Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

AMY KAROZOS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Greenwood, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

ROBERT J. HENKE

CHRISTINA D. PACE

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )

)

S.S., (Minor Child), )

)

And )

)

S.S., (Mother), )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1309-JT-784

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Larry Bradley, Magistrate

The Honorable Marilyn Moores, Judge

Cause No. 49D09-1302-JT-7136
2

May 28, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge

Case Summary and Issue

S.Y.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion for relief 

under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights as to her 

child, S.S. Mother raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court’s 

decision was an abuse of discretion. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

Mother gave birth to S.S. on July 31, 2011. S.S. was born cocaine positive. 

Immediately after S.S. was born, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed 

S.S. from Mother’s care and filed a petition alleging S.S. was a child in need of services 

(“CHINS”). DCS had a number of concerns, including Mother’s lack of stable and 

appropriate housing, untreated mental health issues, and drug abuse. DCS also expressed 

concern because Mother had prior CHINS cases involving two other children that 

resulted in adoption. At a pre-trial hearing, Mother admitted to using cocaine and 

marijuana during her pregnancy and that S.S. tested positive for cocaine at birth. 

On September 14, 2011, a hearing was held and the trial court issued its 

dispositional order. The order required, among other things, that Mother (1) maintain 

regular contact with a DCS family case manager; (2) keep appointments with service 
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providers and DCS; (3) maintain appropriate housing; (4) secure stable and legal income; 

(5) participate in home-based counseling; (6) complete a substance abuse assessment and 

any service related to substance abuse issues; and (7) submit to random drug screens. 

The court’s primary goals were to remedy conditions of instability and untreated mental 

health and substance abuse issues. 

Mother was referred to services for the purpose of addressing her substance abuse 

and mental health issues, but Mother failed to follow through with or complete any of 

those services. Mother’s participation in services was erratic, as Mother refused to meet 

with providers or failed to keep appointments. A DCS case manager suggested that 

Mother participate in in-patient substance abuse treatment. Mother refused to participate, 

believing that she did not need substance abuse treatment. Mother’s compliance with 

random drug screens was inconsistent. Mother tested positive for marijuana in 

September and December of 2011 and gave at least one diluted sample in November 

2011. After December 2011, Mother failed to participate in ten random drug screens, and 

she was eventually discharged from that program due to her noncompliance. Mother 

failed to obtain any mental health treatment and even denied having mental health issues 

after previously reporting that she has bipolar disorder. 

On February 20, 2013, a hearing was held at which the trial court determined it 

was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan from reunification to 

adoption. Mother failed to attend that hearing. DCS filed a petition to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights on February 25, 2013. 

On July 23, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was held on the petition to terminate 

parental rights. Mother failed to attend that hearing, but her counsel was present. 
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Mother’s attorney requested a continuance, to which the State and the guardian ad litem 

objected. The trial court denied the motion for continuance. The State presented 

evidence of Mother’s failure to participate in services or to remedy the issues that led to 

the CHINS proceedings. At the close of that hearing, the trial court indicated that it 

intended to grant the State’s petition to terminate and enter a written order to that effect. 

On July 24, 2013, Mother filed a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana 

Trial Rule 60(B). That motion asserted that Mother failed to attend the hearing due to 

mistake or excusable neglect and requested the trial court set a new termination hearing. 

On August 13, 2013, a hearing was held on Mother’s Rule 60(B) motion. Mother 

claimed that she confused court dates between two cards she was given by the trial court, 

which was the reason she did not show up for the termination hearing. The trial court 

also allowed Mother to give testimony regarding evidence she would have submitted if 

she had been present at the termination hearing. Mother testified that she had attended a 

total of fifteen meetings for Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous since June 

2013. She also revealed that she was pregnant. Her only source of income was Social 

Security disability benefits, and she was currently living with her grandmother. 

On August 22, 2013, the trial court entered two written orders. The first was an 

order terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and S.S. The second 

order denied Mother’s Rule 60(B) motion. Specifically, the court’s order on Mother’s 

Rule 60(B) motion found (1) that Mother’s reason for missing the hearing date was not 

credible when compared to date cards issued by the trial court and (2) that Mother’s 

evidence was not a meritorious defense to the evidence leading to the termination of her 

parental rights in S.S. Mother now brings this appeal. 
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Discussion and Decision

I. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Standard of Review

A decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed with great deference. In re 

J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will neither reweigh evidence nor 

judge the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable 

inferences favorable to the judgment. Id. 

In this case, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. We 

apply a two-tiered standard of review: (1) we determine whether the evidence supports 

the findings of fact and (2) whether the findings support the judgment. In re G.Y., 904 

N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). The trial court’s findings or judgment will be set aside 

only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the record 

lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Id. 

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 sets out what must be proven in order to terminate 

parental rights. The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1261. If a juvenile court determines that the allegations required 

by Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 are true, then the court will terminate the parent-child 

relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

B. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

Mother’s argument on appeal focuses on the trial court’s decision to deny her Rule 

60(B) motion. However, her appellate brief indirectly claims that the trial court’s 

decision to terminate her parental rights was also erroneous. We do not agree. The State 
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presented sufficient evidence at the termination hearing to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights, and the trial court’s order on that point is not clearly erroneous. 

For a span of approximately a year and one-half until the permanency plan was 

changed from reunification to adoption, Mother failed to complete a single service 

referred to her by DCS. More importantly, the trial court found that Mother failed to 

make any serious effort to participate in those services or address her issues of drug 

abuse, mental illness, and unstable housing. Mother’s brief does not point to any finding 

or conclusion by the court that she believes is clearly erroneous, and it appears that each 

element necessary to terminate Mother’s parental rights was supported by the evidence. 

Viewing the evidence most favorably to the trial court’s decision, we find no clear error 

in the trial court’s order. 

II. Mother’s Trial Rule 60(B) Motion

A. Standard of Review

Mother’s principal argument on appeal is her challenge to the trial court’s denial 

of her Rule 60(B) motion and declining to hold a second termination hearing. A grant or 

denial of a motion for relief from judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and thus we will reverse only if there has been an abuse of that discretion. State v. 

Willits, 773 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial 

court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. 

B. Denial of Mother’s Motion

Mother argued she was entitled to relief from judgment because her absence from 

the termination hearing was a product of “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.” See

Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1). Specifically, Mother claimed that she mixed up the dates 
7

and times of two different hearings, believing the termination hearing was set for 10 a.m., 

and that was the reason she did not show up for the termination hearing. Mother 

submitted two hearing date cards to the court: one was for the termination hearing, which 

displayed the correct date and time (July 23 at 8:30 a.m.); the second card showed 

hearings scheduled for June 5 at 9:30 a.m. and June 7 at 8:30 a.m. The trial court 

determined that Mother’s testimony did not match up with her court date cards and that 

her reason for missing the termination hearing was not credible.1 Given our standard of 

review, we find no error in this determination. 

Trial Rule 60(B) also requires the movant to make a showing of a “meritorious 

claim or defense” when the motion is based on a claim of mistake or excusable neglect. 

T.R. 60(B). The movant must show that “if the case was retried on the merits, a different 

result would be reached.” In re K.E., 812 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation 

omitted), trans. denied. The trial court concluded Mother failed to make an adequate 

showing in that regard. Mother testified that she had attended a total of fifteen meetings 

for Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous since June 2013; she was collecting 

Social Security disability benefits; and she was currently living with her grandmother. 

While these circumstances may have been evidence of some improvement, Mother’s 

efforts were not made until the eleventh hour. Moreover, any alleged improvement made 

by Mother came after nearly two years of her nonparticipation in services. It is within the 

trial court’s discretion to “disregard the efforts Mother made only shortly before 

termination and to weigh more heavily Mother’s history of conduct prior to those 

 

1

 In addition to the correct court date card, the State points out that Mother was also informed of the time 

and date of the termination hearing by a notice letter and during a pretrial hearing on June 7, 2013. 
8

efforts.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). In light of 

the evidence submitted at the termination hearing and Mother’s lack of participation 

throughout the majority of the proceedings, we cannot say the trial court’s decision was 

an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s Trial 

Rule 60(B) motion and terminating her parental rights, we affirm. 

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.