T he Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition b y consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3384

___________ Phyllis Y. Black, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, * Social Security Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: February 10, 1998

Filed: April 23, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. Phyllis Y. Black appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her 1 application for social security disability benefits. We affirm.Scoliosis is a lateral curvature of the spine. See T he Sloane-Dorland Annotated 2 Med ical-Legal Dictionary, p. 471 (1992 Supp.). Carpal tunnel syndrome i s “compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with pain and burning or tingling paresthesias in the fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the elbow.” Id. at 501. -2- I. Phyl lis Y. Black is a forty-nine-year-old woman who earned a high schoo l degree and attended 11⁄2

years of college. Her past relevant work includes experience as a receptionist, word processing secretary, statistical word processor, an d receptionist/inventory clerk. On December 17, 1993, Black filed applic ations for social securi ty disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Alleging a disability onset date of December 31, 1992, Black claimed that she was unable to work due to scoliosis, carpal tunnel syndrome, headaches, depression and a nervou s condition

. The Social Security Administration denied her applications initially an d

2 ag ain on reconsideration. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ ) found that Black was not disabled. Pursuant to regulatory guidelines promulgated at 20 C.F.R. § 41 6.920(a) - (f), the ALJ found that Black had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December of 1992 and conclude d that although she suffered from residuals from severe scoliosis and headaches, Black did not have an impairment o r combination of impairmen ts equivalent to a listed impairment. The ALJ further found that Black’s im

pairments did not prevent her from performing her past relevant work. See Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing the five-step eligibility analysis). After applying principles we set forth in Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 132 2 (8th Cir. 1984) (subsequent history omitted), the ALJ further concluded tha t Black’s subjective allegations of disabling pain were not credible.
The Appeals Council denied Black’s request for further review, and sh e subsequently sought judicial review pursuan t to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court-3-

grant ed the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that substantia l evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision to deny Black’s benefits.
II.
We will uphold the Commissioner’s determinations if they are supported b y substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Spradling v. Cha ter , 126 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (8th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Co mmissioner’s conclusion. See Woolf v. Shalala , 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). “In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, we must consider evidence that detra cts from the [Commissioner’s] decision as well as ev idence that supports it.” Id. We may not reverse the Commissione r merely because substantial evid ence exists supporting a different outcome. See Smith v. Shalala , 987 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993). We first address Black’s argument that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of her treat ing physician, Dr. G. Randall Guntharp, who wrote to the Social Securit y Administration urging that

Black be granted disability benefits. Dr. Guntharp’s letter, characterizing Black’s scoliosis as “extreme,” stated that it was only after his urging that Black applied for benefits and that Black “is much more handicapped than many of the people presently receiving disability.” Black argues that the letter represented Dr. Gun tharp’s opinion that she was disabled. She contends that the ALJ wa s co mpelled by our decision in Prince v. Bowen , 894 F.2d 283, 285 (8th Cir. 1990), to discuss Guntha

rp’s opinion. In Prince we held that “[a]n ALJ’s failure to consider or discuss a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled constitutes erro r where, as here , the record contains no contradictory medical opinion.” Id. at 285-86.
The ALJ’ s decision discussed the medical evaluations contained in Dr

. Guntharp’ s letter and noted relevant information from the doctor’s treatment notes

. Although the ALJ apparently incorporated Dr. Guntharp’s findings into his decision,-4-

he did not specifically discredit the physician’s conclusions. Black, contending that the lette r was an unequivocal statement of Dr. Guntharp’s opinion, alleges this was a n error. Although required to develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required t o discuss every piece of evidence submitted. See Miller v. Shalala , 8 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). An ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does no t indicate that such evidence was not considered, see Montgomery v. Chater , 69 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1995 ). Given the ALJ’s specific references to the medical findings set forth in Dr. Guntharp’s letter, it is highly unlikely that the ALJ did not consider and rejec t Dr. Guntharp’s opinion that Black was disabled as a result of her extrem e scoliosis. Black also argues that the ALJ improperly discredited her subjective complaints of pain. “As is true in many disability cases, there is no doubt that the claimant i s experiencing pain; the real issue is how severe that pain is.” Woolf , 3 F.3d at 1213

. In analyzing a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, an ALJ must examine: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3 ) dosage, effectiveness, and side effects o f medication; (4) precipitating and aggravating factors; and (5) functional r estrictions. See Polaski , 739 F.2d at 1322. Other relevant factors i nclude the claimant’s relevant work history and the absence of objectiv e medical evidence to support the complaints. See id

. The ALJ may discount subjective complain ts of pain if inconsistencies are apparent in the evidence as a whole. Se e Spradling , 126 F.3d at 1075. Applying the Polaski directives, the ALJ examined the objective medica l eviden ce of Black’s physiological impairments and the inconsistencies in Black’ s cl aims and determined that Black’s subjective complaints of disabling pain lacke d credibility. The ALJ observed that although Black co mplained of debilitating pain, she was s till able at times to engage in many normal daily activities including househol d w o rk, visiting friends, and attending church. See Lawrence v. Chater , 107 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1997). The ALJ also noted that although Black does experience someThe record reflects that Bla ck’s medication protocol included muscle relaxants 3 and anti-inflammatory drugs. Of the several other prescribed medications that Black lists, so me were recommended for unrelated conditions such as sinus and ches t ailments. Spondylolisthesis is the forward displacement of one vertebra over another. See 4 The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary at 483. -5- li mitation, pain, and discomfort, she has never undergone surgery and has relied on a conservative course of treatment, including exercises, home cervical traction, a back brace, and medication. Se e Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1992). 3
Black claims that physical activity frequently precipitates and aggravates he r severe pain. The ALJ cited Black’s dail y activities as inconsistent with her assertions. It was for the ALJ to resolve any contradictory evidence of Black’s functiona l limit ations. See Bentley v. Shalala , 52 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Where th e me dical evidence is equally balanced, as we find it is here, the ALJ resolves th e conflict.”).
The objective medical evidence revealed scoliosis, spondylolisthesis, an d 4 headaches. The ALJ correctly found that no diagnostic tests or objective medica l findings exi sted to support Black’s carpal tunnel syndrome and psychological claims. Black was also getting some relief from her medications and physical therapy, while Dr. Guntharp’s records reveal a diminishing concern for her back problems. Se e Marciniak v. Shalala , 49 F.3d 1350, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995) (idiopathic scoliosis requiring surgery was not a disabling condition).
Black’s lengthy work history supports her subjective complaints of disablin g pain. As the ALJ found, however, offsetting this wo rk history is the fact that (1) Black was la id off from her position, rather than forced out due to her condition, se e Browning v. Sullivan , 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992); (2) she continued to see k work after her alleged disability onset date, see Bentley , 52 F.3d at 786; and (3) she-6-

continued to receive unemployment benefits after her alleged disability onset date, see Barrett v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1994). Black contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the lay testimony of her p arents. Black’s parents were not qualified to give an opinion regarding her capacity to work, however, and their testimony merely corroborated Black’s testimony regarding he r activit ies. The ALJ, having properly discredited Black’s complaints of pain, wa s equally empowered to reject the cumulative testimony of her parents. See Ostronski v. Chater , 94 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s decision, which reflects a proper application of the Polaski factors, is supported by the record as a whole. Finally, Black argues that the ALJ’s determination that she can return to her past relevant work is not supported by substan tial evidence. She contends that her work as a receptionist/inventory clerk is beyond her residual functional capacity for light work. Black’s pa st relevant work, however, includes her experience as a receptionist, a position classified as having sedentary work requirements. See Dictionary o f Occupational Titles , § 237.367-038 (4th ed. rev. 1991); see also Evans v. Shalala , 21 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, we conclude that the ALJ’s determination tha t Black could return to her past relevant work is consistent with his findings regarding Black’s residual functional capacity. The judgment is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.