism and excellence in service to our country. 

This concludes my remarks. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks so much, Mr. McCullough. I certainly 

want to agree with your last part of your statement very much. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman CARPER. As I mentioned earlier in my opening statement, I think it appears that one of your key findings is that during—this would be really for you, Mr. McCullough, this question— 

but one of your key findings is that during the lead-up to the attack, the U.S. agencies you oversee correctly followed their procedures when they investigated, ultimately cleared, and later shared 

information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Would it be fair to say that 

while some elements of our information sharing system could have 

been improved, there was no silver bullet available to U.S. authorities that would have allowed us to avert the attack? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Yes, Senator, that would be fair to say, that 

there was no silver bullet. There was no one single event that we 

uncovered that we believed would have prevented these attacks. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Do any of our other witnesses want to 

comment on this, on that first question? 

[No response.] 

OK. Again, this would be for Mr. Horowitz, if I could. Mr. Horowitz, your report also seemed to indicate that if the Russians or 
7 

any foreign intelligence partners had shared more specific information, the FBI likely would have dug deeper and been able to use 

more of the tools in their toolbox. It seems to me that getting additional intelligence from foreign authorities might have been the 

only key factor that could have helped to prevent this attack from 

occurring. Are those fair characterizations of your findings? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that that 

would have been, as we indicated, an important piece of information, and as we outlined the requests that were made by the FBI 

to the foreign entity, there were several other items that we identified in the report that the FBI could have followed up on, including, in particular, the travel that was identified of Tamerlan 

Tsarnaev to Russia. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. This would be a question for all of 

our witnesses. Mr. Roth, if you would like to lead off on this, you 

are welcome to. But, this is a question on how to improve information sharing. Our system for preventing terrorist attacks cannot 

and should not depend on the willingness of foreign governments 

to share information with us. Your review found that many actions 

taken were appropriate and in accordance with policy. For example, two of the Department of Homeland Security’s key agencies, 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection, appropriately adjudicated immigration applications for the Tsarnaev family and tracked Tamerlan’s travel to and 

from Russia. 

And this attack shows we can do better. Could you please take 

a minute to highlight for our Committee what the FBI, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Homeland Security 

should be doing in the future to prevent this kind of attack and 

which of these steps have already been taken. 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you for the question, Senator. Certainly, I 

think that in any situation like this, there is room for improvement. One of the things that we discovered in the course of our 

analysis is that immediately after the bombing, when the facts 

were discovered, both CBP as well as USCIS, speaking just for 

DHS, engaged in an after-action sort of look-back to see what it is 

that we could be doing better. 

One of the things that particularly CBP found was the outbound 

analysis of the Tsarnaev’s travel—Tsarnaev, as the report says, 

was on a specific list, a fairly long list. The outbound CBP inspectors did not have the opportunity to engage in an outbound inspection of him. They were unaware, for example, that there was a specific alert that had been placed within the DHS data systems 

Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) to do so. 

So, one of the things they have fixed as a result of this incident, 

independent of the IG investigation, was to ensure that those outbound inspectors now take a look at the underlying documentation 

on each individual within a list of people to look at for outbound. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Let me ask each of our other IGs 

to respond to the same question, if you would, please. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. From the FBI’s standpoint, I think there were a 

couple of places where the information sharing as well as the followup could have been better. We identify them. Again, the most 

significant being the travel that occurred in January 2012. We 
8 

were unable to definitively determine, for example, when the notice 

went to the CBP agent, whether that information was passed to 

the FBI agent. We concluded it likely did happen, based on the information we had, but that was largely based on a practice of a 

CBP agent putting a sticky note on an FBI agent’s desk in that instance, and that should not be the way information is passed. 

There has apparently been followup on that and improving that information system flow so there is documentation of those notices. 

But also in this instance, when Tsarnaev traveled to Russia, that 

was the basis for the Russian notice to us and the request to us. 

There was not further followup on that by the FBI, and that was, 

as we noted, a significant incident. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. I would welcome any comments you 

have, Mr. Buckley, on the same question, please. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that when we 

talk about the information that was shared between the CIA and 

the law enforcement/Homeland Security elements of the U.S. Federal Government, we did not find anything from a sharing standpoint that could be improved upon. What I would like to do in the 

closed session that follows is talk about some specifics regarding 

some things that the CIA may have been able to provide in addition and perhaps some greater collaboration at the worker level. 

Chairman CARPER. And, Mr. McCullough, would you respond to 

the same question, and then I am going to yield to Dr. Coburn. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Mr. Chair, I think the same thing as Mr. 

Buckley just said. I would have some comments on that in the 

closed session. 

The one thing I could say in the open session with respect to the 

NCTC, there has been an enhancement of the data input into certain Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) so that 

there is more complete data there now than there was, and that 

has already been accomplished since the bombing. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. My thanks to each of you. Dr. 

Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. I just have one question for the open session, 

and it is when we have people who immigrate here under an asylum visa and come and then we see returning to the areas from 

which they sought asylum from, do we have any method at all 

which raises a flag that says, you came here seeking asylum from 

persecution in X country and now you are going back to X country. 

Is there anything in our system, anywhere, that raises that up, because if, in fact, you are seeking asylum, the last thing I would 

think is you are going back to the place from which you sought asylum. Do we have anything that we can talk about in open session? 

Mr. ROTH. Senator, you raise a very good question. That is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of what it is that we looked at during 

the course of our inquiry here, but you do raise a very good question. 

Senator COBURN. Well, I do not think that—— 

[Comments off microphone.] 

Never mind. I cannot finish this line of questioning in open session. 
9 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE 

Chairman CARPER. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for being 

here. 

This is obviously a very important topic, and certainly where I 

live in Nashua, New Hampshire, is 45 minutes away from where 

these bombings occurred. And, in fact, a lot of the law enforcement 

officers in New Hampshire went down—the Manchester Special 

Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team, the Nashua Special React 

Team, the New Hampshire State Police and Seacoast Emergency 

Response Team. And, of course, so this is local for us. In fact, Jeff 

Bauman, who is really a hero in these circumstances, his family 

lives in New Hampshire and he was heroic that day, and everything that he suffered, and all of the victims. So, I really appreciate 

the work that you have done on this because this is incredibly important for the country. 

I wanted to ask about, first of all, the JTTF issue. When Boston 

Police Commissioner Ed Davis came before our Committee, that 

was where he focused his attention. He was very concerned, and 

I know you have talked about it in your report, as well, about the 

fact that on the JTTF Task Forces—and I served as State Attorney 

General, so I worked with that Task Force in that capacity—that 

it was too much of a one-way street. In other words, the information coming in was not then communicated downward. And, as all 

of you know, it is really the line police officers on the street that 

are likely to encounter this type of individual first. 

So, can you help us understand, what improvements have been 

made at this point with regard to JTTF communication issues in 

terms of the type of back and forth that Senator Coburn also talked 

about and are necessary to make sure that that information first 

flows downward, but then also flows back upward once that police 

officer on the ground receives information. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Let me take that, first, at least. Senator, it is an 

important part of this report and our finding, and we had the good 

fortune and benefit of hearing from Commissioner Davis in the 

course of our work, who described to us many of his concerns that 

you have outlined. 

One of the things we noted specifically in our report was the failure of the FBI, when an incident or issue like this came up as to 

a person, to alert those local officers, the community that could be 

impacted by an individual like that, both from the standpoint of 

learning if they had information back, but also allowing them to be 

prepared if there were any particular issues or concerns. 

We also heard from Commissioner Davis about the concern that 

the information was flowing one way, but also that there was a 

general attitude on the JTTF that you only gave information to the 

locals if there was a need to know, not as part of a routine relationship, not as something that occurred regularly, but on a need to 

know basis. The likelihood was that unless it was very clear there 

was a need to know, that was not happening as frequently as it 

could. 

We understand that the FBI has sent memos out and is addressing that now. That is a recommendation we have made and that 

is something we will be following up on. 
10 

Senator AYOTTE. So, they are already taking steps to implement 

better information sharing? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We have been told that, and as we do in all of 

our work, we will followup and make our own conclusion on whether that has been effective. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I will tell you this, that the memo is important, but it is also the attitude. So—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. 

Senator AYOTTE [continuing]. Having worked in cases where it is 

Federal, State, local, sometimes county, as well, the attitude, I 

think, that we need to get at, that is the pre-9/11 attitude of we 

are going to hold this information in as the FBI, as opposed to really realizing that we have all these partnerships of people who are 

on the street every day that can help us and we can work together. 

And so I have talked to Director Jim Comey about this, and I am 

hoping that in addition to changes in policy, that it is really an outreach issue by the FBI to reach out to the heads of the JTTFs as 

well as the local officers to really say, we get it. We really understand how important this is in terms of preventing terrorist attacks 

and other types of criminal behavior even beyond terrorism. So, I 

think that that attitude issue, I would love to see, as you look at 

this issue in the followup with the FBI, what is it that the local 

officers feel has been the attitude change on the ground, because 

that is what is going to make the biggest difference here. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. And that is what Commissioner Davis 

mentioned, as well, and it clearly is the culture of the organization 

and the culture of the relationship that is critical. You can put all 

the rules in place that you want, but if folks do not feel like they 

should be talking to one another, it just will not happen. 

Senator AYOTTE. Can I also suggest that engaging the U.S. Attorneys and also engaging the Attorneys General on this, at the 

State law enforcement level, at the Federal level, because I know 

when I served as our Attorney General, I had the role of being a 

chief law enforcement officer, so I could get very much my message 

across in meetings I had with law enforcement about how we were 

going to emphasize these issues. So, I think this has to be a holistic 

approach where you are also engaging the prosecutors they work 

with on a regular basis to say, hey, this is important and this attitude is what is going to help us protect America, working together. 

So, I appreciate that emphasis. 

One thing I looked at that is—I am trying to understand, and to 

the extent that you are able to answer this in the open setting, but 

this followup issue on the CBP and as they notify, you said it was 

done with a sticky note, basically, the trip to Russia by Tsarnaev. 

Those procedures, as I understand it, have now been changed and 

formalized, is that right? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator AYOTTE. So, the question I have is, assuming that formal 

designation, how does the FBI then determine whether there will 

be a followup? Is there a procedure there? Is there a standard there 

that we can understand when the FBI is actually assuming formal 

notification from CBP, as they should be, not with some sticky—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. 
11 

Senator AYOTTE [continuing]. So that is a very important improvement. Then, will they make the decision on, we have to go, 

then, do some more investigative work. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. As it was then—as I believe it still remains—it 

is the agent who gets notified and it is their responsibility to make 

a determination as to whether to proceed. I think there is a strong 

argument to be made that in that situation, an agent should, at a 

minimum, be consulting with their supervisor when, particularly in 

an instance like this, the nub of the information sent to the FBI 

by the Russian authorities was, he is going to travel to Russia to 

join these groups, as we outline here. That is precisely what he did 

in January 2012 in terms of at least the travel. We do not know 

what he did there. But as to the information that went to the FBI, 

that he is going to travel to Russia, that is exactly what information was learned because of the ping and the notice that went on. 

Senator AYOTTE. Absolutely, this seems like pretty compelling information from the Russians. So, I would hope that it would not 

just be left with the discretion of the agent, that you actually would 

have some type of consulting to make sure that in those circumstances, we do have a followup investigation that needs to be 

conducted to find out what his activities were in Russia, and, in 

fact, did he meet with these groups that are associated with terrorist activities, because that would have probably changed, to 

some extent, the prism upon which he was viewed. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. That is correct, because it also, in part, 

corroborated the information that had been sent to the FBI, so it 

demonstrated some credibility on that information. It could have 

resulted in additional followup within the United States. It also 

could have resulted in a notice to the foreign country, to Russia, 

in response to the information they had sent to us. 

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much. I know my time is up, 

and I think this is a very important issue. I want to thank both 

the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing 

and for the work done by the investigators, all of the Inspectors 

General here. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Thanks for those questions. 

I want to be sensitive to what you can say in a public setting and 

what you cannot, but I have a couple questions that relate to Mrs. 

Tsarnaev, and to the extent that you discuss her role in all of this 

and that you can share with us in a public setting, I would welcome that. I have a couple of specific questions, but are there any 

more general comments you would like to make about how you address her role in all this that you can share with us in a public 

setting? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, I will just say, the one thing that we can 

say from the standpoint from what we looked at, the lead information included information about her, not just Tamerlan. The judgment was made to only look at—to only open on Tamerlan, but we 

found there was certainly sufficient information, if the FBI had 

wanted, to open on her, as well, that they could have done so. They 

made the judgment not to, and that was a decision made right at 

the outset, in March 2011. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Others, please. 
12 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I would agree that there was information that 

we found when we examined the post-bombing information that 

was collected, and I think probably that would have to be discussed 

in the classified session. But, there was information that we found 

post-bombing that would relate to that, Senator. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Buckley. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I, too, have information that I will 

impart in the closed session regarding this. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Let me ask a couple of followup 

questions, more specific followup questions. If you can respond to 

these in an open setting, that is fine. If you cannot, we will ask 

them again in a closed setting. 

But, looking back, it seems that one of the key moments in the 

case occurred when the FBI’s initial investigation into Tamerlan 

concluded that he did not pose a threat to the United States. Can 

you give us your assessment of whether or not the FBI’s investigation of Tamerlan and his mother was thorough enough. Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. I think we found there were several steps 

that could have been taken that would have made it more thorough, among them, doing additional database searches. On that, we 

were able to go back and do those ourselves and concluded there 

actually was not much there in the databases that would have been 

helpful, but nevertheless believed a more thorough assessment 

would have included those database searches. 

There could have been interviews of his then-wife, his exgirlfriend, who had filed charges against him, as well as questioning both him and his parents about the specific allegations that 

had come in from the Russian authorities, again, particularly the 

travel that was known about back in March 2011, before the assessment was closed and before later learning that the travel had 

actually been undertaken. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Let me just do a followup on that, Mr. 

Horowitz, if I could. While the Russians did not provide us with a 

whole lot of information, they did warn that both Tamerlan and his 

mother were adherents to radical Islam, as I recall. However, the 

report states that a separate investigation was not opened on 

Tamerlan’s mother. Do you think—and we have talked about this 

a little bit, but I want to come back to it—do you think that this 

was an appropriate decision by the FBI, and should the FBI be permitted to exercise this type of discretion in opting to open or not 

open cases? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. From our standpoint, we think that more consideration should have been given to opening an assessment on 

Zubeidat, as well as Tamerlan. The explanation given to us was 

that the information largely focused on Tamerlan and the judgment 

was made, therefore, to open only on Tamerlan. Based on the rules 

in place and the FBI procedures, that was a judgment they made 

that was within their authority to make. Again, I think, from our 

standpoint, the supervisor should have—and this is really a supervisor decision—should have given more consideration to opening on 

her. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. If I could, Mr. Buckley, a different 

question, please. Two agencies, the FBI and the CIA, received the 
13 

same initial information from Russian authorities, but only the CIA 

decided to nominate Tamerlan for the Terrorist Watch List, as I recall. I understand the reasons for this is specific and classified, but 

I wanted to ask both you and maybe Mr. McCullough, if I could, 

if there was anything you believe intelligence agencies can or 

should do to make these decisions in a more collaborative way so 

that we can ensure that everyone is working off the same information. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Chairman, the answer to your question is yes. 

As I indicated earlier, beyond information sharing, we did identify 

opportunities where, had there been further collaboration, personto-person, office-to-office, speculating, it might have led to a different decisionmaking matrix. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. I am going to ask one 

more question, and then I am going to yield back over to Senator 

Ayotte for additional questions that she might have. 

Mr. Horowitz, this will be a followup question regarding discretion to determine the type of FBI investigation. Your report notes 

that the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force agents have some 

discretion to determine what level of investigation to open on a person of interest and typically try to use a standard, I think it is 

called the least intrusive method. Could you explain why that discretion and standard are important. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Under the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), which is the manual that they use to consider what level of assessment to undertake, there are three 

choices. There is an assessment, which is what was done here, the 

next step up being a preliminary investigation, and the third step 

being a full investigation, the latter two requiring some predication 

to do those steps. The FBI’s manual informs their agents and supervisors to choose the least intrusive method, recognizing that 

they might have more than one choice. And in this case, the agent 

and the supervisor both told us they chose as the least intrusive 

method the assessment. 

It is important to note that none of the steps I indicated that 

could have been taken to make it a more thorough assessment 

were in any way limited by that choice. So, the fact that it was an 

assessment still allowed the steps to be taken. And, similarly, had 

there been an interest in following up on the travel in January 

2012, that could have been done even at the assessment level and 

allowed a determination to be made then whether to escalate it to 

a preliminary investigation or a full investigation. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Thanks. Senator Ayotte. 

Senator AYOTTE. I just had one followup to the Chairman’s question regarding better collaboration between the CIA and FBI. One 

thing that leapt out at me on this that has bothered me is that the 

FBI receives information from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian intelligence agency, and the FBI follows up, 

does their assessment, finds no nexus with terrorism. Then, of 

course, we have been talking about the fact that then Tsarnaev 

goes to Russia again and there was no followup, which I think we 

all agree doing a followup there would have been important. 

That said, what bothered me, also, was the fact that the FBI got 

this information from the FSB—they get that in March. In Sep-
14 

tember, the FSB also reaches out to the CIA. Why is it not that 

the FBI would not notify the CIA in those circumstances as opposed to having a foreign government, waiting for them to actually 

notify an agency, a separate agency within our own government? 

That really leapt out at me and it bothered me, and can you help 

us understand that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. I agree, Senator. As we noted in the report, 

that was a failing of the sharing that occurred. The FBI should 

have alerted in March 2011, when they learned this information, 

their counterparts at the CIA. They did not do that. Ultimately, the 

Russian authorities did do that in September 2011, and as we later 

learned, because of that notice, the CIA did not have—the delay in 

that notice did not have an impact on the assessment, ultimately. 

But, nevertheless, that notice should have occurred earlier. 

Senator AYOTTE. Is there now a procedure in place that would 

have a more formal notification process between the FBI and the 

CIA, because you can see a scenario where this type of situation 

could make a very significant difference. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There is already, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in place that should have been followed here 

that—— 

Senator AYOTTE. It just was not followed. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. So, what is required here is further training and 

an understanding among FBI that they need to do that, and, in 

fact, there was one of the three followups that they did that went 

to the FSB, they did not notify the CIA of that. That was another 

place where that notification should have occurred. 

Senator AYOTTE. Well, this is, I think, important, because we 

have the issue of Federal, State, local information sharing, but also 

information sharing, of course, thinking after 9/11, the improvements and work we have done to make sure our own agencies are 

sharing. So, I hope that there will also be an emphasis on this as 

we look at the followup to this to make sure that the procedures 

are being followed or that the people understand what their responsibilities are. Thank you. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. McCullough, if I could, maybe one or two 

more and then we will wrap it up here. But, if the Russians had 

not shared their initial tip, would we have had any way to detect 

Tamerlan’s radicalization? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. There were—— 

Chairman CARPER. What I am going to get at here is just homegrown terrorism and our ability to ferret them out-—— 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Right. 

Chairman CARPER [continuing]. And understand what is going 

on, if someone is being radicalized, and what its implications might 

be for us. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Well, the Bureau’s actions stem from the 

memo from the FSB, and so that led to everything else in this 

chain of events here. You are saying, if that memo did not exist, 

would he have turned up some other way? I do not know. I think 

in the classified session, we can talk about some of the post-bombing forensics and what was found and that sort of thing and you 

can see when that radicalization was happening. 
15 

And so I would think that this would have come up, yes. At some 

point it would have presented itself to law enforcement and to the 

Intelligence Community, possibly not as early as the FSB memo, 

it did not. But, I think that it would have come up at some point, 

noting what we found post-bombing. 

Chairman CARPER. Sometimes we ask people, and sometimes 

they ask us what keeps us up at night, and one of the things that 

keeps me up at night is concern about homegrown radicalization. 

It is one thing to have folks in other parts of the world who want 

to do us harm, and it is hard enough to find out about that and 

to track and to deter, to counter it. But, it is another kettle of fish 

when the threat comes from within. 

And, the question I will ask here—and if you feel comfortable in 

answering it here, fine, if not, we will get into it in our closed session—but, I would just come back to this issue and say, is our 

counterterrorism and homegrown security system capable of detecting and maybe preventing attacks like this? 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. I believe it is, Chairman Carper. I believe it 

is. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. We will drill down on that a little 

bit more in our closed session. 

My last question would be for—and, you all were good enough to 

give us at least one opening statement. I am going to ask you each 

to take maybe a minute and give us a closing statement, and what 

I would like you to focus on in your closing statement is I want to 

look to see where there is consensus and agreement on things that 

we could have done better, or lessons learned, things we could have 

done better. Dr. Coburn and I, we are not interested in holding 

‘‘gotcha’’ hearings and Monday morning quarterbacking, but we all 

are interested in finding what we could have done better, and 

maybe just remind us of the areas that we could have done better 

and those where we actually are doing better now and maybe some 

others which are still works in process. 

In fact, let us just go right to that question. 

And, do you want to lead off, Mr. Buckley. 

Mr. BUCKLEY. Sure, Mr. Chairman. I will take a stab at it. I 

think, in this specific case and generally, the agency could have 

done better in looking at certain records that it had that might 

have provided a slightly fuller picture when it made the nomination. However, our assessment was that if they had, it would not 

have given that much more information to cause anybody to do 

anything differently. But, they did not, so we do recommend that 

they do check available databases and give a more fulsome record 

when they make such nominations. 

Of course, there is a constant balance and a struggle that takes 

place when you are talking about the CIA and its involvement at 

all and U.S. persons, whether they are citizens, naturalized or 

born, and adverse information that comes from foreign governments pertaining to U.S. citizens. So, there is a line, and it is blurry, and that requires individual employees and their supervisors to 

make case-by-case determinations on what is appropriate and what 

is not, and so it is very hard for the Inspector General—for me, 

anyway—to look back and say, in this case, you should have done 

that, and in that case, you dare not. 
16 

So, this is very much a human enterprise, assisted by machines, 

but the human decision, at the end of the day, is what we ought 

to either stand by or criticize. So, I think that a little bit more 

records checking, making some more fulsome disclosures to NCTC, 

the FBI, and others, as they did in the nomination, could be done 

better. It would not have made a difference in this case. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Horowitz. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Let me just echo what Mr. Buckley just said. Ultimately, on much of what we have talked about on the assessment, those were human judgments made by an agent and a supervisor, and those judgments are going to be made in hundreds, if not 

thousands, of cases. 

In terms of protocols and sharing and the culture that we talked 

about a little bit earlier, about making sure there is that sharing, 

I think you saw a few things here that are indicative of the issues. 

The State and local issue that we talked about—there needs to be 

a recognition that information flow should be both ways and the 

culture should be one of information flow. 

Second, there needs to be following of MOUs within the Federal 

Government, the sharing that could have occurred in several places 

with the FBI and the CIA did not. While it would not have had an 

impact, perhaps, nevertheless, should be occurring regularly. That 

should be one of the first thoughts happening, not something that 

is forgotten about. 

And then, finally, in light of the travel that occurred, another 

place where consideration should have been given to not only followup on the travel, but also, again, the question of whether that 

information should have been shared with the Russian authorities 

that had, in fact, sent us the lead about that very travel. 

Chairman CARPER. Mr. Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. DHS had largely a supporting role in the entire episode. That being said, there were things that they could have done 

that they, I think, are improving as we speak, one of which is assessing the outbound travel to determine whether or not individuals ought to be inspected. It is an enormous task. A place like 

John F. Kennedy International Airport has something like 13 million passengers in any given year, 200 in-bound flights per day. So, 

it is a very difficult situation to get right, but certainly, I think, 

that is an area that could use some improvement. 

Likewise, with transliteration of names and matching names 

within a database, here, we had an example of two separate entries 

in which there was a misspelling, that those names were not 

matched. I think there is room for improvement there, which, I 

think, is taking place. 

Chairman CARPER. Thank you. 

Mr. McCullough, same question. 

Mr. MCCULLOUGH. Mr. Chair, just to kind of summarize, we did 

find the information sharing mechanisms in the government did 

work here. Information was shared. There were errors, inaccuracies. There may have been a lack of completeness or thoroughness 

with the information that was being shared. But, certainly, the institutions and the mechanisms that are in place to share the information were doing that. 
17 

Despite everything that occurred between the FSB information 

going to the FBI and then going separately to the CIA, the CIA 

with the NCTC, the TIDE nomination over to the Terrorist Screening Center, a parallel track from the FBI’s JTTF TECS, despite all 

of this, despite the misspellings or the distinct spellings, there were 

different translations of certain pieces of material between different 

intelligence elements, on January 18, when Tamerlan Tsarnaev 

was going to travel to Russia—this is 3 days before his travel to 

Russia—a Customs officer got a ping. Despite all of those errors 

and inaccuracies, the mechanisms worked. That Customs officer 

was notified that this individual was going to be traveling to Russia. 

And that was the goal. That is the goal of the information sharing. We had a Guardian assessment that occurred, and at the end 

of the day, we would like to know when he is traveling, the Customs officer got that ping. I believe the DOJ IG found, as a matter 

of fact, that it is highly likely that that ping, that information, was 

conveyed to the FBI when that occurred. 

And, we can talk about the judgments that were made with respect to the action that was taken with that information. But, I do 

think that information was shared here. There were some errors. 

There were some inaccuracies. And we have made some recommendations and drawn some conclusions to address these. But, 

at the end of the day, there is not a ‘‘smoking gun,’’ there is not 

a single event or a singular event or a series of events that we can 

say, had this happened, that most certainly would have changed 

the scenario here. Had this happened, that would have stopped the 

bombing. We did not find anything like that. 

Chairman CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Dr. Coburn, any closing statement you would like to make? 

Senator COBURN. That is all for me. It will be in classified. 

Chairman CARPER. OK. Let me just wrap up by saying I think 

we have had a productive session here today. A lot of work has 

gone into preparing for this, and we are grateful for that. We look 

forward to moving to a secure setting and to being able to ask you 

a few more questions and for you to be able to share with us some 

information that you are not able to share here. 

I just want to say, though, on the anniversary of the Boston Marathon and the running of the marathon earlier this month, that our 

thoughts go back to a year ago and the loss of life and injuries, and 

how the lives of some people were taken away and other lives were 

shattered. But, the crowd that was chanting as the runners went 

through their course and ran—I say this as a runner myself, my 

son is a runner, used to live in Boston—I missed qualifying for the 

Boston Marathon by a minute a couple of years ago, by the way— 

it is one thing to take a punch, in this case a sucker punch, and 

it is another thing to bounce back, and, boy, we bounced back. And, 

I am proud for everybody who turned to, in the face of adversity, 

calamity, mayhem a year ago—I am very proud for the way that 

we have demonstrated our strength this year. 

The last thing I would say is, were there some mistakes made? 

Were there some things we could have done better? Clearly, there 

were. We have drilled down on those. We are going to continue to 
18 

drill down on those and make sure we can get as close to perfect 

as we can, and there is a lot riding on that. 

With that, we are going to conclude here. The hearing record will 

remain open for 15 days, until May 15 at 5 p.m., for the submission 

of additional statements and questions for the record. So, if you get 

some, please respond to those. 

And with that, we are adjourned at this point in time and will 

reconvene in just a few minutes. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the Committee recessed and proceeded 

to closed session.] 
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