NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ERIC MUNOZ AGUILAR, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0020 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR 2013-450021-001 

The Honorable Carolyn K. Passamonte, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Ballecer & Segal, LLP, Phoenix 

By Natalee Segal 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. AGUILAR 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined. 

W I N T R O P, Judge: 

¶1 Eric Munoz Aguilar (“Aguilar”) appeals his convictions and 

sentences for knowingly possessing or using a dangerous controlled 

substance, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to 

exclude his statements made to a police officer following his arrest. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Officers Ennis and Mendoza with the Phoenix Police 

Department met with Aguilar at his residence, where he lived with his 

mother, to investigate a report of a stolen bicycle. Aguilar was arrested after 

he admitted he took the bicycle from the owner’s residence without the 

owner’s permission. In a search incident to the arrest, the officers found a 

package of what appeared to be methamphetamine in the coin pocket of his 

jeans. After placing Aguilar in the patrol car and giving him Miranda 

warnings, Officer Ennis asked Aguilar several times whether he knew the 

content of the package; each time, Aguilar replied that he did not know but 

“hoped it was methamphetamine.” He further told Officer Ennis that he 

found the package in his room while cleaning and figured it was his because 

his mother “did not use methamphetamine.” Aguilar also told Officer 

Ennis that he had used methamphetamine three days ago, used it when 

things got bad, and preferred smoking methamphetamine to injecting or 

snorting the drug. Aguilar was charged with one count of knowing 

possession or use of a dangerous controlled substance (a class 4 felony) and 

one count of theft (a class 6 felony). 

¶3 Before trial, Aguilar moved to exclude all of the statements he 

made to Officer Ennis about his past drug use. The trial court denied the 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State 

v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 64, 887 P.2d 592, 594 (App. 1994). 
STATE v. AGUILAR 

Decision of the Court 

3

motion in part, and allowed the State to introduce the statements that he 

had used methamphetamine three days ago, used it when things got bad, 

and preferred smoking to injecting or snorting it. 

¶4 The jury found Aguilar guilty of count 1 but not guilty of 

count 2, and the court sentenced Aguilar to seven years’ imprisonment. 

Appellant timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to the 

Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) sections 12–120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, and 13–4033(A).2

ANALYSIS

¶5 Appellant argues the trial court erred in admitting his 

statements about his past drug use. We review the trial court’s ruling on 

the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Salamanca, 233 

Ariz. 292, 294–95, ¶ 8, 311 P.3d 1105, 1107–08 (App. 2013). 

¶6 The trial court treated the statements in question as 

admissions and omitted any analysis under Rule 404(b)—the rule 

concerning admission of evidence of prior acts. Rule 404(b) generally 

prohibits the admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to 

prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 

therewith; [but the evidence may be admitted] for other purposes, such as 

proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). For 

evidence of prior acts to be admitted, four requirements must be met: 

1) the evidence is relevant, 2) it is admitted for a proper purpose, 3) the 

probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice, and 4) the court must provide an appropriate 

limiting instruction upon request. Ariz. R. Evid. 105, 402, 403 & 404(b); State 

v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 248, ¶ 54, 25 P.3d 717, 736 (2001), abrogated on 

other grounds by State v. Ferrero, 229 Ariz. 239, 274 P.3d 509 (2012). Also, the 

party offering the evidence must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant committed the prior acts. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. at 248, 

¶ 54, 25 P.3d at 736; State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 581–82, 944 P.2d 1194, 

1195–96 (1997). 

¶7 Although the trial court did not analyze the admission of this 

evidence under Rule 404(b), we may independently review whether the 

evidence before the court supports its admission; if it does, we will affirm 

 

2 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes unless changes 

material to our decision have occurred since the date of the offense. 
STATE v. AGUILAR 

Decision of the Court 

4

unless the court clearly abused its discretion. See State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 

536, 545–46, 931 P.2d 1046, 1055–56 (1997) (reviewing independently 

whether the probative value of prior acts is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice after the trial court failed to perform the required 

balancing test); State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, 563, ¶ 32, 161 P.3d 596, 606 

(App. 2007) (stating the trial court’s decision to admit other-act evidence 

will be affirmed as long as it is supported by the facts before the court, 

unless a clear abuse of discretion appears). 

¶8 First, the admissions made by Aguilar are clearly relevant. 

Contrary to Aguilar’s speculation that the statements were intended solely 

to characterize Aguilar as a drug user, the State offered the statements to 

prove Aguilar’s prior knowledge of the drug and its potential packaging, 

and that he likely knew that the package found in his pocket contained 

methamphetamine, a critical element of the crime charged in count 1. 

Additionally, these statements were not only relevant to evaluating 

Aguilar’s credibility, but also to allow the jury to consider the context of 

Aguilar’s other contemporaneous statements to the police that he “didn’t 

know but hoped” the package contained methamphetamine. 

¶9 Second, evidence of Aguilar’s knowledge is a well-recognized 

exception explicitly authorized under Rule 404(b). Aguilar contends this 

purpose is not proper because there are other ways to package 

methamphetamine, and one would not necessarily know a package 

contains methamphetamine simply by examining the packaging. This 

argument, however, only challenges the weight of the evidence and not its 

admissibility, and does not negate the legitimate purpose of proving 

knowledge as a proper basis for admission. 

¶10 Third, Aguilar contends the danger of unfair prejudice 

outweighs the probative value of the evidence, but provides scant 

evidentiary support and little analysis in support of this argument. Such 

conclusory argument is deemed waived. See Childress Buick Co. v. O’Connell, 

198 Ariz. 454, 459, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 413, 418 (App. 2000) (stating issues not 

clearly presented in appellate briefs are deemed waived); MT Builders, 

L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, 304 n.7, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 758, 765 n.7 

(App. 2008) (finding argument raised below but presented on appeal in a 

one-sentence footnote without any analysis is deemed waived). Moreover, 

on this record, we find the probative value of the evidence is not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The statements 

are potentially harmful to Aguilar, given their probative value in 

demonstrating Aguilar’s likely knowledge of the contents of the package; 

however, not all evidence harmful to the defendant is unfairly prejudicial. 
STATE v. AGUILAR 

Decision of the Court 

5

Mott, 187 Ariz. at 545–46, 931 P.2d at 1055–56. Unfair prejudice results 

when “the evidence has an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision on an 

improper basis, such as emotion, sympathy, or horror.” Id. at 545, 931 P.2d 

at 1055. Here, Aguilar has failed to demonstrate any such unfair prejudice, 

let alone the prejudice necessary to support exclusion of his admissions. 

¶11 As for limiting instructions, Aguilar did not request one even 

after the court had advised him he could. 

¶12 Finally, Aguilar does not dispute that he made these 

statements, and does not contend that the State could not have proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that the prior acts he admitted in his own 

statements did, in fact, occur. 

¶13 Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted the statements 

in question, and its error in failing to analyze admissibility under Rule 

404(b) was harmless. On this record, we can easily say that such error did 

not contribute to or affect the jury’s verdict. See A.R.S. § 13-3987 

(disallowing reversal for error that did not actually, or did not tend to, 

prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right); State v. Anthony, 

218 Ariz. 439, 446, ¶ 39, 189 P.3d 366, 373 (2008) (stating error is harmless if 

we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to 

or affect the verdict). 

CONCLUSION

¶14 Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.