NO. 5-04-0542

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________

WALKER ALLEN,					)  Petition for Review of the Order of the

							)  Chief Legal Counsel Designee of the

     Petitioner,					)  Illinois Department of Human Rights. 

							)

v.							)

							)

MICHAEL I. LIEBERMAN, THE 		)  No. 2003SA3596

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and	)

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,		)

							)  

     Respondents.					)

________________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Walker Allen, the petitioner, appeals from a decision of the chief legal counsel

designee of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department), Michael I. Lieberman,

sustaining the Department's dismissal of the petitioner's charges of discrimination based on

age, sex, and disability against his former employer, Southern Illinois University, for a lack

of jurisdiction.  On this direct appeal to this court, pursuant to section 8-111(A)(1) of the

Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2004)) and Supreme Court Rule

335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335), the petitioner alleges that the Department and Lieberman acted

arbitrarily and capriciously.  For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

	I. BACKGROUND

	The petitioner was employed as the director of admissions and records at Southern

Illinois University in Carbondale (University) from 1997 to December 31, 2002.  In June of

2001, he applied for the newly created position of assistant vice-chancellor for student

affairs.  He was not offered the position.  A few months later, Dr. Larry Dietz informed the petitioner in a letter dated December 12, 2001, that the University was not renewing his

continuous appointment as the director of admissions and records, to accommodate the

reorganization of the enrollment-management unit, and that his continuous appointment

would change to a 12-month term appointment which would end at 5 p.m. on December 31,

2002.  The petitioner sent a memorandum to Dietz on December 2, 2002.  In the memo, the

petitioner acknowledged that his term contract was set to expire at the end of the month, and

he expressed his desire to continue working at the University.  He inquired about whether

the University intended to renew his contract, and he requested a written response.  Dietz

informed the petitioner in writing on December 12, 2002, that his term appointment would

not be renewed.  Additionally, Dietz offered to continue to assist the petitioner in his job

search and to host a reception for him as he had done for other departing directors.  The

petitioner's employment with the University ended on December 31, 2002. 

	On April 4, 2002, approximately four months after he had been first informed that his

appointment had been changed from continuous to term, the petitioner filed a charge of

discrimination (No. 280A200931) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC).  He alleged that he had applied for a position for which he was qualified but was

not selected for an interview, in violation of the University's policy.  He alleged that the

University had hired a younger, less-qualified, and nondisabled woman for the position and

that it had given him a one-year term contract because of his age, sex, and disability.  He was

64 years old at the time, and his right arm and hand were paralyzed and impaired.    

	The charge form the petitioner filed with the EEOC contains areas with questions to

answer and boxes to check.  In the area entitled "cause of discrimination", the petitioner

checked boxes next to "sex", "age", and "disability".  In the area entitled "date discrimination

took place", the petitioner stated "October 10, 2001" and checked the box indicating that it

was a continuing action.  (The record is not clear regarding what facts or events are associated with the date of October 10, 2001.)  At the bottom of the form, above his

signature and the date, the petitioner checked a box preceding the following statement:

	"I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, if any. 

I will advise the agencies if I change my address or telephone number[,] and I will

cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in accordance with their

procedures."  

The petitioner had the form notarized and filed it with the EEOC on April 18, 2002.  

	The EEOC transmitted this charge to the Department on April 25, 2002, along with

a fully addressed transmittal form addressed to the Department in Springfield, Illinois.  Like

the charge itself, the form contains a number of boxes to check indicating a variety of

investigatory options for the EEOC and the Department.  For reasons not explained in the

record, none of these boxes was checked on the transmittal form, and aside from the

petitioner's request we do not know why the EEOC sent the form or the charge to the

Department.  The EEOC dismissed this charge in February of 2003; however, the record is

silent regarding the basis underlying the dismissal.  

	About one year after he filed his charge with the EEOC and two months after the

EEOC dismissed it, the petitioner's counsel's paralegal contacted the Department to inquire

about the status of the transmitted charge.  He learned for the first time that the Department

had not assigned the charge a docket number because it had not been filed directly with the

Department.  When asked to identify the Department regulation or other legal authority

creating a direct-filing requirement, he was told that there was no such regulation or

authority.  

	Based on this information from the Department, the petitioner filed a charge directly

with the Department on June 5, 2003, and again checked the box indicating that he wanted

the charge filed with both the EEOC and the state or local agency.  In this second charge, he stated that he had previously filed a charge in April of 2002 with the EEOC, and he

incorporated the allegations in his first charge into the second charge.  The petitioner

continued to allege discrimination based on age, sex, and disability, but he changed the date

of discrimination to December 12, 2002, i.e., the date of Dietz's second letter informing him that the University would not offer him an additional contract.  This time, he did not check

the box on the charge form indicating that the alleged action was continuing.  The

Department assigned No. 2003SA3596 to the second charge and filed it with the EEOC,

which assigned its own number. 

	On December 15, 2003, the petitioner's counsel's paralegal spoke to Tonya Malin, the

Department's investigator assigned to the second charge.  Malin informed him that the

Department was investigating the jurisdictional basis for the second charge and that it

appeared that it might have been filed out of time.  The paralegal informed Malin about the

first charge and told her that the Department had not assigned a number to it.  He explained

to her that the petitioner had filed the second charge directly with the Department only after

becoming aware that the Department had no intention of processing the first charge.  He

asked her to assign a charge number to the first charge and to compute the limitation period

set forth in section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-

102(A)(1) (West 2004)) with regard to the date the first charge had been filed.   

	The Department dismissed the second charge for a lack of jurisdiction on February

18, 2004, based on a report authored by Malin.  The report reflects that the alleged violation 

occurred on December 12, 2002 (the date of Dietz's second letter confirming that no further

contract would be offered), but this date was "corrected" to December 18, 2001 (the date the

petitioner received the change-of-assignment form).  (For clarity, the corrected date should

have been December 12, 2001, the date of Dietz's initial letter informing the petitioner for

the first time that his continuous appointment would not be renewed and offering a 12-month term appointment set to end on December 31, 2002.  However, Dietz's letter was not a part

of the investigator's file.  This detail does not affect the parties' arguments, this court's

jurisdiction, or our disposition of the appeal.)  Malin observed in her report that on

December 2, 2002, the petitioner had requested a reconsideration of his contract and that

Dietz affirmed the University's earlier decision the following week.  Malin characterized

Dietz's response to the petitioner's request as a reaffirmation of the University's earlier

decision and not a new harm.  She further noted that the petitioner had incorporated his first

charge into his second charge, but she stated, "[B]ecause the allegations in the EEOC charge

were not [sic] being filed 604 days after the alleged harm and the fact that another administrative agency was already addressing those allegations, the Department did not

process these allegations."    

	On March 19, 2004, the petitioner filed a request for a review of the Department's

dismissal.  The petitioner noted in the caption of his request that he sought the review of

charge Nos. 280A200931 and 2003SA3596.  Therein, the petitioner discussed work-sharing

agreements between the EEOC and the Department governing discrimination proceedings

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (2000)).  The petitioner argued that pursuant to the agreements, the Department was obligated to docket

and investigate his first charge upon receipt of it from the EEOC and that it would have been

timely filed had the Department docketed it.  He asked that the first charge be retroactively

assigned a Department charge number and processed in accordance with state law. 

Additionally, the petitioner claimed that his second charge was timely and should be

reinstated because it had been filed within 180 days of the date he definitively learned that

he would be terminated, i.e., the date of Dietz's second letter dated December 12, 2002.  The petitioner's request for review was supported by exhibits, including his first and second

charges, the EEOC's transmittal form regarding the first charge, affidavits from the petitioner, his counsel, and his counsel's paralegal, Dietz's December 12, 2001, and December 12, 2002,

letters, and blank copies of charge forms provided to the petitioner by the Department.  (The

charge forms provided by the Department are nearly identical to the petitioner's first charge

filed with the EEOC.)  

	On July 28, 2003, Lieberman entered a final order sustaining the Department's

dismissal of the petitioner's charge for a lack of jurisdiction.  The caption of the order noted

only the number for the second charge–No. 2003SA3596.  The order contains findings of

fact consisting of 10 numbered paragraphs.  Lieberman found that the limitation period for

filing a charge with the Department began on December 18, 2001, when the petitioner

received the notice that his position was changing from a continuous appointment to a term

appointment which would end on December 31, 2002.  He reasoned that Dietz's second letter

dated December 12, 2002, "was merely a refusal by Respondent to change its previous

decision and was not a new act of discrimination."  Lieberman concluded that the

Department did not have jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner's second charge because the

petitioner had filed it on June 5, 2003, more than 180 days after his receipt of the December

18, 2001, notice.  Lieberman addressed the petitioner's first charge in the order.  He stated

as follows:

		"In his Request, Complainant does not provide any evidence showing the

Department has jurisdiction in this matter.  In his Request, Complainant argues that

his charge was timely filed because on April 18, 2002, he filed Charge No.

280A200931 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ('EEOC'). 

Complainant further argues that EEOC Charge No. 280A200931 should have been

cross-filed with the Department.  However, the Department's investigation did not

reveal, and Complainant did not provide, any evidence that the Department received

EEOC Charge No. 280A200931.  Even if the Department had received EEOC Charge No. 280A200931, it would not support a finding of jurisdiction as to this instant and

independent charge.  To his Request, Complainant attached a copy of EEOC Charge

No. 280A200931 and a copy of Dietz's letter to Complainant, dated December 12,

2002.  The Department previously considered these documents and found no evidence

that it had jurisdiction to investigate Complainant's charge.  Complainant also

attached to his Request a copy of a transmittal form for EEOC Charge No.

280A200931, dated April 25, 2002; a letter from Dietz to Complainant, dated

December 12, 2001; and copies of affidavits from Jerry Rappold (a paralegal for

Weinhaus, Dobson, Goldberg and Moreland), Jerome J. Dobson (Complainant's

attorney), and Complainant.  Complainant has not shown good cause why he failed

to submit these documents previously[,] and[] accordingly, this information cannot

be considered at this time.  Roedl v. Midco International, 296 Ill. App. 3d 213, 694 N.E.2d 179, 183 (5th Dist. 1998).  Complainant's Request is not persuasive."

	The petitioner appeals this order pursuant to section 8-111(A)(1) of the Illinois

Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/8-111(A)(1) (West 2004)) and Supreme Court Rule

335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335).  Our review is limited to Lieberman's decision, not the decision of

the Department.  We will not disturb Lieberman's decision unless it was arbitrary, capricious,

or an abuse of discretion.  Deen v. Lustig, 337 Ill. App. 3d 294, 302, 785 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2003); Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 806 N.E.2d 746, 750 (2004).  Agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the agency contravenes the legislature's

intent, fails to consider a crucial aspect of the problem, or offers an implausible explanation

contrary to agency expertise.  La Salle National Bank v. City Suites, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786, 758 N.E.2d 382, 387 (2001).  For the following reasons, we affirm Lieberman's

decision to sustain the Department's dismissal of the second charge for a lack of jurisdiction. 

However, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's claims regarding his first charge, and we reverse Lieberman's findings and order related thereto.   

	II.  ANALYSIS

	Charge No. 2003SA3596

	We first consider the petitioner's arguments related to his second charge, and we

affirm Lieberman's order sustaining the Department's dismissal thereof for a lack of

jurisdiction.  Section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act provides that a charge of discrimination must

be filed in writing and under oath with the Department within 180 days after the date on

which the civil rights violation is allegedly committed.  775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1) (West

2004).  The petitioner's compliance with the 180-day filing requirement of section 7A-

102(A)(1) is a condition precedent to his right to seek a remedy and is required to vest the

Human Rights Commission with subject matter jurisdiction of the charge.  Weatherly v. Human Rights Comm'n, 338 Ill. App. 3d 433, 437, 788 N.E.2d 1175, 1178-79 (2003); Pickering v. Human Rights Comm'n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 340, 346-47, 496 N.E.2d 746, 751 (1986).  The parties do not dispute that the 180-day filing period applies or that it is

jurisdictional.  Therefore, we need only decide the date of the alleged discriminatory conduct

to determine the effect on the Department's jurisdiction. 

	The petitioner contends that the timeliness of his second charge, filed on June 5, 2003,

should be evaluated from the date of Dietz's second letter dated December 12, 2002,

informing him that the University would not renew his appointment beyond December 31,

2002.  The respondents, however, claim that the date on which the 180-day limitation period

began to run was December 18, 2001, when the petitioner was notified of his term

appointment.  We agree with the respondents because their argument is supported by

precedent, and we find that the petitioner's filing of charge No. 2003SA3596 beyond 180

days following the date he was notified of a change in his appointment status deprives the

Department of jurisdiction to consider the charge.  

	Courts and the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) dealing with

analogous facts have held that the discriminatory conduct occurs upon a complainant's

receipt of notification of the term appointment, and not when the complainant's request for

reconsideration is denied or when the complainant's employment ends.  Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-61, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431, 439-42, 101 S. Ct. 498, 503-06 (1980); Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Northeastern Illinois University v. Rothbardt, 98 Ill. App. 3d 423, 429, 424 N.E.2d 742, 747 (1981); In re Berg, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm'n No.Rep. 1987SF0304, slip op. at ___ (June 20, 1997).    

	In arriving at this conclusion, the Ricks Court and the Commission in In re Berg discussed the nature of the term appointment in the university setting and observed that

faculty and staff denied tenure or continuous employment are not immediately discharged

but are offered a terminal contract or term appointment to continue employment for an

additional year.  Upon the expiration of the term appointment, it is understood that the

employment relationship ends.  Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 253, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431, 436, 101 S. Ct. 498, 501 (1980); In re Berg, slip op. at ___.  For the purpose of calculating the timeliness of this type of claim, courts focus on the time the discriminatory

decision is made and communicated to the complainant, not on the time the consequences

of the decision are felt.  Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431, 440, 101 S. Ct. 498, 504 (1980); In re Berg, slip op. at ___.

	In his second charge, the petitioner alleged that around December 15, 2002, Dietz

informed him that the University would not offer him an additional contract and that his

employment would end on December 31, 2002.  Applying the reasoning discussed above to

these facts, we find that neither December 15 nor December 31 is the date on which the

alleged discriminatory conduct occurred.  Rather, the unlawful employment practice, if any,

was the University's failure to interview the petitioner for the assistant vice-chancellor position, the University's hiring of a younger, less-qualified, and nondisabled woman for the

position, and the University's decision to give the petitioner a term appointment set to expire

on a date certain.  The limitations period for these claims, which were alleged in his first

charge and incorporated into his second charge, commenced to run on December 18, 2001,

when Dietz notified the petitioner of a change in his appointment status from continuous to

term.  This is so because the alleged discrimination occurred when the University made the

unlawful employment decision and because the "mere continuity of employment, without

more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination." 

In re Berg, slip op. at ___; Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257, 66 L. Ed. 2d 431, 439, 101 S. Ct. 498, 504 (1980).  

	In his order, Lieberman found that the petitioner knew on December 18, 2001, that

the University intended to terminate his contract effective December 31, 2002.  He reasoned

that Dietz's letter dated December 12, 2002, represented the University's refusal to change

its previous decision and was not a new act of discrimination.  Lieberman concluded that the

Department did not have jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner's second charge because it

was filed on June 5, 2003, more than 180 days after the petitioner's receipt of the December

18, 2001, notice.  We find no error in Lieberman's disposition of the second charge, and we

affirm his order sustaining the Department's dismissal for a lack of jurisdiction. 

	We summarily reject the petitioner's claim that the dismissal of his second charge was

arbitrary and capricious because he was denied a full investigation required by section 7A-

102(C)(1) of the Act and because the Department failed to obtain witness statements or hold

a fact-finding conference required by sections 7A-102(C)(3) and (C)(4) of the Act (775 ILCS

5/7A-102(C)(1), (C)(3), (C)(4) (West 2004)).  We agree with the respondents that these

sections do not apply to charges that the Department has no jurisdiction to consider.  Support

for this conclusion can be found in section 7A-102(C)(4), which provides in part that the Department shall conduct a fact-finding conference unless the charge has been dismissed for

a lack of jurisdiction.  Furthermore, we find that it would be contrary to principles of judicial

economy to require an administrative body to conduct a full investigation of the merits of a

charge if the threshold jurisdictional requirements have not been satisfied.  

	Charge No. 280A200931

	Before we address on the merits the petitioner's arguments involving his first charge,

we must resolve the parties' disagreement regarding this court's jurisdiction.  The petitioner

contends that the Department should have docketed the first charge he filed with the EEOC

and that had the Department docketed it, his charge would have been deemed timely.  He

claims that appellate review of the matter is authorized under section 8-111 of the Act (775

ILCS 5/8-111 (West 2004)) because Lieberman entered a final order on the first charge.  In

contrast, the respondents argue that the issue was not before Lieberman and is therefore not

properly before this court and that no final order ever issued on the first charge.  For the

following reasons, we find that we have jurisdiction to review the petitioner's assignment of

error regarding the first charge.  

	The petitioner's request for a review of the Department's dismissal notice belies the

respondents' argument.  The caption of the petitioner's request clearly reflects that he sought

a review of the Department's dismissal notice involving charge Nos. 280A200931 and

2003SA3596.  Therein, he alleged that the Department's failure to assign a charge number

to the first charge and its dismissal of his second charge for a lack of jurisdiction caused him

to suffer a loss of remedies.  He requested a finding that he had timely filed the first charge

with the Department, and he requested that the Department retroactively assign a Department

charge number.  Clearly, the petitioner presented Lieberman with the same issue now raised

on appeal.  

	Moreover, we find that Lieberman made factual findings regarding the first charge sufficient to vest jurisdiction in this court.  Lieberman acknowledged the petitioner's

argument that the Department should have filed EEOC charge No. 280A200931.  Thereafter,

he made a finding of fact that the Department's investigation did not reveal, and that the

petitioner did not provide, any evidence that the Department had received the first charge

transmitted by the EEOC.  Lieberman continued, stating that the Department had previously

considered a copy of the first charge and a copy of Dietz's letter dated December 12, 2002,

and found no evidence that it had jurisdiction to investigate the petitioner's charge.  

	We interpret Lieberman's order as a final disposition of the first charge and find that

it is a final order within the meaning of the Act, which renders direct appellate jurisdiction

proper.  

	We turn now to consider the merits of the petitioner's argument regarding the first

charge.  The petitioner contends that the EEOC timely transmitted his first charge to the

Department, that the EEOC transmission satisfied the filing requirements of the Illinois

Administrative Code, and that the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ignoring

his charge on the basis that it had not been filed directly with the Department.  To make his

case, the petitioner relies primarily on language in the charge form, language in work-sharing

agreements, and the EEOC's transmission of his charge to the Department.  He emphasizes

that it is the Department's timely receipt of the first charge stating his intent to cross-file with

the Department that constitutes compliance with the filing requirements of the Illinois

Human Rights Act.  In contrast, the respondents argue that the EEOC sends charges to the

Department for informational purposes only and that the filing of a charge with the EEOC

does not mean that the charge is automatically filed with the Department.  They rely

primarily on In re Polewaczyk, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm'n No.Rep. 1994CA2261 (April 25, 2001), as authority to support their argument.  For the reasons that follow, we agree with the

petitioner and decline to follow the Commission panel's decision in In re Polewaczyk.  

	We note that no party has cited any statute or administrative regulation that expressly

requires either (1) a complainant to personally file a charge with the Department to preserve

his rights under the Act or (2) the Department to docket and process a charge filed with and

transmitted by the EEOC.  Section 2520.10 of Title 56 of the Illinois Administrative Code

defines "charge" as an allegation of a civil rights violation filed with the Department.  56 Ill.

Adm. Code §2520.10 (2004)as amended by 20 Ill. Reg. 10631 (eff. July 24, 1996)).  This section

does not say that the charge must be filed with the Department by the petitioner personally

or whether transmission of a charge by the EEOC is sufficient.  Section 2520.40 of Title 56

of the Illinois Administrative Code provides that a charge delivered to the Department by

hand delivery or facsimile shall be deemed filed when received by the Department and that

items delivered by the United States Postal Service shall be deemed filed when postmarked,

properly addressed, and posted for delivery.  56 Ill. Adm. Code §2520.40 (2004)as amended by

29 Ill. Reg. 804 (eff. December 28, 2004)).  The only legal authority cited by any party that

substantively addresses the matter before us is a decision rendered by a three-member panel

of the Illinois Human Rights Commission–In re Polewaczyk, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm'n NoRep. 1994CA2261 (April 25, 2001). 

	The issue in In re Polewaczyk was whether the complainant had effectively filed a charge with the Department pursuant to section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-

102(A)(1) (West 1992)), where he initially filed it with the EEOC and did not personally file

it with the Department.  The Commission panel concluded that the complainant had not

effectively filed his charge with the Department and that the Department had not technically

received it, which deprived the Commission of subject matter jurisdiction of the

complainant's case.  In re Polewaczyk, slip op. at ___.  In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission panel discussed at length the existence and effect of a work-sharing agreement

between the Department and the EEOC, which was fundamental to the panel's decision in the case.  In re Polewaczyk, slip op. at ___.  In the instant case, the petitioner and the respondents rely on the existence of this work-sharing agreement in advancing their

respective positions.  The petitioner relies on the agreement as evidence of the Department's

duty to accept and docket a charge transmitted by the EEOC, and the respondents indirectly

rely on the agreement to the extent that their counterarguments depend solely on In re Polewaczyk.  However, as the respondents point out, the agreement was not before Lieberman and was not attached to the petitioner's petition for review.  Furthermore, we

previously denied the petitioner's motion to supplement the record, so the agreement is not

a part of the record on appeal in this case.  As a result, we do not consider the work-sharing

agreement in passing on the parties' arguments, and we decline to apply In re Polewaczyk to the facts of the instant case.   

	Rather, our disposition in favor of the petitioner is largely motivated by the language

in the preprinted charge form utilized by the Department, indicating when checked that the

complainant desires that the charge be filed with the EEOC and the state or local agency. 

When a complainant checks this box, he also agrees to inform the state agency of a change

in address and to cooperate with the agency in the processing of his charge.  This language,

as checked by the petitioner, clearly reflects his intent that the charge be filed with the EEOC

and the Department and carries with it the strong inference that his charge initially filed with

the EEOC would be cross-filed with the Department without the need for any further action

on his part.  The petitioner's reliance on this language was reasonable, especially in light of

the absence of an administrative regulation or statute providing explicit filing instructions.

	We further find that evidence and inferences from the record support our conclusion

that the Department received the petitioner's first charge from the EEOC and that

Lieberman's finding to the contrary was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. 

Lieberman stated in his order that the Department's investigation did not reveal, and that the petitioner did not provide, any evidence that the Department had received the first charge. 

In making this finding, Lieberman refused to consider certain documents attached to the

request for review, finding that the petitioner failed to show good cause for having not

submitted the documents previously.  We disagree with Lieberman's finding regarding the

Department's receipt of the first charge and his decision to reject the documents offered by

the petitioner.

	There is no dispute that the EEOC transmitted the charge to the Department on April

25, 2002, along with a transmittal form fully and properly addressed to the Department in

Springfield, Illinois.  Moreover, despite the Department having had opportunities to do so,

at no time leading up to Lieberman's order did anyone from the Department ever inform the

petitioner that his first charge had not been received.  It is apparent that the petitioner did not

submit a copy of his first charge, the EEOC transmittal form, and other documents to the

Department prior to filing his request for review because no one from the Department had

ever alleged that the Department had failed to receive his first charge.  Rather, the petitioner

was informed that his first charge had not been processed because he did not file it directly

with the Department.  Under these facts, we find that the petitioner demonstrated good cause

for not previously submitting these documents.  Had Lieberman considered the documents

offered by the petitioner, he would have arrived at the same conclusion as we do: the

petitioner timely filed a charge of discrimination with the Department.     

	Nothing in the Illinois Administrative Code or the Illinois Human Rights Act required

the petitioner to file the charge with the Department himself rather than rely on the EEOC's

transmission.  Furthermore, the charge form adequately informed the Department that the

petitioner sought redress for discrimination based on his age, sex, and disability and that he

expected the Department to take action on his claims.  Nothing in the record supports the

respondents' claim that the EEOC transmitted the petitioner's first charge to the Department for informational purposes only.  Accordingly, we find that the EEOC's timely transmission

of a copy of the petitioner's first charge to the Department satisfied his responsibility under

the Act sufficient to trigger the Department's processing and investigation of the charge and

that he should not be penalized for the Department's failure to docket his first charge.  To do

otherwise would undermine the petitioner's right to redress and shield potentially illegal

discrimination from the reach of state law.  

	III.  CONCLUSION

	Accordingly, we affirm Lieberman's order sustaining the Department's dismissal of

the second charge (charge No. 2003SA3596) for a lack of jurisdiction, and we reverse the

order to the extent that it disposes of the first charge (charge No. 280A200931).  We remand

the matter for further proceedings consistent with this order, including, but not limited to, the

assignment of a Department docket charge number to EEOC charge No. 280A200931 and

the Department's compliance with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements as

they relate to a timely filed charge under section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-

102(A)(1) (West 2004)).

	Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

	HOPKINS and SPOMER, JJ., concur.

                                     	NO. 5-04-0542

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	FIFTH DISTRICT

___________________________________________________________________________________

WALKER ALLEN,					)  Petition for Review of the Order of the

							)  Chief Legal Counsel Designee of the

     Petitioner,					)  Illinois Department of Human Rights. 

							)

v.							)

							)

MICHAEL I. LIEBERMAN, THE 		)  No. 2003SA3596

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and	)

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,		)

							)  

     Respondents.					)

___________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion Filed:	August 30, 2005

___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:	Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

	Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J., and

	Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.,

	Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorney	Jerome J. Dobson, Weinhaus, Dobson, Goldberg and Moreland, 906 Olive

for	Street, Suite 900, St. Louis, MO 63101

Petitioner	

___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys	Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General,

for	Ellen B. Stanfield, Assistant Attorney General, 100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor,

Respondents	Chicago, IL 60601; Mark Brittingham, Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois 

	University, 318 Anthony Hall–MC 4307, Carbondale, IL 62901

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