U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

91–137 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–457 

LEBANON AT THE CROSSROADS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND 

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 25, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

TIM KAINE, Virginia, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement ...................... 1 

Nerguizian, Aram, senior fellow, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ............................................. 29 

Prepared statement (See editor’s note) ........................................................... 31 

Plehn, Maj. Gen. Michael T., Principal Director for Middle East Policy, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Salem, Dr. Paul, vice president, Middle East Institute, Washington, DC .......... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Silverman, Lawrence, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

LEBANON AT THE CROSSROADS 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:44 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tim Kaine (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kaine and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator KAINE. I want to call this meeting of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, the Subcommittee on the Near Eastern, 

South and Central Asian Affairs to order. 

I want to welcome all who are here, especially our four expert 

witnesses who we will hear testimony from today. 

The Senate is currently in the middle of a vote on a veterans bill 

that will take a bit of time, but I want to take advantage of folks 

being here. We will proceed to a first panel and then a second 

panel with questions. And this is a very important topic. 

The topic of the hearing today is ‘‘Lebanon at the Crossroads.’’ 

I just returned from a trip in Lebanon last week with Senator 

Angus King of Maine. We went together because we serve together 

on the Armed Services and Budget Committees, but we also serve 

separately. I am on the Foreign Relations Committee, obviously, 

and Senator King is on the Intelligence Committee. We took a trip 

where we spent time in Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt. In 

some ways, I think we were probably most excited about the trip 

to Lebanon because neither of us had been to Lebanon. We have 

strong feelings about the situation there, but we felt like we needed 

to ground those feelings and thoughts with some reality check. 

On the basis of that trip, I do feel very strongly that the title of 

this hearing is apt. Lebanon is at a crossroads. The Syrian conflict, 

about which we spent so much time in Foreign Relations and 

Armed Services, has devastated Syria and many of its neighbors, 

but I think at least in the American press and in the telling of the 

story about Syrian effects, Lebanon is often an overlooked neighbor 

with respect to stories about the Syrian crisis. 

Lebanon has been extremely generous in welcoming Syrian refugees into the country, as has been its tradition. And it has paid the 

highest price, I believe, in terms of the stability and security of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

country. Lebanon deserves our attention and continued investment 

and partnership, and if we do that and we do it the right way, 

it will be good for the country and good for regional and global 

security. 

In July 2013, Senator King and I, in separate congressional trips, 

visited Turkey and Jordan, and when we were in Turkey and Jordan, we saw, experienced, visited refugee camps and talked with 

leaders about the strain of Syrian refugees on those U.S. partners. 

But it was important that we go back to Lebanon to have those 

same discussions, and what we saw was challenging. The population of Lebanon is a little bit over 4 million and there is nearly 

a million—by many accounts, more than a million—Syrian refugees 

in Lebanon from Syria on top of refugees who have already been 

there from Palestine for many decades. 

Kind of wrapping your head around the notion of a refugee population that has come in the last couple years equivalent to 25 percent of the population of the country is pretty dramatic. Imagine 

80 million war refugees coming to the United States over the 

period of about 2 years. That would be 25 percent of our population. You can imagine how many challenges that would pose. And 

that size of refugee population obviously poses many, many significant difficulties for Lebanese civil society. 

Senator King and I set up this CODEL to visit Lebanon a couple 

of months ago, but through the fortuity of timing, right before we 

arrived in the country, the Government of Lebanon was able to 

form after many months of gridlock. As many of you know who follow Lebanon, the challenge of forming a government among competing factions with Cabinet ministries in a sufficient ratio to receive parliamentary approval is very, very difficult. We had a 

chance to be the first congressional delegation to meet with Prime 

Minister Salam and with President Suleiman after the formation 

of this government. We offered congratulations on the formation of 

the government, and we discussed with each of them the relatively 

prompt path for Presidential elections and the need to keep that 

path on time and the need for a balanced and strong ministerial 

statement, that statement of government that is done within 30 

days of the formation of the government that establishes key priorities for this government in this phase. 

We think the formation of the government with Presidential elections in Lebanon—and the President is elected by Parliament on a 

two-thirds vote—the carrying out of Presidential elections with parliamentary elections to follow should provide assistance and should 

help in administering some of the challenges that result from the 

Syrian refugees. But that will not be at all sufficient. There must 

be much more work done by international partners, including the 

United States, if we care about the stability of Lebanon. 

During our time there, we met not only with elected officials. We 

also met with many NGOs administering aid to Syrian refugees. 

We met with members of Parliament and Cabinet ministers in the 

newly formed government. We met with the UNHCR Administrator, Ninette Kelley, to talk about refugee issues. And what we 

found bluntly was again and again even if we would ask questions 

about Lebanese internal issues, within a very short time the 

answer would end up being about Syria and about the Syrian 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

challenge, not only the refugees coming into the country, but how 

the decision of the Hezbollah organization to participate so actively 

and visibly in the Syrian civil war has increased violence, largely 

Sunni-Shia violence, within the country of Lebanon. 

It was a challenging trip. One morning we were leaving the 

American Embassy to go have a meeting with President Suleiman 

and a bomb went off in downtown Beirut near where we were. You 

could hear it. You could see the smoke. This was an everyday event 

to many, sadly. We assumed that our meeting with President 

Suleiman would be canceled. If it were here, a bomb going off—two 

motorcycles exploding a bomb that killed many and injured many, 

many more in a part of downtown near where a meeting—the 

President would say, I got my hands full, I do not want to have 

the meeting. But President Suleiman basically wanted us to see 

the kind of challenge that he was dealing with. And so the meeting 

continued and in the midst of the meeting, the President was being 

interrupted with phone calls to try to talk to the Iranian Ambassador. This particular bombing was near an Iranian cultural center 

to talk to others. 

And it was a little bit heartbreaking to see the normality of the 

situation and to feel as visitors—we were just there for a brief 

time—but the challenge that must pose for the everyday life of 

those who might be caught in the cross-fire of violence occurring 

in random ways in random neighborhoods. 

On the question of Syria, I think we all agree that U.S. diplomatic energies notwithstanding, we are not happy with the path 

that the situation in Syria is taking, not by a long shot. The United 

States is the largest provider of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees outside the country, including in Lebanon. The aid we give is 

through the U.N. and then distributed through worthy NGOs. We 

are the largest provider of humanitarian aid. We are deeply engaged in negotiations around the eventual destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile in Syria. We are deeply engaged in efforts 

at the U.N. Security Council or in Geneva to try to find the path 

forward. But while we are deeply engaged, we are not happy with 

the process and the progress. And so that continues to pose challenges that could be of a longstanding nature for Lebanon. 

Weeks ago, I called for a resolution, after meeting with victims 

of civil war in Syria who exited Syria through Lebanon, to try to 

provide more aggressive insertion of humanitarian aid into Syria, 

not just the provision of aid to Syrian refugees outside the country, 

but to focus on aid inside Syria. The U.N. last week adopted a resolution, finally overcoming Russia’s propensity to veto, along with 

the support of China, even humanitarian aid resolutions. Last 

week there was a little bit of a breakthrough on that. But frankly, 

whether it was a breakthrough or not will only be determined by 

whether humanitarian aid starts to be delivered in a more significant way. 

But if we are to try to tackle the challenges and be a good partner and ally in Lebanon, we need to continue that, the delivery of 

humanitarian aid in Syria, the provision of humanitarian aid for 

refugees who have exited Syria, and a continued effort diplomatically to try to find a path to a resolution or cease-fire in the civil 

war. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

During our visit to Lebanon, we also had the opportunity to visit 

with Lebanese Armed Forces and explore the ways in which the 

United States is working in tandem with the armed forces. We 

found a high degree of satisfaction with that relationship within 

the armed forces. Many of the armed forces leaders we met in the 

Lebanese Armed Forces had done training either in the United 

States or with U.S. military leaders. And I would say throughout 

the region, probably in Lebanon the degree of satisfaction in the 

mil-to-mil relationship was probably the highest. 

That military armed forces has a significant challenge because in 

some critical areas, the armed forces are weaker than the Hezbollah militia. That is an unusual situation to contemplate from an 

American standpoint where it would not be imaginable that a militia in the United States would be more powerful than the armed 

forces. It kind of challenges concepts that you have about the 

strength of armed forces. But every day and in numerous ways, the 

American military leadership is working with the Lebanese Armed 

Forces to increase capacity, whether it is technology or training, 

and we found a high degree of satisfaction and appreciation for 

those relationships. We want to make sure that we continue this 

because it is not just the Syrian effect, but it is also al-Qaeda and 

other extremist groups that we worry about. They must not be able 

to establish a base of operations in Lebanon. 

We want to ensure that United States policy and support for 

Lebanon remain strong, and we feel like the plight in Lebanon is 

an untold story of the Syrian civil war. 

Finally, before I introduce our first panel and we ask them to 

make opening statements and have a bit of a dialogue, the other 

reason to have this is our Lebanese American population is such 

a strong part of America. One of the reasons you do hearings like 

this is not only to cast a spotlight on a part of the world where a 

story has not been told, but also to honor Americans whose tradition and heritage is such that they have strong connections in 

Lebanon. And Lebanese Americans are often not removed from 

Lebanon. They are deeply engaged in Lebanon. We find that in Virginia and in so many communities throughout the United States. 

The Lebanese American contribution to our society, whether it is 

the foundation of St. Jude’s Hospital which is a spectacular story 

or so many other areas, is something that is really notable. And 

when we have significant chunks of our population who care so 

deeply about their own homes, that in and of itself is a reason for 

the United States to be focused as well. 

So both because of the critical role of Lebanon in the Middle East 

but also because of this strong Lebanese American population in 

this country we decided to hold this hearing and focus on ways 

where the United States can continue to be a partner but find 

strategies and ways to be better partners. 

We have two panels with us. 

Senator Risch is the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 

the Near East, South and Central Asia, and I suspect Senator 

Risch will be here when the vote on the veterans bill is done at 

some point. When he arrives, I will ask if he has opening comments, and I may interrupt the testimony. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

But I want to move in to our two panels. Our first panel is two 

distinguished folks. I will introduce them both and then ask each 

to give opening statements. Then we will get into a dialogue. 

Larry Silverman is Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for Near Eastern Affairs. Mr. Silverman was helpful in prepping 

me and Senator King to go do the visit to Lebanon last week. He 

has been Director of Israel and Palestinian Affairs for the Department of State and also served as Vice President Biden’s Special 

Advisor for Europe and Russia. During the first half of his career, 

Mr. Silverman focused on issues related to the Middle East, serving overseas in Jordan and Syria and in Washington, served as 

special advisor to Bill Burns. Mr. Silverman, glad to have you with 

us. 

We are also pleased to be joined today by Maj. Gen. Mike Plehn, 

who is the Principal Director for Middle East Policy in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense for policy. General Plehn helps execute 

defense policy and national security strategy for 15 Middle East 

nations, including Lebanon. And we are happy to have him with 

us today. 

With those introductions, I would like to ask Mr. Silverman first 

to offer your testimony. We accept your written testimony into the 

record. Try to summarize within 5 minutes. Then General Plehn. 

Then we will get into question and answer. 

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE SILVERMAN, ACTING DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman Kaine, 

and thank you for inviting me today to testify on the situation in 

Lebanon and our policy toward that very important country in a 

very volatile region as you saw directly. 

Your hearing comes at an important moment for Lebanon’s security and stability. Public discussion of Lebanon, as you say, in the 

United States has often focused primarily on the impact of the Syrian refugee flows into that country. The refugee crisis that you witnessed firsthand during your recent visit to Lebanon represents an 

urgent, imperative need. 

That said, Lebanon faces broader issues, and the United States 

is helping Lebanon respond to these challenges because Lebanon’s 

future affects important U.S. interests in the region, which are 

very obvious just by the geographical nature of Lebanon’s location 

and its neighborhood. 

The Syrian conflict threatens progress and Lebanon’s attempt to 

cement national identity and to establish lasting stability and an 

effective political system. The February 15 formation of a government by Prime Minister Salam, after 10 months of gridlock, is a 

welcome development for the Lebanese people and an opportunity 

for the United States and Lebanon to work together to achieve 

shared goals. 

The Lebanese people deserve a government that responds to 

their needs and protects their interests. As it works to gain a vote 

of confidence from Parliament and begins to exercise full powers, 

this government is in one sense better than its predecessor. Nearly 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

all political factions are represented in a careful balance. The 

March 14 faction is in the government. 

In order to obtain confidence, the Cabinet, as you say, must now 

agree on a ministerial policy statement. We have expressed support 

for this government. How we work with it will depend on its policies and its actions. 

The next political hurdle, as you know, is the end of President 

Suleiman’s term in office on May 25. Presidential elections should 

be conducted on time, freely, and fairly, and without foreign interference. We hope that the spirit that led to the government formation will also ensure that there is no Presidential vacancy. 

I think you know already, Mr. Chairman, of Lebanon’s unique 

security problems: a porous border, Hezbollah’s weapon stockpiles 

beyond government control, the need for all armed groups to be disarmed. And you know that existing political and sectarian differences have been intensified by the war in Syria. Hezbollah 

entered that war contrary to the agreement of all Lebanese parties 

to dissociate Lebanon from foreign conflicts. Hezbollah, on behalf of 

its foreign supporters, is dragging the Lebanese people into a war 

in defense of the Assad regime. Hezbollah’s posture of acting inside 

the state when it is convenient but stepping outside the state to 

use arms and violence when it wishes is deeply threatening. And 

now extremists fighting the Assad regime and its Hezbollah backers have brought their fight inside Lebanon, through a wave of reprehensible terrorist attacks that have killed and injured scores in 

Beirut and other cities. 

Amidst this, the Lebanese Armed Forces have acted to maintain 

internal security. Just 3 days ago, two Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were killed in a terrorist suicide bombing. As you know, the 

LAF has had recent counterterrorism successes, capturing some 

high-profile terrorists, including a facilitator for al-Qaeda-affiliated 

groups responsible for several suicide bombings. 

These incidents highlight the ongoing dangers from Hezbollah’s 

support for the Assad regime and the flow of violent extremists, 

whether they be from the al-Nusra Front version in Lebanon, the 

Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, the last of which claim responsibilities for the most recent 

bombings. 

The critical material and training we provide to the LAF and the 

internal security forces builds their capacities to conduct operations 

against extremists, terrorists, and criminal organizations. My colleague, General Plehn, will offer details on this. We are trying to 

increase our foreign military financing to the LAF in order to modernize it and build its capabilities, particularly to secure its border 

with Syria. 

Mr. Chairman, we need to maintain the strong partnership we 

have built with the LAF. And we appreciate Congress for its continued support of State and Defense programs that enhance Lebanon’s security and economic development. 

Mr. Chairman, you saw and you said that Lebanon hosts more 

Syrian refugees than any other country in the region, nearly 

940,000 or more. There is not a single Lebanese community that 

has not been affected by the refugee crisis. The United States is 

doing its part to help Lebanon deal with the burden, providing over 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

$340 million in assistance. We urge other countries to meet the 

pledges that they have made. 

There has also been a very damaging economic spillover to the 

tourism sector to investment and trade. The World Bank has estimated that the crisis will cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percent this 

year, and losses from the conflict would reach $7.5 billion. 

The most promising economic sector would be possible substantial reserves of offshore natural gas and even oil deposits. We hope 

those will be explored and contracted, and the State Department 

is engaging with both Lebanon and Israel to see about potential 

solutions to their maritime boundary dispute. 

Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, and 

President Suleiman last September launched the International 

Support Group for Lebanon. We look to this group not to be a oneoff in September, but to be an active vehicle by which the international community can provide the support to promote stability. 

Secretary Kerry will attend the next gathering of this group, the 

International Support Group, in Paris next week. 

The United States is also committed to ensuring an end to the 

era of impunity and assassinations and political violence in Lebanon. That is why we strongly support the work of the Special 

Tribunal for Lebanon, which just began 1 month ago the trials to 

determine and bring to justice those responsible for assassinating 

former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, and dozens of others. The 

Lebanese people, Mr. Chairman, have waited too long for accountability and justice. Unfortunately, as we all know, political violence 

still plagues Lebanon. Just in December, former Finance Minister 

and Ambassador to the United States, Mohammad Chatah, was 

assassinated. 

Mr. Chairman, Lebanon has faced existential challenges since its 

independence. The Taif Accord in 1989 helped end the civil war. 

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 helped structure 

a return to stability, and the 2012 Baabda Declaration established 

the principle that all Lebanese parties and factions should abstain 

from regional conflicts. It needs to be implemented. The Baabda 

Declaration needs to be implemented by all parties. 

Fortunately, amidst all these problems, Lebanon also has friends, 

and the United States counts itself as a very important friend of 

Lebanon and will continue to be. We need to stand with the people 

of Lebanon now. It is in our national interest to promote a stable 

Lebanon, free of foreign interference and able to defend its interests. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Silverman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE SILVERMAN

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for inviting me to testify today on the situation in Lebanon and our policy 

toward that important country in a very volatile region. 

Your hearing comes at an important moment for Lebanon’s security and stability—and that of the entire Levant. Public discussion of Lebanon in the United 

States has often focused primarily on the impact of the Syrian refugee flows into 

the country. This attention, including the Senate’s hearing on this subject last 

December, is warranted. 

Mr. Chairman, the refugee crisis that you witnessed first-hand during your recent 

visit to Lebanon represents an urgent, imperative need. That said, it is one of sevFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

eral issues Lebanon’s leaders and the Lebanese people face today. In addition to the 

refugee crisis, I would like to discuss today the political, security and economic challenges Lebanon faces, and how the United States is responding to all these challenges, because Lebanon’s future affects important U.S. interests in the region. 

The United States has a long history of diplomatic engagement with Lebanon to 

promote our interests in regional stability, the development of democracy, economic 

prosperity, and the effort to counter terrorism and extremism. We have worked to 

support and rebuild Lebanese state institutions that were left in ruins as a result 

of the civil war, and we have provided development assistance that helps to improve 

the lives and livelihoods of Lebanese citizens. Since the end of the Syrian occupation 

in 2005, we have accelerated our assistance to crucial state institutions to enable 

them to take on the leadership roles and management functions that a national government should perform. 

Mr. Chairman, it is essential that the international community stand by responsible forces in Lebanon in a broader sense, and particularly so in the next several 

months. Let me explain why. 

POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Lebanon is at a critical point in its attempt to cement a national identity and to 

establish lasting stability and an effective political system. The conflict in Syria 

threatens the progress it has made. Lebanon’s political leaders face a series of political hurdles in the first few months of this year; it has just overcome the first of 

these. The February 15 formation of a government by Prime Minister Salam, after 

10 months of stalemate and gridlock, is a welcome development for the Lebanese 

people and an opportunity for the United States and Lebanon to work together 

toward shared goals. We thank former Prime Minister Najib Mikati for his service, 

and we thank President Michel Sleiman, who has worked to steer Lebanon during 

very difficult times, and who worked with PM-designate Salam for months to form 

this Cabinet. 

The Lebanese people deserve a government that responds to their needs and protects their interests. This new government is comprised of eight members from the 

March 14 coalition, eight from the March 8 coalition, and eight others without formal affiliation. As it works to gain a vote of confidence from Parliament and begins 

to exercise its full powers, this new government is in a sense an improvement over 

its predecessor: nearly all political factions are represented in a careful balance, and 

after 3 years outside of government, the March 14 coalition is now part of the 

Cabinet. 

It is clear that the March 14 coalition determined that its interests in stabilizing 

Lebanon and promoting democracy and good governance were better served by participating in this government. In order to gain that vote of confidence, the Cabinet 

must first come to agreement on a ministerial policy statement. We have expressed 

support for the new government, but how we will work with it depends on its policies and actions. 

The next political hurdle facing Lebanon is the end of President Sleiman’s term 

in office on May 25. We have made clear to all those concerned in Lebanon that 

the United States believes Presidential elections should be conducted on time, freely 

and fairly, and without foreign interference. We hope that the interest in a stable 

Lebanon that drove the parties to reach agreement on the new Cabinet will also 

drive them to ensure that there is no vacancy. Lebanon needs responsible leadership 

that will address the challenges facing Lebanon and fulfill Lebanon’s international 

obligations. 

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Lebanon has truly unique security problems: an undemarcated and porous border 

with Syria that facilitates terrorist infiltration; areas of the country outside full 

state control; Hezbollah’s weapon stockpiles beyond government authority; the continuing need to implement UNSCR 1701 that called for the disarmament of all 

armed groups in Lebanon and stressed the importance of full control of Lebanon by 

the Government of Lebanon; and a history of foreign interference in its internal 

matters. 

Mr. Chairman, as you saw clearly during your visit, challenges to Lebanon’s security are rising. Existing political and sectarian differences have been intensified by 

the war in Syria. Hezbollah entered that war against the earlier agreement of all 

Lebanese parties and the Lebanese Government to ‘‘dissociate’’ the country from foreign conflicts. The Lebanese people know only too well the repercussions of spillover 

from the Assad regime’s brutal suppression of its own people. Syrian aircraft and 

artillery have violated Lebanon’s borders with impunity. Hezbollah is dragging the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

Lebanese people into a war in defense of an Assad regime whose continuation can 

only result in more conflict, more terrorism, and more instability for Lebanon. It 

does so not in the interest of Lebanon, but in its own narrow interests and on behalf 

of its foreign sponsors. Hezbollah’s posture of acting inside the state when it is convenient, but stepping outside the state to use arms and violence when it deems necessary for its self-interests remains deeply disturbing and threatening. 

And now, extremists fighting the Assad regime and its Hezbollah backers have 

brought that fight inside Lebanon, through a wave of reprehensible terrorist attacks 

that have killed and injured scores in Beirut and other cities. 

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has acted to maintain internal security, and 

it has taken losses in those operations. Twenty LAF soldiers were killed in a June 

2013 attempt to arrest an extremist and his followers in Sidon, and the LAF has 

intervened a number of times in Tripoli in an effort to mitigate politico-sectarian 

clashes. The LAF has had some recent counterterrorism successes. It has captured 

a number of high-profile terrorists, including a facilitator for several al-Qaeda-affiliated groups that have carried out a spate of brutal suicide bombings in Beirut, 

Hermel, and other Lebanese towns. 

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in Beirut, David Hale, said of the terrorist 

incident that occurred during your visit, ‘‘these abhorrent acts of . . . terrorism 

threaten the principles of stability, freedom, and safety that the people of Lebanon 

have worked so hard to uphold and we urge all parties to refrain from retaliatory 

acts that contribute to the cycle of violence.’’ 

These incidents highlight the ongoing dangers to Lebanon from the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah’s armed support for the Assad regime, and the flow of violent 

extremists (such as the Nusra Front, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the Levant, and 

the Abdullah Azzam Brigades) into Lebanon, who seek to justify their indiscriminate attacks as retaliation against Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria. Of course, the 

flow of these fighters is a problem for several states in the region. The states from 

which these fighters are coming are concerned about the dangers these fighters will 

present when they return to their home countries. 

Central to any country’s stability is a trained and capable security sector that is 

accountable to the people and the state. The critical support we provide to the LAF 

and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) is intended to build their capacities to conduct operations against extremists and criminal organizations and to ensure security throughout the country, including along its borders. Our assistance to the 

LAF—the United States has provided over 70 percent of LAF acquisitions— 

strengthens its ability to serve as the sole institution entrusted with the defense of 

Lebanon’s sovereignty. 

We are trying to increase this assistance in order to modernize the LAF, and in 

particular to build its capabilities to secure its own borders with Syria, which are 

porous. Providing the LAF with the ability to better control its borders is crucial. 

U.S. assistance helps ensure that extremist actors, such as Hezbollah, Iran, or the 

Syrian regime, have minimal opportunity to influence the LAF. We continually 

assess our policy of engagement with and assistance to the Government of Lebanon 

to ensure that no foreign terrorist organizations (including but not limited to 

Hezbollah) influence or benefit from the assistance we provide to the LAF and the 

ISF. 

Our sustained support through the funding that Congress approves—FMF, IMET, 

and DOD 1206 funds—is critical to improving the capabilities of the LAF. Our 

IMET program in particular has built lasting professional relationships between the 

senior ranks of the LAF and the U.S. military, as well as strengthened the values 

of civilian leadership and respect for rule of law within the LAF officer corps. My 

Department of Defense colleague, General Plehn, will provide greater detail of our 

relationship with the LAF, but I want to emphasize the importance of the relationships we have built with the LAF and with the ISF over the years. My DOD colleagues and we thank you for your continued support of State and Defense programs that provide for Lebanon’s security and economic development. 

As Chairman Kaine heard directly from LAF Commander Kahwagi in Lebanon, 

the LAF is a beacon of cross-confessional integration for the entire country. It 

remains one of the most respected national institutions in Lebanon because it 

reflects the diversity of the country: it is in fact the sole national institution able 

to counter destabilizing influences from within Lebanon and without. Supporting 

the LAF strengthens its ability to serve as a model for other Lebanese institutions. 

Our assistance has been effective and is welcomed by Lebanon; it has helped create 

important relationships. We need to maintain this strong partnership. 

You have seen reports that Saudi Arabia will provide $3 billion for the LAF. 

International assistance to the LAF can help build up the capabilities the LAF 

needs. The United States believes international donors can complement each other’s 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

efforts in order to maximize the growth of needed capabilities for an armed force 

whose troops are badly stretched across the country. We are in contact with the 

Governments of Saudi Arabia and France regarding this assistance to promote maximum coordination. 

HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES

Lebanon hosts more Syrian refugees than any other country—both per capita and 

in absolute terms. There are currently nearly 940,000 Syrian refugees—some 20 

percent of the total population now, as well as 51,000 Palestinian refugees from 

Syria in Lebanon, of which the vast majority reside in host communities in rented 

accommodations, unfinished buildings, or in informal tented settlements in more 

than 1,600 localities throughout the country. There is not a single Lebanese community that has not been affected by the refugee crisis. With refugee arrivals continuing, the sheer volume of need has overwhelmed ability of the central government and local municipalities to respond to the enormous challenge of providing 

public services to this large and growing population. 

The United States is doing its part, providing over $340 million in humanitarian 

assistance since the beginning of the Syrian conflict to support the needs of refugees 

in Lebanon and the communities that host them, including $76.4 million announced 

by Secretary Kerry at the International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for 

Syria held in Kuwait a month ago. Last September at the inaugural meeting of the 

International Support Group for Lebanon, Secretary Kerry announced $30 million 

in assistance specifically aimed at helping the communities that host these refugees. 

As you know, Lebanon does not have formal refugee camps for Syrians; almost all 

of the refugees from Syria live in Lebanese communities, placing strains on basic 

infrastructure and health and educational systems. We appreciate the generosity 

and hospitality of the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese people and understand the enormity of the influx. 

In its most recent humanitarian appeal, the U.N. is seeking $1.7 billion in 2014 

to adequately respond to the refugee crisis in Lebanon, on top of the money that 

the government of Lebanon is already spending on the crisis. The scope of the crisis 

is an unprecedented challenge for the U.N. humanitarian agencies and nongovernmental organizations; the Lebanese will face this challenge for some time. The international community must step up to provide both humanitarian and development 

assistance to assist these refugees and the communities that host them in order to 

bolster Lebanon’s stability while meeting urgent humanitarian needs. 

We urge those countries that have made pledges of funds for Lebanon and the 

other neighboring countries hosting refugees, as well as for those in need remaining 

inside Syria, to fulfill these commitments as quickly as possible, and to be responsive to future appeals, as the United States will be. 

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

The spillover of the Syrian conflict, including terrorist attacks in Beirut, has 

weakened Lebanon’s tourism sector, investment, and foreign trade—all important 

components of Lebanon’s open economy. Uncertainty has depressed consumption, 

with wealthy tourists gone and more Lebanese reluctant to spend. Investors are 

delaying decisions, and Lebanon’s land trade routes have been disrupted. This year 

will likely be the fourth consecutive year of slowing growth for the Lebanese economy. For example, the World Bank has estimated that the crisis will cut real GDP 

growth in Lebanon by 2.9 percent this year. 

Our economic assistance programs encourage growth in Lebanon through improving the technical expertise of small businessowners and their access to financial 

resources, especially in the agricultural sector. We also encourage the Lebanese 

Government to do more to promote economic reform, including privatization of its 

moribund public sector industries, though this has been stymied due to political 

gridlock. 

Banking is a pillar of the Lebanese economy, and the banking sector, despite all 

of Lebanon’s economic challenges, saw deposits grow significantly in 2013, providing 

economic stability through its purchases of government debt and funding of private 

sector activity. Given its importance, it is all the more critical that the banking sector in Lebanon safeguard Lebanon’s place in the international financial system by 

doing all it can to protect itself and correspondent banks in the United States and 

elsewhere from money laundering and terrorist finance. In coordination with the 

Treasury Department, we engage with the Central Bank of Lebanon and with Lebanese banks to ensure that they have vigorous systems to combat these illicit finance 

threats. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

The most promising economic sector in the medium- to long-term may be the 

hydrocarbons industry. Lebanon may have substantial reserves of offshore natural 

gas and maybe even oil deposits. However, the lengthy political stalemate, as well 

as a maritime boundary dispute with Israel, has prevented Lebanon from further 

exploring its offshore resources. As a result, no exploration has taken place, and any 

potential finds would take a number of years to begin producing. 

We expect the newly formed Cabinet may take steps to restart the process to 

allow international oil companies to enter the Lebanese market and explore. The 

State Department is engaging with both sides to explore potential solutions to the 

maritime boundary dispute. Those discussions have progressed well, and we hope 

they will resume with the new government now in place. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF BROAD INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

In the face of all these challenges, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and 

President Michel Sleiman mobilized support for Lebanon’s stability, sovereignty, 

and state institutions by launching last September the International Support Group 

for Lebanon, which currently consists of the U.N., the permanent members of the 

U.N. Security Council, the World Bank, the Arab League, Germany, Italy, and the 

EU. It was a strong demonstration of international support for Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability, and for responsible Lebanese political actors. 

We look to the ISG to be an active vehicle by which the international community 

can demonstrate political and financial support to promote stability and to help Lebanon address specific challenges. Secretary Kerry will attend the next gathering of 

the ISG in just 8 days, in Paris. 

The United States, along with many others in the international community, is 

committed to ensuring an end to the era of impunity for assassinations and political 

violence in Lebanon. That is why we strongly support the work of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. One month ago, the Tribunal began its initial trials to bring to 

justice those responsible for assassinating former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 

2005, along with dozens of innocents killed in this and other attacks. The Lebanese 

people deserve accountability and justice. The commencement of the trials is an 

important step, but political violence still plagues Lebanon. Former Finance Minister and Ambassador to the United States Mohammad Chatah was assassinated in 

December in downtown Beirut. Two other March 14 leaders survived assassination 

attempts in 2012—a minister in the current Cabinet, Boutros Harb, and Lebanese 

Forces leader Samir Geagea. ISF Information Branch Chief Wissam al-Hassan was 

killed in a car bomb in Beirut in October 2012. 

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, Members: Lebanon has faced many 

existential challenges since gaining independence in 1943, and today it faces similar 

challenges from the war in Syria. Lebanon has found reliable international partners 

to see it through some of its darkest periods and emerge the stronger for it. The 

1989 Taif Accord was the basis for ending 15 years of civil war, and its multiconfessional National Pact remains in effect. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 

1701 helped structure a return to stability. The 2012 Baabda Declaration established the principle that all Lebanese parties and factions should abstain from 

regional conflicts. It needs to be implemented by all parties. 

But Lebanon has friends, and the United States is one of them. We need to stand 

with the people of Lebanon; it is in our national interest to promote a stable, secure, 

and sovereign Lebanon, one that is free of foreign interference and that is able to 

defend its own interests. And we will continue our efforts to end the conflict in 

Syria, as that conflict—left unchecked—will, among other repercussions, continue to 

destabilize Lebanon and other states in the region. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Silverman. 

General Plehn. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL T. PLEHN, PRINCIPAL 

DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

General PLEHN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Kaine, thank you for 

the opportunity to speak today, and thank you for your help in 

drawing attention to Lebanon’s security challenges, especially those 

due to the Syrian conflict. The impact on Lebanon from the conflict 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

in Syria has become acute, as you well know, and you have 

described the impact of the refugees, as has Mr. Silverman as well. 

But the Syrian conflict also is attracting foreign fighters from 

across the region and around the world. Those foreign fighters are 

becoming battle-hardened and gaining experience that could have 

destabilizing effects in the years to come. 

Of great concern—and you have mentioned it already—the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, in particular, has exploited 

the growing governing vacuum in eastern Syria to carve out territory to train its fighters, recruit more fighters, and plan attacks. 

Both the ISIL and al-Nusra Front have established a presence in 

Lebanon and are seeking to increase their cooperation with Sunni 

extremist groups already operating in Lebanon. And as you noted, 

during your recent visit the Sunni terrorist attacks in Lebanon certainly are on the rise. 

Since 2014, seven attacks against Shia population centers have 

been executed. Approximately 10 individuals have died and more 

than 120 have been wounded in those attacks. 

I would tell you that the Lebanese Armed Forces have taken a 

variety of bold measures to maintain stability in Lebanon and 

counter the destabilizing effects that the Syrian conflict risks to 

Lebanon’s security. The increased operational tempo of Lebanese 

Armed Forces’ deployments over the past few months reflects their 

commitment to Lebanon’s security. In fact, the last willingness to 

exercise its role as the sole, legitimate defense force in Lebanon has 

made it a target as well, and just last weekend, second border regiment personnel were killed when a suicide bomber detonated a 

vehicle near an LAF checkpoint. 

I would also tell you that our continued engagement and assistance to Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces is all the more 

important in this time of increased challenges to Lebanon’s stability. As mentioned in previous testimony, the Lebanese have just 

agreed upon a new government. This important step provides us 

with an opportunity to increase our engagements both with Lebanon’s Government as a whole and the Lebanese Armed Forces in 

particular. 

For fiscal year 2014, we have provided approximately $71 million 

in foreign military financing, thanks to the U.S. Congress, and $8.7 

million in fiscal year 2013 1206 funding. Both of those strengthen 

the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces and support its mission 

to secure Lebanon’s borders, defend the sovereignty of that state, 

and implement, as Mr. Silverman noted, U.N. Security Council 

Resolutions 1559 and 1701. 

Since 2005, the United States has allocated nearly $1 billion to 

support the Lebanese Armed Forces and internal security forces, 

making us Lebanon’s key partner in security cooperation. 

Recently in December 2013, President Suleiman announced the 

Saudi Arabia will grant Lebanon $3 billion to purchase defense 

items from the French. So in concert with international partners 

such as the French and in line with the International Support 

Group for Lebanon that Mr. Silverman mentioned, we fully support 

strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces and will continue to 

work with partners to ensure our assistance is complementary and 

used effectively to meet these growing challenges. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

I would also tell you that our International Military Education 

and Training program with Lebanon is our fourth-largest in the 

world. It builds strong ties between the United States and Lebanon 

by bringing Lebanese officers to the United States. In fiscal year 

2013, Lebanon received $2.9 million under the IMET program. 

That allowed 67 Lebanese military students to attend education 

and training classes here in the United States. Since 1985, this 

program has brought more than 1,000 Lebanese military students 

to the United States for education and training. 

Similarly, our section 1206 assistance has enabled the LAF to 

monitor, secure, and protect Lebanon’s borders against terrorist 

threats and the illicit transfer of goods. Since 2006, the United 

States has provided more than $100 million in section 1206 to 

assist the LAF. 

We are also focused on the LAF’s desire for institutional reform. 

The DOD has just instituted a defense institution reform initiative 

with the LAF. This initiative complements a U.S. whole-of-government effort supporting Lebanese security sector reform. 

In closing, sir, I would say that our positive relationship with 

and continued support to Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces 

is now more important than ever. And I thank you and the other 

distinguished members of your subcommittee for not only calling 

this hearing but for your abiding interest and support for Lebanon. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Plehn follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL PLEHN

Chairman Kaine, Ranking Senator Risch, and other distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about the evolving 

security situation in Lebanon in relation to the conflict in Syria and the importance 

of our partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

Your help in drawing attention to Lebanon’s security challenges, especially to 

those due to the Syrian conflict, is both timely and beneficial. 

The impact on Lebanon from the conflict in Syria has become acute. In Lebanon, 

there are now nearly 1 million refugees from Syria, equal to approximately 20- 

percent of the current population in Lebanon. Despite Lebanon’s official dissociation 

policy regarding the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah is militarily involved in Syria, and 

sectarian tensions are spilling over the Syria-Lebanon border. Lebanese towns and 

villages near the border with Syria regularly experience shelling from Syria—both 

by the Syrian regime and Syrian opposition forces—due to regime allegations that 

opposition fighters use Sunni-dominated areas as safe havens as well as opposition 

allegations that Hezbollah uses Shia-dominated areas to enter Syria and launch 

attacks. 

The Syrian conflict is attracting foreign fighters from across the region and 

around the world. We assess there are now significantly more foreign fighters in 

Syria than there were foreign fighters in Iraq at the height of the Iraq war. Many 

of these fighters are finding their way to a number of fighting units, including terrorist groups such as the al-Nusra Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant. These foreign fighters are becoming battle-hardened and gaining experience 

that could have destabilizing effects in the years to come. Of great concern, the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, in particular, has exploited the governing vacuum in eastern Syria to carve out territory to train its fighters, recruit more of 

them, and plan attacks. Both the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Nusra 

Front have established a presence in Lebanon and are seeking to increase their cooperation with Sunni extremists groups already operating in Lebanon. These Lebanese-based groups have claimed a number of recent attacks in Lebanon. 

Senator Kaine, as you experienced during your recent visit to Beirut, Sunni terrorist attacks in Lebanon are on the rise. Since the beginning of 2014 alone, seven 

suicide attacks have hit Shia population centers. Last week’s twin bombing in Bir 

Hassan, as reported in the press, likely was targeting the Iranian Culture Center 

in the area in south Beirut. Approximately 10 individuals died and more than 120 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

were wounded. The al-Qaeda-linked Abdallah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for the attacks. Leaders across Lebanon’s political spectrum have condemned 

the attacks. 

THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND STABILITY

The Lebanese Armed Forces has taken a variety of bold measures to maintain stability in Lebanon and counter the destabilizing effects that the Syrian conflict risks 

to Lebanon’s security. The increased operational tempo of Lebanese Armed Forces 

deployments over the past few months reflects their commitment to Lebonon’s security. In the last 7 months, we have seen our partners in the Lebanese Special forces 

deploy to Sidon for counterterrorism operations, to Tripoli to conduct stability operations, and to Arsal to provide security for the populations affected by Syria’s instability. Throughout this period, the 2nd Intervention Regiment conducted stability 

operations and supported counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts in the 

Bekaa Valley. The LAF’s willingness to exercise its role as the sole legitimate 

defense force in Lebanon has made it a target as well. Just last weekend, 2nd Border Regiment personnel were killed when a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle at 

a LAF checkpoint. 

U.S. and international assistance builds the capacity of the Lebanese Armed 

Forces to serve the democratic government and people of Lebanon. The Lebanese 

Armed Forces have organized themselves effectively to maintain a tremendously 

high operational tempo for many of its units, and have demonstrated the ability to 

make appropriate requests for and use of equipment, as well as unity and professionalism in numerous operations. One recent example of the Lebanese Armed 

Forces’ success was the February 12, 2014, arrest of an Abdallah Azzam official, 

which led to the discovery of and dismantling of a large car bomb. 

U.S. SUPPORT TO THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES

Our continued engagement and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces are all 

the more important in this time of increased challenges to Lebanon’s stability. As 

mentioned in previous testimony, the Lebanese have just agreed upon a new government formed by Prime Minister Tammam Salam. This is an important step for the 

government and people of Lebanon, and provides us with an opportunity to increase 

our engagement with Lebanon’s Government as a whole and the Lebanese Armed 

Forces in particular. 

The emergence of the Lebanese Armed Forces as Lebanon’s sole legitimate 

defense force is a critical component of Lebanon’s long-term stability and development. U.S. assistance to Lebanese Armed Forces, approximately $71 million in fiscal 

year 2014 FMF and $8.7M in fiscal year 2013 1206 funding, strengthens the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces and supports its mission to secure Lebanon’s 

borders, defend the sovereignty of the state, and implement U.N. Security Council 

Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Since 2005, the United States has allocated nearly $1 

billion to support the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security forces, making 

us Lebanon’s largest partner in security cooperation—a key pillar of our bilateral 

relationship. 

In December 2013, President Sleiman announced that Saudi Arabia will grant 

Lebanon $3 billion to purchase defense items from the French. In concert with international partners such as the French, and in line with the International Support 

Group for Lebanon, we fully support strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces and 

will continue to work with partners to ensure that our assistance is complementary 

and used effectively to meet these growing challenges. 

Our International Military Education and Training (IMET) program with Lebanon is the 4th-largest in the world. IMET builds strong ties between the United 

States and Lebanon by bringing Lebanese officers and officials to the United States 

for professional development and to train alongside U.S. forces. In fiscal year 2013, 

Lebanon received $2.9M under the IMET program that allowed 67 Lebanese military students to attend education and training classes in the United States. Since 

1985, the IMET program has brought more than 1,000 Lebanese military students 

to the United States for education and training. 

Our Section 1206 assistance has enhanced the Lebanese Armed Forces’ ability to 

monitor, secure, and protect Lebanon’s borders against terrorist threats and the 

illicit transfer of goods. Since 2006, the United States has provided more than 

$100M in Section 1206 funding to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces to build its 

counterterrorism capabilities. Most recently, Congress approved $9.3M in FY 2014 

1206 funding to enhance Lebanon’s border security capability further by providing 

the Lebanese Armed Forces’ 2nd Border Regiment with additional surveillance 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

equipment to guard its portion of the border—including radars, seismic sensors, and 

cameras. We are also focused on supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces’ desire for institutional reform; the Department of Defense has just started a Defense Institution 

Reform Initiative (DIRI) with the Lebanese Armed Forces. This initiative complements a U.S. whole-of-government effort supporting Lebanese security sector 

reform. U.S. Central Command continues to provide support to the training and professionalization of the Lebanese Armed Forces, while the Department of State 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funds a program to 

strengthen the capability and management capacity of the Internal Security Forces. 

All of these programs help to strengthen our relationship and ties between our two 

militaries and throughout their ranks. 

SUPPORTING LEBANON

The crisis in Syria will likely not end soon, nor unfortunately will its impact on 

neighboring Lebanon. Our positive relationship with, and continued support to, Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces is now more important than ever. The effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces is evident in how 

well it has managed the violence that has plagued Lebanon over the course of the 

conflict in Syria. The Lebanese Armed Forces is a critical pillar of Lebanon’s stability and its ability and commitment to curtailing sectarian fighting and terrorism 

has been a significant factor in preventing Lebanon from descending into greater 

violence. 

Senator KAINE. I just cannot help but comment that only the 

acronym ‘‘happy’’—the U.S. military could use the phrase ‘‘LAF’’ 

with a straight face. Lebanese Armed Forces. I am sure everyone 

knows that, but even the armed forces gave me a hat with LAF on 

it that I am now wearing around. 

So let me just ask you first. When we went to Lebanon—for 

either or both of you—a lot of what we heard before we went was 

the warning that Lebanon is approaching a breaking point, and 

that would be described differently by different people asking that. 

Is that kind of language alarmist or accurate? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say we do not quite use 

that language only because Lebanon has been through so much, 

more than maybe arguably any other country. But this is a very, 

very serious situation, and Lebanon is facing very, very serious 

threats. It faced threats even before the Syrian war to its independence and its sovereignty and its security obviously. There were 

political assassinations before the Syrian conflict, for example. But 

the Syrian conflict has really exacerbated this. 

The Lebanese are fond of using an Arabic word that translates 

into ‘‘saturation’’ when they talk about the refugee issue, that they 

are saturated. In other words, even though you could give more 

money—the international community can and should give more 

money, but they are simply saturated as a society with this. But 

we are appreciative that they are reaching out and accepting these 

people. 

But I would say there are real risks and threats, and that is why 

it is so important that the international community get behind the 

moderate, the responsible voices in Lebanon, that are very concerned about threats to stability. 

Senator KAINE. General Plehn, any thoughts on that question? 

General PLEHN. Yes, sir. I would say that Lebanon has proven 

to be amazingly resilient, given the stresses that they have been 

put under certainly from what has been happening in Syria as 

well. And I think a key component of that resilience, at least on 

the military side with the Lebanese Armed Forces, has been that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

engagement between the United States and the Lebanese Armed 

Forces. They have shown some very good progress recently certainly in counterterrorism fronts as well. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. We spent time with the new Prime Minister talking about the formation of the government. And the system and the 

steps over the next couple of months are a little bit unusual, and 

I wanted to get your opinions about what might likely occur. We 

are nearing the end of a 6-year Presidential term, and the expectation is there would be Presidential elections by late May. If there 

is a successful Presidential election, the newly formed Prime Minister and government would then dissolve after 3 months. But I 

gather they would dissolve with the feeling that they had done 

their job, and depending on how the Presidential election goes, 

there is some chance that that Cabinet and Prime Minister could 

be the nucleus of the next government working together with a 

new President. Am I reading this the right way? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. You are, Mr. Chairman. 

One other comment on your first question, just to echo what 

General Plehn just said, which is this is a very tough situation. It 

could be much worse and much tougher had we not had the institution of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the internal security forces 

to help, assisted by us and the development of this relationship. 

This is a unique—it is an overused word. I think this is a unique 

political situation. So the government now has to try to reach 

agreement on a ministerial statement. If it does not, it goes on 

being a caretaker, which means it is not able to make—even before 

the Presidential election—is not able to make real policy. And some 

of these economic decisions, which tend to get lost—if the government does not, for example, pass decrees, it cannot issue tenders 

for this gas exploration, for example. And these are issues that generally have not been taken up by caretaker governments. That is 

why they need to have a fully empowered government to do that. 

And as you say, it may be that if we can take the spirit that 

reached this compromise to reach a government, if that extends to 

the Presidential election, then we have a President. Then we will 

have another government. Hopefully that would be easier to form, 

given that we have gone through a government fully empowered or 

a vote of confidence and a Presidential election. 

But there is no sugar coating. This gets down to a very complicated process in which a lot of equities have to be taken into 

account. And as you see, one day there is going to be a government, 

the next day there will not be a government. And we thought that 

we might have a ministerial statement even yesterday. Now we are 

waiting for them. I hope they can reach agreement on that. So I 

hope that we can build upon what spirit we have had in reaching 

the formation of a government. 

Senator KAINE. The selection of the President is also different 

than we might think of it here. The selection of the President is 

done by Parliament based on a two-thirds vote. It is not automatic 

that you get a two-thirds vote for a President. We were in dialogue 

with local leaders, and one of the possibilities they indicated was 

that in the past, when it has been difficult to find a candidate 

who could reach the two-thirds threshold, that there would be a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17 

temporary adjustment of the constitution to allowing the sitting 

President to have a holdover period. It might be a year. It might 

be 2 years. 

We met with President Suleiman and he certainly did not suggest anything about staying past his 6-year term. 

But based on what you know now, what do you think is the prospect that by May there could be the candidates who could come out 

who might be able to develop a two-thirds support in a Parliament 

for the selection of a new President post-late May? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. No. You are exactly right, Mr. Chairman. And 

I cannot put a percentage on the possibility that this will happen. 

We believe it is important to do these elections, which are parliamentary not popular elections, on time and according to the constitution. You are right. They have gotten around this before by 

extension of the President. I do not know if that will happen. The 

intent right now is to truly elect a President. And there are different means of electing a President, whether you work it out and 

bring it as more of kind of a rubber stamp by the Parliament or 

you have a genuine debate within Parliament. We do not know exactly what will happen. So it is really very, very difficult to guess 

at this point. I would say the odds increased of an election of a 

President, but who knows? And just the add to the complexity, 

then we would have another government. Then it would have to 

form itself up. 

And remember, we are looking at parliamentary elections again 

later this year because this Parliament will go out of business in 

November just based on the previous extension of its mandate. We 

had wanted elections before, and I think the Lebanese wanted elections before but they were not able to organize parliamentary elections. So it is even more complicated than that. So this is a very 

eventful political year for Lebanon. 

Senator KAINE. With Hezbollah openly declaring its support for 

Assad in Syria and sort of going all in to send troops in in Syria, 

how has that affected Hezbollah politically inside Lebanon? I know 

there has been controversy about that decision by Hezbollah to do 

that. It certainly has engendered acts of Sunni violence that have 

spiked, largely attributed to Hezbollah’s decision to go all in in 

Syria. So talk about Hezbollah’s political support in Lebanon and 

how the decision to focus on Syria has affected their political 

support? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. As I said in my remarks, Mr. Chairman, this is 

not a war in which the people of Lebanon wanted or want to be 

involved. This is, in effect, Hezbollah dragging the people of Lebanon into a foreign war. 

I think there have been political costs for Hezbollah in this. I 

cannot say if that is why we have a government today. I think 

there is a lot of concern across the board, across the political spectrum regarding the violence that you witnessed directly and that 

has plagued Lebanon of late but even more so than throughout its 

political life. So I think there have been political costs. And we will 

have to see. That is why elections are important. We will have to 

see how that manifests itself. You cannot automatically translate 

it, but I think there is deep-seated concern on the part of the Lebanese people that they are not getting anything out of this. As a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18 

matter of fact, everything that is flowing from this is negative for 

them, and it goes well beyond the refugee situation. 

We have condemned the violence from Sunni extremists, as well 

as from Shia extremists. So Lebanon is paying a heavy price, and 

the Lebanese people deserve to stop being forced to pay that price. 

Senator KAINE. In your testimony and in my opening comments, 

I talked a lot about the Syria effect on Lebanon, which was a main 

subject of virtually every conversation we had. 

I want to ask a question about one other significant dynamic, the 

U.S. discussions with the P5+1 nations with Iran over their nuclear 

program and the prospect that a resolution of that particular challenge and some rapprochement between Iran and the United States 

or Iran and other nations, including Saudi Arabia, could have 

within Lebanon. Could a potential rapprochement with appropriate 

skepticism about whether we would get there between Iran and the 

West and Saudi Arabia open the door to greater political stability 

in Lebanon, or would there be a converse concern that an emboldened Iran freed from some of the sanctions might further exacerbate tensions in the country? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think if you talk to Lebanese people, a lot of Lebanese people 

would tell you that they would like to believe—genuinely like to 

believe—that if we are able to reach a nuclear deal—the P5+1 is 

able to reach a nuclear deal with Iran—that it will have a positive 

effect, not the negative effect. I hope that is not the case. But most 

people like to think that there is a possibility here. 

Iran’s regional actions are obviously a threat. We have condemned them. They are a state sponsor of terrorism, and they continue, obviously, to be a major supporter of the Assad regime, 

among many other aspects of sponsoring terrorism. But this is not 

part of the P5+1 talks. They are very much focused on the nuclear 

issue. 

I hope that what you say is true and that it will induce Iran to 

adopt a more responsible behavior in the region. When it came to 

the Geneva conference and the issue came up over Iran coming, 

potentially attending, could Iran potentially be a part of a solution? 

Theoretically, yes; but we were asking it to do what everybody else 

that attended the Geneva conference was being asked to do, which 

was to accept the Geneva communique and the purpose of the 

Geneva talks which Iran chose not to do. And so Iran exempted 

itself—excepted itself from that process. 

So hopefully it will have that more—if we are able—and the big 

‘‘if’’ is we are able to reach an agreement. It will have that positive 

effect. Obviously, that is up to Iran, but I think in Lebanon, the 

Lebanese people want to see, obviously, a change in Iranian policy 

toward Lebanon, as well as to Syria. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask a question or two about refugees 

before turning to Lebanese Armed Forces questions for General 

Plehn. 

One of the issues we picked up in dialogue with NGOs and the 

U.N. High Commissioner was sort of the changing definition of this 

refugee challenge. So the dimension from numbers is significant 

and sizable. If you assume that the refugee problem is a short-lived 

problem, you treat it one way, but once someone has lived in the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

country for a year and then 2 years and 3 years—I think there are 

about 330,000 young people in the Lebanese public school system, 

and there are nearly 75,000 or 80,000 Syrian children of school age 

who are now living in communities. As the refugee challenge goes 

on for longer and longer, the strategies for dealing with refugee 

issues start to change. You know, instead of emergency aid of 

water bottles, what do you do to develop better water systems? 

Do you think our strategy and the strategy of the U.N. and other 

refugee-serving agencies is appropriately starting to look at sort of 

the long-term need or are we still focusing on the kind of emergency relief that might not really take into account the realistic 

nature of that refugee population? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think your diagnosis is exactly 

correct. As large and as bad as the figures are in terms of the total 

number of refugees that have come into Lebanon and to Jordan 

and elsewhere, in some sense the bigger number is how many 

years they might stay. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. If you look at the region, Lebanon has raised 

this very real challenge with us. I do not know if you met with 

King Abdullah of Jordan when he was here. 

Senator KAINE. Two weeks ago; yes. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. But he has often spoken of this. It is this challenge of when might these people go home. 

This is not something that comes new to us or is a new consideration. And that is why we talk about assistance to the refugees. We 

always need to make sure that people understand we are talking 

about assistance to the refugees and to the communities that are 

hosting them because even in Jordan, 80 percent of the refugees 

are not living in camps. And as you know, Lebanon has very 

restricted, informal tented settlements in a couple of places, but in 

general, no camps. There are 1,600 communities in which the refugees live. 

So it is a huge strain on educational systems, and that has to be 

addressed. And some of our money is going to expanding access to 

education. When we say access for the refugees, we also mean 

access for the local communities because otherwise refugees are 

taking up that access. You have seen double sessions in school and 

things like that. 

Senator KAINE. And just again for the audience—most may follow this, but it is pretty important to note—because of the number 

of Syrian children in Lebanon, many Lebanese schools are going to 

split shifts, morning sessions with refugee children and afternoon 

sessions with local populations or vice versa, often having to teach 

in different languages in the morning and afternoon sessions. So 

again, thinking 330,000 children in the public schools nationally, 

but about 80,000 refugee children in this community, the magnitude of this challenge is very, very dramatic. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. So beyond the education issue are particular 

issues of health and infrastructure, meaning water infrastructure, 

for example, which is hugely important in Lebanon and in Jordan 

as well. And so some of our money is going to the U.N. and other 

money is going to NGOs. And Secretary Kerry, when he attended 

the International Support Group in New York in September, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

brought with him $30 million that was particularly focused on 

aiding the host communities. So we are dealing with water, trying 

to enhance and increase water infrastructure to get to these communities. And it can be helping with housing to be honest, money 

that is going to communities when they add on to their houses, for 

example, to accommodate refugees. 

So absolutely, you are right to focus on these longer term 

infrastructural burdens because, as you mentioned earlier, you are 

getting a youth population. And as I think you heard when you 

were in Lebanon, a lot of kids just not being educated. Period. And 

that has enormous implications not just for Lebanon but throughout the region. 

Senator KAINE. I gather that the way you describe this challenge, 

the International Support Group that was convened is looking at 

this dynamic where, instead of emergency relief, as the conflict in 

Syria stretches longer, they need to possibly change the kinds of 

relief they provide to the refugee and host populations. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Yes, that is right. We do not need to wait for 

groups, either an international support group or any other institution. We need to do it. The individual countries need to do it ourselves. And that is why we are focused on that. Our money is 

already focusing on that. And when we talk about Lebanon with 

our allies, we are talking about these kind of long-term challenges 

that need to be addressed, not just getting the immediate needs of 

food or medicine. 

Senator KAINE. General Plehn, turning to the Lebanese Armed 

Forces, before I ask about the relationship with U.S. military, I 

would like your assessment on one sort of aspect of the Lebanese 

Armed Forces. You know, one of the clear challenges, as we met 

with civilian leadership, the complexity of forming a government in 

a population where there has been this tradition of very delicate 

power-sharing between Sunni, Shia, Maronite, Roman Catholic, different groups within the country. It is a little bit like Belgian politics where everything sort of has to be allocated not among language groups but among ethnic groups. And that, together with the 

complications of the Syrian civil war, was the reason it took so long 

to put together this governing coalition. 

Moving over into the Lebanese Armed Forces, how are they able 

to integrate these populations? The civil side has a hard time doing 

it, but within the Lebanese Armed Forces, are the Sunni, Shia, and 

Christian service men and women well integrated in units? And 

can that serve a leadership function in terms of modeling to the 

remainder of society that, look, this can be done? 

General PLEHN. Mr. Chairman, that is both a great question and 

a great observation, and you have highlighted certainly the difficulty within Lebanon with the many different confessions that 

come together in that country. What I would tell you is what you 

know, that the Lebanese Armed Forces really is a model for how 

those different confessions are able to come together within that 

country, certainly rally behind the mission of being the sole, legitimate security provider for the country itself and then I think, as 

you noted, provide that model for the rest of the country for the 

future. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

Senator KAINE. Talk a little bit about how the Lebanese Armed 

Forces responds to these twin challenges, first of having this 

sizable and powerful militia in Hezbollah and, second, now that 

there is this spike in Sunni-Shia violence since Hezbollah has gone 

into Syria. These are two different kinds of challenges that the 

Lebanese Armed Forces have to deal with. Talk a little bit about 

their capacity in dealing with these two challenges, the Hezbollah 

relationship and the spike in Sunni-Shia violence in the last year 

or so. 

General PLEHN. Yes, sir. If I may take the last first with the 

spike in Sunni-Shia violence. I think what we have seen is exactly 

what you would hope and expect out of any armed forces for a 

country, is that those individuals are willing to put themselves on 

the forefront of the fighting. And as I noted earlier in my testimony 

and as you noted as well, the Lebanese Armed Forces have paid 

the cost of that intervention to provide security for the people of 

Lebanon. 

You, yourself, noted that Lebanese Hezbollah is a well-armed 

militia, something that just is not normal to us in America in 

terms of a construct for how we deal with armed force. Certainly 

from the United States military perspective, our engagement with 

the Lebanese Armed Forces to build that professional military 

force, to reinforce both to them and to the people of Lebanon that 

they are the sole, legitimate security provider for Lebanon is certainly that path that we want to go down. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I just jump on what Mike 

just said? 

Senator KAINE. Yes, please. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. Which is, there is another component too with 

the diplomatic component, which is we have to work together with 

governments in the region and even in Europe to stop the flow of 

foreign fighters going to this conflict. And we have to stop the flow 

of financing to violent extremists. And that is a very important 

effort that is going on right now. We have seen some steps by some 

countries to constrict or restrict and to penalize—punish with 

harsh laws, harsh penalties—people who go over to fight, who are 

going over to Syria or anywhere else to fight. And that really needs 

to be an important part of our whole-of-government approach to 

this problem. And I think it will be a subject, for example, when 

President Obama goes to Saudi Arabia later. That will be because 

we are working with all of the governments of the region and in 

Europe as well to deal with this. We really need to stop at the 

source as well. 

Senator KAINE. If we hope to increase the support we provide to 

the Lebanese Armed Forces, how can we assure that any technological capacity or weapons systems or weaponry—that there are 

appropriate safeguards and accountability controls over U.S.- 

supplied security material so that they stay in the right hands and 

do not fall into the wrong hands in the middle of a very volatile 

security environment? 

General PLEHN. Mr. Chairman, in Lebanon, much as we have in 

many other countries, we have an office of defense cooperation in 

Beirut. Their primary purpose truly is to ensure that we have the 

appropriate safeguards and that we are performing the appropriate 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

end-use monitoring is what we call it when we provide foreign military sales, equipment to partner nations. So our U.S. personnel in 

the Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut will do that enhanced 

end-use monitoring to ensure that that equipment is both accounted for and being used properly. 

Senator KAINE. I found it interesting, in the dialogue with the 

Lebanese Armed Forces, their take on the Saudi Arabian and 

French potential for receipt of Saudi Arabian assistance to purchase French military assets. They said they liked the U.S. equipment a lot better basically is what the Lebanese Armed Forces was 

saying. 

But I gather from your testimony, General, that you feel like the 

more partners, the better, the more assistance, the better. You do 

not find that Saudi Arabian provision of $3 billion to purchase 

French assistance—you do not find that troubling or problematic. 

You view it as greater partners to help the armed forces is to be 

desired and not to be feared? 

General PLEHN. Sir, I think Lebanon can use a lot of friends 

right now. They are in difficult straits, as you well know. I would 

tell you that we certainly are working with Lebanon and with the 

rest of our partners, as I mentioned in my testimony, to ensure 

that that $3 billion grant is complementary to other efforts and 

that it is used on the things that the Lebanese Armed Forces truly 

need the most. I would offer to you that there are infrastructuretype projects that would help support the Lebanese Armed Forces 

that would be as, if not more, valuable to them in many areas than 

specific pieces of equipment. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you for that answer. 

One more question about the economy, back to Mr. Silverman. 

You talked about the prospects for natural gas to be a boost for the 

Lebanese economy. It requires more than a caretaker government 

to make some of the decisions about accessing those oilfields, which 

I guess would largely be in the Mediterranean. But could you 

expand a little bit on what these natural gas reserves might offer 

Lebanon and how those could help the Lebanese economy? 

Mr. SILVERMAN. We do not know exactly how large they are, but 

there is significant interest and they could be extensive. Obviously, 

Israel is on the other side of this, and their resources are extensive, 

what they have found so far, as you know. So I think the interest 

is there, and it really could be a great, great boon to the Lebanese 

economy. There is no question about it if it is handled the right 

way and if they get in and move forward because this is not a 

static market. 

I am not the expert, but the experts that work on this have 

explained to me and to the Lebanese that there are a finite number 

of investments. There is a finite amount of money that the international oil companies have to invest. And they will see a potentially profitable field, but they also need to have the certainty or 

the confidence that they can put in a major, major investment, not 

the investment to do an initial exploration or something, which 

may not be very much. But when you really get in and sign contracts and move forward with exploitation, that is an enormous 

investment. And meanwhile, other countries are attracting these 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

companies, and Lebanon is behind because it cannot attract because it cannot release a tender. 

So I think it is hard to put a figure on how much it could contribute to the GDP of Lebanon, but I think everyone acknowledges 

that it could be quite significant if the structure is put together, 

the regulatory structure too, and the exploration moves forward. 

Senator KAINE. And is one of the issues with Lebanon—I think 

there are two sizable fields in the Mediterranean, one pretty much 

in what all would agree are Israeli waters and one that kind of 

straddles a border, depending on how you draw the water border, 

between Israel and Lebanon. I gather the exploitation of that field 

would probably not just require a Lebanese non-caretaker government to decide to move forward, but possibly also some cooperation 

with the Israeli Government about making sure that those borders 

are appropriately delineated. 

Mr. SILVERMAN. I referred in my remarks to this maritime 

boundary line and, Senator, you are exactly correct. That is what 

we are talking about here. The companies, obviously, make this 

judgment themselves, but when I said they are looking for certainty and predictability, they do not want to enter a political dispute. They do not want to enter in a territory that will then turn 

out to be still subject to a dispute. And that is why we have been 

talking to both the Israelis and to the Lebanese trying to be helpful 

in reaching a solution to their maritime boundary line and what 

can be exploited. We think it can be done. We absolutely believe 

that there can be an arrangement worked out and that Lebanon 

can go forward if the decisions are made. 

Senator KAINE. I have about 5 hours more of questions for this 

panel, but I do want to get to the second panel. Before I say a few 

concluding words and introduce the panel, I did want to at least 

pass to Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. I will pass. 

Senator KAINE. Let me just say a word in conclusion. One of the 

most powerful aspects of this visit—and I have got a State Department witness and a DOD witness here today. But one of the most 

powerful aspects of the trip was going to the memorial to U.S. men 

and women from our State Department, from our military, who lost 

their lives in Lebanon, and the list of people is very, very long. I 

think Senator King and I were really struck looking at the memorial, the Marine barracks bombing, the Embassy bombing, the 

Embassy Annex bombing, and then a whole series of other instances, two, three, four, five, six, seven Americans at a time during that period in the early 1980s, the late 1980s. It was a very 

powerful thing. It was a very visible indication not only of American sacrifice but of the kinds of challenges that that very resilient 

Lebanese population has been dealing with on a daily basis. 

But it also made Senator King and I really step back and realize 

the sacrifice that our military and our Foreign Service—sometimes 

we do not express the same appreciation to nonmilitary who are 

serving abroad as ambassadors with a small ‘‘A’’ for us. That 

memorial makes very vivid the sacrifice of any Americans who 

serve abroad, whether in the military and other capacity. It is important that we acknowledge that. And I just wanted to acknowledge that as you finish. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

There may be additional questions from members of the panel 

that will be submitted in writing. But I appreciate you being here 

today and look forward to continuing to shed some light on the situation in Lebanon with your help. Thank you very much for 

coming. 

Let me now introduce our second panel. Our second panel will 

come up to the table with nametags ready. 

Dr. Paul Salem is vice president of the Middle East Institute 

leading an initiative on Arab transitions. Prior to joining the Middle East Institute, Dr. Salem was the founding director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, Lebanon, between 2006 and 

2013 where he built a regional think tank distinguished by the 

quality of policy research and high regional profile. From 1999 to 

2006, Dr. Salem was the director of the Fares Foundation and in 

1989 founded and directed the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 

Lebanon’s leading public policy think tank. Dr. Salem writes regularly in the Arab and Western press and has been published in 

numerous journals and newspapers. Dr. Salem, we are glad to have 

you today. 

In addition, we have with us Mr. Aram Nerguizian, who is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

where he conducts research on strategic and military dynamics in 

the Middle East and north Africa. During his time at CSIS, Mr. 

Nerguizian has worked on Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed 

Forces extensively. He is frequently consulted by governments and 

the private sector, appears regularly on television, and has 

authored a number of books and reports on the Middle East and 

regional security issues. 

I would like to ask Dr. Salem to begin with his opening comments, followed by Mr. Nerguizian. Your written comments are 

accepted for the record. If you could try to summarize in about 5 

minutes, and then we will move into a dialogue. 

Dr. Salem. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL SALEM, VICE PRESIDENT, 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. SALEM. Senator Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, thank you 

very much for the honor of sharing my views with you on my 

native Lebanon. 

Lebanon is, indeed, at a crossroads both in time and space. What 

I mean by that, it has survived 3 years of the Syrian crisis. Can 

it survive a fourth and a fifth? The pressures in time are increasing 

at all levels. In space, it is at a crossroads in the sense that Lebanon is very much penetrated by regional and international influence, and Middle East is going through an intense period of 

restructuring not only in Syria but also as the United States sort 

of retreats slightly, the United States, Iran, the gulf countries and 

so on and Russia playing new games, Lebanon is very vulnerable 

to all of that. Lebanon has survived 3 years of the Syrian conflict, 

but for all of those 3 years has been close to the breaking point. 

Indeed, unless a resolution is achieved in the Syrian war, Lebanon’s political and security institutions, its economy, and social 

fabric might, indeed, increasingly fall apart. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

Lebanon is the weakest link in Syria’s environment. Any investment in Lebanon is, indeed, an investment in regional stability 

and, I would say, global security. 

The spillover from Syria is enormous. Lebanese politics has been 

aligned for, and against, the Assad regime for 9 years, and that has 

sort of defined political alliances in the country for a very long 

time. And that has created political paralysis, political tension in 

the country for the past 3 years. 

The refugee situation is well known, and the numbers really go 

into uncharted territory. I know of no other country that has received so many refugees in such a short period of time. The first 

panel said are we close to the breaking point. This is uncharted 

territory. No society has done what Lebanon is attempting to do. 

Now, on the other hand, Lebanon does have coping mechanisms. 

It is not a coincidence that it has survived for 3 years. It is a country accustomed to crisis and has been through many internal and 

regional crises before. The political system, although weak and 

often dysfunctional, is also inclusive and is built on principles of 

accommodation and power-sharing and that is very important. 

The army, although severely challenged and viewed by some 

with some taint, remains a very important national and inclusive 

institution. 

And the living memory of Lebanon’s own civil war that ended in 

1990 deters most parties and most citizens from moving toward 

any major confrontation. 

As we know, a major step forward was taken 10 days ago with 

the formation of a national unity government. This is an extremely 

important step. It is the first step forward in 3 years. For the past 

year, there have been attempts to form a government, but let us 

not forget that for 2 years before that, since January 2011, Lebanon was limping along with a lopsided government which did not 

include the March 14 coalition. So after 3 years, this is indeed an 

extremely important step. 

Certainly this new government deserves important support, 

endorsement, and cooperation. It needs to be followed right away 

with a Presidential election. Presidential elections require, yes, a 

two-thirds majority for a quorum. It requires a two-thirds majority 

in the first vote, but in the second vote, requires a simple majority. 

So it is not exactly as difficult as imagined. Extending the term of 

the President or changing the constitution—that in itself requires 

a two-thirds majority. So it is equally difficult, but you can elect 

a President with a simple majority after you get the first twothirds quorum. There are hopes that in the accommodation that 

happened in the last few weeks this might be the case. 

And I will indicate—we can come back to it later—that the 

change is not so much only internal bargaining and so on. There 

has been a change in the regional environment. The two main patrons of the two groups, Iran and Saudi Arabia—I think there has 

been a shift there certainly on the Saudi side. The fact that there 

has been a Geneva meeting—we can get back to that—but there 

has been a shift in the region. That might help us move forward 

in Lebanon. 

Of course, we need to follow Presidential elections with parliamentary elections, as mentioned before. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

On extremist groups, it is important to start by saying that all 

the major parties, certainly Shia, Christian, Druze, are committed 

to power-sharing, are committed to stability, are committed to 

avoid internal warfare. There is no major movement toward internal conflict. There is no will for it. There is no plan for it. 

But there is a very high tension because of Hezbollah’s direct 

engagement in the war in Syria, and this has led to some radicalization in the Sunni street in Lebanon and some homegrown 

groups, but it has also encouraged groups from Syria and others 

related to al-Qaeda to take the fight to Hezbollah territory inside 

Lebanon and that is what we have seen in the last few months. I 

think this will remain a serious security concern for Lebanon but 

is not about to bring the house down. Hezbollah is in a deep rut 

in terms of its engagement in Lebanon and Syria, and that will 

affect its long-term viability and the strategic environment between 

Hezbollah and Israel, its main and original enemy. 

The key goal, obviously, would be to end the crisis in Syria. The 

best way to help Lebanon is to do that, but that does not seem to 

be happening any time soon. 

For Lebanon, I would reiterate what many of my colleagues have 

said. Endorse and support the new government. Support the election of a new President and the holding of parliamentary elections. 

Continue to take the lead generously in donation to Lebanon and 

to the refugee community. Build on strong U.S.-Lebanese military 

cooperation and relations, as well as encourage allies to do so as 

well. Work to maintain stability along the Lebanon-Israel border. 

We have seen just in the last 24 hours an Israeli attack on the border area between Lebanon and Syria. The borders between Lebanon and Israel have been stable since 2006. It is important to 

keep that the case, and certainly the United States can be important in that area. 

Finally, I would also agree with Mr. Silverman that encouragement for Lebanon to move forward on the offshore oil/gas issue is 

important. We can talk more about that in the Q&A. It is not so 

much that it would immediately get any revenues to the Lebanese 

Treasury. This might take a full decade, but moving forward in 

that area would give confidence to the Lebanese themselves, would 

make major international companies and states have a stake in 

Lebanon’s stability, and might be a very important source of stability and confidence in Lebanon moving forward, even if the revenues will take many, many years, if at all, to move forward. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Salem follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL SALEM

Senator Kaine, members of the committee, I am honoured to share with you my 

thoughts on the political and security situation in my native Lebanon, the impact 

of the ongoing war in Syria, and what implications there may be for U.S. policy. 

The precarious republic of Lebanon has survived 3 years of the Syrian conflict, 

but it has been teetering close to the breaking point. Unless a resolution or dramatic 

de-escalation is achieved in the Syrian war in the coming year, Lebanon’s political 

and security institutions, its economy and its social fabric might begin to come 

apart. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

SYRIA SPILLOVER

The number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon, a country of only 4 million 

people, is rapidly approaching the 1 million mark, with thousands more arriving 

every day. That is like the United States receiving an influx of 80 million refugees 

in 2 years. Sixty-five percent of these refugees are women and children. One in five 

of them are under the age of 4. 

Lebanon has kept its borders open, and the country’s communities have welcomed 

these refugees in their villages, neighborhoods, and local facilities. But the burden 

has been heavy and the cost high. There are now as many Syrian children as Lebanese in a school system that was barely able to keep up with its precrisis obligations. The strain on the health, water, electricity, housing, and public service infrastructure has been enormous. 

The crisis has also impacted the economy, which has gone from healthy growth 

to contraction; and unemployment, especially in host communities, has climbed rapidly. Tensions between host and refugee populations in some areas are on the rise, 

and the strain has added to the political and sectarian tensions already present in 

the country. 

COPING MECHANISMS

But Lebanon—a country not unaccustomed to crisis—also has remarkable coping 

mechanisms. The political system, although weak and often dysfunctional, is nonetheless inclusive, and is built on principles of accommodation and power-sharing. 

The army, although severely challenged during the present crisis, remains a 

national and inclusive institution. And the living memory of Lebanon’s own 16-year 

civil war that only ended two decades ago, presents a strong antidote to any rush 

toward major internal conflict. 

The main political coalitions in Lebanon—known as the March 14 and March 8 

coalitions—have been aligned for and against the Assad regime for the past 10 

years. And while their differences increased during the Syrian crisis, leading to 

political tension and institutional paralysis, neither side was interested in pursuing 

significant internal conflict. For the first 2 years of the crisis, Lebanon had a lopsided government in which the March 14 coalition was not represented; but even 

that government resigned a year ago, and the country limped along with only a 

caretaker government. Parliamentary elections scheduled last year, also were not 

held. 

A major step forward was achieved 10 days ago, when the country’s polarized 

political factions agreed to form an inclusive national unity government. This is an 

important step in easing sectarian and factional tensions, consolidating precarious 

national stability, and helping the country ride out the oncoming waves of instability emanating from Syria. This new government should receive rapid and strong 

international support and endorsement. 

To further reinforce Lebanon’s political institutions, this step needs to be followed 

by the election of a new President for the republic to a fresh 6-year term, as the 

current President’s term ends in May. And this should be followed in the fall by 

overdue parliamentary elections. 

A revival of Lebanon’s democratic and inclusive political institutions is essential 

to giving Lebanese confidence in their own future, and to give Lebanon’s friends and 

investors, confidence as well that Lebanon can pull through this latest crisis. Lebanon’s precarious republic has survived external and internal wars before; with 

strong external support, it might survive this latest crisis as well. 

EXTREMIST GROUPS

While the country’s main parties have joined a national unity government, polarization among the communities continues, and risks to security mount. Lebanon’s 

outgoing government had declared an official policy of neutrality and disengagement 

toward the Syrian conflict, but Hezbollah fully engaged in the fight alongside the 

Assad regime. And many in the Sunni community sympathised with the Syrian 

rebels, offering various forms of aid and assistance. 

Although the country remained generally calm, intermittent eruptions of violence 

have racked the northern city of Tripoli, the southern town of Sidon, and several 

border towns such as Ersal in the eastern part of the country. A string of car-bombs 

targeting Shiite as well as Sunni neighborhoods have repeatedly threatened to push 

tensions to the boiling point. 

In the face of a heavily armed and militant Hezbollah, the main Sunni parties 

and politicians have generally chosen accommodation not confrontation. This has 

left some of the Sunni street dissatisfied, and created space for the rise of more radFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

ical groups that want to challenge Hezbollah directly. Some of these are homegrown, such as the movement of Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir, but others are part of 

wider regional networks in Syria and elsewhere, such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades that claimed responsibility for the latest bombings, Jubhat al-Nusra and other 

al-Qaeda linked groups. 

The leader of the mainstream Sunni Future Movement has recently called on his 

community to renounce such radical jihadist groups, and the state’s security apparatus is struggling to better secure the border and track down members of these 

cells and networks, but these security breaches are likely to continue intermittently. 

They will shake Lebanon’s stability, but are unlikely to bring the whole house down. 

WHAT CAN AND SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?

Address the Cause 

The key goal, of course, is to go to the source, and try to end or dramatically deescalate the raging conflict in Syria. The tepid international response over the past 

3 years to the Assad regime’s massacring of its own people, and the feeble support 

to the Free Syrian Army and the nonrebel groups, has convinced the Assad regime 

and his allies that they can prevail. It has also created an opportunity for the rise 

of more radical opposition groups. Without serious pressure, this conflict will be 

resolved neither on the battlefield nor on the negotiating table; it is likely to go on 

for a decade or even two, with unimaginable human suffering and incalculable consequences for the region and for global security. 

The Assad regime has proved willing to fight to the last Syrian and would rather 

govern part of a devastated Syria than share power with others in a united Syria. 

And yet, when faced with a massive military threat, as that made by the U.S. last 

August, it has buckled and made major concessions. A regime that rules by force 

responds only to superior force. As long as that is not forthcoming in terms of serious military support to the Free Syrian Army or external military action, they will 

offer no major concessions. 

The latest pledge from the Obama administration to increase support to the opposition is welcome, but is likely to be below the level that would seriously worry the 

Assad regime or alter the balance of power. And it is way below what Assad’s allies 

are pouring into Syria in terms of men, money, and materiel. Unless the power calculations are changed dramatically, Assad is not going anywhere in the foreseeable 

future. 

De-Escalation 

If the Syrian conflict is not going to end soon, and a real transition is not currently viable, the alternative interim goal should be to at least de-escalate the conflict and focus on achieving cease-fires, getting aid to the millions of Syrians that 

need it, stabilizing as many parts of the country as possible, and limiting the zones 

of active warfare. When Lebanon fell apart in 1975, it took 15 years to patch it back 

together again. But during those 15 years, there were periods of intense civil war, 

but many years and zones of relative calm in which citizens could rebuild their lives 

and businesses, send their kids to school, and go about their daily life while the 

political order that had fallen apart awaited a new configuration. 

The U.N. Security Council Resolution passed last week ordering warring parties 

in Syria to stop blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid is an important but long 

overdue step in putting people first. If no one is going to win this war anytime soon, 

the world must focus on de-escalating the fighting, delivering urgent aid, creating 

zones of stability and normalcy, and saving Syrian civilians. 

For Lebanon a resolution or de-escalation of the Syrian conflict would mean that 

no new refugees would enter the country, and the million that are already there 

would begin to make their way back to Syria. And it would also allow a diminution 

of political and security tensions that keep the country on tenterhooks. 

Support for Lebanon 

But if the Syrian conflict will be neither resolved nor de-escalated, then Lebanon 

is in for a very dangerous ride in 2014 and 2015 and will need all the help it can 

get from the United States and other friends. 

The United States and Lebanon have enjoyed many decades of warm relations 

reinforced by shared values and a large Lebanese American community. And the 

U.S. has been a strong supporter of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the biggest contributor to Lebanon’s refugee relief needs. Among the ways that the U.S. could build 

on this support and help Lebanon survive the continuing storm are the following: 

—Endorse and support the new national unity government. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

—Encourage the Lebanese parties to move forward in electing a new President of 

the republic and in holding overdue parliamentary elections. 

—Include Lebanon in high level visits of U.S. officials to the region. 

—Continue to take the lead in donating and getting other nations to donate to the 

urgent and growing needs of the massive refugee population, with an immediate 

focus on the upcoming International Support Group for Lebanon meeting on 

March 5 in Paris. 

—Build on long-standing U.S.-Lebanese military cooperation and work with other 

allies to bolster the capacities of the Lebanese Army and internal security forces. 

—Continue to work with the Lebanese security forces to boost their counterterrorism capacities. 

—Encourage and provide assistance to the new Lebanese Government to move forward with the delayed offshore gas bidding round; this would provide muchneeded economic confidence, and help build a more promising economic future for 

the country’s rising generations. 

IN CLOSING

The Syrian war has devastated Syria and destabilized the entire region. Lebanon 

is the weakest link in the chain of countries around Syria. It has been the most 

generous in welcoming war-ravaged refugees and paid the highest cost in terms of 

its own stability and security. It deserves all the help you can offer. And any investment in Lebanon’s stability, is an investment in regional stability, and in global 

security. 

I thank you for your attention and for the opportunity to address your esteemed 

Committee. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Dr. Salem. 

Mr. Nerguizian. 

STATEMENT OF ARAM NERGUIZIAN, SENIOR FELLOW, BURKE 

CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to speak to you today about Lebanon and the pressures 

it faces in the wake of the Syria crisis and broader instability 

across the Levant. 

I have submitted a far longer written analysis that both explains 

and contextualizes what I am about to stay in depth, using opensource reporting and research conducted in field work in Lebanon. 

I fully understand how busy members and their staff are, but I 

hope that some of you will still be able to look to it for a level of 

detail that I cannot go into in this short statement, and I request 

that it be put into the official record. 

Senator KAINE. Without objection. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Allow me to summarize some of the key points. 

Syria’s civil war and the Lebanon-Syria insecurity nexus now 

complicate and inform every aspect of sectarian and factional competition in Lebanon in ways that neither the Lebanese nor their 

regional and international allies seem to have fully accounted for. 

The conflict in Syria also defines how both the United States and 

Iran deal with their respective sets of interests, partners, and allies 

in Lebanon and the broader region. 

Competing Lebanese factions have adopted diametrically opposing views on Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Anecdotal data from 

polling and field work all show deep divisions along Sunni-Shiite 

lines. Lebanon’s Shia continue to view the Assad regime, Iran, and 

Hezbollah favorably while maintaining unfavorable views of Saudi 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

Arabia. Meanwhile, the country’s Sunnis continue to maintain the 

opposite set of views relative to the country’s Shia. 

The pressure that Lebanon’s Christians feel as a result of local 

and regional Sunni-Shia tension are also growing. Whether it is on 

Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, or Saudi Arabia, a significant portion of 

Lebanon’s Christians remain divided about whether any of these 

regional and local actors can be viewed favorably or whether they 

could be trusted to make positive and stabilizing use of their influence in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah’s decision to commit to offensive military operations 

inside Syria in concert with Assad’s forces is a preemptive war of 

choice in Syria that reflects its own narrow set of overlapping priorities in the country. These include the primacy of preserving the 

resistance axis with Iran, Hezbollah’s sense that it can neither 

appease increasingly militant Lebanese Sunni political forces, nor 

reverse deepening regional Sunni-Shia tensions, and that Shia 

communal fears as a regional minority group increasingly inform 

a need to create strategic depth in Syria. 

In 2014, Hezbollah’s military priorities in Syria continue to center on its combat role east of the Bekaa Valley with a focus on strategically significant terrain such as the town of Qusayr and the 

Al-Qalamoun mountain range. Both remain critical to supply lines, 

and whoever controls them can shape the flow of aid, weapons, and 

personnel either to or from Syria. Hezbollah may have accurately 

calculated that moderate and urban Sunni factions and political 

forces would not, or could not, escalate in Syria, or by resorting to 

attacks against the militant group or the Lebanese Shia community. However, the rural Sunnis in the north and the Bekaa have 

always been a separate demographic, and Hezbollah actions in 

Syria may also dramatically accelerate major shifts currently 

underway within the Sunni community. 

In 2014, Lebanon’s mainly Sunni ruling north continues to maintain the highest overall and extreme poverty rates in the country, 

at levels in excess of 52 percent, or more than twice the national 

average. Dire socioeconomics and feelings of being underrepresented by traditional Sunni leadership have left northern Sunnis 

increasingly vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of militant and 

jihadi groups, including the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Jabhat 

al-Nusra, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. 

Meanwhile, these shifts within Lebanon’s Sunni community are 

taking place both alongside and because of acute demographic, 

socioeconomic, and security pressures from the influx of mainly 

Sunni displaced Syrians, now numbering more than 900,000 in 

Lebanon and centered in parts of the country with high poverty 

rates, poor education, health care, and other infrastructure. 

While the scale of pressures on Lebanon and its people continues 

to grow, there are still a broad range of actors and institutions that 

seek to play a stabilizing role, and no institution has contributed 

more to relative stability than the Lebanese Armed Forces, or the 

LAF. The principal national security partner of the United States 

in Lebanon, the LAF has expanded from a force of 59,000 in 2010 

to a force of some 65,500 in 2014, largely in an effort to stand up 

border protection forces, including the first and second border regiments, to deal with the pressures from Syria. The undermanning 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

of conventional units has also proven to be a necessary evil to ensure as broad a national deployment as possible, totaling some 

24,000 to 30,000 troops in the field. 

As a result of the conflict, the LAF maintains three core national 

security priorities. These include creating a real-world security and 

border regime along the Lebanese-Syrian border, managing the 

risks of on-again/off-again violence and volatility along the U.N. 

Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon, and lastly conducting what 

the LAF calls high intensity internal stability and counterterrorism 

operations. 

In many ways, the LAF’s growing counterterrorism capabilities 

and the central role of LAF military intelligence and counterintelligence efforts increasingly define the U.S.-Lebanon military-tomilitary relationship. The LAF’s growing ability to act on external 

intelligence, focus on dismantling groups like the Abdullah Azzam 

Brigades and similar militant and jihadi organizations, and the 

military’s interdiction of IED, vehicle IED, and suicide attacks are 

key sources of even limited stability in a region in turmoil. 

The LAF has worked hard to bring on line two border regiments 

to manage growing instability. This has included building up fixed 

Sanger-style observation posts that will be equipped with day and 

night electro-optical surveillance systems and anti-RPG netting 

and protection, along with other defensive countermeasures. The 

LAF hopes to build at least an additional eight fixed observation 

posts in 2014. 

What the LAF needs now at the national level to push through 

its national security priorities is strong government leadership and 

political top cover. While Prime Minister Tammam Salam managed 

to form a Cabinet that includes both March 14 and March 8 coalitions and that enjoys broad international legitimacy, it still 

remains unclear at the end of February 2014 whether the new Cabinet would be capable of seizing on the LAF’s momentum along the 

border. 

Lastly, at the international level, the LAF and the Lebanese 

need countries like the United States and other donors and partners to support the military’s development efforts, especially the 

LAF’s capabilities development plan, the International Support 

Group for Lebanon, and the upcoming Rome conference to support 

the LAF. 

I could go into far greater detail on all of these pressures, but 

I will leave them for the Q&A period. I thank you for your time 

and this opportunity. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The prepared statement submitted by Mr. 

Nerguizian was too voluminous to include in the printed hearing 

but will be maintained in the permanent record of the committee. 

It can also be found at: http://csis.org/files/publication/140225l 

NerguizianlLebanonltestimony.pdf.] 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Nerguizian. 

We will just start a dialogue and these will be questions that I 

will pose to either or both of you as we explore in more detail some 

of your testimony. 

First, I would like each of your assessments about sort of what 

will likely happen in the next steps in the political process from the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

ministerial statement to the Presidential election, whether you 

think it is more likely that there will be Presidential candidates in 

the selection of a new individual for President or whether it might 

prove more probable that we would see an extension of President 

Suleiman’s term. I do not want you to have to pin down with precision your percentage estimates of the chances, but I think it will 

be helpful for us as we think about our relationship, to get the 

sense of you as experts as to what you think the next steps in the 

political process are likely to—what are the results likely to be. 

Dr. SALEM. Well, as I said, the formation of this government does 

reflect the change in some of the regional powers in their positioning and they have encouraged their allies to work together to form 

this government. I think the ministerial statement certainly takes 

a bit of time. There is a lot going on. There is a lot being negotiated, but I think they will come out with a ministerial statement. 

I think this regionally supported mood to create some stability in 

Lebanon to keep Lebanon politically away from the conflict that is 

going on Syria even though Hezbollah mainly is involved there— 

I think this will continue in the immediate future. And I hope that 

that will impact a very heated, sort of behind-closed-doors discussion that started about the next President. It is not clear exactly 

who that will be but I think there is current momentum toward 

actually electing a next President. There is more leniency from 

both sides to accept a candidate even if that candidate is not their 

favorite candidate. None of the major players, maybe except one of 

the Christian parties, is sort of playing a spoiler role. Otherwise, 

for the time being, most of the players are in this collective game. 

I would say it is more likely than not that there will be a new 

President elected, you know, 51–49. Hard to say. 

The second most likely would simply be that the post will fall 

vacant for a while or a long time. 

The third possibility would be the extension of the term of the 

current President. That is very difficult, very unlikely. That 

requires a two-thirds consensus. That does not exist. 

So either we elect a new President or we fall into a period of a 

vacancy. 

The key factor that created this momentum and the key factor 

that could ruin this momentum is the regional environment. I 

think we happen to be at a moment, even though Geneva did not 

succeed, it did happen, and we have moved from sides expecting 

that the other side is going to fall within 2 months to a realization 

that this is going on for a long time. There has been sort of a 

moment of a diplomacy. How long that will last in the region— 

weeks, months—if in that sort of honeymoon period we can go 

ahead and elect a President, we will be lucky. If we miss that, I 

think we will go back to what we had before, which is paralysis. 

We could not have elections for Parliament. We could not form a 

government, and we could not elect a President. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Nerguizian. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Mr. Chairman, most of the factions in Lebanon 

have been competing, whether it is domestically or in Syria, with 

an assumption that somehow the crisis would be resolved within a 

relatively fixed or short period. I think it has dawned on every faction that matters that Syria’s civil war is in every way going to be 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

a decade of long-term pressures and dynamics that they, whether 

they like it or not, are going to have to cooperate with each other 

on in terms of the next steps. So you have right now a Cabinet. 

Beyond the formation of this Cabinet and its ministerial statement, 

you have a number of other institutions that are deeply dependent 

on this. For example, in the LAF, you have an organization that 

is known as the Military Council, which has traditionally played 

the role of a buffer dealing with a lot of the sectarian pressures. 

It remains largely vacant. You have the longer term issue of who 

will be the next LAF commander. And all of these events, filling 

key leadership posts, dealing with the Presidency, and then dealing 

with leadership of the LAF in the long term—they all require a set 

of factors that are like delicate sequencing. 

But, frankly, Mr. Chairman, I think it is difficult to sit and think 

realistically about who the people are that could fill in these posts. 

The Presidency, just as Cabinet formation has shown us, is deeply 

precarious and uncertain. None of us can predict how this will play 

out. You have only a finite set of players that are being considered 

anecdotally. 

But the bigger issue, I think—and I highlight this in my statement—is that you have a Christian community in Lebanon and 

frankly in the region that, for better or for worse, feels that it 

needs a strong President or at least a President that enjoys broad 

communal support. Now, will we get to that in the scenarios that 

Dr. Salem described, or will this map out in a way that is far more 

unstable? It is difficult to predict, and I frankly am careful about 

making those sorts of assumptions. 

Senator KAINE. I asked the previous panel the question of 

whether in its internal politics in Lebanon, Hezbollah has been 

affected or seen any erosion of its political support because of the 

decision to go all in in the Syrian civil war. And I would like to 

hear each of you sort of address—the role of Hezbollah in Syria is 

one thing, but how has it affected their place in Lebanese society 

and sort of their political profile at the current time? 

Dr. SALEM. Well, initially it was not a very popular move 

amongst Hezbollah’s own supporters. Initially when the uprising in 

Syria seemed like part of the early Arab Spring, pro-democracy, the 

Assad regime was firing on people, there was not a clear understanding of why should Hezbollah get involved. There was not yet 

the appearance on the other side of these radical al-Qaeda-related 

groups. But Hezbollah’s popularity in the community is so overwhelming on so many levels. There is no real contest there. But 

even if there was some reluctance, there was no real questioning 

of the decision, some complaining but no real questioning. 

I would say that the community certainly is maybe drained, is 

very concerned, but I think they have been convinced to some 

degree that, indeed, there is a major Sunni radical threat to them. 

Now, whether that threat was partly created by what the Assad 

regime itself did and you get the enemy that you would desire, but 

indeed this threat has become real. It has become real to all Lebanese. It certainly has become real to the Shiite community in Lebanon. So I would say they are paying a very high price. They are 

not happy about it, but there is not any major questioning right 

now of the decision. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

I think the major impact on Hezbollah is long-term, that this is 

effectively a force which was designed, A, to push back at Israeli 

occupation. Secondly, it was designed as a deterrent for Iran 

against any potential Israeli or American strike on Iran. That is its 

function. Now, since Syria left Lebanon, they have had to be the 

policeman in Lebanon. So they have turned into internal politics. 

Now they have to be the policeman and the army in Syria. They 

are so overreaching, so overextended. In the long term, this is 

something that drains them, drains the community, makes them 

long-term very vulnerable, similar to what the PLO experienced 

between 1975 and eventually 1982. 

What I sort of worry about most is that the border region between Lebanon and Syria and Israel, which has been stable for the 

last 8 years, in the long term will likely not be because the powers 

are shifting. And Hezbollah is not in a good position. It is fighting 

on many fronts. It was not designed to do so. The community is too 

small to sustain it. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Nerguizian. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Mr. Chairman, Hezbollah always knew that 

taking this level of action in Syria would cost it support within the 

broader Lebanese Sunni community, to say nothing of broader 

Arab popular support. That has essentially come to pass. They no 

longer enjoy that broad range of backing at the regional level. But 

that is the cost, as Hezbollah sees it, of creating that strategic 

depth that it thinks it needs. 

The other side of this is that on net balance, Hezbollah’s role has 

brought some degree of predictability, perhaps not in the way that 

many would like, along the Lebanese-Syrian frontier. If one were 

to ask 4 or 5 years ago would Hezbollah allow or sanction or facilitate the establishment of better border relations, more demarcation, a robust security regime along the border, one would be hesitant to say, yes. But the dynamics are such now that you have at 

least an opportunity to do good, to do good in terms of the Lebanese and institutions like the LAF focusing on building up these 

institutions and structures along the border. 

You also have all the patterns that Dr. Salem described in terms 

of what the long-term radicalization and instability effects are. In 

every way that matters, radicalization within the Sunni community 

in Lebanon and the inflow of fighters presents as much of a threat 

to mainstream Sunnis in the country as it does to mainstream Shiites. And that has bought Hezbollah some breathing room. 

But in the long term, I think there is no doubt. You have a transformation that is taking place that is part of internal Shiite dynamics but also part of a broader regional pattern that includes Saudi 

Arabia, Iran, and the United States. Right now, it is not clear, if 

there is a resolution of the Syria conflict, what will be Hezbollah’s 

future, but what is broadly clear to me is that Iran is looking for 

a posteriori arrangement. And by that, what I mean is if there is 

going to be some kind of a new regional order that ties in negotiations on the nuclear file and that ties in on the U.N. Blue Line and 

Hezbollah, it is something that they would like to see occur as a 

result of an arrangement or a framework, not before. So you are 

going to continue to see continued support by Iran. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35 

And within the Shiite community, I have to agree there is no real 

basis to say that there is anything more than marginal dissent 

within the community. Hezbollah has been very effective, and 

frankly, their opponents have helped as well to create a narrative 

of self-defense and countering terrorism, which has become in 

many ways a national reality. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Dr. SALEM. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator KAINE. Yes, please. 

Dr. SALEM. I just want to add something that is sort of relevant 

about the refugee situation and security, both Hezbollah and 

national security. 

You have a million, maybe up to a million and a half, refugees 

from Syria. The vast majority are Sunnis. Lebanon, in the sense by 

what is happening Syria by Hezbollah’s actions, is effectively turning into a Sunni majority country, and yet Hezbollah is fighting in 

Syria and Lebanon and putting itself in a very precarious situation. 

The country has absorbed a quarter of the number of its population 

in refugees, and yet, ‘‘nothing has happened.’’ And one marvels at 

that. 

The metaphor I sort of use is it is like you are pouring fuel into 

the basement. Nothing has happened yet, but it takes one match 

for that to explode. The experience of Lebanon or other communities with refugees, whether it was the Palestinians—it took several years. But if and when that refugee population becomes mobilized and militarized, as some groups in Syria and the region are 

trying to do, once that happens, then that fuel ignites and neither 

Hezbollah nor Lebanon can control it. 

For us that means and maybe for U.S. policy, yes, it has been 

survivable so far but, A, we need to stem the flow and, B, we need 

to find ways to get those people starting to go back either in a 

resolved Syria or safe havens, you know, get the flow reversed. 

Lebanon—I mean, one marvels that it has survived so far, but this 

could detonate at any point in the near future and it requires 

urgent attention to be reversed, not just treated symptomatically. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Salem, your comments really echo Mr. Silverman on the earlier panel when he said we are just sort of in 

uncharted territory. Twenty-five percent of the population equivalent being as refugees. So far, no massive match strike, but we just 

do not know when that point would come in terms of that breaking 

point that you testified to. 

In terms of the magnitude of the refugee challenge, moving to 

that, Mr. Nerguizian made the point of everyone probably thought 

that this civil war would be something that would be resolved 

sooner, and everybody is kind of waking up to a reality that it is 

not going to be a quick resolution. It is going to take significant 

time. 

Do you think Lebanese civil society, the NGO community, the 

International Support Group—are they appropriately now changing 

their thinking and planning to treat this not as an emergency situation, but really to start to look at it as a long-term problem, in 

which case the way you manage it is going to be different than 

kind of a traditional emergency relief operation? For either of you. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Mr. Chairman, one of the side effects of regularly traveling to Lebanon—and I traveled in 2013 about six 

times—is that you get to see the gradual evolution of all the patterns you just described. You no longer have any of the optimism 

that you can have short-term efforts with a quick payoff. All the 

realities now, whether it is the NGO community, the humanitarian 

aid structures that are operating in Lebanon, or emerging structures like the International Support Group, are all going to have 

to exercise a great degree of strategic patience in all of this. 

This is not a civil war that is just born out of protests over a 

short-term period as a result of droughts. It is the basic collapse 

of a state structure that has been kind of limping along since as 

far back as the Second World War. You are looking at a transformational moment. And whether it is the ISG or local forces, I 

am seeing a gradual, slow, and difficult shift to this. 

But it has always been a key challenge in terms of resourcing. 

You have all of the impacts, not unlike those we have seen here 

in the United States tied to national resourcing and aid that are 

now coming to bear. You do not have the kinds of funds that are 

required readily available. And the countries that do have them are 

mainly in the gulf and have interests that are not necessarily tied 

to finding a quick and stabilizing effect on Lebanon and may be too 

closely linked to their own strategic imperatives in terms of 

regional competition. 

But that is where I think U.S. and allied influence is critical. It 

plays a key role in shaping the choices of some of these countries 

that do also depend on the United States—for example, in the case 

of the gulf security architecture. The United States can play a positive role in shaping some of this because I think that there is an 

acceptance, at least within the U.S. interagency, not to say at the 

broader national level and the policy community, that this is a decade of instability. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Salem. 

Dr. SALEM. Well, I mean, I would emphasize—I mean, I agree 

with all of that, and one must prepare for that. But I also definitely 

think that the world and the region cannot afford for this to go on 

for a decade. The regime in Syria has proven willing to fight to the 

last Syrian, to destroy all of Syria. It is willing to maintain power 

over part of a devastated Syria rather than share power with others over a united Syria. It is a regime that only understands force. 

When force was threatened against it, within days it made a major 

concession. 

So from a policy perspective, it is such a dire crisis that it needs 

a much more robust interdiction. And I know this is a debate that 

has been going on in other chambers and so on. But looking at Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, the whole region, Iranian gulf tensions, 

tensions among U.S. allies in the gulf themselves, which have complicated the situation in Syria and in Iraq and elsewhere, yes, the 

United States wants to disengage, but the United States is still the 

biggest player in the region. Both allies and opponents look to it 

to figure out their own policy. This conflict—one cannot afford to 

leave it go on and on. 

Now, what that means, what difficult decisions must be taken I 

do not know. I for one know that Lebanon cannot survive 2 more 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

years, 3 more years of this. As we said, we are in uncharted territory. Although we have been in similar situations before with large 

refugee populations, it meant the destruction of Lebanon and 16 

years of civil war in Lebanon. So we cannot at all be complacent. 

We can be thankful that we survived these 3 years. 

But the lesson I take away is, yes, maybe prepare for the worst, 

but what needs to be done is again redoubled efforts to end this 

conflict. And I think in 2013 and 2014, there was a major initiative 

from the United States on the chemical weapons thing. It got 

immediate results. There was a great effort from Secretary Kerry 

which got at least some progress on the diplomatic front. This is 

not completely hopeless, but it requires more heavy lifting. And it 

needs to end. It cannot go on for years and years. 

Senator KAINE. I very much share that view. While we are disappointed, obviously, with the path of the Geneva discussions in 

Syria, there is no substitute for those discussions, and even if the 

opportunity or the hope is just a flicker, we have got to do what 

we can to keep that ember alive. 

It is the case the United States is the largest provider of humanitarian support for Syrian refugees outside the country. We are 

working on dismantling one of largest chemical weapons stockpiles 

in the world. That has been a significant diplomatic project. And 

while there have been aspects of the progress of that destruction 

that we are not happy with, we are, nevertheless, pursuing it and 

going forward, and we will untill its completion. 

The challenge about the delivery of humanitarian aid is a significant one right now, but we were at least gratified that Russia 

dropped its veto posture in the Security Council over the delivery 

of humanitarian aid within Syria. If we could do that in a more 

aggressive way, that might stanch the flow of additional refugees 

out. It might. But the test of that Security Council resolution is obviously going to be pretty apparent, pretty quickly, to see whether 

actually we are able to do that delivery of aid or not. Much more 

heavy lifting has to be done. The engagement is there. The results 

have not been what we want but that does not mean that we need 

to back off. 

I asked the previous panel—and, Mr. Nerguizian, I think you 

addressed this briefly in your testimony. Talk to us about the Lebanese Armed Forces in this inclusion aspect. To a first-time visitor, 

on the political side this delicate balance between the March 8/ 

March 14 and others, the Sunni-Shia, Christian, the way this is 

balanced is very delicate. And when you cannot find that delicate 

balance, you end up with a caretaker Prime Minister. You end up 

with a government that cannot form. As we had brief interactions 

in this visit with the Lebanese Armed Forces, it seemed like it was 

less a group here of Sunnis, a group here of Shias, a group here 

of Christians, but a more integrated and inclusive armed forces. 

But that was from a brief visit. And I would be curious as to both 

of your sense on, is the Lebanese Armed Forces inclusive in that 

way, and is that inclusion within an armed forces of 60,000-plus 

people—does that offer lessons that can be helpful lessons more 

broadly in Lebanese civil society? 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is first critical to point 

out that the LAF reflects the socioeconomics and demographics of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

the time. I do not want to get into too much detail because I could 

easily write a book on the issue. 

But if you were to look at the LAF in 1965, you would see an 

overwhelming number of Shiites because the LAF then, as now, 

was a vehicle for socioeconomic advancement. It was a chance for 

communities or demographics to uplift themselves. 

When you fast forward to 2014, what you see is a pattern where 

the overwhelming majority of the LAF in terms of manpower is 

now Sunni. And when I say ‘‘overwhelming,’’ I mean 42 percent. 

This reflects the reality of a force that is recruiting heavily from 

the north and heavily from Aakkar because these are provinces 

that frankly need the income and need the structure. You have a 

pension plan with benefits and the promise that eventually your 

children might not have to deal with either military service, or 

move on to other strata in the economy. 

But beyond this, which does exist, you do have to bear in mind 

the officer corps, unlike the demographics of the broader force, is 

very heavily regulated in terms of which sect is represented and 

how. You have broadly a 50–50 split in terms of the officer corps 

of some 3,500 personnel. You do not have any quotas within the 

broader force. And this trickles up all the way to the top in terms 

of deputy chiefs of staff, chief of staff, the army commander, and 

so on. 

And I think what does give this force a positive esprit de corps, 

to use the analogy, as opposed to one that is divisive is that over 

the history of the LAF going back to 1943, you have had an effort 

to incubate an idea, an idea that this is not a nonsectarian Lebanon or a nonsectarian LAF, but rather that this is a crosssectarian country, and this is an institution that has to represent 

those interests. 

Beyond that, you have a nucleus of officers, many of which are 

now at the command level, who were trained in 1980, 1981, and 

1982. This is in many ways the vintage generation of LAF officers 

and they now are at their prime. They are cross-sectarian. They 

come from all the communities, and they genuinely want to do 

good. And if they are to advance professionally and to move on in 

their careers and play a role in the next 2 or 3 years, that is favorable not just for Lebanon. It is favorable for regional stability. If 

that opportunity is missed, you are looking at the next generational 

gap, somewhere between 10 and 15 years within which you have 

to wait for the next crop of officers to mature and play a role. And 

these demographics are delicate and difficult and dense. I am 

happy to go into greater detail after the testimony. 

Senator KAINE. Yes, that is helpful. 

Dr. Salem. 

Dr. SALEM. Yes, I would agree with that. I mean, indeed, in a 

sense everybody’s cousin is in the army. Everybody is serving the 

army as a family, and that is extremely important for national 

identity and people’s general respect for the army. Now, there have 

been incidents here and there where there have been remarks 

about this thing or that thing, but it is one of the major institutions which reinforces Lebanese identity and attachment to the 

state. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

It is also important to note, though, that this army, being a 

multisectarian or cross-sectarian army, reflects the very society it 

is part of. It cannot be used as a blunt instrument internally 

against any community. Many people ask why does it not fight 

Hezbollah or fight—you know. It cannot engage directly in any internal conflict. It can maintain peace. It can create stability. It can 

protect borders. It plays a very important role in reinforcing basic 

political understandings and political accommodations. So it has it 

strengths. It also has its limitations. It has done reasonably well 

in this period. 

But the Lebanese political system also, for all of its faults and 

dysfunctions, is a fairly ingenious and inclusive one and makes 

sure that all the communities feel they have a stake, that they are 

not threatened by the state or any decisions taken in that state. 

There might be lessons there for Syria of 2025 or even Iraq, which 

is having a very difficult time managing a multicommunal reality. 

Senator KAINE. So I am going to ask you to make a general 

choice. For future U.S. military assistance to the Lebanese Armed 

Forces, what is more important? Training assistance or equipment 

and weaponry? 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Mr. Chairman, the net effect of U.S. training 

has been to elevate the special forces to being true special forces 

by regional standards. They are not just units in name alone. 

What you have now, though, is an urgent need to stand up the 

rest of the force. The core 3,700 SOF personnel, special forces personnel, continue to benefit from this training and not just from the 

United States But you also have 11 mechanized brigades and 5 

intervention regiments that, frankly, are going to be at the forefront of what is going to be an even more difficult and challenging 

period for the LAF. You have a force that is also gradually swinging south from the northern border with Syria down past the 

Bekaa frontier, and it will eventually, through the deployment of 

the second border regiment, encircle parts of Lebanon where you 

have communities that, frankly, are not quite sure what the intentions of the LAF are. 

Now, in parallel to their efforts to manage this—and the LAF 

does want to essentially have a soft glove approach of partnership 

and working in partnership with communities like the one in Arsal, 

and that is a key point. 

I think the United States has a key role to play in standing up 

the third and fourth border regiments. This is not to say that we 

can pick equipment over training. Frankly, one is nothing without 

the other, as you know. 

Senator KAINE. Right. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. But right now, one has to always revert back 

and look at what the CDP, the capabilities development plan, says. 

The overarching tenets there are not just about acquisition and 

systems. The LAF has learned a lot about that. It is far more 

focused on building an LAF 2025 dealing with all of the pressures 

Dr. Salem and myself described. So I think while we have to 

prioritize some aspects of training, it is always going to be a caseby-case analysis in terms of looking whether or not to prioritize 

that over land systems, naval systems, or other combat mechanisms. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Salem. 

Dr. SALEM. Aram is the expert on this. So I defer to him. 

Senator KAINE. I just report to you the opinion of the U.S. military leadership in Lebanon about the professionalism of the special 

forces is just as you suggest, Mr. Nerguizian. They were highly 

complimentary of the professionalism of the special forces. As you 

mentioned, it is not special forces in name only. It is special forces 

that they have merited by their training and their performance. 

And I was struck in meeting with Lebanon Armed Forces leadership how many of them talked about their training either in Lebanon with United States military forces or here in the United 

States. Some of the training that we do of foreign military leaders 

here in the United States or in-country are so cost-effective compared to other things that we do. I am on the Budget Committee 

too, and we are wrestling with all these budgetary issues. 

After we were in Lebanon, we went to Egypt and I had a lengthy 

meeting with General el-Sisi. We have a lot of challenges right now 

in that relationship because of some of the suspensions of aid that 

we have put in place after the events of June and July 2013. But 

over all of those challenges that we have, the year that General 

el-Sisi spent at the National War College in 2006 in Carlisle, PA, 

gives him a real understanding of the United States and a real 

affection for that military-to-military relationship. And in a period 

where there are some disagreements and challenges, having a 

background of ‘‘but we trained together, I know these people and 

they know me, we got a problem, but we ought to be able to work 

for it,’’ that year of training or the training that we provide to leaders in the LAF—I think the value of it is so much greater than the 

incremental cost of training one more person at the War College or 

doing a little bit more training in Lebanon. So I am a strong supporter of this kind of training going forward. 

Let me ask you this. How about the question about the effect of 

a rapprochement with appropriate skepticism, some increasing rapprochement with Iran? The interim joint plan of agreement around 

the nuclear negotiation then has led to a larger discussion about 

trying to find a diplomatic resolution of this issue of Iran’s nuclear 

weapons program. It is focused on their nuclear weapons program. 

It is not focused on other issues. But in human experience, we understand that finding an agreement on one aspect makes it easier 

potentially to find an agreement on another. If there was some rapprochement between the West and Iran or maybe between Saudi 

Arabia and Iran, would the likely effect of that on the internal 

political dynamic in Lebanon be positive or would it be hard to predict what that effect would be? 

Dr. SALEM. Well, if I may, I mean, there has been a perceived 

rapprochement or at least dialogue between the United States and 

Iran, as there has been between the United States and Syria over 

the chemical weapons deal. And many in the region, particularly 

the Gulf States who 2 years ago thought that the Assad regime’s 

days were numbered, that the United States and Western position 

was clear, and also thought that the United States and others had 

a very firm position isolating, containing, or even combating Iran— 

now they wake up to a very different world in which Assad is sort 

of a partner in the long-term chemical weapons deal where he can 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

drag his feet pretty much for a very long time. Iran is in negotiations, which might take a very long time and which certainly at 

least indicate that the United States is coexisting with Iran and 

with the Assad regime for the current future. 

Now, what did that create in terms of dynamics? I think it created several. First of all, it created panic in some countries in the 

region, in the gulf, and some degree Turkey. For a while, that 

caused them to escalate and want to go their own way. But I think 

in the last few months, I think we have seen a more sober reaction 

that, well, this is the new reality. You know, this is going to take 

some time. Expectation that Assad is going to fall tomorrow is not 

real. The United States is not about to do it and is not as tough 

against Iran as it was. And that is what I referred to that we are 

living through now, a moment particularly from Saudi Arabia, to 

some degree from Turkey and the Emirates and Kuwait, a sense 

of movement a bit toward accommodation, some stabilization for 

now in this particular phase. 

But I think what is missing from this entire picture is that the 

United States is negotiating with Iran over the nuclear file, but 

from the Iranian perspective and from the states in the region, 

Iran is maintaining and indeed extending its hegemony in Iraq and 

in Syria and in Lebanon. And the two ships are sort of linked. The 

more they talk with the United States, the more they have the free 

hand, they feel, either in the Assad regime bombing civilians or 

Iran supporting whether it is Maliki, Assad, Hezbollah, and so on. 

And that creates more conflict and more tension. 

Now this, obviously, is all complicated and, as you said, requires 

heavy lifting. But the region is sort of in a conflict system and the 

United States is only dealing with parts of it and often creating 

repose somewhere and tension somewhere else. 

What is certainly missing is the United States engaging Iran 

with the states of the region to talk about things beyond the 

nuclear issue, which is Iran’s projection of power into Iraq, Syria, 

and Lebanon and doing so in a very flagrant way that breaks all 

norms of international relations and so on. If the Middle East is 

to see any kind of stability, that cannot continue. And unfortunately, that is not part of the Iranian-United States discussions. So 

I think if it remains at that level, indeed it could be destabilizing. 

Senator KAINE. One sentiment I picked up on in my travels in 

the region that it was actually very helpful to kind of hear this expression was the anxiety in the region not about the failure of the 

United States-Iran negotiation over the nuclear program, but there 

is an anxiety about its success. If there was success, would the 

United States say, okay, our work is done here? We have reached 

a deal on the nuclear program and we do not need to worry about 

these other issues of projection of Iranian power in the region and 

how that could destabilize regimes. There seems to be some significant concern that the United States would feel good about a deal 

on the nuclear program and then potentially say we do not need 

to worry about the other issues when, for many of the nations in 

the region, they are equally or more concerned about the projection 

of power and the destabilizing effects of Iranian policy, as they are 

about the nuclear program. So it was helpful to hear some of those 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

42 

dynamics when we were there. And that sounds like one of your 

cautionary warnings to us. 

Mr. Nerguizian. 

Mr. NERGUIZIAN. Mr. Chairman, the three issues that frankly 

cannot be disassociated from each other are how the gulf and Iran 

are competing in the Levant, the P5+1 talks you described, but also 

I think the core issue that countries in the gulf are fundamentally 

misinterpreting or getting the wrong message about what, if anything, is the Rebalance to Asia. The interpretation in the gulf is 

that the United States is abandoning the gulf security architecture. 

And frankly, every meeting that we have conducted in the region 

reinforces this view. I think it is incumbent on the administration 

and frankly the broader diplomatic community to just make it 

clear. There is no pivot to Asia. You have an acceptance and an 

understanding by key NATO allies that Iran’s conventional and 

asymmetric forces are squarely focused on the gulf, and that drives 

a great deal of this whether it is competing in Iraq or competing 

in Syria. 

But in all of this, I think again key countries have underestimated just how severe the scales are in terms of what Syria is 

doing. You have a new generation of fighters returning home to 

countries in the gulf, returning to Europe. You have all of the patterns of the Arab uprising in terms of broad socioeconomics, labor 

markets, which we did not discuss in detail but that drive a lot of 

this. And I think even countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia that 

look at what is happening in Syria as zero sum, in terms of who 

wins or loses, are slowly coming around to a view that I think the 

United States has slowly moved to, which is that you need a pragmatic response to a broader trend. I agree with Dr. Salem. There 

need to be short-term solutions, but this is a long pattern. The arc 

of history will be long in the region in terms of what the end state 

will look like. You need metrics of stability. And if linking what is 

happening in Syria and as a result in Lebanon to P5+1, in concert 

with a successful strategic communications effort from the gulf, 

produces more stability, then so be it. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Salem, I have one last question for you. You 

indicated in your testimony—you talked a little bit about the economic issues that could be positive in Lebanon if there is a pursuit 

of natural gas development. And you said I could say a word more 

about that if you were interested. I actually am sort of interested 

in your expertise on these economic issues. What do you see as sort 

of the opportunities that these gas reserves provide for the Lebanese economy and the likelihood that those opportunities will be 

accessed and taken advantage of in the near or medium term? 

Dr. SALEM. Yes, I have worked a lot on this and met with the 

people and companies that are involved. This is a very interesting 

and somewhat complicated situation. 

The reserves—of course, they are not proven. One has to drill 

and so on. But from even the estimates of many of the companies 

or their expectations, there are very, very serious, particularly the 

gas reserves. They are a bit deep. So they are expensive to get at. 

Much will depend on at that time what are the market outlets and 

what is the money calculations behind it. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43 

But I see it really in two stages. Stage one is going ahead with 

the bidding to which many of the major oil companies of the West 

and the East have applied to bid, and the bid round was supposed 

to happen last year because the government still needed to issue 

a few decrees. When it resigned, it was a caretaker government 

and could not go forward. The first stage is going ahead with the 

bidding round, and for the first 4 to 5 to 6 years, there will be no 

revenue. You know, maybe within 5–6 years, you begin to drill. You 

begin to get some energy, but to turn that into money, it might be 

a 7–10 years window. 

But what is important about phase one, if you have major oil 

players from the United States and Russia and Europe and China 

engaged in this sector in the eastern Mediterranean, alongside 

Israel and Cyprus, which relates to then Turkey and the EU and 

all of that, it might create for Lebanon an investment in its stability and its long-term viability because of the importance of 

energy, similar to how the gulf sort of gets its stability and security. The gulf countries are a strange—you know, tribes and this, 

but they survive because they have important resources. Other 

parts of the world sometimes have that as well. That is very important for Lebanon’s geostrategic environment if the East and West 

agree that this must be a peaceful zone because there are important resources here. 

Now, actually moving forward on what is the economic value of 

this, the first thing is to figure out how to get it to market. The 

market is effectively Europe. The original approach was or the plan 

was certainly to take it overland to Turkey which would mean 

through Syria. As long as the war there is raging, you cannot do 

that, but that is the most cost-effective way. And I would indicate 

that part of the war for Syria has to do with who is going to control 

the future of eastern Mediterranean energy. 

The other way to do it, which Israel is exploring, is whether to 

do it through LNG in Cyprus and put it on ships or possibly from 

Cyprus an undersea pipeline to Turkey and then Turkey gets it to 

market. So it gets into a lot of geopolitics and relations. 

If Lebanon can get this to market and sell it, that would be— 

well, let me say two things. The energy itself, the gas—if it is 

extracted, the first use of it is directly into the Lebanese electricity 

production, which would take the biggest bill from Lebanon’s public 

finances off the records as what we pay to create electricity. That 

would be the first and most direct easing for the Lebanese public 

finances. 

The second part is if we begin to sell on the markets. The money, 

according to the law that was passed, will be put into a sovereign 

wealth fund. The law for the sovereign wealth fund and the details 

of how that money will be spent has not yet been negotiated, but 

the principle of creating a sovereign wealth fund, which is the 

proper approach in principle, has been made law and a future parliament will have to pass a law as to what the wealth fund will 

use the money for. Will it be to draw down debt? Will be capital 

investment? Or will it be just insurance for the future? The Norwegians are working very closely with the Lebanese. They have the 

best model. There are other models as well. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

44 

So it is geostrategic stability first and within a decade, if they 

move ahead, beginning to move ahead on some economic benefits 

which would be very significant. 

During that whole period, there would be a benefit that companies both upstream, downstream will begin setting up in Lebanon 

to prepare for this sector, and that in itself creates economic activity in Lebanon which creates jobs and growth, all of this overshadowed by the war in Syria. So it is pretty tough going. But still, 

there is serious interest in the international community, even with 

the war going on, for the bids to go forward. 

Most of the gas and so on is not in the border area. There are 

fields. It is not exactly clear because one has to drill to be sure. It 

is likely that one of the main Israeli fields maybe dips up a bit into 

southern—the very disputed zone. But it is really not a major issue 

in the sense that there is 90 percent of drilling that can take place 

that has nothing to do with the Israeli border issues. So we can go 

on for 20–30 years without even touching that issue. If people want 

to avoid it, it is definitely avoidable. The challenges are to get 

ahead with the bidding round, to begin the process, to find ways 

to get it eventually to market and to have some security and stability over this decade. 

Senator KAINE. I want to thank you both for being here and for 

your testimony. One of the challenges of being a junior Senator is 

I am usually at hearings where I get to ask questions for 5 minutes. The ability to have two panels and have 2 hours where I can 

ask all the questions I want is a great satisfaction to the policy 

glutton in me. 

Your expertise is very much appreciated. This is a very important relationship. And I frankly worry that in the story of Syria, 

the effect in Jordan has been a little better known, as it should be. 

It should be well known. The effect in Turkey has been a little better known, as it should be. It is important that the effect in Lebanon is very well known here in Congress and in this country. You 

have helped with that today. I look forward to continuing to work 

together with you. 

And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER