Filed 9/26/24 P. v. Sandoval CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MANUEL FIGUEROA 

SANDOVAL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B331508

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TA126752)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Laura R. Walton, Judge. Affirmed.

Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
2

Defendant and appellant Manuel Figueroa Sandoval 

appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 (former 

§ 1170.95).2 Because defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6 

relief as a matter of law, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2013, an information was filed charging defendant with 

second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)); unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); and unlawful firearm 

activity (former § 29805). It also alleged that defendant 

personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing 

great bodily injury and death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).)

Later that year, a jury convicted defendant of all three 

offenses, and found the firearm allegations true. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to a total of 40 years to life (15 years to life 

on the murder charge and a consecutive term of 25 years to life 

for the firearm enhancement).3

On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. 

Sandoval (May 12, 2015, B254512) [nonpub. opn.] (Sandoval).) 

Nine years later, defendant filed a petition for resentencing 

pursuant to section 1172.6. The prosecution opposed the petition, 

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise indicated.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was 

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, 

ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new 

numbering.

3 Sentences on all other charges were stayed pursuant to 

section 654.
3

arguing that defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as 

a matter of law. As exhibits, it attached copies of the jury 

instructions given at trial, the verdict, and our prior opinion in 

defendant’s direct appeal (Sandoval, supra, B254512). 

Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a one-sentence written reply

“submit[ting] on the prosecution’s . . . response[.]”

In June 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s petition. It 

“f[ound] that the defense has not met the threshold for a prima 

facie hearing based on the fact that . . . it was a one-defendant 

case.” The court explained that defendant “was found [guilty] by 

a jury and was convicted of second degree murder . . . and the 

jury found true the allegations that in the commission of the 

murder, [defendant] personally and intentionally discharged a 

firearm, which caused great bodily injury and death to” the 

victim. Taken together, the verdict thus established that 

defendant was “the actual shooter because no other defendants 

were alleged to be involved.”

Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Law

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate 

Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to “amend the felony murder 

rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it 

relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed 

on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the 

intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying 

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” 

(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Among other things, the bill 

amended section 188 to require that, when the felony-murder 

rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act 
4

with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a 

person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, 

subd. (a)(3).) 

“Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism whereby people ‘who 

believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer 

qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019[] 

may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by 

filing a petition in the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arnold

(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 382.)

In order to obtain resentencing relief, a defendant convicted 

of murder must allege that (1) an information was filed against 

him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder 

under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine, or any “other theory under which malice 

is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation 

in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); (2) he was convicted of murder 

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he could not now be convicted 

“because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 

January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).

Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for 

resentencing, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis 

to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6, 

subds. (b)(3) & (c).) “[T]he prima facie inquiry . . . is limited 

. . . ‘“[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s factual allegations as true 

and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the 

[defendant] would be entitled to relief if his or her factual 

allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to 

show cause”’” and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. 

(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).)
5

In making this assessment, the trial court may consider the 

defendant’s record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 970–971.) As our Supreme Court explained in Lewis, “[t]he 

record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima 

facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions with 

potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, 

supra, at p. 971.) However, “the court should not make 

credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the 

weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at 

p. 953.)

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section 

1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022) 

77 Cal.App.5th 539.)

III. Analysis

A. Reliance on Prior Appellate Opinion

In 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–

2022 Reg Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551), which amended section 

1172.6 to clarify that “the factual summary in a[] [prior] 

appellate opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an 

evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner’s eligibility for 

resentencing.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 

(Flores); see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Several appellate courts have 

recently held that, “[b]y logical extension, the factual summary 

also may not be used to determine a petitioner’s eligibility at the 

prima facie stage.” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164,

1183; see also, e.g., Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)

Defendant argues that the trial court violated this precept 

by improperly relying on the factual summary in Sandoval, 
6

supra, B254512, to deny defendant’s section 1172.6 petition. He 

is wrong. 

The trial court based its denial on the procedural history of 

defendant’s case. At the prima facie hearing, it did not so much 

as mention any of the facts underlying defendant’s convictions. 

Instead, the court explained that it would deny the petition 

because (1) defendant was the sole person charged with the 

murder of the victim; (2) the jury found that defendant personally 

and intentionally discharged a firearm resulting in the victim’s 

death; and (3) taken together, these two things established that 

defendant must have been the actual killer. 

Even if the trial court took this information directly from 

our prior opinion—as opposed to the numerous other documents 

before it—both the number of persons charged with the victim’s 

murder and the jury’s verdict are procedural matters. And unlike 

factual summaries, the court is free to consider the “procedural 

history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion” at any 

stage of section 1172.6 proceedings. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) 

Accordingly, the court did not erroneously rely on our opinion in 

Sandoval, supra, B254512.

Defendant contends that the trial court should not have 

relied on any of the exhibits to the prosecution’s opposition, 

presumably including the copy of our prior opinion in Sandoval, 

supra, B254512, because those exhibits were never properly 

authenticated. But defendant never objected to the submission of 

those documents, either in his written opposition to the 

prosecution’s motion or orally at the prima facie hearing. His 

“failure to object . . . on grounds of . . . lack of authentication 
7

procedurally bars him from asserting those contentions on 

appeal.”4 (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 159.)

Alternatively, defendant insists that the trial court must 

have relied on the factual summary in our prior appellate opinion

in some capacity, because any contrary suggestion would 

improperly imply that the trial court was derelict in its duty to 

read and consider all evidence presented to it. Not so. Courts 

routinely encounter and review pieces of evidence that they do 

not ultimately rely on to render judgment. And defendant cites 

no legal authority for the novel proposition that a trial court 

necessarily relies on every portion of every piece of evidence 

presented to it by a party. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 

764, 793 [“‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with 

citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on 

a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it 

without consideration. [Citations.]’”].)

B. Firearm Sentence Enhancement

Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly relied 

on the jury’s firearm use finding to deny his section 1172.6 

petition, citing case law holding that “an enhancement under 

section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not in itself preclude a 

4 This argument also fails on the merits, since the trial court 

could have gotten the same data it relied on—the number of 

persons charged with the victim’s murder and the jury’s 

findings—from other documents in the record, namely, the copy 

of the information and the 2013 minute order detailing the jury’s 

verdicts. If the trial court’s sole error was taking procedural 

information from the prosecution’s exhibits rather than the other 

places it appeared in the record, that error would be patently 

harmless. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–837.)
8

petitioner from obtaining relief under section” 1172.6. (People v. 

Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 592 (Offley).)

It is true that the mere existence of “a [firearm]

enhancement . . . does not establish as a matter of law that a

defendant acted with malice aforethought.” (Offley, supra,

48 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) But where, as here, the jury finds that

defendant was the only person charged who personally used a

firearm to commit murder, that finding does establish that

defendant was the actual killer.5 (Compare People v. Garrison

(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743–744 [although a personal gun use

finding “does not automatically show the defendant is the actual

killer . . . when the record shows only one person . . . used a gun

. . . the true finding on a personal use enhancement demonstrates

that th[at] p[erson] was the actual killer”] with Offley, supra, at

p. 597 [reversing the denial of a defendant’s resentencing petition

because the jury’s finding “showed only that a principal to the

crime, not [the defendant] himself, fired [the murder] weapon”].)

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by determining that,

in the context of this case, the jury’s firearm finding establishes

that defendant was the actual killer. And as such, defendant is

ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. (People v.

Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 [“As a matter of law,

5 Defendant suggests that only a review of the entire record 

of conviction could “foreclose the possibility . . . that [defendant] 

was subject to vicarious liability under an alternative theory that 

he was an aider and abettor who was responsible for someone 

else’s acts.” The notion that defendant could have been convicted 

as an aider and abettor is wholly unsupported by the record; the 

jury at defendant’s trial was not instructed on aiding and 

abetting liability.
9

resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an

‘actual killer.’ [Citations.]”].)

We thus conclude that the trial court correctly denied

defendant’s resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT