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THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN EGYPT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 24, 2014

Serial No. 113–207

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., director, International Security and 

Counterterrorism Issues, International Affairs & Trade Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 8

Mr. Charles Dunne, director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, Freedom House ............................................................................................................ 32

Mr. Sam LaHood (former Egypt Country director, International Republican 

Institute) ............................................................................................................... 41

Mr. Patrick Butler, vice president, Programs, International Center for Journalists .................................................................................................................... 53

Ms. Lila Jaafar, senior program manager, National Democratic Institute ........ 58

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.: Prepared statement ....................................... 10

Mr. Charles Dunne: Prepared statement .............................................................. 35

Mr. Sam LaHood: Prepared statement .................................................................. 43

Mr. Patrick Butler: Prepared statement ................................................................ 56

Ms. Lila Jaafar: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 60

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 84

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 85

Written response from Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., to question submitted for the record by the Honorable Doug Collins, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Georgia ............................................................... 86

(1)

THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN 

EGYPT 

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I know that many of our members are in other committees so 

they will be scooting back and forth during our hearing. So please 

excuse our absence at any time during your testimony and don’t 

think it has anything to do with you. 

It might have to do with you but not the others. But after recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch or Mr. Connolly, if Mr. 

Deutch is not here promptly, for 5 minutes each for our opening 

statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our first witnesses and without objection 

the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record and members may have 5 days to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitation in the 

rules. 

Following the completion of our first panel, I will then introduce 

our second panel of witnesses and their prepared statements will 

also be made a part of the record. The chair now recognizes herself 

for 5 minutes. 

Egypt has long been considered a key state for U.S. national security objectives in the Middle East and North Africa and for over 

30 years our two nations have shared strategic military and political cooperation. 

For its part, Egypt reached a peace agreement with Israel in 

1979 and since then the United States has provided Egypt with billions of dollars in military and economic assistance. 

In return, Egypt keeps the peace with its neighbor and our strategic ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel, and it also provides us with access to the Suez Canal that gives us a critical route 

for transit between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf or the 

Indian Ocean. 

But today’s Egypt isn’t the Egypt of ’79 or even 2009. When the 

Arab Spring began, few thought Mubarak would fall. Mubarak was 

2

forced to step down and Egypt was finally able to begin the transition toward freedom and democracy. 

But Egypt was a society that never had any experience with democracy. There was no foundation for democracy and governance, 

civil society, rule of law. They were just millions of Egyptians who 

knew that they wanted something better and they just didn’t know 

how to achieve it. 

Perhaps sensing that the time to open Egyptian society was near, 

the United States Government began to fund democracy and governance programs in Egypt a little over a decade ago. 

What started out as a relatively modest program with lofty goals 

and objectives, the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Egyptian street’s 

response proved that there was indeed the need and the desire for 

such programs in Egypt. 

That year, the U.S. Government increased our funding for democracy and governance from $13 million in Fiscal Year 2010 to 

$72 million in Fiscal Year 2011. Due to the ongoing unrest that 

later became the Egyptian Revolution, the Egyptian Government 

began to strongly object to some of the U.S. Government’s planned 

democracy and governance programs and the Ministry of Justice 

began targeting or implementing partners in Egypt. 

Then in December 2011, Egyptian authorities raided the office of 

17 local and foreign NGOs including four American NGOs who 

were implementing U.S.-funded programs—Freedom House, National Democratic Institute, NDI, the International Republican Institute, IRI, and the International Center for Journalists, ICFJ. 

Forty-three of the employees of these NGOs were arrested and 

they were charged with operating offices in Egypt without being 

registered and receiving foreign funds without the approval of the 

Egyptian Government. 

Despite the ever-changing fragile state of Egypt’s transition to 

democracy, from the time of the arrests until the time they were 

convicted in June of last year, the one constant that remained was 

that these 43 individuals were pawns in a politically-motivated dispute between the Egyptian and the U.S. Government. 

The NGOs were merely doing their job and operating how they 

believed to be in accordance with Egyptian law yet they were arrested, they were tried, they were convicted in a politically motivated operation and many people may think that because we got 

the Americans out of the country and back to the United States 

that their struggles are over. 

But that is not remotely the case. This conviction has loomed 

over the heads like the sword of Damocles, as they have to live 

their lives in constant worry of the repercussions. 

That is why in June 2013, my colleague, Gerry Connolly, and I 

requested that GAO conduct a review of U.S. economic and security 

assistance to Egypt. GAO will present today their findings of the 

first phase of the report that deals with the NGO and civil society 

issues. 

Today’s hearing is important to tell their stories and let us know 

how this has impacted the lives of these 43 and their families and 

how it has impacted U.S. democracy and governance programs in 

Egypt and elsewhere. 

3

Our witnesses deserve to be heard. We need to hear their story 

because the fight for civil society, the fight for democracy, for governance, for rule of law and human rights in Egypt is nowhere 

near over. 

The transition to democracy is still fragile and al-Sisi has a long 

hard row ahead. One of the easiest ways that he can prove to 

Egyptians and the U.S. that he is serious about this task is to immediately and unconditionally pardon the 43 NGO workers. 

We have seen mass arrests and we have already seen journalists 

from Al Jazeera arrested and sentenced to 7 to 10 years in jail. 

These are not signs of a open inclusive society that respects human 

rights. 

Just because Egypt lives up to its obligations under the peace 

treaty with Israel doesn’t mean that the United States will continue to provide assistance unconditionally and disregard human 

rights conditions because we will not do that. 

While we recognize Egypt’s commitment to the Sinai and security 

threats, there must be an improvement in Egypt’s human rights 

record and it must take steps to advance the aspiration of the people of Egypt toward democracy. 

And with that, I would like to yield 5 minutes for an opening 

statement from Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I certainly 

associate myself with everything you have just said. It has been a 

privilege to work with you on this matter and am requesting the 

GAO study in question after the conviction of 41 employees of four 

non-governmental organizations in June 2013. 

The NGOs, which included the National Democratic Institute, 

the International Republican Institute, the Freedom House and 

International Center for Journalists were operating in Egypt with 

direct U.S. funding. We have provided over $140 million for democracy assistance in Egypt since 2009. 

The Egyptian Government had previously objected to NGOs receiving this direct funding. In what is perceived as retaliation for 

the U.S. continuance the NGO offices were raided in December 

2011 and an investigation ensued. 

U.S. State Department put together a concerted effort to provide 

the NGOs with diplomatic, legal and financial assistance for their 

defense. In an unfortunate miscarriage of justice, the 41 charged 

employees were convicted and sentenced to 1 to 5 years in prison. 

These wrongfully convicted NGO employees have since had to 

live with the burden and stigma of a court conviction in their 

records. Given this episode and for several other reasons, count me 

a skeptic on Egypt’s commitment to promoting civil society. 

The military coup in July 2013 and the subsequent brutal crackdown against dissidents was a clear message to the United States 

that the democratic transition in Egypt was all but over. 

Since the coup, 16,000 people have been jailed and 2,500 Egyptian citizens have been slaughtered in the streets in confrontation 

with government forces. Congress, fortunately, issued a response to 

the violence when it included in the Fiscal Year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill a requirement that the Secretary of State must 

certify that Egypt is meeting its commitment to democratic transiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:52 Oct 14, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072414\88832 SHIRL
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tion and taking steps to govern democratically prior to the release 

of certain military assistance. 

While the Secretary has certified Egypt is upholding its peace 

treaty with Israel and its strategic commitments to the United 

States, he has yet to certify Egypt’s commitment to democracy, understandably. 

It is not difficult to see why. The same military that executed the 

violent suppression of dissent was afforded further power and autonomy under the constitution adopted just this past January. 

Since the election of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, the former commander 

in chief of the Egyptian armed forces, government actions have provided further cause for concern. In response to the conviction of 

three journalists in June, Secretary Kerry responded, ‘‘Today’s verdicts fly in the face of the essential role of civil society, a free press 

and a real rule of law.’’

‘‘I call,’’ the Secretary said, ‘‘on the President to make clear publicly his government’s intention to observe Egypt’s commitment to 

the essential role of civil society, a free press and the rule of law.’’ 

That is our Secretary of State. 

I welcome statements from the administration that call out this 

regression in Egypt. I hope our witnesses today from the four prosecuted NGOs can provide guidance on how we return to a path toward democracy in Egypt. 

The draft law and associations released on June 26th by Egypt’s 

Ministry of Social Solidarity does not engender such confidence and 

its commitment to civil society by the Egyptian Government. 

The law would allow the government to dissolve NGOs that 

‘‘threaten national unity,’’ and inspect their office spaces. Sound familiar? 

Human Rights Watch has deemed the measure the death knell 

of NGO independence in Egypt. The organizations represented by 

our witnesses have institutional knowledge about operating in that 

country and I would like to know how this new Egyptian legislation 

would further hinder NGOs that have taken up the cause simply 

of trying to promote democratic civil society in Egypt. 

I fear that answer will not be a helpful one. Congress must consider this and other developments as we weigh requests for continued financial and military assistance as part of an important bilateral relationship. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

I would like to tell Mr. LaHood that this is a baby friendly committee so you should get that little one back. We like those sounds. 

So pleased to yield 1 minute to Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

your strong support in promoting democracy in Egypt. Egypt is a 

very important and appreciated friend of the United States. I know 

first hand of the extraordinary people of Egypt. 

My dad passed through the Suez Canal in 1944, as he was a Flying Tiger on the way to serve in India and China, and recently my 

son, Julian, served with the South Carolina Army National Guard 

in Operation Bright Star in Egypt and he was very, very impressed 

by the positive people of Egypt. 

5

We have high hopes for the people of Egypt, one of the world’s 

great civilizations and I want to again thank you for having this 

hearing today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to your family for their service. 

Thank you, Mr. Wilson. And now I would like to allow Mr. Deutch 

for his opening statement 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I would 

like to particularly thank you and Congressman Connolly for your 

leadership on this issue over the past year, in particular. 

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today and I welcome 

back Mr. Johnson. Thanks to you and your colleagues at GAO for 

the great and important oversight work that your agency provides. 

It has been a little over a year since the convictions against four 

American NGOs were handed down by the Egyptian court. Employees of these organizations were accused of political subversion, engaging in political activity and receiving unauthorized funds from 

a foreign source. 

These are still dubious accusations at best and the convictions 

deeply trouble me. Many of us are still hopeful that the election of 

President Sisi can set the country back on a democratic path but 

it is difficult to see a way forward if these convictions are allowed 

to stand. 

The United States has spent tens of millions of dollars annually 

on democracy and governance programs in Egypt and from 2009 

until March 2014 funding for these programs totaled $140 million 

and our spending on these projects jumped from $13 million in Fiscal Year 2010 to about $72 million the following year, reflecting the 

hope that the people’s revolution could lead to important democratic changes in the country. 

Instead, we saw the election of Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood government which led to a brutal crackdown on civil society and a severe restriction of human rights. Ultimately, the raid on the four 

U.S.-based NGO offices in December 2011 led to the conviction of 

43 NGO employees, Americans and Egyptians, in June 2013. 

These NGO programs were intended to increase space for and 

widespread participation in civil society organizations. Instead, 

that space is dramatically constricted as U.S.-linked organizations 

were accused of foreign interference. 

The persecution and the prosecution of NGO workers is unacceptable. It was unacceptable under Morsi and it is unacceptable 

under President Sisi. 

The United States must send a clear and consistent signal to the 

Egyptian Government and whoever is in power to the Egyptian 

people and to the world that fundamental democratic principles 

such as the rights of assembly and association must be upheld. 

Many of us were troubled in November 2013 when the government passed the protest law which banned public gatherings that 

were over 10 people without a permit. 

Egyptians are now facing a draft law on associations that would 

impose severe restrictions on civil society organizations and subject 

to undue oversight and interference by the government. Let me be 

clear. I fully support our relationship with Egypt. 

It is a critical strategic relationship. But I urge the government 

to avoid any actions that will stifle civil society or restrict basic 

6

democratic freedoms for its people. The country has undergone 

many changes in the past 3 years and I am hopeful for a brighter 

and more prosperous Egypt. 

The government has maintained its promises to move quickly toward elections, but as we all said 2 and 3 years ago an election 

doesn’t make a democracy. This government must be responsive 

and it must be inclusive. 

At the same time, U.S. Government policies must reflect the 

shifting environment. Our policies have to be able to predict and 

effectively respond to the actions of Egyptian Government. 

Mr. Johnson, in your testimony you refer to the GAO recommendation that State Department and USAID should determine 

lessons learned from the NGO incident and incorporate them into 

future policy. 

I look forward to hearing how we can ensure that the kind of 

work that we want to do with civil society can continue while ensuring that those on the ground have the necessary protections 

that they need. 

Now, I know that there are those who believe that the U.S. 

should disengage from countries when there seem to be discrepancies between their approach to democracy on a daily basis and 

our own, particularly if those countries are far away. 

But I firmly believe that our partnership with Egypt is vital to 

ensuring the security of this country. Cooperation with the United 

States and our regional partners like Israel and Jordan on security 

issues is just one piece of that puzzle. 

A strong, stable and prosperous Egypt can serve as an anchor in 

a volatile region and we have to seek a balance in our relationship 

accordingly. 

To our witnesses and the organizations you represent, thank you 

for the work you are doing around the world to build civil society, 

to strengthen the rule of law and governance and to promote 

human rights. 

The prosecution and conviction of these 43 men and women 

should remind us that the work that you do is not easy and we are 

grateful for your efforts, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

We should note that many of the things that we will be judging 

Egypt on are not going to be based on what has happened during 

a time of turmoil where you have a change of authority in government. 

Egypt came this close to being dominated by a radical Islamic 

philosophy that would have destroyed the chances for peace and 

stability anywhere in the Middle East, especially in dealing with 

the Israeli conflict that is going on right now between the Israelis 

and the Palestinians. 

And the people of Egypt went into the streets by the hundreds 

of thousands and, joined by the military, decided they were not 

going to have a radical Islamic caliphate controlling their country. 

During that time, when that was being prevented, yes, there 

were people—many people who were arrested who would not be arrested under normal circumstances and it is time now, however, for 

7

those of us who support a democratic and stable and positive Egypt 

to join with others in the demand—not the demand but the request 

of the current government to start going back toward real democratic principles and they could start, for example, by releasing 

these 43 NGO workers that were arrested and by releasing the six 

journalists that are now being held in Egypt that President al-Sisi 

now says was a mistake to have them arrested in the first place. 

So let us hope—let us not judge Egypt on what happened during 

this time of turmoil as they were changing and trying to get away 

from a radical Islamic caliphate and toward a more democratic society. Let us now judge them as they build their democratic society 

and judge them based on how they do with this things like this. 

Thank you very much for your leadership, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Cicilline is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I want to 

thank you and Ranking Member Deutch for calling this very important and timely hearing on the state of civil society in Egypt and 

I particular want to thank you, Chairman and Congressman 

Connolly for your early leadership and requesting the review and 

report, which we will hear about today. 

Egypt has been an important and long-time ally of the United 

States and receives $1.3 billion in military aid each year. Yet despite public statements supporting democratic changes, the military-led government has failed to carry out many basic reforms 

that would signal its commitment to rule of law, human rights and 

media freedom. 

The egregious case of the four organizations before us today is 

just one example. Though this case began under a different government also led by the military, the current leadership has done 

nothing to rectify it. 

Meanwhile, the staff involved have had their lives threatened, 

their families harassed, their reputations questioned and some 

have had to flee the country to avoid prison. 

Since the al-Sisi government took over, civil societies have faced 

harassment, journalists have been imprisoned and more than 

16,000 political prisoners have been detained. Political reform 

takes time, to be sure, but Egypt is not on a good trajectory at this 

point in time, and I look forward to hearing the testimony presented today, particularly the panelists’ views on how the United 

States can productively support reforms that protect fundamental 

human rights in Egypt, and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Seeing no further requests for time, our subcommittee is delighted to welcome back Mr. Michael Johnson, who is the senior executive and director of international affairs and trade at the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office. 

In this role, he assesses U.S. counterterrorism and security efforts focusing on Afghanistan, Pakistan and other terrorist state 

safe havens. 

Prior to this position, Mr. Johnson was an assistant director in 

GAO’s homeland security and justice team, and he also spent a 

year detailed to the House of Representatives Homeland Security 

Committee, you poor thing. 

8

Was that under Peter King? Oh, that has got to hurt. Thank you 

so much——

Mr. CONNOLLY. He used to have hair then, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. You are recognized 

and your prepared statement will be made a part of the record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES MICHAEL JOHNSON, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM 

ISSUES, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & TRADE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chairwoman 

Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to return before the subcommittee to discuss the results of our report being released today 

on U.S. democracy assistance efforts in Egypt. 

This report focuses on three issues—first, the extent to which the 

U.S. Government can identify and manage the risks of providing 

direct assistance through the Democracy Assistance Program in 

Egypt; second, the types of support that the U.S. Government provided to the nongovernmental organizations; the extent to which 

the U.S. Government Democracy Assistance Program was affected 

by the prosecution of NGOs. But before I get into the specific findings of that report I would like to provide a little context. 

For over 30 years, as you have noted, the Egyptian Government 

has been a key U.S. partner, receiving billions of dollars in U.S. 

economic and military assistance. For over a decade, the U.S. Government has funded democracy assistance in Egypt at the tune of 

approximately $140 million since Fiscal Year 2009. 

This included direct funding to NGOs totaling about $65 million 

after the January 2011 revolution which ended, as you know, the 

Mubarak presidency. The Egyptian Government, however, objected 

to how the U.S. was providing this assistance to NGOs, asserting 

that the U.S. was violating the terms of an agreement of process 

that the two governments had outlined. 

The Egyptian Government raided, as you noted, the offices of 

several NGOs including four U.S. NGOs, and charged and convicted employees of these four organizations with, among other 

things, operating an unauthorized organization in Egypt. 

The U.S. Government noted its disagreement with the actions 

and the efforts and views of the Egyptian Government. With respect to the findings outlined in the report being released today, 

first, I would like to note regarding the efforts to identify the managed risks we did find consistent with State Department and 

USAID and Federal internal control standards that the U.S. Government had identified and took some steps to manage the risk of 

funding democracy assistance in Egypt. Some of that effort goes 

back to 2005. 

This included awareness of the Egyptian Government’s likely objection to the U.S. plans to directly fund NGOs after the 2011 revolution. We do note, however, in our report that State and USAID 

had not done enough to document and incorporate the lessons 

learned from the experience in Egypt. Applying lessons learned, as 

we previously reported, can among other things inform future deciVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:52 Oct 14, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072414\88832 SHIRL
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sions helped to inform future work processes and activities and 

provide a way forward. 

Second, and related to NGO support, a report that the U.S. Government had provided the four prosecuted NGOs with diplomatic, 

legal, financial and grant flexibility support. With respect to diplomatic support, this included holding multiple meetings with Egyptian officials to try to defend or prevent the prosecution of NGO 

employees. 

Legal support included working with NGO lawyers to develop 

legal strategies. Financial support allowed the four NGOs to use 

about $4.9 million in grant funding to pay for various legal costs. 

NGOs were also allowed to modify their grants, to adjust their 

planned activities and time lines. 

Third, we report that the prosecution of NGOs did in fact affect 

U.S. democracy assistance in Egypt. More specifically, the four 

prosecuted U.S. NGOs currently cannot operate and conduct activities inside Egypt and these NGOs had to cancel some activities 

such as election observations, voter education and political party 

training. 

As the figure you will see that is being projected shows, since the 

start of the NGO trials in 2012 the amount of U.S. funding for democracy in governance projects in Egypt has decreased, going from 

a high of about $72 million in Fiscal Year 2011, as some of the 

members noted, to about $6 million in Fiscal Year 2013, its lowest 

level during the 2009–2013 time frame. 

The number of awards, as the figure also shows, also declined 

during the same period, from a high of about 100, as the figures 

shows, in Fiscal Year 2011, to a low of about 15 is Fiscal Year 

2013. 

In closing, we recommend in our report that the Secretary of 

State and the USAID administrator take steps to incorporate lessons learned from the U.S. experience in Egypt into plans for managing aggressive future democracy assistance efforts. The State Department and USAID both concur with our recommendation. 

I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today and 

also would like to personally thank the GAO staff who traveled 

with me in Egypt—Ryan Vaughn, Drew Lindsey, and Rachel 

Dunsmoorfor their efforts on this particular engagement. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Charles Michael 

Johnson. Thank you. 

We just had the pleasure of receiving your testimony last month 

on our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan—we thank you for 

that—and your GAO team’s assessment of our oversight and accountability of U.S. assistance there in Afghanistan, and while this 

report is focused on our democracy and governance programs in 

Egypt, your report has a certain similarity to the previous one. 

You reported that even though State and USAID have been receptive to your recommendations—and from looking at the report 

you paint both agencies in a good light in terms of how they reacted to the NGO trial in Egypt and how they supported the four 

NGOs and their employees—but there is still a lingering problem 

with the access that you were given. 

You told us at the last hearing that it would be helpful if State 

and USAID granted your team more timely access to the documents that you had requested and I am seeing that same theme 

in this report. 

Could you comment on how this issue—timely access to documents—impacts your work? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I would like to note that we continue to experience some challenges in getting timely access. The process in particular for getting access from both USAID and State in particular 

on this Egypt engagement was quite burdensome and difficult. 

They were—you know, both agencies required, as I noted in my 

last testimony, our employees to go to a reading room to look at 

materials. 

They limited our ability to take notes and also to make copies of 

the documents as well. This is definitely an unnecessary and burdensome type of approach for us to do our work and provide you 

guys information in a timely manner. 

So we continue to experience some challenges with both agencies. 

In particular, Egypt is one of the case studies that we worked out 

an agreement with USAID to see how things can be improved and 

I would have to say that this case study is not going well at all. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, following up on what you just said, you 

say that lessons learned from Egypt should inform future U.S. 

plans and that Egypt is a model case. But, clearly, this all happened or the process began several years ago. 

Is there any indication that State and USAID identified these 

problems in Egypt and began implementing corrective measures 

across the board to avoid a future scenario like the one we saw in 

Egypt early on in the process and has there been this—or has there 

been this slow learning curve? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, one thing I want to note is it has been made 

clear to us that we have seen this in the work we have done. It 

is definitely a challenging situation that the U.S. Government finds 

itself in, both State and USAID. 

With respect to lessons learned, as I note in my opening statement, they were aware of the risks back in 2005, as early as that 

point in time. There have been some actions that have been taken 

that they highlight in terms of establishing working groups and 

country groups that will look into this issue. 

20

As part of our recommendation we also follow up to see to what 

extent is that going to specifically address what we have asked for 

and that is to document the lessons learned and to apply those to 

future plans going forward. 

So we will be monitoring that. I think they have up to 60 days 

to respond to their authorizing committees to their specific actions 

but they did concur. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Your report and testimony discusses the U.S. Government’s work with these NGOs and our democracy in governance programs. During the course of your 

fieldwork, though, you interviewed local Egyptian NGO workers 

and government officials. 

Who did you meet with in Egypt and what did you take away 

from that meeting? Do they feel like civil society remains under attack? How does the Egyptian Government describe the case of 

these NGOs and their employees? 

I remain concerned that they aren’t really sure yet which direction al-Sisi will take Egypt and the new constitution certainly included some good revisions but also some troubling ones. The new 

NGO draft law is very troubling and the mass arrests and the 

trials aren’t in line with democratic ideals. 

One of the most important things that al-Sisi can do to prove to 

the international community that he is serious about leading Egypt 

into this new era of democracy is to pardon these 43 NGOs and the 

U.S. must continue to press this as a top priority. 

Al-Sisi says it is not within his power, that he cannot do that. 

Can you tell me about who you met with and what is al-Sisi—

should we push him to pardon them or will he not go that way? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We actually had a lot of success in country meetings with various officials, the U.S. Government officials as well as 

some of these civil society groups, and in addition we met with 

some members of the Egyptian ministries, in particular Dr. Bakr, 

who at the time was the deputy minister of international cooperation. 

Different viewpoints and different perspectives, obviously, as I 

noted earlier there is some disagreement between the two parties. 

Let me first comment with respect to the meetings we have had 

with the U.S. State Department and the USAID representatives. 

They made clear to us some of the positions they were taking in 

terms of not agreeing completely with the positions that the Egyptian Government was taking and what they were doing to support 

the NGOs and in particular to find some relief for those who were 

prosecuted. With respect to the Egyptian Government, basically 

their position was that the NGOs were in violation of their Egyptian laws in particular and that——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They were not given a chance to register. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Exactly. That came out of a lot of the focus group 

meetings we had. We met with about 17 civil society organizations 

in country, had various round tables. 

The views were a variety of views but in particular we did hear 

quite a bit that the registration process was extremely burdensome 

and some had registered as far back as 2006 and were still waiting 

on registration. 

21

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr, Johnson. Very 

pleased to yield to the ranking member, my good friend, Mr. 

Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Johnson, do State and USAID have the authority to respond 

to the kind of risks that they face? Are they—are there regulations, 

are there laws that make it more difficult for them to be able to 

tackle the challenges that they face—the risks that they face? 

Mr. JOHNSON. In terms of—obviously, foreign policy issues and 

how we deal with challenges overseas is the purview of the State 

Department as well. That is their role. 

In terms of risk mitigation, we have long reported, whether it is 

this type of situation or even working in a dangerous environment 

that a risk mitigation strategy needs to be in place and taking that, 

obviously, the practice that we see many of our agencies undertake 

and as we reported is that you need to apply lessons learned and 

build on your previous experience in the way forward in terms of 

how you proceed. 

So in terms of the ability to do it, we definitely believe and we 

think that they do have that ability to mitigate risk and to plan 

for that risk in advance as they move forward. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And so building on lessons learned in what way 

and are there other countries where lessons have been learned that 

can be applied here as well? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I mean, just a month ago I talked about the 

lessons learned that the U.S. Government can take from the experience in Iraq and apply those to Afghanistan. That has been a 

long-standing thing that has been mentioned and as we talked 

about in that hearing, you know, the shift from the military-led to 

civilian-led presence there are lessons learned there. 

Similarly, here if we see a situation where the partner country 

is not as receptive to democracy, obviously, we have an experience 

here as the U.S. is going to face—is likely to face this challenge in 

other environments. They need to apply those lessons to those experiences going forward. And even as we go back in and there—

if there is any effort to have conversations and discuss this with 

the Egyptian Government, these lessons that we have gone through 

need to be a part of that process. 

Mr. DEUTCH. What does that mean? There is a part of the country that is not as responsive to democracy—what does that mean? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Obviously, we are well aware that some of the 

ministries and some of the members of the Egyptian Government 

were not as receptive to the types of civil societies that the U.S. 

and its NGOs were promoting or even NGOs—even Egyptian 

NGOs were promoting and looking forward to. So that needs to be 

taken into consideration as we move forward in developing new 

policies. 

Mr. DEUTCH. What would those policies be and what message 

would be helpful coming from here to support those policies? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, GAO is not in a position to comment on policy. That is the purview of the Congress, the administration and 

the various agencies. What we would say is that the lessons 

learned from Egypt and other experiences need to be applied to 

that decision as we move forward. 

22

Mr. DEUTCH. All right. So then go back to what you can actually 

comment on, which is what to learn from those lessons. I appreciate that. We will worry about the policies. 

So you make the suggestions, though, on what would actually 

matter on the ground for these NGOs and for people who are trying 

to build democracy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. I mean, obviously, we have gone through an 

experience here and obviously there are different approaches that 

we have taken in terms of the types of assistance that is provided. 

Those are things that we have an experience in that we can learn 

from those lessons going forward. 

There are, you know, different types of organizations that we 

fund and actually the U.S. has had some success working with the 

Egyptian society and actually moving forward on some democracy 

assistance efforts. So there are ways that this has worked. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. So let us try that again. Give me an example 

of something that works that could be used as a model, that could 

be replicated elsewhere and——

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, again, just to emphasize, we don’t do policy 

but we are aware that there were some organizations that were not 

subject to the NGO registration requirement that can also carry 

out similar activities. So that is an alternative approach. Obviously, when we are working in environments that are not conducive or that are challenging we need to find a way to mitigate and, 

obviously, that needs to be in the form of these focus groups that 

they are talking about pulling together, working groups, can study 

the different things that actually may be acceptable, reach some 

compromise agreement on those and try to work through the other 

means by which we can move forward on other initiatives. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I am uncomfortable, though, with the suggestion 

that the way to move forward is to find the groups that have not 

been singled out and have not been prosecuted. I would rather figure out how to avoid having groups who are there to promote democracy. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And I 100 percent agree with that. What we don’t 

want to do is find ourselves in a situation again where we are 

doing things ad hoc or we are doing them on the fly as things are 

evolving. 

Egypt gives us an opportunity to take these lessons, to document 

those lessons when you find yourself in a similar situation in any 

other environment to know what actually was effective in terms of 

what worked. 

Mr. DEUTCH. That is great. I appreciate that. Thank you, Madam 

Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. In reading your remarks, 

you said the U.S. Government increased the amount of funding it 

awarded to Egypt for democracy and governance assistance from 

approximately $13 million in 2010 to approximately $72 million in 

2011. This funding included an increase in direct funding to NGOs 

totaling about $65 million. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. 

Mr. WEBER. I am doing the math and the increase from $13 million to $72 million is not $65 million. Did I miss something? 

23

Mr. JOHNSON. The increase from $13 million. 

Mr. WEBER. To $72 million. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. 

Mr. WEBER. And it says this funding included an increase in di- rect funding to NGOs totaling about $65 million after the 2011 revolution. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The figure—the combined figure that talks about it—is approximately $71.6 million in terms of democracy assistance 

in 2011. Not all of that would have been direct funding. 

The portion we are highlighting in 2011—the surge, as we would call it, or the increase—was $65 million in direct funding to the 

nongovernmental organizations. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. So in December 2011, according to your testimony, the Egyptian Government raided the offices and, of course, 

as we have noted, they arrested and charged. And so now we are 

saying that the U.S. organizations and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and NGOs had to close their operations in Egypt. Is there 

a vacuum? 

Mr. JOHNSON. As I also noted there are some groups and some 

societies that are or have, you know, undertaken some of the civil 

society initiatives. There were some efforts that they are currently 

no longer able to undertake. 

I think the political party strengthening was one of the areas 

probably that was impacted that these groups were involved in. 

Again, there is a variety of different civil society groups that the 

U.S. has funded that are operating there. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And what happens to the $65 million? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The $65 million has been awarded. As I mentioned 

earlier, there was some grant flexibility allowed where some of the 

organizations were able to do alternative things. 

One example is where instead of—I got to be careful how I 

present it—some of the information is sensitive and classified—

there were some efforts to do some of the things online as an alternative approach to continue to move forward some of the initiatives. 

In addition, some of the time frames were pushed out to allow 

the organizations to fulfill their agreement with the grants, in particular. Some of the financing, as noted earlier, was used to provide 

legal assistance or support for legal costs to some of the NGOs. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. When you say online that was one of my questions from later on and that is does Egypt have a robust open 

Internet? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not sure if I can comment on whether the 

Internet is robust and open. From my own personal experience 

there didn’t seem to be a problem in accessing some things through 

wireless. But then again, I was in a decent hotel. 

Mr. WEBER. Sure, the NSA is not reading those emails too. Did 

I say that out loud? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I have no comment on that particular issue. I am 

not aware of that. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. And some say that the United States should 

no longer provide aid. Some say we should provide more aid and 

24

they argue that the United States must increase funding for democracy and human rights, especially at a time when Egypt needs 

more funds. 

In your view, how could the U.S. Government best promote the 

advancement of human rights including religious freedom in Egypt 

and how would you break that spending down? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. The specific human rights issue as a part 

of our broader engagement and review that we are going to be undertaking in response to a request from this subcommittee. We will 

be reporting hopefully on that issue later. We have a much broader 

review. This democracy and governance issue is a smaller subset 

so at this time we are not prepared to comment on the human 

rights issue. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. The head of Egypt’s National Council for 

Human Rights called for a delay in passing the law until a new 

Parliament is elected. What is that date? Do you know? When is 

the new Parliament election? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I believe it is in the fall. In the fall is the time 

frame we were given. 

Mr. WEBER. Do you know the date or the month in the fall? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me consult with my staff. Around October of 

this year is what we were told. We don’t have a specific date but 

October was the month we have been made aware of. 

Mr. WEBER. Sounds like my grandfather when he was about 90. 

I asked him when he was born and he said, ‘‘In the spring, I 

think.’’ So all right. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Mr. Connolly of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. My friend, that reminds me of a 

story about a man in his 90s, an Irishman, and was asked, you 

know, when his birthday was and he said, ‘‘You know, March 

18th,’’ and somebody said, ‘‘What year?’’ And he went, ‘‘Every 

year.’’

Okay. Mr. Johnson, thank you for being here and thank you for 

responding to the chairman’s request and mine. Did you interview 

the NGO personnel who were charged and convicted? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, we did. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And what was it they were charged with? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Specifically, I guess, our reading is that they were 

charged with operating an unauthorized organization in Egypt. 

That was one of the charges. There is some additional insight in 

our more sensitive report that you are receiving later today. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was there not also if not an explicit charge certainly an implicit charge they were working for a foreign agent, 

namely, the United States Government and that that was contradictory to the interest of the Egyptian Government? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We did not specifically see that but I have been 

made aware that that has been some of the allegations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. In fact, I think it was an explicit allegation 

made by the minister at the time during the previous administration. And is it not true that when somebody is tried in an Egyptian 

court they are put in a cage? Is that correct? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I don’t have the details of how they are detained. 

25

Mr. CONNOLLY. Take it from me. And it is a very humiliating experience for a young person. Their families see this. They are 

ashamed to go back into their communities and trying to explain 

this is a huge burden. 

So there is a lot of shame, in addition to the fact you have got 

a conviction on your record. The whole process is a degrading and 

demeaning process and deliberately so. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Some of the views—as I mentioned, we have met 

with the four prosecuted NGOs and those in country. Obviously, 

they feel as if the situation they were put in was a challenging one. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Did you see any difference between the Morsi 

government and the al-Sisi government with respect to this issue? 

Mr. JOHNSON. At the time of our review and in-country visit 

there was—Sisi was not in power as the President. We did not see 

much of a difference between the Mubarak period and the Morsi 

period. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, we are now in the al-Sisi period and the 

military government has been in power for a year. Are you aware 

of any difference? Getting any hints, some emails, some notes, 

someone whispering in your ear that maybe this government’s got 

a different attitude from the previous two governments with respect to these innocent NGO personnel who have been arrested? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We definitely look forward in the ongoing work we 

have underway for you, Congressman, to continue to pursue that 

and follow up and update the report based on this time frame we 

have here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I do think this subcommittee is going to be 

very interested in the answer to that question because one sense 

is there is no difference. You talked about lessons learned and risk 

mitigation strategies with respect to State Department and AID. 

How did you feel their response was to those two things that you 

think are very important as part of your recommendations? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think they were open to our recommendations so 

that is a good sign. I would say, during the course of our work, that 

obviously this is a very sensitive topic. 

You know, noting—we didn’t go as far as to say there were specific detail risk mitigation plans but we did give the agencies credit 

for identifying risk and taking some steps to manage the risk so 

we use the word manage the risk. 

Obviously, this goes back, as I said, to 2005. In 2011 or ’13 actually there was a cable that we referred to in the report that they—

a global cable that was done that began to raise awareness on challenges to democracy and its assistance globally. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You visited Egypt yourself? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, in March. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. In March. And when you visited the Embassy 

and our AID mission did you have a strong sense that this was a 

high priority issue for them in the great panoply of issues? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I had a strong sense that the entire U.S. Egyptian 

relationship was a high priority for the folks there and I got that 

viewpoint from our State Department as well as some of the Egyptian Government officials on the defense side. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry. I didn’t understand your answer. I 

am asking about the fate of these 43 individuals——

26

Mr. JOHNSON. Forty-three. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is that—did you get the sense when you were 

there——

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. This is a high priority in the constellation of the relationship? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. I would—I would say we would take that 

away as——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good, because I think that is really important 

that the Egyptian Government understand that we are not letting 

up on this and we do care about these individuals a lot irrespective 

of nationality. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Chabot of 

Ohio is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I apologize for having to come and go. I have got actually three hearings 

going on at the same time and I appreciate your patience here. 

Mr. Johnson, thank you for your—and I will read your testimony. 

I just had a couple of questions here. First of all, I am pleased to 

hear that efforts were made to amend the controversial 2012 constitution by referendum in January. However, I, and I know others, 

had some concern about the new constitution granting greater 

power to the military including military trials of civilians, and if 

you have already addressed this issue I apologize. But could you 

comment on that issue? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We really didn’t look in detail at that issue in 

terms of greater power. That is something—we are going to look—

we have a broader review, as I noted earlier, that we have underway for the subcommittee and we are going to look at the entire 

U.S. assistance and our relationship on the defense as well as civilian side. 

So at some point we are going to look at—specifically we are focused on how the U.S. may have adjusted its strategic objectives 

in Egypt over time. So we may touch on that issue in our additional work down the road. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. And another issue I wanted to 

touch on and I know we have—I heard Mr. Connolly talk about the 

NGOs and how the government has been pursuing them and how 

that has made their lives in many ways literally hell, even if they 

are outside the country and it makes traveling and a whole range 

of other things more difficult. 

And I had the Egyptian Ambassador in my office recently and we 

discussed this and a lot of issues at length, and we obviously give 

Egypt a significant amount of aid and it is one of the highest countries that we do provide that aid, and I have supported that in general over the years because they have been a very important ally 

and their relationship with Israel and their leadership in normalizing relations with Israel has been significant not just to the region but to the whole world and so I commend them for that. 

All that being said, that clearly is one leverage point that we 

have with them on this whole NGO issue and resolving it in a 

manner that we think would be just and acceptable to all involved. 

27

And, of course, he indicated that it could be—I won’t go into all 

the reasons that he gave me in a public forum here but they would 

prefer that we not stop the aid until this issue is resolved. Could 

you comment on that to the extent that you can in a public forum 

like this? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the decision to stop or to fund or not fund 

is a policy decision that the agency and the administration and the 

Congress would have to make. 

I guess our primary purpose on this review was to look at what 

the U.S. has done to provide some sort of a way forward and our 

takeaway on this particular job is to definitely apply these lessons 

learned from Egypt from this experience as we decide then whatever strategies we use, even if that includes, you know, certification 

requirements, withholding funds or conditioning funds, that is a 

policy decision. 

That is something that we think needs to be considered as we 

do this again in other countries or even continue this in Egypt. 

Again, that is up to the Congress and the administration to make 

that determination. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. Let me just conclude with more 

a statement than a question but it seems that a lot of the NGO 

personnel who have been prosecuted both Americans and otherwise 

that the charges on failing to register or not registering appropriately or operating without the proper documentation and those 

types of things that it wasn’t at all unusual for this practice to go 

on and I don’t think anybody was trying to do anything illicit here 

or to break laws intentionally or anything else. They were just trying to provide a service to Egypt that Egypt should be grateful for 

rather than coming down so hard. 

And this is certainly one of the things that I am going to measure this new government by—how they deal with this—because I 

wasn’t a big fan of the Morsi government and as a Member of Congress and as a former chair of this committee in the last Congress 

I was, quite frankly, pleased to see Morsi, who I thought was a real 

danger to the country, removed and I don’t necessarily like seeing 

a government displaced in extralegal ways. 

But in measuring this government, the way they deal with this 

is going to be one of the things that I am going to consider very 

much on whether—how much my support will be. So thank you 

very much and my time has expired. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. You and 

many others as well. Mr. Cicilline is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Ms. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Johnson. I would like to first focus on your testimony relative to State and USAID’s development of risk management plans, and did you find that those assessments that are done 

to both develop a risk management plan and to develop, obviously, 

plans to mitigate risk are done are country specific and how often 

are they updated and do you have a recommendation as to a 

change in that policy? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We don’t have a—we did not make a recommendation to change the policy because the policy actually exists in terms 

of them developing country-specific plans. 

28

The issue here for Egypt is that that has not been completed and 

I would say that is an issue beyond Egypt and other priority countries that the U.S. has on its radar as part of our priority. 

Several country plans have not been completed despite the fact 

that some of the countries may be priorities in terms of U.S. national security or U.S. foreign relations issues. So that is a challenge and we have heard that, you know, some of the country 

teams and country folks in country actually would welcome such 

plans being completed. The lessons learned piece would be a part 

of that—should be a part of that. Part of these plans should include 

risk management strategies. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I am going to get to lessons learned in a moment 

but what I am asking is very specific. Is it the current practice of 

USAID and the State Department to have country-specific plans 

that assess the risk to NGOs and suggest—make recommendations 

to mitigate that risk? 

Mr. JOHNSON. If it is a best practice in internal control standards 

there should be risk mitigation plans. Our programs——

Mr. CICILLINE. I am asking do they currently—is that protocol 

currently in place at USAID and State? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a requirement to have the country plans 

and as I was noting the country plans should and are required to 

have some sort of risk mitigation as part of those. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. And are they required to be updated regularly, annually or less than that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is my thought that those country plans are done 

within a range of time of 3 to 5 years. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes. The reason I am raising this it seems to me 

that in the world in which we currently live the notion of, A, not 

having a plan or not having a plan that is not updated regularly 

is useless. I mean, we are talking about environments that are 

changing very quickly and it seems to me and I am asking whether 

you agree that it would be helpful to obligate USAID and the State 

Department to develop risk management plans and to give specific 

guidance to NGOs about the work that they might do on the 

ground that are country specific and very current. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Again, we didn’t make a recommendation on that 

but given they have an existing requirement or policy for the development of country plans we would support the notion of those 

plans should be routinely updated as a best practice for strategic 

planning and risk mitigation planning. So absolutely those things 

should be in place and should be routinely updated. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. Thank you. And Mr. Johnson, you just 

mentioned that the conclusion both in your written testimony and 

in your testimony today is that there are lessons to be learned and 

that both USAID and State should be sure to integrate and share 

those lessons within the internal workings of the agency. 

But while I recognize we ultimately may get to weigh in on the 

public policy surrounding the lessons, presumably you drew some 

conclusions about facts on the ground and what in fact those lessons are. 

So what lessons—what lessons are there to be learned, recognizing we will decide what the response is in terms of policy but 

you, clearly, made some conclusions about what the lessons are? 

29

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, obviously, there was a lesson learned in 

terms of being prepared to provide support to the nongovernmental 

organizations and having that strategy planned out in advance. 

If you know you are going to a situation where there may be a 

challenge to any of the implementing partners or U.S. personnel 

you should in advance be planning for how you are going to mitigate and counter those challenges or adverse consequences, as we 

often say. You just have to do that in advance. 

That is the way of further protecting or deciding how you adjust 

and make sure you support the U.S. taxpayers’ dollars that they 

are not subject to any misuse or indirect use or unintended use. So 

absolutely document those things. 

Mr. CICILLINE. There are other lessons—are there other lessons 

that you think are to be learned from what you reviewed in Egypt? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think there is the discussion that you have with 

your partner nation that you are engaging with. Those are things 

that we have seen happen, documenting across as we have seen. 

As I mentioned, there is this April 2013 cable that lays out some 

of the things that they have—were warning others to pay attention 

to in the global setting. But we do think State and USAID need 

to document all those lessons and what they took away from this 

experience. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Well, I would think—just ask if you would give 

that some thought and if there are additional lessons to be learned, 

recognizing we have an opportunity to respond to it in terms of policy but having the benefit of what you have identified as important 

lessons would be helpful. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I guess just to quickly comment, the activities that they can—they know they can do can be documented that 

are less subject to being criticized or challenged. 

Also, alternative ways to deal with some of the challenges should 

be documented, knowing that where there are more challenging efforts in certain types of activities should be laid out, those are less 

challenging. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Madam Chairman, I just want to say—and thank 

you again because I think this hearing gives us an opportunity to, 

again, reaffirm the ongoing commitment of the United States Congress to press the Egyptian Government to address this issue not 

only for the Americans and the American NGOs but for all the individuals and organizations that are engaged in democracy building and strengthening of civil society. 

And I think that Congressman Connolly’s point that this is something that we intend to stay on and is important to the American 

people, to our country and to our standing in the world. 

And I thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member 

Deutch, for giving us the opportunity to make that point very clearly, and with that I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Johnson, appreciate 

you being here. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. YOHO. I have met with several people from Egypt, you know, 

in the roles of Ambassador and associated with the Government of 

30

Egypt and I asked them the sentiment of what they see—their outlook when they look at America—what do they see, what do they 

don’t like of your neighbors in the Middle East. And I was not—

I guess I was a little bit surprised. 

He said the sentiment is that America has lost their credibility. 

They have lost their way. We don’t know where you stand and the 

good will that you had has disappeared and that you meddle too 

much. 

And then I am reading here the GAO recommendations that the 

State and USAID incorporate lessons learned from the experience 

in Egypt into risk management plans for future democracies and 

government assistance office—or efforts. What have we learned 

that we can do differently so that we don’t make the mistakes of 

the past, in your opinion? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Again, I would go back and say policy decisions we 

leave those up to the agencies, the administration and the Congress. Obviously, being aware, as I mentioned, that State and 

USAID were and the U.S. Government was of the views of our 

partners are important. 

That is something that needs to be documented, and going back 

to comments on the country plans our lessons learned is to—in 

your priority country area is having those country plans that are 

required include risk mitigation plans or documenting some of the 

challenges to some of the priorities that we have is important. 

I think that is something that we have heard that the country 

teams and the folks in the mission would welcome and encourage. 

I mean, that is a huge lesson learned that needs to be acted on, 

that sometimes you need to prioritize which country plans you do 

first and get those done. 

Mr. YOHO. But from your experience what do you find? Are you 

getting resentment or blowback and the people saying, you know, 

you guys just need to back off—let us figure out some of these problems? 

I have got something here that says when did the U.S. Government first identify the possibility that the Egyptian Government 

might oppose U.S. direct funding for democracy assistance? 

What that means to me is they don’t want the democracy assistance—we will work these things out—you are meddling too much. 

Are you seeing that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we have seen that mentioned by a few individual government officials who were running some of the ministries in Egypt. 

In terms of some of the civil society groups we met with in Egypt 

who were actually Egyptian NGOs or Egyptian civil society groups 

they actually welcome the U.S. assistance and the U.S. efforts in 

support in terms of promoting democracy. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. That assistance, is it going—is it effective as 

far as are we getting the results that we as a nation that is helping 

them out—are we getting the results we want? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Again, looking at—as part of a broader engagement one of our objectives is to look at the results of that and we 

haven’t at this stage reported on that in this preliminary work we 

have done. 

31

But we have seen that there have been several activities that 

have been undertaken by the U.S. and some of our foreign NGOs 

in terms of political party strengthening, election watching, voter 

education—things of that nature. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. With the al-Sisi government are you seeing an 

increase in their economic engine? Is it becoming more productive? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We will be looking into that issue as a part of the 

broader——

Mr. YOHO. But right now have you seen any change? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Our work basically was done prior to his election. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. But has there been a change in the last, say, 

2 years? 

Mr. JOHNSON. There has been——

Mr. YOHO. As far as—unemployment, has that gotten better? 

Mr. JOHNSON. All indication from the previous information I 

have seen is that it has not gotten as far as we would hope for it 

to get as well as the Egyptian people. But, again, they welcome the 

U.S. support in helping it to move forward. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. How much foreign aid does China give to 

Egypt? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you see a presence of them over there? 

Mr. JOHNSON. We did not run into any Chinese Government officials while we were there. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. I know they—China is going around and they 

are investing in infrastructures in countries and then they become 

great trading partners. I would like to see us do more of that instead of trying to tell them how to run their country. 

I know there is a tradeoff there that we are giving foreign aid 

that they should follow some guidelines but I think we need to kind 

of refocus and do a paradigm shift on how we handle our foreign 

aid and I would like to focus on trade and not aid so that we build 

an economic engine that we become good trading partners and in 

doing so the Egyptian people will have an economy that is growing 

and they will have jobs and they will handle a lot of their own 

problems on their own. Would you think that is a great way to go? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Once again, the policy decisions we leave up to the 

policy makers. But if that is something you would wish for GAO 

to look into down the road, have our trade folks——

Mr. YOHO. Absolutely. I sure would. I appreciate your time. 

Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Yoho. Thank you, 

Mr. Johnson. I enjoyed having you appear before our subcommittee 

again and I know that it won’t be the last time. Thank you very 

much for being with us. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I will give time for the second panel to 

set up. That will be Mr. Dunne, Mr. LaHood, Mr. Butler and Ms. 

Jaafar. 

Thank you very much for being with us. For our second panel, 

we welcome back Mr. Charles Dunne, who is the director of Middle 

East and North Africa programs at Freedom House. Prior to joining 

Freedom House, he spent 24 years in the Foreign Service serving 

throughout the world including Cairo and Jerusalem. 

32

Mr. Dunne has had a distinguished career in public service, serving as director for Iraq at the National Security Council, as a foreign policy advisor at the Joint Staff in the Pentagon and as a 

member of the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff. Thank 

you, Mr. Dunne. 

And then we welcome Mr. Sam LaHood, who joined the International Republican Institute, IRI, in August 2010 and relocated to 

Cairo, Egypt to be the country director for the IRI Egypt program. 

While there, Mr. LaHood witnessed the January 25, 2011 revolution and helped build the IRI Egypt program into one of the institute’s largest programs. Mr. LaHood departed Cairo in March 2012, 

taking an assignment with the IRI Asia division and he currently 

serves as program office for Cambodia and Indonesia. It is a pleasure to see you, Mr. LaHood. 

Next, we have Mr. Patrick Butler, who is the vice president for 

programs at the International Center for Journalists where he 

oversees the development and execution of ICFJ programs and supervises program personnel in addition to conducting training himself. 

He was previously the program director and director of training 

at the International Center for Journalists. We welcome you, Mr. 

Butler. 

And our last presenter will be Ms. Lila Jaafar, who is the senior 

program manager with the National Democratic Institute, focusing 

on the Middle East and North Africa region. 

She has more than 10 years of experience developing and implementing programs to strengthen political parties, civil society, electoral processes and the political participation of women and youth 

throughout the Arab world. Ms. Jaafar lived in the Middle East for 

the past 20 years and from 2007 to 2011 throughout the January 

25 revolution she served as NDI’s resident representative in Cairo. 

We are so pleased to have a star group of panelists today and 

we look forward to your testimony. Thank you for everything that 

you do to promote democracy and freedom worldwide, and we will 

begin with you, Mr. Dunne, and your written statements will be 

made a part of the record. Feel free to summarize. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES DUNNE, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE 

EAST AND NORTH AFRICA PROGRAMS, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and 

Ranking Member Deutch and other members of the committee. It 

is an honor to appear before you once again to discuss the human 

rights situation in Egypt and the cost to human rights worker of 

the so-called NGO foreign funding case. 

And I really want to thank you for your continued interest in 

this issue. Given the chaos and tragedy that is going on elsewhere 

in the world today, your attention is particularly welcome and very 

much appreciated. And you are right—this issue, the issue of the 

NGO case—is very important in Egypt. 

Why? Should Egypt succeed as a democracy this will bolster 

hopes for a stable Middle East. Such a success by example and in 

fact would advance the interests of the United States and many 

others in peaceful and effective government in a very rough part 

of the world. 

33

Now, NGOs play an important role in this. They are vital monitors of politics, enablers of social reform and watchdogs against 

the scourges of torture, corruption and other assorted handmaidens 

of repression. 

The case against them in Egypt has wreaked havoc on their ability to do this and to promote human rights and the rule of law in 

Egypt—many of these efforts generously funded by the United 

States Government. 

Remains of the former regime in Egypt never really went away 

and they worked from the first months of the 2011 revolution 

against Hosni Mubarak to stage a comeback. In my view, there is 

no democratic transition in Egypt today. 

On the contrary, it is the reverse. It is a transition back to an 

autocracy that would make the Mubarak government look liberal 

by comparison. Now, the NGO case was a tactical maneuver in the 

grand scheme of Egyptian politics. 

I believe it was intended to do a few things—first of all, to put 

a scare into the United States about supporting civil society and 

the mission of civil society. 

It was intended to frighten domestic Egyptian NGOs, which 

number in the tens of thousands, from doing work anything remotely related to politics, democracy promotion, human rights and 

the whole family of issues that we think of as promoting freedom. 

Freedom House was subjected to this push back precisely because our programs were effective. They engaged and empowered 

private citizens who worked for and felt they deserved better government and basic civic rights. Now, this case has hurt families 

and it has hurt many friends of ours. 

Freedom House was forced to cancel grants to several Egyptian 

NGOs after our work was banned in the country about a year ago. 

Four of our employees were forced to flee for fear of lengthy jail 

sentences. 

One has received political asylum in America. Another is in the 

process of applying for political asylum, and among them they have 

five young children from whom they are effectively exiled. 

I am lucky. I was not at the trial. I was not in the cage during 

this spurious proceeding. But I do have to travel wherever I go 

with a letter from Interpol attesting to the political nature of the 

charges and a letter which effectively denies Egypt’s request for an 

international arrest warrant—a red notice—for us. 

On two separate occasions I have been detained and then once 

deported from an Arab country because of these charges. Both of 

those visits, by the way, were on work funded by the U.S. Government. 

I have to check with the U.S. Embassy wherever I go in the region before I travel to ensure that I won’t be arrested at the airport. Now, Freedom House’s Egyptian democracy compass has 

tracked political developments in the country for the last year. 

On practically every front Egypt has regressed. Some members 

of the committee mentioned the more than 16,000 people arrested. 

There are estimates that have appeared in the Egyptian press of 

as many as 41,000 people who have been arrested since the coup 

and that says nothing of the many who have been killed—at least 

2,500 in protests against the government. 

34

Now, if the United States is serious about supporting civil society 

human rights, the rule of law and a real democratic transition in 

Egypt, in my view it should do the following things. 

First, the United States should insist on pardons for all those 

convicted in the NGO case. U.S. taxpayer money should not be 

used to subsidize a government that has destroyed American democracy promotion programs and sentenced U.S. citizens to jail 

terms for trying to carry them out. 

U.S. should insist on its right guaranteed under international 

compacts to freely associate with and fund NGOs. 

Second, I believe the United States should reevaluate its basic 

relationship with Egypt including military aid and consider shifting 

most if not all of that to educational and economic support programs. 

And third, the U.S. must publically call out human rights abuses 

so as to encourage our friends in civil society and it must tell the 

Egyptian Government that we are not willing to continue business 

as usual without fundamentally relooking at what our relationship 

is. 

With that, I thank you and I am happy to take any of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dunne follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very eloquent. Thank you very much. We appreciate all the work that Freedom House does. 

Mr. LaHood. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SAM LAHOOD (FORMER EGYPT COUNTRY 

DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE) 

Mr. LAHOOD. Thank you, ma’am. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee, thank you and 

thanks to all the Members of Congress who have supported the 

nongovernmental organizations and our staff who have been 

caught up in Egypt’s crackdown on civil society. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, I want to thank you personally for the 

unwavering interest and support you have shown to myself and my 

colleagues at this table. You have appropriately focused this hearing on the struggles for civil society in Egypt and what a struggle 

it is. 

We are living proof of that struggle. On June 4th of last year, 

I was convicted by an Egyptian court to 5 years in prison in Egypt 

with hard labor for working to advance democracy as part of a U.S. 

Government sponsored policy and program. 

We here were found guilty in a trial that was very obviously politically motivated and the result was preordained in a bogus trial. 

It was part of a broader attempt to stifle and intimidate Egyptian 

civil society emboldened by events that began on January 25th of 

2011. 

We, the convicted NGO staff, were entangled in an intergovernmental dispute between the United States and Egypt. We were carrying out U.S. policy and look at the price we paid. This has affected our personal and professional lives profoundly. Since our 

conviction last June, the full implications of how the verdicts affect 

us are still emerging. 

Under Egyptian law, I am a felon. It is unclear how that applies 

in the United States so I need to read the fine print when applying 

for a loan or sign a rental agreement, visa or job application. 

In applying for life insurance, my broker believed he was obligated to include my conviction in his application but he was concerned about the ramifications of providing detailed information 

about my verdict to the company for fear that it might enter into 

my permanent record. 

I am still waiting for the Virginia Board of Elections to tell me 

whether I am eligible to vote. For a lawyer to be admitted to the 

Bar, to be a stockbroker, real estate agent, teacher or sell insurance you need to have a clean record, as you know. 

Every time I fill out an application or a questionnaire I will be 

on the lookout for the question, ‘‘Have you ever been convicted of 

a crime?’’ And I will need to think very carefully about my answer. 

As Charles mentioned, our ability to travel internationally is another question mark that hangs over our heads. Clearly, I cannot 

travel to Egypt but numerous other places around the world how 

confident can I be that I will not run into legal trouble and be put 

into proceedings for possible extradition to Egypt and how do I assess that risk? But I know that my personal hardship pales in comparison to the hardship of others. 

42

I never faced the full humiliation of standing in a cage in an 

Egyptian courtroom nor did I spend even 1 day in an overcrowded 

Egyptian jail cell. Some of my convicted Egyptian colleagues have 

no option to return home without facing jail time. 

They are now refugees. Others have lost personal relationships 

and work opportunities. All of us have been impacted and had the 

course of our careers and lives altered. 

It seems crazy to think that for working to advance democracy 

in Egypt I would be rewarded with a jail term. But look no further 

than the three journalists from Al Jazeera who are currently serving 7- and 10-year jail terms. 

Though I don’t know Peter Greste, Mohamad Fahmy or Baher 

Mohamed well, I know that they were equally innocent of the ludicrous charges that they were put on trial for as those of us here 

today were. 

A revolution began in 2001 which broke the barrier of fear 

among civil society activists in Egypt but their activities are now 

being increasingly stifled by a regime that is attempting to put the 

genie back in the bottle. Change is not always linear but it is always hard and it is always a struggle, as you know. IRI continues 

to partner with those Egyptians who want to build a more democratic and open society. We hope that the Egyptian Government 

will soon make that possible. 

The same court that made a mockery of justice unfortunately not 

only has the power to punish Americans in their country but unless 

action is taken in our country too we—do we really want to tell authoritarian governments that they have the power to affect the 

lives and prospects of innocent Americans? 

The U.S. Congress can statutorily affirm that the convictions of 

the 43 NGO staff are not recognized under U.S. law and were politically motivated. This would remove the legal question mark over 

our heads and the frustration of trying to determine under 50 separate state jurisdictions whether the convictions affect our ability to 

conduct routine everyday business. 

U.S. Government should not downgrade support for Egyptian or 

international civil society organizations like those here today. To do 

so would abandon our partners in Egypt as well as the values for 

which the United States stands. 

There are many Egyptians who continue to be arrested and 

thrown in jail on trumped up charges. I would urge the United 

States continues to support those committed to advocating for freedom and democracy. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. LaHood follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Powerful testimony. 

We thank you very much for sharing it with us. 

Mr. Butler. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PATRICK BUTLER, VICE PRESIDENT, 

PROGRAMS, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR JOURNALISTS 

Mr. BUTLER. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch 

and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

allowing me and my colleagues the opportunity to testify before you 

today. 

As you know, more than a year ago I and 42 other NGO workers 

were convicted in an Egyptian court for working on programs designed to build democracy, monitor elections and train political parties and journalists. We were given sentences ranging from 1 to 5 

years in prison. 

After an initial stir and expressions of outrage from the State 

Department and Members of Congress, the case has largely faded 

away. Most people who knew about the case probably think it was 

resolved long ago. 

That is why we are especially grateful to you for having us here 

today. More than a year later, nothing has changed except the lives 

of the convicts, mostly for the worse. Most Egyptians convicted in 

the case are in exile, often separated from their families, their immigration status in limbo, unable to earn a living. 

For Americans and other non-Egyptians, the convictions have 

prevented international travel or thrown up obstacles in everything 

from applying for jobs or loans or getting a security clearance. The 

case was an early indication of changes to come in Egypt. 

We were the canaries in the coal mine. In the past year, Egypt 

has seen a brutal crackdown on opposition groups, civil society 

workers and journalists including the conviction last month of 

three Al Jazeera journalists who dared to interview members of 

banned opposition. 

Everything the Egyptian leadership is now doing to intimidate 

the country into acquiescence could have been foretold by the verdicts last year against us. I was one of five people working for the 

International Center for Journalists who were convicted in the 

case. 

The others were Americans Michelle Betz and Natasha Tynes 

and our Egyptian colleagues, Yehia Ghanem and Islam Shafiq. 

Michelle, Natasha and I were not in Egypt when the charges were 

filed but we were immediately labeled fugitives from justice. 

Yehia, who is with me today, and Islam were in Egypt and they 

attended every hearing in the stifling hot cage, sometimes sharing 

the cramped space with murderers and rapists. Like other NGOs, 

we brought the Egyptians out of Egypt before the verdict was announced and they have not returned home since. 

For me the conviction has been an inconvenience. I probably will 

never go back to Egypt and I may not be able to travel elsewhere 

in the region either for fear of being extradited. 

I know I will still have a job even if I can’t travel to the Middle 

East but Michelle and Natasha are freelance media development 

contractors and when they can’t travel to the region they lose work. 

The convictions have seriously affected their livelihoods. 

54

For our Egyptian colleagues and friends, though, the convictions 

are nothing short of catastrophic. Yehia Ghanem, an esteemed 

Egyptian foreign correspondent and editor with nearly 30 years of 

experience, is in perhaps the worst situation of any of the convicts. 

Because of his seniority, his 2-year sentence was not suspended 

as it was for many other Egyptians. That means he will go to jail 

if he returns to Egypt. Yehia has not seen his wife and three children or his ailing mother in more than a year. 

His distinguished career in Egypt is over, his pension lost. ICFJ 

helped him get a fellowship as a journalist in residence at the City 

University of New York for the last academic year but the fellowship was not enough to permit him to support his family in New 

York. 

While he has been here, his family members have continued to 

suffer harassment in Cairo including three raids on their home by 

security officials seeking Yehia even though they knew he is in the 

United States. 

The most recent raid happened Sunday night. The raids 

against—these raids and one against the family members of Nancy 

Okail, another Egyptian defendant, proved that while the U.S. 

Government seems to have forgotten the case the Egyptian Government certainly has not. 

Yehia is now looking for a job and hoping to bring his family to 

the United States. His greatest hope is to receive a green card so 

that he has the security to work either in the United States or in 

a Middle Eastern country that will not extradite him to Egypt. 

So far, we have not been able to get him a green card. Islam 

Shafiq has brought his wife to the United States and they now 

have a young son. They are applying for asylum with Islam’s family continuing to receive threats against him on a regular basis. 

Islam’s father died while he was exile. He was not able to return 

home for the funeral. Every one of the convicted NGO workers—

Americans, Egyptians and citizens of other countries—has a story 

like this to tell. The case has ruined many people’s lives and for 

what? 

In our case for trying to help Egyptian journalists do a better job 

of reporting on issues that matter to their audiences. The verdict, 

as we all know, was a sham based entirely on political calculations 

and not at all on the evidence presented in the case. 

But the greatest tragedy of this case is not its effect on individuals like Yehai Ghanem or any of the four of us before you today. 

The greatest tragedy is what this case has meant for the people of 

Egypt. 

The country’s authoritarian government learned the consequences of its prosecution of Americans and Egyptians working 

together to improve their society. Nothing. There were no consequences. 

Now, with political opponents, human rights workers and journalists regularly jailed and most of Egyptian society scared into silence, we are seeing how Egypt is putting into practice what it 

learned from our case. 

In closing, I urge you to do all you can for our Egyptian colleagues especially. They are suffering the most from this case. 

When the charges were filed, U.S. Government officials and MemVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:52 Oct 14, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\072414\88832 SHIRL
55

bers of Congress visited them and promised to do all they could for 

them. 

Many feel that those promises have been forgotten. Help us get 

them green cards so that they can have a stable life and support 

their families in the U.S. They paid a price for working on U.S. 

Government-funded programs and they deserve our thanks. 

Again, my sincere thanks to this committee for having us here 

today and keeping this case alive. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Butler follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Butler, and thank 

you for always pointing out the other folks who are suffering so 

much. Thank you. That says a lot about each and every one of you. 

Ms. Jaafar, we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LILA JAAFAR, SENIOR PROGRAM 

MANAGER, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Ms. JAAFAR. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Deutch, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the criminal 

convictions handed down to me and 14 other employees of the National Democratic Institute who were put on trial in Egypt. 

I also wanted to thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and many of 

your colleagues for the continued statements of support that you 

have issued for those of us who must now carry the burden of these 

unjust convictions and I also wish to thank the many Egyptian 

civic organizations and political leaders who have voiced their 

statements of support, especially those for whom public statements 

resulted in charges of their own. 

On June 4th, 2013, I woke to find that I had been found guilty 

in absentia by an Egyptian court. The inflammatory rhetoric in 

that verdict contradicts the reality of our programs which included 

election observation approved by the Government of Egypt as well 

as nonpartisan voter education, civil society development, women’s 

candidate training and long-term political party strengthening for 

more than 50 registered political parties. 

There can be little doubt that the goal of this verdict was to reduce or eliminate international support for independent civil society in Egypt. 

This unjust verdict has been incredibly disruptive. Some colleagues have lost jobs because the country in which they were assigned to work denied them entry or their potential employer 

feared that the verdict would impact their ability to do the job. 

Others have been detained by police in foreign countries while 

traveling due to outdated red notices issued by Egypt through 

Interpol. My initial feelings of shock and dismay quickly gave rise 

to concerns about my career and family. Although I grew up in 

California, the daughter of Middle Eastern and European immigrants, I went to a university in Lebanon and worked in the Middle 

East for the past 10 years, 7 of them in Egypt. I built a life there. 

When charges were filed against us and we were told to leave the 

country there was no time to bid goodbye to that life, the Egyptians 

I worked with and the many participants I had come to count as 

friends. Now knowing I may never return still creates a deep ache 

in my heart. 

This verdict separates me from my family as well. As you see, 

my parents retired in the Middle East where several family members remain. Others convicted in the same NGO trial are separated 

from children, parents and immediate family, and we are only 43 

stories. 

International human rights groups estimate that somewhere between 16,000 and 41,000 individuals have been imprisoned in 

Egypt since June 2013 when our verdicts were handed down. Thousands more have lost their lives. Countless families are affected. 

59

When our offices were raided, I remember NDI’s president, Ken 

Pollack, saying it was possible we were like canaries in a coal 

mine—a warning of even worse things to come. 

Now the Government of Egypt is reportedly considering a new 

draft NGO law that is even more restrictive than the one under 

which we were convicted. While not yet final, it contains language 

that requires Egyptian civil society groups to receive prior approval 

from the government before conducting domestic fund-raising efforts or accepting funding from international donors. 

The draft law also prohibits any public opinion research and cooperation with a foreign organization without prior notification of 

the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Those who are deemed to have 

violated this provision risk 1 year imprisonment and a fine of 

100,000 Egyptian pounds. 

International NGOs like ours would still be subject to the prior 

approval of multiple government ministries and constant monitoring. That registration could be terminated at any time for any 

activity that the government deemed to threaten national unity. 

Our verdict, the raids on the NGOs, the trials of journalists, the 

protest law and the proposed NGO law contradict the promises of 

freedom of expression and association and a free press, which are 

guaranteed under the 2014 Egyptian constitution. 

There is still a great hunger for democracy in Egypt, especially 

among youth who now recognize it will take more than street demonstrations to create a more pluralistic and democratic system. 

Although we have not had a presence in Egypt for more than 2 

years, we continue to review emails almost daily with request for 

assistance. More than 48,000 copies of NDI’s publications have 

been downloaded in Egypt since we left the country and more than 

120,000 unique visitors have used NDI’s Arabic Web site. 

Democratic activists in Egypt do exist and they are working for 

genuine political reform. They deserve international support. With 

all its human faults and failings, the democratic process is an ideal 

worth upholding and very much in U.S. strategic interests. 

The fact that this committee is having this hearing and that I 

was invited to share my story speaks volumes about how our system values individual citizens. It is my hope that one day every 

Egyptian knows what this feels like and that I will be able to return to Egypt and share in their joy. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jaafar follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much. Thank you to each 

and every one of you for the work that you do, the work that your 

institutions do and it is very uplifting to hear these shocking stories. 

And one of the main reasons that we are holding this hearing is 

to hear about your experiences and what it has been like to those—

for those affected by last year’s trial. People just assume that everything is fine and that isn’t the case. But we move on. 

The story is the headline of the day and until the next paper 

comes and it is just yesterday’s news. We have heard about the 

human toll that you so dramatically presented to us that it has 

taken both on your work and on your personal lives and it is very 

heartening to hear how concerned you are about your Egyptian colleagues. 

And we will continue to push for your pardon, and some of you 

had said in their testimony about this canary in the coal mine. You 

and the other 42 NGO workers at your trial was a sign of worse 

things to come and earlier this month we saw al-Sisi say that he 

regretted the conviction of the Al Jazeera journalists but he said 

that only after a significant expression of international outrage. 

Yet in your testimony, Mr. Dunne, you worry that in Egypt today 

there is a transition back to an autocratic form of government that 

would make Mubarak seem liberal in comparison. Do you believe 

that under al-Sisi there is a chance that civil society conditions will 

improve or do you think that it could be even worse than under 

Mubarak? 

Mr. DUNNE. Madam Chairwoman, I do believe that it could be 

significantly worse under President al-Sisi. What we have heard 

from Egyptian interlocutors, diplomats and so on for months now 

is just wait until General al-Sisi is elected as President and then 

you will see a liberalization in the human rights situation. 

Not only has that not happened, it has gone backwards. Some of 

us have talked about the numbers of people who have been imprisoned since the coup last year and some of us has talked about the 

issues with the NGO law including an exception for shutting people 

down and prohibiting activities for public morals charges, which 

can be interpreted any way you like, and I think it will be. 

I mean, clearly, it is moving in a more restrictive direction for 

the kind of work that we do. The other thing that this new law 

would do in fact is limit organizations to doing social welfare and 

development work. In other words, if you are baking bread or, you 

know, helping village enterprises, which is all good, you are fine. 

But if you are doing the kind of work that all of our organizations 

are doing you are not fine. 

So I don’t see a glimmer of home in the political direction, certainly in the direction of NGOs right now. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Now, Egypt, obviously, is a strategic country for U.S. assets militarily and politically but we have 

seen so much turmoil and so many changes in Egypt that I think 

we need to reexamine our relationship with Egypt. I know that you 

had talked about conditioning the aid, move it from the military to 

education. 

What are your thoughts for the other three folks? Do you think 

that the United States should condition our military aid to Egypt 

69

until we get pardons for you or that we see greater respect for 

human rights or civil society and the rule of law? 

And also, is there anything that you believe that our Government 

can or should do to improve this draconian new NGO law that 

many fear will be the death knell for independent organizations in 

Egypt? 

What should we be doing to help foster civil society in Egypt and 

continue the work of political reform? 

And lastly, the administration—you know, when we were lining 

up witnesses we wanted to find out who in the administration is 

in charge of your cases. We couldn’t find a name. We do not know 

that there is a person tasked with your case and I worry about 

that. 

Please describe your experiences with the administration. What 

more do they need to do to step up? 

Mr. LAHOOD. If I could just start. The first thing I would say is 

from my standpoint when I was in Egypt I am very appreciative 

of everything the Obama administration did to secure Lila and I’s 

release when we were actually in Egypt when we were in the Embassy. 

And so from my standpoint if that pressure hadn’t been put on 

them by the administration I think I would be in jail right now, 

and it is an odd thing to say but I believe it is true and I look at 

the Al Jazeera journalists and I know it is true. So I am very complimentary of everything the Obama administration did, certainly, 

you know, at that time. 

But, you know, from my standpoint I would look at, you know, 

I think the U.S. Government should assess its policy toward Egypt, 

given all the changing landscape, as you noted, and I think the 

government should remain focused on the long-term—on our longterm goals and values that led us to support people around the 

world who bravely stand up to advance freedom and human rights. 

I don’t think the United States Government should downgrade 

support for Egyptian or international civil society organizations because of what has happened in Egypt. I think to do so abandons 

our values. And I very much appreciate your point about who is in 

charge of our case within the U.S. Government. 

I go to events once in a while in Egypt just for fun to harass 

Egyptian officials who come here and I run into U.S. officials and 

I ask them all the time, you know, who is in charge of our case 

and the answer is well, there is a lot of people working on it, and 

I would say but if there was one person who would it be or what 

office would it be, and the answer is a lot of people are working 

on it. 

We don’t need somebody working on it. We need somebody working to find a solution for it, not just following it, not just tracking 

it. And so that is one thing that I would advocate that I would love 

to know who is in charge of it. 

And the other point I would just make that I have complained 

about to anybody who will listen is the U.S. Government has been 

very good at keeping the institutes informed of what is going on 

as it relates to our case. 

But these are individual charges that we carry forward. I leave 

IRI, I am still a convicted felon. It doesn’t matter that I work or 

70

don’t work for IRI. And so that has been one of my gripes that the 

U.S. Government has done, in my opinion, a poor job of keeping us 

as individuals informed, and as Patrick sort of alluded to, you 

know, for some of their employees who were contractors who 

weren’t strongly affiliated with their institute they have tried to 

move on with their lives and they have this cloud that still hangs 

over their head as individuals. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Butler, Ms. Jaafar. 

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. You know, in response to your first question, 

ICFJ is a nonpartisan organization that is strictly devoted to improving journalism around the world and we try to remain independent of advising the U.S. Government on what it should do. 

So I can’t really respond in terms of what I think the U.S. Government should do in terms of cutting off aid or not cutting off aid. 

But I will say as I said in my remarks that I don’t think the response should be nothing and it feels like that has been the response. 

In terms of the point that you made again I will back up what 

Sam said. You are absolutely right in terms of having a point person at the State Department. We don’t have that. 

I think sometimes that if we don’t as the four organizations communicate among ourselves I find out much more from these guys 

sometimes than I do from, you know, people at State because—in 

part because we don’t have that one person to go to. 

I will say that they have been very helpful in a number of things 

such as working with, you know, to get Interpol to give us the letters that we take whenever we travel. That was definitely the 

State Department pushing for us to get those letters that say that 

these are not valid charges. 

It took a while but we got them. We also have a letter from the 

State Department that says that it does not consider these charges 

to be valid and in response to some of the things that Sam talked 

about in terms of applying for jobs, loans, security clearances and 

things like that, this letter should be, as we understand it, reason 

to be able to say no, we were not convicted of a felony. 

But, as Sam said, we never really know whether somebody is 

going to then Google us and find out that we were. So I think you 

are absolutely right, we would like to have more, you know, one focused person at State that we can go to when we have requests like 

how are we going to help our Egyptian colleagues with their immigration status, you know, things like that—to have one person to 

go to. 

I think right now, because we have different parts of State funding our different projects, we go to the people who funded us and 

that may be very different people. So it would be very, very helpful 

to have that. 

Ms. JAAFAR. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to, you know, just 

agree with Sam and what he said. I don’t think I would be here 

today before you if the administration did not help us and support 

us during the most difficult times of this journey. 

I also wanted to say that NDI doesn’t take a position on military 

assistance. However, I think that it is really important that assistance for democracy in governance continue. 

71

But at the same time it is important that the civil society organizations have this space to operate and that is what is so concerning 

about the draft NGO law. If it is passed in its form—in its current 

form it will be among the most restrictive in the world. 

So I would just ask that we keep sight—keep our eye on that 

law. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much. You are an inspiration to us all and I apologize the lack of attendance. It is because we have so many—so many subcommittees and but you—we 

will make sure that we broadcast your words far and wide. Thank 

you so much. It is a pleasure to be with you. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks to all of 

you for being here and sharing your very personal and very powerful stories. I am—look, the point that a number of you raised, I am 

supremely confident that after this hearing it will be easier for you 

to identify someone at the State Department to talk to about the 

cases. 

I trust that will be a positive and hopefully simple result to come 

from this hearing. I would actually like to broaden the discussion 

a bit beyond your personal situations to the work that you advocate 

for and talk about not just what the government—administration 

and Congress—have done with respect to your convictions but 

where the issues that you care about—where you think these 

issues that you care about place on our agenda, on both ends of 

Pennsylvania Avenue. 

Human rights, free expression, women’s rights, building of civil 

society—do you feel the support for—not just for you but for the 

work that you do and if not what more can be done? 

What more would you like to hear and how do we ensure—I 

guess where I am—the point of my question is how do we ensure 

that these issues remain of vital importance to all of us as we tackle the myriad of challenges around the world? 

Mr. Dunne. 

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you very much. I will be happy to take the 

first crack at this. I think there has been the start of a pull back 

from supporting many of these issues not only by the United States 

but by European Governments as well who see at least in the Middle East that this is getting really hard to do. 

I think all of the issues that you described, Congressman, are vitally important as a complex of things that we need to support as 

a country along with the Europeans as not just a nice thing to do 

if we have the time and the money to do it but as a vital component of our security interests in Egypt and other countries, especially in the Middle East but also elsewhere. 

But you are also seeing a lot of authoritarian push back. We 

have seen that in Russia with the AID mission having to leave. 

We are seeing, you know, a Gulf Arab-led push back against democracy and human rights in Egypt and I don’t see kind of an integrate policy that supports both security interests which are vital 

including the military relationship with Egypt but that also include 

all of these other issues which lead to better governance and social 

stability over the long term. 

72

I think that more funding needs to be devoted to this but most 

importantly a comprehensive strategy has to be devised by our 

Government in concert with the Europeans and other like-minded 

governments to advance this. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. Mr. LaHood, why do—why should 

human rights matter in our approach to the world? 

Mr. LAHOOD. Well, you ask a great question. I am going to just 

try and take a small bite at it and just—from my standpoint, we 

have a strong focus on security and stability and I think—I think 

that is valid. 

I think that makes great sense. But I think you look at the Middle East today, you look at what has happened in Egypt and I 

think you see that that stability was a veneer, and it was great 

while it lasted until it completely falls apart. Doesn’t seem to me 

that it is sustainable. 

I just look at Egypt—you know, I was in Egypt on January 25th 

during the revolution and I just always look back and think whatever the plan was on January 24th of 2011 with U.S. and Egypt 

it wasn’t a great plan. 

You look at Egypt the way it was, what the great percentage of 

people who were illiterate, the great percentage of people who lived 

on less than $2 a day—whatever the old plan was that wasn’t a 

very good one. 

And I think the veneer of stability has blown up in our faces and 

I just don’t see the path that Egypt’s on now as one that is going 

to lead to long-term stability and that is the one point I would 

make. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Mr. Butler. 

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. Well, obviously, the area that most concerns us 

at the International Center for Journalists is freedom of expression, the rights of journalists to report freely about what is going 

on and that has gotten a lot of attention in Egypt lately with the 

convictions of the Al Jazeera journalists. 

But I wanted to point out that while that case has gotten a lot 

of attention not as much attention is paid to all the other journalists who are in jail in Egypt. There are, according to the Committee 

to Protect Journalists, 14 journalists in prison in Egypt. 

It is one of the highest rates in the world and those are not necessarily high profile international journalists working for major 

international networks. Most of them are local journalists who are, 

you know, paying the price for trying to report independently. 

We often say that there—and I guess getting to your question, 

you know, one point would be why should we pay attention to this 

anymore. You know, have we—have we gotten to a point where it 

is not going to matter anyway, given what has happened in Egypt. 

And I think we often say that there is no difference now between, 

you know, what we are seeing now under Sisi and what we saw 

under Mubarak and that is true to an extent. 

But there is one important difference, which is that the whole 

media landscape has changed and, you know, back in Mubarak’s 

day there was only the official media and now there—we have, you 

know, cable networks like Al Jazeera but we also have social networks and people are—you know, the genie is out of the bottle and 

so people have gotten used to being able to express themselves to 

73

do that kind of thing and you can’t completely shut that off the 

way Mubarak could shut off all independent or, really, any kind of 

independent reporting. 

So what we do is try to focus often in very repressive societies 

on other ways of getting information to the public and that can still 

happen in Egypt. And, you know, obviously, we can’t work in Egypt 

but until this case is resolved but very, you know, strongly echoing 

what Charles and Sam have said about the need to continue this 

kind of work, especially in our area of freedom of expression and 

journalism. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thanks. Madam Chairman, do we have time for 

Ms. Jaafar to answer? 

Ms. JAAFAR. Mr. Deutch, I think it is extremely important to continue to work on human rights and democracy in governance because we are looking at long-term stability. I don’t think there can 

be any long-term stability without the space for people to express 

themselves, for them to participate in the political process. 

I think even for economic development as well this is directly 

linked. How can there be foreign direct investment and progress in 

the economy of Egypt when there is a crackdown on civil society 

and human rights violations? 

So I think it is something that absolutely in our strategic interest 

to continue to keep an eye on. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I agree with you completely and I applaud the four 

of you for your dedication in this issue and the immense difficulty 

that you find yourselves in still as a result of it, and we are really 

grateful for your appearance here today. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Appreciate you all being 

here. Correct me if I am wrong but I think I have heard you all 

say that you feel the Egyptian Government is moving away from 

a democracy type to a authoritarian type. Is that pretty much the 

consensus of all four of you? Ms. Jaafar. 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes, sir. It certainly is mine. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. Why is that? Mr. Dunne, go ahead. 

Mr. DUNNE. Okay. Thank you very much, sir. Look, even if you 

look at the circumstances surrounding the elections in which the 

state media were all bent toward General al-Sisi’s election complaint by his chief opponent were dismissed out of hand by the 

electoral commission including charges of intimidation at the polling places. 

That is an indication that the election while, you know, had the 

form of a free and fair election wasn’t really free and fair. It was 

a tightly restricted political space. But we see the restrictions on 

journalists. 

I mean, Patrick is absolutely right that people—there are more 

outlets now but we have many journalists in prison, others who are 

being intimidated and others who are self-censoring because of, you 

know, hints from the government. We have had political violence 

at a level that we haven’t seen in Egypt. 

Mr. YOHO. But why do you think it is moving more toward authoritarian? Because I agree with Mr. LaHood and Ms. Jaafar in 

74

that for the last 30 years we have seen a veneer that is washing 

away. 

It is eroding away, and I think we are seeing maybe the true nature of what the people in charge actually believe. They don’t believe in a democracy. They believe that people need to ruled 

through the authoritarian model. Is that what you see? 

Mr. DUNNE. That is what I see and while there are, for example, 

some new ostensibly more liberal elements in the new constitution 

the rights guaranteed in that constitution have not been followed 

in practice over the course of the last year and it has carved out 

a space for the military to be absolutely unaccountable to civilian 

authority. 

Mr. YOHO. And I saw that the military has been given more authority, and that brings me to a point that I want to bring up. 

Do the Egyptian people—number one, what do they want and do 

the Egyptian people know, understand or comprehend the meaning 

or know the depth of what we deem as human rights as we understand them as delineated in our Declaration of Independence which 

we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 

equal and they are endowed by their creator with certain 

unalienable rights, among these life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 

Our country was founded on these principles. What I see over 

and over again, especially in the Middle East, is we are trying to 

introduce these to a government, not to the people, and bring it in 

from the bottom up instead of the top down because what I am seeing is after 30 years or 40 years of the veneer saying you have to 

follow these and they are saying, with one hand, okay, we will do 

that but with the other hand it is the repression that we have seen 

over and over again because they don’t believe in this. What do the 

Egyptian people believe in? 

Mr. DUNNE. I will take a first brief shot at this and then turn 

it over to others. Polling data that I have seen over the last 10 

years consistently shows that the Egyptians, as well as majorities 

of populations in other Arab countries, believe that democracy is 

the best form of government for them. They have a different view 

of what that might mean. 

Mr. YOHO. I need to stop you there because I often say this—a 

democracy, as Ben Franklin pointed out, is two wolves and a sheep 

deciding what to have for lunch. The sheep always loses. 

We are a republic, which protects the rights of the minority, and 

I think we should promote that more instead of democracy—this 

word democracy is, and I know what we are all trying to say with 

that but it is a misnomer because democracies don’t work real well. 

Republics work pretty good, though. 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes. Marwan Muasher, who is the current vice 

president of the Carnegie Endowment, is going back home to Jordan to lead a new civil society organization. He just wrote a book 

on pluralism in the Arab world and perhaps that is a better way 

to describe it. 

In other words, exactly what you are saying—the rights of minorities whether they are religious minorities, women or others 

need to be protected and respected and that is maybe more of what 

75

I am trying to say, and I think the population in Egypt really more 

or less agrees with that. 

Right now, undoubtedly, their focus is on security and economic 

success. But the revolution of 2011 was about that as well as about 

better governance and the right of the people to be respected in 

their opinions. 

Mr. YOHO. And I admire them for standing up and doing that. 

Madam Chair, my time is out. I appreciate it. Thank you all very 

much. Good luck to you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are the host of our Florida GOP luncheon so you better make that good—some good barbecue. 

Mr. YOHO. You don’t want to miss it. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Get over there and start cooking it. 

Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Welcome to our 

panel. Just by way of preface, I want to say that I have heard some 

rationalization and equivocation among some here in Congress. I 

believe that we undermine your cause when we rationalize a military coup with a military dictatorship as ruthless as this one. 

Mr. Dunne, I think you were making the point to Mr. Yoho that 

this is a whole different magnitude—a whole different level of oppression. It is not just another authoritarian regime in Egypt and, 

you know, the crackdown and the slaughter of citizens on the 

streets is a whole new dimension. 

And if we say here well, we didn’t like the Muslim Brotherhood—

I didn’t either, but our State Department actually said they were 

elected in a free and fair election. It was overthrown by a military 

junta and if American Congressmen think that is okay because of 

ideological preference then I think we undermine everything you 

all stand for and have worked for. And I also think, frankly, without intending to we undermine the cause of the NGO personnel we 

are trying to champion. 

We cannot have it both ways. Either we are for democracy or we 

are not, and we need to have clarity about that in this body. Otherwise, we put you at risk. 

Having said that, by the way, Mr. LaHood, did I understand you 

to say you were concerned about your voting status in Virginia because of a conviction? 

Mr. LAHOOD. Yes, sir. I moved—I was a resident in Virginia before I moved abroad and that is where my voting status is, in Arlington, Virginia, and when I moved back to the States last year 

they were getting ready for the primary—for the governor primary 

and I actually looked up. 

The state law in Virginia is a little bit vague. It basically says 

if you are a convicted felon and you have completed your sentence 

you are eligible for reapply to have your voting rights. 

I never completed my sentence and the law is a little bit vague 

in that it doesn’t delineate where they mean by that. And so I actually called the state board of——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Elections. 

Mr. LAHOOD [continuing]. Of elections and asked some questions. 

They called me back with some follow-up questions. But I never got 

a clear answer. I am actually——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. 

76

Mr. LAHOOD [continuing]. On the cusp of relocating to Maryland 

where the law is very specific and says if you have been convicted 

in a municipal, state or Federal court, which I wasn’t, then——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I was going to offer to help you but if you have 

got the bad taste of moving to Maryland there is no helping you. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Well, my wife is from Baltimore so I don’t have 

much choice. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. You are forgiven. 

Mr. LAHOOD. If I am going to stay in the area it has got to be 

Maryland. So I argued for Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, if you come to your senses and move back 

to Virginia let me know and I will help. 

Mr. LAHOOD. I will. But my point is, sir, though that for us we 

face these issues in trying to figure out how this works. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Yes. Exactly. Mr.—well, do I understand 

from your testimony that the State Department has not given you 

a point of contact—who do we go to on our cases with respect to 

organizations, Mr.—no? 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes, sir. That would certainly seem to be the case 

at present. It used to be that the legal advisor’s office was highly 

involved in this and, again, I have to give them credit for doing 

what they did in concert with the Justice Department for getting 

Interpol to vacate their—you know, the red——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. DUNNE [continuing]. Notice request, which I understand if 

those had been issued and they are routinely issued we would have 

been in serious trouble about our ability to travel anywhere outside 

the United States. 

Having said that, we have not heard from the State Department 

on this case for probably close to a year since the convictions and 

I do think State has moved on from it. And I grant that they have 

quite a few things on their plate right now, but it is important to 

us still. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, it is important to us up here, too. So let us 

work with you and I am appalled to hear that and shame on the 

State Department for not staying on top of this and making sure 

you all have a very clear point of contact who has got some authority to try to answer questions and take actions when necessary. 

Mr. Dunne, you also talked about the need for an integrated policy—you know, understanding the complexity of the relationship 

with Egypt, and I think that is a really good point and I guess 

what strikes me about how this State Department and about many 

of my colleagues here in Congress have approached the relationship, frankly, in a very compartmentalized way. 

So this issue is over here, but after all, we have got—and we do. 

We have lots of legitimate concerns and needs and priorities but if 

we do that we make it just so much easier for the Egyptian Government to do what in fact it has done to you and to your organizations. A brief comment before my time runs out. 

Mr. DUNNE. I would just say I think that with what has happened in the NGO case the Egyptian Government thinks it just 

won—it just won this issue and have accomplished what it wanted 

to do, which is what I tried to describe in my testimony. 

77

And I don’t, frankly, think that U.S. policy has caught up to the 

new reality in Egypt and there does have to be this integrated policy which reconciles our security interests, which are very, very 

real and our diplomatic interests as you see Egypt working on 

Gaza right now but with the need to promote better governance, 

civil society, human rights and the rule of law in the country and 

be very clear about that in public, and I have not seen that up to 

this point. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chair will indulge. Anyone else want to 

comment on that? Yes. 

Mr. LAHOOD. The one thing I would just say to your point is, you 

know, for the Egyptian Government to be able to prosecute our institutes, which are directly funded by the Embassy, by the U.S. 

Government, we were doing exactly what we were asked to do by 

the U.S. Government. 

You look at the—you look at the board of IRI and NDI, not to 

mention Freedom House with John McCain and Madeline 

Albright—that they are able to prosecute us for doing this work 

there and they get away with it, it sends a clear message throughout Egypt to everyone that they are going to do whatever they 

want and I think it is horribly damaging. 

Mr. BUTLER. And I just want to add one thing—that it is not just 

a message to Egypt. It is a message to countries around the world 

and we have seen, for example, in Ecuador, which is another country that is not so friendly to the United States, that, you know, 

crackdowns on NGOs there. 

We had a project there where we were intending to work there 

and we have had to pull out of that country in part because some 

of the same things that—using some of the same tactics, not necessarily charging but the same kinds of tactics against NGOs that 

we saw in Egypt. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Ecuador, if I may interrupt, has hired 

a PR giant—$6.4 million to do PR for them and what they do is 

they charge folks who are opposition leaders with money laundering, drug trafficking and they are here working the halls of Congress saying that Ecuador—everything is great there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, while you were out of the 

room the issue of having a point of contact with the State Department came up and we don’t have one, and knowing of your commitment to this issue and, of course, my own, I wonder if you and I 

might consider a joint letter to the Secretary to remedy that situation immediately. Mr. LaHood. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Just the one other thing that we brought up is it 

is not somebody who is a point of contact but somebody who is responsible for helping us resolve this issue. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. LAHOOD. Just to clarify it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, no. That is my shorthand. But I think I did 

make that clear it had to be someone vested with the authority to 

respond to you and make decisions and point us in the right direction when somebody else has the expertise. I agree. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And a coordinated response. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. A coordinated response. That is right. Undoubtedly, the chairman and I will work out that language. 

78

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Cicilline is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you again for your testimony and for being here. You 

know, I think in many ways people do assume when individuals 

were released that sort of everything is fine and I really appreciate 

you sharing with us and with everyone who is watching the impact 

that this has had on you and others and the implications it has for 

the rest of your life. 

And, you know, I know a lot of people toss around the word heroes but you are four great American heroes and the colleagues you 

represented in your testimony are as well and we are a better 

world because of what you do and just want to say at the outset 

thank you for your courage and for the work. 

In my tradition we call it (foreign language spoken)—healing the 

world, which is what you are doing by building civil society and democracy all over the world. 

So I think one of the challenges we face is that the—almost by 

definition the places in the world that need your work most urgently are the places, of course, where it is hardest to do the work 

just by definition and so, you know, the opposition to freedom and 

liberty and human rights isn’t organic. 

It is typically the force of some other structure, whether it is 

military or government, and so by definition the places that democracy building is so urgently needed are the hardest places to do it 

and, as you all know better than anybody, it is sometimes the most 

dangerous places to do it. 

So what I sort of—I think our responsibility is to figure out what 

do we do to reduce the danger of this really important, and to your 

point, Ms. Jaafar, critical to the security interests of this country. 

This isn’t just democracy building because it would be better to 

live in a world where everyone enjoys these freedoms, which of 

course it would be, but it is in our direct national security interests 

to develop democracies and freedom and liberty around the world. 

And so it is not an extra exercise. 

It is, I think, central to our responsibility to keep American citizens safe here and around the world. So I take it that, first, is, you 

know, we have to continue to press the Egyptian Government 

about the importance of responding to this case appropriately. 

I met with the Egyptian Ambassador yesterday. This was central 

to my conversation with him. I think this hearing does that but I 

think—you know, I take away that that is something we need to 

continue to do, be certain that we are continuing to fund and support democracy building around the world. 

Don’t use this occasion to pull back from that. In some ways, it 

becomes even more urgent that we stay engaged in this work. 

Third, that we have to be sure that we—that the people who are 

doing this work sort of understand that it is not just an important 

exercise and good to do sort of like philanthropic work but it is, 

again, central to our security and just making sure our colleagues 

understand that as well as the American people. 

Fourth, I think to make sure that we identify and mitigate risks 

in every say that we can and be sure that that information is being 

communicated to NGOs in country-specific ways so that as they do 

79

this important work that we at least reduce in every way that we 

can the dangers. 

And I think the final thing that I would add to that list is, and 

this sort of builds on something Mr. LaHood just said, it is really 

for us to make the case that these are not individual criminal cases 

against individuals. 

While that is part of it, these are really cases against democracy 

and civil society and the American way of life and really if there 

were some way for us to really almost intervene in these cases as 

a country because the work of these NGOs is not the work of an 

individual person. 

Although they are the people doing it, it is the work of the 

United States and the work of, you know, intentional decisions by 

this Congress representing the people to invest in this work. And 

so I don’t know the right way for us to do that but I think we have 

got to figure out a way that this becomes our cause, not just the 

cause of individual defendants in the criminal case. 

So that is, I think, my list of six things but I want to, in addition 

to that, are there other things that we should do or could begin to 

do as a Congress to advance the work that you and the organizations you represent are engaged in? 

Mr. DUNNE. Let me just start very briefly. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I am the last witness so I can just summary, as 

I can do, you know. 

Mr. DUNNE. Look, I totally agree with the points you brought up 

and just to kind of expand a little bit on the last one, I would also 

say that we have to insist on the internationally guaranteed rights 

of civil society in Egypt and elsewhere to associate with organizations such as all of ours. 

Part of the intention of the new NGO law and the NGO case was 

to sever those ties so NGOs in Egypt could be more easily repressed and I think it is very important to continue speaking out 

on this. 

And any time there is a congressional delegation who is going to 

Egypt to meet with civil society organizations and I think it would 

be wonderful if congressional delegations could already—could try 

to meet with some of the people who have been imprisoned because 

of their political involvements such as Ahmed Maher, for example, 

and others. 

And the Egyptian Government will always refuse but it certainly 

makes a public case for the importance of this. One other thing is 

I would just like to draw your attention to is the ongoing expansion 

of anti-terrorism laws in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries 

in the Middle East which broadly create definitions of terrorism 

that include all sorts of political activities. 

This is one of the reasons why the Al Jazeera journalists were 

convicted—for associating with the Muslim Brotherhood. That is 

considered terrorism now, and you see similar laws in other places 

and that is something that should be, I think, a talking point with 

a lot of these governments because it is part of this authoritarian 

push back that I was trying to describe earlier. 

Mr. LAHOOD. If I could, just a couple quick points I would make. 

You know, first is, as I said in my statement, finding domestic relief for us is something that would be helpful, obviously, and as I 

80

understand yesterday in the Senate a bill was actually introduced 

that referred directly to our case. 

Senate Bill 2649 was introduced by Senator Lindsey Graham and 

he had a few bipartisan co-sponsors and I understand that it was 

a bill to provide certain legal relief from politically motivated 

charges by the Government of Egypt and specifically about our 

case. And so that, as I understand is the specific relief we need to 

help us here in the United States. 

But the second point I would make is ultimately for us what we 

need is a pardon from President al-Sisi. That is the only thing that 

is going to lift this cloud that sort of hangs over our heads. And 

so to the extent that the administration and Congress can keep the 

advocacy of that up is helpful to us as well. Thank you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thanks. 

Mr. BUTLER. Just a couple of quick points. I agree with everything Sam just said in terms of assistance to the organizations and 

the individuals who were convicted. 

Two points—one is that, you know, you mentioned the importance of protecting NGOs of communicating with NGOs and I think 

that is a point that was alluded to earlier but perhaps hasn’t been 

expounded upon enough, which is that in this dispute between the 

U.S. Government and the Egyptian Government over the aid—the 

increased aid that was going to our NGOs we didn’t know anything 

about that—you know, that dispute that was happening between, 

you know, the objections that the Egyptian Government was raising to the redirection of funding toward us and we could have had 

the opportunity to decide if, you know, is this something we want 

to do. 

You know, I think if we knew that now in another country we 

would be very careful about taking that assistance if we knew that 

the local government had objected to it. 

So I think communicating with the NGOs that is obviously an 

administration thing, not a Congress thing. But that is one point. 

Another point is in terms of further assistance is our grants is 

over so we no longer have any funds to support our Egyptian personnel or for legal costs if there should be additional legal costs. 

So that is something going forward. 

You know, we are on the line for paying for all that ourselves if 

there are additional legal costs. You know, the Egyptian defendants 

are appealing their cases. We can’t appeal ours but they are appealing theirs. So that is another point. 

Ms. JAAFAR. I agree with everything you said. I couldn’t have 

summarized it better. I would just add that it is very important 

that we continue to support civil society in Egypt. They do feel 

abandoned. 

Yes, the environment is a lot more oppressive and challenging 

now, more than it has ever been, and yet they are still willing to 

do the work. They are still willing to take the risk, to build a better 

Egypt for their children, for their community, and I think we need 

to support that both, you know, in terms of assistance—financial 

assistance—but also vocally as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield 

back. 

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. 

Johnson, for sticking around for this panel. It says a lot about you 

and your interest, and thank you. You inspire us and we will work 

all we can do to seek that pardon. 

Thank you so very much for your wonderful stories, for sharing 

it, and for the trauma that this has brought upon your lives. Thank 

you for speaking out for freedom, democracy, the rule of law. You 

do good work. Thank you. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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