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S. HRG. 113–421 

THE TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 10, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon, Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2 

Dobbins, Ambassador James, Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ..................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 41 

Letter and GAO Report Submitted to Supplement Answers to Questions 

No. 4 and No. 5 ............................................................................................. 46 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

Sampler, Donald L., Jr., Acting Assistant to the Administrator, Office of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ......................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 50 

Graphs Submitted to Supplement Answer to Question No. 5 ...................... 60 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Shaheen, Kaine, Markey, Corker, 

Rubio, Johnson, Flake, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

We thank our witnesses, Ambassador Dobbins and Acting Assistant Administrator Donald Sampler, for being here. 

In July, this committee met to assess the transition in Afghanistan. At the time, Mr. Ambassador, you had been on the job only 

2 months. And, in looking over the transcript from that hearing, I 

was struck by how the issues remain virtually the same, 5 months 

later. I will look forward to hearing what both of you believe we 

should expect in the coming months, as well as your perspective on 

some broader issues I have with respect to the State Department 

and USAID’s planning for a post-2014 presence. 

Clearly, this is a critical time in the transition process. President 

Karzai has, in my view, unwisely decided to gamble with the lives 

of millions of his citizens with a delay in signing the Bilateral 

Security Agreement, testing our patience and threatening the 

progress made by so many Afghans, in partnership with the international community, since 2001. And I believe this brinksmanship 

is unwarranted and, frankly, insulting to the sacrifices made by the 

United States military and taxpayers, and it is not in Afghanistan’s 

best interests. 

But, I do not think anyone should take my word for it. Ask the 

thousands of Afghans who participated in the Loya Jirga last 

month and overwhelmingly called for Afghanistan to sign the BSA. 

Ask leaders in the region who have called upon Afghanistan to 

sign. Ask Afghan civil society leaders, who, without a smooth and 

stable transition, stand to lose ground gained over the past decade. 

And ask the women of Afghanistan, who stand to lose the most if 

Afghanistan falls victim to the kind of violence we saw in the 

1990s. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

Any further delay will have real implications on the ground. 

First, every day that passes makes it more difficult to plan militarily. Second, the longer the delay, the more players in Afghanistan and across the region will hedge their bets, leading good people to leave Afghanistan and taking needed capital with them. 

Simply put, at some point the United States has to ask if we 

should let our long-term interests and our substantial investments 

in Afghanistan be determined by a lame-duck President. 

If we are not able to finalize the Bilateral Security Agreement, 

the results are clear: all United States troops would have to leave 

the country, support in Congress for appropriations for the Afghan 

military and development efforts will diminish, and we will not be 

able to support the Afghan military in any significant way, or be 

able to provide development assistance at the same levels. 

Afghans seem to understand this. It is unfortunate that President Karzai does not, though, I note with interest a recent article 

that says that President Karzai agreed on a cooperation pact with 

Iran on Sunday, while continuing to resist signing a long-term 

security agreement with the United States. It is pretty amazing to 

me. He has enough time and effort to strike an agreement with 

Iran, but not with the country that has shed blood and national 

treasure to bring it to the point in which it is today. 

Let me reiterate, finally, that the United States has no intention 

in interfering in the election process. The choice of President and 

provincial officials will rest with the Afghan people. But, the future 

of international assistance will depend upon the integrity of the 

process. We have seen some progress with respect to the election 

preparations, but I am still concerned about the security situation. 

We know that hundreds of polling places will not be able to open. 

Many are in areas too dangerous for domestic and international 

observation. 

I am also deeply concerned about the disenfranchisement of 

women, especially in rural areas, where it has been difficult to 

recruit Afghan women to serve in security roles at polling stations. 

It is also clear that President Karzai’s behavior makes it difficult 

to plan our diplomatic and development efforts. I look forward to 

our witnesses providing the committee with a better understanding 

of the administration’s planning for the State Department and 

USAID’s footprint, post-2014. 

Having laid out those broad parameters, let me thank you both 

for being here. I look forward to our discussion. 

And, with that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Corker, for his opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I do not know the 

outcome of today’s meeting exactly, in light of what is happening 

in Afghanistan, but I would like to make three brief points, and 

certainly look forward to hearing your testimony. 

I think that you know where we are today in this bilateral agreement, we certainly have a President of a country that is really not 

speaking for its citizens. And I think everyone understands that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

And all of us have had encounters with Karzai and understand the 

irrationality that comes with most dealings with him. So, I think, 

as I talk to troops in Tennessee, that are getting ready to be there 

in February, and they are sort of asking, ‘‘Why would we go to a 

country that has a President who is dealing with us this way? Why 

would we do that?’’ And, of course, my explanation is, again, ‘‘He 

is not speaking for Afghanistan, and we have got to look to the 

longer view and the Afghan people, and not to one individual that 

is somehow trying to find his place in history.’’ 

Secondly, I would love to hear—I know that, when Ambassador 

Dobbins was in a most recent classified setting, we thought we 

were maybe a couple of days away from something happening, and 

I know that everyone shared that view, and that is not where we 

are—but, I would love to hear your assessment as to how this 

uncertainty is affecting things inside the country, economically, 

how it is affecting business decisions, how it is affecting the ingress 

and egress of citizens there, and how it is going to affect the political circumstances between now and the proposed election in April. 

And then, lastly, I know that a number of us who were at the 

Munich Security Conference last year—it was almost 11 months 

ago—our NATO allies were wanting to know, How are they going 

to provision troops? How many folks? There are some things that 

I know the administration can and should be communicating to our 

NATO allies. And I do not know if you want to—especially Ambassador Dobbins—shed any light on the conversations that are occurring, relative to if we get this bilateral agreement in place, you 

know, how those communications are going, and are we still going 

to be in a position to be appropriately ready when that time comes. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our witnesses, 

and thank them for being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Let us turn to Ambassador Dobbins, who is the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Department of 

State, and Mr. Sampler, who is the Acting Assistant to the Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs for 

USAID. 

Your full statements will be included in the record. I would urge 

you to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so we 

can have a dialogue with you. 

And, Ambassador Dobbins, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, Senator Kaine. 

My longer statement does cover a range of issues, but I do want 

to concentrate on the one that both of you have raised, which is the 

fate of the BSA and the consequences for our and the international 

community’s relations with Afghanistan. 

As you noted, the Loya Jirga, which was assembled by President 

Karzai, had 2,500 Afghan leaders from across the country, it 

strongly endorsed this agreement, and it urged President Karzai to 

conclude it by the end of the year. One member of the Loya Jirga 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

actually told me that, of the 2,500 people, only 25 spoke out against 

the agreement, which would be a pretty startling majority. 

The United States certainly agrees with the Afghan people. Concluding the BSA will send an important signal to the people of 

Afghanistan, to the Taliban, to our allies and partners, and to the 

region. For the Afghan people, it will reduce anxiety and uncertainty about the future. A signed BSA will tell the Taliban, who 

may think that the end of 2014 means the end of international support, that their only path to peace is ending violence, breaking ties 

with al-Qaeda, and accepting the Afghan Constitution. A signed 

BSA will ensure the region that the United States will remain 

engaged, as will its allies, and that we are not going to abandon 

Afghanistan, as we did once before, to our regret, in 1989. 

To our NATO allies and other international partners, a BSA will 

open the door to concluding a NATO agreement of comparable 

status of forces and allow them to begin planning for their 2015 

presence. 

For all these reasons, the administration is committed to expeditious signature of this agreement. Delaying signature is in no one’s 

interest, as both of you have stressed. Delay would add another element of uncertainty as the Afghans prepare for their elections. For 

the United States and our NATO allies, it would mean the lack of 

clarity about our own presence in 2015. That, in turn, would jeopardize the fulfillment of pledges of assistance that NATO and other 

countries have made in Chicago and Tokyo. 

As Ambassador Rice made clear during her recent visit to Kabul, 

although it is not our preference, without a prompt signature of 

this agreement, we will have no choice but to initiate planning for 

a 2014—post-2014 future in which there would be no United States 

or NATO troops in Afghanistan. 

Let me make clear, however, that plans are not decisions, and 

assure you that we are not about to decide to abandon all that we 

and the Afghan people have achieved over the last 12 years. Based 

on the results of the Loya Jirga, expressions of public opinion 

throughout the country, and discussions throughout my own visit 

to Kabul last week, I do not believe that there can be any serious 

doubt that the Afghan people want the United States and NATO 

forces to stay, and recognize that the Bilateral Security Agreement 

is a necessary prerequisite. 

The BSA is also the keystone of a much wider international commitment involving over 70 countries ready to provide economic and 

security assistance to Afghanistan beyond 2015. Afghanistan’s 

regional neighbors, with the exception of Iran, also understand the 

importance of the BSA. I understand that President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, Prime Minister Singh of India, and 

Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan have also personally urged 

President Karzai to conclude this agreement. Now, as you know, 

several of these leaders are no fans of an American military presence in Central Asia, but they all seem to recognize that, without 

continued international military and economic support, Afghanistan risks falling back into civil war, with the attendant rise in extremist groups, outflow of refugees, and disruptions in commerce 

that would threaten the region as a whole. Given this coincidence 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

of Afghan public and regional governmental opinion, I see little 

chance that the BSA will not be eventually concluded. 

Awaiting the arrival of the next Afghan President to do so, however, will impose large and unnecessary costs on the Afghan people. Already, the anxiety caused by President Karzai’s refusal to 

heed the advice of the Loya Jirga is having such an effect. While 

in Kabul last week, I learned, from the World Bank and other 

sources, that the Afghan currency is slipping in value, inflation is 

increasing, capital fleeing, property values dropping. Probably for 

the first time since 2001, the outflow of Afghan population exceeds 

the return of refugees. The longer this uncertainty about the future 

international commitment to Afghanistan continues, the more anxiety will increase, potentially dominating the upcoming Presidential elections, threatening to turn these into a polarizing, rather 

than a unifying, experience in the country. 

Prolonged uncertainty over the BSA will also erode larger international support for Afghanistan. At Tokyo in July 2012, and in 

Chicago in May of that year, the international community pledged 

billions in support of the Afghan security forces and the Afghan 

economy beyond 2014. As in the United States, the fulfillment of 

these pledges is dependent on public support and parliamentary 

approval. Prolonged delay in concluding the BSA, and the also 

required NATO equivalent agreement, can only diminish the prospect that these pledges will be fully met. 

So, just to conclude, there, really, I have no doubt that the BSA 

ultimately will be concluded. I am concerned about the damage and 

the costs which a prolonged delay will create. I cannot predict with 

any certainty when it is going to be signed. I think there is some 

prospect that it could still be signed this year. But, you know, given 

my own discussions with the President last week, I am simply not 

in a position to provide you any assurances on that. It certainly 

continues to be our objective, and we are nowhere near a decision 

that would involve our departing Afghanistan altogether. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES F. DOBBINS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the transition in Afghanistan. 

As all of you know, the U.S. role in the latest chapter of Afghanistan’s history 

began on September 11, 2001. Within a month, U.S. forces were in Afghanistan in 

pursuit of the al-Qaeda terrorists who planned the attacks and the regime that had 

given them sanctuary. That military involvement has now lasted more than a decade and has expanded to a NATO-led international coalition of 49 nations. The military campaign has been accompanied by a truly extraordinary international civilian 

campaign to help heal the scars of decades of war and years of life under a system 

of government that made the cruel commonplace and to ensure that such a government can never again return, to provide shelter to those who would threaten American citizens, interests, or allies. 

From the beginning, we have made clear that our role in Afghanistan and our 

presence there cannot be open ended. It has always been the aim of U.S. policy to 

strengthen Afghan institutions so that the Afghan Government and people can provide for their own security, grow their own economy, and manage their own internal 

and external affairs. The President has spoken of these three transitions: security, 

economic, and political. The underlying element of all three has been a gradual and 

responsible effort to help Afghans recover from decades of conflict and Taliban rule 

that damaged or destroyed nearly every institution in the country. 

A stable, democratic, and secure Afghanistan is a U.S. national interest; it will 

be a bulwark against al-Qaeda and other dangerous extremist groups and a partner 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

in the effort to prevent those groups from using Afghanistan to plan and launch 

attacks against our people and our allies. And while Afghanistan still faces significant challenges, I can say with the perspective of having first led U.S. diplomatic 

efforts on Afghanistan 12 years ago, that we are closer than ever to achieving this 

goal. I’d like to spend a few minutes reviewing our efforts and the progress Afghanistan is making. 

SECURITY TRANSITION AND PARTNERSHIP

The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), signed by President 

Obama and President Karzai in May 2012, codified the terms of our partnership 

after 2014. It looked ahead to a Transformation Decade of cooperation, as the 

Afghans continued to strengthen their institutions, improve governance, and stabilize their economy. While making clear that the United States does not seek permanent bases in Afghanistan or a presence that is a threat to Afghanistan’s neighbors, the SPA included a provision to negotiate a Bilateral Security Agreement 

(BSA) between the two countries which would govern future security cooperation. 

After a year of negotiations to conclude the text, that agreement was submitted 

2 weeks ago to a Loya Jirga, a traditional gathering of 2,500 Afghan leaders from 

all parts of the country. After 3 days of debate, the Loya Jirga overwhelmingly 

endorsed the BSA as written and urged President Karzai to sign it before the end 

of the year. This decision underscores the clear and strong desire of the Afghan people to continue their partnership with the United States and the international community and their determination to move forward, away from the Taliban past. 

The United States agrees with the Afghan people. Signing the BSA promptly is 

the path to a partnership in support of Afghan efforts to achieve lasting peace, security, and development. It will send an important signal to the people of Afghanistan, 

to the Taliban, to our allies and partners, and to the region. For the Afghan people, 

it will reduce anxiety and uncertainty about the future, allowing them to concentrate on the upcoming elections and to invest with confidence in their own economy. A signed BSA will tell the Taliban, who may think that the end of 2014 means 

the end of international support for Afghanistan, that their only path to peace is 

by ending violence, breaking ties with al-Qaeda and accepting the Afghan Constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. A signed BSA will assure 

the region that the United States will remain engaged there and not abandon 

Afghanistan as we did in 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal. To our NATO allies and 

other international partners, a signed BSA will open the door for NATO to begin 

negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Afghanistan that will 

cover its forces participating in the train, advise, and assist mission. 

For all of these reasons, the administration is committed to expeditious signature 

of the BSA. Delaying signature is in no one’s interest. Delay would add another element of uncertainty as Afghans prepare for the April, 2014 election to choose President Karzai’s successor. For the United States and our NATO allies, delay means 

a lack of clarity needed to plan for a post-2014 military presence. That, in turn, 

would jeopardize fulfillment of the pledges of assistance that NATO and other countries made at the Chicago and Tokyo conferences in 2012. As Ambassador Rice 

made clear in her recent visit to Kabul, although it is not our preference, without 

a prompt signature we will have no choice but to initiate planning for a post-2014 

future in which there would be no U.S. or NATO troop presence in Afghanistan. 

Let me make clear, however, that plans are not decisions, and assure you that 

we are not about to decide to abandon all we and the Afghan people have achieved 

over the past 12 years. Based on the results of the Loya Jirga, expressions of public 

opinion throughout the country and discussions throughout my own visit to Kabul 

last week, I don’t believe that there can be any serious doubt that the Afghan people 

want American and NATO forces to stay and recognize that the BSA is a necessary 

prerequisite. The BSA is also the keystone of a much wider international commitment, involving over 70 countries ready to provide economic and security assistance 

to Afghanistan beyond 2015. 

Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, with the exception of Iran, also understand the 

importance of the BSA. President Putin of Russia, President Xi of China, Prime 

Minister Singh of India, and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan have all personally 

urged President Karzai to conclude the BSA in recent weeks. Several of these leaders are no fans of an American military presence in Central Asia, but all recognize 

that without continued international military and economic support, Afghanistan 

risks falling back into civil war, with the attendant rise in extremist groups, outflow 

of refugees and disruptions in commerce that would threaten the region as a whole. 

Given this coincidence of Afghan public and regional governmental opinion, I see 

little chance that the BSA will not be eventually concluded. Awaiting the arrival of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

the next Afghan President to do so, however, will impose large and unnecessary 

costs on the Afghan people. Already the anxiety caused by President Karzai’s refusal 

to heed the advice of the Loya Jirga is having that effect. While in Kabul last week 

I learned from the World Bank and other sources that the Afghan currency is slipping in value, inflation increasing, capital fleeing, and property values dropping. 

Probably for the first time since 2001 the outflow of population exceeds the return 

of refugees. The longer this uncertainty about the future international commitment 

to Afghanistan continues, the more anxiety will increase, potentially dominating the 

upcoming Presidential elections, threatening to turn these into a polarizing rather 

than unifying experience for the country. 

Prolonged uncertainty over the BSA will also erode larger international support 

for Afghanistan. At Tokyo in July 2012 and at Chicago in May 2012, the international community pledged billions to the support of the Afghan security forces and 

the Afghan economy beyond 2014. As in the United States, the fulfillment of the 

pledges is dependent on public support and parliamentary approval. Prolonged delay 

in concluding the BSA, and the also-required NATO equivalent agreement can only 

diminish the prospect that these pledges will be fully met. 

As the President has said, the U.S. combat mission will end in Afghanistan at 

the end of 2014. The BSA does not prescribe the number of U.S. forces that may 

be present in Afghanistan after 2014, but it will give us the invitation to remain 

that President Obama will need as he makes that force-level decision. By next 

February, there will be 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, down from roughly 

100,000 at the height of the surge, and any post-2014 military presence will be 

much smaller. Those who remain will concentrate on two specific, narrow missions: 

counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and 

training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. 

It is important to note that, while the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 

are still a work in progress, there is reason to be encouraged, thanks to capabilities 

that have been fostered and developed by the U.S. military and our allies. Our 

efforts are making a critical difference and can continue to do so. I should note that 

the Afghan people themselves share this assessment. According to a recent Asia 

Foundation survey, 88 percent of Afghans have confidence in the Afghan National 

Army and 72 percent in the Afghan National Police. 

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

I know that Assistant Administrator Sampler will talk about USAID’s efforts to 

deliver and monitor civilian assistance in Afghanistan, how that assistance has 

improved the lives of ordinary Afghans, and the challenges his agency faces working 

in that country. I am happy to talk about the specifics of what we are doing, but 

I first want to offer some encouraging news about how we are doing overall. For 

the past 9 years, the Asia Foundation has conducted a nationwide survey of Afghan 

attitudes and opinions, tracking long-term trends among the population. The latest 

annual Asia Foundation of more than 9,000 Afghans drawn from every province was 

released last week, and it confirmed, through the eyes of ordinary Afghans, the 

depth and durability of the progress Afghanistan has made, with our support. 

A few numbers stand out. Today, 57 percent of all Afghans believe their country 

is moving in the right direction. This number has increased steadily since 2008, 

when it stood at 38 percent. Not surprisingly, the majority—76 percent—said they 

were better off economically than they were under the Taliban. Three quarters gave 

their national government a positive assessment although they remained critical of 

subnational government and Parliament and concerned about corruption at all levels. Five in six Afghans—men and women—believe that women should have an education. Seventy-five percent believe it is acceptable to criticize the government in 

public—a sign of an active democracy with an independent media, which is the civilian institution in which Afghans have the most confidence. Sympathy for armed 

opposition groups is far lower than in 2009 and yet, nevertheless, a majority of 

Afghans understand the need for peace and support Afghan-led reconciliation 

efforts. The overall picture is one of an aspiring nation that has witnessed and welcomed the progress that the international effort has helped bring about. These are 

the people whose representatives at the Loya Jirga overwhelmingly approved the 

BSA. 

This growing optimism among Afghans is due in part to the increasing capability 

of some of their institutions, none of which existed in 2001. According to the poll, 

the Afghan media is one of the country’s most trusted institution. The growth of a 

free media is one of the great achievements of reconstruction in Afghanistan. When 

the Taliban ruled, people had few modern means to communicate with one another 

(there were fewer than 40,000 phones in the country) or to get information (there 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

was one state-run TV station). Now, more than 18 million Afghans have phones and 

the telecommunications network covers 90 million of the population. Afghans are 

also eager for news, which they see on one of the 75 TV stations or hear on the 

175 radio stations available. This is not, I should add, a triumph of quantity over 

quality. In the most recent worldwide assessment of press freedom by Reporters 

Without Borders, Afghanistan outranked Pakistan and India and every other country but one in its region. The Loya Jirga that considered the BSA was televised 

nationally and Afghans watched as their representatives debated their future. This 

would have been technically impossible and politically unimaginable 15 years ago. 

There is a body of research that demonstrates the effectiveness of the international effort in Afghanistan. Of the 20 major post-cold-war interventions conducted by the United States, United Nations, and others, Afghanistan had the 

greatest improvements in the U.N.’s Human Development Index, was third among 

20 improvements in government effectiveness as measured by the World Bank, government, and was second out of these 20 in growth of per capita income. Afghanistan’s progress should be compared with that of other countries that have faced 

similar levels of conflict. Even postwar stabilization in European countries over 

these same decades, where conditions for stabilization have been much more favorable, has taken many years. 

Afghan institutions are performing better, in part, because they are increasingly 

integrated within the regional economy of Central and South Asia. With considerable financial and technical assistance from the United States and American supported international agencies, millions of Afghans can now access electricity from 

power lines stretching across their northern border into Central Asia. In the last 

5 years, trade between Afghanistan with its South and Central Asian neighbors has 

far outpaced trade with the outside world. Building strong state, civil society, and 

private sector institutions by economically integrating Afghanistan within its neighborhood remains at the heart of our New Silk Road vision. 

POLITICAL TRANSITION

Despite all of the focus on the BSA in recent days, the political transition is next 

year’s critical event. A timely Presidential election in April can be a unifying 

moment for the country, consolidating the gains of the past decade and demonstrating that the Afghan people would rather use politics than violence to solve 

their differences. If successful, this will be the first peaceful transfer of power from 

one elected leader to another in Afghanistan’s history. 

The Afghans have committed to holding credible, inclusive, and transparent elections, and they are on track to meet this commitment. Larry Sampler will talk 

about what we are doing to support this effort, so let me talk about what the 

Afghans have done and are doing. As with elections anywhere, many things can go 

wrong between now and election day in April, but Afghanistan is far ahead, in 

terms of technical preparations, of where it was in previous electoral cycles. 

Afghanistan’s last elections were conducted under rules established by Presidential 

decree because the political system had been unable to reach consensus on necessary legislation. Compare that to today. This past summer, Afghan legislators 

passed the laws establishing the structures that will shape the vote and procedures 

to evaluate complaints. In July, President Karzai signed that legislation into law. 

Now, the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) is implementing those laws, 

working with the Ministry of Interior on the security plans that will be critical to 

the success of the election. The IEC is also engaged in a nationwide voter registration ‘‘top up’’ program, which, thus far, has enrolled 3.1 million new voters of which 

1 million are women. Although women’s participation in the process still needs to 

improve, 3 of the prospective Vice Presidents are women, as are over 300 (11 percent) of the provincial council candidates. Presidential candidates have registered 

and last month the IEC approved a final official list of 11 candidates. Official campaigning gets underway in February, when rallies, ads, and televised debates will 

take place. 

We have made clear that, in the upcoming election, the United States will support 

the process, not any individual party or candidate. We will continue to assist Afghan 

electoral authorities, the Afghan Government, Parliament and civil society in their 

efforts to strengthen the electoral system and to minimize electoral fraud. While the 

Afghan Government has taken encouraging steps to ensure security for poll workers, the Independent Election Commission and other elections-related workers, we 

will continue to monitor security trends as the elections near. Our military experts 

are also helping the Afghans with security planning. That said, ISAF planners have 

been surprised by the extremely limited number of requests from the Afghan security forces as they support IEC voter registration efforts in insecure areas of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

country—what is, in effect, a dry run for the challenges they will need to handle 

during next April’s vote. 

Enduring stability will require reconciliation and we remain committed to supporting an Afghan peace process. Our objective has been, and continues to be, to 

promote and support a political process by which Afghans sit down with other 

Afghans to determine the future of their country. The outcomes of peace and reconciliation must be the Taliban and other insurgent groups breaking ties with 

al-Qaeda, ending violence, and accepting Afghanistan’s constitution, including its 

protections for women and minorities. Even as we remain committed to supporting 

a peace process, we do not plan to let up our fight against international terrorism 

in Afghanistan or our support to Afghan forces. Our military and diplomatic efforts 

continue to be mutually reinforcing. 

I do not mean to present an overly rosy picture of Afghanistan’s present or future. 

Many challenges remain. The Taliban continue to fight. Afghanistan remains one 

of the poorest countries in the world and the drawdown of international military 

forces will reduce economic growth. Afghans still need to put in place the physical 

infrastructure and legal framework to encourage long-term sustainable development 

and attract private investment. Corruption is a major problem—one the Afghan 

public is aware of and one the Afghan Government promised to reduce as part of 

the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. The narcotics trade is far from under 

control, as the recent announcement of a record poppy harvest showed. All of these 

require sustained commitment from the Afghans and the further development of 

their institutions to remedy. But most Afghans want to fix them, as the survey 

shows, and international support is vital to helping them do so. 

As we focus on the pivotal year 2014, which will mark the end of the U.S. combat 

mission and what we hope and expect will be the successful transfer of power to 

a new, democratically elected Afghan President, we should also keep an eye on the 

future of this region. Afghanistan has a young population; more than 65 percent of 

Afghans are under 25 and the average age is 18. Over the last decade many of these 

young Afghans have gone to school, learned to use e-mail, set up Facebook pages, 

become connected to other Afghans outside their provinces and ethnic groups, 

reclaimed their artistic heritage, become familiar with other countries and ways of 

life, even learned English. (There are 1.5 –2 million Internet users.) They participate in civil society and establish think tanks. They are moving from the rural areas 

to the cities for jobs and education. Sustaining our relationship with Afghanistan 

means maintaining our connection with those young Afghans. Their future is crucial 

to the stability of the region and ultimately the security of the United States. Right 

now these young men and women want democracy, access to free media, economic 

opportunities, transparency, and education. A partnership with the United States 

will help them consolidate the institutions that did not exist 12 years ago, but which 

have grown in their lifetimes and which will help ensure that these youth rebuff 

the recruitment of extremists and help to build a peaceful democratic partner for 

the United States and our allies. 

In conclusion, let me emphasize that despite the many challenges, we have much 

to build on as we look to the future of America’s partnership with Afghanistan. 

Thanks in large part to the generosity of the American people, the courage of its 

men and women in uniform and the bipartisan support of Congress, Afghanistan is 

a fundamentally different country than it was 12 years ago. It remains a hopeful 

country, although uncertainty over conclusion of the BSA is unnecessarily increasing anxiety at just the point in Afghanistan’s growing self-reliance where reassurance is most necessary. This administration looks forward to continuing its work 

with Congress to help ensure that as these hopes are realized our own vital national 

security interests are secured. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Sampler. 

STATEMENT OF DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT 

TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND 

PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SAMPLER. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

I have been working on and in Afghanistan in both civilian and 

military capacities since 2002. In addition to having worked with 

the Afghan emergency Loya Jirga and the Afghanistan constitutional Loya Jirga, I have served as a representative of an international NGO, a senior advisor to two ISAF commanders, and as 

chief of staff to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. 

After the fall of the Taliban regime, I saw, firsthand, an Afghanistan that had been devastated by decades of conflict. The unprecedented investment by United States taxpayers and the international community, in partnership with the Afghans themselves, 

has created transformational changes in Afghanistan that are 

reflected in the United Nations 2013 Human Development Index. 

Afghanistan improved its score in that index more than any other 

country in the index of that year, an improvement of about 60 percent. Changes of this magnitude are not made overnight, especially 

in such a deeply traditional society and in such a challenging operational environment. The results of international civilian assistance are significant, but fragile. 

Just a few examples: In 2002, there were only 900,000 Afghan 

children in school, and virtually no girls. Today, nearly 8 million 

children are in school, and 30 percent of them are girls. Life expectancy in Afghanistan has increased from 42 years to over 62 years. 

The maternal mortality rate has declined by 80 percent, and child 

mortality has decreased by just under 50 percent. 

In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to electricity. 

Today, that number is 18 percent. And the Afghan electric utility 

is well on its way to financial stability. 

In 2002, there were very few fixed telephone lines, and a call outside of Afghanistan required a satellite phone. Today, the combined 

phone networks in Afghanistan cover 90 percent of the Afghan population, and 85 percent of women have access to a cell phone. 

Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned businesses and associations, almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher education 

are women, and women are active participants in the Afghan political process. 

As we enter the transition period of 2014, USAID’s strategy is 

threefold: to maintain and make durable the gains that have been 

made in health, education, and the empowerment of women; to 

mitigate the economic consequences of the military drawdown; and 

to foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and effective 

Afghan governance, to include the 2014 elections. 

USAID places a high priority on ensuring that American taxpayer dollars are used wisely. While many of the issues in Afghanistan are unique to that country, monitoring projects in challenging 

environments is something that USAID does around the world, and 

does very well. In designing the Afghanistan monitoring strategy, 

USAID incorporated lessons learned from our monitoring programs 

around the world, to include Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, and South 

Sudan. I will note that these programs that form the basis of our 

Afghanistan monitoring program have been reviewed in six separate USAID Office of the Inspector General reports as well as three 

reports by the General Accountability Office. 

Finally, external audits provide useful oversight and discipline, 

and they complement and reinforce USAID’s own efforts to ensure 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

U.S. tax dollars are used effectively and efficiently. There are currently over 100 audits ongoing of USAID programs in Afghanistan. 

The bottom line is that USAID will terminate programs if the 

agency determines that adequate oversight is not possible or that 

adequate development progress is not being made. 

With respect to the elections, a credible, transparent, and inclusive electoral process is central to the U.S. Government’s transition 

strategy and critical to Afghan stability and democratic development. USAID remains focused on supporting an inclusive and 

democratic process by supporting Afghan electoral authorities and 

by building the capacity of democratic stakeholders in Afghanistan 

so that they can participate in the elections in a robust and 

informed way. USAID supports independent domestic observers, 

civil society, media, and political parties, helping them appropriately engage in the democratic process. 

USAID is supporting the participation of women in all aspects of 

the electoral process, promoting the hiring and training of female 

polling staff, promoting public outreach to women voters by civil 

society and by public officials, and enhancing the ability of women 

candidates to campaign effectively. 

In conclusion, I have worked in Afghanistan as a member of 

the Department of State, USAID, and the U.S. military. I have 

attended ramp ceremonies for the fallen heroes of all three organizations. I am personally, and USAID is institutionally, keenly 

aware of the enormous sacrifices made by Americans to build a 

secure and a stable Afghanistan. And we fully understand the need 

for constant vigilance, particularly during this delicate transition 

period. We are making tough decisions, we are prioritizing our 

investments, and we are looking for things that have the greatest 

potential for long-term success. 

As USAID navigates the 2014 transition period, we continue to 

be committed to safeguarding taxpayer resources and to ensuring 

that the remarkable levels of development progress made in 

Afghanistan are maintained and made durable. 

It is an honor to be here today and to be able to share with you 

a small glimpse of what USAID is doing in that regard. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD L. SAMPLER

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the 

role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in advancing U.S. 

Government policy through USAID’s civilian assistance program during the transition in Afghanistan. It is an honor to appear before you today with Ambassador 

Dobbins. 

USAID has been fully engaged in Afghanistan for 12 years, and during that time 

Afghanistan has made remarkable development gains in many sectors. This transition period is a pivotal moment for Afghanistan, in anticipation of which USAID has 

been planning and adjusting its programming to maximize sustainability and 

accountability. 

I have been working on and in Afghanistan in both civilian and military capacities since 2002. In addition to having worked with the Afghan Constitutional Loya 

Jirga and the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga, I have served as a representative of 

an international nongovernmental organization, and as chief of staff of the U.N. 

Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. I bring these perspectives to USAID’s work 

today. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Continued U.S. engagement is critical to Afghanistan’s stability and to protecting 

the vital interests of our own country. Improving governance, creating economic 

opportunity, and supporting civil society are critical to solidifying our military gains 

and advancing our political and diplomatic goals for Afghanistan and the region. In 

order to achieve these goals, USAID has reoriented its assistance program to lessen 

its stabilization work and place an even greater emphasis on long-term, sustainable 

development programming. 

USAID AND RESULTS

After the fall of the Taliban regime, I saw firsthand an Afghanistan devastated 

by decades of conflict. The unprecedented investment by U.S. taxpayers and the 

international community, in partnership with the Afghans, has created transformational changes in Afghanistan that are reflected in the United Nation’s 2013 

Human Development Index. Afghanistan improved its score more than any other 

country in the index since 2000 on a percentage basis: a nearly 60 percent increase. 

Although Afghanistan had a very low starting point, the upward trends show powerful aggregation over a decade and strongly reflect areas of USAID investment. 

Changes of this magnitude are not made overnight, especially in such a deeply 

traditional society and challenging operational environment. The results of international civilian assistance, led by USAID in concert with the broader U.S. Government, are significant, though fragile: 

• Education: In 2002, there were only 900,000 Afghan children in school, and virtually none of them were girls. Today, nearly 8 million children are registered 

to attend school and more than one-third of them are girls. 

• Health: Life expectancy has increased from 42 years to over 62 since 2001; the 

maternal mortality rate has declined by 80 percent from 1,600 deaths to 327 

per 100,000 births; and child mortality decreased from 172 to 97 deaths per 

1,000 live births. 

• Energy: In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. 

Today 18 percent do. In addition, USAID assistance has helped put the Afghan 

national power company (DABS) on a path to become fully self-sustaining. 

DABS collected $220 million from the sale of electricity in 2012, an increase of 

67 percent from 2010. 

• Mobile Technology: In 2002, there were few fixed telephone lines and making 

calls outside of Afghanistan required a satellite phone. Today, the combined 

phone network covers 90 percent of the Afghan population; 85 percent of women 

have access to a mobile phone. The telecommunications sector is Afghanistan’s 

greatest source of foreign direct investment, largest remitter of taxes to the government, and biggest licit employer, providing jobs for 100,000 Afghans. 

• Women: Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned business and associations; 

almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher education are women; and 

women are active participants in the Afghan political process, with three female 

Cabinet members of the Afghan Cabinet, 68 Members of Parliament (of the 249 

seats), and three women Vice Presidential candidates. 

USAID TRANSITION STRATEGY

Over the last 2 years USAID has regularly reviewed and adjusted its programs 

to ensure that they advance the administration’s strategic objectives and are necessary, achievable, and sustainable. USAID’s transition strategy is threefold: 

• Maintain and make durable the gains made in health, education, and the 

empowerment of women; 

• Mitigate the economic impact of the drawdown through a robust focus on the 

agriculture sector, private sector development, the operations and maintenance 

of infrastructure investments, and the future potential of the extractives industry; and, 

• Foster improved stability by supporting legitimate and effective Afghan governance, including the 2014 Presidential election. 

Operationally, USAID has adjusted its implementation model to improve sustainability and meet the challenges presented by the transition through: 

• Focusing assistance in Regional Economic Zones (REZs) that cover major population centers and promote regional trade and economic opportunities; 

• Developing a multitiered oversight strategy that, along with other monitoring 

and evaluation efforts, will continue to ensure adequate oversight over projects 

in the field, as field staff decrease; 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

• Transforming USAID’s approach in Afghanistan to one of mutual accountability, ensuring alignment with Afghan priorities and promoting Afghan reforms; 

and 

• Implementing USAID’s 2011 Afghanistan Sustainability Guidance, which emphasizes the principles of (1) increasing Afghan ownership and capacity; (2) contributing to stability and confidence, and (3) effective and cost-efficient programming. 

With these parameters in mind, USAID works in coordination with the U.S. Government interagency and the Afghan Government to review and revise USAID’s 

Afghanistan portfolio. For example, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan in 2012, USAID substantially downscaled a 5-year, $32 million agricultural faculties program found to be duplicative of efforts by another donor. 

Sustaining the development gains made over the past decade will require continued reforms by the Afghan Government. USAID is active in promoting these necessary reforms in coordination with our international partners through the Tokyo 

Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). As part of TMAF, USAID has established a bilateral incentive fund to encourage action on key reforms. Funds will be 

released as the Afghan Government meets certain thresholds of progress on the key 

TMAF indicators. 

For instance, as a result of the Afghan Government’s progress in meeting commitments related to the upcoming elections, USAID is preparing to release $15 million 

(out of the $75 million in incentive funds for this year) through the World Bank’s 

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The Afghanistan Ministry of 

Finance is now working with other Ministries to undertake agreed reforms to 

ensure that the remaining $60 million of U.S. incentive funds for this year are 

focused on Afghan priorities. In addition, the United States coordinates closely with 

the Afghan Government and other donors to prioritize reform objectives and coordinate other incentive programs, including those that are part of the ARTF. 

Throughout this transition, USAID continues to closely coordinate with the 

Departments of Defense and State and other relevant agencies. For example, 

USAID has placed Liaison Officers with both the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) Joint Command and the Special Operations Joint Task Force to advise 

these commands on the design and implementation of development projects. USAID 

has two representatives on the Department of Defense’s Commanders Emergency 

Response Program Board, and these positions ensure the Agency’s visibility on proposed military development projects and synergies of such projects with USAID’s 

programming. USAID also participated in the Department of State-led ‘‘Transfer of 

Tasks’’ exercise, which helped to inform the U.S. Embassy and USAID mission on 

how to responsibly transfer development-related activities undertaken by ISAF to 

other U.S. Government entities or to the Afghan Government. Throughout this process, USAID has drawn on lessons learned from the Iraq experience to help navigate 

the transition period. 

OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

USAID places the highest priority on ensuring that American taxpayer funds are 

used wisely, effectively, and for their intended purpose. While many of the issues 

in Afghanistan are unique to that country, monitoring projects in very challenging 

environments is something the Agency has been doing for years in many places 

around the world. 

In addition to the usual oversight USAID undertakes in every country where it 

works, USAID’s Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative (known as A3) 

focuses on four areas: 

1. Award Mechanisms—We rely less on large agreements and have increased the 

number of smaller and more flexible agreements. We are also utilizing assistance 

awards that provide the most visibility on project costs, such as cost-reimbursable 

contracts and limiting layers of subcontracts to two. 

2. Partner Vetting—The USAID mission established a Vetting Support Unit in 

February 2011. The unit conducts checks on non-U.S. companies and non-U.S. key 

individuals for prime contractors, subcontractors, grant recipients and subgrantees 

to determine whether or not they are associated with known malign entities or individuals. We have kept $41.5 million from being awarded as a result of our vetting 

process. 

3. Financial Controls—We are enhancing controls on project funds, such as using 

electronic funds transfers in lieu of cash payments, using independent financial 

monitors to verify appropriate usage of funds, ensuring close review of recipients/ 

contractor’s claims prior to payment, and performing audits of locally incurred cost. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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4. Project Oversight—USAID uses a multitiered monitoring approach that 

includes, as appropriate, independent monitoring contractors; observation by U.S. 

Government staff; reporting by implementing partners, local nongovernmental organizations and civil society; and use of technological tools, such as time- and datestamped photos. By using multiple sources of monitoring data, USAID can compare 

information received from separate sources to ensure the greatest degree of oversight possible. 

USAID will terminate projects, or specific activity sites within projects, if the 

Agency determines that adequate oversight is not possible or adequate development 

progress is not being made. In designing the Afghanistan monitoring strategy, 

USAID incorporated lessons learned from its use of third-party independent monitoring in challenging environments across the world, including Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, and South Sudan, as well as from the USAID Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) and U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits, as well as public 

feedback. 

USAID has also developed a new unit at the mission, the Implementation Support 

Team, which is responsible for providing an additional layer of critical review and 

analysis for the many streams of monitoring information and for providing USAID 

leadership with alternative courses of action for addressing challenges with project 

implementation. In addition, USAID is continuing its close coordination with other 

donors to share best practices and expertise on monitoring. 

USAID also has a rigorous system of oversight for its ‘‘on-budget’’ programming 

with the Afghan Government. This means that USAID conducts assessments to 

ensure that each Afghan ministry or entity has systems in place to manage onbudget assistance. To date, USAID has assessed 13 ministries, but has limited its 

on-budget assistance to 6 ministries, subject to stringent safeguards. 

For ‘‘on-budget’’ assistance, USAID utilizes multiple levels of protection to mitigate risks before disbursing any funds. These measures may include, but are not 

limited to, requiring the Afghan Ministry of Finance to establish noncommingled, 

separate bank accounts for each project with USAID; disbursement of funds only 

after USAID has verified that the ministry has achieved a performance milestone 

or USAID has verified accrued costs; an annual audit by a USAID OIG-approved 

firm; substantial involvement and oversight by USAID staff in procurement processes; independent management, monitoring and evaluation of services; and technical assistance to increase the capacity of ministries while addressing any 

vulnerabilities or weaknesses identified in the assessments. All ‘‘on-budget’’ assistance requires compliance with USAID accountability and oversight procedures, 

including site visits to ministries by USAID staff or independent contractors, as well 

as regular reporting. Ministries are required to fully comply with the mitigation 

measures prior to and throughout the disbursement process. If Afghan ministries 

fail to adhere to these measures, the agreements are subject to immediate suspension or termination. 

For example, USAID has worked closely with the Ministry of Education to assess 

its financial management systems, implement extensive mitigation measures for the 

risks these assessments identified, and audit their progress and monitor results. 

USAID negotiated a stringent series of preconditions and financial controls pursuant to the launch of a $27 million textbook printing program, part of the Basic Education, Literacy, and Technical Vocational Education and Training Project. The specific steps USAID required to mitigate these risks included use of a noncommingled 

separate bank account from which all project disbursements are to be accounted for; 

an annual audit including quarterly audit testing of all project disbursements under 

the agreement by an OIG-approved certified public accounting firm; and USAID 

involvement and mandatory clearance of the textbook procurement cycle for each 

separate procurement undertaken under the agreement. USAID subsequently obligated a total of $20 million toward the agreement, and to date $11.7 million has 

been disbursed. 

Finally, audits provide useful oversight and discipline, and complement and reinforce USAID’s own efforts to ensure U.S. tax dollars are used effectively and efficiently. There are currently over 100 ongoing audits of USAID programs in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2013, the GAO, USAID OIG, and Special Inspector General for 

Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) completed over 65 financial and program audits in 

Afghanistan. 

Oversight is a process that requires continual reexamination and the ability to 

adjust to new circumstances as they arise. Although there are inherent risks in 

doing business in a country like Afghanistan, we work hard to ensure taxpayer dollars are adequately protected while carrying out a vital component of the U.S. Government’s national security policy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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AFGHANISTAN 2014 ELECTIONS: USAID’S ROLE

A credible, transparent, and inclusive electoral process is central to the U.S. Government’s transition strategy and critical to Afghan stability and democratic development. Afghanistan has made significant progress, with support from USAID, 

toward holding elections in April 2014: two key election laws were passed over the 

summer, marking the first time the Parliament directly approved the electoral process. Commissioners to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) have been appointed through a 

consultative process, and have proceeded to implement responsible plans for conducting polls for the April 5 vote. Candidates registered for the Presidential and 

Provincial Council elections in an orderly fashion, and the final candidate lists were 

prepared after complaints were addressed by the appropriate Afghan institutions. 

In short, there has been significant progress on multiple elements of the necessary 

electoral machinery, pointing toward a timely and credible election this spring. 

USAID, in coordination with partners in the U.S. Government and the international community, remains focused on supporting an inclusive and democratic 

process by supporting Afghan electoral authorities and by building the capacity of 

democratic stakeholders in Afghanistan to participate in a robust and informed way. 

USAID is the lead donor to the IEC and IECC through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ELECT II basket fund, which provides expert advice and 

mentoring to the IEC and funds key election procurement, training, and logistics. 

USAID is also funding IECC activities through the UNDP ELECT II basket fund. 

In addition to the electoral authorities, USAID supports independent domestic observers, civil society, media, and political parties, helping them appropriately engage 

in the democratic process. 

USAID is supporting the participation of women in all aspects of the electoral 

process: promoting the hiring and training of female polling staff; promoting public 

outreach to women voters by civil society and public officials; and enhancing the 

ability of women candidates to campaign effectively. 

Despite many existing and potential challenges, Afghans have demonstrated 

through every stage of the election planning process that they see a successful election as the only acceptable option to decide the leadership of their next government. 

The U.S. Government, through USAID and other departments, is providing acrossthe-board support to help ensure this happens. 

CONCLUSION

USAID always keeps in mind the enormous sacrifices made by Americans to build 

a secure and stable Afghanistan, and we fully understand the need for constant vigilance, particularly during this delicate transition period. 

Throughout our efforts, we are applying important lessons from the past 12 years 

in Afghanistan, as well as from other high-risk environments in which USAID has 

worked. Weaning Afghanistan from unsustainable levels of assistance is necessary 

for us, and essential for them, and we are making tough decisions and prioritizing 

investments that have the greatest potential for long-term sustainability. As USAID 

navigates through the 2014 transition period, we are committed to expending every 

effort to safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that the remarkable development 

progress in Afghanistan is maintained and made durable. 

Denying al-Qaeda a chance to rebuild in Afghanistan remains America’s primary 

mission in that country, and the programs implemented by USAID are essential elements to the success of that goal, particularly through the transition period. 

It is an honor to be able to share with you today a small glimpse of what USAID 

is doing in that regard. I look forward to answering any questions that you may 

have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both. 

Let me start off with Ambassador Dobbins. What is Karzai’s purpose? It seems to me that he is putting his country, his legacy, 

maybe even his personal security at risk. What is his purpose? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You need to put your microphone on. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Sorry. 

I can tell you what—you know, the kinds of conditions he is laying down. I would have to speculate about what further purposes 

may be beyond it. But, although he has spoken generally about a 

number of different desiderata, they basically come down to two, as 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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far as we can determine. You know, one is a peace process, and the 

second is no entry into Afghan homes, sanctity of Afghan homes. 

On the first, we, of course, have supported reconciliation. We 

have tried to advance reconciliation. His position, at the moment, 

seems to be that we actually have to succeed in initiating a formal, 

overt, public Afghan Government/Taliban peace negotiation before 

he will sign the BSA. Now, I have noted to him that the Taliban 

have no real incentive to facilitate his signing a BSA, and that this 

conditionality actually probably works against what he would like 

to see. Not that we are opposed to a peace process; on the contrary, 

we are—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Ambassador DOBBINS [continuing]. All for it. So, that is one of 

his desiderata. 

And the second is—in the context of the BSA and in the context 

of the—on the text of the BSA and then an assurance he got from 

the President alongside it, you know, we have committed to respect 

the sanctity of Afghan homes and to operate in ways that recognize 

the importance of privacy and safety within the home. He seems 

to be interpreting this as: Under no circumstances, in any case, 

even if accompanied by Afghan troops, and even if Afghan troops 

are actually leading the operation, should the United States forces 

participate in entering and searching a home in search of a 

terrorist. 

So, we think both of these are a bit of an overstretch. Now, it 

could be that, in the end, formulas will be determined that are 

mutually acceptable. Clearly, what he is asking is beyond where we 

are likely to be able to accommodate him. But, he may see this as 

the beginning of another negotiation. 

The CHAIRMAN. I know that your testimony said you feel that we 

definitely will get there. But, is there a breaking point here? Is 

there a point in which the consequences of not having a signed 

agreement are going to have—you refer to some of the consequences. Certainly, when I was there earlier this year, there was 

a real concern, both among Afghanistan’s neighbors and internally 

in Afghanistan, about people hedging their bets, about having that 

sense of confidence for the future, especially as the 2014 elections 

are pursued. Are there not real consequences? 

And, as part of that answer, can you talk a little bit about the 

regional implications of this agreement and political transition— 

can you describe what diplomatic efforts and planning to address 

the concerns expressed by some of our partners in the region, and 

perhaps, through that process, mitigate potential second- and 

third-order effects of the transition? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I agree with you entirely. Senator, 

on the consequences of delay. I think your opening statement and 

mine were almost, you know, at perfect parallel on those consequences, and they—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Please have the State Department note-taker put 

that down in their report back to the State. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador DOBBINS. And the longer the delay is, the greater 

those consequences are. 

Is there a point at which walking away from Afghanistan would 

be better than continuing to live with uncertainty? Personally, I do 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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not think so. Because I think the consequences of leaving entirely 

would be even more catastrophic. But, clearly, the sooner the 

better. 

We are engaged with the neighboring countries. You mentioned 

President Karzai has just visited Iran, but he is also in—I think, 

3 days from now, going to be visiting India, where he will meet 

with the Prime Minister and other leaders in India. He is visiting 

Turkey shortly thereafter. We have already mentioned what Russia, what China, what Pakistan have said. So, I think that, with 

the exception of Iran, there is quite a remarkable, actually, international consensus that, while the United States should not stay 

forever, it should stay for a while longer. 

I do think that, to the extent we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he knows that, too, right? Part of his willingness to delay is because he believes that, at the end of the day, 

it is not in our interests not to stay. So, in doing so, he thinks he 

has leverage, in that regard. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that is probably accurate. What I 

think—the most viable sort of leverage, I think, is probably domestic; that is, his supporters, his political opponents, the media, the 

public. I mean, this is on every talk show, every night, and they 

have got 76 channels of television there. This is a big topic. It is 

the main topic of public debate. And there is, as we have both 

noted, overwhelming support within the population. And I am 

hopeful that, over time, that will begin to have an effect, along 

with whatever advice he gets from friendly neighbors, of whom, for 

instance, his upcoming visit to India could, I think, be quite influential, because he highly respects and has good relations with the 

Indian Government. 

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, part of Afghanistan’s future is going to 

be in its regional integration in trade opportunities. And I think a 

lot of that is embodied in the administration’s new Silk Road Initiative. I think that the FY14 Foreign Operations bill, which passed 

out of the Appropriations Committee this year, wisely calls for a 

plan to integrate the functions of your office back into the Bureau 

of South and Central Asian Affairs. Can you shed some light on the 

State Department’s plans to integrate SRAP and SCA, and what 

challenges are there in conducting that integration? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I—you know, I think—I would not say we 

have a plan. I think there is a sort of a general working assumption that the transition, in end of 2014, where we move from a 

large combat presence to a small train-advise-and-assist presence, 

would be a logical breakpoint, where you might make some 

changes in the way the State Department is organized. 

On the other hand, even under those circumstances, Afghanistan 

is still going to be one of our largest, if not the largest—certainly, 

it will be the country in which we are most heavily engaged in a 

country that is still undergoing conflict. And whether you would 

want to just turn this over to the Afghan desk officer, I am not 

sure. So, I think reintegration into the Bureau, in some circumstances, in some manner, might well make sense. 

I mean, when I was the Special Envoy for Afghanistan, back in 

2001, I was administratively attached to the South Asian Bureau. 

When I was the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the State for the Balkans, I got my administrative support from the 

European Bureau, as opposed to from the Secretary’s office directly. 

Although, in both cases, I had direct access to the Secretary of 

State. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am certainly not suggesting, nor do I 

think the subcommittee suggests, that it be the Afghan desk officer 

that deals with the major account that we have in this part of the 

world. But, I think there is some benefit in integration, because it 

is not just Afghanistan that we are focused on there; it obviously 

has regional consequences, as well. And I would love to see the continuing development and thought of the State Department in that 

regard. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and, again, to both 

of you, for your testimony. 

You know, for a long time, there has been a push by many to try 

to get the administration to commit to what the troop levels were 

going to be if there was a bilateral agreement that was agreed to. 

And I know there have been specific ranges that we have talked 

about, in combination with NATO, and then a contingent of Special 

Ops, aside from that operation, that we would have, unilaterally. 

Has the—do you think, to any degree, the lack of our willingness, 

if you will—the administration’s willingness—to actually commit to 

firm troop levels—or, firm commitment to troop levels—has that 

entered into Karzai’s flakiness on this issue? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Probably not. Karzai has shown complete, 

total disinterest in troop levels or even assistance levels, and is 

focused on some of these other issues that clearly are hot buttons 

with him. I think his working assumption is, we will do what is 

necessary, as Senator Menendez indicated, and that, therefore, he 

can take that for granted. We try to tell him that American opinion 

is not exactly where he thinks it is, and there—that he is—you 

know, that he is playing with fire. 

And it was instructive that the Foreign Minister of Iraq visited, 

10 days ago, met with President Karzai and said, ‘‘Do not make the 

same mistake we did. You know, we kissed the Americans goodbye, and we need them today.’’ 

Senator CORKER. So, let me ask you—obviously, you assess, you 

know, the need for troops, or the levels of those troops, based on 

conditions on the ground. And you just mentioned that things obviously are deteriorating. I mean, part of having security in the country is having appropriate economic growth and all of those kinds 

of things. And these actions on his part are causing that to deteriorate. Is this situation in Afghanistan, is it affecting how you are 

discussing troop levels right now? And is that moving up or down 

based on the changes that are happening there internally? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I do not think the negative trends that I 

have suggested have yet manifest themselves in a degree that 

would impact the battlefield. I mean, it is only been, what, 2 

weeks, 3 weeks that we have faced this problem that Karzai gets 

endorsement for it but says he does not want to sign it during his 

term of office. As I have said, there are already some manifestations, in terms of the economy, but they are limited—— 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

Senator CORKER. Will it, over time, affect things in that way, if 

it goes out to the end of the election and—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Possibly, yes. I think, if the uncertainty 

persisted through the summer, we would have less allies when we 

finally do confirm this, we would have less public support in this 

country when we finally get an agreement. We might even have 

less support here in the Congress, although I would hope not. But, 

these are real dangers. And would it affect morale on the battlefield? So far, that has not been a problem. So far, the Afghan Army 

has been performing well, taking high casualties, replacing them, 

fighting hard. But, frankly, if this uncertainty persisted and was 

exacerbated by regional interference of the sort that we have seen 

in other decades, you could draw a lot of very unpleasant scenarios. 

I think we need to try to ensure that it does not unravel in that 

regard over the next several months. But, I agree that these are 

dangers. 

Senator CORKER. And I know, with Iraq, you alluded to that, but 

a big part of that, I think, was what we were leaving behind was 

so insignificant that I think Iraqi political leadership decided it was 

not worth the internal grief, if you will, to enter into an agreement. 

I do not sense anything like that is at play here, and I do sense 

there is a sincere effort, on behalf of our country, to end up with 

a bilateral agreement that leaves a substantial number of folks 

there to see this through. And, to that end, in talking about our 

internal situation, other than preserving our gains, how would you, 

as our special envoy—how would you describe what our national 

interests are in Afghanistan as people watch a President there, if 

you will, turn his back on all the things that have happened there 

over the last 10 to 12 years? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. We obviously have an interest in preventing al-Qaeda from repositioning itself in Afghanistan, from 

being able to operate with the active collaboration of a government 

that supports it, which was the case before 2001 and which would 

be the case again if the Taliban were to come to power in part or 

all of Afghanistan. They remain the link to al-Qaeda. We have no 

reason to believe that they would not continue to allow al-Qaeda 

to use the territory and to actually facilitate their use. So, that is 

one. 

We have an interest in preventing even a largely dismantled 

al-Qaeda from rebuilding itself within an Afghan sanctuary, which, 

again, would be a real possibility if the Taliban were to come back 

to power. 

We also have an interest in preventing Afghanistan from simply 

falling into a wider civil war, which would become exactly like 

Syria, a magnet for extremists, militants of all stripes, including 

al-Qaeda, but not just al-Qaeda, some with global agendas and 

some with desires to attack the United States at home and abroad. 

We do not need another ungoverned space, another country like Somalia, like Yemen, like Syria, that has no capacity to control its 

own territory and which is in an ongoing and everlasting conflict 

which attracts every extremist in the world to plant their flag, to 

recruit, to fundraise, and to use that conflict as a basis for wider 

action. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I thank you for that answer. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

In regards to Karzai, in his irrational activities—I mean, we 

have got to act responsibly, and sometimes when you are in a negotiation and you have an irrational and irresponsible partner, it 

ends up changing the dynamic in a way that is not to your advantage. Is there any part of this that has to do with manipulating the 

election, in your opinion, and potentially causing favor to move 

toward his brother in the election? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. He has been pretty consistent in everything he has said to everybody he has talked to, that we know of, 

in opposing his brother’s candidacy, frankly. 

Senator CORKER. Well, is he trying to affect it, in any direction? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. So, there is obviously those kinds of suspicions, particularly on the part of his political opponents. He has 

done nothing to substantiate that, so far, that we know of. He 

seems to be committed to holding the election on time. He has 

encouraged a number of candidates to run, not just one. He clearly 

does not, at this stage, have an identified favorite. And he, otherwise, has largely avoided the kind of interference that one could 

legitimately take exception to. He expresses a concern, based on his 

experiences in 2009, about our interfering in the election, and, of 

course, we have reassured him on that stage. At one point, after 

National Security Advisor Rice gave him some assurances in that 

regard, he declared himself satisfied and that he would no longer 

raise the issue. But, he does come back to it, as clearly there—you 

know, 2009, from his standpoint, was fairly traumatic, and he is 

not willing to let it go. But, to be fair, at this stage we have not 

seen anything which suggests that this is a ploy to either postpone 

the elections or manipulate their outcome. 

Senator CORKER. You know, if you look at our foreign policy over 

the last few years, American foreign policy has really—I mean, we 

have been Iran’s best friend, whether intentionally or unintentionally, over the last several years. And, you know, obviously, the 

President of Afghanistan entered into this agreement with Iran, 

which really was not much of an agreement. I think it is an agreement to agree down the road. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

Senator CORKER. It was not very specific. But, from his manipulative standpoint, what was Karzai attempting to do with this 

agreement he just announced with Iran? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. As we understand it, he simply agreed to 

negotiate an agreement. And he has negotiated these kinds of 

agreements with other states in the region. I do not know that 

this—I cannot tell you whether this meeting was set up before we 

had the Loya Jirga and all, his trip to Iran. He has gone there once 

or twice a year since he became President, back in 2001–2002. 

So, at this point, I would not attach a lot of importance to it. Iran 

is the only country that is encouraging him in his current stance. 

Of course, they are not encouraging him to sign it late, they are 

encouraging him not to sign it at all. 

Senator CORKER. Not at all; yes. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. You know, their position would be, ‘‘You 

do not need the Americans. You know, there are lots of other countries of the region that will help you.’’ In fact, there are no other 

countries of the region that are offering the kinds of assistance that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

the United States and its NATO allies are prepared to commit to, 

and the other countries of the region have made that clear. 

So, is this a gesture designed to demonstrate that he has other 

options? Maybe. But, it is so in keeping with his relations with 

Iran over the last decade that at this point, I am not getting too 

excited about it. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

And, Ambassador Dobbins, appreciate your service in a challenging environment; both of you, actually. 

You mentioned President Karzai’s interest in reconciliation 

agreement with the Taliban. And can you talk a little bit more 

about that? What kind of prospects do we think are realistic? Why 

should the Taliban—or, why do we think the Taliban might be 

interested in reaching some sort of an agreement with the current 

Government of Afghanistan or the government of any new President, once we begin to draw down our forces and there is less of 

an obstacle to their regaining power? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, first, to be fair to President Karzai, 

he is not asking for, or expecting, a peace agreement with the 

Taliban. He simply wants a process to be begun under his administration, which is a natural enough desire, and one we would be 

happy to support, if it was realistic. And, in fact, we have been trying to promote it for several years, since, essentially, 2011, 

when—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. So, can you also talk about why what he is 

proposing is not realistic. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, particularly saying, ‘‘I won’t sign the 

BSA until I have formal talks with the Taliban’’—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. OK. 

Ambassador DOBBINS [continuing]. Does not exactly give the 

Taliban an incentive to talk to him. The Taliban might be willing 

to talk to him if he never signs the BSA, but he is not providing 

them an incentive, with that particular formula. The Taliban have 

been quite consistent, for several years, that they are willing to 

talk to us, they are not willing to talk to the Government of 

Afghanistan. We brought them over that line, almost, in June, and 

then it faltered, not, in fact, as a result of the Taliban’s bad faith, 

but for other extraneous reasons, and we did not get to that goal 

line. And I guess I would have to say that it is unlikely that they 

will cross that in the next—you know, between now and April. 

They would not seem to have an interest in enhancing the legitimacy of the current regime, or, in particular, of the elections that 

are going to produce the next regime. That would seem the logic 

that is consistent with everything they have said, and it is consistent with what we know about what they say to themselves and 

what they say to others, privately. 

But, over the longer term, you know, it is our view that if we 

have a BSA, if we have a continuing presence, if the international 

community remains committed, if the international financial support for the ANSF and to the Afghan Government as a whole is 

sustained, that the Afghan forces will continue to dominate and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

hold the major population centers, that the Taliban will eventually 

realize that the American departure, if you will, has not brought 

them a breakthrough, that the war will continue indefinitely until 

they reach a settlement. There are elements within the Taliban, we 

think, who are interested in talking. I would not say, at this point, 

they are interested in a settlement that we would regard as acceptable, but they are interested in talking, and that is a first step. 

So, I think we will continue to support this, in principle; we will 

continue to try to support it, in practice. But, our expectations are 

that something is more likely to take fruit once a new government 

has been elected, which clearly has broad support within the country, and the international continued support into the coming decade is manifest and obviously going to materialize. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate that argument. It sounds optimistic. However, given our failure, in past years, to have any 

progress—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I am a diplomat; I am optimistic. [Laughter.] 

That is what we do. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, and we politicians are usually optimistic, too, but—— 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Let me—one piece of that concern about what 

might happen with the Taliban, I think also has to do with what 

happens with the rights of women. And there was an article, yesterday in the New York Times, talking about some backsliding 

with respect to women’s rights in Afghanistan. And notwithstanding all of your positive statistics, Mr. Sampler, I think there is real 

concern that, if we leave, that one of the things that will get sacrificed is Afghan women and what their future might look like. And 

so, what assurances might there be in BSA that would address that 

issue? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, if we leave entirely, you are absolutely right. I mean, I think the country, as a whole, will suffer, 

but probably women will suffer the most. I will let Larry talk a bit 

about, you know, what our programs are, going forward, and the 

degree to which, assuming we have a BSA and a continued presence, we are going to be able to administer and continue to support 

the programs in the area of women’s rights and women’s empowerment. 

I think that, you know, the statistics that Larry has indicated do 

have to be contrasted with significant serious problems that women 

still face there. On the other hand—you know, so the—Afghanistan 

has not gone from the 14th century to the 21st, but it may have 

gone from the 14th century to the 18th or something, in terms of 

number of women in universities, number of women—well, in number of women in Parliament, they are in the 21st century, essentially, as—and in some of the others—number of women in the 

workplace, including number of women of entrepreneurs—there 

has been some rather striking gains. 

But, perhaps most important is the change in public attitudes. 

If you look at survey results, going back to 2001—Asia Foundation 

does one every year, and they have got a new one—you know, the 

number of men who think that women should be educated—you 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

know, I think it is now 60-some percent, maybe even higher, and 

I think much higher among people who have girl children. The 

number of men who think that women should be in the marketplace, in—you know, in jobs. These trends—although, in the last 

year, they have come down slightly, I think—they have been— 

there has been very significant gains. And it is those kinds of 

changes in attitudes which, over time, will sustain the progress 

that we have made. 

But, Larry, you may want to add something on this. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Sure. I will second the notion that the statistics 

cited in the New York Times article are grounds for concern, but 

there has been so much progress made that we cannot allow it to 

dissipate. 

The things that strike me as most compelling are the 20 percent 

of women—or, the 20 percent of higher education students who are 

now women. We could not have seen that statistic when our forces 

first went into Afghanistan, because there were no women who had 

primary and secondary educations. So, the fact that women are 

entering into the advanced education field is promising, not just 

because it means there are women capable of taking senior jobs, 

but because it means they have reached a level where they will not 

allow themselves to be rolled back. 

Another statistic that I think is more relevant than perhaps first 

recognized is that 85 percent of women in Afghanistan have access 

to a cell phone. So, no longer are they relegated to a small backroom in a compound, they now are able to reach out, they are able 

to receive news, they are able to communicate with each other. On 

my last visit to Kabul, I visited with a group of women who are 

using SMS technology to build their ability to cohesively and coherently campaign, not for office, themselves, but for issues among the 

candidates who are running for office. So, they are demonstrating 

a level of sophistication that just has not been there in previous 

years. 

And I will also mention, and be happy to discuss further if you 

like, we have a program that we plan to implement, if the situation 

allows us to continue engaging, called PROMOTE, which is 

intended to focus primarily on the roughly 200,000 women between 

the ages of 18 and 30 who do have secondary education degrees. 

It also does things for other women who are disadvantaged and do 

not have that level of education, but we have made a deliberate 

policy decision that, in the transitional period, we wanted to be 

able to build on the work that has been done and help these 

200,000 women find ways to gainfully engage themselves in the 

future of Afghanistan and then serve as role models so that the 

pool of such women will continue to grow. 

But, I do think you are right to be concerned about rollbacks. 

Afghanistan is a big country, there are women in all kinds of different situations. But, I am also cautiously optimistic that, if we 

are allowed to stay, we will continue to see improvements in their 

status. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

And, to the witnesses, thank you. We always thank witnesses for 

their service and for appearing, but I want to just kind of underline 

and exclamation-point it today, because we hear these statistics, 

but I think it is really important to step back and just talk about 

how meaningful they are. I mean, just take the life-expectancy 

increase from 42 to 62 in 10 years. There is just no precedent for 

that. There is just—I mean, I do not think the United States has 

ever been involved in anything that would have had that kind of 

impact, a 50-percent expansion of the life of a regular person 

because of the work that we and our partners have done, in tandem with the Afghans, on public health issues. It is unprecedented. 

It took 100 years for the life expectancy to—in the world—to increase by 30 years, from 30 to 60, essentially, in the 21st—in the 

20th century. But, to do 20 years in 10 years, in one decade, is 

amazing. And that has largely been driven by public health for 

women and children. If you drop maternal deaths by 80 percent, 

if you drop infant mortality by 50 percent, that is what drives up 

life expectancy in what we have seen. And then the increases in 

children in school, you know, by, essentially 10 times, so it is almost an infinite increase in the number of women in school. You 

have to feel a sense of satisfaction about it. I mean, I know it is— 

and that probably makes it incredibly frustration, what you are 

dealing with now, but those of you who have done this—I do not 

know how this polls with the American public, to know that we 

have helped expand life expectancy from 42 to 62 years in Afghanistan with the work that we have done, but, in terms of feeling good 

about what you have done, and feeling like you have played an important role in a very challenging circumstance, you ought to feel 

a sense of pride. And I think we can feel a sense of pride, you 

know, that we have been willing to stick with it. That does make 

it frustrating. 

You alluded, Ambassador Dobbins, to Iraqi Foreign Minister 

Zabari, and I was him this weekend, and—just to expand on this 

a little bit—I was at a security dialogue in Bahrain, this weekend, 

and—the Iraqi Foreign Minister Zabari was publicly saying, ‘‘I 

have told President Karzai, ‘Do not bluff the Americans. The Americans were willing to stay in Iraq. We told them we did not want 

them. And we wish we had not told them that now, 2 years later. 

We wish the Americans had stayed in Iraq.’ ’’ And he has met 

directly, as you indicated, with President Karzai, and he said, ‘‘Do 

not think you can bluff them, and do not be foolish enough to think 

that, if they depart, your life is going to be better. Your life is going 

to be worse.’’ And so, that is what makes this moment a frustrating 

one. 

I am kind of curious about your—each of your sense about this— 

the election campaign coming up, and how this issue of the BSA 

could play into it. Assume that Karzai does not change his position 

and he keeps taking the position that, ‘‘I am not going to do anything; it is for the next person.’’ My initial thought was, I would 

be very worried that the role of the United States, or the role of 

the international partners in the BSA, and the economic aid, being 

part of an election campaign would not be a good thing. It would 

seem like it would be preferable to get that resolved and have the 

election campaign proceed with the candidates making their cases 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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with that as sort of an issue that has already been resolved. But, 

I guess I kind of have now—I am questioning my own sense about 

whether that would be a good thing or a bad thing. 

If Karzai does not—if he continues in his current position, this 

BSA issue would have to be a major issue that the Presidential 

candidates would be addressing. They are addressing it in talk 

shows in 78 TV channels. How would that play out over the course 

of an election campaign, based on your experience? And would that 

likely be a positive, or would it be, as I initially thought, a negative? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think it would cut two ways. I think, 

first of all, most of the candidates would endorse the BSA and 

promise to sign it. Several have already done so. It is possible that 

all of them would. So, the future of the BSA might not, in fact, be 

an issue in the campaign in the sense that all the candidates, or 

at least all the serious candidates, might well converge on a single 

position. 

I think that the uncertainty attached to the future of the international commitment, on the other hand, would tend to, as—you 

know, in threatening environments, people tend to converge on 

their ethnic identities, on strongmen who can protect them. It 

polarizes already divided societies. And so—and, you know, in the 

current environment, they have had—this is the third Presidential 

election, and they have had two parliamentary elections. And, you 

know, if you lose the election, you just go into comfortable opposition. You still have a seat in the Parliament, you still get paid, you 

are still in the patronage world, you are not excluded. 

You know, if Afghanistan’s going back to the 1990s, you lose an 

election, you go into exile or get killed. I mean, it is a different ball 

game. It is the winner-takes-all-and-never-gives-it-up, and the losers, you know, are losers for life, unless they spark a revolution. 

But, you do not want that kind of thinking. You want it something 

in which the losers accept the results and say, ‘‘It is okay, we will 

try again next time, and, in the meantime, please make sure that 

I get my share of the patronage, by the way,’’ you know, which is 

what a lot of this is all about. 

So, high levels of anxiety, indecision about the future, I think 

could have a very divisive effect, even if the BSA itself is not a 

point of contention. That is what I would be concerned with. 

Larry. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Sampler. 

Mr. SAMPLER. The only thing I would add is, I think President 

Karzai is demonstrating, in his resistance to sign the BSA, the distance between his opinions and public opinion, and the other candidates. And it might threaten his role as kingmaker. He sees himself very much as the father of the state and as a kingmaker in 

Afghanistan, and I think it would weaken, in some ways, the persona of President Karzai as the spokesman of the Afghan people. 

But, the thing that concerns me more is the hedging that Ambassador Dobbins mentioned earlier. Any uncertainty—and in the elections, the uncertainty may be demonstrated by hedging, particularly on the provincial elections. Remember, we are having two 

elections in April, both the Presidential and provincial. And the 

provincial elections are where the local contesting warlords or 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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powerbrokers go kind of head-to-head to represent their communities. 

And I think Ambassador Dobbins is exactly right when he says 

that the population in this area, if there is this continued uncertainty, will be inclined to go back to what they have always known. 

And that is not necessarily what we see as best for the future of 

Afghanistan. We want them looking at progressive new ways to 

achieve representation. 

Senator KAINE. And again, I was not sure I completely understood this, until your testimony, but it is important for us to grapple with it, make sure I get this right. 

The progress of the Bilateral Security Agreement has a direct 

impact also on the promises of economic aid by the—you know, the 

70-plus nations that have been part of it. It may not be the same 

document, but the absence of a Bilateral Security Agreement is 

going to cause serious concern by any party that is thinking, on the 

international level, about putting economic aid into Afghanistan. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think there is a couple of impacts. And, 

again, I will ask Larry to elaborate. But, you know, one is that if 

we do not have troops, we will not have diplomatic representation. 

It is conceivable, under the worse of circumstances, that we could 

not even have an embassy if the country really does, you know, 

descend into serious civil conflict. I mean, we left in 1989. We 

might face a situation, particularly post-Benghazi, when the risk 

tolerance is so low, where you would face a very difficult dilemma. 

But, let us not go there, for the moment. 

Even if you had an embassy, the embassy would largely be 

Kabul-centric. You would not be able to get out into the provinces. 

And so, your ability to oversee and assure that Congress and other 

Parliaments that the money was being properly spent would be 

somewhat circumscribed in a no-BSA world. 

But, secondly, you know, you can make an intellectual case that, 

even with no troops, you should still have the same amount of nonmilitary assistance, maybe even more. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. But, you tell me. My judgment is: no 

troops, no aid, or almost no aid, that the political support for the 

aid comes from the military presence. The people see, ‘‘This is 

important.’’ We have got, you know, 5–10,000 troops, whatever it 

is. ‘‘This must still be an important place, and that is why we have 

a big aid program.’’ If we do not have any troops, I think it is going 

to be much more difficult, also, for you to justify and secure the 

number of votes that will be needed for the civilian aid program. 

But, you know this more than I do. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Sampler. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, I have the benefit of executing, within a policy envelope dictated by Ambassador Dobbins and Ambassador 

Cunningham and, of course, the Congress and the President, within that envelope, if there were no BSA and there were a decision 

to continue the program, it would be incredibly challenging. USAID 

staff around the world are devoted to doing the best they can for 

people in desperate situations, but it requires some measure of 

access, and it requires some measure of, not just physical access, 

but political freedom to maneuver. And I think not having a BSA— 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

and I am just speculating, but—we would lose that freedom to maneuver, so it would be incredibly challenging to try to implement 

programs in that environment. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chair—but, one last thing I would just like to put on 

the table. This is really out of an Armed Services perspective, than 

Foreign Relations, but it ties, that we are dealing, right now, with 

whether we will be able to pass an NDAA, National Defense 

Authorizing Act, by the end of 2013. And one of the reasons we 

need to is, there are some expiring authorities in that act, that expire on December 31, that, if we do not act before the end of the 

year—two, in particular, touch on Afghanistan; there are some others that touch on it more generally—but, there is currently programmed into the Defense appropriation spending for reintegration 

activities in Afghanistan to reintegrate former Taliban and other 

members back into civil society. That is funded, but that funding 

expires on December 31 unless we pass an NDAA. And, similarly, 

any military member that is engaged in hostile fire is entitled to 

hazardous pay, under the current appropriations bill. That authority expires on December 31 if we do not pass an NDAA, and that 

could affect us, as well. 

So, these are important issues, just in the FRC status, but there 

is also another item on the table right now in the Senate that has 

a significant bearing upon the kind of stability activities that we 

want, going forward. And so, it is my hope that the body will act 

with dispatch on that NDAA, as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Let me ask you two final questions. We have touched, here, in 

various iterations, on the election process, which is, I think, very 

important for the future of Afghanistan. And everyone who I speak 

to tells me that security is their major concern, or the highest concern with reference to the elections. What can be done to address 

the issue of ghost polling stations in insecure areas? And what 

about the issue of security for women’s polling stations, which 

could hinder the ability of Afghan women to vote? Could insufficient security at polling stations impact the legitimacy of this election for the Afghan people? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I had a briefing on election preparations, 

from ISAF when I was there last Thursday, and they were pretty 

positive about the degree to which the Afghans are taking responsibility for this, are coordinating effectively. They are engaged—the 

Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior are engaged, at quite 

high levels, with the president of the Election Commission. The 

president of the Election Commission is clearly in charge and not 

hesitant about exercising that authority. ISAF will, of course, be 

prepared, within its limited capabilities. I think we will have about 

34,000 troops there—ISAF troops there. I guess that is—the figure 

is American troops in—when the election takes place, in April—to 

provide some of the assets that will be needed—helicopter lift and 

a few other things. 

They have plans to secure all the polling stations, different levels 

of commitment, in terms of police and soldiers for each polling station, depending on the level of threat. I think there are three or 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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four districts where they have decided they are simply not going 

to be able to have polling stations. These tend to be quite unpopulated areas, lightly populated areas. They seem to be pretty confident that they are going to be able to conduct the election in the 

vast majority of the country. 

Larry. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Yes, Senator, the important metric to keep in 

mind, too, is Afghan expectations. I mean, the Afghans understand 

the problems with women polling stations much better than we do. 

And I think, basing on the 2004 and then the 2009 elections, we 

are on track to meet the Afghan expectations. 

That is not to say that we are taking this problem for granted. 

While I cannot assure you that it will be resolved completely, I can 

assure you that the U.S. Government and the international community are devoting significant resources specifically to empowering women in these elections—as I mentioned in my remarks, 

focusing on ways for women to network and campaign together, 

focusing on training women searchers, women polling-station 

observers, and women polling-station workers. Those are things 

that, through the United Nations Development Programme Election Assistance Team and through the Independent Election Commission, we actually think we will be better off this year than we 

have been in previous elections. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am glad to hear that last statement, 

because I appreciate the nature and understanding of the Afghan 

expectation, but I would hope that our expectation would be, to the 

extent feasible, as high as possible, and that we would be working 

toward that. 

Mr. SAMPLER. No, Senator, it certainly is. When I mentioned 

resources we have devoted to this, what I meant was that the bar 

that we would accept and that the international community would 

accept is probably not going to be reached, but that gives us something to strive for so that the resources and the efforts we are putting into it will show some sign of success. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask two final questions, then, concerning 

women, a topic on which we have had a fair amount of discussion 

here. We have cited all of the great forward movement, which we 

should all be thankful for and supportive of, but it seems to me 

that we have seen some backsliding in this regard, particularly 

when I see the lower House of the Afghan Parliament trying to 

weaken the landmark Elimination of Violence Against Women law, 

and the U.N. releasing a report which indicated that only 7 percent 

of registered incidents of violent crimes against women went 

through a judicial process using that law. So, what steps does the 

Department intend to make to relay to the Afghan Government 

that we are looking for a vigorous implementation of the law, post2014? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we, of course, work directly with the 

Parliament on legislation of this matter, and bring our concerns 

directly to the attention of individual parliamentarians. I believe 

that they have not succeeded in weakening the law you talked 

about, at this point, although the threat to do so is there, and it 

is still, as I recall, enforced by decree rather than by legislation. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, even without passing the weakened legislation, the fact is that only 7 percent of violent crime goes through 

a process envisioned by the law. I am just wondering—you know, 

laws are great but not unless we actually enforce them. So I hope 

that, with all the resources and efforts we are putting in here, that 

we are making it clear, as part of our continuing relationship, that 

the enforcement of the law is critically important. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right, absolutely. And clearly we have 

programs designed to support both the effectiveness of the police 

and judiciary, in general, as well as in this specific area. I do not 

know what proportion of violent crimes, in general, end up going 

through the judiciary in Afghanistan. It may not be any higher 

than the figure you cited for—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would be interested in getting feedback 

from you on that. 

Finally, for Mr. Sampler, I understand that AID uses third-party 

monitoring techniques in many countries in the world, and sometimes they are the primary means of evaluating a program. But, 

given the environment in Afghanistan, there is a lot of skepticism 

about relying on third-party monitoring. Can you discuss, to what 

extent you are using that type of monitoring and evaluation in Afghanistan, how they are being implemented, and—I think this is 

an area that the SIGAR suggested there will be an audit of. So, I 

would like to get a preview of that before I see the SIGAR’s report. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Certainly, Senator. Would you mind if I added 

something onto the Violence Against Women issue before I enter 

into that? 

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. 

Mr. SAMPLER. The Elimination of Violence Against Women law 

is one of the key elements of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability 

Framework. That is a multilateral international donor commitment 

to the Government of Afghanistan that, as they demonstrate 

progress on several hard deliverables, we would reciprocate and 

recognize that. The passage of the law and the reporting, by province, of violence against women, are two of the hard deliverables 

that they have not yet met. The United States, bilaterally, has 

attached incentive funding to those two actions, and there is money 

in the pot that will not go to the Government of Afghanistan unless 

and until they accomplish those. And in my last meeting with Minister of Finance Zakhilwal, he is very keen to see these funds 

released. And Finance Minister Zakhilwal agreed that he would 

begin to use his influence within the Government of Afghanistan 

to help these things move forward. And what it does is, it gives the 

ministers and the Government of Afghanistan some political capital 

and an incentive to literally do things that are politically hard to 

do. So, we are focused on that, and we are making sure that the 

Afghans understand our insistence on progress. 

But, if I could note—I mean, again, having worked there since 

2002, I am thrilled that there is an elected Government in Afghanistan that is debating laws. We may not like, right now, where they 

are in the debate, but at least we now have partners that we can 

engage with in a normal Westphalian-sort-of-state way and to 

influence, because we did not have that for the longest time. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

With respect to your question about third-party monitoring, the 

first point that I would make is, unfortunately, third-party monitoring has entered the arena of public thought with a very heavy 

negative connotation. Third-party monitoring is what we do all 

over the world. I am an electrical engineer by training in university, and studied physics. I would not be able to go out to a health 

program in Afghanistan, for example, as a U.S. Government direct 

hire and provide USAID meaningful information on the successful 

implementation of that program. So, what we do, whether it is 

Afghanistan or Honduras or other hard places like Pakistan and 

South Sudan, is, we hire competent professionals who go and do 

that work for us. So, in every case around the world, I literally do 

not believe there is a single mission in the world that would not 

use some form of third-party monitoring. 

Having said that, Afghanistan is different, both with respect to 

scale of the problem, the complexity of the problem, and the security situation and the restricted movements, because what we do 

have in Honduras is the ability for a U.S. Government direct hire 

to jump in a car and ride out and kick the tires on a project. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. Well, I am not against all third-party 

monitoring. That is not what I suggested in my question. My—— 

Mr. SAMPLER. I am sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Question concerns, specifically, 

third-party monitoring as it relates to an environment such as 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. SAMPLER. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. To what degree are you doing it in Afghanistan, 

and what are the challenges you face, or are you doing more direct 

monitoring, without a third party, through AID? 

Mr. SAMPLER. No, what we have done is—our contract officers, 

who hold the warrant to approve or disprove payments, have to 

have a certain amount of information about the program. And how 

we provide them that information is, in Afghanistan, something of 

an adventure and something of a challenge. What we have come up 

with is multiple layers that provide that information. On the one 

hand, partners self-report; they have quarterly and even, some 

case, weekly reporting requirements. That information goes into 

USAID’s Afghanistan Info database. We hire third-party monitors, 

and we correlate the information that third-party monitors provide 

against that which the partners have provided. We have, in the 

past, used ISAF to go out and validate that a particular project is 

ongoing, and even to provide photographic evidence. We have used 

technology, such as overflights with photographs, of large agricultural projects. Flying a plane over and taking a photograph is the 

best way, sometimes, to measure progress. 

And then, for other programs, social programs, such as making 

sure that schoolteachers get paid out in these remote districts, we 

are using SMS technology, where we actually interrogate the SMS 

network of schoolteachers and say, ‘‘Did you get your paycheck?’’ 

And then we get feedback in that way from the teachers, themselves, saying they did or did not get paid. 

So, the answer to your question is, really, we are being innovative and creative in Afghanistan in ways we have not necessarily 

been forced to innovate or create in other countries, but we are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

devoted to making sure that that contracting officer, who, to put 

you in his or her shoes, is probably a 28- to 34-year-old young professional with USAID with enormous responsibility to say, ‘‘Pay the 

bill’’ or ‘‘Do not pay the bill.’’ We want them to have all the information they need. And if ever a contract officer raises her hand or 

his hand and says, ‘‘Wait a minute, I am not confident that I have 

got what I need,’’ we stop that program. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am going to cease here, but my concern 

is, for us to continue to be supportive of the type of money that we 

are pumping into a country like Afghanistan, with all the challenges we have already talked about, we are going to need to have 

some sense of our ability to assess what we are succeeding at, what 

our delivery system is doing, what the effects are, exactly. Because 

when we have to respond to the American taxpayer, they are going 

to want to know. And inevitably, when we get into an area— 

although I think AID does a pretty good job across the spectrum 

beyond Afghanistan—but, inevitably, when we read a story from a 

report like the SIGAR’s, that suggests that we are just missing the 

ball—and I am saying we will see that—it is a real consequence to 

the policy opportunities here, so that is why I actually want to pursue this different hearing in a broader context with AID, in general. I am a big supporter of AID, but we also have to have 

accountability to be able to continue to have that flow of support, 

whether in Afghanistan or beyond. 

Now, I have gotten my questions in that I wanted to ask, and 

I have bought time for Senator Flake to get here. So, with that— 

oh, and Senator McCain—and so, with that, Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. All right, thank you. 

I appreciate the testimony. I am sorry I was not here to hear it, 

but I have reviewed some of it. 

Ambassador Dobbins, you have talked about, in your testimony, 

that Russia and China, India, and Pakistan have all personally 

urged Karzai to conclude the BSA, because they recognize that 

instability is not to their benefit, either. What assistance are those 

countries planning to provide over the course of the agreement, 

over the next 10 years? Are we the only ones on the hook for assistance, moving ahead, both military and economic and otherwise? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, Senator. I mean, they vary. In terms 

of assistance levels, India has a pretty substantial assistance program, substantial for, itself, a developing country. China has some 

significant investments in Afghanistan. There are about 70 countries that are part of either the ISAF coalition or—such as Japan, 

for instance—provide significant economic assistance. And, as I 

said in—earlier—one of the reasons that we believe that the Bilateral Security Agreement needs to be concluded as soon as possible 

is so that that coalition, a really substantial coalition of substantial 

countries who are making substantial commitments, commitments 

to pay the Afghan Armed Forces—I think we anticipate that about 

20 percent would come from other allies—it does not begin to deteriorate, that countries do not begin dropping out, that they do not 

use the excuse that, ‘‘The Afghans do not seem to want us, the 

Afghan President seems ambivalent about whether we should 

stay,’’ to not fulfill commitments that they have made over the 

years, and not to continue to participate. But, Larry can probably 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

tell you what proportion of economic assistance comes from nonAmerican countries, but if you include the international financial 

institutions, I think we are well less than half. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Well, Mr. Sampler, let me kind of go 

along that route. Ten years from now, why should we have any 

more confidence that the economy will be able to sustain the government any more than it is now? I realize you need security, and 

we know those arguments, certainly. But, when you look at 

Afghanistan right now, you are hard-pressed to look at an area or 

a sector of the economy that will step up, in the next 10 years, to 

actually replace some of the revenue that we are providing now. 

Why should we feel any differently? 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, I will give you two examples, a specific 

and more general. 

The specific example is the proliferation of small and medium 

enterprises in Afghanistan. And I wish I could take full credit for 

this, but I have to say, this is just ordinary decent capitalistic 

activity. As the population in Afghanistan becomes more educated, 

and as they move from the rural to the urban centers, there are 

markets that were not there before. And it has been our experience 

that small and medium enterprises generate a lot of the economic 

activity that will sustain GDP. 

And there are sectors in Afghanistan, if we could take you to 

Herat, where the mining industry is actually doing quite well, and 

Herati marble now is being exported to Italy; up in Mazar-e Sharif, 

there are value chains around some of the agricultural sectors, that 

the north has a strength in, that they are preparing and then 

shipping, to the Central Asian states, some of their agricultural 

products. 

The general answer I will give you is: we, just last month, 

launched a new program, called the Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Program, and it is focusing on generating trade by working 

in the region, not just in Afghanistan—to your point, Mr. Chairman, about regional integration—it works in the region to lower 

real and perceived tariffs to regional trade. So, we are trying to 

find ways for Afghans, not just to export their apples to Pakistan, 

where they turn them into juice and ship them back, but to help 

the Afghans build a value chain so that they are packaging their 

own juice and then shipping it across the region. It also has a component which is increasing revenue, and that is to help the customs 

officials at the borders and the Government of Afghanistan collect 

the revenues and then put them into their coffers. 

And one of the points that I focus on with Minister Zakhilwal: 

If Afghanistan is able to achieve WTO accession in the next couple 

of years—and this program will support that—WTO accession has, 

historically, in the situation of countries like Afghanistan, generated a 4- to 5-percent increase in GDP for the first 5 years, so 

a net gain of GDP of 20 percent before it flattens out. That will not 

completely make up for the GDP that has been lost by the military 

drawdown, but it will help to offset it, and it will put Afghanistan 

back on a more stable glidepath of what we would consider a 

transitioning or developing country. 

Senator FLAKE. All due respect, that was—you are talking 

about—and I have been there, and I recognize some of that is going 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

on—that is on the very margins, in terms of what is going to be 

needed to sustain government. And it is a pretty bleak picture, in 

my view. 

We did a study, when I was in the House on one of the committees, about the trucking contracts that are currently in force, moving goods between military bases, and we contract with local 

Afghans to do that. I think, at least count, that was about 20 percent of the Afghan economy, just trucking contracts that we are 

paying for to move goods around. 

When that goes away, it just tells you how much—it is an indication to me of how much the economy just relies so much by our 

presence. And that is why it is still so startling that Karzai is resisting this BSA. So, I do not pretend to understand that, but I just 

think we have spent a lot of money there, obviously—$683 billion, 

total, in Afghanistan, and in military and economic aid, and that 

for a promise that some of this might hold up after we withdraw. 

It is a tough pill to swallow for those of us who are going to be 

asked to authorize and appropriate additional funding over the 

next 10 years. And so, I just want some sense of why we should 

think that, 10 years from now, we will be in a better position than 

we are right now, and if—or we will be having this same argument, 

10 years from now, and being asked to extend another agreement 

that will provide a lot more funding. Can you give me any more 

comfort than—— 

Mr. SAMPLER. Senator, I mean, 10 years is a good lens. I mean, 

I think, 10 years from now, we will begin to see some return on 

the investments in the mineral wealth of Afghanistan. That is 

something that has a fairly long development period. As Ambassador Dobbins was saying, one of the consequences of the hedging 

that goes on in Afghanistan because of the lack of a BSA and the 

lack of clarity, going forward, is the development of the tenders, 

and the development of the ministerial capacity to let tenders for 

the mineral wealth of Afghanistan, is challenged. But, if we can get 

those tenders out, then 7 to 8 to 10 years after those tenders are 

let, Afghanistan should be able to see a return on that investment. 

Afghanistan is not, in 10 years, going to be a Sweden; we are 

hoping for a Bangladesh. The focus is on the lines of governance 

that will allow Afghanistan, in modest ways, to incrementally 

improve. And 10 years is a good first step. Development workers 

typically think it takes 10 years to get to the next stage of development. So, I do not mean to be overly optimistic, but, when I work 

with my staff, one of our founding principles is that Afghanistan 

will survive; what it will look like 10 years from now is largely up 

to the Afghans to determine, and we want to make sure that we 

are giving them the kinds of assistance and the kinds of technical 

support that they need, that that is as positive a scenario as it can 

be in 10 years. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Let me just add—— 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Ambassador DOBBINS [continuing]. Briefly, Senator, that a lot 

will depend on, you know, whether Afghanistan faces the same 

security challenge 10 years from now that it faces today. The 

largest driver of the Afghan budget is the security costs, and the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

largest focus of American assistance is helping pay some of those 

security costs. 

We do have programs across the region to increase regional integration. To the extent these countries become tied together economically—and they are becoming tied together more economically—their incentives to interfere, to allow their territory to be 

used to destabilize Afghanistan, which has always been the weakest country of the region, the one most susceptible to outside interference—will diminish and Afghanistan will face less of a security 

challenge. 

Probably more than anything else, this will depend on whether 

Pakistan, over the next decade, is able to gain control of its own 

territory, particularly its border regions, and stop allowing that territory to be used to destabilize Afghanistan. 

If those things happen—and I think 10 years is a period during 

which it is reasonable to hope they will happen, it is reasonable to 

plan on them happening—then I think Afghanistan’s capacity to 

otherwise fund its own government operations may be—you know, 

it may be—they may be capable, within their own resources, at 

that point. 

Senator FLAKE. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the 

witnesses. 

If I heard your last comment right, you think that they will be 

able to fund their own government and functions of government, 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Within a decade? 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Assuming that they are not facing an 

insurgency; yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is not about 95 percent of their economy, right 

now, USAID assistance funding? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well no, it is not that high. It is certainly 

significant; and it is not just United States, of course. 

Senator MCCAIN. Of course. But, it is foreign aid, it is not their 

own economy. Where do they rank—where does Afghanistan rank 

in the world estimate of corruption? I believe it is at the bottom. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. It is. Well, I think there are two other 

countries, but yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Two other countries. I understand and have 

paid close attention to the problem we have with President Karzai 

on the signing of the BCA—excuse me—the strategic—the BSA. 

Have we announced what size of the force we are going to leave 

behind, yet? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No. We had intended, assuming that the 

BSA was concluded this year, to announce that early next year. 

Senator MCCAIN. Why would we not want to define, for the 

Afghan people and maybe for the Congress, what those roles and 

missions would be for 2014 and even beyond, so that they would 

know, maybe Congress might want to know? And are we not seeing 

a repeat of what happened in Iraq? And your and my version of 

what happened in Iraq may differ. But, since I was there on the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35 

ground, I will challenge any other interpretation than what happened with Senator Graham and Senator Lieberman and I when 

Maliki had agreed to have a U.S. troop presence, and we never, 

ever gave them a decent number until, in the words of General 

Dempsey, it cascaded down to 3,500, and then the Iraqis decided 

it was not worth it, and now we are seeing everything unravel in 

Iraq. Why in the world would we not tell the Afghans and the 

American people what size of residual force we want there and 

what their roles and missions would be? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think that is a good point, Senator. 

I am not suggesting we should not. Frankly, President Karzai’s 

unwillingness to sign an agreement that he—the text of which is 

fully agreed, and which he asked the Loya Jirga to endorse, is a 

new problem. In other words, we did not anticipate that he was 

going to ask the Loya Jirga to endorse this and then, at the conclusion of that meeting, announce that he was not going to sign it 

until the end of his term of office. So, we are grappling with that. 

Our assumption had been that this was, in fact, going to be signed 

by the end of the year, at which point, within a few weeks, we 

could make the announcement you have suggested. We are now 

grappling with the uncertainty, the possibility that it may take a 

lot longer to get this agreement concluded. As I said in my opening 

testimony, I believe, based on my own visit there, that there is no 

serious doubt that the Afghan people do want us and that we will 

eventually get a BSA, but we may not get it within the timeframe 

we anticipate, in which case, we will have to face exactly the issue 

that you have raised, and make a decision. 

Senator MCCAIN. We should face the issue before, so that the 

Afghan people know what our commitment is, Ambassador. And, 

by not doing so, you are making a very, very serious mistake and 

a repeat of the movie we saw in Iraq. And so, I understand why, 

to some degree—not very much, but to some degree—why President Karzai is waffling around. Because he does not know what our 

commitment is. And why we will not announce what our commitment would be is—defies imagination. And there are many of us 

that know that if you get below a certain number, then that force 

spends its time defending itself. And for months and months and 

months, some of us have been arguing strenuously, say, ‘‘Tell them 

what our commitment is. Tell them what the roles and missions 

are,’’ and maybe Karzai will not be quite as paranoid as he is 

today. 

So, I blame Karzai for a lot of it, but I can also, from his viewpoint, see that, since we have not even told him what our commitment and roles and missions are, that he would be, at least to some 

degree, uncertain of the degree of our commitment. 

Is it true that Karzai recently agreed to a long-term friendship 

and cooperation plan with the Iranian Government? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, let me address the first part of your 

question first, and then I will come to that. 

I do not know that you and I have any disagreement on the utility of announcing the size and scope of our presence. So, I am not 

taking issue with you on—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Then one would wonder why the administration has not. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

Ambassador DOBBINS. What I would say is that President Karzai 

has shown absolutely no interest in the size of the forces, or indeed 

the scale of our aid budget. He—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, he shows an interest, in my conversations 

with him. He showed one that we wanted to know, in my conversations with him. Maybe he has not with you, but he certainly has 

with me. But, go ahead. 

Ambassador DOBBINS [continuing]. He certainly knows—I mean, 

the Bilateral Security Agreement defines, in excruciating detail, 

the functions that our forces would undertake. What he does not 

know, but has not pressed us on, is the exact scale of that commitment; that is, how many troops would be involved. So, I can attribute a number of explanations to his behavior; some are consistent with what he has said, some are just speculation. I do not 

think that our failure to specify a number actually is a factor in 

his decisionmaking, which is not to say that I disagree with your 

more general point on that. 

On the Iran—what—as I understand it—all he and the Iranians 

have agreed is that they should negotiate such an agreement, 

which has yet to be—there is not even a text of it, in other words. 

I mean, it is just, ‘‘Yes, let us negotiate such an agreement.’’ He 

has negotiated these with a number of the neighbors. He visits 

Tehran once or twice a year, ever since he came into office. He is 

going on to visit India, a much more important relationship for 

him, in 3 days. He is visiting Turkey shortly thereafter. So, as I 

said earlier in the testimony, although I am not particularly happy 

about this, I would not attach too much importance to it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. 

And, Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me—you may have 

already said it, responded—the status of negotiations with the 

Taliban? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. There is nothing, really, new to report. I 

said that President Karzai has articulated two conditions for signing the BSA, both of which seem, to us, to be somewhat unrealistic. 

One is that we somehow produce a formal, open, publicly acknowledged Afghan Government/Taliban peace process before the BSA 

has concluded, to which I have responded that I do not see that the 

Taliban have much incentive to facilitate signature of the BSA, and 

so I was not sure that articulating that linkage advanced his 

desire; nor was it, in my judgment, likely that we would be able 

to do that in the few months that remain before the elections, although we support, in principle and in practice, a reconciliation 

process, and have spent several years trying to persuade the 

Taliban to talk to the Afghan Government. And so, we are perfectly 

prepared to continue. 

He has also asked for a cessation of all U.S. and NATO military 

operations involving the entry into Afghan homes, even when 

accompanied by Afghan forces, and even when led by Afghan 

forces, which, you know, almost amounts to a cease-fire, you know, 

a one-sided cease-fire, in terms of the effort to deal with this ongoing threat. Now, we have provided assurances, in the BSA and in 

a separate assurance from President Obama, that we will take seriously the sanctity of Afghan homes, as we do homes in the United 

States, that we recognize the importance of both privacy and safety 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

in one’s home. And we are prepared to continue to do that, and to 

intensify it in the future. But, so far, that has not satisfied him. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Thank you both for your service. 

Pakistan. As we draw down in Afghanistan, what pressures 

could that put on Pakistan, in terms of instability or breeding 

grounds for insurgent groups? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think a lot will depend on how this goes. 

I mean, if it goes as we hope it will go, with a continued American 

and NATO military commitment, with continued substantial assistance to Afghanistan, and—on the one hand—and, on the other 

hand, continued improvement in the Pakistan/Afghan relationship—and there has been a marked improvement over the last 2 

or 3 months—then I think it will become somewhat easier for Pakistan to begin to stabilize its own border regions. 

You can easily have a different analysis, in which we withdraw 

more comprehensively, there is less or none of a NATO military 

advise-and-assist presence, international assistance begins to 

diminish, all of Afghanistan’s neighbors, not just Pakistan, begin 

the typical hedging behavior of all—looking for factions to support, 

and the factions, the warlords, the regional commanders, the 

powerbrokers, begin to maneuver, not within a constitutional system of checks and balances and—you go into opposition but you get 

a chance to come back 4 years from now, but in a much more— 

you know, a much more brutal arena. Under those situations, I 

think it is quite possible that the border regions of Afghanistan 

would begin to be even more of a safe haven for anti-Pakistani terrorists than they already are. And, of course, the regions of Pakistan become an even greater safe haven for terrorists and extremists that want to—— 

Senator MARKEY. And so, are we taking steps to ensure that 

there is security along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as we 

begin to draw down? What are those steps—are there contingency 

plans that we are putting together? And I would add that there 

could be a refugee exodus out of Afghanistan into Pakistan that 

could have a destabilizing impact, as well. Could you deal with 

those issues relating to security along the border? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. The—I mean, our primary method of dealing this, for the moment, is to try to conclude the Bilateral Security 

Agreement, provide the Afghans an assurance that the international commitment is going to be sustained beyond 2014, and to 

be able to conduct an election campaign and the selection of a new 

President within a security blanket, if you will, that the future is 

not going to be turned to the 1990s, but is going to be continuity 

of the progress that they have made over the last decade. 

We do not want to see an outflow of refugees. Millions have come 

back over the last decade, and we do not want to see that flow 

reversed. 

We have worked carefully with the new Pakistan Government to 

try to promote better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Part of what Pakistan is proposing is a much more substantial 

cooperative border regime. The Afghans, of course, do not accept it 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

as a legitimate border, but essentially a regime, along that line, 

which would better regulate the some-60,000 people who go back 

and forth every day across that line. The Pakistanis seem serious 

about moving toward a more substantial regime, more checkpoints, 

more biometric data to make sure you know who is moving back 

and forth, that kind of thing. It is going to take time to put those 

kinds of things in place, but they have at least agreed to begin 

talking about that. 

Clearly, our ability to directly impact security on the border is 

going to be somewhat diminished as our own forces go down, but 

part of the residual force we are talking about is a small counterterrorism force which would operate almost exclusively partnered 

with Afghan forces and would be directed very much at the insecurity and militancy that grows up in the border region. 

Senator MARKEY. If I can move over to Iran—again, in this meeting with Rouhani and Karzai, reportedly they talked about an economic, security, and political strengthening of their relationship. 

Especially as we pull back, it does create opportunities for Iran to 

move in. 

What is it that you are concerned about, if anything, in a relationship between Iran and Afghanistan becoming closer? Where 

might our interests actually coincide with Iran—and where might 

they diverge with Iran, in terms of what their objectives might be 

in the next several years? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, that is a good question. I mean, Iran 

has always had a pretty substantial aid program for Afghanistan. 

I remember, in the first Donor Conference, in 2002, the Iranian 

commitment was actually larger than the American commitment. 

They have also had a positive relationship with Karzai, even under 

the worst of the Iranian governments. They, on the other hand, 

have also provided arms and money to the Taliban—in small measure, nothing like what flows from the Pakistan side. But, they have 

played both sides of the fence. 

They collaborated with the United States, back in 2001, after 

9/11, because they did not like the Taliban. They almost went to 

war with the Taliban. The Taliban were suppressing the Shia minority in Afghanistan. They had something like 4 million refugees 

that they wanted to go back into Afghanistan; I think about 2 million of them have gone back, so far. And they have a big drug problem flowing out of Afghanistan. So, the driver of their continuing 

to flirt with the Taliban is that it is a way of demonstrating to the 

United States that they would have avenues to make our life miserable if we got into a military conflict with them. If that becomes 

less difficult, their interests in Afghanistan are likely to coincide 

more with ours. 

Senator MARKEY. And has Iran in any way tried to undermine 

this bilateral security agreement? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

Senator MARKEY. They have. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. They have argued against it. And they are 

the only country that argues—— 

Senator MARKEY. And they are arguing against it because—what 

would be their response to it, if it is finalized? And how do we expect them to respond to an agreement that they do not agree with? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Ambassador DOBBINS. They will live with it if it gets—if and 

when; because I think it will be concluded—their argument against 

it is, they are against foreign troops in the region. They had the 

same position with respect to Iraq, of course. And indeed, they wish 

U.S. troops would leave the Persian Gulf. So, it is not exclusive to 

Afghanistan. And the obvious reason is, they do not want to be susceptible to American pressures on any of their borders. They probably exaggerate the degree to which Afghan bases are important to 

us for that particular purpose. 

So, on the other hand, you know, as I have said, they have 

always had a positive relationship with Karzai, a significant aid 

program. Karzai goes there once or twice a year. He has bilateral 

agreements, of the sort he is probably talking about with Iran, with 

a number of other countries of the region. So, I do not know that 

this is a particular break from the pattern of Karzai’s relations 

with Iran. And, of course, we are not leaving unless we are forced 

to. We intend to stay and have a significant relationship, including 

a significant defense relationship with Afghanistan for a number of 

years to come. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio will be the final member for questions. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. And I will be brief. I know most of 

these questions have been asked and answered. 

Just as an aside, I get a lot of questions from constituents. They 

read the news about Karzai’s behavior, they see the sacrifices that 

Americans have made to bring freedom and stability to Afghanistan, and they ask, ‘‘Why are we involved? Why don’t we just pick 

up and go?’’ I think you have probably answered this question, certainly in your opening statement, but just to confirm it. 

If the United States were to pursue the zero option, completely 

withdraw, or even if we were to withdraw, potentially, to a level 

below a certain number, would it be safe to say that, between 18 

and 24 months, we would see, potentially, all-out civil war and perhaps even the return of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to Afghanistan? 

Is that a fair statement? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that would be a real risk. I think 

Afghanistan has come a long way. Its armed forces have come a 

long way, but they continue to be dependent on the United States 

and United States allies for training, advice, assistance, some enabling capabilities, and, in particular, for financing. And Afghanistan, as a whole, is a weak state surrounded by more powerful 

states. If those states perceived that the international community 

was eliminating or reducing dramatically its commitment to 

Afghanistan, they would begin to change their own behavior. At 

the moment—with the exception of Iran—Russia, India, Pakistan, 

and China have all argued with Karzai that he ought to sign the 

BSA. 

So, at the moment, we have the international—the regional consensus is reinforcing stability in Afghanistan. That could change. 

Afghans would become more uncertain, more anxious. In those 

kinds of situations, societies generally polarize around powerful figures, around ethnic leaders, warlords, military commanders, people 

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who they think can protect them, and you would begin to see the 

kind of fragmentation that are you are seeing already in Iraq. 

Senator RUBIO. But, so far, it has not been signed. We have 

given them—the administration’s position is, if it is not signed by 

the end of 2013, they will have to begin planning for the zero 

option. If, in fact, Karzai does not sign, or decides to leave it for 

the next President to sign, what are our options, at that point, if, 

in fact, it is not signed or agreed to by either Karzai or his successor? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, you know, I think—and, I think, in 

answering your constituents, you should argue that we cannot let 

one man be the bellwether for Afghanistan’s attitudes toward the 

United States or desire to have us continue the commitment. It is 

clear, after the Loya Jirga in which 2,500 influential Afghans from 

all over the country strongly and overwhelmingly endorsed conclusion of the Bilateral Security Agreement and asked to be concluded 

by the end of the year, that there is no serious doubt that the 

Afghans want us to stay. Having just come back from a visit there 

last week, I do not think there is any serious doubt that a bilateral 

securement will eventually be concluded. There are a lot of costs 

for delaying it until next summer, for instance, and we are not advocating that. We are, in fact, underlining the risks and the costs 

of delay, in terms of diminished international support and increased anxiety and fragmentation among the Afghan people. 

We have said that, in the absence of an agreement by the end 

of the year, we will have to begin planning for not having an agreement. But, as I said in my written testimony, plans are not decisions, and we are not about to make a decision—— 

Senator RUBIO. Well, Secretary Kerry has said that someone 

other than Karzai could sign on behalf of the Afghans. Is this the 

current position of the administration? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Say that again, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. Secretary Kerry has said that someone other 

than Karzai could, potentially, sign on behalf of the Afghans. Is 

that him speculating or is that the official position of the administration? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes, I think that may have been overinterpreted. Of course, Karzai can designate anybody he wants to sign 

the agreement. We routinely have our Ambassadors sign these 

agreements, or our Secretary of State. If Karzai did not want to 

personally sign it, he could ask somebody else, but it could only be 

signed under his authority and at his direction, as long as he is 

President. 

So, as I said, I think it will eventually be concluded, but there 

will be a cost to delaying. And the cost will be a cost to the Afghan 

people. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, my last question is—and this was asked by 

Senator McCain, about the prospects of talks with the Taliban. I 

know that is one of the conditions that Karzai has now raised. Do 

we have an official list of assurances that we are asking for before 

we would even consider resuming talks with the Taliban? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. We have no preconditions for talks with 

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tions are that they have to lay down their arms, accept the Afghan 

Constitution. So, you know, we, in June of this year, were about 

to open talks with the Taliban, and we would be prepared to do so 

again, but only if they are paralleled by a negotiation between the 

Taliban and the Afghan Government. I mean, we are not going to 

try to negotiate peace in Afghanistan. That is something the 

Afghans have to do. And the Taliban have refused to engage the 

Afghan Government. And as long as they continue that stance, it 

is hard to make much progress. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. I think 

it is probably the judgment or views of, if not all, then the majority 

of the members of the committee, that the sooner that President 

Karzai executes this agreement, the better his standing will be in 

the Senate, as well as the better our ability to help Afghanistan 

enter its new chapter with success. And I hope that, if those 70 

or whatever number of stations in Afghanistan have been reviewing or will report on this hearing, that they take away that message. The administration seems to have an enormous amount of 

patience. I am not quite sure that the Senate does as well. 

So, I look forward to the execution of the agreement as quickly 

as possible, on behalf of the future Afghanistan, and the sacrifices 

that have been made by Americans, both in lives and national 

treasure. 

With the thanks of the committee for your testimony, the record 

will remain open until the close of business on Thursday, and this 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question #1. The November 2013 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report shows that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has reached a record high this 

year. Overall potential production of opium increased by 49 percent and 19 of the 

country’s 34 provinces are now poppy growers, two more than last year. 

The November 2013 ‘‘Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan’’ released by the Department of Defense was very critical of U.S. efforts 

to eradicate poppy, particularly the Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program, 

which provides development grants based on successful eradication efforts. 

Taken together, the DOD and UNODC reports reflect an apparent growing lack 

of will on the part of the Afghan Government to seriously address this issue, a paramount concern moving forward. There does not appear to be a serious effort by the 

Afghan Government to pursue drug traffickers, especially as we move into the transition year. 

♦ Please list the concrete results in counternarcotics programming that we realistically expect to achieve in 2014 and 2015? Please focus on the anticipated 

results of this programming, not program activities. 

Answer. We are disappointed that UNODC has reported that cultivation reached 

an all-time high in 2013. The U.S. Government has recently published its poppy cultivation and opium production estimates for 2013 and did not find that 2013 was 

a record year for cultivation. Rather, our estimates reflect a 10-percent increase in 

cultivation—or 198,000 hectares under cultivation in 2013. This of course is serious 

enough cause for concern. 

However, cultivation is not the only indicator of progress and commitment on 

counternarcotics. The Department of State, Department of Defense, and Drug 

Enforcement Agency have partnered with the Afghan Government in making strides 

in several key elements of the U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics strategies. Afghanistan now has an effective counternarcotics police force dedicated to interdicting drug 

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networks and arresting traffickers. The Afghan Government’s central counternarcotics court effectively processes hundreds of significant counternarcotics cases 

each year. Within the last 12 months, the court has convicted major narcotics criminals, including U.S.-designated drug kingpin Haji Lal Jan and sentenced him to 15 

years in prison. Through programs managed by the Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and USAID, Afghan farmers 

now have better access to resources for growing licit crops, rather than poppy. These 

are the types of results that we expect to see in 2014 and beyond, particularly with 

continued U.S. support for Afghan counternarcotics institutions. 

Our experience in other parts of the world has shown that counternarcotics is a 

long-term effort that requires a multifaceted approach, well integrated with broader 

efforts to support good governance and sustainable economic growth. Our focus has 

been, and will continue to be, to help the Afghan Government build institutions and 

the political will to take on the drug trade on its own. However, we cannot evaluate 

progress on the Afghan drug trade in a vacuum. There are other factors at play. 

We are working to develop a strong, licit economy that provides an alternative to 

the drug trade; to promote stable government institutions; and to cultivate an 

Afghan security force that can improve the security environment sufficiently to 

make drug cultivation and trafficking more difficult. These areas, along with dedicated counternarcotics efforts, will require continued U.S. support to reduce the supply of opium in the long term. 

Two points of clarification: the Governor-Led Eradication program supported by 

INL reimburses the expenses of poppy eradication that have been verified by the 

U.N.; it does not fund development projects. In addition the Good Performers Initiative provides funding for development projects in provinces that have achieved or 

maintained poppy-free status, have significantly reduced poppy cultivation, or have 

made significant counternarcotics efforts. 

Question #2. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned about 

Afghanistan’s ability to raise revenue in the future. For years, government revenue 

collection had steadily increased, but the World Bank reports an 11 percent decrease 

in nominal terms during the first half of 2013. In a recent report, the Bank blamed 

the shortfall on ‘‘leakages and weakness in administration, particularly in customs.’’ 

♦ What concrete measures is the State Department taking to improve the Afghan 

Government’s ability to collect revenue? 

Answer. We agree that Afghanistan’s future depends in large part on the ability 

of the Afghan Government to efficiently and transparently collect revenues to 

become more self-reliant. We have been tracking Afghan revenues very closely and 

using diplomacy along with assistance to help build a sustainable revenue base and 

ensure the country meets its revenue potential. Afghan revenue collection got off to 

a disappointing start in 2013, due to a number of factors, including the slowdown 

in economic growth, the collection of some 2013 taxes ‘‘in advance’’ during the 2012 

fiscal year, and corruption. Revenues rebounded somewhat over the summer and 

early fall after the Ministry of Finance introduced several reform measures, 

although the latest data shows that revenues through the first 9 months of 2013 

were still 7.4 percent below revenues from the prior year over the same period. 

These results illustrate uncertainty surrounding the ongoing security and upcoming 

political transitions, which has reduced investor confidence, dampened economic 

growth, and reportedly led more officials to engage in rent-seeking and corrupt 

behavior as they contemplate the possible loss of their government positions postelection. 

We and other donors anticipated the strain the transition would put on the 

Afghan economy and have designed and implemented a number of programs and 

initiatives to improve the prospects for Afghan revenue collection by focusing on 

more immediate means of revenue generation as well as longer term institutional 

changes that will promote sustainable growth, at the same time closing the space 

for corruption. We have focused on improving the performance of the current top 

revenue generating areas—taxes and customs fees—and initiated efforts to support 

the development of new sources of revenue including from extractives and a planned 

value added tax. Programmatically, USAID has begun implementing its new $78 

million Afghan Trade and Revenue (ATAR) project that will work directly with the 

Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance to improve customs and border procedures, use improved procedures and technology to reduce corruption, complete Afghanistan’s accession to the WTO, and build fiscal capacity. The 

Department of State and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative have also 

worked closely with the Afghan Government and are hopeful Afghanistan will be 

able to accede to the WTO in 2014. Based on the experience of other countries, we 

expect WTO accession will have a positive influence on GDP growth and translate 

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into increased revenue from business taxes and customs fees. Additionally, USAID 

will continue its ongoing project supporting electronic funds transfer that increases 

transparency and efficiency in the collection of taxes and fees, as well as the distribution of salaries and other uses of funds. USAID has been implementing a program in the extractives sector that will help the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 

and the private sector to develop the professional skills and transparent systems required to attract world-class investors to exploit Afghan natural resources and generate royalties and additional taxable economic activity. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul 

hosts the U.S. Customs and Border Protection-managed Border Management Task 

Force, which provides direct mentoring to Afghan border and customs officials at 

three land border crossing points, inland customs depots, international airports, 

both agencies’ headquarters, and in the National Customs Academy. The Embassy 

Borders Office helps to coordinate various U.S. and international agencies working 

in Afghanistan to improve border management. 

The Department is also using a number of diplomatic initiatives to help build a 

more sustainable revenue base. We and other donors are using the Tokyo Mutual 

Accountability Framework to encourage key economic reforms to support revenue, 

including compliance with the existing IMF Extended Credit Facility (which includes a revenue benchmark of 17 percent of GDP by 2025 and requires passage 

and implementation of new value-added tax legislation that is currently being considered by the Afghan Parliament), improved budget transparency, recovering additional embezzled assets from Kabul Bank, and other activities, which should encourage greater trade and investment flows. Afghanistan also explicitly acknowledged at 

the Tokyo Conference that the international community’s ability to sustain support 

for Afghanistan in the future depends on meaningful Afghan efforts to combat corruption. In addition, the Department of State has engaged with the Afghan Government and governments in neighboring countries to strengthen regional trade, transport, and energy networks that have the potential to add to Afghan revenues in the 

future. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has regular consultations with the Ministry of 

Finance at all levels to advise on revenue matters, help in planning for continuity 

through the transition, and resolve disputes in various taxation cases. 

Question #3. What is the organizational structure of SRAP? How many personnel 

work in SRAP and what are their specific roles? How does SRAP coordinate with 

the South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Bureau? 

Answer. SRAP was created in 2009 by former Secretary Clinton to lead diplomatic 

and development efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. SRAP reports directly to the 

Secretary and through him to the President. It is comprised of 22 personnel who 

form the core of a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach to policymaking and implementation. This core office includes direct hires from the State Department and other USG 

agencies, a representative from the German Foreign Ministry, and outside subject 

matter experts. 

In addition, the country offices for Afghanistan and Pakistan (about 20 personnel 

assigned to each office) and the Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad report to the 

Special Representative. Reflecting the broader regional context and intersection 

with U.S. relations with India and Central Asia, the Principal Deputy SRAP is 

‘‘dual-hatted’’ as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in SCA. SRAP and SCA coordinate 

closely on a range of regional issues including Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s relations with their neighbors. 

Question #4. In report # GAO–12–750, GAO made the following recommendation: 

To ensure that current and future assisted interagency acquisitions in support of 

State’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistent with regulatory requirements and guidance designed to improve the management and use of such acquisitions, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense should undertake a comprehensive review of all existing and proposed assisted interagency acquisitions in 

support of State’s missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify and implement 

corrective measures to bring the acquisitions into compliance and to strengthen 

management. 

Specifically, this should entail (1) the Department of State assessing the cost 

effectiveness and full range of requirements, which can be used to inform future 

best procurement approach determinations, (2) the Departments of State and 

Defense preparing and signing interagency acquisition agreements that address the 

elements established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, such as roles and responsibilities for contract management and oversight, and (3) the Department of State planning for sufficient personnel to perform contract oversight. 

♦ Please provide a status update on #1, #2, and #3. 

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Answer. (#1) State continues to host biweekly Transition (Contracting) Phase II 

Working Group teleconference calls between Department multibureau participants 

and Department of Defense (DOD) to address requirements and post-transition activity in Iraq. Additionally, State cochairs both the Afghanistan Executive Steering 

Groups (ESG) and the Afghanistan Transition Coordination Group (TCG) with DOD 

to jointly assess the current and future acquisitions activities for Afghanistan, and 

to ensure a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach. Through these groups, State and DOD 

are addressing the full range of requirements, exploring the most cost effective 

means for delivery, and working to deploy the appropriate interagency agreements 

to ensure compliance with regulatory guidance. State is also working with DOD to 

enhance the database at MAX.gov used to store information on joint Interagency 

Agreements. With regard to existing interagency acquisitions, State continues to 

work with DOD to identify where any required justifications do not exist and generate the required documentation in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 

and DOD FAR (DFAR) requirements. Future State/DOD collaborations would have 

the same documentation requirements. 

With regard to contract oversight, State has engaged DOD for more clarity on 

their procedures identifying the number of personnel required to manage DOD contracts in dangerous and constantly changing environments. State is keenly aware 

of the importance of providing contractor oversight and is currently considering a 

variety of methods to formulate the right number of properly trained Contracting 

Officer’s Representatives (COR) numbers—including the size of contractor staffing, 

location and/or function of the contract, a computation related directly to the dollar 

value of the contract, or perhaps a hybrid that takes into account each of these factors. In the case of both Iraq and Afghanistan, their approach to contractor oversight and staffing has been detailed in the Department of State Acquisition Human 

Capital Plan submitted to the Office of Budget and Management on March 31, 2013. 

(#2) State issued Procurement Information Bulletin (PIB) 2013–03 Acquisition 

Agreements on January 30, 2013, to fully align Department policy with current FAR 

and OMB requirements regarding interagency acquisition. 

(#3) State transferred to DOD $1,972,240 via a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request for Rock Island Contracting Command acquisition services on September 6, 2012. 

[The above responses to GAO–12–750 were transmitted to the Senate Committee 

on Foreign Relations on October 3, 2013, via letter signed by the Assistant Secretary 

for Legislative Affairs.] 

Question #5. In report # GAO–12–750, GAO made the following recommendation: 

To better inform future decisions regarding the use of assisted interagency acquisitions and to better manage and more consistently implement their use, the Secretary of State should revise the State First policy to fully align with current FAR 

and OMB requirements regarding interagency acquisitions. 

♦ Please provide a status update on this recommendation. 

Answer. The Department’s revised policy was issued as Procurement Information 

Bulletin (PIB) 2013–03 on January 30, 2013, to fully align policy with current FAR 

and OMB requirements regarding interagency acquisitions. 

[The above response to GAO–12–750 was transmitted to the Senate Committee 

on Foreign Relations on October 3, 2013, via letter signed by the Assistant Secretary 

for Legislative Affairs.] 

Question #6. In report # GAO–12–614, GAO made the following recommendation: 

To improve State’s ability to track progress of efforts in Pakistan to counter IEDs, 

the Secretary of State should direct the U.S. mission in Pakistan to enhance its 

counter-IED performance measures to cover the full range of U.S. assisted efforts. 

♦ Has State produced a strategic document that contains counter-IED performance measures in Pakistan? If so, could you please share this document with 

the committee? 

Answer. The Department is committed to countering the threat of improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and with DOD is leading 

a robust interagency effort aimed at disrupting the illicit network of IEDs and IED 

precursors. We agree with you on the importance of performance metrics as part of 

that effort and that, ultimately, the only metric that matters is the reduction of 

lives lost and affected by IEDs. We would be pleased to brief committee members 

or staff on the different performance measures that have been incorporated into our 

counter-IED efforts. 

The Department is prioritizing efforts to counter the threat of IEDs as part of the 

Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Working Group of the Strategic Dialogue 

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with Pakistan. Through its security assistance programs, the Department is providing equipment and training to Pakistan’s security services to improve their 

capacity to combat IEDs. The Department has also provided support for public information programming aimed at increasing the Pakistani public’s awareness and 

activism on the IED threat. The Department continues to work with Pakistan in 

close coordination with JIEDDO to implement its action plan for countering IEDs. 

We look forward to continued discussions with Congress on the progress and impact 

of these activities. 

Question #7. How many personnel currently work at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan? How many are full time State Department personnel and how many are contractors? How many are Third Country Nationals? 

How many personnel are assigned to U.S. diplomatic presences in Jalalabad, 

Herat, and Kandahar? Does the State Department have staff assigned elsewhere in 

the country? 

When does the State Department anticipate completing construction on new facilities at the Embassy compound in Kabul? How much will this construction cost? 

Answer. There are 785 U.S. direct hire civilian employees in Afghanistan, 420 of 

which are State Department. There are 3,812 civilian contractors associated with 

the mission: 1,976 are U.S. citizens; 495 are Afghans, and 1341 are Third Country 

Nationals. 

Currently, there are five diplomatic staff members assigned to Forward Operating 

Base Fenty at Jalalabad Airfield in Nangahar. The diplomatic staff in our consulate 

in Herat has been drawn down following the attack last spring; we have 13 diplomatic staff operating out of a temporary location at the Italian base in Herat (Camp 

Arena) while the consulate facility is being repaired. In Kandahar, we have 22 diplomatic staff colocated with the military on Regional Platform at Kandahar airfield. 

There are 67 other chief of mission civilians serving at 5 other locations outside of 

Kabul including our consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif. 

The multiyear Embassy construction project is expected to be completed in early 

2017. The cost of the project is estimated to be approximately $860 million. 

Question #8. As we discussed during the hearing, the U.N. recently released a report which indicated that only 7 percent of incidents of violent crimes against 

women went through a judicial process using the Elimination of Violence Against 

Women law. 

♦ What proportion of overall incidents of violent crime is prosecuted by the 

Afghan justice system? 

Answer. The lack of reliable data on the incidence and prosecution of crime 

throughout Afghanistan makes it difficult to compare prosecutions for crimes 

against women with prosecutions for violent crimes in general. The State Department is dedicated to supporting Afghan justice institutions in increasing the number 

of prosecutions for both violent crimes and crimes against women. The recently 

launched Case Management System (CMS), developed through Department of State 

funding and the only reliable data on nationwide prosecutions, has registered a total 

of 2,418 arrests for violent crime in the three provinces in which CMS is operational 

(Kabul, Herat, and Balkh). Of these cases, recorded from October 2012 to September 

2013, 1,443 led to prosecution, or 60 percent of reported violent crimes in those 

three provinces (nationwide rates are not available). In those same three provinces 

451 arrests were made pursuant to the Law on Elimination of Violence Against 

Women (EVAW) from January–December 2013. Of those, 274 went to prosecution, 

handled by Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Prosecution Units 

supported by the U.S. Government. This represents a 61-percent prosecution rate, 

nearly identical to the rate for all violent crimes. However, it should be noted that 

Kabul, Mazar, and Herat are all urban areas and that rates are almost certainly 

lower in rural areas. 

The figure cited in the U.N. report also needs to be understood in light of important differences between EVAW law cases and other violent crime cases prosecuted 

by the Afghan justice system. Under the EVAW law, a victim may withdraw her 

case at any stage of judicial prosecution and police/prosecutors may not pursue a 

case after this has occurred. Therefore, it is not that 7 percent of cases were prosecuted and 93 percent were mediated. A high number of cases end up being withdrawn by the victim. Although UNAMA notes this provision, it does not identify it 

as a possible contributing factor to the gap between registration and prosecution. 

It is also important to keep in mind that women often seek justice within their 

own communities through informal justice systems that have been in place throughout Afghan history. That said, criminal cases are supposed to be referred by the 

jirga/shura traditional dispute resolution bodies to the district courts. Statistics 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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could be low because women drop the case or fear being accused of ‘‘Zina,’’ or moral 

crimes themselves. It is likely that the majority of violent crimes against women 

have not been adjudicated in the formal system; however, we believe that the percentage has steadily increased over the past 10 years and continue to monitor the 

progress of EVAW prosecutions. The United States has, and will continue to, advocate for full implementation of the 2009 EVAW law. We will also remind Afghan 

leaders of their commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 

(TMAF) to implement EVAW. 

LETTER AND GAO REPORT SUBMITTED TO SUPPLEMENT

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NO. 4 AND NO. 5

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[The above letter and GAO report were also sent to: Bob Corker, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; Edward R. Royce, chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; Eliot L. Engel, Committee on Appropriations, House 

of Representatives; Barbara A. Mikulski, chairwoman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate; Richard C. Shelby, vice chairman, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. Senate; Harold D. Rogers, chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives; Nita M. Lowey, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; Darrell E. Issa, chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives; Elijah E. Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives; Thomas R. Carper, chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate; and, Tom 

Coburn, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.] 

RESPONSES OF DONALD L. SAMPLER, JR., TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MENENDEZ

Question #1A. Security of Aid workers.—Do recent attacks on aid workers indicate 

an emerging trend where these individuals, even for Afghan-led initiatives, are targeted by insurgents? 

Answer. The number of attacks against aid and humanitarian organizations in 

the past year has increased. Aid and humanitarian organizations operating in 

Afghanistan are funded from a broad range of U.S. and non-U.S. affiliated sources, 

including other foreign governments and private organizations, not all of whom 

report threats and attacks to the Embassy. However, attacks that are reported are 

recorded in the Aid Worker Security Database (https://aidworkersecurity.org/). 

According to this data base, 56 attacks were reported in 2012 and 79 reported in 

2013. 

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Question #1B. Have threats to USAID staff and partners increased over the past 

year? If yes, by how much? 

Answer. The number of threats against USAID and USAID implementing partners in the past year has increased by 23.4 percent. The Partner Liaison Security 

Office, USAID Afghanistan, tracks these incidents using the Afghanistan Infrastructure and Security Cartography System (AISCS). According to AISCS, 47 threats 

were reported in 2012 and 58 reported in 2013. 

Question #1C. If these threats have increased, does USAID have the adequate 

budget resources to address this growing threat environment? Is there a shortfall 

in funding? 

Answer. USAID implementing partners are responsible for providing security for 

their staff. There is no indication at present that the average cost of security for 

USAID implementing partners is increasing, but the security situation in Afghanistan is fluid; it can vary based on threat and location, and can change suddenly and 

often without warning. Security assessments (conducted by the Implementing Partner) are an ongoing process. Security costs are factored into partner proposals for 

USAID review. Historically, specific security costs for USAID partners vary from 

location to location and the type of project. Currently for partners utilizing the 

Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF), security costs average 6.2 percent of 

the total estimated cost of project awards. Additionally for USAID personnel, the 

USAID Regional Security Office (RSO) assesses security conditions and makes 

appropriate resource recommendations. 

Question #2A. Duplicative efforts.—In your testimony you stated that USAID, in 

consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, substantially scaled down a $32 

million agricultural faculties program found to be duplicative of efforts by another 

donor. 

♦ Please describe USAID’s consultation mechanism with the Government of 

Afghanistan to identify duplicative development efforts. 

Answer. USAID conducts extensive consultation with the Government of Afghanistan across its entire civilian assistance portfolio, including sector- and projectspecific coordination, and one of the reasons for this consultation is to identify duplicative development efforts. USAID consults on an almost daily basis with the Aid 

Management Directorate (AMD) of the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF). The 

AMD is responsible for coordinating all civilian assistance on behalf of the Afghan 

Government. USAID also frequently takes the lead in coordinating donor community collaboration with the government through the AMD. 

USAID conducts three annual consultation processes with the MOF. Joint portfolio reviews allow USAID technical staff, Afghan Government line ministries, and 

the AMD to conduct detailed reviews of USAID projects. Donor Cooperation Dialogues conducted with each donor allow for macrolevel evaluation of assistance flows 

and harmonization of the donor community. Core Donor Consultations focus on onbudget assistance and allow donors and the Afghan Government to plan together 

for the coming year’s expenditures on development projects. As a part of these processes, donors submit development project data, including locations, funding, and 

results, to the Afghan Government so that it can analyze annual assistance across 

the donor community, across sectors, and across geography. Furthermore, USAID 

and other donors provide information on the alignment of USAID’s portfolio of programs with Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs, allowing donors and the government to work together in balancing assistance across priority sectors. 

In addition to the portfolio-wide processes mentioned above, USAID consults regularly with Afghan Government line ministries on individual project development and 

implementation. These ministries are essential partners in planning, developing, 

and implementing USAID assistance projects. Some coordination examples include: 

• Infrastructure—Interministerial Commission for Energy, chaired by the Afghan 

Government, which includes the Ministry of Energy and Water, Ministry of 

Public Works, and Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS, the national utility), USAID and other key donors, and the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF). 

• Agriculture—Provincial Level Technical Working Groups with the Ministry of 

Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) and USAID staff. 

• Health—USAID holds a monthly meeting with the Deputy Minister for Policy 

and Planning of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). In addition, technical 

working groups composed of MoPH and USAID and other donor staff provide 

an opportunity to ensure that donors are effectively dividing their efforts across 

distinct elements of technical strategies. 

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Question #2B. Are there consultation mechanisms in place with other donors, or 

just with the Government of Afghanistan? 

Answer. USAID participates in extensive coordination mechanisms among other 

donors in addition to bilateral and multilateral coordination consultations with the 

Afghan Government. In addition to Afghan Government-led coordination bodies, 

donors often hold consultations at the sector and project level to harmonize activities. Some consultations are formalized by working through international organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Others are standing committees that coordinate activities in a given sector. Some consultations arise as needed 

to support specific projects or activities. Examples include: 

• United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)—Hosts policylevel and sector-specific committees to coordinate donor activities, including the 

weekly Head of Agency meeting, with every other meeting cochaired by the 

Afghan Ministry of Finance. 

• Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)—Managed by the World Bank 

since 2002, ARTF is one of the most effective standing mechanisms for donor 

consultation and cooperation. Areas of collaboration include agriculture, health, 

education, governance, and public financial management. USAID is the largest 

annual contributor to ARTF and directly supports programs in education, 

health, agriculture, and economic growth. 

• Afghanistan Infrastructure Trust Fund (AITF)—The AITF, managed by the 

Asian Development Bank, allows for donor coordination and joint funding of 

infrastructure projects. 

• Health Sector—USAID chairs the Health Development Partners Forum. USAID 

also partners closely with the World Bank and the European Union in supporting the Afghanistan basic health package and essential hospital services. 

Future programming will be coordinated through the World Bank’s System 

Enhancement for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) program. While close 

donor coordination has been an important factor in achieving dramatic health 

gains over the last decade, the SEHAT program is expected to streamline management of donor support and further enhance coordination. 

• Elections—USAID works with other partners through an elections working 

group to ensure that donor support to elections is coordinated and that key policy concerns are communicated jointly to the Afghan Government. USAID also 

supports elections programming through the multidonor United Nations Development Program ELECT project. 

• Agriculture—In addition to regular consultations with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), USAID is part of an Agriculture 

Donor Coordination Working Group, composed of donors and MAIL that meets 

quarterly to strengthen coordination among partners. Further, USAID organizes 

a bimonthly Water Donor’s Coordination meeting that is cochaired by USAID’s 

agriculture and infrastructure offices. 

• Infrastructure—In addition to regular consultations with the Interministerial 

Commission for Energy, USAID is part of an intra-U.S. Government working 

group on infrastructure cochaired by USAID and the Department of Defense. 

• Gender—USAID participates in gender coordination and working groups at several levels in Afghanistan. As the cochair of the U.S. Government’s Kabul Interagency Gender Working Group, USAID engages in the coordinated effort to 

implement the U.S. Government Gender Strategy in Afghanistan (2012). Externally, USAID participates in the Interagency Gender Donor Coordination group 

in Kabul. In Washington, the Office of Afghanistan Pakistan Affairs works 

closely with the State and Defense Departments through relevant task forces 

on: Women, Peace and Security, Gender-Based Violence, and Trafficking in Persons to ensure a coordinated effort. 

Question #2C. Are there any other cases where duplicative efforts have been 

found? What action was taken? 

Answer. USAID takes significant steps to ensure projects in design are not duplicative of existing efforts by the Afghan Government or other donors. However, with 

the complexity of the environment in Afghanistan, and the unusually large number 

of donors contributing high levels of assistance, duplication has occurred. When 

duplicative efforts are identified, USAID works with the relevant partners to 

streamline efforts and ensure they are mutually supportive. This is becoming increasingly important in the transition period, and the expected decrease in donor 

funds over time means that greater harmonization will maximize available funding. 

Some examples of efforts to streamline donor support and eliminate duplication 

are noted below: 

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Health: In the early stages of the international intervention in Afghanistan, 

USAID, the European Union (EU) and the World Bank divided responsibility for 

delivering basic health services and essential hospital services across Afghanistan. 

This division of labor allowed for swift improvements in health service delivery, and 

directly contributed to the significant health impacts over the past decade, including 

remarkable gains in access to health care, maternal mortality, and infant and child 

mortality. However, in establishing the systems necessary to swiftly deliver health 

services, each partner had to create appropriate procurement mechanisms and 

financial management processes through the Ministry of Public Health to ensure 

that funds were managed and results achieved according to their respective policies 

and regulations. As of 2014, USAID will be joining the EU in delivering health services through the World Bank’s SEHAT program. This is a significant step that will 

eliminate separate management systems and unify the Afghan health system. Ultimately, the goal is for this single, donor-supported health system to transition to 

an Afghan-managed health system. 

Energy: USAID is coordinating with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 

World Bank on their regional energy proposals, the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (TUTAP) energy corridor project and the proposed Central Asia-South Asia (CASA)-1000 project. In some cases, we have found 

small duplicative efforts in this area. For instance, a power system study being 

funded by USAID had some overlap with work being done by World Bank’s contractor regarding CASA–1000 transmission line routing. USAID’s implementing 

partner will directly coordinate further with the World Bank’s contractor to avoid 

duplicative work. 

Democracy and Governance: USAID is currently designing a follow-on to the 

Regional Afghanistan Municipal Program for Urban Populations (RAMP UP) municipal support program. RAMP UP made significant gains in major municipalities, 

and the follow-on program will work to sustain those gains. As other donors are active in the large cities of these municipalities, however, the follow-on program will 

place less emphasis on major municipalities in favor of increased emphasis on small 

and medium municipalities. This approach will decrease duplication of effort in 

major municipalities, while sustaining previous gains and broadening USAID’s 

reach to those cities that will benefit most from our assistance. 

In consultation with other donors and the Government of Afghanistan, USAID 

has become concerned that capacity-building efforts in several ministries may be duplicative, as several donors may be supporting the same ministry through different 

projects. USAID will conduct an assessment of its off-budget ministry capacitybuilding programs to identify duplicative efforts and other weaknesses, and when 

appropriate seek to coordinate future capacity-building through mechanisms such as 

ARTF’s Capacity Building for Results and the Afghan Government’s Civilian Technical Assistance Program. USAID is currently drafting the statement of work for an 

assessment team that should begin its work in early 2014. 

Question #3A. Bilateral Incentive Fund.—In your testimony you stated that $60 

million remains in the U.S. bilateral incentive fund, to be released as the Afghan 

Government meets certain thresholds of progress on the key TMAF indicators. 

♦ Which TMAF indicators is the remaining $60 million tied to and what are the 

benchmarks the Government of Afghanistan must reach for the funds to be 

released? 

Answer. The $75 million in incentive funding from FY 2012 resources is tied to 

progress on the five Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) Areas: (1) 

representational democracy and equitable elections; (2) governance, rule of law, and 

human rights; (3) integrity of public finance and commercial banking; (4) government revenues, budget execution and subnational governance; and (5) inclusive and 

sustained growth and development. Donors and the Afghan Government agreed 

upon 17 ‘‘hard deliverables’’ in the first half of 2013 that would demonstrate 

progress in the five TMAF reform areas. 

The Afghan Government has made satisfactory progress on a number of the hard 

deliverables, including the four associated with TMAF Area 1 (Representational 

Democracy and Equitable Elections), allowing the release of the first $15 million 

from the Incentive Fund. 

Disbursement of the remaining $60 million is dependent on progress in the other 

four thematic TMAF areas. We are evaluating now whether the Afghan Government 

has made sufficient progress on these remaining deliverables. 

Prior to January 29, 2014, when the Joint Coordinating and Monitoring Board 

(JCMB) with the Government of Afghanistan and other members of the international community is scheduled to be convened, the U.S. Government will finalize 

its assessment of Afghan progress and determine which, if any, of the remaining 

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four TMAF areas show progress sufficient to justify the release of additional FY12 

incentive funds. 

Question #3B. Is $75 million for the bilateral incentive fund an appropriate limit, 

or should the fund be expanded to include larger amounts of U.S. assistance to the 

Government of Afghanistan? 

Answer. The $75 million in incentive money is only the first part of a larger $175 

million commitment the U.S. Government made at the July 2013 Senior Officials 

Meeting in Kabul to incentivize progress toward TMAF goals. As part of that commitment, the U.S. plans to allocate an additional $100 million in incentive funds 

to incentivize TMAF progress by the Afghan Government in 2014. The specific 

details of what performance is needed will be made after the January 2014 JCMB 

meeting referenced in the prior answer. 

In addition to the bilateral TMAF incentive fund, the U.S. has obligated approxi- mately $318 million to the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 

(ARTF) in fiscal year 2013, part of which will be used for incentive funding. The 

U.S. contribution is pooled with that of other donors and allocated to a number of 

mechanisms within the fund, including the ARTF Incentive Program. The ARTF 

incentive fund focuses primarily on incentivizing improved Afghan financial management and transparency. 

Further, the U.S. and other donors announced their intentions in the TMAF to 

incentivize 10 percent of their funding by the end of 2014, with the goal of increasing that amount to 20 percent by the end of the next decade (2024). The administration considers the United States-Afghan bilateral TMAF incentive fund and ARTF 

Incentive Program to be part of the overall incentive funding initiative. We believe 

the $175 million slated for the bilateral incentive fund and the additional funding 

in the ARTF incentive program provide incentive for Afghan reform without undermining development progress and stability during this critical year of transition. 

Question #4A. In your testimony you stated that the ‘‘Transfer of Tasks’’ exercise 

helped inform USAID on how to transfer ISAF development projects to other entities. In 2011 the Government Accountability Office issued a recommendation which 

called on the Department of Defense to enter information about its Afghanistan 

development projects into a common database with the State Department and 

USAID. However, this recommendation is yet to be implemented. I am concerned 

that the lack of a common database of development projects creates an unnecessary 

gap in the institutional knowledge base of our development efforts. 

♦ Is there a plan to transfer information on projects conducted by CERP, TFBSO 

and AIF into the Afghan Info database? 

Answer. USAID recognizes the value of a more comprehensive database of USG 

funded projects in Afghanistan and is working with the State Department and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to determine the most effective manner to achieve 

this goal. To date, Afghan Info has received a limited, one-time transfer of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) data, but no data on the Task 

Force for Business Stability Operations (TFBSO) or the Afghanistan Infrastructure 

Fund. 

However, close and continued engagement with DOD ensures that programs are 

coordinated and guarded against duplication of effort. Currently, USAID has not 

taken on any DOD projects identified from the U.S. Government Transfer of Tasks 

exercise. Moving forward, if USAID were to take on development assistance oriented 

tasks from DOD based on the Transfer of Tasks exercise, the tasks would be added 

to Afghan Info. 

USAID has attempted over time to retrieve relevant DOD CERP data as opportunities have arisen, although a formal mechanism does not currently exist. To date, 

as mentioned above, USAID has received a limited one-time transfer of DOD CERP 

records. More data transfers have been difficult to coordinate because DOD project 

records are stored on a classified system and in some cases project data itself is classified. As a result, CERP data are only available in an unclassified form at a significant delay due to challenges such as ensuring the quality of data and preventing 

operational risks that could flow from the release of data in unclassified form. 

In addition, USAID and DOD databases collected different information, which 

makes data transfer more difficult. Since Afghan Info is a USAID system that was 

designed to fit USAID requirements and processes, it is often difficult to accommodate other agencies’ workflows. Recently, Afghan Info modifications have focused on 

upgrades that better meet USAID’s internal performance management needs, particularly to facilitate better use of partner reporting and better ways to monitor 

projects from an increased number of sources, such as the Afghan Government, 

other donors, and the beneficiaries themselves. 

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The next opportunity for transferring DOD information into Afghan Info will likely occur once CERP has ended and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy 

has finished reviewing and declassifying CERP data. At that time, we anticipate 

that current restrictions on the transfer of data to Afghan Info will be lessened. 

Regarding AIF activities, USAID consults regularly with DOD on the implementation of infrastructure programs to ensure all projects are coordinated and provide 

the maximum benefit for Afghanistan’s development. As such, current coordination 

provides USAID better visibility of AIF activities than would be possible through 

any attempt to incorporate non-USAID administered activities into Afghan Info 

while they are under implementation. Thus AIF has generally not been part of this 

discussion. 

To date, USAID has not sought to incorporate TFBSO into the Afghan Info database. TFBSO programs are significantly more complicated to incorporate due in part 

to the nature of its program portfolio and overall organizational and bureaucratic 

differences in program data-sharing. However, USAID has quarterly coordination 

meetings with TFBSO to ensure full visibility and understanding of the USG programs in the economic and infrastructure sectors. On a more frequent, but ad hoc, 

basis the USAID team working with the Ministry of Mines meets with the TFBSO 

staff working with the extractive sector to discuss and better coordinate programs. 

In addition, there are other coordination mechanisms in Kabul currently in place 

like the Deputies-Level Executive Working Group, regular field level coordination, 

and close cooperation between working level projects teams at USAID, the Department of State and DOD. 

Question #4B. Please share the ‘‘transfer of tasks’’ list with the committee. 

Answer. USAID has been an active participant in the Transfer of Tasks exercise 

in coordination with U.S. Embassy Kabul, which led civilian agency participation in 

the review process. The Department of Defense (DOD), via CENTCOM and ISAF, 

compiled an initial list of approximately 420 tasks for consideration during the 

Transfer of Tasks exercise. USAID has not taken on any DOD projects identified 

during the exercise. As the list of tasks is a DOD product, we respectfully request 

that the committee coordinate with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this 

request for the list. 

Question #5A. In your testimony you stated that USAID will terminate projects 

or activities if adequate third-party oversight is not possible or adequate progress 

is not being made. 

♦ Please list any past development projects or activities in Afghanistan that were 

terminated because of lack of oversight or progress. 

Answer. To date, USAID has not terminated/cancelled any projects for the reason 

of constraints on oversight. USAID has and will continue to terminate/cancel and 

extensively de-scope projects when there are problems with implementation and 

progress. Please find attached a list of terminated/cancelled projects since 2008. 

Issues with progress can take many forms including not having the desired impact, delays in implementation, and corruption. Regardless of the cause or form, 

USAID provides appropriate justification and documentation to terminate programs. 

Question #5B. How many USAID projects do you estimate will rely on third-party 

monitoring in 2015? 

Answer. USAID applies a multitiered monitoring approach to collect and verify 

data using a variety of means to inform decisionmaking. This approach recognizes 

the increasing importance of a variety of monitoring sources to gather project monitoring data and that each project requires its own, unique monitoring plan based 

on the type of activities taking place. One example is the important use of satellite 

imagery as a monitoring tool for crop production. Customized monitoring plans position each USAID project manager to gather and analyze monitoring data from various, appropriate monitoring sources, to compare data to ensure confidence in the 

reporting, and to make programmatic decisions based on the results. By using multiple and overlapping sources of monitoring data, USAID can compare information 

received from separate sources to verify project activities and ensure the greatest 

degree of oversight possible. Tiered monitoring actors are: 

• Tier 1: U.S. Government (USAID and other agencies); 

• Tier 2: Implementing Partners; 

• Tier 3: Afghan Government (internal monitoring and evaluation systems, observation) and other donors; 

• Tier 4: Civil society, local organizations, and beneficiaries; and 

• Tier 5: Independent Monitoring Contractors (Third Party Monitors). 

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USAID has also developed a new unit at the mission, the Implementation Support 

Team, which is responsible for providing an additional layer of critical review and 

analysis for the many streams of monitoring data. This unit will review performance 

at the project and sector level, and provide USAID leadership with alternative 

courses of action for addressing challenges with project implementation. Currently, 

USAID already utilizes independent monitors as one method of monitoring projects 

in the infrastructure, health, and stabilization sectors in Afghanistan. We estimate 

in 2015 that much of the likely portfolio, consisting of some 60 to 80 projects, will 

use the Tier 5 Independent Monitoring Contractors to one degree or another. USAID 

will regularly review project activities to determine if adequate oversight is possible, 

and make decisions about the viability of continued implementation, including the 

potential termination of activities. 

Question #5C. How much do you estimate third-party monitoring programs will 

cost in FY14 and FY15? 

Answer. Agency guidance recommends 5 to 10 percent of total program resources 

should be allocated for both monitoring and evaluation. This includes the required 

3 percent of program funds for evaluations. USAID anticipates spending up to 6 percent of its resources on monitoring efforts, which includes third-party monitoring. 

The total cost of USAID’s portion of the monitoring contract is thus well within the 

2 to 7 percent range outlined in Agency guidance. 

A lesson learned from USAID/Iraq’s use of independent monitors is to provide 

adequate funding to monitoring contracts, which is a principle behind the Agency’s 

guidance. This is necessary so that USAID can appropriately respond to a changing 

implementation environment. As such, the Monitoring Support Project (MSP) has 

an estimated project ceiling of up to $170 million, which includes a still-to-be-determined potential buy-in option for other U.S. Government agencies. Thus, the ceiling 

provides USAID operational flexibility that other contracts of this type do not have. 

Question #5D. Please describe in detail the specific tools that will be used to conduct third-party monitoring in Afghanistan. 

Answer. USAID clearly defines the role of Independent Monitoring Contractors; 

they do not represent the U.S. Government, the Afghan Government, or any other 

local organization, and they do not take the place of USAID staff as project managers. Their function is to monitor and verify—to USAID—whether USAID-funded 

activities have been undertaken according to the terms and conditions of contracts, 

grants and/or cooperative agreements with implementing partners. USAID then 

uses this information to manage its projects to achieve maximum development 

impact. 

Within this role, Independent Monitoring Contractors may use a variety of methods to verify project data. The precise nature of the data collection efforts will vary 

on a project-by-project basis. USAID is developing project specific monitoring plans. 

Potential monitoring tools include those described below: 

i. Site Visits: Individuals working under the Monitoring Support Project (MSP) 

will visit USAID project sites and independently verify activities implementing partners have completed and reported to USAID. USAID requires that these individuals 

have the relevant technical expertise for the sites they are visiting or the data they 

are collecting. These reports, including corroborating data, will be reviewed by 

USAID. 

Every effort will be made to corroborate information reported by monitoring partners. To do so, USAID compares information from site visits with additional evidence from other monitoring techniques, such as GPS tracking, photography, and 

crowd-sourcing, as described below, to mitigate the risk of bias, error, or corruption. 

• Global Positioning System (GPS) Tracking: MSP monitors will be equipped with 

GPS receivers so they can navigate to and verify activity locations using the 

geographic coordinates provided to USAID by technical projects’ implementing 

partners. Monitors will use GPS receivers to record the precise location of all 

of their verification visits. This information can be collected through photos 

taken with GPS-enabled cameras (see below), so location data collected with 

stand-alone GPS receivers can be used to validate the coordinates embedded in 

the photos. 

For security reasons, the MSP monitors may be required to devise strategies 

for recording the precise locations of activities using more discreet and inconspicuous GPS recording devices. In the event that standard GPS receivers cannot be used for a particular verification visit, the contractor will inform USAID 

of the alternative method used to determine the coordinates for a site visit 

before the monitoring is implemented. 

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• Photography: GPS-, date- and time-stamp enabled digital cameras are required 

for all site visits. These pictures provide photographic evidence of project implementation and also include the time and location of a particular verification 

visit. Should security circumstances prevent monitors from taking such pictures, the MSP monitor must inform USAID, propose alternative measures for 

validating the authenticity of the site visit report, and include information from 

the alternate measures in the visit report. The photos will be cross referenced 

by USAID to photos and locations provided by the project implementer and the 

other locations provided by the monitoring partner. 

ii. Satellite/Aerial Imagery Analysis: The requirement for satellite/aerial imagery 

data and analysis as a part of a verification and monitoring plan for a given project 

will be determined by USAID, in consultation with the MSP contractor. USAID will 

work with interagency partners that already procure commercial satellite imagery 

to acquire imagery of project sites where appropriate, so this cost will not be covered 

by MSP. An example of this approach would be an agriculture project required to 

measure changes in cultivated land, such as wheat or orchard crops, over time. 

USAID already uses this technique in Afghanistan and around the world through 

its Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS–NET). 

iii. Surveys: USAID is requiring that MSP design and deploy two types of public 

opinion surveys: 

• Rapidly-developed and rapidly-deployed surveys. While the scope and general 

conclusions of these surveys is more limited than larger national surveys, they 

provide a quick perspective on project activities for USAID, including supplemental data, or short-term trends that may need further qualitative research. 

They may be deployed through a number of instruments and mediums, including human enumerators and cell phones. 

• Larger, more rigorous surveys. These are thoroughly designed and tested surveys meant to prevent bias. They will be sufficiently large to draw statistically 

significant inferences and deployed by trained enumerators with quality control 

measures in place. 

iv. Data collection with mobile devices: Verification and monitoring activities using 

mobile devices, including cell phones may also be used as monitoring tools. These 

include the following: 

• Conducting surveys of technical project beneficiaries via short message service 

(SMS; i.e., text messages) or interactive voice response systems. Surveys consisting of 1 to 20 questions will be used where deemed appropriate by USAID. 

MSP will manage the inflow of survey responses, compile them into a readable 

format, and report findings back to USAID. 

• Assisting implementers of USAID technical projects in incorporating cell phonebased data collection into their project implementation. The purpose of this 

activity is to help expedite monitoring efforts by assisting USAID and technical 

project implementers to collect, manage, and utilize cellular technology in 

implementation. 

• Managing data intake and databases for unsolicited reporting. MSP will assist 

USAID in organizing and managing e-mail addresses and phone numbers where 

project beneficiaries and other Afghan citizens can send information on project 

performance. USAID will direct MSP monitors to conduct followup visits to 

locations that unsolicited reporting identifies as particularly problematic or 

beneficial. 

v. Crowdsourcing: MSP will assist USAID in defining the specific and discreet 

monitoring tasks that can be performed by members of the public and the most 

effective methods of soliciting and receiving this information. This could include 

feedback on specific aspects of project performance or a related indicator where it 

would be advantageous to receive feedback from a broader population and not just 

direct beneficiaries. 

For example, a subnational governance project training municipal employees on 

project planning and budgeting could be monitored by soliciting information on 

municipal service delivery from local citizens. Through radio, we can create a callin service for the public to respond via SMS on the length of time it takes for the 

delivery of a particular service that USAID attempted to improve through its assistance. MSP will work with USAID to develop and implement an outreach campaign 

that drives the solicitation. This could include informing communities about programs being implemented by USAID and/or the municipal government in a given 

community and their expected outcomes. Information collected from crowd sourcing 

will be reported back to USAID and used to verify information reported through 

other monitoring tiers. 

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Question #6A. Economic Impact of the Drawdown.—What specific programmatic 

steps is USAID taking to mitigate the impact of the loss of jobs in the Afghan economy due to the drawdown of the international presence at the end of 2014? 

Answer. Over the last 11 years the United States has helped Afghanistan achieve 

significant economic growth, which has averaged over 9 percent annually. However, 

the military drawdown poses a challenge to sustaining this growth. World Bank projections depend on differing sets of assumptions, but the more optimistic scenarios 

place future annual growth at 4 to 6 percent. The World Bank also expects an increase in unemployment, currently about 8 percent, but given the large informal 

economy, expects the greater impact to be felt on underemployment (low-paying, 

non-full-time jobs) which is at about 48 percent, and may increase alongside underemployment. 

To mitigate the potential negative impact of the transition on Afghanistan’s economy and help it move to more sustainable sources of growth, U.S. Government 

efforts have been focused on promoting the development of Afghanistan’s most productive sectors: agriculture, small and medium enterprise (SME) development, 

trade, and mining, and reinforcing of the key policies needed for growth; e.g., the 

business enabling environment and human capacity. USAID is concentrating these 

efforts in Regional Economic Zones in and around major municipalities and economically productive corridors—the areas in Afghanistan that have the greatest 

potential for sustainable growth due to concentration of population, presence of economic infrastructure, and access to domestic and international markets. 

USAID will focus on the agriculture sector since it is highly relevant to poverty 

reduction and job creation. Agriculture generates more than 50 percent of employment and roughly 75 percent of Afghans earn their income from the agricultural 

sector. Furthermore, employment in agriculture is characterized by small family 

businesses, often producing merely for subsistence and seldom providing enough resources to sustain families throughout the year. Between 2013 and 2018, USAID 

will implement four new regional agriculture development programs that are designed to increase employment along a number of market-oriented supply chains 

that will focus on value-added processing, linking farmers and private sector actors 

to regional markets, and addressing constraints in the business enabling environment. The USAID agriculture portfolio also includes critical investments such as 

irrigation, extension services and the provision of agriculture financing for commercialization and expansion that are required for leveraging the potential of agriculture to create jobs and reduce poverty. USAID will continue to introduce low cost, 

productivity enhancing technologies that are likely to yield jobs, higher outputs, and 

require lower water amounts, delivering environmental benefits at the same time. 

Other economic development activities will also help mitigate the effects of the 

drawdown on the economy, and help create jobs. The Financial Access for Investing 

in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project assists the Government of 

Afghanistan and the private sector in developing the financial sector. FAIDA helps 

USAID’s Afghan partners in building capacity to deliver finance where it can be 

used most effectively, and in developing a legal framework and market infrastructure in which financial sector institutions and their business partners can create 

employment opportunities for all Afghans. The Afghanistan Workforce Development 

Program (AWDP) helps address the twin problems of unemployment and the scarcity of technically skilled Afghan labor and trained business managers by improving 

quality and access to training in market-driven skills including construction, information and communications technology, mining, business management, and service 

industries to enable Afghans to fill jobs in these fields. By improving the quality 

and access to training in market-driven skills, AWDP complements the workforce 

development goals of the Afghan Government while providing trained employees to 

growing businesses. 

The Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises (ABADE) program primarily works with the private sector to strengthen the productivity of 

enterprises so that these enterprises can have sustained growth and job creation. 

ABADE’s objectives are to increase domestic and foreign investment, stimulate 

employment, and improve sales of Afghan products. ABADE’s alliances with Small 

and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) will accelerate productivity and job creation by 

mitigating risk, and leveraging contributions from private companies via alliances. 

Question #6B. How many jobs do you anticipate will be created as a result of 

USAID’s efforts? 

Answer. While many factors affect the creation of jobs, USAID is aiming to create 

approximately 34,000 jobs through the direct influence of USAID programs in the 

agriculture and economic growth sectors in 2014. These estimates are subject to 

change depending on the fluid conditions during Afghanistan’s transition period. 

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By the end of the Regional Agriculture Development Program (RADP), USAID anticipates a 20-percent increase in full time employment in the targeted areas and 

value chains, which equates to approximately 10,000 new jobs, including a 10–15- 

percent target increase in women’s full time employment. The Financial Access for 

Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project has hired 19 district 

and regional coordinators to assist in the creation of new private sector loans that 

are anticipated as being able to generate more than 2,100 new full-time equivalent 

jobs in 2014. The Assistance in Building Afghanistan by Developing Enterprises 

(ABADE) program estimates its public private alliances and technical assistance 

will help generate 12,000 new jobs in 2014. 

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GRAPHS SUBMITTED TO SUPPLEMENT ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 5

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