About the Report

With Nigeria’s 2011 election cycle well within view, the 

country’s political elites remain locked in a tense succession 

negotiation after the midterm death of President Umaru 

Yar’Adua. In this already-troubled election season, Nigeria’s 

history of electoral violence raises significant additional 

concerns about the possibility of hostilities. Commissioned by 

the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention at the United 

States Institute of Peace, this report offers a brief overview of 

electoral violence in Nigeria, examines Nigeria’s prospects for 

a nonviolent political transition in 2011, and concludes with 

recommendations for a safer, more secure polling season.

Ebere Onwudiwe, a senior faculty member in the department of 

behavioral sciences at Central State University in Wilberforce, 

Ohio, is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for 

Democracy and Development (CDD) in Abuja, Nigeria. 

Chloe Berwind-Dart, a conflict resolution consultant to CDD for 

the production of this report, has lived and 

worked in Nigeria since 2009. 

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 263 December 2010

© 2010 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Ebere Onwudiwe and Chloe Berwind-Dart

Breaking the Cycle of 

Electoral Violence in 

Nigeria

Summary

•	 Nigeria’s 2011 polls will mark the fourth multiparty election in Nigeria and, if a power 

transfer occurs, only the second handover of civilian administrations since the country’s 

return to democracy in 1999. 

•	 Past election cycles have featured political assassinations, voter intimidation, intra- and 

interparty clashes, and communal unrest. Party primary season, the days immediately surrounding elections, and the announcement of results have been among the most violent 

periods in previous cycles.

•	 Although the most recent elections in 2007 derived some benefit from local conflict management capacity, they were roundly criticized for being neither free nor fair.

•	 The 2011 elections could mark a turning point in the consolidation of Nigeria’s democracy, 

but they could also provoke worsening ethnosectarian clashes and contribute to the continuing scourge of zero-sum politics.

•	 President Umaru Yar’Adua, who died in May 2010, kept his 2007 inauguration promise to 

create an Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) but failed to adopt key recommendations that 

the committee made. 

•	 His successor, President Goodluck Jonathan, appointed a widely respected professor, Attahiru Jega, to head the Independent National Electoral Commission, inspiring hope that 

electoral processes will improve in 2011. 

•	 The issue of “zoning,” the political elite’s power-sharing agreement, has taken center 

stage in the current election cycle and will drive significant conflict if the debate around it 

devolves into outright hostilities. 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Contents

Introduction 2

Electoral Violence in Nigeria 3

Formation of the 2007 Electoral Reform Committee 4

Patterns of Electoral Violence 5

Key Drivers of Conflict in the 2011 Elections 7

Violence Prevention 10

Recommendations 12
2

•	 In this unusual election cycle, local and international organizations and Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) must redouble their efforts both to prevent and resolve conflicts and 

to promote conflict sensitivity.

•	 The near term requires an increasingly important role for the judiciary in combating electoral 

fraud, and the longer term requires the creation of the ERC–recommended Electoral Offenses 

Commission, which would specialize in the investigation and prosecution of crimes.

•	 Local agencies and respected community leaders must remain proactive and creative in 

violence-prevention programming, irrespective of international funding. Established local 

organizations with preexisting networks are best situated to perform early-warning and 

conflict management functions. 

•	 High voter turnout and citizen monitoring are vital for ensuring that the 2011 elections in 

Nigeria are credible and civil.

Introduction

While Africa’s largest democracy prepares for the polls, serious questions remain about 

Nigeria’s capacity and political will to conduct free, fair, and peaceful elections. Since independence in 1960, violence and myriad irregularities have persistently marred the process 

of electing the country’s leaders. Nigerian politicians have become habituated to fraud, 

corruption, intimidation, and violence, as if they consider these the necessary weapons of 

political winners. Nigerian voters have been denied the chance to count and be counted 

and, disturbingly, the trend has worsened. National and international monitors observing 

the 2007 polls referred to them as an undemocratic charade, while Freedom House declared 

them the worst in Nigeria since the end of military rule in 1999.1

Will 2011 be a transformational year of relatively peaceful transition, or a reprise of violent electoral disenfranchisement? As Nigeria navigates the 2011 election season, few are 

hopeful that this ugly political history will not be repeated. Fierce ambition among Nigerian 

politicians is certainly part of the problem. So too is the scarcity of transparency, accountability, and law enforcement oversight in the funding and running of campaigns, leaving 

ambitions unchecked and enabling the “do-or-die” approach so famously touted by outgoing 

president Olusegun Obasanjo in 2007. 

Nigerian elections have not been about the issues, nor about addressing the many 

challenges faced by Nigeria’s largely struggling citizenry. The Nigeria Labour Congress has 

recently threatened a general strike if the government raised the price of fuel. Yet the question of petrol subsidies is largely absent from party platforms. Pensioners of the federal 

government recently underwent an onerous identity and eligibility verification process, yet 

politicians are not discussing what policies they can offer this important class of voters. 

There is debate over the “privatization” of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), 

but this issue too is rarely featured in aspirants’ speeches. Many politicians make passing 

references to improving electricity output and publicly agree that corruption is one of Nigeria’s greatest problems, but most citizens see such comments as half-hearted attempts to 

paper over political gambits for power. 

The failure to address the pressing issues facing ordinary Nigerians is a bleak and irksome reminder that politics in Nigeria is not yet by, about, or even for average citizens. 

Elections have been about power: controlling it, undermining it, distributing it. Among both 

political elites and civilians, alliances form along expedient lines of convenience, ethnicity, 

and religion. These political alliances can be fluid, particularly among the elites, and all too 

frequently they encourage allegiance to factional rather than national interests. In this 

context, conflict can be triggered at any stage of the electoral process, particularly in this 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor 

of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, 

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy Van Rest, Executive 

Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • James N. Miller, 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy •

Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
3

very unusual election season, which follows the midterm death of President Umaru Yar’Adua 

and the succession of a vice president, Goodluck Jonathan, whose unexpected leadership is 

a matter of some controversy. Unfortunately, community unrest and murders that appear to 

be politically motivated have already taken place. 

Still, election strife is preventable, but a 2011 election season less violent than its predecessors will occur only through the efforts of all stakeholders. Where hostilities have not 

or will not be prevented, opportunities remain to manage conflicts better and to build upon 

the good work of community leaders, citizens, and civil society groups dedicated to Nigeria’s 

peaceful democratic development. 

Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Since the rebirth of Nigeria’s democracy in 1999, violence of varying levels has been an 

unfortunate staple of Nigerian elections. Local peacemaking efforts in conflict-prone states 

such as Kaduna have led to meaningful security improvements, and more recent efforts are 

under way in restive Plateau state, but the risk of election violence nationwide is unacceptably high.2 Many drivers of election violence remain unaddressed and will be exacerbated if 

tensions around the 2011 polls escalate further.

Whether sponsored or spontaneous, election-related conflicts are distinctive, signifying discontent around tightly interwoven social and economic concerns. In Nigeria, these 

concerns include dissatisfaction with government performance, competition for resources, 

inter- and intragroup distrust, joblessness, and anger at an abundance of unscrupulous 

politicians with little respect for due process or rule of law. During election periods, underlying social and economic concerns collide with hopes and fears of change, raising tensions 

and the likelihood of violent competition. This is particularly true in countries like Nigeria 

where chronic instability, poor governance, communal disputes, gang-related fighting, and 

violence sponsored by power brokers fosters long-standing grievances. Economic incentives, 

preexisting anger, and opportunistic desires for revenge can be potent incentives for violence. Fresh anger at election injustices under the aegis of a government still perceived as 

promising only modest accountability for electoral crimes is a worrisome factor. 

1999: Election-related violence occurred this year, though not as extensively as some had 

feared. The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 

which jointly observed the 1999 elections, concluded that “the transition from military to 

civilian rule was generally conducted without violence,” reserving their sharper criticism for 

the “electoral irregularities” and “outright fraud” that their monitors reported.3

2003: Violence during the 2003 election cycle was more blatant and widespread. Intraparty clashes, political assassinations, and community unrest in already volatile areas such 

as Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta, characterized these elections. This cycle also marked 

the unchecked proliferation of another worrisome development: the hiring and arming of 

militias to serve narrow political ends. One concerned nongovernmental organization (NGO) 

monitoring the elections characterized them as “a low intensity armed struggle.”4 Politicians and party bosses found a ready supply of unemployed men, frequently youths, willing 

to perpetrate violence in exchange for pay and firepower.5 As a result, these young men 

comprised a significant percentage of the lives lost leading up to the 2003 polls.6

2007: These elections saw the same patterns of violence and intimidation from earlier 

elections. Merely declaring oneself a candidate was enough to put one’s life at risk. In 

fact, by 2007, electoral violence had become such a credible risk despite Nigeria’s return to 

democracy that the mere threat of it was enough to keep large swaths of voters away from 

the polls, as in Rivers state, where absent ballot materials and violent threats contributed to 

low voter turnout. When statewide tallies nevertheless boasted vote casting in the millions, 

Many drivers of election violence 

remain unaddressed and will be 

exacerbated if tensions around 

the 2011 polls escalate further.
4

violence surged in the postelection period. Weapons and firearms still circulating from the 

2003 election cycle not only increased the likelihood of violence but also afforded militias 

new leverage through which to influence the very powers that had armed them in the first 

place.7 In light of the violence unleashed during the 2007 and other past elections, ActionAid Nigeria released a report in 2010 that classified Nigerian electoral violence squarely 

within the category of protracted social conflict, “characterized by civil strife, heightened 

social and political tension, [and the] sporadic use of violence, but in which armed conflict 

is not formally declared.”8

2011: With the 2011 polls fast approaching, politically motivated violence seems to have 

already taken place in several states. In Edo state, for example, a political contender was 

gunned down in August after declaring his intention to contest for a seat in the House of 

Representatives.9 A security aide to the current Bauchi state governor was shot in what 

may have been an attempted attack on the governor himself, an incident that followed several other attacks involving Bauchi politicians or their affiliates.10 Well-known Niger Delta 

militant Saboma George, accused of past election rigging, was killed in Rivers state, while 

the supporters of two gubernatorial candidates recently clashed in Kano, leading to one 

reported death and numerous injuries.11 In Anambra and other eastern states, high-level 

political kidnappings are already on the rise. Meanwhile, in October 2010, Nigerian security 

officials intercepted thirteen shipping containers of smuggled weaponry at the Lagos port 

in what many analysts consider an ominous portent for this year’s election season.12

Formation of the 2007 Electoral Reform Committee 

The electoral process itself had been so heavily compromised by 2007 that domestic and 

international monitoring bodies pronounced it irreparably flawed. Condemnation of the 

2007 elections was so total that it appeared for a time to jeopardize Nigeria’s leadership 

role in Africa. International observers wondered how a country whose leaders were so 

undemocratically selected could enjoy prominent roles in the Economic Community of West 

African States and the African Peer Review Mechanism.13 Coming on the heels of President 

Obasanjo’s unconstitutional attempt to remain in office for a third term,14 the elections 

continued to drive Nigeria’s already-beleaguered governance credentials downhill. 

Incoming president Umaru Yar’Adua, with a reputation for honesty and probity, needed to 

act quickly to legitimize his presidency and to repair the country’s tattered image. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka had called on him to abdicate by declaring himself “not a receiver of stolen 

goods,”15 but Yar’Adua proposed a different solution. Pledging electoral reform in his May 2007 

inauguration speech, he promised citizens some hope that Nigeria’s historically impenetrable 

electoral process would finally open the political system to citizen participation.

In August 2007, President Yar’Adua formed an Electoral Reform Committee composed of 

nearly two dozen respected citizens. Chaired by Honorable Justice (ret.) Muhammadu Lawal 

Uwais, the ERC set about assessing the country’s many electoral dilemmas and developed 

a set of recommendations, such as granting true independence for Electoral Management 

Bodies, ensuring the sensible distribution of election management duties, attaining international electoral standards, resolving election disputes, and mitigating postelection tensions.16 By December 2008, the committee had submitted its sizable report and detailed 

recommendations to President Yar’Adua, including three bills the committee drafted for 

expedited submission to the legislature.

The Yar’Adua administration’s response to the ERC recommendations was tepid. The ERC 

had called for the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) to be sovereign, at both 

the federal and state levels, to ensure much-needed political and fiscal autonomy. It also 

Condemnation of the 2007 

elections was so total that 

it appeared for a time to 

jeopardize Nigeria’s leadership 

role in Africa.
5

recommended the establishment of three new management bodies, including an Electoral 

Offences Commission and a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission. Both 

were intended to relieve INEC of an unwieldy set of responsibilities. The administration 

rejected crucial reforms outright, rebuffing the committee’s call to end the presidential 

appointment of the INEC chair. This rejection alone was considered an enormous blow 

to true reform. Nigeria’s civil society sector and most of its political parties—a notable 

exception being the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP)—protested, asserting that an 

independently chosen INEC chair was necessary for INEC’s independence and credibility. 

Ultimately, the administration drafted and sent seven of its own suggested reform bills 

to the National Assembly, but the bill relating to the regulation of political parties was 

immediately refused. The remainder of the bills languished after the legislature tabled 

further decisions, proclaiming that the remaining bills should be considered within a 

broader constitutional review process, despite Yar’Adua’s request that the bills be considered 

separately from other questions of constitutional reform.17 Yar’Adua’s subsequent illness 

and untimely death brought the reform agenda to a standstill. While his administration 

ultimately accepted a high percentage of the ERC’s recommendations, its rejection of key 

provisions had a dispiriting effect on citizenry and civil society organizations. 

An independently elected INEC chairman would have improved public morale as well as 

INEC credibility by providing potentially violence-preventing evenhandedness in election 

oversight and implementation. Even so, newly appointed INEC chair professor Attahiru Jega 

is widely seen as the best chairperson for whom citizens could have hoped. Well respected 

and credible, his selection by President Jonathan comes none too soon. 

More broadly, the electoral reform process represents a missed opportunity for a national 

conversation regarding large-scale violence prevention. The ERC made a pointed call for 

violence reduction through, for example, increased electoral inclusiveness and widespread 

mentality shifts. The Yar’Adua or the Jonathan administrations could have taken up the wellestablished problem of electoral violence directly. Neither did. In the short time remaining 

before elections, much needs to be done by all stakeholders to navigate Nigeria’s veritable 

minefield of electoral flashpoints.

Patterns of Electoral Violence in Nigeria

Before turning to specific drivers of conflict during the 2011 election season, it is worth noting that election-related violence across Nigeria manifests in foreseeable patterns. Election 

conflicts typically fall into four related categories: intraparty feuding, interparty clashes, 

electoral-events violence, and communal unrest. 

Intraparty Feuding

Violence among party factions happens most frequently prior to the party primaries, and 

its intensity correlates positively with the party’s political influence. As one respected 

analyst put it, “Where a party holds power, the level of strife within that party tends to be 

greater.”18 At the national level and in many of Nigeria’s thirty-six states, the PDP is the 

ruling political party. A place on the PDP ticket has assured victory at the polls in many 

parts of the country. From the State Houses of Assembly to the governorships, competition 

for PDP nominations is frequently associated with violent struggle.19 This type of violence 

rarely involves ordinary voters directly. More typically, it is fought by elite-sponsored militias 

or directed at the elites themselves, as in July 2006, when the PDP gubernatorial aspirant for 

Lagos, Chief Funsho Williams, was murdered in his home by hired assassins.20

The electoral reform process 

represents a missed opportunity 

for a national conversation 

regarding large-scale violence 

prevention.
6

Interparty Clashes

While this type of violence can happen at any point in the election cycle, it most frequently 

takes place after party primaries and during the postelection period when party supporters 

who believe the election was rigged against their candidate clash with the opposition. A 

good example of this was the recent postelection violence that took place in Rivers state. 

Voting there had been minimal. Missing ballot materials or closed polling booths were a 

serious part of the problem, but so too was voter intimidation. Yet statewide vote tallies 

were in the millions, causing significant outrage. In this case, election violence increased 

rather than decreased following the elections. As Human Rights Watch observed, the Rivers 

state violence “was no random explosion” and, in fact, was arguably not simply a response 

to local events but a “widely predicted aftershock of Nigeria’s rigged and violent April 2007 

nationwide elections.”21

Electoral Events Violence

Patterns of election violence follow a largely predictable sequence around key electoral 

events. Party primaries and election days (and specifically the announcement of results) 

are critical periods of concern, but even the initial selection of party delegates can be a 

contentious affair.22 This, coupled with the headline-grabbing pressure that the new INEC 

chair is under to adequately manage voter registration and the eleventh-hour uncertainty 

around the final dates for the 2011 polls, has created a general atmosphere of anxiety. Past 

elections have shown that violence becomes increasingly likely as the polls draw nearer, and 

the entire month of elections is a high-risk period, as previous elections have demonstrated. 

April 2007 saw an almost 42 percent uptick in recorded incidents of violence over March 

2007.23 Actual election days have also historically been spoiled by violence and intimidation 

tactics targeted at journalists and political aspirants and their families, as well as at ordinary 

voters, as Human Rights Watch observers noted during the 2007 polls in Ekiti, Rivers, and 

Anambra states. Meanwhile, the announcement of election results known to be fraudulent 

can provoke heated reactions, as reported in the case of opposition voters who set government buildings ablaze in Katsina at the unlikely seeming news that “PDP had swept the 

state’s gubernatorial polls.”24

Communal Unrest

Election tensions tend to exacerbate preexisting community conflicts, which in Nigeria may 

involve regional resource fighting, rebellious unrest in response to corrupt and degenerative 

leadership, and/or ethnoreligious hostility. Two regions of particular concern are Plateau 

state in the lower North-Central area of the country and the Niger Delta in Nigeria’s south, 

but other regions of concern include the notoriously insecure east, including states such as 

Anambra, and increasingly restive parts of the north, such as Borno.

Anambra has what one representative newspaper terms an “ugly past” of electoral 

violence and fraud.25 Long a good example of very bad politics, previous polls in Anambra have featured armed political militias, the dominance of extralegal political backers 

(commonly referred to in Nigeria as “godfathers”), ballot-box stuffing, ballot-box stealing, 

and the nearly routine threat of kidnappings and other security breaches. Yet, the 2007 

gubernatorial race, which was rerun in February 2010 and is widely seen as a “test case” 

for the 2011 general elections, offers indications that better managed elections can be 

more peaceful. Conducted amid an extensive intervention program by the Department for 

International Development–sponsored ActionAid Nigeria, election preparations engaged 

local stakeholders from the police and citizenry to politicians and INEC officials. ActionAid 

Election tensions . . . exacerbate 

preexisting community 

conflicts, which in Nigeria 

may involve regional resource 

fighting, rebellious unrest 

in response to corrupt and 

degenerative leadership, and/or 

ethnoreligious hostility.
7

Nigeria employed a holistic approach to violence prevention and largely succeeded in stemming it. Voter education components of the program also appear successful: a number of 

reports note instances of nonviolent civil insistence that votes be properly accounted for.26

Anambra state’s 2011 polls will not include a gubernatorial election, but concerns remain 

high for Anambra and other eastern states with a history of electoral unrest.

Jos, the capital of Plateau, where ethnic and religious differences are compounded by 

the perception that some groups are indigenous to the state (“indigenes”) while others are 

migrants (“settlers”), has been rocked by intracommunal fighting for years. The Jos crises 

are colored by the fact that some groups view Plateau as an ethnic homeland, but the crises 

also represent a battle for control of land and other resources that are often administered 

along ethnoreligious lines.27 Plateau’s miseries are exacerbated during periods of open 

political competition, an issue addressed in greater detail later in this report.

The Niger Delta is another long-standing concern. President Yar’Adua made peace in the 

oil-rich region a priority. In 2009, his administration offered Delta fighters an amnesty 

package that included education and jobs training in exchange for laying down and, in 

some cases, for handing over their weapons.28 Some Niger Delta watchers lament that a 

peace that is “bought and paid for” rather than negotiated leaves the root causes of militancy unaddressed,29 and even supporters of the program remain concerned that lingering 

questions of resource allocation have not been answered.30 Tragically, ongoing concerns 

appeared all too prescient when car bombs detonated on October 1, 2010, during Independence Day celebrations in Abuja. A faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the 

Niger Delta claimed credit for this unprecedented attack in the country’s capital, which left 

more than a dozen dead and many more injured. Later that month, a militant attack on an 

oil facility in Bayelsa state reportedly cut production there by 60,000 barrels per day.31 It 

is not yet clear how the historically volatile Delta—long a source of violence and insecurity 

during elections and beyond—will weather the remainder of the 2011 election cycle. 

Of more recent alarm has been a surge in religious extremist violence in parts of northern 

Nigeria, including Borno state. World media was briefly captivated in late 2009 when reports 

of a group popularly known as Boko Haram—a moniker roughly meaning that Western 

education is prohibited—clashed with local authorities in what became a vicious cycle of 

attack and counterattack. By the end of the fighting, security personnel and dozens of Boko 

Haram’s members and associates had been killed, including its leader, Muhammad Yusuf, 

who was captured alive and largely uninjured but did not survive police custody. In October 

2010, the reconstituted group struck again. Suspected Boko Haram militants gunned down 

a prominent Muslim scholar—known as both a critic of Boko Haram and an associate of 

Borno’s governor—and later attacked a police station near Maiduguri, Borno’s capital. These 

groups attract membership by defining themselves against the corruption and profligacy of 

religious elites and politicians. It is not entirely clear how they will respond to elections 

per se. These remarkably bold attacks do not bode well, especially in a region now rife with 

small arms and other weaponry.

Key Drivers of Conflict in the 2011 Elections

A relatively smooth electoral transition could be conducted in an atmosphere in which voters 

feel confident that their votes are secure and that criminals will be held accountable, in which 

political parties resolve leadership disputes through dialogue and negotiation, and in which 

politicians do not exploit social, economic, and religious grievances in their bids to secure a 

victory. However, if current officeholders abuse incumbency powers to force victory at the 

polls—a widespread practice in previous elections that is accomplished by significant violence—then the transition is bound to be characterized by conflicts and threats to national 

Some Niger Delta watchers 

lament that a peace that is 

“bought and paid for” rather 

than negotiated leaves the root 

causes of militancy unaddressed.
8

stability. The incumbency factor is a particular concern during the 2011 polls, because they 

feature a significant number of first-term executives, up to and including the president, seeking reelection. The “zoning” debate is also of special concern, and the need for an amicable 

solution to the zoning question remains high. Finally, though INEC has received an inevitable 

boost in the form of its new chair, it remains an agency burdened by a cumbersome set 

of duties. With regard to violence prevention, creation of the ERC-recommended Electoral 

Offenses Commission could have been of particular advantage in reassuring the public that 

election-season criminality will be investigated and punished. As it stands, Nigeria’s courts 

will remain challenged by inevitable postelection appeals to justice. 

Zoning 

“Zoning” is essentially a power-sharing agreement among members of Nigerian political 

parties, most notably the country’s principal political party, the PDP. It is an arrangement 

designed to promote inclusiveness and therefore political stability among Nigeria’s main 

ethnic groups from the north and south. Fears of ethnic domination are long-standing, and 

in fact the country’s postindependence choice of federalism as a governing principle was 

itself largely motivated by this concern. The constitutionally mandated “federal character” 

principle maintained by the government32 and the creation of successively more states under 

the Nigerian federation were both attempts to avert ethnocentric tendencies and even violence by offering each group equal access to national leadership and to break the otherwise 

dominating blocs formed by Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups.

Under zoning, six geographical areas (South-South, South-East, South-West, NorthCentral, North-East, and North-West) become unofficial “geopolitical zones” from which 

candidates rotationally vie for the presidency and other top leadership positions. As the 

current debate over who should take the presidency in 2011 demonstrates, however, zoning 

is largely seen as an agreement between the political north and the political south. Hence, 

northern leaders who have sought a “consensus candidate” to replace the late president 

Yar’Adua—who was recently announced as Atiku Abubakar, former vice president from 1999 

to 2007—did not limit their consideration to northern politicians from Yar’Adua’s own zone, 

the North-West. Zoning has been a key element in maintaining a relative peace, which in 

turn divests the military of an excuse to leave the barracks. Following eight years of rule 

by President Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner, the north was slated to take its eight-year 

turn at the top of the party. But Yar’Adua died shy of the halfway mark, and Vice President 

Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Niger Deltan, ascended to power. Many northerners contend 

that Jonathan should not contest for president because the presidency is still zoned to 

the north, while Jonathan’s supporters argue that he is completing a joint mandate with 

Yar’Adua for an eight-year term. 

The PDP has not yet declared its candidate for 2011, but President Jonathan holds the 

incumbent’s advantage of funds and administrative control, no small benefit in Nigeria’s system of executive supremacy. The PDP’s candidate has won every presidential election since 

1999—and not a single source consulted for this report expects the 2011 polls to upset 

that pattern—so a PDP nod for Jonathan likely upends the prevailing political paradigm. 

Many fear that outcome would lead to a discontented north and a rise in ethnoreligious 

violence incited, or at least condoned, by disgruntled elites. Finally, Jonathan’s ascension is 

an unexpected advantage to the South-South, home not only to the country’s significant oil 

supply but also to popular outrage over the environmental and human toll of an extractive 

industry that many Niger Deltans feel does not fairly compensate them. The presidency is a 

boon they will be loath to lose, and that factor adds an uncertain and troublesome element 

to a region that is already associated with recurrent as well as electoral unrest.33

Zoning has been a key element 

in maintaining a relative 

peace, which in turn divests the 

military of an excuse to leave 

the barracks. 
9

Resource-Based Competition

Nigeria is a relatively wealthy country. This fact stands uncomfortably juxtaposed with 

Nigeria’s persistently bleak social indicators. Most citizens live on less than $2 per day and 

more than two-thirds live on less than $1 per day. Maternal mortality rates are remarkably 

high—some of the worst in the world, in fact—while adult literacy rates and the availability 

of jobs are unacceptably low. If a Nigerian man lives past forty-eight, he is beating the odds. 

These and other prosperity indicators are so dismal that the 2010 Global Peace Index report 

ranks Nigeria 137 out of 149 countries surveyed.34 The same ordinary citizens burdened by 

these difficult truths also bear the brunt of Nigeria’s underperforming electrical grid and its 

dilapidated roads, which together challenge even the most basic of daily activities. 

It is little wonder that resource-based competition—for employment, for arable land, for 

oil profits, and for the financial advantage of political favor—underlies much of Nigeria’s 

unrest. As political scientist Victor Adetula recently noted, “While electoral violence may 

occur before or after electoral competition, at their base are protests and agitations over 

socioeconomic issues.”35 With regard to election-related violence, these agitations play out 

on two levels. First, competition for political seats among elites can be incredibly fierce. 

Prospective politicians may be wealthier and better educated than most of their countrymen, but they too suffer from a dearth of alternative job prospects. Second, politicians and 

party bosses bent on mischief have a ready supply of recruits from an aggrieved, resourcedeprived population. The lure of cash rewards for “security details” or outright troublemaking should not be underestimated in this context.

Social Divisions

Too often, leaders across Nigeria exploit and exacerbate the country’s many social divisions 

to deadly effect as in communities like Jos, where Jonah Jang was elected governor in 

2007 directly following years of leadership by the divisive Joshua Dariye. Despite a political 

mandate to equitably govern all of Plateau’s inhabitants, Governor Jang has regularly and 

inflexibly promoted the notion that land ownership and other rights belong only to certain residents. A Christian of Berom extraction, Jang makes no apology for advancing the 

notion that members of his ethnic group are rightful “indegenes” who need not share the 

advantages of residency rights and who should resist religiopolitical domination by ethnic 

Jasawa (Hausa) Muslim “settlers.”36 Rather than play the part of a peacemaker or even 

strike a conciliatory tone, Jang governs by reinforcing divisions and emboldening intergroup 

discrimination. During his tenure, hundreds of residents have died in communal fighting, 

especially in the state’s capital. 

In a country still widely united by its deference to elders and authority, it is crucial 

that Plateau’s leaders not only call for but set personal examples of peaceable coexistence, 

dialogue, and nonviolent conflict resolution if the bloodshed is to stop. Taken as a whole, 

Nigerians have much in common. Across ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic diversity, 

citizens share remarkable religiosity (Nigeria is one of the most faithful countries in the 

world), an emphasis on the importance of family and supportive social networks, a strong 

entrepreneurial spirit, and a resilient appetite for democratic governance. Together, Nigerians have navigated a difficult history since independence, persisting as a nation despite a 

civil war and a host of military dictatorships. Case studies from across the globe have shown 

that communities are more peaceful when members value the “connectors” that bind them 

over the “dividers” that separate them.37 Up to and since the historic signing of the Kaduna 

Peace Declaration, a vital aspect of the Interfaith Mediation Centre’s work in that state 

has been enjoining religious and community leaders to proudly, outspokenly emphasize the 

values and interests that unite residents despite their apparent differences. 
10

Spoilers

The generally tense zoning debate, coupled with resentment from some northern elites at 

losing the executive office, is raising concerns that troublemaking candidates will instigate 

violence as a means of presenting themselves as the most viable manager of the resulting 

insecurity. An alternative possibility—and one that is just as bleak—is that any large-scale 

eruption of violence might tempt President Jonathan to declare a state of emergency and 

put off elections entirely. 

Postelection Grievances 

Postelection violence similar to the Rivers example cited earlier continues to be a general 

concern. Some election watchers look forward to a continued role for appeals courts in 

managing election complaints and were gratified by the National Assembly’s passage of an 

amendment requiring elections to be held earlier than usual to permit INEC and the judiciary 

enough time to adjudicate disputed results. INEC has more recently petitioned for elections 

to be pushed back toward April to better prepare for the voter registration process, and the 

National Assembly has approved the request. This is a welcome development for election 

organizers but a loss for judicial arbiters. Nevertheless, the judiciary can continue to play 

a crucial role in postelection tension reduction. In fact, with the October 2010 federal 

appeals court cancellation of Ekiti state’s 2007 gubernatorial outcome, citizens received 

a timely reminder that nearly a dozen flawed elections from the previous cycle have been 

overturned by the courts. Reactions to the Ekiti decision have been mixed, ranging from 

jubilation at justice served to anger at justice delayed. The judicial system clearly needs 

support to process pleas and to do so much faster. Still, redress for fraudulent outcomes is 

clearly obtainable even without a newly minted Electoral Offenses Commission.

Violence Prevention 

Local agencies and international donors have worked for years to support democratic development in Nigeria. Violence prevention must remain an important part of these efforts, particularly now that the high-risk election season is under way. Nevertheless, during dozens 

of conversations and interviews conducted in support of this report in August–September 

2010, the answer to questions regarding violence-prevention work already in progress was 

concerning. Most respondents stated that not enough was being done. Specific responses 

included: “I hear about plans only not action”; “Projects may be under way in some few 

communities, but work is not coming together at a higher level”; “From the federal and 

state governments, there is really nothing going on; they are just relying on security forces 

who need more training on bringing down conflicts without brutality.” With regard to the 

international community, one NGO representative said, “We were approached by a donor 

agency but don’t know if they will fund our work,” while another reported that “from the 

international donors, I hear about credibility more than violence prevention.” Sounding a 

related note, a conflict management scholar and practitioner noted, “You can’t talk about 

credibility without helping to stop the violence because violent elections are not credible 

elections.”38

In all likelihood, the months prior to elections will see a fresh crop of violence prevention programs, and this is an important step. Nevertheless, these reflections offered by 

civil society and community leaders working across Nigeria represent important feedback 

regarding the need for increased activity as well as the need for increased visibility both in 

the planning and implementation stages of violence-prevention work. The pervasive mood 

among those interviewed for this report was one of uncertainty about whether violence 

Any large-scale eruption of 

violence might tempt President 

Jonathan to declare a state 

of emergency and put off 

elections entirely.
11

prevention work will prove a serious programmatic or funding priority and how to make it a 

priority if funding proves limited. Nonetheless, local actors in conflict zones and high-risk 

regions must redouble their efforts to manage ongoing disputes and involve community 

stakeholders in publicly calling for peaceful elections. In this regard, civil society, religious 

bodies, and the media have important roles to play. Their efforts can be amplified by the 

support of external actors.

Civil Society, Religious Bodies, and the Media

Civil society is a diverse sector with strong and well-established organizations as well as a 

proliferation of new or underdeveloped agencies. As the civil society sector has gained in 

relevance and credibility, so too have the number of civil society groups overtly or covertly 

organized by government actors or political parties. Frequently called government nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) or political party nongovernmental organizations (PPONGOs), these partisan organizations may muddle information exchanges. For example, when 

leading nonpartisan NGOs condemn the elections as lacking credibility, PPONGOs counter 

those claims in an effort to cause doubt or confusion. Nevertheless, many credible civil 

society groups play a very positive “watchdog” role in civic education, election monitoring, 

and community dispute resolution purposes. These organizations are well positioned to 

take a leading role in violence prevention and credible information sharing during upcoming elections. 

Religious bodies have generally played a positive and nonpartisan role in recent election 

cycles, and some have facilitated events such as candidate debates. Religious leaders who 

call for nonviolent conflict resolution and for youths to resist being used as political pawns 

have proven to be effective in persuading citizens against fighting. Archbishop John Onaiyekan and the Sultan of Sokoto, Mohammad Sa’ad Abubakar, who cochair the Nigeria Inter 

Religious Council, represent just one well-known example of faith leaders joining forces to 

set an example of interreligious cooperation, to speak out in favor of peaceful coexistence, 

and to deescalate tensions.

Readers know that a large number of the print media are owned by proprietors from 

southern geopolitical zones. One concern, therefore, would be that these media houses 

could overemphasize stories and opinions that are unfavorable to the ruling party’s zoning policy, a policy that “disqualifies” the incumbent president’s candidacy. Alternatively, 

media outlets perceived as having a northern slant could give greater space to reports and 

opinions that favor zoning or nothern candidates. If such conflicts of interest arise and are 

not properly managed, they could call the impartiality of election reporting into question. 

Specifically with regards to news about electoral violence, it is vital that the public trusts 

media outlets and that the media remains fair and impartial in portraying conflicts so as to 

inform rather than inflame.

External Actors

In recent Nigerian elections, external actors have played consequential roles by supporting 

voter-education get-out-the-vote efforts and election-monitoring projects. These efforts are 

most meaningful when allied with local organizations and stakeholders. A promising example of this is the recently launched Project 2011 Swift Count, a partnership of the Federation 

of Muslim Women’s Associations in Nigeria, Justice Development and Peace/Caritas Nigeria, 

the Nigerian Bar Association, and the Transition Monitoring Group, supported by the U.S.-

based National Democratic Institute, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and 

the UK Department for International Development. Together, these organizations will train 

thousands of vote tabulators to conduct a parallel count as votes are cast. Programs like 

Religious leaders who call for 

nonviolent conflict resolution 

and for youths to resist being 

used as political pawns have 

proven to be effective in 

persuading citizens against 

fighting. 
12

these can play important roles by independently verifying election results, providing realtime qualitative feedback, and assuring the Nigerian public that nonpartisan teams are on 

the ground to promote fairness and restore public faith in the entire process. Civil society’s 

appetite for such activities is not donor driven, and prodemocracy or human rights NGOs are 

just two of many groups interested in such election-related activities. There are a number 

of labor groups and other professional or religious bodies that may organize activities with 

or without donor financing,39 though external financing and expertise can improve quality, 

depth, and coverage. 

International actors must focus significantly more attention on the matter of violence 

prevention specifically. Nigerian security forces require additional training toward managing 

and deescalating tension, but strong local partners with proven track records and community credibility are already situated to serve in early-warning and conflict prevention capacities at the community level. More broadly, external powers should not be quick to embrace 

Nigerian leaders brought to power by clearly fraudulent elections. Electoral rectification may 

be sought via INEC and the judiciary, as happened to an encouraging extent after the 2007 

elections. Whatever the vehicle for redress, external powers must continue to encourage 

Nigerian leaders to settle for nothing short of a credible mandate. 

Recommendations toward a Nonviolent Political Transition in 2011

•	 President Jonathan must continue to support credible, nonviolent elections and government bodies must make every effort to speed up remaining decisions relevant to INEC’s 

organization and management of elections.

•	 As a country with an established history of communal unrest, Nigeria must invest and 

reinvest in government-led initiatives for peace and conflict management at the federal 

and state levels. Where such government infrastructure exists—the Abuja-based Institute 

for Peace and Conflict Resolution, for example—adequate funding and capacity-building 

resources must be made available. Where it does not yet exist—agencies such as the 

Electoral Offenses Commission—it must be promptly constituted, if only in view of future 

elections. Such government initiatives must be fiscally and infrastructurally sacrosanct. Too 

frequently in Nigeria, turnover in government leadership spells the demise of the previous 

leadership’s initiatives. Peace and conflict management programs must remain a consistent 

priority.

•	 Regional and international actors are needed as ongoing champions of electoral reform 

and as funders for well-established local actors with not only long-standing presence in 

the communities they serve but also violence prevention experience and preestablished 

networks to call upon. Partnering with established local actors is especially important given 

the short time remaining before elections.

•	 Communities currently lacking political, community, or religious leaders positioned to diffuse conflicts and deescalate tensions would be well served to identify and support credible 

actors who can play such roles. 

•	 Civil society, religious leaders, and citizens should encourage high voter turnout. One recent 

survey reports that while only 35 percent of survey respondents felt confident that 2011 

elections would be free and fair, 81 percent are willing to vote.40 A remarkable opportunity 

exists to encourage this eagerness for credible democracy by encouraging citizens to cast 

their ballots. High voter turnout puts more citizen witnesses at the polling stations, discouraging mischief making and encouraging the proper usage of ballots, increasing chances 

that votes cast will be votes counted.

Strong local partners with 

proven track records and 

community credibility are 

already situated to serve in 

early-warning and conflict 

prevention capacities at the 

community level.

Nigeria must invest and reinvest 

in government-led initiatives for 

peace and conflict management 

at the federal and state levels.
13

•	 Particular attention must be paid to preexisting conflict zones. Local and international 

actors should share or avail themselves of conflict-mapping reports that offer detailed 

assessments of high-risk regions around the country and that would assist them in prioritizing conflict prevention efforts. Conflict-mapping data should be distributed as widely as 

possible to maximize information sharing and encourage donor and actor coordination.41

•	 Local civil society groups must be proactive and take the initiative for violence-prevention 

planning and implementation. Contingency plans for outreach work that can be implemented even without external funding will be important.

•	 Lessons learned from programs such as ActionAid Nigeria’s recent intervention in Anambra 

must be collated and shared widely for adaptation and adoption in other states and at the 

federal level.

•	 Social media offer exciting possibilities for early-warning systems as well as electionmonitoring activities. Such systems should be approached with caution, however, as new 

media can just as easily be used to spread inflammatory rumors and false information. 

Trusted citizen monitors should be culled from experienced, preexisting early-warning networks originally developed at the community level for monitoring ongoing tensions.

•	 Conflict prevention programs must reach the right audience. Politicians and security agents, 

for example, can either serve as catalysts of conflict or play irreplaceable roles in conflict 

management and violence prevention. Direct and sustained engagement of these two 

important groups remains a neglected aspect of violence-prevention initiatives.

•	 Nigeria’s judiciary is poised to play a critical role in resolving electoral disputes. Giving all 

necessary support to judges, including special training, must be a priority so that cases 

may be processed more efficiently. Community leaders should encourage citizens to recall 

the unprecedented number of judicially overturned election results from the 2007 polls. 

Faith that electoral redress is available may itself discourage citizens from taking justice 

into their own hands.

•	 International development partners and the Nigerian government must assist in diligently 

monitoring immediate triggers of electoral violence and in combating long-standing structural causes of unrest, such as the faltering economy, the poor provision of basic services, 

endemic corruption, and the allotment of benefits such as jobs and scholarships based on 

controversial, outdated notions of “indegeneship.”

•	 INEC must be afforded every manner of support in its efforts to craft an independent and 

credible electoral management body and to handle the massive voter registration process. 

While the new chair’s role will undoubtedly be significant, his reform efforts must be supported in order to meet with comprehensive success.
14

Notes

1. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2008—Nigeria,” www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2

008&country=7461. The International Crisis Group (ICG) went so far as to characterize Nigeria’s 2007 elections 

as the worst in the country’s history. See Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? Africa Report no. 126 (Dakar/

Brussels: ICG, May 30, 2007).

2. Kaduna has been significantly calmer since the Interfaith Mediation Centre, in cooperation with community 

leaders, facilitated the Kaduna Peace Declaration. For information on a recent initiative in Jos, see Andrew 

Agbese, “Jos Communities to Sign Peace Pact,” Daily Trust, September 15, 2010.

3. “Observing the 1998–1999 Elections: Final Report,” Carter Center and National Democratic Institute for 

International Affairs, November 1999, 10. 

4. This comes from an April–May 2003 Environmental Rights Action report on Nigeria’s federal and state elections, 

reproduced in Nigeria Today, April 26, 2003, as cited in Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: 

The Unacknowledged Violence,” June 2004.

5. For a discussion of political gangs and complex resource battles in Nigeria’s fraught Niger Delta, see Judith Burdin 

Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, Special Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, August 2009).

6. HRW, “Nigeria’s 2003 Elections.”

7. See note 4. See also Jennifer Hazen and Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: 

The Niger Delta In Perspective” Small Arms Survey, December 2007; Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 4.

8. Gbenro Olajuyigbe, “Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Protection Model,” ActionAid Nigeria, with support from the 

UK Department for International Development, 2010.

9. Jethro Ibileke, “Aspirant Shot after Declaring His Intention to Contest,” Next, August 10, 2010.

10. “Gunmen Shoot Bauchi Governor’s Orderly,” Next, August 31, 2010.

11. Austin Ekeinde,“Police Recover Body of Former Gang Leader,” Next, August 27, 2010. See also Jaafar Jaafar, “Kano 

Deputy Gov. Takai’s Supporters Clash,” Daily Trust, September 13, 2010.

12. Christian Purefoy, “Weapons Seizures Troubling Sign Ahead of Nigeria Elections,” CNN, October 28, 2010, http://

edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/10/28/nigeria.smuggled.weapons/index.html?hpt=C2.

13. Pascal Fletcher, “Polls Show Africa’s ‘Giant’ Has Clay Feet,” Reuters, April 24, 2007.

14. See Ebere Onwudiwe, “Is a Hero of Democracy Trying on a Crown?” Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2006.

15. “Soyinka Urges New Nigerian Polls,” BBC News, April 27, 2007.

16. For the full scope of the committee’s review, please see “Volume I: Main Report” of the “Report of the Electoral 

Reform Committee,” December 2008.

17. François Grignon, “Nigeria Needs to Prevent Another Electoral Debacle,” ICG, October 1, 2009, www.crisisgroup.org/

en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria-needs-to-prevent-another-electoral-debacle.aspx. See also “Nigeria: 

Yar’Adua’s Electoral Reform Programme Suffers Setback,” Afrique en ligne, May 27, 2009, www.afriquejet.com/news/

africa-news/nigeria:-yar%27adua%27s-electoral-reform-programme-suffers-setback-2009052728452.html.

18. Ayo Obe, in conversation with author, September 2010.

19. Ibid.

20. Another political party, the Action Congress, won the governorship of Lagos in 2007. Many examples of election 

violence in Nigeria that can be classified according to this report’s typology are in ICG, Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding 

a Political Crisis, Africa Report no.123 (Dakar/Brussels: ICG, March 28, 2007).

21. HRW, “Politics as War: The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria,” 

March 26, 2008.

22. Hazen and Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria.”

23. Victor A. O. Adetula, “Election Related Violence in Nigeria—Survey of Trends and Patterns in the 2007 Elections,” 

Studies in Politics and Society: A Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association no. 8 (December 2007): 244.

24. HRW, “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,” April 17, 2007, www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/04/15/nigeria-pollsmarred-violence-fraud.

25. Max Amuchie, “Anambra Election Largely Peaceful, but with Pockets of Violence,” BusinessDay, February 6, 2010.

26. In at least one case, citizens forced a local INEC official to close a polling station and formally declare that no 

votes were cast rather than risk subsequent, opportunistic ghost balloting from that locality. 

27. Chris Kwaja and Darren Kew, “Analysis: Nigeria’s Smoldering Crisis in Jos, Dialogue between Christians and Muslims 

Is Necessary to Prevent another Round of Violence,” GlobalPost, August 2010, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/

africa/100407/nigerias-jos-violence.

28. Charles Ajunwa, “How Amnesty Doused Political Tension in the Niger Delta,” This Day, August 26, 2010.

29. Author’s interview with Abuja-based civil society leader, September 6, 2010. 

30. Okon Bassey, “Amnesty Not Solution to Resource Control,” This Day, September 16, 2010.

31. “JTF Launches Manhunt for Attackers of Agip Oil Facility,” Next, November 1, 2010, http://234next.com/csp/cms/

sites/Next/News/Metro/Politics/5637108-146/jtf_launches_manhunt_for_attackers_of.csp.

32. The federal character principle is a constitutional consociation device designed to promote national unity and 

a sense of belonging by preventing sectional or ethnic domination in the composition and administration of 

government and its agencies. 

33. Asuni, Blood Oil in the Niger Delta, 3–4.

34. Global Peace Index 2010, www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2010/scor.

35. Adetula, “Election Related Violence in Nigeria,” 234.

36. Philip Ostien, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Nigeria,” Muslim-Christian Relations 

in Africa (August 2009): 18–21, www.sharia-in-africa.net/media/publications/ethno-religious-conflict-in-JosNigeria/Ostien_Jos.pdf.
15

37. For a full discussion of do-no-harm conflict-sensitivity tools, as well as a host of supporting case studies, see 

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, www.cdainc.com, and Mary Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support 

Peace—or War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1999).

38. Author notes from interviews conducted with civil society and community leaders working in Abuja, Lagos, and 

Jos in August and September 2010.

39. This category includes the churches and mosques themselves, not simply religious-based NGOs practiced at raising 

funds from external donors.

40. Adeoye Gbenro, “81% of Nigerians Will Vote Next Year,” Next, September 30, 2010.

41. For an in-depth discussion of donor coordination challenges and democracy development in Nigeria, please see 

Victor Adetula, Darren Kew, and Chris Kwaja, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Nigeria,” FRIDE, May 2010, www.

fride.org/download/IP_WMD_Nigeria_ENG_jul10.pdf.
Other Titles on Nigeria

•	 Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World (2008) by John 

N. Paden

•	 Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? by Stephanie Schwartz (Peace Brief May 2010)

•	 Blood Oil in the Niger Delta by Judith Asuni (Special Report, August 2009)

•	 Bringing Peace to the Niger Delta by Kelly Campbell (Peace Brief, June 2008)

•	 Nigeria’s 2007 Elections: The Fitful Path to Democratic Citizenship by Jibrin Ibrahim (Special 

Report, January 2007)

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.