Filed 11/3/20 P. v. Magana CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDWIN EDMUNDO MAGANA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D075886

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD262083)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.

Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve 

Oetting and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

After law enforcement recovered large amounts of liquid and solid 

methamphetamines and several firearms from Edwin Edmundo Magana’s 

property in Los Angeles County, they arrested and charged him in San Diego 

County. When Magana challenged venue, the People argued the drugs 

recovered at Magana’s home had entered the United States through a port in 

San Diego and traveled the length of San Diego County before arriving in Los 

Angeles, creating a nexus with San Diego County. The superior court agreed. 

The case eventually went to trial in San Diego, and Magana was convicted.

Magana appeals his conviction, arguing that venue in San Diego 

County was improper. We conclude there was some evidence to support the 

superior court’s determination, and we will affirm.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS

In 2011 and 2012, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was 

targeting a “cell” of drug traffickers. Within this cell, the DEA had identified 

Armando Gomez as an individual who received drugs in Tijuana, packaged 

them, placed them in cars, and directed their transport across the United 

States border. The DEA had also identified Martin Bucio and Frederico 

Perez Ramirez as participants who received drug loads from Gomez in the 

United States. 

To track these individuals, the DEA used wire taps. In one phone call 

on May 15, 2012, Gomez told Bucio where the drugs were in San Diego and 

when he could expect to receive the load. DEA Agent Holley testified: 

“Basically[, Gomez] was telling [Bucio], hey, this is where it’s at, San Diego. 

It will be to you by whatever time.” In other intercepted phone calls on May 

18 and May 21, Gomez updated Ramirez about when to expect the drug loads 

heading to him. On May 22, the DEA intercepted calls involving Gomez that 
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identified an individual by name, a license plate, and provided a vehicle 

description. 

On May 23, 2012, agents seized narcotics from the vehicle identified in 

the call at the San Ysidro port of entry in San Diego County. At that point in 

time, more than 99 percent of methamphetamines were manufactured in

super labs in Mexico. 

Gomez’s cell transported anywhere from 25 to 50 pounds of drugs at a 

time from Tijuana through San Diego and into Los Angeles. The DEA never 

discovered any other mode of transportation; couriers moved drugs through 

the San Diego corridor to other parts of the country. The DEA confirmed 

drug loads crossed through San Diego’s port of entry on May 15, May 18, and 

May 23, and Special Agent Holley testified that the DEA had multiple drug 

seizures in San Diego County, at the port of entry, from this drug 

organization. 

The DEA intercepted additional calls in June. It tracked a call made 

June 18 to an address on Horace Avenue in Granada Hills, in Los Angeles 

County. Ramirez, who was inside the home, indicated he was counting a 

significant amount of drugs. 

The following morning, law enforcement officers conducting 

surveillance of the home on Horace Avenue observed Bucio and Ramirez 

leave the property and followed them to another home in Los Angeles 

County, where 190.5 pounds of methamphetamine were later seized. 

On June 19, 2012, Laverne Police Department Detective Devin Harden 

knocked on the door of the Horace Avenue home, and Magana answered. 

When Detective Harden asked Magana if there were drugs or guns in the 

home, Magana admitted there were both. He and his wife consented to a 
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search and provided law enforcement with access to a detached garage on the 

property. 

Inside the garage, law enforcement recovered two AR-15 assault rifles, 

four semiautomatic handguns, and magazines and ammunition. Law 

enforcement found 26.6 kilograms, or 58.6 pounds, of solid methamphetamine 

and 59.6 liters, or 131.1 pounds, of liquid methamphetamine in the garage. 

Police also recovered $136,970 in U.S. currency from Magana’s bedroom. 

At trial, Magana testified he had met a woman at the park near his 

home who mentioned that she and her boyfriend, who had a restaurant 

together, were having financial problems and needed someplace to store their 

food for three to five weeks until they could get their own storage place. She 

asked Magana if they could store the food at his home, and he said they 

could. He said he did not know the stored items contained drugs. 

Magana was charged with four felony counts: (1) possession for sale of 

powder Methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,1 § 11378; count 1); 

(2) possession for sale of liquid methamphetamine (§ 11378; count 2); 

(3) possession of more than $100,000 dollars knowingly obtained from the 

unlawful sale, possession for sale, or transportation for sale, of a controlled 

substance (§ 11370.6, subd. (a); count 3); and (4) knowingly receiving or 

acquiring more than $25,000 dollars from a violation of the Uniform 

Controlled Substances Act (§ 11470.9, subd. (a); count 4). In connection with 

count 1, Magana was charged with four quantity allegations: one kilogram, 

four kilograms, 10 kilograms, and 20 kilograms. (§ 11370.4, subd. (b)(1)–(4)).) 

With respect to count 2, it was alleged that the liquid methamphetamine 

exceeded 30 liters. (§ 11370.4, subd. (b)(1).) The charging documents also 

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Health & Safety 

Code.
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alleged, in connection with counts 1 and 2, that Magana was personally 

armed with six firearms. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c).) 

Before trial, defense counsel moved for a change of venue, arguing 

there were no criminal allegations with connections to San Diego County, and 

Los Angeles County offered a more appropriate venue because it was where 

the defendant resided, where witnesses and evidence were located, and where 

the crime occurred. At the hearing on the matter, Magana’s attorney argued 

that Evidence Code section 781 did not provide a basis for venue because 

there were insufficient preparatory acts in San Diego County to justify venue. 

The court concluded San Diego County was a proper venue because one 

of the preliminary acts was transporting the drugs from Tijuana to Los 

Angeles, necessitating travel through San Diego. The court noted that over 

99 percent of the methamphetamines entering Los Angeles were produced in 

Mexico, no drugs were produced from any other location, including the 

United States, and the drugs managed by Gomez and Bucio specifically were

entering through San Diego County; thus, there was a preponderance of 

evidence that there was a nexus with San Diego. 

Following trial in San Diego, a jury found Magana guilty of all four 

counts and found true the weapons allegations attached to counts 1 and 2. 

The court sentenced Magana to 14 years four months in prison. Defendant

timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

The prosecution bears the burden at trial of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence facts that establish venue in the county where 

the defendant is being prosecuted. (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 

1283 (Thomas).) We uphold the determination on appeal if there is some 
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evidence to support the finding. (Ibid.; People v. Chavarria (2013) 213 

Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369 (Chavarria).)

Generally, defendants are prosecuted in the venue in which the crime 

was committed. (Pen. Code, § 777.) However, Penal Code section 781 

permits a defendant whose alleged crime has occurred in two jurisdictional 

territories to be prosecuted in “any competent court within either 

jurisdictional territory.” Penal Code section 781 is liberally construed 

(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 202 (Posey)), and venue is proper in 

any county where “ ‘preparatory acts have occurred,’ ” even when those acts 

are not elements of the charged offense. (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 

p. 1284.) Courts have determined preparatory acts include stealing firearms 

in one county before shooting a victim in a different county (People v. Price 

(1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 385-386) and meeting victims in one county and making 

phone calls from there before killing the victims in another county (People v. 

Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 493-494).

Venue can also be based on “ ‘preparatory effects,’ ” or the effects of 

preparatory acts. (Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1285, 1286; Posey, supra,

32 Cal.4th at p. 202.) Thus, in a case like the one before us, venue is proper if 

“ ‘the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of’ 

defendant’s unlawful possession occurred in [San Diego] County.” (Thomas,

at p. 1284.) In Posey, the Supreme Court concluded venue was proper in 

Marin County based on preparatory effects. There, a police officer in Marin 

County paged the defendant in San Francisco, the defendant believed he was 

calling back the officer in Sonoma, and the defendant agreed to sell drugs in 

San Francisco, where the sale actually occurred. (Posey, at p. 220.) The court 

explained that even though the defendant may not have known he was 

placing a telephone call to Marin County, “venue turns on the presence or 
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absence, in a county, of acts or effects constituting the crime or requisite to 

the commission of the crime—not on the defendant’s state of mind or on the 

soundness of any beliefs that he or she might hold as to the location of those 

acts or effects.” (Id. at p. 221.)

The court in Chavarria likewise looked at the preparatory effects in 

determining venue. There, unlike in Posey, the defendant was not directly 

involved in the preparatory acts that formed the basis of venue. (Chavarria, 

supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1370-1371.) Several phone calls were 

exchanged between an informant in Ventura County and a third person in 

Los Angeles County for the sale of drugs in Los Angeles. (Id. at p. 1367.) 

Although the defendant did not initiate or participate in the phone calls 

between the informant and the third party, the appellate court nonetheless 

concluded that the conversation in which the drug sale was negotiated was a 

preparatory act that occurred in two counties, Ventura and Los Angeles, 

making each appropriate for prosecution. (Id. at pp. 1370-1371.) Even 

though the defendant was not directly involved in those preparatory acts, 

“[t]he drug sale of which appellant was convicted was negotiated by his 

accomplice over the phone with an individual who was physically present in 

Ventura County. But for that call, there could have been no sale. Because this 

constitutes some evidence sufficient to support the finding that preparatory 

acts or effects requisite to commission of appellant’s crimes took place in 

Ventura County, his motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue in that county 

was properly denied.” (Id. at p. 1371.) Penal Code section 781 does not 

require the acts or effects “ ‘requisite to the consummation of the offense’ ” to 

directly involve the charged defendant. (Chavarria, at p. 1371.) 

The question before us is whether there was “some evidence” of 

preparatory acts or effects in San Diego to justify venue in San Diego. 
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(Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283.) Magana argues there were not, 

primarily because there was no evidence of preparatory acts in San Diego, 

like drugs changing hands, stash houses, or phone calls. And he argues there 

were no effects from the drugs traveling through San Diego that would justify 

its imposition of venue. 

We disagree with Magana’s assessment of the evidence. While it is 

accurate that the People did not present evidence of stash houses in San 

Diego, there was some evidence of communication between members of the 

drug cell and couriers in San Diego. In particular, during the May 15 phone 

call intercepted by the DEA, Gomez conveyed to Bucio where, specifically, the 

courier transporting drugs was located in San Diego. In order to do that, the 

drug courier had to have communicated in some manner the load’s location to 

Gomez. Although Magana, like the defendant in Chavarria, was not directly 

involved in those conversations, as long as preparatory acts or their effects 

occurred in San Diego County, even without a defendant’s involvement, 

venue is proper. (Chavarria, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1370-1371.)

Magana also argues that no preparatory acts or effects occurred in San 

Diego because the drugs traveled directly from the border to Los Angeles and 

there is no evidence the specific drugs recovered from Magana’s home were 

those sent through San Diego. But because over 99 percent of all 

methamphetamines were created in Mexico super labs and the drugs had to 

move through San Diego County to get to Los Angeles, the act of transporting 

the drugs necessarily occurred in San Diego. Additionally, even if the courier 
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made no stops in San Diego County after passing through the port of entry,2

he certainly accessed San Diego resources by traveling either along the 

Interstate 5 or Interstate 15 corridors. Absent the drugs traveling through 

San Diego, Magana would not have had them in his possession; thus, there 

was some evidence of the preparatory acts or effects “ ‘requisite to the 

consummation of’ defendant’s unlawful possession.” (Thomas, supra, 53 

Cal.4th at p. 1284.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

2 Magana argues in both his opening brief and his reply that there was 

no evidence couriers stopped in San Diego because Agent Holley testified the 

drugs “came from the source, which is Tijuana, and [were] trafficked directly 

to [the house on] Horace [Avenue].” However, this exchange addressed 

whether the drugs were sourced to any other distributors outside the chain. 

Agent Holley did not specify whether drugs were transferred to new couriers 

in San Diego after passing through the San Ysidro port of entry or whether 

the drugs were carried all the way to Los Angeles by the same individuals 

who transported them across the border, only that the drugs went directly to 

Magana’s house. There is no question that drugs were seized in San Diego 

County at the port of entry, or that they traveled through San Diego before 

arriving at Magana’s property.